04 Respondent

LEX OMNIA MOOT COURT - 2016
TC-04

IN THE HONBLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION UNDER ARTICLE 136 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION NO. 1996/2016

DHARMANAND POVER V. UNION OF INDIA
&
GENTLEMANIAN SWAMY V. LAVEESTA KETALVAD
UPON SUBMISSION TO THE HONBLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND HIS COMPANION JUSTICES OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
ON SUBMISSION TO THE REGISTRY OF THE COURT

OF THE HONBLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
~MEMORIAL FOR THE RESPONDENTS ~
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................................................. 4
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................................... 6
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS ........................................................................................... 10
WEB RESOURCES................................................................................................................. 12
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ................................................................................ 13
STATEMENT OF FACTS ................................................................................................ 14
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ............................................................................................... 16
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ....................................................................................... 17
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED ............................................................................................ 19
I. THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE BEFORE THE
HONBLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA..................................................................... 19
1. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT. ............................................................................................... 19
2. SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION OF LAW. .................................................................................... 19
3. DECISION OF THE HON'BLE HC OF DELHI HAS CAUSED "GREAT MISCARRIAGE OF
JUSTICE". ............................................................................................................................. 19
II.
S. 124-A OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860, DOES NOT CONSTITUTES
AN UNREASONABLE RESTRICTION ON THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND
EXPRESSION UNDER ARTICLE 19 (1) (A) OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA.
20
1. THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION GUARANTEED UNDER THE CONSTITUTION IS
NOT AN UNFETTERED FREEDOM. .......................................................................................... 20
2.
PRESERVATION OF PUBLIC ORDER. ................................................................................ 21
3. PUBLIC DISORDER OR LIKELIHOOD OF PUBLIC DISORDER IS THE GIST OF S-124A. ....... 22

4. KEDAR NATH SINGHS INTERPRETATION REQUIRES NO REVIEW AS IT PROMOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL ETHOS, VALUES AND IDEALS. ................................................................... 22
5.
INDIAN CONSTITUTION AND ITS UNIVERSALISTIC INTERPRETATION. ............................. 24
6. RIGHT
TO DISSENT IS NOT WHAT IS CURBED BY THE LAW OF SEDITION, BUT IT IS THE
RIGHT TO REJECT THE NATION BY ABUSING THAT IS UNACCEPTABLE. .................................. 24
III. THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE BEFORE THE

HONBLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA. ................................................................... 26
1. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ................................................................................................ 26
2|Page

2. SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION OF LAW. .................................................................................... 27
3. DECISION OF THE HON'BLE HC OF DELHI HAS CAUSED "GREAT MISCARRIAGE OF
JUSTICE". ............................................................................................................................. 27
IV. WRIT PETITION FILED BY LAVEESTA KETALVAD BEFORE THE
HONBLE HIGH COURT IS NOT MAINTAINABLE UNDER THE PROVISIONS
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. .......................................................................... 27
1. THE COMPANY, I LOVE TRUMP LTD. IS NOT A STATE UNDER ART 12. .......................... 28
2. THE ENTIRE SHARE CAPITAL OF THE CORPORATION SHOULD BE HELD BY THE
GOVERNMENT....................................................................................................................... 29
IN THE INSTANT MATTER, I LOVE TRUMP LTD. IS A WHOLLY OWNED COMPANY OF MR.
GENTLEMANIAN SWAMY, WHICH IMPLIES THAT THE SHARES OF THE COMPANY WAS OWNED
BY HIM AND THE SOLE CONTROL OF THE COMPANY WAS AT HIS DISPOSAL. THIS
AUTOMATICALLY NEGATES THE FIRST CRITERIA LAID DOWN, ABOUT THE ENTIRE SHARE
CAPITAL BEING OWNED BY THE GOVERNMENT. ..................................................................... 29
3. THE
STATE IS SO MUCH AS TO MEET ALMOST ENTIRE

EXPENDITURE OF THE CORPORATION. .................................................................................. 29
FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE OF THE
4. THE CORPORATION ENJOYS MONOPOLY STATUS WHICH IS STATE CONFERRED OR STATE

PROTECTED. .......................................................................................................................... 29
5. EXISTENCE OF DEEP AND PERVASIVE STATE CONTROL MAY AFFORD AN INDICATION THAT
THE CORPORATION IS A STATE AGENCY OR INSTRUMENTALITY. ........................................... 29
6. THE
FUNCTIONS OF THE CORPORATION ARE OF PUBLIC IMPORTANCE AND CLOSELY
RELATED TO GOVERNMENT FUNCTION. ................................................................................ 30
V.
THE CRITERIA REQUIRED FOR A PRIVATE BODY TO BE AMENABLE TO WRIT
JURISDICTION PUBLIC FUNCTION, NOT FULFILLED. ....................................................... 30
The company did not perform any public duty or public function. .............................. 31
1. THERE
ARE AN EXISTENCE OF AN EQUALLY EFFICIENT, ADEQUATE AND EFFICACIOUS
ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES, WHICH WILL ACT AS A BAR AGAINST ART. 226. ............................ 32
2. SS. 271 AND 272 OF THE COMPANIES ACT, 2013. .......................................................... 33

3. REMEDY UNDER THE PENAL LAW. ................................................................................. 34
4. MR. GENTLEMANIAN SWAMY HAS A RIGHT TO PRODUCE AND SELL CDS IS COVERED
UNDER THE RIGHT TO CARRY ON BUSINESS UNDER ARTICLE 19 (1) (G). .............................. 34
PRAYER ............................................................................................................................. 37
3|Page
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ABBREVIATIONS
EXPANSIONS
&
AND
S.
SECTION
SS.
SECTIONS
PARAGRAPH
PARAGRAPHS
A.P.
ANDHRA PRADESH
AC/ APP. CASE
APPEAL CASES
AIR
ALL INDIA REPORTER
ART.
ARTICLE
BOM.
BOMBAY
CAL
CALCUTTA
CLR
COMMONWEALTH LAW REPORTER
CO.
CORPORATION
CRI LJ/ CR LJ
CRIMINAL LAW JOURNAL
CR LR
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW
DEL
DELHI
ED.
EDITION
FIR
FIRST INFORMATION REPORT
GOVT.
GOVERNMENT
H.P.
HIMACHAL PRADESH
HC
HIGH COURT
HONBLE
HONOURABLE
IPC
INDIAN PENAL CODE
KANT.
KARNATAKA
KER.
KERALA
LD.
LEARNED
LTD.
LIMITED
M.P.
MADHYA PRADESH
ORI.
ORISSA
4|Page

ORS.
OTHERS
P&H
PUNJAB AND HARYANA
P./PG.
PAGE
PUNJ.
PUNJAB
PVT.
PRIVATE
PW
PROSECUTION WITNESS
RAJ.
RAJASTHAN
SC
SUPREME COURT
SCC
SUPREME COURT CASES
SLP
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION
SUPP.
SUPPLEMENTARY
U.P.
UTTAR PRADESH
US/ U.S.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
W.B.
WEST BENGAL
WLR
WEEKLY LAW REPORT
5|Page
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
SL. NO.
INDIAN SUPREME COURT CASES
PG.
NO.
1.
Venkatamma v. City Improvement Trust Board, AIR 1972 SC 2683
29
2.
Ajay Hasia Etc. v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi & Ors. Etc., AIR 1981 SC
487
Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. The International Airport, AIR 1979 SC
29
3.
31
1628
4.
Urmila Roy v. Bengal Peerless Housing Development Co. Ltd., AIR
29
2009 SC 2086.
5.
R.K. Panda vs. Steel Authority of India & Ors. (1994) 5 SCC 304
29
6.
Mahabir Auto Store v. Indian Oil Corporation, (1990) 3 SCC 752
29
7.
State of West Bengal v. V.K. Mandal & Ors., AIR 1962 SC 779
29
8.
Murlidhar Dayandeo Kesekar v. Vishwanath Pandu Barde & Anr., 1995
29
Supp (2) SCC 549

9.
Consumer Education & Research Centre & Ors. v. Union of India &
30
Ors., (1995) 3 SCC 42

10.
Jatya Pal Singh v. Union of India, (2013) 6 SCC 452
30
11.
Radhakrishna Agarwal v. State of Bihar, (1977) 3 SCC 457
30
12.
Kulchhinder Singh v. Hardayal Singh Brar, (1976) 3 SCC 828
30
13.
Prathama Bank v. Vijay Kumar Goel, (1989) AIR 1989 SC 1977.
30
14.
B.S Minhas v. Indian Statistical Institute, AIR 1984 SC 363
30
15.
Balmer Lawrie & Co. Ltd. v. Partha Sarathi Sen Roy, (2013) 8 SCC 345
30, 31
16.
Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology, (2002)
30, 31
5 SCC 111
17.
N. Nagendra Rao & Company v. State of A.P., (1994) 6 SCC 205
30
18.
Rajasthan SEB v. Mohan Lal, AIR 1967 SC 857
30
19.
LIC v. Consumer Education & Research Centre, (1995) 5 SCC 482
30
20.
Virendra Kumar Srivastava v. U.P. Rajya Karmachari Kalyan Nigam,
30
(2005) 1 SCC 149
6|Page

21.
Lt. Governor of Delhi v. V.K. Sodhi, (2007) 15 SCC 136.
30
22.
State of U.P. & Anr. v. Radhey Shyam Rai, (2009) 5 SCC 577
30
23.
P.K Ramchandra Iyer v. Union of India, (1984) 2 SCC 141
30
24.
Mysore Paper Mills Ltd. v. Mysore Paper Mills Officers Assn., (2002)
30,
2 SCC 167
33
25.
Som Prakash Rekhi v. Union Of India & Anr., 1981 AIR 212
30
26.
Binny Ltd. & Anr. v. Sadasivan & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 1976 of 1998
31
(Supreme Court of India, 08/08/2005);

27.
Poonam v. Sumit Tanwar, AIR 2010 SC 1384
31
28.
Vineet Narain v. Union of India, (1998) 1 SCC 226;
33
29.
Kalyan Singh v. State of U.P, AIR 1962 SC 1183
31
30.
G. Bassi Reddy v. International Crops Research Institute and Anr., Civil
31
Appeal No. 2399 of 1986 (Supreme Court of India, 14/02/2003)

31.
Balmer Lawrie & Co. Ltd. v. Partha Sarathi Sen Roy, (2013) 8 SCC 345
30,31
32.
Praga Tools Corporation vs Shri C. A. Imanual & Ors., 1969 AIR 1306
32
33.
Dwarka Nath v. Income Tax Officer, AIR 1966 SC 81
32
34.
Anandi Mukta Sadguru Shree Mukta v. V.R. Rudani & Ors., 1989 AIR
1607
Federal Bank Ltd v. Sagar Thomas & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 106 of
32
35.
32
2001 (Supreme Court of India, 26/09/2003)

36.
U.P. State Co-Operative Land Development Bank Limited v. Chandra
33
Bhan Dubey and Ors., Civil Appeal Nos. 514 and 515-516 of 1985
(Supreme Court of India, 18/12/1998)
37.
Rashid Ahmed v. Municipal Board, Kairana, AIR 1950 SC 163
33
38.
Nain Sukh Das Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1953 SC 384.
33
39.
Bombay Metropolitan Region Development Authority v. Gokak Patel
33
Volkart Ltd., (1995) 1 SCC 642

40.
Union of India v. Cottage Arts Emporium, AIR 1992 2218
33
41.
Union of India v. Mangal Textile Mills, (2010) 14 SCC 553
33
42.
Nivedita Sharma v. Cellular Operators Assn. of India, (2011) 14 SCC
33
337
7|Page

43.
Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. v. Commr.(AA), (2009) 14 SCC 338
33
44.
V. Vellaswamy v. Inspector General of Police, AIR 1982 SC 82
33
45.
Jyotendrasinhaji v. S. Tripathi, AIR 1993 SC 1991
33
46.
Kunga Nima Lepcha v. State of Sikkim, AIR 2010 SC 1671
33
47.
K.K Shrivastava v. Bhupendra Kumar Jain, (1977) 2 SCC 494
33
48.
Bar Council Of Delhi And Anr. Etc vs Surjeet Singh And Ors., 1980
33
AIR 1612.
49.
G.J. Fernandez v. State of Mysore, (1967) 3 SCR 636
33
50.
State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose, AIR 1954 SC 92
20
51.
Kameshwar Prasad v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 1166
20
52.
Supt., Central Prison v. Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia, AIR 1960 SC 633
21
53.
Romesh Thappar vs. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 124
22
54.
Kedar Nath Singh vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 955
22
55.
Bennet Coleman & Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1973 SC 106
20
56.
Noise Pollution (V), In re, AIR 2005 SC 1336
20
57.
I.R Coelho v. State of T.N, AIR 2007 SC 861.
20
58.
Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 167 OF
21
2012 (Supreme Court of India, 12/03/2016).

59.
Prakash Chandra Sachdeva v. State, (1994) 1 SCC 471.
21
60.
Ram Lila Maidan Incident, In re, (2012) 5 SCC 1.
21
61.
Sri Indra Das v. State of Assam, Criminal Appeal No.1383 of 2007,
25
(Supreme Court of India, 10/02/2007).

62.
Subramanian Swamy v. Ministry Of Law & Ors., WP(Criminal) No.

184 Of 2014, (Supreme Court of India, 13/05/2016).
8|Page
25
SL. NO.
INDIAN HIGH COURT CASES
Pg.
No.
1.
Aidal Singh And Ors. vs Karan Singh And Ors. AIR 1957 All 414
33
2.
ICICI Bank Limited Rep. By Its Sr. v. Lakshminarayanan, 2008 SCC
32
OnLine Mad 5
3.
Dr. Anand Kumar Gupta v. Rajghat Education Centre and others, 2003 (1)
32
AWC 503
4.
Emperor v. F.G. Kalkhowan, AIR 1937 AII 418
31
5.
Indian Tobacco Corporation v. The State of Madras, AIR 1954 Mad 549
31
6.
Ku Vidhya Mishra v. Governing Body & Other, 2012 SCC OnLine Chh
31
154 J1
7.
S.D. Siddiqui vs University Of Delhi And Ors., Letter Patent Appeal No.
29
2256/2005 (Delhi High Court, 19/11/2005).

8.
Annie Besant v. Advocate General of Madras, AIR 1919 PC 31
21
9.
Niharendu Dutt v. Emperor, AIR 1942 FC 22, 26
22
10.
Indramani Singh v. Manipur State, AIR 1955 Mani 9.
22
11.
Queen Empress v. Amba Prasad, (1898) ILR 20 All 55.
23
12.
Sanskar Marathe v. The State Of Maharashtra, Cri.PIL 3-2015.
25
SL. NO.
1.
R. v. Burns, (1886) 16 Cox CC 355.
PG.
NO.
22
2.
R. v. Sullivan, (1868) 11 Cox CC 44.
21
COURT DECISIONS AROUND THE WORLD
9|Page
SL. NO.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
1.
Art. 13
2.
Art. 14
3.
Art. 19
4.
Art. 19 (1) (a)
5.
Art. 19 (2)
6.
Art. 19 (6)
7.
Art. 136
8.
Art. 226
SL. NO.
INDIAN STATUTES
1.
The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
2.
The Companies Act, 2013
3.
The Constitution First (Amendment) Act, 1951
4.
The Indian Penal Code, 1860
5.
The Indian Press Act, 1910
SR. NO.
FOREIGN STATUTES
1.
German Criminal Code, 1871
2.
The Criminal Code of The Netherlands,1881
3.
Treason, Sedition and Subsersive Activities, US Code
SL. NO.
BOOKS
PG.
NO.
1.
V.N. Shuklas Constitution of India (M.P. Singh, 12th ed., 2013)
20
2.
Konrad Zweigert & HeinKotz, Introduction to Comparative law ( 2nd ed., 1987)
24
3.
John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State (12th ed., 2003)
26
4.
Ratanlal and Dhirajlals Law of Crimes (Justice C.K. Thakker, Honble Mr. 26
Justice Y.K. Sabharwal (26th ed., 2007)
5.
Ram Jethmalani, D.S. Chopra, The Indian Penal Code (1st ed., 2014)
10 | P a g e
25

6.
Kent Greenwalts Free Speech Justifications in Comparative Constitutional Law 20

(M.P. Singh, 7th ed., 1989)
SL. NO.
JOURNALS
1.
Rajeev Dhavan, Borrowed Ideas: On the Impact of American Scholarship on
Pg.
No.
24
Indian Law, The American Journal of Comparative Law (1985)

2.
Sujit Choudhury, Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of
24
Comparative Constitutional Interpretation, Indiana Law Journal (1999)
SL. NO.
MAGAZINES AND NEWSPAPERS
1.
Venkatesh Nayak, Sedition Police Omission FIRs and RTIs, Commonwealth

Human
Rights
Initiative,
PG.
NO.
22
http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/blog/the-
sedition-row-at-jnu-the-law-how-its-been-applied-in-the-past-and-omissionsby-delhi-police.
2.
Soli J Sorabjee, Sedition law should stay, but its interpretation must be specific
23
and not wide-ranging as in British era, The Times of India (19/02/2016)

http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/toi-edit-page/sedition-law-shouldstay-but-its-interpretation-must-be-specific-and-not-wide-ranging-as-inbritish-era-2/
3.
Arvind P. Dattar, Section 124A should stay, The Indian Express (25/02/2016)
23
http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/section-124a-should-stay-2/
4.
Asad Ismi, Maoist Insurgency Spreads to Over 40% of India. Mass Poverty and
23
Delhis Embrace of Corporate Neoliberalism Fuels Social Uprising,

http://www.globalresearch.ca/maoist-insurgency-spreads-to-over-40-of-indiamass-poverty-and-delhis-embrace-of-corporate-neoliberalism-fuels-socialuprising/5362276
5.
Sunil Raman, SeditionDebate: Freedom of speech is not an unfettered right,

First Post Politics (13/02/2016).
11 | P a g e
26
SL. NO.
WEB RESOURCES
1.
www.westlaw.india.com (WEST LAW INDIA)
2.
www.manupatrafast.com (MANUPATRA)
3.
www.judis.nic.in (SUPREME COURT OF INDIA OFFICIAL)
4.
www.jstor.org (JSTOR)
5.
www.scconline.com (SCC ONLINE)
12 | P a g e
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The jurisdiction of the Honble Supreme Court which has been invoked under Article 136 of
the Constitution of India.
136. Special leave to appeal by the Supreme Court
(1) Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant
special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any
cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India
(2) Nothing in clause (1 ) shall apply to any judgment, determination, sentence or order passed
or made by any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed
Forces.
13 | P a g e
STATEMENT OF FACTS
BACKGROUND
1. Kamlalal Nohru University (KNU) is an elite educational institution located in Delhi,
offering post-graduate courses in the liberal arts. The campus has two political parties, the leftleaning Championist Party of India Farcist (CPI-F), and the right-wing Desh Jalao Party
(DJP). Verbal spats and physical violence between rival political camps are common.
Sanwariya Kumar, the President of KNU Student Council, Kabmar Khalid and Kamiban
Bhattacharya are CPI-F affiliated PhD scholars.
CIRCUMSTANCES LEADING TO THE CASE
2. At the annual rally conducted on February 9, 2016, various slogans were raised against the
tyranny of the Indian state. The slogans were initially about Azadi but soon changed to antiIndia chants. It is alleged that slogans to the effect of death to India, we will wage war
against this tyrannical state till it crumbles and we will avenge the murder of Taqbool were
raised. Members of DJP filmed the entire event and subsequently alerted the police. The police
arrived at the KNU campus and arrested Sanwariya Kumar, Kabmar Khalid and Kamiban
Bhattacharya on charges of sedition under S. 124A, IPC. At this time, Dharmanand Pover,
agreed to represent the KNU students and filed a writ petition under Art. 226 at the Honble
High Court of Delhi (i) the crime of sedition within the meaning of S. 124A constituted an
unreasonable restriction on the right to freedom of speech and expression set out in Art. 19 of
the Constitution of India; and (ii) Art. 19 protects the freedom of the individual to disagree with
state policy and dissent against actions of the state.
APPEAL TO THE HONBLE SC
3. Honble HC of Delhi ruled in favour of Laveesta, and held that the ban on production and
distribution of CDs was a reasonable restriction on Gentlemanians right to carry on any trade
or occupation. Hence the present appeal.
14 | P a g e

BACKGROUND
1. Gentlemanian Swamy is a Member of the Parliament and enjoys support from various
categories of people. He is known to write negatively about corrupt politicians and in the past
have been known to files cases questioning suspicious transactions involving various
politicians as well. He likes to propagate a pro-Hindu ideology for which he has established a
Wholly Owned Company known as I Love Trump Ltd. which produces CDs of songs and
videos propagating pro-Hindu ideologies.
CIRCUMSTANCES LEADING TO THE FILING OF THE PETITION
2. Due to the company's immense success and popularity, various people have, with mala
fide motive, alleged that the CDs include songs and videos of provocative songs and videos
targeting minority communities with explicit threats of mass murder and sexual violence. The
pro-Hindu propagations have been misconstrued as remarks against the minority communities.
At this juncture, Ms. Laveesta Ketalvad, being one of those people who made such allegations,
moved the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution, seeking a ban on the production and
sale of CDs by I Love Trump Limited.
DECISION OF THE HIGH COURT
3. In the High Court, Ms. Swamy took the defence of his right to carry on business under Art.
19(1)(g) whereas the High Court held that a reasonable restriction can be imposed on the
business, thus banning the production and distribution of the said CDs.
APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT
4. Now the matter is pending before the Honble Supreme Court of India.
15 | P a g e
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
I.
WHETHER
THE
IS MAINTAINABLE BEFORE THE
HONBLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA?
II.
WHETHER S.124A
OF THE IPC,
1860,
CONSTITUTES AN UNREASONABLE
RESTRICTION ON THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION UNDER ART. 19
(1) (A) OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA?
I.
WHETHER
THE
IS MAINTAINABLE BEFORE THE
HONBLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA?
II.
WHETHER THE BAN ON THE PRODUCTION OF CDS BY I LOVE TRUMP LTD. IS

A REASONABLE RESTRICTION ON THE RIGHT TO PRACTISE ANY PROFESSION,
OR TO CARRY ON ANY OCCUPATION, TRADE OR BUSINESS ENSHRINED UNDER
ART. 19 (1) (G)?
16 | P a g e
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I.
THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION IS NOT MAINTAINABLE BEFORE THE HONBLE

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA.
That the SLP filed by the Appellants is not maintainable. For a Special Leave to be
maintainable in the Honble Supreme Court, the most fundamental ingredient is a
substantial question of law. In this case, the substantial question of law involved is the
constitutionality of S. 124-A of the IPC and over a period of time the Honble Supreme
Court has through various cases settled the law, and interpreted its constitutionality.
Therefore, there is no substantial question in the petition to begin with and as a result,
the SLP must be quashed and not admitted.
II.
S.
124A
OF THE IPC,
1860,
CONSTITUTES AN UNREASONABLE RESTRICTION ON THE
FREEDOM OF SPEECH & EXPRESSION UNDER ART. 19 (1) (A) OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
INDIA.
Firstly, the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of India even though
the bulwark of democratic expression, isnt an absolute right. It is subject to reasonable
restrictions and penalising offences like sedition is a step towards that. Allowing a
citizen to abuse the nation and incite others against the government to lead to public
disorder in the guise of intellectual opinions is not expected nor is it permissible.
Secondly, the legislative intent of the section was not to curb freedom of speech but to
check secessionist activities, left wing extremism, violence against public servants,
cyber propaganda by terrorists and their supporters etc. To curb all these anti national
activities, state should be equipped with some extra powers in the form of laws so as to
maintain the integrity and safety of our country. It is essential to note that the failure of
executive, in instances, should not fail the law in its entirety. Instead of eliminating the
law there should be measures to curb misinterpretation of the law. Therefore it is the
contention of the respondents is that the section in question is very much a
constitutionally correct reasonable restriction on the freedom of speech and expression.
17 | P a g e

I.
THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE BEFORE THE HONBLE SUPREME

COURT OF INDIA.
We have are approaching the Hon'ble Supreme Court under Art. 136 of the
Constitution. The Special Leave petition filed, fulfils the criterion of a substantial
question of law, as well as appeals against a judgment that has caused grave miscarriage
of justice. This is why the Leave for Special appeal is absolutely maintainable and
therefore must be admitted in the Supreme Court.
II.
THE BAN ON THE PRODUCTION OF CDS BY I LOVE TRUMP LTD. IS A REASONABLE

RESTRICTION ON THE RIGHT TO PRACTISE ANY PROFESSION, OR TO CARRY ON ANY
OCCUPATION, TRADE OR BUSINESS ENSHRINED UNDER ART. 19 (1) (G).
That the CDs produced by I Love Trump ltd. specialises in producing and distributing
provocative songs and videos targeting minority communities with explicit threats of
mass murder and sexual violence, which in itself is violative of the Indian Penal Code.
Such an act can cause communal tension and discord in society. Therefore banning the
production and distribution of such CDs would be a reasonable restriction under Art.
19(1) (g). Moreover, the right under Art. 19 (1) (g) cannot be claimed by a company
viz. I Love Trump Ltd.
18 | P a g e
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
I.
THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE BEFORE THE

HONBLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA.
1.The Petitioner has approached The Honble Supreme Court of India under Art. 136 of the
Constitution of India. The requirements of Special Leave Petition are satisfied in the following
case.
1. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT.
2. The first criteria under Art. 136 of the Constitution of Special Leave petition is for it to be
an appeal to "any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter
passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India". In this case this appeal is
made against the judgment passed by the Singh Judge of the High Court of Delhi,1 in the Art.
226 Petition, filed by Dharmanand Pover.
2. SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION OF LAW.
3.The second criteria of a Special Leave petition is the existence of a substantial question of
law2 of public importance. The question of constitutionality of Section 124A of the Indian
Penal Code 1860 is the substantial question of law of public importance, in this case.
3. DECISION OF THE HON'BLE HC OF DELHI HAS CAUSED "GREAT MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE"3.

4. The existence of Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code causes great miscarriage of
justice in its application on people and their right to free speech and expression protected by
the Constitution.
MOOT PROPOSITION, LEX OMNIA MOOT COURT 2016, PAGE 2 4

Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari, AIR 2001 SC 965.See also, Pankaj Bhargava v. Mohinder Nath, AIR
1991 SC 1233; Raghunath Prasad Singh v. Dy. Commr. of Partabgarh, AIR 1927 PC 110; Sir Chunilal Mehta &
Sons Ltd. v. Century Spinning & Manufacturing Co. Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 1314; Union of India v. Chaman
LalLoona and Co., AIR 1957 SC 652; M.M Gupta v. State of J & K, (1982) 3 SCC 41.
3
Kerala SEB v. Kurien E. Kalathil, AIR 2000 SC 2573; See also, Chain Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1973 SC
2677; Shrinivas Pannalal Chokani v. State of M.P., AIR 1954 SC 23; State of Rajasthan v. Narayan, AIR 1992
SC 2004; D.V Shanmughan v. State of A.P, AIR 1997 SC 2583; State of J & K v. Hazara Singh, AIR 1981 SC
451.
1
2
19 | P a g e

II.
S. 124-A OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860, DOES NOT CONSTITUTES AN

UNREASONABLE RESTRICTION ON THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND
EXPRESSION UNDER ARTICLE 19 (1) (A) OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
INDIA.
1. It is humbly submitted before this Honble SC that the rights enumerated in Article 19 (1)4
are those great and basic rights which are recognised as the natural rights inherent in the status
of a citizen5.
However, these rights are not absolute and uncontrolled.7 It is subject to
curtailment of qualified reasonable restriction. The principles on which the power of the State
to impose restrictions is based is that all individual rights of a person are held subject to such
reasonable limitations and regulations as maybe necessary or expedient for the protection of
the rights of others, generally expressed as social interest.8
1. THE FREEDOM
OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION GUARANTEED UNDER THE CONSTITUTION IS NOT
AN UNFETTERED FREEDOM.
1. Article 19 (1) (a) secures to every citizen the right to freedom of speech and expression.9
Article 19 (1) (a) is the bulwark of a healthy, progressive and democratic society10. It leads to
the creation of new ideas and knowledge, finding of truth, building tolerance and receptivity
and is essential for self-rule.11 However, demonstrations being visible representations of ideas
would be protected as a form of speech provided they are not violent and disorderly.12 Section
124-A13 prohibits attempting to bring about hatred or ill will and contempt or low opinion about
the Government established by the law by making base, dishonourable and contemptuous
statements14 to incite violence and disorder.
Art. 19, the Constitution of India.

V.N. Shuklas Constitution of India, 127, (M.P. Singh, 12th ed., 2013).
6
State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose, AIR 1954 SC 92.
7
K. Krishna Murthy v. Union of India, (2010) 7 SCC 202; Noise Pollution (V), In re, AIR 2005 SC 1336; I.R
Coelho v. State of T.N, AIR 2007 SC 861.
8
V.N. Shuklas Constitution of India, 128, (M.P. Singh, 12th ed., 2013).
9
Kent Greenwalts Free Speech Justifications in Comparative Constitutional Law, 157, (M.P. Singh, 7th ed.,
1989).
10
Supra 2, at 133.
11
J.S. Mill, On Liberty (1859); A. Meiklejohn, Political Freedom (1965); Dissent of Justice Matthew in Bennet
Coleman & Co. v. Union of India, (1972) 2 SCC 788; AIR 1973 SC 106; P.K. Tripathi, Spotlights on
Constitutional Interpretation, 278, (1978).
12
Kameshwar Prasad v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 1166.
13
S. 124-A, The Indian Penal Code, 1860.
14
Annie Besant v. Advocate General of Madras, AIR 1919 PC 31, (A case under the Indian Press Act, 1910 which
was closely similar to the provision of 124-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860).
5
20 | P a g e

2. PRESERVATION OF PUBLIC ORDER.
1. The preservation of public order is one of the cardinal duties of the Constitution of India15
and one of the principle grounds for imposing restrictions on the freedom of speech and
expression. The expression public order is synonymous with public peace, safety and
tranquillity.16 A hundred and fifty years ago, holding a meeting or procession was considered
seditious. This opinion and its judicial interpretation has changed by leaps and bounds, though.
Sedition now embraces only those practices which by deed, word or writing are calculated to
disturb the tranquillity of the State and lead ignorant persons to subvert the government17.
The incident at KNU18 was not a mere demonstration nor was it made in spirit of free
expression. It was a calculated effort to belittle and crumble the patriotism that Indians so
cherish. The statements so made was not made to effect criticism of the government but was
made to propagate an ill feeling about the national integrity and to do so over Indian soil is
repugnant and seditious to the very core of it, to state the least.
2. Statements like, death to India, we will wage war against this tyrannical state till it
crumbles and we will avenge the murder of Taqbool19 is not in any way critical of the
government or its measures but is an attempt at subverting the existence of the Indian Union.
These words incite and advocate the overthrow of the Government by unlawful means soon to
resort to violent measures. By their very nature they involve danger to the public peace 20 and
to the security of the State. They have the pernicious tendency or intention of creating public
disorder or disturbance of public tranquillity and 'law and order'21. The very security of the
State depends upon the maintenance of law and order22 and this law and order is hampered
once there is an attempt to incite citizenry to develop disloyalty towards their own nation by
attempting to bring into hatred or contempt the Crown, the Houses of Parliament, the
Constitution, to raise discontent among the people or promote hostility, between the various
classes of people.23
15
Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 167 OF 2012 (Supreme Court of India,
12/03/2016).
16
Supt., Central Prison v. Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia, AIR 1960 SC 633.
17
R. v. Sullivan, (1868) 11 Cox CC 44.
18
19
20
Prakash Chandra Sachdeva v. State, (1994) 1 SCC 471.
21
Ram Lila Maidan Incident, In re, (2012) 5 SCC 1.
22
Venkatesh Nayak, Sedition Police Omission FIRs and RTIs, Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, available
at http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/blog/the-sedition-row-at-jnu-the-law-how-its-been-applied-in-the-pastand-omissions-by-delhi-police, last seen on 27/09/2016.
23
R. v. Burns, (1886) 16 Cox CC 355.
21 | P a g e

3. PUBLIC DISORDER OR LIKELIHOOD OF PUBLIC DISORDER IS THE GIST OF S-124A.
1. It is humbly submitted before this Honble SC that Public disorder or the reasonable
anticipation or likelihood of public disorder, is thus the gist of the offence. The acts or words
complained of must either incite to disorder or must be such as to satisfy reasonable men that
that is their intention or tendency.24 The comments made or slogans raised by Sanwariya Kumar
and his associates25 appeals to any reasonable man as seditious in intention. Section 124-A
talks of intentions and tendencies that bring about hatred and contempt. Thus, it clearly shows
that sedition does not necessarily involve any creation of disorder. 26
2. Your Honble Lordship Justice Fazl Ali, in his dissent of Romesh Thappar v. State of
Madras27 said that sedition in any serious sense leads to disorder and even threatening to the
security of State and therefore is a reasonable curtailment to the freedom of speech and
expression.
Deletion of the word sedition from draft article 13 (2), therefore, shows that criticism of
Government affecting disaffection or bad feelings towards it is not to be regarded as a
justifying ground for restricting the freedom of expression and of the press, unless it is such as
to undermine the security or tend to overthrow the state.28
4. KEDAR NATH SINGHS29 INTERPRETATION REQUIRES NO REVIEW AS IT PROMOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL ETHOS, VALUES AND IDEALS.
1. The Supreme Court in Kedar Nath Singh30 held that if the section in question were given
the wide interpretation that it had been so given in the Privy Council decision, it would be
inconsistent with Art. 19 (2) inasmuch as it would have no relation to the ground of restriction
permissible under clause (2) of Art. 19 viz., the interests of the security of state, or public
order which are relevant in the present context. The Supreme Court has, accordingly,
interpreted s. 124-A to mean that an utterance would be punishable under this section only
when it is specifically intended to excite violence and disharmony among otherwise peaceful
people. One does not need to advocate mutiny, rebellion or disturbance in order to be hit by
the Section; all that is needed is the advocacy of feelings of enmity31. The words used in this
24
Niharendu Dutt v. Emperor, AIR 1942 FC 22.

26
Indramani Singh v. Manipur State, AIR 1955 Manipur 9.
27
Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 124.
28
Ibid.
29
Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1959 All 101 (121).
30
Ibid.
31
25
22 | P a g e

situation are akin to ill will, a definite insubordination of authority or seeking to alienate the
people and weaken the bond of allegiance32.
2. Sanwariya Kumar and his associates33 were trying to enrage and excite a crowd into a mob
against the nation of India its very existence and mob rule and mob justice cannot be permitted
however strongly one may dislike the government. If that happens the very basis of a civil
society is undermined and there is no vibrant democracy prevalent in our country. Section 124A
Sedition as interpreted by the Supreme Court is necessary. Its misuse is no ground for its
deletion34.
3. It would be perilous to abolish this section35 as an anachronistic colonial provision.36 We
cannot forget that dozens of districts in different states face a Maoist insurgency37 and rebel
groups virtually run a parallel administration. These groups openly advocate the overthrow of
the state government by revolution. Against the backdrop of this stark reality, the abolition of
Section 124A would be ill-advised merely because it has been wrongly invoked in some highly
publicised cases.38 The Kedar Nath judgment defines why exactly there is a need for the
provision in question here:
the freedom [of speech and expression] has to be guarded against becoming a licence for
vilification and condemnation of the Government established by law, in words, which incite
violence or have the tendency to create public disorder. A citizen has a right to say or write
whatever he likes about the Government, or its measures, by way of criticism or comment, so
long as he does not incite people to violence against the Government established by law or
with the intention of creating public disorder.39
4. The legislative intent of the section was not to curb freedom of speech but to check
secessionist activities, left wing extremism, violence against public servants, cyber propaganda
by terrorists and their supporters etc. To curb all these anti national activities, state should be
32
Queen Empress v. Amba Prasad, (1898) ILR 20 All 55.

34
Soli J Sorabjee, Sedition law should stay, but its interpretation must be specific and not wide-ranging as in
British era, The Times of India (19/02/2016), available at http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/toi-editpage/sedition-law-should-stay-but-its-interpretation-must-be-specific-and-not-wide-ranging-as-in-british-era-2/,
last seen on 01/10/2016.
35
Supra 28.
36
Arvind P. Dattar, Section 124A should stay, The Indian Express (25/02/2016), available at
http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/section-124a-should-stay-2/ , last seen on 01/10/2016.
37
Asad Ismi, Maoist Insurgency Spreads to Over 40% of India. Mass Poverty and Delhis Embrace of Corporate
Neoliberalism Fuels Social Uprising, available at http://www.globalresearch.ca/maoist-insurgency-spreads-toover-40-of-india-mass-poverty-and-delhis-embrace-of-corporate-neoliberalism-fuels-social-uprising/5362276,
last seen on 01/10/2016.
38
Ibid.
39
Supra 26.
33
23 | P a g e

equipped with some extra powers in the form of laws so as to maintain the integrity and safety
of our country. It is essential to note that the failure of executive, in instances, should not fail
the law in its entirety. Instead of eliminating the law there should be measures to curb
misinterpretation of the law.
5. INDIAN CONSTITUTION AND ITS UNIVERSALISTIC INTERPRETATION.
1. The Universalistic interpretation provides that all the constitutional guarantees are cut out
from the same cloth.40 The courts should interpret such guarantees in a manner in which the
concept of liberty transcends national boundaries. It states that different legal systems give the
same or similar solutions, despite the great differences in their historical development,
conceptual structure, and style of operation.41
2. The fundamental rights42 of citizens of India are based entirely on the U.S. Bill of Rights.
As a result, Indian courts have been following the precedents of foreign courts in clarifying
the parameters of statutes applied.43 There are multiple legal systems all over the globe that
validate sedition laws and include them in their laws. Certain countries that have still preserved
their sedition are United States of America44, The Netherlands45, Germany46 and henceforth,
one can easily conclude that the very reason behind this is that the integrity and sovereignty of
a state cannot be compromised.
6. RIGHT TO DISSENT IS NOT WHAT IS CURBED BY THE LAW OF SEDITION, BUT IT IS THE RIGHT TO
REJECT THE NATION BY ABUSING THAT IS UNACCEPTABLE.
1. The provision of sec 124-A is not unconstitutional as being violative of the fundamental
right of speech and expression guaranteed under Art. 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution. The
restrictions which have been imposed by the impugned provision is in the interest of public
order, within the legislative interference. If a certain provision of law is construed to be
consistent with the constitution and another interpretation renders the same unconstitutional,
the court would lean towards the former construction.47 The explanations provided to the main
40
Sujit Choudhury, Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of Comparative Constitutional

Interpretation, Indiana Law Journal, 74, 111 (1999),
41
Konrad Zweigert & HeinKotz, Introduction to Comparative law, 36 (2nd ed., 1987) (Basil Markensinis has
expressed the same view: Unashamedly, therefore, the series and the book, while not going the differences, were
aimed at underlying and underlining similarities, common problems, and the advantages of searching together for
similar or common answers).
42
PART III, Fundamental Rights, the Constitution of India.
43
Rajeev Dhavan, Borrowed Ideas: On the Impact of American Scholarship on Indian Law, The American
Journal of Comparative Law, 505-526 (1985).
44
Chapter 115- Treason, Sedition and Subsersive Activities, US Code.
45
The Criminal Code of The Netherlands, 1881.
46
Section 130, German Criminal Code, 1871.
47
Sri Indra Das v. State of Assam, Criminal Appeal No.1383 of 2007, (Supreme Court of India, 10/02/2007).
24 | P a g e

body of the section 124-A makes it clear that criticism of public measures or a comment on
governmental action however strongly worded would be within the ambit of the fundamental
right of freedom of speech and expression. It is only when the words, written or spoken have a
tendency or intention of disturbing the law and order in the society, the law steps in to prevent
such activities in the greater interest of public order. The respondents contend that the
impugned provision strikes the correct balance between individual fundamental rights and the
interest of public order.48
2. In interpreting the said provision the court must not merely look into the literal
interpretation of words used but also take into consideration the antecedent history of the
legislation, its purpose and the mischief which is being suppressed. The provisions of this
section should be construed so as to limit their application to acts involving intention or
tendency to create public disorder or disturbance of law and order. Sedition, thus embraces all
those practices which are calculated to disturb the tranquillity of the state and lead ignorant
persons to endeavour in the subversion of the government and the laws of the country.49
3. The Constitution First (Amendment) Act, 1951, added two words of the widest amplitude
giving the state wide discretionary powers to protect law and order of the state. The two words
which were added to article 19 (2) are, in the interest of and public order. These words
helped with the restrictions that can be put through law on the freedom of speech and expression
guaranteed under article 19 (1) (a). The constitutionality of section 124-A cannot be questioned
as it is the fundamental duty of the state to maintain peace and public tranquillity as envisaged
by the drafters of the constitution.50 The security of the state depends upon the maintenance of
law and order and offences against the state need to be punished.51 The legislation in question
has fully protected the freedom of speech and expression which is the sine qua non of a
democratic form of government. However, this freedom needs to be guarded against becoming
a warrant for denigration and disparagement of a government which has been formed by a
democratic process and under the untenable duty to protect and maintain public order.52
4. The demand of the appellant in this present appeal is excessive and ironic in its very
essence. Every citizen of the nation is a subscriber to the state. They are given protection and
48
Sanskar Marathe v. The State Of Maharashtra, Cri. PIL 3-2015, (Bombay High Court, 17/03/2015).
Ram Jethmalani, D.S. Chopra, The Indian Penal Code, 664 (1st ed., 2014).
50
Subramanian Swamy v. Ministry Of Law & Ors,, Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 184 Of 2014, (Supreme Court
of India, 13/05/2016).
51
Ibid.
52
Ratanlal and Dhirajlals Law of Crimes, (Justice C.K. Thakker, Honble Mr. Justice Y.K. Sabharwal, 26 th ed.,
2007).
49
25 | P a g e

are assured maintenance by the state and the corresponding duty that arises from the enjoyment
of these rights is that the citizens owe their allegiance to the state. The concept of statehood has
evolved manifold and has shrunk itself to homogeneous units and the active role often taken
by the state to promote nationalism through emphasis on shared symbols and national
identity.53 Hence, it is unacceptable to make derogatory remarks made in order to hamper such
national identity.
5. The world has come a long way since the 9/11 attacks54 and the London Underground
attacks55. United Kingdom prior to these incidents permitted clerics talking about overthrowing
or subverting governments in mosques. However, states have grown increasingly conscious of
their security and to permit anti-national statements would not only undermine state security
but would also belittle the spirit of national pride. A democratic right that needs to be cherished
and protected must not be allowed to be misused in the name of freedom. There is a line that
divides right to have academic debate and support to terrorism or the idea of terrorism, that
should not be violated or allowed to be. If it is, then the law must come into play. 56 Freedom
of speech and expression and freedom of communication has a preferred status in a democratic
society and must be guarded zealously. Sedition is a serious crime against the state threat to
the stability and challenge to the authority of the state not merely opposition, however strong
or resistance to the policy of the government. It is true that it is difficult to decide where to
draw the line. But is also true that the line has to be drawn, as far as possible.
III.
THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE BEFORE THE

HONBLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA.
1.The Petitioner has approached The Honble Supreme Court of India under Art. 136 of the
Constitution of India. The requirements of Special Leave Petition are satisfied in the following
case.
1. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT.
2.In this case this appeal is made against the judgment passed by the Single Judge of the High
Court of Delhi,57 in the matter Writ Petition matter filed by Ms. Laveesta Ketalvad.
53
John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State, (12th ed., 2003).

The September 11 attacks were a series of four coordinated terrorist attacks by the Islamic terrorist group alQaeda on the United States on the morning of Tuesday, September 11, 2001.
55
British Broadcasting Corporation, 7 July Bombings (17/10/2009) available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/uk/05/london_blasts/what_happened/html/russell_sq.stm , last seen on
02/10/2016.
56
Sunil Raman, Sedition Debate: Freedom of speech is not an unfettered right, First Post Politics (13/02/2016).
57
54
26 | P a g e

2. SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION OF LAW.
3.The second criteria of a Special Leave petition is the existence of a substantial question of
law58 of public importance. The question of whether or not reasonable restrictions will apply
here on the Fundamental Rights of Mr. Swamy under Art. 19(1) (g) is a the substantial question
of law.
3. DECISION OF THE HON'BLE HC OF DELHI HAS CAUSED "GREAT MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE"59.
4. It is the humble contention of the appellants that the Judgment of the High Court of Delhi
has caused grave miscarriage of justice. The Right to carry out any business or trade is a
Fundamental Right guaranteed to Mr. Gentlemanian Swamy by the Constitution and the ban
imposed by the High Court is prejudicial to this right, especially as it was passed without
checking the veracity of the allegations put against him were not proved by way of a properly
conducted investigation. Moreover, the Writ itself was not maintainable in the High Court as a
private person such as Ms. Swamy who was carrying out a private act of business through his
privately owned business was not amenable to writ jurisdiction. Therefore, the matter should
not have been admitted in the first place. Thus, the judgment passed in that matter was
extremely prejudicial and cause a great miscarriage of justice.
IV.
WRIT PETITION FILED BY LAVEESTA KETALVAD BEFORE THE

HONBLE HIGH COURT IS NOT MAINTAINABLE UNDER THE
PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA.
1. The Appellants humbly submit before the Hon'ble Court that the WP which was filed by
Laveesta Ketalvad under Article 22660 of the Constitution of India, seeking a ban on the
58
SantoshHazari v. PurushottamTiwari, AIR 2001 SC 965.See also, PankajBhargava v. MohinderNath, AIR 1991
SC 1233; Raghunath Prasad Singh v. Dy. Commr. of Partabgarh, AIR 1927 PC 110; Sir Chunilal Mehta & Sons
Ltd. v. Century Spinning & Manufacturing Co. Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 1314; Union of India v. ChamanLalLoona and
Co., AIR 1957 SC 652; M.M Gupta v. State of J & K, (1982) 3 SCC 41.
59
Kerala SEB v. Kurien E. Kalathil, AIR 2000 SC 2573.See also, Chain Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1973 SC
2677; ShrinivasPannalalChokani v. State of M.P., AIR 1954 SC 23; State of Rajasthan v. Narayan, AIR 1992 SC
2004; D.V Shanmughan v. State of A.P, AIR 1997 SC 2583; State of J & K v. Hazara Singh, AIR 1981 SC 451.
60
Power of High Courts to issue certain writs,
(1) Notwithstanding anything in Article 32 every High Court shall have powers, throughout the territories in
relation to which it exercise jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any
Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus,
mandamus, prohibitions, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights
conferred by Part III and for any other purpose.
(2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person
may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the
27 | P a g e

production and sale of CDs by I love Trump Ltd., was not maintainable as I love Trump Ltd.
was a wholly owned private company of Gentlemaniam Swamy, engaged in a private business
of producing CDs61 for the purpose of earning profits. Therefore as, neither does the company
come under the purview of 'state' under Article 1262, and nor is the business undertaken by the
company considered to be a business with public purpose63, the company is not amenable to
Writ jurisdiction. It is important to understand that mere incorporation of a company under The
Companies Act64 does not mean that the company automatically becomes a State under Article
12 of simply because it has been registered under a statute. Even private bodies may have to
be registered under a statute, or are regulated by a statute, but that does not necessarily mean
that they are State under Article 12.65
1. THE COMPANY, I LOVE TRUMP LTD. IS NOT A STATE UNDER ART 12.
1. It is humbly submitted to understand that I Love Trump Ltd. is not State under the meaning
enshrined in Art. 1266. For that purpose the landmark judgments of Ajay Hasia67 and R.D.
Shetty68 can be referred to. The various criterion used by the Honble Supreme Court to declare
cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such
Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories
(3) Where any party against whom an interim order, whether by way of injunction or stay or in any other manner,
is made on, or in any proceedings relating to, a petition under clause (1), without
(a) furnishing to such party copies of such petition and all documents in support of the plea for such interim order;
and
(b) giving such party an opportunity of being heard, makes an application to the High Court for the vacation of
such order and furnishes a copy of such application to the party in whose favour such order has been made or the
counsel of such party, the High Court shall dispose of the application within a period of two weeks from the date
on which it is received or from the date on which the copy of such application is so furnished, whichever is later,
or where the High Court is closed on the last day of that period, before the expiry of the next day afterwards on
which the High Court is open; and if the application is not so disposed of, the interim order shall, on the expiry of
that period, or, as the case may be, the expiry of the aid next day, stand vacated.
(4) The power conferred on a High Court by this article shall not be in derogation of the power conferred on the
Supreme Court by clause (2) of Article 32.
63
Venkatamma v. City Improvement Trust Board, AIR 1972 SC 2683 (Any purpose which directly benefits the
public or a section of the public is a public purpose).
64
S. 7, The Companies Act, 2013.
65
S.D. Siddiqui v. University of Delhi & Ors., Letter Patent Appeal No. 2256/2005 (Delhi High Court,
19/11/2005).
66
Supra 63.
67
Ajay Hasia Etc. v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi & Ors. Etc., AIR 1981 SC 487.
68
Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. The International Airport, AIR 1979 SC 1628.
61
62
28 | P a g e

the International Airport Authority as State69, was later summarized in the case of R.D. Shetty
and the guidelines laid down to identify a State instrumentality, stands as follows:
2. THE ENTIRE SHARE CAPITAL OF THE CORPORATION SHOULD BE HELD BY THE GOVERNMENT.70
1. In the instant matter, I Love Trump Ltd. is a Wholly Owned Company of Mr. Gentlemanian
Swamy71, which implies that the shares of the company was owned by him and the sole control
of the company was at his disposal. This automatically negates the first criteria laid down,
about the entire share capital being owned by the Government.
3. THE
FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE OF THE
EXPENDITURE OF THE CORPORATION.
STATE
IS SO MUCH AS TO MEET ALMOST ENTIRE
72
1. The next criteria of a financial assistance given by the Government is also untrue as I Love
Trump Ltd. had never received a financial assistance from the Government, being merely a CD
producing company not undertaking any business, qualifying itself for any Government
funding whatsoever.
4. THE
CORPORATION ENJOYS MONOPOLY STATUS WHICH IS
PROTECTED.
STATE
CONFERRED OR
STATE
73
1. The third requirement of monopoly status is also unfulfilled as the impugned Company
produces CDs which is a business undertaken by several other companies.
5. EXISTENCE OF DEEP AND PERVASIVE STATE CONTROL MAY AFFORD AN INDICATION THAT THE
CORPORATION IS A STATE AGENCY OR INSTRUMENTALITY.74
1. The next criteria of a deep and pervasive State control, also remains unqualified as there
is absolutely no State control existing in the company.
69
Supra 63.
Urmila Roy v. Bengal Peerless Housing Development Co. Ltd., AIR 2009 SC 2086.
71
72
R.K. Panda v. Steel Authority of India & Ors. (1994) 5 SCC 304; See also, Mahabir Auto Store v. Indian Oil
Corporation, (1990) 3 SCC 752; State of West Bengal v. V.K. Mandal & Ors., AIR 1962 SC 779; Murlidhar
Dayandeo Kesekar V. Vishwanath Pandu Barde & Anr., 1995 Supp (2) SCC 549; Consumer Education &
Research Centre & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., (1995) 3 SCC 42.
73
Jatya Pal Singh v. Union of India, (2013) 6 SCC 452; Radhakrishna Agarwal v. State of Bihar, (1977) 3 SCC.
457; Kulchhinder Singh v. Hardayal Singh Brar, (1976) 3 SCC 828.
74
Prathama Bank v. Vijay Kumar Goel, (1989) AIR 1989 SC 1977; See also B.S Minhas v. Indian Statistical
Institute, AIR 1984 SC 363; Balmer Lawrie & Co. Ltd. v. Partha Sarathi Sen Roy, (2013) 8 SCC 345; Pradeep
Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology, (2002) 5 SCC 111; N. Nagendra Rao & Company v. State
of A.P., (1994) 6 SCC 205; LIC v. Consumer Education & Research Centre, (1995) 5 SCC 482; Rajasthan SEB
v. Mohan Lal, AIR 1967 SC 857; Virendra Kumar Srivastava v. U.P. Rajya Karmachari Kalyan Nigam, (2005) 1
SCC 149; Lt. Governor of Delhi v. V.K. Sodhi, (2007) 15 SCC 136.
70
29 | P a g e

6. THE FUNCTIONS OF THE CORPORATION ARE OF PUBLIC IMPORTANCE AND CLOSELY RELATED
TO GOVERNMENT FUNCTION.75
1. It is a private company undertaken for a commercial purpose of earning profits.76
2. These guidelines were used in various cases to distinguish a corporation which was a State
instrumentality from one that wasn't, such as in the case of Som Prakash Rekhi v. Union of
India77. However, these guidelines are not to be stretched so far as to bring in every autonomous
body which has some nexus with the Government within the sweep of the expression, "the
State".
3. Henceforth, it is submitted that I Love Trump Ltd. is a Wholly Owned Company
incorporated under the Companies Act78 by Mr. Gentlemanian Swamy. Therefore it becomes
amply clear that none of the guidelines or criterion as mentioned in the landmark case of Ajay
Hasia79 has even been remotely fulfilled which leads us to the conclusion that I Love Trump
Ltd. is not a Government instrumentality and therefore not amenable to Writ jurisdiction.
V.
THE CRITERIA REQUIRED FOR A PRIVATE BODY TO BE AMENABLE TO WRIT

JURISDICTION PUBLIC FUNCTION, NOT FULFILLED.
1. It is true from the wordings of Art. 22680 that a WP can be filed against a private person as
well.81 The phrase "to any person" denotes that a writ under Art. 226 can be filed against a
private person as well, for any purpose.82
2. In the case of G. Bassi Reddy v. International Crops Research Institute and Anr 83, it was
held that the power of the High Court to issue such a writ to "any person" can only mean the
power to issue such a writ to any person to whom, according to well-established principles, a
writ lay. A writ may issue to an appropriate person for the enforcement of any of the rights
conferred by Part III84 is clear enough from the language used. But the words "and for any other
75
State of U.P. & Anr. v. Radhey Shyam Rai, (2009) 5 SCC 577; P.K Ramchandra Iyer v. Union of India, (1984)
2 SCC 141; Mysore Paper Mills Ltd. v. Mysore Paper Mills Officers Assn., (2002) 2 SCC 167.
76
77
Som Prakash Rekhi v. Union Of India & Anr., 1981 AIR 212.
78
79
Supra 68.
80
Supra 61.
81
Binny Ltd. & Anr. v. Sadasivan & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 1976 of 1998 (Supreme Court of India, 08/08/2005);
Ku Vidhya Mishra v. Governing Body & Other, 2012 SCC OnLine Chh 154 J1.
82
Poonam v. Sumit Tanwar, AIR 2010 SC 1384; Bhagwandas Gangasahai v. Union of India, AIR 1956 SC 175;
Kalyan Singh v. State of U.P, AIR 1962 SC 1183; Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union v. Union of India, (1981)
1 SCC 568.
83
G. Bassi Reddy v. International Crops Research Institute and Anr., Civil Appeal No. 2399 of 1986 (Supreme
Court of India, 14/02/2003).
84
Part III-Fundamental Rights, the Constitution of India.
30 | P a g e

purpose" must mean "for any other purpose for which any one of the writs mentioned would
according to well established principles issue.85 It has already become clear that an entity
ordinarily amenable to writ jurisdiction has to either be the State or a State instrumentality.
Therefore, even the phrase "any person" would broadly encompass a State instrumentality. If
we interpret the word "for any other purpose" literally it will mean that a writ can be issued for
any purpose whatsoever, for example, for deciding private disputes, for grant of divorce,
succession certificate etc.86
3. Similarly, if we interpret the words "to any person" literally it will mean that a writ can
even be issued to private persons. However, this would not be the correct meaning in view of
various decisions87 of the Honble Supreme Court in which it was held that a writ will ordinarily
lie only against the State or instrumentality of the State. The correct interpretation of the
aforesaid words in Art. 22688 are that a writ can ordinarily be issued to a person to whom writs
were traditionally issued by British Courts on well-established principles. Similarly, the words,
"for any other purpose" have to be interpreted in the narrower sense to mean that a writ can
ordinarily be issued for the purpose for which writs were traditionally issued by British Courts
on well-established principles.
7. THE COMPANY DID NOT PERFORM ANY PUBLIC DUTY OR PUBLIC FUNCTION.
1. The British Courts did not ordinarily issue writs to private persons except a writ of Habeas
Corpus89. Primarily the powers under Art. 22690 have been to be exercised against public bodies
and rarely against private persons except in the arena of human rights which is acquiring
horizontal application.91 The Honble SC observed that a writ may lie against a private body
only when it performed a public function or discharged a public duty. 92 Now the question of
what is a public function or a public duty was upon interpretation. However, in the case of
G. Bassi Reddy93, it was held that, "although it is not easy to define what a public function or
85
Indian Tobacco Corporation v. The State of Madras, AIR 1954 Mad 549; Emperor v. F.G. Kalkhowan, AIR
1937 AII 418.
86
Indian Oxygen Employees Union v. Union of India, Writ Appeal No. 286 of 2003 (Madras High Court,
12/02/2009).
87
Balmer Lawrie & Co. Ltd. v. Partha Sarathi Sen Roy, (2013) 8 SCC 345; See also, Pradeep Kumar Biswas v.
Indian Institute of Chemical Biology, (2002) 5 SCC 111; Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport
Authority of India, (1979) 3 SCC 489; Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology, (2002) 5
SCC 111.
88
Supra 58.
89
Praga Tools Corporation v. Shri C. A. Imanual & Ors., 1969 AIR 1306; Dr. Anand Kumar Gupta v. Rajghat
Education Centre & others, 2003 (1) AWC 503.
90
Supra 58.
91
Dwarka Nath v. Income Tax Officer, AIR 1966 SC 81.
92
Supra 79.
93
Supra 81.
31 | P a g e

public duty is, it can reasonably be said that such functions are similar to or closely related to
those performable by the State in its sovereign capacity." Therefore for a private body to be
amenable to writ jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution, it must be performing some
public duty94. However, in the facts at hand we see that I Love Trump Ltd. is not performing
any public duty whatsoever, and is merely doing business for the purpose of profits which
relieves it from public duty95.
2. Arguendo, it has become amply clear from the case of Praga Tools Corporation96 that the
writ which is generally issued to a private body is that of habeas corpus whereas in the case at
hand the writ which has been issued for the purpose of banning the production and sale of
CDs97 has to be a writ of mandamus. A writ of mandamus would also lie against a company
constituted by a statute for the purpose of fulfilling public responsibilities98. Again, in this case
we observe that I Love Trump Ltd. was neither incorporated for a public purpose nor given any
public responsibility. Moreover, the nature of the duty is relevant. This duty or responsibility
must be a positive obligation owned by the person or authority to the affected party99. However,
we see that in this case, I Love Trump Ltd. had no such positive duty towards any person and
therefore cannot be amenable to writ jurisdiction under Art. 226100.
1. THERE
ARE AN EXISTENCE OF AN EQUALLY EFFICIENT, ADEQUATE AND EFFICACIOUS
ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES, WHICH WILL ACT AS A BAR AGAINST ART. 226.
1. The five writs specifically mentioned in Art. 226 are known in English Law as prerogative
writs, for they had originated in the King's prerogative power of superintendence over the due
observance of law by his officers and tribunals.101 The prerogative writs are extraordinary
remedies intended to be applied in exceptional cases in which ordinary legal remedies are not
adequate.102
2. Alternative remedy is a bar to the use of Art. 226 and the Honble HC reserve the right to
reject a petition under Art. 226 when it feels that an adequate remedy exists elsewhere.103
94
Anandi Mukta Sadguru Shree Mukta v. V.R. Rudani & Ors., 1989 AIR 1607.
Federal Bank Ltd v. Sagar Thomas & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 106 of 2001 (Supreme Court of India, 26/09/2003).
96
Supra 87.
97
98
ICICI Bank Limited Rep. By Its Sr. v. Lakshminarayanan, 2008 SCC OnLine Mad 5.
99
U.P. State Co-Operative Land Development Bank Limited v. Chandra Bhan Dubey and Ors., Civil Appeal
Nos. 514 and 515-516 of 1985 (Supreme Court of India, 18/12/1998).
100
Supra 58.
101
Aidal Singh And Ors. v. Karan Singh And Ors. AIR 1957 All 414.
102
Rashid Ahmed v. Municipal Board, Kairana, AIR 1950 SC 163; Nain Sukh Das v. The State of Uttar Pradesh,
AIR 1953 SC 384.
103
Bombay Metropolitan Region Development Authority v. Gokak Patel Volkart Ltd., (1995) 1 SCC 642; See
also, Union of India v. Cottage Arts Emporium, AIR 1992 2218; Kunga Nima Lepcha v. State of Sikkim, AIR
95
32 | P a g e

The remedies under Art. 226 should not be permitted to be utilised as substitutes for alternative
remedies. All the Honble HCs accordingly agree that writs or directions under Art. 226 should
ordinarily be not issued where an equally efficient and adequate alternative remedy, exists,
unless there is any exceptional reason for dealing with the matter under the Writ jurisdiction.104
Thus it becomes amply clear that an alternative remedy is a bar to the invocation of Art. 226.
On the basis of the aforementioned principle of Art. 226, we humbly submit that the WP filed
by Ms. Laveesta Ketalvad must have been rejected by the Honble Delhi HC due to the
existence of the alternative remedies which are as follows.
2. SS. 271 AND 272 OF THE COMPANIES ACT, 2013.
1. 271105 talks about circumstances in which a company may be wound up by the Tribunal.
Sub-section (c) of 271 says, "if the company has acted against the interests of the sovereignty
and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public
order, decency or morality", it can be wound up by means of a petition filed by either the
Central Government or a State Government, under sub-section (g) of 272106.
2. In this regard, the claims of Ms. Laveesta Ketalvad against I Love Trump Ltd. of producing
CDs with threats of mass murder and sexual violence against minority communities,107
implies that the company has indeed acted in a way which is against public order, decency and
morality. Therefore, 271 would have been an apt remedy for Ms. Ketalvad. She could have
written an application to the MCA, Govt. of India, to file for a petition under 272, for winding
up of I Love Trump Ltd. and if truly there would have been merit in her case then the winding
up petition would have succeeded in the Tribunal, resulting in the winding up of the impugned
company.
3. However, without taking the usual course of action, she chose to invoke the Writ
jurisdiction which is a clear departure from the general practice and also a waste of valuable
time for the Hon'ble High Court. This is an alternative remedy which existed and must clearly
2010 SC 1671; Vineet Narain v. Union of India, (1998) 1 SCC 226; G.J. Fernandez v. State of Mysore, (1967) 3
SCR 636; Bar Council Of Delhi And Anr. Etc v. Surjeet Singh And Ors., 1980 AIR 1612.
104
K.K Shrivastava v. Bhupendra Kumar Jain, (1977) 2 SCC 494; See also, Jyotendrasinhaji v. S. Tripathi, AIR
1993 SC 1991; V. Vellaswamy v. Inspector General of Police, AIR 1982 SC 82; Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. v.
Commr.(AA), (2009) 14 SCC 338; Nivedita Sharma v. Cellular Operators Assn. of India, (2011) 14 SCC 337;
Union of India v. Mangal Textile Mills, (2010) 14 SCC 553; Colllector of Customs v. Ramchand Shobraj
Wadhwani, AIR 1961 SC 1506.
105
106
107
MOOT PROPOSITION, LEX OMNIA MOOT COURT 2016.
33 | P a g e

have been exhausted before choosing another course of action. Therefore, the judgment passed
by the Honble High Court must be struck down.
3. REMEDY UNDER THE PENAL LAW.
1. The Respondent in the present case, Ms. Laveesta Ketalvad claimed that the CDs produced
by I Love Trump Ltd. a company wholly owned by Mr. Gentlemanian Swamy, had material
which had "threats of mass murder and sexual violence" against the minority communities. She
argued that the CDs were provocative and sought to create discord between different
communities108, leading to escalated tension and the outbreak of communal riots, and it also
promoted enmity between communities and fell within the ambit of 153A109.
2. In this regard, we humbly submit that Ms. Laveesta Ketalvad could have easily filed an FIR
against the directors110 of the company I Love Trump Ltd. under 154111 of the CrPC. That
way the criminal case against the company and its directors could have been started and in the
investigation that ensued would have cleared all doubt. However, despite having a legal
recourse in criminal law as an alternative remedy, Ms. Laveesta Ketalvad chose to file a WP
under Art. 226112 which is a clear misuse of the provision and therefore the judgement passed
by the Honble HC in that regard must be set aside as invalid.
3. As from the above mentioned two provisions, one from the Companies Act and another
from CrPC, it becomes amply clear that there indeed existed an alternative remedy, which
should have acted as a bar to the admission of the WP filed by Ms. Laveesta Ketalvad under
Article 226. There the judgement passed by the single judge bench of the Honble High
Court113 must be set aside as invalid.
4. MR. GENTLEMANIAN SWAMY HAS A RIGHT TO PRODUCE AND SELL CDS IS COVERED UNDER
THE RIGHT TO CARRY ON BUSINESS UNDER ARTICLE 19 (1) (G).
1. We humbly submit that the ban on the production on of CDs by Mr. Gentlemanian Swamy
through his company I Love Trump Ltd. is a clear cut violation of the "right to practise any
profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business" enshrined under Art. 19 (1) (g)114.
108
Ibid
110
Subhra Pant, FIR filed against managing director of Gurgaon based Vatika Group, Times of India (6/05/2016),
available at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/gurgaon/FIR-filed-against-managing-director-of-Gurgaonbased-Vatika-Group/articleshow/52155523.cms, last seen on 26/09/2016.
111
S. 154, The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
112
Supra 58.
113
114
Art. 19 (1) (g), the Constitution of India.
109
34 | P a g e

Article 19 (1) (g) endows upon every person the right to carry out any business. The mere fact
that I Love Trump Ltd. is a company with a separate legal entity115 would not affect the right
of Mr. Gentlemanian Swamy who is the sole owner of the equity of the company and is a
generally accepted rule that a shareholder of a company invoke the right enshrined under
Article 19 (1) (g) in case of the company's rights being affected which leads to a subsequent
aggravate effect on his rights. Thus, it becomes clear that Mr. Swamy has the right under
Article 19 (1) (g) which is being affected by the ban imposed by the Honble Delhi High Court.
It needs to be seen that the business undertaken by Mr. Swamy comes within the ambit of a
trade116 under Art. 19 (1) (g). To produce CDs for propagating a certain religious ideology
and in turn for the purpose of profits would come under the ambit of a trade or business.117
Moreover, the allegation of producing content that has instances of threats relating to mass
murder and sexual violence is merely an allegation which has not been substantiated with any
proper evidence. It is for a criminal court to prove or disprove whether or not anything violative
of the IPC at all exists in the contents of those CDs. Basing one's judgment in a biased manner
without any proper investigation by the police, is absolutely against the principles of Natural
Justice and jeopardising the business of Mr. Swamy. Therefore, the alleged contents of the
CDs, until proven, must not be the reason for banning the production and sale of these CDs
as it greatly hampers the business of the Respondent and in turn violates his Fundamental
Rights under Article 19(1) (g).
2. The second most important aspect that must be observed is the popularity of the CDs in a
large section of the Country. It's clear from the facts that the CD business is a "flourishing"
once the CDs themselves are extremely popular in North India.118 Now North India
traditionally consists of States such as Punjab, Jammu & Kashmir, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh,
Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand and the Union Territories of Delhi and Chandigarh. North India
also includes states like Rajasthan, Bihar and Madhya Pradesh.
3. On a bare reading of the names of the states it can be safely concluded that these are the
states with the maximum Muslim population in the country. Thus, the popularity of the CDs
in these states clearly and without an iota of doubt prove that the general perception of the
MOOT PROPOSITION, LEX OMNIA MOOT COURT 2016, PAGE 2 PAGE 3 7

Aviation Shipping Co. Ltd, v. Murray (Inspector of Taxes), (1961) 2 All ER 805 (A trade is an organised
seeking after profits, as a rule with the aid of physical assets); Khoday Distilleries Ltd v. State Of Karnataka,
1995 SCC (1) 574 (The primary meaning of the word 'trade' is the exchange of goods for goods or goods for
money. However, the word 'trade' has also secondary meaning, viz., business carried on with a view to profit. In
fact, the words 'trade' and 'industry' are also used interchangeably many times).
117
Supra 64.
118
MOOT PROPOSITION, LEX OMNIA MOOT COURT 2016.
115
116
35 | P a g e

people are not as negative and violent as the Appellants in the instant case would like to believe.
Also, there are no instances of any communal violence reported, as a result of the CDs. The
fact that it's an extremely popular and flourishing business proves that people all across the said
territory likes and appreciates the songs and videos made by I Love Trump Ltd. The parameter
of appreciation for an artistic commodity such as music CDs can only be on the basis of how
successful these businesses are and therefore it can clearly be held that the CDs produced by
Mr. Swamy's company was extremely successful and appreciated. The complaint made by the
Appellants is with mala fide motive, and is a mere strategy to ruin the image of an extremely
successful enterprise and highjack their business.
4. As it has been made clear that the business carried on by Mr. Swamy is neither illegal, nor
against any existing law, therefore, in the light of Art. 19 (6)119, the business of I Love Trump
Ltd. cannot be said to invite a reasonable restriction. Now, it's important to see that 19 (6) also
provides for expressly mentioned restriction in two scenarios, such as:
(i) the professional or technical qualifications necessary for practising any profession or
carrying on any occupation, trade or business, or
(ii) the carrying on by the State, or by a corporation owned or controlled by the State, of any
trade, business, industry or service, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of citizens or
otherwise
5. If the case at hand is to be observed, we see that the business of I Love Trump Ltd. is neither
affected by the technical qualification of sorts, nor by a State action entering into the same lines
of business. Therefore it becomes obvious that no reasonable restriction can be imposed on I
Love Trump Ltd. which is a carrying out an absolutely legal act of producing CDs contrary to
the allegations put forth of causing communal hatred.
119
Art. 19 (6), the Constitution of India.
36 | P a g e
PRAYER
In the lights of the facts stated, issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, the
Appellant most humbly and respectfully pray and request to the Honourable Court to:
1. Uphold the judgement of the Single Judge of the High Court of Delhi, which declared
Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code to be constitutional
2. Declare Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code 1860 to be constitutional
3. Quash of the Single Judge bench Judgment of the High Court of Delhi which passed a Writ
of Mandamus banning the production and distribution of CDs by I Love Trump Ltd.
4. Pass any other order which the Hon'ble Court deems fit in the light of equity, justice and
good conscience.
All of which is most humbly and respectfully submitted.
Sd/COUNSEL FOR THE APPELLANTS

37 | P a g e
38 | P a g e

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LEX OMNIA MOOT COURT - 2016

LEX OMNIA MOOT COURT - 2016

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION UNDER ARTICLE 136 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION NO. 1996/2016

ON SUBMISSION TO THE REGISTRY OF THE COURT

~MEMORIAL FOR THE RESPONDENTS ~

LEX OMNIA MOOT COURT - 2016

PRESERVATION OF PUBLIC ORDER. ................................................................................ 21

3. PUBLIC DISORDER OR LIKELIHOOD OF PUBLIC DISORDER IS THE GIST OF S-124A. ....... 22

INDIAN CONSTITUTION AND ITS UNIVERSALISTIC INTERPRETATION. ............................. 24

TO DISSENT IS NOT WHAT IS CURBED BY THE LAW OF SEDITION, BUT IT IS THE

RIGHT TO REJECT THE NATION BY ABUSING THAT IS UNACCEPTABLE. .................................. 24

III. THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE BEFORE THE

LEX OMNIA MOOT COURT - 2016

STATE IS SO MUCH AS TO MEET ALMOST ENTIRE

4. THE CORPORATION ENJOYS MONOPOLY STATUS WHICH IS STATE CONFERRED OR STATE

FUNCTIONS OF THE CORPORATION ARE OF PUBLIC IMPORTANCE AND CLOSELY

RELATED TO GOVERNMENT FUNCTION. ................................................................................ 30

ARE AN EXISTENCE OF AN EQUALLY EFFICIENT, ADEQUATE AND EFFICACIOUS

2. SS. 271 AND 272 OF THE COMPANIES ACT, 2013. .......................................................... 33

LEX OMNIA MOOT COURT - 2016

AC/ APP. CASE

ALL INDIA REPORTER

COMMONWEALTH LAW REPORTER

CRIMINAL LAW JOURNAL

CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW

FIRST INFORMATION REPORT

INDIAN PENAL CODE

LEX OMNIA MOOT COURT - 2016

PUNJAB AND HARYANA

SUPREME COURT CASES

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

WEEKLY LAW REPORT

LEX OMNIA MOOT COURT - 2016

INDIAN SUPREME COURT CASES

Venkatamma v. City Improvement Trust Board, AIR 1972 SC 2683

Urmila Roy v. Bengal Peerless Housing Development Co. Ltd., AIR

Mahabir Auto Store v. Indian Oil Corporation, (1990) 3 SCC 752

Murlidhar Dayandeo Kesekar v. Vishwanath Pandu Barde & Anr., 1995

Supp (2) SCC 549

Ors., (1995) 3 SCC 42

Jatya Pal Singh v. Union of India, (2013) 6 SCC 452

Radhakrishna Agarwal v. State of Bihar, (1977) 3 SCC 457

Kulchhinder Singh v. Hardayal Singh Brar, (1976) 3 SCC 828

Prathama Bank v. Vijay Kumar Goel, (1989) AIR 1989 SC 1977.

B.S Minhas v. Indian Statistical Institute, AIR 1984 SC 363

Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology, (2002)

N. Nagendra Rao & Company v. State of A.P., (1994) 6 SCC 205

Rajasthan SEB v. Mohan Lal, AIR 1967 SC 857

LIC v. Consumer Education & Research Centre, (1995) 5 SCC 482

Virendra Kumar Srivastava v. U.P. Rajya Karmachari Kalyan Nigam,

(2005) 1 SCC 149

LEX OMNIA MOOT COURT - 2016

Lt. Governor of Delhi v. V.K. Sodhi, (2007) 15 SCC 136.

P.K Ramchandra Iyer v. Union of India, (1984) 2 SCC 141

(Supreme Court of India, 08/08/2005);

Poonam v. Sumit Tanwar, AIR 2010 SC 1384

Vineet Narain v. Union of India, (1998) 1 SCC 226;

Kalyan Singh v. State of U.P, AIR 1962 SC 1183

G. Bassi Reddy v. International Crops Research Institute and Anr., Civil

Appeal No. 2399 of 1986 (Supreme Court of India, 14/02/2003)

Dwarka Nath v. Income Tax Officer, AIR 1966 SC 81

2001 (Supreme Court of India, 26/09/2003)