THE

LAND

WARFARE
PAPERS
No. 13

-APR 11_ 199Mw

OCTOBER 1992

00

Operational Logistics
and the Gulf War

00/
1~

By William G. Pagonis and Michael D. Krause

This do-==ment L
.ox pcbli

zelea..c

bkew

approvod

cmzd eaI* i

distzbutio is u21%limuu.

94-10470
A N,r Sam#*y Afts Papr
Published on Occasion by

TM IN811fTII OF
LAND WARFARE
ASSOCIATION OF THE
UNITE STATES ARMY

Arnglon.

Va___t

94

94__1

OPERATIONAL LOGISTICS AND THE GULF WAR

by
William G. Pagonis
and

hMichael D. Krause

F-I
SDist

DISTRIBUTION STAXEMM A, PER TEMON

colom J. LUNDEIL
AUSA/INSTITUTE OF LAND WARFARE
2425 WILSON BLVD
ARLIfiN, VA 22201 cG 4/11/94

ThO IOms
~ASSOCITION

Of LAW Wafa

OF TME UNrTE

AR

STATES ARMY

AN AUSA INSTITUTE OF LAND WARFARE PAPER

In 1988 the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) established within its
existing organization a new entity known as the Institute of Land Warfare. Its purpose is
to extend the educational work of AUSA by sponsoring scholarly publications, to incluoe
books, monographs and essays on key defense issues, as well as workshops and symposia.
A work selected for publication as a Land Warfare Paper represents research by the author
which, in the opinion of the editorial board, will contribute to a better understanding of a
particular defense or national security issue. Publication as an AUSA Institute of Land
Warfare Paper does not indicate that the Association of the United States Army agrees with
everything in the paper, but does suggest that the AUSA believes the paper will stimulate
the thinking of AUSA members and others concerned about important defense issues.
LAND WARFARE PAPER NO. 13, OCTOBER 1992
OPERATIONAL LOGISTICS AND THE GULF WAR
by

Wiliam G. Pagonis
and

Michael D. Krause
The pape rctnsets the personal opinios of the authrs an should not be takn
to represen: the views of the Department of the Army, the Departmnt of Defense, the

Institute of Land Warfare, the Association of the United States Army or its members.
Copyright 1992 by
the Association of the United States Army
(AUSA)

All rights reserved. No parts of this publication may be retps ,, stored in a

retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any mum, elecronic, machanicaL
photocopying, recording or otherwise, widiout the prior written pernission of the AUSA

Institute of Land Warfare, 2425 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, VA 22201.

quiies rearding this aW futre Land Warfar Papm should be directed to:
Assoiatiofthe United StatAmy, Instit of Lead W fm,2425 Wis Boulevad
ArlingtoVk&ia 22201,lepho 1400-336-4570, or(703) 841-4300. exnsion 320.
Ui

CONTENTS
Foreword ...........................................................................................................

Introduction ..........................................................................................................

The Framework of Operational Art ..........................................................................

Logistics of Forward-Deployed and Power-Projection Forces ............................. 5

Theater Setting and Objectives ............................................................................

Concept of Operations and Scheme of M aneuver .................................................

Intelligence and Deception ..............................................................................

10

Operational Fires ..................................................................................................

11

Reserves ...............................................................................................................

12

Comm and .......................................................................................................

13

Operational Logistics: Some Observations .......................................................

13

Bibliography ...................................................................................................

15

TM eAuthors ....................................................................................................

17

Illustrations

SaudiArabia ......................................................................................................

vi

Desert Shield: Major Supply Routes and Logistical Bases....

I
s'

__________________

_____-------------

-------

-----.-

........................

_____fr

FOREWORD

The Gulf War was underwritten by logistics. Building the Southwest Asia theater
infrastructure, deploying U.S. forces, sustaining the campaign and bringing the forces and
their materiel back home were major accomplishments. Key to Operations Desert Shield
and Desert Storm was the close coordination between the logistical and operational
commands and the commanders' ,understanding that logistics must dovetail with the
mission and concept of operations of the projected force.
Addressing the fundamentals of the operational art, LTG William G. ("Gus")
Pagonis, the theater logistical commander in the Gulf War, and his logistics plans chief,
Colonel Michael Krause, show how and why logistics must be part and parcel of the

operational concept. The theater mission, concept of operations and scheme of maneuver
are examined to bring out the criticality of logistics in effecting surprise and deception.
Concluding with a series of observations on the logistical operations of the war, the authors
make it clear that operational logistics will be critical in future power projections of U.S.
forces.
In the final analysis, this paper serves notice that the study of the operational art must
encompass an appreciation for operational logistics on a par with that usually accorded the
operations of combat formations.

Jack N. Merritt

Gcneral, US k Retired
President

I
October 1992

-U

cEr

cnl

~vi__

OPERATIONAL LOGISTICS AND THE GULF WAR

Introduction
In January 1991, one of the most successful wars in America's history commenced.
Logisticians overcame in an extraordinary way what General H. Norman Schwarzkopf,

the theater commander, called a "daunting tas!L" Logistics did three things: built the
theater infrastructure, sustained a victorious military campaign, and closed out the theater
of war by bringing personnel and materiel home. The discussion that follows is based on
the assumption that the reader is familiar with the Desert Storm campaign. Therefore,
details of tactical operations are omitted.
At the start of the war, General Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
spoke in simple terms: "We are going to cut it off and kill it." Put into a military context,
he revealed the operational concept for the upcoming campaign.
This paper provides a framework for discussing the role of operational logistics in

the ground phase of the Gulf War. It addresses the essential logistical differences between
forward-deployed forces and power-projection forces; the elements of operational art as

the connector between strategy and tactics; and logistics iu an operational setting in
Southwest Asia. The conclusions suggest considerations of operational logistics which
will be important in future deployments. Indirectly, closer Integration of logistics into
campaign planning, particularly the concepts of operations, maneuver and reserves, is

The Framewert of Operational Art

During the last decade or so, the United States Army has rediscovered operational
art. In this period, major dctrinal changes have been introduced, debated and reformulated. There has been a renaissance of hnking about the operational level of war and

operational am
Operational art is different from stae and tactics. It holds to a different logic.
The pepective of opefional art is diffeamt as well OpeW ional art is the connection
between th ainm of Matey and twa
Stias
ivolves die conduac of wafarve Wu

t
S

Wh* politcal and mAiy aims Whil tactis involva the oaduct of batt Wo
at desmoy do arny, opoaumea art conribuses tD the conduct of suaeg
by the achkvenetof ntay objectivsL tdiffUnfrtom awa bynothaviapapoitical
objectveovaIco

In the 19th
IMceny, Gomn

Field Mmashal Helmuth von Moltk ben to

diferetiae m g ilitary sftrateg, operatons and tactmics Hercogalid dhat sUraMg

_

__

_---- _

in war is inherently linked with the attainment of the political objective, and that operational
art defines military objectives which underpin the political objectives. His conduct of
operations - his practice of the operational art - has been studied ever since. German
usage and practice led to Russian-Soviet adoption of the operational art concept in the 20th

century. Rediscovery of the importance of the operational art for American and allied
forces is a consequence of the Cold War.
The dimensions of war change among strategy, operations and tactics. The
strategist aims at the enemy's center of gravity, be it a nation's will, the delicate seam of
an alliance or key resources. The operational center of gravity is the mass of enemy military

force and its command, control and communications.

At the tactical level, the tactician has a more limited perspective. Tactical
commanders are concerned with how to fight; operational commanders define where and

when to fight; and strategic commanders decide whether or not to fight

In tactics, maneuver and fires are mutually interdependenL At the operational level

maneuver and fires are used to unbalance the enemy and achieve momentum and tempo.
In tactics, intelligence is concerned with capabilities. At the operational level,
intelligence is concerned more with intentions. Deception is used by the tactical
conmander to hide forces. In the operational context, deception is used to hide intent and
cause the enemy to reveal his intent.
In operational art, the use of reserves is critical, but they are not the sane reserves
uncommitted ready force - thought of at the tactical leveL Reserves at the
operational level should be thought of as the future use of forces which may or may not
-an

be presently engagedL Also, at the operational level, logistics may be considered another
form of reserve. At the strategic level, force generation capability and logistics are the
reserves.
At Uh tactia level, logistics is used to affct the battle in progress. However,

ogistics at the operatinal level is more than susuaining the force. Logstics is part of the
commander's concept of operations and scheme of maneuver. Logistics adds synergism
to all of the cleentzs of opemtimal art and helps to underwrite campaigns.
At the swat&gic level, the cwminander looks toward the outcome of campairgs of
the wars a mam of xhhiwving policy objecdves. His tme hoizod
is distant. A the
operaetial level, the conunander also looks to the futne; he looks beyond the oucome
o(battle H is concrned with several moves ahead, indays, weeks andeven aonhs. The
tacticommander looks toward the ouscme of epi
anl battles in hbm.

The strategist fornmlats aims and penrates capabil es do opeational comrmmder reks Maiy of dit over mw thi taial
m c
mmai l orders imediam acon
in the&Mof baubl. OpadOmalrt involve a visaon of vny of action wch caruies out
the straegic objecdves.

_---------~~--------r

the previous discussion points out, operational art is composed of different

-As

perspectives. The elements of operational art - which ame essential to its understanding
outlined below. This framework is used in turn to measure operational logistics in
the Gulf War.
-are

Theater Setting: The strategic view of a theater of war holds to the political and
military objectives to be realized. The strategist sees the theater as a whole. He
views the nature of its geography and the general nature of military forces in the
theater. The operational commander holds to a different view-, he has to realize
certain military objectives. These objectives concern the capabilities ofthe opposing
military force, particularly the center of gravity of the opposing force, or its mass.
Th operational commander also looks to the geography of the theater in determining broad plans of action which will facilitate his concept of operations.
Objectives: Policy dominates the conduct of warfare. Prussian general and military

strategist Carl von Clausewitz reminds us: "Warfare is the continuation of politics
by other means." A nation-state's reason forgoing to war has a political and military

objective. The definition of national and political objectives and the determination
of the means to achieve them is strategy. The translation of military and political
objectives into military objectives in a theater of war is operational art.
Concept of Operations: What makes for a successful campaign? How does a
commander integrate and synchronize the diverse forces under his command and
direct them to carry out the mission? A commander thinks through the plan which

will accomplish the operational objective and in turn will realize the strategic goal
"'Tn concept must convey his intiat and insure unity of effort. TIe commander's
concept of operation is the composer's score used to orchestrate the entire conduct
of play. Above all, the concept must be based on clear objectives. T

commander

measures his vision within the stretched capacity of logistical operations.

IatInligemce the ability to see. This is not only what meets the eye but also the ability
to visualize the opponent's inten su~d capability. The cominnder who, in this

contest of wills, thinks through what his opponent's inteesw

and actions ae, the

conminder who does a hypothe.is of enemy intentions, will be bet"er prepared to

aciomplsh his own course olaction. A
a
may focus on answering these

questions: Where retheenesy'srer? Whencan they move? Doesthe coemy

focc comndhave a reserve? Nf mt. is &= an indiaon of main efort which

can Mcali th reaion
of fbices in f-nuteu?
ig
Deai o: the ability to fool and notto be fooled. Deception is best when itcauses
the oppoeM o convince himself of thctauinty of his own actiom it is best when
is not merely "cover and concealm=t"
Dm
choice [ceptin
it causes him to
Dacptio alms at causing susprise and creating ambiguity.

'
_

_-

Manesar: This is more than just movement. It is a concept of the integrated use
of various forces and functions to unhinge the enemy. Maneuver creates leverage

which generates opportunity. Concepts of operation trnslated into schemes of

maneuver present the opponent with difficult and unwanted choices which are key
in the creation of leverage. Maneuver uses all aspects of the application of force and
involves the combination of fires, movement and reserves.
Operatknal F',e This elerent involves the integrated application of land, sea
and air firepower to attain an objective. But operational fires are notjust the massed
application of artillery and air or naval supporting fires; rather, it is the application
of fires on critical components of the enemy which cause him to quit. This is not
just"fire and movement" writ large; rather, it is an understanding of the combination
of speed of movement with delivery of fires. The concentration of fires can create
leverage.
Remerves: The strategist generates them, the operational commander creams them
through future capabilites, and the tactical commander has them at the ready. In
each case, reserves are critical to the outcome of the war, the campaign and the
battle. Forces in reserve placed at the right time and place, created from extant or
generated forces, c n decide the outcome of a campaign.
Operational Logsbtcs Logistics provides the ability to mass combat power. It
is a way of structuring a battle, campaign or strategic setting. It is calculated to

cream

possbilitis

fforfuforc utilization. Logistics determines how, when and

whew the force arrives in a theater; where and when combat power can be massed.

Lo4gistics .admwrites dohoe

p~ of qirau
-h
aI d scem of(Ein

ve and

is the fulcrum upon which leverage can be crenat

Command: This elm involves the wieth

ogy for the inegaed, orcbh-

rated and synchronizmd application of force. T cm

er is a compose and
conductw, he is a ce player playing nulsipl ganos on diffrt
board The
-

commandkr smast have vision, purpe bala and crncr maio TChmWnnicaioofecnmnm's innmt
ough sinl, crhp, co- -dictk
may be the kcy to a scessfl cawfaign. Cmnaud and operadoAl ut bing the

logW and persectve of fthawe warfare and the conduct of cam~pgs togettr
This framewor of operational art can he used to measmr operatisal loistics in
the Ouff War. lTk ==s of fan=u to be employed imut also be weighd inudesan
fth role of operational logstcs

Logistis of Forward-Deployed and Power-Projection Forces

Inherent in the difference between power-projection and forward-deployed forces
is the maturity of the theater. In a theater where forces are forward deployed, the
infrastruc-ture of the theater is known and their use is well planned. The logistical readiness
of forward-deployed forces enables those forces to roll out of their different bases and
deploy into combat Sustainment supplies, reser/e stocks and spare sets of equipment are
prepositioned with the forward-deployed force. A forward-deployed force is familiar with
road, rail, aerodromes, ports and infrasucture that have been used numerous times in
peacetime rehearsals. Contracts for services and supplies are established and exercised.
Communications - telephone and radio- are well established, with satellite relay where

necessary. All aspects of the logistical movement of forces 4d their sustainment and
control would be known, rehearsed and in readiness. Little would be unknown in the
logistical world, including that of the enemy.
This is not necessarily true in the power projection of forces. The thedate of war and
theater of operations may have only very recently entered the planning horizon. The
theater may not have any U.S. forces near it or on the ground. The logistical in
cture
- the ports, rail, road, airports, telecommunication system- may be known only by study
conducted from afar. The plethora of things that go with living in a place where you expect
to fight will simply not be there. Everything, including fuel, food, amnmunition, transportation, communications equipment and maps, has to be brought with the force being
projected into the theater. A thousand questions will be left unanswered. Will there be
off-loading ramps at the aercromes? What types of cranes are available in the ports? How

much water can be provided? Are there military-specification or compatible fuN and oil?
Whatpersml hygieneaeilities are there? Cm aninflux oftroops- at surge rates of 5,000
a day - be accommodated? Where will soldiers live, sleep, eat, work, shower and go to
the bathroom? Can a force coming from a distinctly different climate function? How long
will it take for soldiers' equipment to arrive? What of cultural, religious and societal
differences? How will soldiers be received into an entirely different culture? These
questions
in the broadest sense - indicate the potential unknown nature of the theat
-

logistical infrastrctr and critical shortfalls which may confrout a power-projection

force.
In powaprojuecion, the eraionalcommander-thetheaterconmander-in-chief
-is consaimed by ft segicaspc tsoflogisic How much air- and saMtis available
and how muich tine is available? The national-kle decisionmnke- willbe advised obow
flmuch lift to maki available by doing a risk analysis. If sqpeed is of the essee, emergency
authority from the presdit may be nruix

d for allocation of civilian aircraft and ships.

The nezt dextson point invlvs the ris to be taken in projecting into the thiatorcombat
forc versus logistical or cunbet servie support
Strategic
ameiay
d

ite

deploymen

Afin

comIba forcII

Theater Setting and Objectives

Application of force in a theater is underwritten by logistics. The nature of the

theater will determine the nature of the logistical support. Logistics at the strategic level
involves determining how the force gets to the theater, what materiel it will bring, and how
fast it gets into the theater, this is essentially a strategic movement problem. At the

operational level, logistics must be in consonance with the logic of the operational concept.
The logistics applications in Southwest Asia can be measured through use of the
operational framework described above.
The strategic objectives of the Gulf War articulated by President Bush were to: free

the western hostages held by Iraq; defend Saudi Arabia; liberate Kuwait; and destroy
weapons of mass destruction so as to increase the stability of the region.
General Schwarzkopf, the theater commander, used these strategic objectives to
focus on the military objective to destroy the Iraqi military force. General Schwarzkopf

postulated the center of gravity of Iraqi forces to be two-fold: the Republican Guard core, well-equipped forces which supported the regime of Saddam Hussein - and the
command and control infrastructure used by Saddam Hussein to control his military forces.
Hence, the objective of the Central Command's theater campaign was to destroy the Iraqi
force after crippling Saddam Hussein's centralized command, control and communications.
The first objective for General Schwarzkopf was to deter the Iraqi force from

invading Saudi Arabia. This was, after all, in consonance with the strategic military mission
to defend the oil-rich nation. Saddamn Hussein's forces in Kuwait, after occupation of this
small sheikdom, could have continued their offensive down the Saudi Arabian coastal
"highwayaiming for the port of Dannam. The port of Jubail and oil-producing areas would
have fallen into Iraqi hands.
What deterred Iraq from continuing the invasion? At this stage we do not know
except to point out that the application of power-projectiom. forces - the quick response
of naval, air and ground forces - evidently made Saddam Hussein think twice about
continuing his offensive. It may be that he never intended to invade Saudi Arabia. It may
be that he caklculat the effects of exposure of the long logistical tail of his forces to allied
intwrdtion. Certainly the use of allied naval and ground-based attack aircraft would have

had significant effect on die ability of Iraqi ground forces. But this is speculation.
What is imown is this: The fu application of strafte mobility - the staging of
air, naval and ground formces into the theater - accomplished the defentse mission.
Distames were h-rnese - 8,000 miles by air and more than 10,000 miles by sea.
The sftaugi lift was fmh engpaged by activation of the civilian air reserve fleet and the
militarsearft reserve fleet. Over 10,000 air sories and more than 500 ships brought the

force to thea,ter. TiM waS a ctCafactr

hs.hp
6

which

tined
_

critical initial buildup items - ammunition, water purification equipment, port handling
equipment and other logistical materiel - facilitated this process.
The incoming force used the existing airports of Dhahran, Riyadh and, to a lesser
extent. King Khalid Military City (KKMC). At these airports, the problem became how
to receive, stage and move forward the soldiers and airmen coming into the theater. A
national command authority decision to first send in combat forces made the logistical
effort more difficult. In fight of this decision, early-arriving theater logisticians recognized
the need to use host nation support to the utmost.
The host nation, Saudi Arabia, offered to meet the force's basic needs - food,
water, fuel and shelter. But providing for the simple needs of 540,000 personnel was an
immense undertaking. Organization of what would be provided by the Saudi government
became a first priority. In-theater transportation already existed due to the large number
of civilian trucks used in Saudi Arabia for construction and transport. Trucks of all
description, but particularly heavy equipment transporters, were contracted for the
buildup of the theater infrastructure and later for the sustainment of the ground campaign.
Logistics at the operational level was defined by the nature of the theater and the
military objectives. These were conditioned by the factors of time and space and the need
first to deter and then to fight. These conditions underwrote the buildup of the theater
infrastructure and reliance upon host nation support.
(ROMEO)

(HOTEL)

(OSCAR)*

E.RSIIA(G
GU)LF.

MILES

E RGA

H400MILES

md Lqogka Sam
Dust Shdld: M8Jr Supply Roft an

Concept of Operations and Scheme of Maneuver

General Schwarzkopf explained his concept of operations in a news briefing shortly
after the victorious ground campaign. His concept was predicated on building up ,he force,
first to deter the enemy from attacking (thereby gaining time) and then to defend. Each
day won time and gave credibility to deterrence. Tume and deterrence also gained logistical
advantage. As the buildup continued, the logistical advantage figured prominently in the
evolving concept of operations for the campaign. Next would come an offensive option.
Schwarzkopf's concept of operations: First, blind the enemy; if the enemy could not
see, he could not position his force to counter the allied blow. Next, have the enemy think
the allied forces were coming where he expected them to come: an assault from the Persian
Gulf into Kuwait, along with a land assault against the main Iraqi positions in occupied
Kuwait, and a flanking attack via the Wadi al Batin to try to get around these positions.
Let him fool himself into thinking what he was disposed to think in the first place. Use the
air campaign to blind and cripple his command, control, communications and intelligence
mediums, threaten an amphibious assault, attack the main Iraqi positions to hold them in
place, and then use the agility and punching power of two corps to outflank Iraqi forces.
This would cut off and destroy the much vaunted Iraqi Republican Guard forces, the
operational reserves of the Iraqi army.
This commander's concept was predicated on two logistical concepts: first, to build
logistical bases which could support two corps firom forward locations (the distances from
the coastal ports and airbases - more than 350 miles - made these bases a prerequisite

for ground operations); and second, to move two corps which were malpositioned. (The
XVRI Airborne Corps to the east and the VII Corps to the west had to change positions.)
These two logistical tasks, daunting in themlves, had to be done without leaving tracks
in the desert.
General Schwarzkopf s concept depended upon having the enemy fool himself. The
logistical buildup of forward logistical bases, far to the west of the Wadi al Batin, even to
the west of King Khalid Military City and to the west of any combat forces, could be Sen
The solution was not to start the buildup until the air campaign had blinded the Iraqis.
Hence, the westward movement of supplies for the two corps could not start until the

blinding had wod.A Then, while the buildup was ongoing during the aerial assault, the
movement of the two corps to their forma

tactical positions could take plc under the

air umbrella. General Schwarzkops concept was predicated on logistics not revealing
his inHtUM While logistical fmrward bases were crucial to support the corps and the

Mnovemeaofte twocorps was aneMeSity, thgeC Imeishnuatoff

te bases and movement
inident therto could be detectd and would signal intent

In fbt, the building of the fcrward logistical bae and tde wetward movement o(
td tw coMr --croang tem in fte mceus- was so inmdiblean undeaklng that
aied commanders initially did not believe it could be done.

On December 27, 1990, the Secretary of Defense and the chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff were-briefed on the-concept of p
ons by General Schwarzkopf in
Riyadh. After General Schwarzkopf explained his "end-run concept," the commanders
from the two Army corps, the Marines, the Air Force and the 22d Support Command
(SUPCOM) presented their respective plans, in broad conceptual terms, to support the
flanking movement. The logistical plans paid particular attention to the crossing of the two
corps and the building of forward logistical bases to the west.
Toward the end of the briefing, General Schwarzkopf indicated that nothing was to

move until after the January 15 expiration of the United Nations deadline for redeployment
of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. When a head start on the movement to get log bases in place
was requested, General Schwarzkopf spoke bluntly: "That's not possible. The entire plan
hinges on surprise and deception. If you start relocating your log bases tomorrow, we'd
run a great risk of being detected. Hussein would shift his defenses westward. Or worse,
he'd order his forces to attack before the deadline and preempt our strategy."
He concluded, "What we need to know is exactly how long it will take to get those
log bases out there, in position to support the flanking maneuver, assuming you started
moving out on 16 January.... We'll meet again on Saturday [December 29] to discuss a
revised plan to accommodate these new goals."
The logisticians went back to the drawing board. After frantic efforts a revised plan

was taken to Riyadh and, on December 29, the requested briefing took place. The briefing
followed the format of the earlier briefing, with General Schwarzkopf's introduction
including the comment that the president had been briefed on the end-run plan. The
commander's staff representatives presented their plans. Most of these included more
log ticalsupporlthancoukd be provided. The zeviuad2l-day logistics plan neededto build
the log bases and move the corps was then presented.
"This briefing of the logistics plan was a turning point. The other commanders rallied
to the 22d SUPCOM's support, sensing that, if all worked together, the logistical effort
would succeed. Almost as a sidebar, General Schwarzkopf reflected that if his commanders wo skepdcal about the plausibility of the logistical effort in supporting the concept

of operaions, the enemy would be skeptical as well. In shat the magnitude of effort
required to suppo the westward flank attack - -the end run"-- served the deception
neds.
The sequence was detailed planning and then movenmat. For 18 critical days, 18-

wheekes were transpming combat equipment and mnaerieL passing one point on the
wetward road every minute, every hour, 24 hours a day. Iberwvenent was stagging.
By Fer
2ok *ac" ofthe mclps was in position and the logistical forward bases stocked

to th ecamey 1W4WL

Mccentralconceptof mamnvr was to s*vwp t

this was ktimately tied to achieving operational

hinsf hbo

ikkis dhtha wsn

western flanL Aswehaveseen,

rpris.

Hence the enenmy had to fool

n swep was all but bmposasiL

The malpositioned corps - XVIII Airborne in the east and VII Corps in the westhad to be repositioned. Further, elements of the VII Corps would continue to arrive from
Europe until the beginning of the campaign. As if the movement and log base building were

not enough for the logisticians to accomplish in support of the scheme of maneuver, the
force had to be modernized. The incoming forces had to exchange their Abrams M I tanks,
which had 105mm guns, for MIAIs with 120amm guns and better chemical and armor
protection. On top of this, the incoming VII Corps equipment was European forest green.
This would not do in the desert; therefore, equipment was painted desert camouflage tan.
In short, there was much to do before the scheme of maneuver could be carried out.
Modernization, painting, transport and log base construction had to be accomplished.
Mobility was the key. This meant high combat systems readiness. Complete
factory-to-foxhole integrated maintenance and distribution was practiced. The Army
Materiel Command and other commands and agencies were directly involved in helping
to achieve the highest readiness to date.

Intelligence and Deception

Logistics reveals capability as well as intent.
During the American Civil War, the published news accounts of Union nonbattle

casualties per thousand allowed General Lee to know the exact size of General Hooker's
Army of the Potomac before the Chancellorsville campaign. The movement of supplies
particularly bargeloads of food - on the main supply route from Washington down to
Aquia Harbor by Fredericksburg revealed the buildup of Hooker's planned offensive.
-

Similarly, at the national intelligence level, the Iraqi logistical buildup revealed their
intent to invade Kuwait. All the signposts were there. National-level intelligence analysis
indicated as much but was not given credence until the event.
With respect to Desert Shield preparations, news reports from the theater and
Pentagon-level briefings did not hint at the magnitude of the logistical effort required to
pull off the iestwud movement. The buildup in the ports and auports could be seen by
the enemy. T7e movemnt of forms into the eaern provinces of Saudi Arabia could be

followed. The positioning of even one brigade to King Khalid Military City occasioned
a repositioning of Iraqi forcs to the west and frth:r deployment of forces to westrn
Kuwait and southern Iraq to prevent a flanking maneuver around the Wadi &lBtn

How do you preclude the Ir&is from oboaning uIli

regardmi millions of
aom ot msupMs and nMtuIs? How do you " lo dtcs? At operaolal lvel, it is
kupmwaf ms to revedhal
tu to the m y. Lostics can rveal kntnd action by
tefleu i dtI bulkhip at farcspartcululy Ifawprla IseasentlaL, and surprise wastbie
bmy to Sbara .`kol's
weMr flankinog ffev. Log base -if built too soon- would
rval his conoept of operations.
ftef
logistcs had to be an integral pt of the

- --

Son
t

the questio of "hding" loitis the.bestapproach was to stay in the Saudi

eastern province, to use existing facilities in the east and KKMC only sparingly, to disperse
and wait, and only after the beginning of the air campaign to move logistics westward.
During the buildup of the force, logistic base Bastogne was bruilt for the XVIID
Airborne Corps. When the VII Corps was added, log base Alpha was constructed. But
General Schwarzkopf's decision to surprise the enemy with the western sweep meant no
other log bases would be constructed. This meant constrction of log bases Bravo, Echo
and Charlie would have to await the start of the air campaign. The need for surprise

the need to fool the opponent-- had a definitive logistical component. Again General
Schwarzkopf reasoned that if his commanders thought the logistical task daunting, then

the enemy would think so as well Therefore, logistical tracks in the sand could not be
allowed until the opponent was blinded.
The extent of this deception was not known back in the United States. Even highly
classified briefings in the Army's Pentagon war room - the operations center - kept the
force position and their logistical bases in the eastern province until after the beginning of

the ground campaign.

The other question related to intelligence and deception was the logistical supportability of the western flanking move. Could it be done? Could two malpositioned corps
be crossed and repositioned at the same time the logistical bases were being constructed?
4
questions were answered in the 22d Support Command logistical plan, which
worked out detailed movement schedules for the transportation of the two corps and the
shipment of supplies and nmaeriel for the logistical bases. It took longer than originally
plamned; two weeks became three. One reason, therefore, for the stretching of the air

campaign from two to three weeks was the time needed to position the corps and build up
the logistical bases.

OperatiooWa Fares
Th planned initial massive use of arlery and

uiei launcih rocket systems

requird significant tonnage of amnmiion well fdrward. Tw first probiem was to ge

mor than 40,000 tns of ammunito into the ater. The second was to get it forward
to enable the tacal numuver units to have battalion-level artillery diret fire aupr

TmkdcW fires to support gmund maneumv unl is generally understood, but

opires
Om are
for mocorqiz. Thew flies are ued to support the s !h1F of
maneve. Inthe sert
ia f m
,
were
carried out jointly. Naval Tomahawk
csnin mifles .akeud
wd
Air Forc A-ID and odwim adcal ah rad ad Army rotary

.4 blad the enem,

fwiosa
awres apph
Cpeadonal logistc had to supy fth necesay ammunltio. This meant moving large
I of so mw~v qvki to d f ph=e at do A t
domort. totimWs q

,i

vouea~nl seeds

11__

__

Anmmnition at forward log bases became mobile, which caused a problem at the
tactical ,units. Combat formations retained a great number of the uploaded trailers,
preventing them from being reused for a return trip, thus causing a shortage in trailers. This
was also true of fuel tankers, where the same problem of withholding f-.I traiers applied.
Transportation capability was limited, though thousands ofcontractor vehicl-s were hired.
This meant that some tactical units operated at the edge of the logistical envelope.
Additional forward logistical bases were planned in Iraq. However, because of the

fast-paced nature of the ground campaign, these planned forward log bases were never
formally set up. Instead they became mtller transfer points for key elements of supply,
particularly ammunition and fuel.

Mobility was central to the resupply of ammunition. In turn, operational fires were
key to breeching the Iraqi lines, blinding them and destroying their will to resist Who will
forget the application of massive operational fires on a highway north of Kuwait City?

Reserves
Reserves at the operational level involve the planned use of force in a future time
frame. This means the commander must visualize using presentlyengaged forces forfuture

missions - all at the decisive place and at the right time. The same is true in the ability
ofoperationallogistcs to create reserves. Operational logistics gave General Schwarzkopf s
concept of operations the capability to use the First Cavalry Division in a demonstration
role up the Wadi al Batin, then rearm, refuel, reenergize and contribute to the combat

power of the Vl Coqnp

Operational logistics provided for planned reconstitution of units. Standby tank
crews, s~adby vehicle drivers and provisional units for forward area support constituted

planned reinforcements as needed by the operation commander.

Logistics at its best allows the operational commander to mass his combat power

for dedisve atim. When needed, logistics creates reserves through the ue of materiel
and peWsonnel to create or reconstitute units where needed.

In the redeployment hrom the theater, reserve continued to play key role The
opeaional commander's repnsb. fioir the campaign did am end with the cease-fim.
&ecoasmd to have mission
for thbe
-teand specified tat all ground
cown~omt would leave within the shaora possible time. Use of logisical reere
Puriculady units of th, Anay's mum coaqnwmu, nmotehs
e for possible.

I1

Command
Command at the operational level focuses principally on insuring unity of effort. The

operational commander apportions this effort through correlation among theater-peculiar

needs, weaving them into his concept of operations to support attainment of the objective.
One critical innovation by General Schwarzkopf was to give one-stop logistical
command responsibility. He vested operational logistics command in the 22d Support
Command. The theater logistician spoke for the logistical needs of the theater and focused
on supporting the unique campaign plan.
Within the theater support command, command was centralized for plans and

operations but decentralized in execution. This permitted concentration of effort. Total

communication in the entire command through innovative and imaginative management
was accomplished by the use of both old and new techniques. (The ability to communicate
at every level with the conmanding general using 3x5 cards was unique. This simple and
effective medium allowed a private's ideas to come to the commander immediately.)
Situation briefings and thorough reviews took place daily. Replication of this command
medium in the forward area at KKMC during the war itself was another innovation. A third
aspect of communication was the continual daily logistical situation report faxed and
transmitted up the chain of command and going directly to the theater commander and

Department of the Army operations center. Telephone consultations between the theater
and logistical commanders and the supporting Army staff back home took place daily.

Opeationu

Laogis Som Observal

Statistics are part of the story of operational logistics. More than 117,000 wheeled

vehicles and 12,000 tanks and armored vehicles were deployed and redeployed. Half of
these vehicles and other items ofequipment had to be repainted indesertcamouflage. More
than 1,700 helicopters, 41,000 cargo containers and 350,000 tons of unexpended
ammimition were hauled to the theater and eurned in over 500 ships and 10,000 aircraft
sorties. Over95 millim meals were served and 2.5 billion gallons of fuel consumed. Mail

for the 540,000 sokloies, airmen, miarines and sailors reached staggering proportions 38,000 tons, enough to cover 21 football fields eight feet high. More than 5,000

depaMun and cmtrmor civilians were deoploye

Some observations on operaional logisc are in order: Strategic lift woked, but
more airliftad
seafMtshipsare needed. lift and mobility ae key. The ability to obtain

the support of vehicles of all despions. but piulaly heavy euipment Masportas.

was
dcal. The fa, water, food, shelter amd
pmvided by the Sa"
govame wr
ticadl Nf this support had to be brought to ft theatr, the problems
woulM have been much m1re drifficlt.

13_

Operational planning at a centralized level facilitated execution at the right time and
place. Contractor support, deployment of military department civilians and host nation
support were significant aspects of operational logistics. The use of a theater army area
command structure (the 22d Support Command) and a theater single integrated logistics
focus were consistent with the operational ar.
There was not enough materiel handling equipment to do the job. A source of heavy
equipment transporters should be part of planning for future operational logistics use.
Truckstops/convoy support centers for resting, refueling, feeding and maintaining the
vehicle force and the forward support coordinator concepts should be part of logistical
doctrine. Infrastructure planning for resource management, contract support and host
nation capabilities should be part of theater fast forward-deployment capability. Further,
a cell of logisticians should be available at a moment's notice for any future contingency
deployment Allied logistics efforts must be fully integrated into operational logistics.
The theater commander's concept of operation and scheme of maneuver were
cormunicated to the theater logistical command. Within the logistical command, planning

accounted for how each support element would fit into the concept and the scheme of
maneuver. Rapid and innovative communications flow insured that problems became
solutions. Problems which needed high-level help- from the Washington command post,
the Army Materiel Command or the Defense Logistics Agency - were made known
quickly and acted upon.
Operational logistics in the Gulf War showed the value of the total force. Individual
reservists and units were mobilized from the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve

amd filled cnic roles in the mretiwm, frwmd mwement mad s

ofthe force.
During the logistical support of the ground war, the integrated logistical force supported
the campaign. In the redeployment of the force, again the nation's reserves played a crucial
role.
"Forget logistics and you lose" is an apt expression attributed to the VII Corps

or,
LTG Fredrick FnkLs. Most importantly, lostics at the operational level
is an kgW pet of the concept of operations Operational logistics is the foundation for
sucesful operaional planning and execution.
(eaeu Schwazkopf rempned therole of logist when he said,
c*m faced a undtles and pulled off a s
cular msn
"

1e logsti-

BiDU OGRAPliY
McGrath, John J. and Krause, Michael D.
(unpublished manuscript, 1992).

Theater Logistics and the Gulf War

Pagonis, LTG Widliam G. Moving Mountains: Lessons in LeadershipandLogisdicsfrom

the GuLf War. Camnbridge Mass: Harvard Business School Press, 1992.
Pagonis, LTG WilliamG. and Krause, Colonel Michael D. "Tbeater Logistics and the Gulf
War," Army Logistician,July/August 1992, 3-8.
Pagonis, LTG William G. and Krause, Colonel Michael D. "Observations Won Gulf War

Logistim" Army Logiscan, SepteberOctober 1992,4-11.

22d Support Command. After Action Report. Atlanta, Ga.: Third Army, 1992, 18
volumes. (Most primary source documentawon can be found consolidated in that report.
copies of which are contained, along with the other source nmtmial listed below, in the
Desert Shield/Storm Archives kept by the U.S. Army Center of Military History in
Washington, D.C.)
ARCENT Forward Support Command. Operation Plan 91-5, "SWA Army Prposition Plan," 15 April 1991.

ARCENT Support Command (Provisional) Assistant Chief of Staff - Host Nation

Activities. "Historical Report 7 August-22 September 1990," 2 October 1990.
ARCENT Support Command. Operations Plan 91-1.12 November 1990.
ARCENT Support Commnd. Operations Plan 91-2,"Combined OPLAN for the
Defense and Restoration of Kuwait" 15 f
1991.

ARCENT Support Command (Prool).

"Logisics Plaing Cel
Lxarned/fflc Flow," 25 Septemer 1990.
Caffmin Joint (zeft of Staf M"Smnmd
Deatilae," 1I July 1991.

COMUSARCENT. Opeuains Pln Operat

DSER S
2

"SWA P

i-

Lessoas
Decis

Desert Strm 001, 5 January 1991.

Rm" 1991.

22d SupWCmn
-dSMr

Cemmmd Operatln DESERT SHOED

andDESERTSTORM Svmwayof Key Sodd.

is

12
Jue991.

22d Support ComnnanL "Command Report Operation Desert Shield," 23 March

1991.
22d Support Command. "Command Report: Operation Desert Storm, 17 January15 March 1991," 5 April 1991.

22d Support Command. Operations Order 91-2, "Desert Storm Phase m (Ground
Attack)," 24 February 1991.
22d Support Conmmand. Operations Order 91-4, "Desert Farewell (Redeployment)," 18 March 1991.

22d Support Comnuad Assistant Chief of Staff for Resource Management.

"-CommadReport for Operation Desert Shield," 23 February 1991.
22d Support Command, Deputy Commnanding General for Materiel and Serviem
"Command Report for 21st TAACOM," 28 February 1991.

U.S. Army Matriei Con

Storm," 31 March 1991.

d. "C.ommand Report, Operation Desert Shied/

THE AUTHORS
Lieutenant General William G. Pagonis, USA. is the conmmanding general, 21st
Theater Army Area Command, in Kaiserslautem, Germany, and was commanding general
of the 22d Support Command and theater logistics conumander, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia,
from August 1990 to January 1992. He is a graduate of Pennsylvania State University,
the Army Command and General Staff College and the Naval War College. He has
published extensively on logistics, transportation, managenent and leadership. His book,
Moving Mountains: Lessons in Leadership andLogistics from the Gulf War, was just
published by Harvard Business School Press.

Colonel Michael D. Krause, USA ReL, served as chief of logistcal plans for the 22d
Support Command, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. He is the former Deputy Chief of Mlilitary
History, Washington, D.C. A graduate of Norwich University, he holds A4A and PhD
degrees from Georgetown University. He is also a graduate of the Array Command and
General Staff College and the National War College. He has writien a two-volume
anthology titled On OperationalArt: Oriins,Evolution, andApplication and Theater
Logistics and the Gutf War, both accepted for publication in 1993.