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MAFSC/33/2004/SSG 10

ARAB-ISRAEL WAR 1973- YOM KIPPUR WAR

References:
A.

Command and Leadership Module Comd 4 Ex 1.

B.

PBB (MAL) 100,Malaysian Armed Forces Staff Manual, Vol 1-Svc Wr

(Provisional).
C.

MTAT Ref Manual Handbook on Research.

INTRODUCTION

1.

The October War between Arabs and Israel was a large scale conventional war since

the Israeli War of Independence in 1948, involving air power, hundreds of tanks and
thousands of troops. The symphony of military attack on Israel by both Egypt and Syria had
not only surprised the Arab supporters but it also took the whole world with surprise. The
attack commenced at 1400 hours on Saturday, 6 October 1973. The day was the Jewish Day
of Atonement (or Yom Kippur) when two-thirds of the Israelis were either holidaying or at
their devotions. The war took place at two fronts, across the Suez Canal and in the Golan
Heights. During this time the myth of Israeli invincibility was broken. However, the vicious
war lasted till 24th October 1973 and downed over 550 aircraft, destroyed 2700 tanks, and
more than 20,000 persons killed1. It provided salutary lesson for the Israeli and taught that the
Arabs, particularly the Egyptians are no longer a soft military option. The Israeli quickly

Strategic Survey 1973, IISS: 1974.


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modified their tactics and employed new weapons in puncturing the Egyptian and Syrian Air
Defence (AD) system.

2.

From the first few hours of the war of October 1973 it was clear that it would take a

very different course from that of the six-day war of 1967. The six-day war had started after a
long period of tension, with both sides fully prepared; the Israeli air force (IAF) had struck
pre-emptively and effectively destroyed the Egyptian Air Force (EAF) within minutes, and
the Egyptian Army, left to fight in the open desert with no air cover, was routed. This time it
was the Arabs who struck first - and jointly - with unusual but accurate coordination. Israel
was surprised, with her ground defences weak. The Egyptian AD complex, successfully
established air cover over the Egyptian forces crossing the Suez Canal, and Israel lost heavily
in attempts to breach it and the similar was repeated by Syrian AD. Israeli forces were faced
with fighting on two fronts and mobilizing at the same time, and since the Syrian attack,
directly threatening Israeli territory, posed the more serious problem.

3.

When Syria and Egypt launched their combined attack on Saturday, 6 October, they

not only achieved complete tactical surprise but also caught the Israeli Defence force (IDF)
only partially mobilized and with many men on leave for Yom Kippur (the Day of
Atonement). Paradoxically, however, the fact that it was Yom Kippur - when all were indoors
and the roads were clear - enabled Israel to carry out mobilization quickly, within about 72
hours. In some cases reserve units were in action within 18 hours.

AIM

4.

The aim of this paper is to analyze the Yom Kippur war and draw appropriate lessons

learnt mostly at operational and tactical level.

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SCOPE

5.

The scope of this paper are as follows:


a.

Planning of The Battle.

b.

Basic Consideration.

c.

Influence of Technology.

d.

Lesson Learnt.

e.

Conclusion.

PLANNING OF THE BATTLE

6.

The Yom Kippur War was the direct consequence of the Six-Day War of June 1967 in

which Israeli Forces had occupied vast areas of Arab territory in the Sinai, the Golan Heights,
the West Bank and East Jerusalem2. Despite the acceptance by the Israel of the United
Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 242 which had called for the vacation of Arab
territories occupied by Israel during 1967 War, it had shown no signs of giving up these
territories. The Egyptian President, Anwar Sadat finally decided to launch military attack in
order to regain the lost territory. The Egypt and Syria had begun to formulate a highly secret
two-front war plan of simultaneous attack to recover the lost territories in the Sinai and Golan
Heights.3

2
3

Air Commodore N.B. Singh, Air Power in the New Millennium, Manas Publications: New Delhi, 2000, p.110.
Anwar el-Sadat, In Search of Identity, Dehra Dun: 1983, pp.241-242.
3

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WAR STRATEGY

7.

The Arab Strategy.

The strategy evolved by Arab forces was mainly based on

their experience of and the lessons they had learnt from the Arab-Israel War of June 1967. The
Arabs knew that they could not win the war against Israel without gaining air superiority,
which was at the same time impossible. Therefore, the Arabs decided on a strategy of limited
objectives. The Egyptian plans were limited to crossing of the Suez Canal and establishing the
bridgehead on the east bank under the cover of surface-to air missile (SAM) systems and anti
aircraft guns (AAA), which could neutralize Israeli air superiority over the limited tactical
area of the Suez Canal.4 It was planned to employ the EAF for interdiction and close support
missions in the beginning of the war and wait till the IAF weakened due to its aircraft losses
by the ground based anti aircraft missile and gun systems. But in reality, this situation did not
arise because the United States mounted a massive airlift to re-supply Israel with weapons
and made up for losses suffered by the Israeli Air force. 5 The Syrian objectives, on the other
hand, were not so limited and included the regaining of all the territories of the Golan Heights
which Israel occupied in the War of 1967. In addition, in the joint Arab plan of Egypt and
Syria, Jordan was expected to pose a potential threat across her border with Israel, without
actually starting hostilities.

8.

The Israeli Strategy.

The Israeli war plans against the Arabs relied mainly on the

superior quality of its air force and its capability to undertake pre-emptive strike missions
against Arab air forces as experienced in the war of 1967. Israeli expectation was that after
the Air Force had gained the command of the air, and simultaneously ground forces had been
4

Kenneth Hunt, Military Lessons, Survival, Jan-Feb1974, p.4 in N.B. Singh, Air Power in the New
Millennium, Manas Publication: New Delhi, 2000, p.135.
5
Badri, Magdoub, and Zohdy, The Ramadan War, 1973, Dunn Lorong:1974, p.83
4

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mobilised, the Israeli tank forces supported by the air force would mount a counter attack
without any interference from the enemy air force. However, the surprise joint attack by
Egypt and Syria on two widely separated fronts put tremendous pressure on Israeli political
and military leadership. According to Chaim Herzog, while the Arabs, with the help of Soviet
advisors had done a detailed analysis and evaluation of the lessons of the 1967 war and had
made important changes in their concepts, strategy, and organisation and set up an
independent AD Command in Egypt; Israel on the other hand, swept under the carpet all the
shortcomings that had been revealed in the war.6

MILITARY BALANCE

9.

The Yom Kippur War involved huge number of personnel and equipment. The military

balance between Israel and Arab forces prior to the war is mentioned below7:
Military Balance Arab Israel War 1973
Serial
(a)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Subject
(b)
Total Strength
Army
Navy
Air Force
Reserves
Tanks
Field Artillery
Combat Aircraft
Submarines
Destroyer
Fast Attack Boats
Ground Based Air Defence (GBAD)

Arab Forces
(c)
430,000
380,000
17,000
33,000
700,000
3,200
1,200
946
12
5-8
75-85
180 batteries SA-2 and SA-3
75 batteries SA-6
Over 2000 SA-7
Large amount of ZSU-23-4

PHASES OF WAR

6
7

Chaim Herzog, The War of Atonement: October, 1973, Boston:1975, p.2


The Military Balance 1973-74, London: 1975, pp.31-36.
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Israel
(d)
300,000
275,000
5,000
20,000
180,000
1,800
500
488
02
-51
10 HAWK Missile batteries
Several hundred 20 mm and
40 mm AAA

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10.

The October 1973 War can be divided in the following four distinct phases:8

a.

Phase One (6 9 October): Egyptian and Syrian Joint Offensive against

Israel and Israeli withdrawal.


b.

Phase Two (10 13 October): Israeli counter attack against the Syrians.

c.

Phase Three (14 15 October): Egyptian Second attack and tank battles in

the Sinai.
d.

Phase Four (15 22 October): Israeli crossing of the Canal to the West Bank.

THE WAR

11.

The Surprise Attack By Arab Forces On 6 9 October 1973.

Egypt and Syria

launched concurrent military attacks against Israel on both fronts at precisely 1405 hours on
the 6 October 1973.
a.

Egypt Attack on Sinai.

(1)

The Crossing Operation.

On the Northern Sinai front, the 2nd

Egyptian Army consist of the 18th Division, 2nd Division and 16th Division
while on the Southern Sinai front was the 3rd Egyptian Army consist of 7th
Division and 19th Division. Their first effort was to soften the Bara Lev Line
by heavy artillery bombardment. Aircraft were employed to carry out close air
support to neutralize Israel command post artillery and missile system, radar
site and other electronic warfare and communications systems. While those
operations were on, the Engineer group carried out the task of breaching the
embankment using collapsible assault boats and other means. This was
8

Edgar, O Balance, The Yom Kippur War-October 1973, RUSI Journal, Jan-Mar 1974, pp.7-16
6

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achieved within 15 minutes of H hour. Simultaneously a massive artillery
bombardment opened up on the Israeli front-line position. In the first minutes
of attack about 10,500 shells fell on the Israeli positions at the rate of 175
shells per second. Israels 14th Armoured Brigade whose area of responsibility
war narrowed to the central suffered their first casualty against the Egyptians
who fought stubbornly. By 1500 hours it was clear that the Egyptians were
staging a major attack all along the front. By 1600 hours it was evident that the
Egyptians were crossing the Suez Canal in a major amphibious operation. It
took place along the full length of the Bar Lev Line especially at the Northern
sector. The Israeli troops were equipped with various anti-tanks and antiaircraft weapon formed the first line of defence for the defence for the advance
of the 2nd and 3rd Army. Within 4 hours the Egyptians had landed over 80,000
troops in 12 waves, East of Suez Canal. This force was protected by the
advance guard while they executed the vulnerable canal crossing. The assault
was supported by the air force with the total 240 aircrafts. This paralysed the
Israeli resistance, and by midnight on the same day most of the 2 nd Army had
cross the Suez Canal and followed by the 3rd Army in the South. Initially 500
tanks manage to cross the Suez Canal. By the 9 October more than 800 tanks
and 80,000 troops had crossed to the East bank of Suez Canal. But the control
of former Egyptian oilfield at Abu Rudeis by the Israel located at the far bank
Gulf of Suez South of Sinai remained in Israeli hand. Several Egyptian
commandos raids by helicopter failed to capture the oilfield.

(2)

Egyptian Forces Building Up Position at East of Suez Canal. From

6 to 14 October, the Egyptian built up this position along a narrow strip east of

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the canal with an average width of 5 miles. The 2 nd and 3rd Army, which had
operated well at the canal crossing stage, were reluctant to advance any further.
By doing so their units would have move beyond the zone defended by the
missiles and would have open themselves for the attack by the Israel Air Force.
Despite the superior position that the Egyptians have gained on the ground,
they did not try to challenge Israeli air superiority outside the zone defended
by the missiles. Within the missile zone the Israeli Air Force suffered serious
losses within the missile protected zone while attempting to counter the
Egyptian operation. The Egyptian infantry began to dig in and to deploy air
defence asset; this was implified by the mobile character of the vehicle launch
SAM. However the Armoured Division preferred to wait until the East bank
had been broadened before launching the second stage of the attack. The
Egyptian did not consolidate their position completely. A gap of 20 to 25 miles
wide at the Eastern shores of the Bitter Lakes, remained between the two army
bridgeheads and never protected by the SAM Batteries.

(3)

Egyptian Air Force Strike Mission. At H hour, the Egyptian Air

Force with 240 planes crossed the Suez Canal with the mission to strike three
airfields in Sinai, hit the Israel surface to air batteries, three command post,
radar stations, medium artillery position, the administrations centers and the
strong point on the sand bank east of Port Fuad. But in this battle, and the
resistance from the Israeli Air Force showed that the early phase by the
Egyptian Air Force plan was not particularly successful. Despite of the
formidable nature of the missile weapon, the Israeli air attacks nibbled away at
it as well.

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(4)

Egyptian Naval Force Conducted Blocked and Support Operation.

As for the naval battle, the Israeli and Egyptian Naval Force conducted
operations with difference tactics. The Egyptian realized that the Israel Naval
superiority only limited their objective in conducting blockade and support of
the army at sea to shore bombardment. The Israeli Navy had little or no
experience and furthermore some ships were still under construction. With the
outbreak of the war, the Egyptian declared a naval blockade in the Red Sea.

b.

Syria Attack On Golan Height. The offensive attack also began with the

intensive artillery and air bombardment along the 65 km front. Under this covering
fire three Infantry Divisions and two Armoured Divisions i.e. the 1 st and 3rd Armoured
Division comprising a total of 1,200 tanks launch on the 6 October. The 7 th Infantry
Division struck Westward and south Westward through Ahmadiya south of Tel El
Syihiba. The 5th Division focused through north of Juhada while the 9th Division
attacked westward between Kudum and Kuneitra. The 5 th and 7th Division initially
moved in two parallel columns as a spearhead, striking directly into the Israeli line of
defence. The Imperial Guard Division covered the route to Damascus. The Syrian
attack with the element of surprise was initially successful. Mount Hermon was
attacked by Syrian commandos using four helicopters. By 7 October, the Syrian
advanced approximately 10 km and fought successfully against Israeli counter attack
similar to that on the Sinai front. The Syrian made good used of portable SAGGER
missile (antitank) which they had a large numbers and their RPG bazookas. The
Syrian Armour outnumbered the Israeli and furthermore the Syrian vehicles were
equipped with night vision equipment and both factors enhance the success.

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12.

Israel Defensive Counter Attack.

The Israeli counter attack began at 0830 hours

on the 8 October on the Golan Height. The main effort was to be along the El Al Rafid route,
with 19th Reserved Brigade leading and the 20th Brigade ready to follow trough. The 70 th
Reserve Brigade was to follow, mopping up and protecting the right flank above the Ruqqad.
To the left of the main effort, the 14 th Reserve Brigade was to advance along a line leading
from the Gamla Rise at Givat Yoav through Mazrat Kuneitra via Nahal Geshur to Husniyah.
By October 10, the 20th Brigade held the Rafid crossroad and by the afternoon, the Syrian left
the Golan Heights. The retreating force left behind 867 tanks, some of which were among the
most modern T62 type. By October 22, Mount Hermon was again in Israel hands and to
Israeli, Mount Hermon is the eyes of the State of Israel and they know they had to take it
whatever cost. The Syrian attack across the Golan Heights on the 6 October threatened to
break through in the heart of Israel. After the heavy fighting, the Israeli halted the Syrian
armoured thrust and counter attacked, retaking the Mount Hermon and drove deep into town
of Sassa.

13.

The Offensive Counter Attack by Israel. The counter attack can be summarised as

follows:
a.

Encirclement of Egyptian 3 Army.

Israeli forces had opted to wait for

several days before deciding to cross the west of Suez Canal through the gap between
2nd and 3rd Army. The planning and the battle appreciation were ugly and at the great
length. Finally the Israeli 14th Armoured Brigade and 243rd Armoured Brigade decided
to cross the Suez Canal at the northern part of Great Bitter Lake on 16 October.
Egyptian reserve armour moved from the west to the east but was destroyed in the
offensive. The Israel commander was taking advantage of the Egypt losses in the

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offensive to cross the Suez Canal. On the night of 15 and 16 October, Israeli
paratroopers and tanks crossed the Suez Canal. Fierce tank battles took place as the
Egyptian tried to counter the attacking force of Major Gen Sharon. However, Israeli
force encircled the Egyptian and destroys their fighting cohesion. By the 18 and 19
October the Israeli forces moved west without resistance. The advance party destroyed
SAMs and AAA sites enabling the Israeli Air Force to provide air cover. The operation
was a successful with the encirclement of the Egyptian 3 rd Army from the west of the
Suez Canal. By the 20 October, the Egyptians 3 rd Army realized that the strategic
purpose of Israeli penetration to the West Bank was to cut their lines of
communications and supplies.

b.

Israel Air Force Close Support.

As in the Air Force battle, first phase of

the Israel Air Force was unable to attack as planned and was obliged to take
considerable risks giving close support to ground forces. Moshe Dayan as the Air
Force Chief to concentrate all their air support at dawn 7 October to block the Syrian
advance and the Israeli ground force succeeded in destroying part of Syrian missile
capability. The Israeli Air Force was extensively within the Syrian air space, attacking
strategic target, oil installations, power plants, bridges and other Syrian
infrastructures.

c.

Israel Naval Force Support Weapon.

There were quite effective naval

battles in the form of blockade and missile engagement. Israel used her small navy
aggressively and effectively. The War saw first massive use of sea launched surface to
surface missiles. The blockade could possibly bring strategic results if the war would
have been prolong and could have nullified to some extent Israels retention of control

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over Sharmes-Sheikh, with its commanding position at the mouth of the Gulf of
Aqaba. The Israeli efficiency in the employment of Electronic Warfare manages to
destroy a number of Syrian vessels.

BASIC CONSIDERATION

. SELECTION AND MAINTENANCE OF AIM

14.

The aim of the Arabs was to defeat Israel on the field of battle and capture important

land areas. They could not achieve the aim as failed to persist on offensive actions. After
immediate success of first offensive, the Arabs remained under the shield of SAM umbrella
which restricted them to continue offensive action. On the other hand, the Israelis earned their
aim by all out efforts and won victory.

OFFENSIVE ACTION

15.

The Yom Kippur War was the battle of offensive actions. Arabs Forces took the

initiative to carry out offensive action against Israeli airfields, headquarters and supply
centres. They coordinated a well orchestrated offensive attack on both fronts. Such offensive
action was pre-emptive and surprising to Israeli Armed Forces as well. Except the IAF, Israel
did not have sufficient forces on ground to counter such a huge offensive. Israel had to launch
counter offensive actions to avert defeat.

SECURITY

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16.

The Egyptians employed several passive measures with varying degrees of success.

They succeeded in deceiving Israel to belief that their concentration of forces were for routine
exercise. In successive planning, method was chosen by the Egyptian President and his
commanders, so, such requirement for action gradually were shifted from one level to a lower
level in accordance with a fixed scheme. The plan was kept secret within a very small number
of advisers close to Sadat until five to six months before the war. Moreover, Arabs protected
their air craft on ground by constructing hardened aircraft shelters and dispersing at many
airfields. They also used dummy sites to deceive the Israeli air forces.

SURPRISE

17.

Arabs made a pre-emptive surprise attack. After the 1967 war, Israelis were extremely

over confident and did not search for the military weaknesses. They were busy with their
ensuing election, and were reluctant to mobilize prematurely. Israeli attention was focused on
the success of the Palestinian guerrillas in Austria. Egyptians considered the Israeli
advantages of air superiority, technological ability and rigorous training. They selected 6
October for the attack after considering that it was the holy day in the Jewish religious, which
would find many Israeli soldiers on leave and also the month of Ramadan when Israelis will
not expect any attack from the Arabs. Egypt could persuade the Israeli political leaders that
Egypt was not ready for war and would not be ready for at least a year. Egypt also deceived
Israels intelligence into believing that Egyptian units were engaged in military manoeuvres
rather than actual preparations for an invasion. Cairo newspapers announced that army
officers were permitted to go for the Umrah. This led to a major strategic surprise of the
Israeli forces and is generally considered to be the result of Egyptian planning and Israeli
confidence.

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COOPERATION

18.

Cooperation is a means of attaining concentration of force with economy of effort in

pursuance of the aim and sound administration is the prerequisite for success in war. In Yom
Kippur War, the Egyptian, Syria and other Arab countries had built up a remarkable
relationship. This can be seen in the April 1973, the first organization for cooperation between
Syrian and Egyptian fronts had been set up. The Federal Armed Forces Commander in Chief
approved the control system over both fronts. October 6 was also a proud landmark on the way
toward serious Arab cooperation. It showed the deep-rooted common origin or the Arab and
the strong tie that so closely bind them. The Arab insistence upon carrying their share in
historical responsibility was confirmed, as was their readiness to give and to sacrifice until all
territories are liberated, all rights are restored and victory achieved.

FLEXIBILITY

19.

Israel aircraft were not restricted to one particular role and they shifted their missions

accordingly to fit the tactical necessities. For example IAF kept A-4 for CAS, but at times
they used F-4 for CAS depending on the situations. Besides carrying troops, the Arabs used
helicopters for drooping napalm bombs. On the other hand, the Israelis used helicopters for
command and control.

CONCENTRATION OF FORCE

20.

The Egyptian Air Force concentrated around 150 aircraft on the first day along with

1500 artillery guns while attacking on the Berlev line. IAF could concentrate more in air
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attacks as the Egyptians and Syrians decided not to attack in depth of Israel territory which
resulted in suppression of Arab AD. When IAF faced tremendous defence from Syrian AD
batteries, then they concentrated more on suppressing the Syrian batteries than CAS missions.
After achieving their aim of SEAD, they transferred their concentration on providing CAS to
their land forces. Ultimately Israel achieved air superiority over their area of interest. Another
aspect of the crippling firepower was the concentrated artillery fire, which followed the
massive air strike. Egypt used some 3,000 field guns, which also provided firepower in the
shape of barrage for the assaulting troops to follow and to keep direction with. All this was
tremendous and the Egyptian Armed Forces had applied the principle of concentration of
firepower well.

ECONOMY OF EFFORT

21.

The surprise attack by the Arab forces and their SAM defence caused heavy damage

and destruction to Israeli Air Force. To prevent further losses, Israel moved their ground
forces to counter the initial attack while used limited number of aircraft in suppressing Arab
AD. They maintained reserve of their combat aircraft which were later used after gaining air
superiority over the Arab territory.

Israel used correct tactics and weapon to meet the

requirement during battle. On the other hand, the Arab having much greater number of
aircraft and AD weapons could not maintain the superiority in the war. One report says that
the Arab fired almost 50-75 SAM per aircraft killed, which resulted to their deficiency of
missile stock during the early stage of battle.

ADMINISTRATION

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22.

Logistic considerations are often the deciding factor in assessing the feasibility and

influencing the outcome of the war. Egyptians and Syrians had built up a massive forward
supply depot. This greatly reduced their logistics management problems as well as their
logistic vulnerability. On the other hand, Israel had deficiency in their mobilization and depot
systems which gave the Arabs a significant advantage. During the war, both Arab and Israel
received a huge amount of latest aircraft and weapons from USSR and USA respectively. It
was the US equipment supplied to Israel by air (only 26% of the total US equipment was
supplied by air) played a vital role in averting her defeat.

INFLUENCE OF TECHNOLOGY

ELECTRONIC COUNTER MEASURES (ECM)

23.

The sophisticated multi frequency capabilities of the SA-6 and ZSU 23-4 were

unfamiliar to the Israelis, as well as the complicated homing guidance system of SA-6 in
particular. Syrians in Golan Height had fewer AD weapons to engage the Israeli aircraft.
Surface to Air Missiles radars were deceived by different jamming techniques. Israel Air
Force (IAF) aircraft dropped chaff to confuse the radar of missile and proved effective. They
used flares to confuse SA-7. Use of ECM, modified chaff package and lo-hi-lo tactics found
the soft spot of SA-6. The attempt to neutralize Egyptian SAM defence using same procedure
did not work, probably due to better training and weapon familiarity of the Egyptians.
Moreover they capitalized on its presence by using spoof techniques against RWR and
claimed to have prompted several unnecessary ejections.

PRECISION GUIDED WEAPONS

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24.

Israel used different surface to air missiles like MIM-23B Hawk, MIM-72A Chaparral

and Redeye for their AD. Beside the conventional weapons, they used PGM like AGM-12
Bullpup, AGM45A Shrike, AGM-65A Maverick to cause havoc to Arab ground targets. The
Arabs used several types of Surface to Air Missiles such as SA-2, SA-3, SA-6 and SA-7 for
AD which caused heavy toll to Israeli aircraft. The IAF was virtually ineffective until a
number of these missiles sites were destroyed to create gap within Egyptian AD Network.
Israel also used HOBOS and Martin Marietta Walleye I. The TOW anti tank missiles proved
very effective scoring 100 percent hits, beating all previous records in accuracy.

USE OF RECONNAISSANCE AIR CRAFT, UAV AND SATELITE

25.

The US SR-71 reconnaissance aircraft detected the gap between the 2nd and 3rd Army

of Egypt. Subsequently Operation Gazelle was carried out and neutralized the SAMs which
were a turning point of the war. IAF used Teledyne Ryan Model 1241 multi mission UAV for
high altitude photographic reconnaissance. There were other reports suggesting the use of
Firebee I type drones to deliver Israeli built air-to-ground missiles to attack Egyptian missile
sites. Both USA and USSR helped their clients with satellite pictures during the war.

LESSONS LEARNT

26.

The Yom Kippur War is an excellent show case of many lessons of warfare. These

lessons are still valid. The war presented excellent cooperation among the forces especially in
the land air battles. The war is a rare example where the ground forces supported to attain air
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superiority by the IAF by destroying Egyptian AD capabilities. Thus, the Israeli ground forces
effectively performed Suppression of Enemy air defence (SEAD) operations. The use of
Electronic Counter Measures (ECM), Precision Guided Munitions (PGM), Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles (UAV), and Satellites paved the way of modern warfare. The battle of Bekka Valley
in 1982 and Gulf War in 1991 were the follow up of many lessons learned from this war. The
unprecedented success of anti-tank missile has drawn a new tactics to deal with tank
offensive. As such the study of this war is very much relevant for conventional forces of third
world countries where resources are limited and demand fullest utilization of all possible
means through improvisation. Therefore, the Yom Kippur War stands as reference before us.

27.

This was one of the biggest international wars, waged under conditions of

international dtente, involving the largest concentrations of troops, weapons and


sophisticated equipment never before seen in the entire military history of the region. It was
distinguished by the employment of the missiles, which featured prominently in land, sea, air
and AD operations, as well as electronic and counter electronic measures. The important
military lessons that the war of 1973 brings out are:

a.

Surprise was achieved by the Arab forces in open deserts despite the great

development of modern means of surveillance and intelligence. Lulled into a sense of


superiority, the Israelis had not thought it conceivable the Arabs would be capable of
mounting an offensive against them, let alone on two fronts simultaneously, and
neither did they dream the Arabs could make such deceptive plans or keep such
secrets. This proves that surprise as a principle of war has withstood the test of times
and will continue to do so in future wars. It must follow that our Armed Forces must
be on their guard at all times and be ready to react instantly.

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b.

A modern battle will continue to remain one of combined arms in which all

arms co-ordinate to achieve one mission or one objective. Israel's dependence on the
tank alone was the cause of its failure in many battles. On the Egyptian side, the
combined arms concept achieved prominent success at the tactical level. Also, the
collaboration of all branches of the armed forces achieved success at both operational
and strategic levels.

c.

When opposed by a strong AD system, air supremacy is difficult to be

achieved by an air force however superior it might be, qualitatively or quantitatively.


The passive AD measures taken by Egyptian also proved its requirement on reducing
own casualties and destruction from any enemy attack.

d.

The air force will continue to play a leading role in armed conflicts. A stronger

and greater conflict will appear among the AD means and systems to match the
tremendous developments in air forces and electronic warfare.

e.

The struggle between the tanks and the anti-tank weapons will continue

despite the success the latter achieved in this war.

f.

The necessity of diversifying arms sources and developing a larger national

potential for an armament industry is an important lesson.

g.

There is a danger of preparing for a short war; if a war is not won within a

stimulated time, it is invariably lost because plans and stocks of materials do not cater
for extra time.

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h.

Air reconnaissance and surveillance played an important role in this war. It

seems that the power with the best reconnaissance satellite system will have an
outstanding advantage in any future war, while a country without one, or without
access to one, will be at an acute disadvantage.

i.

Almost no military campaign can be won without persistent offensive action.

Persistent offensive action is needed not only to achieve victory but also to avert
defeat. Arabs failed to persist on their offensive operations which invited Israel to
take initiative.

j.

Quality is important, not quantity, both in equipment and tactics. In the war

the Arabs had superiority with SAMs in both quality and quantity; on the other hand,
Israeli had edge over its opponents in qualitative aircraft and tactics.

CONCLUSION

28.

The war of 1967 and 1973 were interrelated events. The humiliating defeat of the Arabs

in 1967 paved the way for another major war in 1973. While the war in 67 was one sided air
war without hi-tech weapons, the 1973 war opened up the horizon of modern warfare and
revealed the potential of PGM, EW and UAVs. The war had been characterised by surprise and
tactical and technological innovation. The Arabs though successfully launched offensive in two
fronts but could not capitalize it in the later part due to Israels tactical and technological
innovations. The Arabs had to retreat even after they could reoccupy the lost territory. In the
war both Arab and Israel made extensive use of air power to their benefit. As far as the concept
was concerned Arab followed a strategically offensive but tactically defensive strategy. On the
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other hand Israel followed a strategically defensive but tactically offensive strategy. The
analysis revealed how the principles of war were integrated to achieve the best result.

29.

An analysis to the Israeli position shows that the war was considered to be against Israeli

interest, and therefore it was to be avoided as much as possible. Unlike 67 War the Israelis were
in the difficult situation due to the Arabs extensive SAM defences. Israeli Air Force initially
suffered heavy causalities. Despite initial success achieved by the Arabs they could not retain
the same till the last. The Arabs employment of air power did not happen in conformity of the
accepted air power principles and in many a cases they lacked the vision as a whole. Therefore,
they were not able to turn that initial victory a total one. On the other hand Israel took a
different approach even after a set back. They employed the air power with a vision which
ushered them a victory. Although the war was short but it was very important from the air
power perspective. Number of valuable lessons can be drawn from this which are certainly
important and likely to contribute in any future air war. This great victory achieved by the Arabs
during the Yom Kippur War was not the end of the struggle against Israel. It is no more than one
more link in its multi-link chain. They still have oncoming stages for which they should prepare
themselves with the same strength and solidarity so as to attain their ultimate goal. Annexes A to
F indicate the overall concept and consequences of the war.

June 04

MOHD YUSNI BIN ABU BAKAR


Mej
Leader Sub-syndicate Group 10
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Annexes:
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.

Map Representing Attack by Egypt.


Map Representing Attack by Syria.
Map Representing Golan Heights Campaign.
Map Representing Operation Gazelle.
Arab Israeli Balance Forces.
Losses in the Arab-Israeli War 1973.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
1.

Air Commodore (Retd) N.B. Singh, Air Power in the New Millennium, Manas

Publications: New Delhi, 2000.

2.

Strategic Survey 1973, IISS: 1974.

3.

Anwar el-Sadat, In Search of Identity, Dehra Dun: 1983.


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4.

Badri, Magdoub, and Zohdy, The Ramadan War, 1973, Dunn Lorong: 1974.

5.

Chaim Herzog, The War of Atonement: October, 1973, Boston: 1975.

6.

The Military Balance 1973-74, London: 1975.

7.

Lon O. Nordeen, Jr., Air Warfare in Missile Age, Smithsonian Institution Press, 1985.

8.

Edgar, O Balance, The Yom Kippur War-October 1973, RUSI Journal, Jan-Mar 1974.

9.

Cordesman and Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War: Vol I: The Arab-Israel Conflicts

1973-1989, Boulder: Westview Press, 1990.

10.

50 Years Anniversary of Israel 1973- www.jajz-ed.org.il/50/time/73.html

11.

Air Raid by Israel- www.us-israel.org

12.

Egypt Israel Syria War 1973- www.onwar.com

13.

The Yom Kippur War. A Nation Caught by Surprise- www.foigm.org/prevarts.html

14.

Yom Kippur War- www.lexicorient.com

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