People vs Paniterce

GR No. 186382
April 5, 2010
Article 1157 of the New Civil Code
FACTS:
The appellant, Domingo Paniterce, was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes of Rape and Acts of Lasciviousness. That sometime in 1997, the accused
with grave abused of confidence being the father of the victim with lewd designs by
means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously succeed in having carnal knowledge with his 10 years old daughter,
against her will and without her consent.
However, during the pendency of the case, the accused died at prison. A copy of the
death certificate was given to the court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the civil liability of the accused pending appeal is extinguished upon
his death.
HELD:
No. Death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and
only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense
committed. The claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of (the)
accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than
delict.
Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from
which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) Crimes or Acts or Omission Punished by law
e) Quasi-delicts
Hence, where the civil liability survives, an action for recovery therefor may be
pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action to be enforced either
against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the
source of obligation upon which the same is based.

Maniago vs. Court of Appeals

253 SCRA 674
February 20, 1996
Article 1161
FACTS:
Petitioner Ruben Maniago was the owner of shuttle buses which were used in
transporting employees of the Texas Instruments, (Phils.), Inc. from Baguio City
proper to its plant site at the Export Processing Authority. In 1990, one of his buses
figured in a vehicular accident with a passenger jeepney owned by private
respondent Alfredo Boado. As a result of the accident, a criminal case for reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property and multiple physical injuries against
petitioners driver, Herminio Andaya.
A month later, a civil case for damages was filed by private respondent Boado
against petitioner Maniago.
Petitioner moved for the suspension of the proceedings in the civil case against him,
citing the pendency of the criminal case against his driver and because no
reservation of the right to bring it (civil case) separately had been made in the
criminal case. But the lower court denied petitioners motion on the ground that
pursuant to the Civil Code, the action could proceed independently of the criminal
action.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondent may bring an action for damages against
petitioner, despite the absence of reservation.
HELD:
No. As a general rule, reservations must be made to institute separately all civil
actions for the recovery of civil liability, otherwise they will be deemed to have been
instituted with the criminal case.
Article 1161 of the New Civil Code expressly provides that civil obligations arising
from criminal offenses shall be governed by the penal laws, subject to the provisions
of Article 2177. Under Article 2177, responsibility for fault or negligence under the
preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from
negligence under the Penal Code.
In other words the right of the injured party to sue separately for the recovery of the
civil liability whether arising from crimes (ex delicto) or from quasi delict under Art.
2177 of the Civil Code must be reserved otherwise they will be deemed instituted
with the criminal action

Roman Catholic Bishop of Jaro vs Gregorio De la Pea, administrator of the

late Fr. De la Pena
26 Phil. 144
November 21, 1913
Topic: Article 1163
FACTS:
Sometime in 1898, Fr. De la Pea assigned a trustee of the sum of Php6, 641.00 for
the charitable purposes. In the same year, he deposited in his personal account
Php19, 000.00 in the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank at Iloilo. During the war, Father
De la Pea was arrested by military authorities as a political prisoner. His bank funds
were confiscated as the military authorities thought that the funds were for
revolutionary purposes.
The Roman Catholic Bishop of Jaro brought action against the appellant, Gregorio de
la Pea, who was the administrator of the property of the deceased Fr. Agustin de la
Pea to recover the sum of P6, 641 in the Court of First Instance in Iloilo. The CFI of
Iloilo awarded the plaintiff P6, 641 with interest at the legal rate from the beginning
of action, thus this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Fr. De la Pea and his trustee are liable for the loss of the bequest
money by placing it in his personal bank of account.
HELD:
No, Fr. De la Pea and his trustee, Gregorio, are not liable for the loss of the bequest
money.
Although Article 1163 of the New Civil Code discusses that a person obliged to give
something is also bound to preserve it with the diligence pertaining to a good father
of a family, it is also stated under Article 1174 that no one shall be liable for
events which could not be foreseen, or which having been foreseen were inevitable,
with the exception of the cases expressly mentioned in the law or those in which
the obligation so declares..
Fr. De la Pea was not responsible for the loss of the amount in question since the
confiscation of the funds by the military authorities were unforeseen events. He
cannot be held liable for negligence since we cannot measure if he was indeed
negligent in depositing the funds in his bank account or if he deposited it in a

separate account. No law prohibited him from depositing the amount as he did and
no law changed his responsibility because of that act.

Equatorial Realty Dev't Inc. vs Mayfair Theater Inc.

GR No. 106063
November 21, 1996
Topic: Article 1165
FACTS:
Carmelo & Bauermann, Inc. owned a land, together with two 2-storey buildings at
Claro M. Recto Avenue, Manila, and covered by TCT No. 18529.
Sometime in 1967, Carmelo leased its parcel of land with 2-storey building to
respondent, Mayfair Theater Inc. 2 years later, Mayfair entered into a Second Lease
with Carmelo for another portion of the latters property.
Both leases contained a clause giving Mayfair a right of first refusal to purchase the
subject properties. Sadly, on July 30, 1978 - within the 20-year-lease term -- the
subject properties were sold by Carmelo to Equatorial Realty Development, Inc. for
eleven million smackers, without their first being offered to Mayfair.
As a result of the sale of the subject properties to Equatorial, Mayfair filed a
Complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Manila for the rescission of the Deed of
Absolute Sale between Carmelo and Equatorial, specific performance, and damages.
RTC decided in favor of the petitioner. CA reversed and ruled for Mayfair. Hence this
appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale of property to Equatorial is valid.
HELD:
No. The sale of the property should be rescinded because Mayfair has the right of
first refusal. Both Equatorial and Carmelo are in bad faith because they knew of the
stipulation in the contract regarding the right of first refusal.

The stipulation is a not an option contract but a right of first refusal and as such the
requirement of a separate consideration for the option, has no applicability in the
instant case. The consideration is built in the reciprocal obligation of the parties. In
reciprocal contract, the obligation or promise of each party is the consideration for
that of the other. (Promise to lease in return of the right to first refusal)
With regard to the impossibility of performance, only Carmelo can be blamed for not
including the entire property in the right of first refusal. Court held that Mayfair may
not have the option to buy the property. Not only the leased area but the entire
property.

Megaworld vs. Tanseco

GR No. 181206
October 3, 2009
Topic: Article 1169
FACTS:
Megaworld and Tanseco entered into a Contract to Buy and Sell a condominium at a
pre-selling project, The Salcedo Park. The purchase price was P16, 802, 037.32,
the installment payment of which was provided in the contract. A balance of P2,
520, 305.63 shall be paid on October 31, 1998, the stipulated delivery date of
the unit.
A construction schedule was also provided in the contract: xxx shall be completed
and delivered not later than October 31, 1998 with additional grace period of six (6)
months within which to complete the Project except delays due to acts of God, xxx
or any other cause or conditions beyond the control of the SELLER. In this event, the
completion and delivery of the unit are deemed extended accordingly without
liability on the part of the SELLER. xxx In any event, all construction on or of the
Project shall remain the property of the SELLER.
Respondent paid all installments due up to January, 1998, leaving unpaid the
balance pending delivery of the unit. However, Megaworld failed to deliver the unit
on October 31, 1998 or April 30, 1999, the last day of the six-month grace period.
Three years later, Megaworld informed Tanseco that the unit was ready for
inspection preparatory to delivery. Tanseco was demanding the return of
P14,281,731.70 representing the total installment payment she had made, with
interest at 12% per annum from the expiration of the six-month grace period and
pointed out that none of the excepted causes of delay existed. Since her demend
was unheard, Tanseco filed on June 5, 2002 with the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board's (HLURB) a complaint against Megaworld for rescission of
contract, refund of payment, and damages.
In its Answer, Megaworld attributed the delay to the 1997 Asian financial crisis
which was beyond its control; and argued that default had not set in, Tanseco not

having made any judicial or extrajudicial demand for delivery before receipt of the
notice of turnover.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was no delay on the part of petitioner Megaworld since there
was no demand from respondent Tanseco.
HELD:
Article 1169 of the Civil Code provides: xxx In reciprocal obligations, neither party
incurs in delay if the other does not comply or is not ready to comply in a proper
manner with what is incumbent upon him. From the moment one of the parties
fulfills his obligation, delay by the other begins. The Contract to Buy and Sell of the
parties contains reciprocal obligations, i.e., to complete and deliver the
condominium unit on October 31, 1998 or six months thereafter on the part of
Megaworld, and to pay the balance of the purchase price at or about the time of
delivery on the part of Tanseco. Compliance by Megaworld with its obligation is
determinative of compliance by Tanseco with her obligation to pay the balance of
the purchase price. Megaworld having failed to comply with its obligation under the
contract, it is liable therefor.
Moreover, Megaworld cannot avail itself of the benefits of Art. 1174 of the Civil Code
1997 Asian financial crisis cannot be generalized to be unforeseeable and beyond
the control of a business corporation. A real estate enterprise engaged in the preselling of condominium units is concededly a master in projections on commodities
and currency movements, as well as business risks. The fluctuating movement of
the Philippine peso in the foreign exchange market is an everyday occurrence,
hence, not an instance of caso
fortuito. Megaworld's excuse for its delay does not thus lie.

Central Bank vs. Court of Appeals

GR No. L-45710
October 3, 1985
Article 1169
FACTS:
Island Savings Bank, upon favorable recommendation of its legal department,
approved the loan application for P80, 000. 00 of Sulpicio M. Tolentino, who, as a
security for the loan, executed on the same day a real estate mortgage over his
100-hectare land located in Cubo, Las Nieves, Agusan. The loan called for a lump
sum of P80, 000, repayable in semi-annual installments for 3 years, with 12%
annual interest. After the agreement, a mere P17K partial release of the loan was
made by the bank and Tolentino and his wife signed a promissory note for the P17,
000 at 12% annual interest payable w/in 3 yrs. An advance interest was deducted
from the partial release but this pre-deducted interest was refunded to Tolentino
after being informed that there was no fund yet for the release of the P63K balance.
Monetary Board of Central Bank, after finding that bank was suffering liquidity
problems, prohibited the bank from making new loans and investments. And after
the bank failed to restore its solvency, the Central Bank prohibited Island Savings
Bank from doing business in the Philippines. Island Savings Bank in view of the nonpayment of the P17K filed an application for foreclosure of the real estate mortgage.
Tolentino filed petition for specific performance or rescission and damages with
preliminary injunction, alleging that since the bank failed to deliver P63K, he is
entitled to specific performance and if not, to rescind the real estate mortgage.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Tolentino can collect from the bank for damages.

HELD:
Yes. The loan agreement implied reciprocal obligations.
Under Article 1169 of the New Civil Code, when one party is willing and ready to
perform, the other party not ready nor willing incurs in delay.
In the case at bar, Tolentino executed real estate mortgage, he signified willingness
to pay. That time, the banks obligation to furnish the P80K loan accrued. Now, the
Central Bank resolution made it impossible for the bank to furnish the P63K balance.
The prohibition on the bank to make new loans is irrelevant because it did not
prohibit the bank from releasing the balance of loans previously contracted.
Insolvency of debtor is not an excuse for non-fulfillment of obligation but is a breach
of contract. The bank was in default and Tolentino may choose bet specific
performance or rescission w/ damages in either case. But considering that the bank
is now prohibited from doing business, specific performance cannot be granted.
Rescission is the only remedy left, but the rescission should only be for the P63K
balance.