Professional Documents
Culture Documents
JUDICIAL REVIEW
FACTS:
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a
Resolution, sponsored by Representative Felix William D.
Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to
conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner
of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)." On
June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide
Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this Court for "culpable
violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and
other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by
Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and
Didagen Piang Dilangalen, and was referred to the House
Committee. The House Committee on Justice ruled on October
13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient
in form," but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003
for being insufficient in substance. To date, the Committee
Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in
plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of
the Constitution. Four months and three weeks since the filing
on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003,
a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss
it, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the
Secretary General of the House by Representatives Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of
the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House
FACTS:
The Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities (PACU)
assailed the constitutionality of Act No. 2706 as amended by
Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180. These laws
sought to regulate the ownership of private schools in the
country. It is provided by these laws that a permit should first
be secured from the Secretary of Education before a person
may be granted the right to own and operate a private school.
This also gives the Secretary of Education the discretion to
ascertain standards that must be followed by private schools.
It also provides that the Secretary of Education can and may
ban certain textbooks from being used in schools.
PACU contends that the right of a citizen to own and operate a
school is guaranteed by the Constitution, and any law
requiring previous governmental approval or permit before
such person could exercise said right, amounts to censorship
of previous restraint, a practice abhorrent to our system of law
and government. PACU also avers that such power granted to
the Secretary of Education is an undue delegation of
legislative power; that there is undue delegation because the
law did not specify the basis or the standard upon which the
Secretary must exercise said discretion; that the power to ban
books granted to the Secretary amounts to censorship.
ISSUE: Whether or not Act No, 2706 as amended is
unconstitutional.
HELD: No. In the first place, there is no justiciable controversy
presented. PACU did not show that it suffered any injury from
the exercise of the Secretary of Education of such powers
granted to him by the said law.
FACTS:
Juanito Mariano, a resident of Makati, along with residents of
Taguig suing as taxpayers, assail Sections 2, 51 and 52 of R.A.
No. 7854 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati into a
Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati).
Another petition which contends the unconstitutionality of R.A.
No. 7854 was also filed by John H. Osmena as a senator,
taxpayer and concerned citizen.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land
areas of the proposed city of Makati violating sections 7
and 450 of the Local Government Code on specifying
metes and bounds with technical descriptions
2. Whether Section 51, Article X of R.A. No. 7854 collides
with Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the
Constitution stressing that they new citys acquisition of
a new corporate existence will allow the incumbent
mayor to extend his term to more than two executive
terms as allowed by the Constitution
3. Whether the addition of another legislative district in
Makati is unconstitutional as the reapportionment
cannot be made by a special law
HELD/RULING:
1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 states that:
Sec. 2. The City of Makati. The Municipality of Makati shall
be converted into a highly urbanized city to be known as the
City of Makati, hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall
Facts:
FACTS:
On May 1, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo, faced by an
angry and violent mob armed with explosives, firearms,
bladed weapons, clubs, stones and other deadly weapons
assaulting and attempting to break into Malacaang, issued
Proclamation No. 38 declaring that there was a state of
rebellion in the National Capital Region. She likewise issued
General Order No. 1 directing the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and the Philippine National Police to suppress the
rebellion in the National Capital Region. Warrantless arrests of
several alleged leaders and promoters of the rebellion were
thereafter effected.
Aggrieved by the warrantless arrests, and the declaration of a
state of rebellion, which allegedly gave a semblance of
legality to the arrests, the following four related petitions were
filed before the Court. Prior to resolution, the state of
rebellion was lifted in Metro Manila.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the declaration of a state of
rebellion is constitutional
RULING:
As to warrantless arrests
As to petitioners claim that the proclamation of a state
of rebellion is being used by the authorities to justify
warrantless arrests, the Secretary of Justice denies that
it has issued a particular order to arrest specific persons
in connection with the rebellion. xxx
With this declaration, petitioners apprehensions as to
warrantless arrests should be laid to rest.
In quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities
may only resort to warrantless arrests of persons
suspected of rebellion, as provided under Section 5,
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, if the circumstances so
warrant. The warrantless arrest feared by petitioners is,
rebellion.
Nevertheless, it is equally true that Section 18, Article VII does
not expressly prohibit the President from declaring a state of
rebellion. Note that the Constitution vests the President not
only with Commander-in-Chief powers but, first and foremost,
with Executive powers.
xxx the Commander-in-Chief powers are broad enough as it is
and become more so when taken together with the provision
on executive power and the presidential oath of office. Thus,
the plenitude of the powers of the presidency equips the
occupant with the means to address exigencies or threats
which undermine the very existence of government or the
integrity of the State.
xxx
Thus, the Presidents authority to declare a state of rebellion
springs in the main from her powers as chief executive and, at
the same time, draws strength from her Commander-in-Chief
powers. xxx
Declaration of State of Rebellion is Superfluity
The foregoing discussion notwithstanding, in calling out the
armed forces, a declaration of a state of rebellion is an utter
superfluity. At most, it only gives notice to the nation that such
a state exists and that the armed forces may be called to
prevent or suppress it. Perhaps the declaration may wreak
emotional effects upon the perceived enemies of the State,
even on the entire nation. But this Courts mandate is to probe
only into the legal consequences of the declaration. This Court
finds that such a declaration is devoid of any legal
significance. For all legal intents, the declaration is deemed
not written.
Should there be any confusion generated by the issuance of
Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, we clarify that,
as the dissenters in Lacson correctly pointed out, the mere
declaration of a state of rebellion cannot diminish or violate
constitutionally protected rights. Indeed, if a state of martial
law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution or
In the present case, the mootness of the petition does not bar
its resolution. The question of the constitutionality of the
Presidents appointment of department secretaries in an
acting capacity while Congress is in session will arise in every
such appointment.
Power of Appointment
Ad Interim Appointments vs. Temporary Appointments
FACTS:
This case was brought on when President Arroyo through
Executive Secretary Ermita issued appointments to
respondents as acting secretaries of their respective
departments. Several senators filed this petition in Court. After
Congress adjourned on Sept. 22, 2004, President Arroyo issued
ad interim appointments to same respondents, now as
secretaries of the departments to which they were previously
appointed in an acting capacity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not President Arroyos appointment of
respondents as acting secretaries without the consent
of the Commission on Appointments while Congress is
in session
RULING:
Mootness
The Solicitor General argues that the petition is moot
considering that President Arroyo already extended to
respondents ad interim appointments on Sept. 23, 2004,
immediately after the recess of Congress.
xxx However, as an exception to the rule on mootness, courts
will decide a question otherwise moot if it is capable of
repetition yet evading review.
FACTS:
The Republic of the Philippines through the PCGG entered into
a Consignment Agreement with Christies of New York, selling
82 Old Masters Paintings and antique silverware seized from
Malacanang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila alleged to
be part of the ill-gotten wealth of the late Pres. Marcos, his
the members thereof, although the public has been given the
opportunity to view and appreciate these paintings when they
were placed on exhibit.
Similarly, as alleged in the petition, the pieces of antique
silverware were given to the Marcos couple as gifts from
friends and dignitaries from foreign countries on their silver
wedding and anniversary, an occasion personal to them. When
the Marcos administration was toppled by the revolutionary
government, these paintings and silverware were taken from
Malacaang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila and
transferred to the Central Bank Museum. The confiscation of
these properties by the Aquino administration however should
not be understood to mean that the ownership of these
paintings has automatically passed on the government without
complying with constitutional and statutory requirements of
due process and just compensation. If these properties were
already acquired by the government, any constitutional or
statutory defect in their acquisition and their subsequent
disposition must be raised only by the proper parties the
true owners thereof whose authority to recover emanates
from their proprietary rights which are protected by statutes
and the Constitution. Having failed to show that they are the
legal owners of the artworks or that the valued pieces have
become publicly owned, petitioners do not possess any clear
legal right whatsoever to question their alleged unauthorized
disposition.
Requisites for a Mandamus Suit
Further, although this action is also one of mandamus filed by
concerned citizens, it does not fulfill the criteria for a
mandamus suit. In Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, this
Court laid down the rule that a writ of mandamus may be
issued to a citizen only when the public right to be enforced
and the concomitant duty of the state are unequivocably set
forth in the Constitution. In the case at bar, petitioners are not
after the fulfillment of a positive duty required of respondent
officials under the 1987 Constitution. What they seek is the
enjoining of an official act because it is constitutionally
infirmed. Moreover, petitioners' claim for the continued
enjoyment and appreciation by the public of the artworks is at
most a privilege and is unenforceable as a constitutional right
FACTS:
On October 5, 1994, AEDC submitted an unsolicited proposal
to the Government through the DOTC/MIAA for the
development of NAIA International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA
IPT III).
DOTC constituted the Prequalification Bids and Awards
Committee (PBAC) for the implementation of the project and
submitted with its endorsement proposal to the NEDA, which
approved the project.
On June 7, 14, and 21, 1996, DOTC/MIAA caused the
publication in two daily newspapers of an invitation for
competitive or comparative proposals on AEDCs unsolicited
proposal, in accordance with Sec. 4-A of RA 6957, as
amended.
On September 20, 1996, the consortium composed of Peoples
Air Cargo and Warehousing Co., Inc. (Paircargo), Phil. Air and
Grounds Services, Inc. (PAGS) and Security Bank Corp.
(Security Bank) (collectively, Paircargo Consortium) submitted
their competitive proposal to the PBAC. PBAC awarded the
project to Paircargo Consortium. Because of that, it was
incorporated into Philippine International Airport Terminals Co.,
Inc.
AEDC subsequently protested the alleged undue preference
given to PIATCO and reiterated its objections as regards the
prequalification of PIATCO.
On July 12, 1997, the Government and PIATCO signed the
Concession Agreement for the Build-Operate-and-Transfer
Arrangement of the NAIA Passenger Terminal III (1997
Concession Agreement). The Government granted PIATCO the
franchise to operate and maintain the said terminal during the
concession period and to collect the fees, rentals and other
charges in accordance with the rates or schedules stipulated
in the 1997 Concession Agreement. The Agreement provided
that the concession period shall be for twenty-five (25) years
commencing from the in-service date, and may be renewed at
FACTS :
Then Secretary of DOTC, Oscar M. Orbos, issued Memorandum
Circular No. 90-395 to then LTFRB Chairman, Remedios A.S.
Fernando allowing provincial bus operators to charge
passengers rates within a range of 15% above and 15% below
the LTFRB official rate for a period of one (1) year.
This range was later increased by LTFRB thru a Memorandum
Circular No. 92-009 providing, among others, that "The
existing authorized fare range system of plus or minus 15 per
cent for provincial buses and jeepneys shall be widened to
20% and -25% limit in 1994 with the authorized fare to be
replaced by an indicative or reference rate as the basis for the
expanded fare range."
Sometime in March, 1994, private respondent PBOAP, availing
itself of the deregulation policy of the DOTC allowing provincial
bus operators to collect plus 20% and minus 25% of the
prescribed fare without first having filed a petition for the
purpose and without the benefit of a public hearing,
announced a fare increase of twenty (20%) percent of the
existing fares.
On March 16, 1994, petitioner KMU filed a petition before the
LTFRB opposing the upward adjustment of bus fares, which the
LTFRB dismissed for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the authority given by respondent LTFRB to
provincial bus operators to set a fare range of plus or minus
and granted the Subic SEZ incentives ranging from tax and
duty-free importations, exemption of businesses therein from
local and national taxes, to other hall-narks of a liberalized
financial and business climate. RA 7227 expressly gave
authority to the President to create through executive
proclamation, subject to the concurrence of the local
government units directly affected, other Special Economic
Zones (SEZ) in the areas covered respectively by the Clark
military reservation, the Wallace Air Station in San Fernando,
La Union, and Camp John Hay. On 16 August 1993, BCDA
entered into a Memorandum of Agreement and Escrow
Agreement with Tuntex (B.V.L) Co., Ltd. (TUNTEX) and
Asiaworld Internationale Group, Inc. (ASIAWORLD), private
corporations registered under the laws of the British Virgin
Islands, preparatory to the formation of a joint venture for the
development of Poro Point in La Union and Camp John Hay as
premier tourist destinations and recreation centers. 4 months
later or on 16 December 16, 1993, BCDA, TUNTEX and
ASIAWORLD executed a Joint Venture Agreements whereby
they bound themselves to put up a joint venture company
known as the Baguio International Development and
Management Corporation which would lease areas within
Camp John Hay and Poro Point for the purpose of turning such
places into principal tourist and recreation spots, as originally
envisioned by the parties under their AZemorandmn of
Agreement. The Baguio City government meanwhile passed a
number of resolutions in response to the actions taken by
BCDA as owner and administrator of Camp John Hay. By
Resolution of 29 September 1993, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Baguio City officially asked BCDA to exclude all
the barangays partly or totally located within Camp John Hay
from the reach or coverage of any plan or program for its
development. By a subsequent Resolution dated 19 January
1994, the sanggunian sought from BCDA an abdication, waiver
or quitclaim of its ownership over the home lots being
occupied by residents of 9 barangays surrounding the military
reservation. Still by another resolution passed on 21 February
1994, the sanggunian adopted and submitted to BCDA a 15point concept for the development of Camp John Hay. The
sanggunian's vision expressed, among other things, a kind of
development that affords protection to the environment, the
making of a family-oriented type of tourist destination, priority
in employment opportunities for Baguio residents and free
FACTS:
Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec 18, Art.
VII of the Constitution, President Estrada, in verbal directive,
directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate
with each other for the proper deployment and campaign for a
temporary period only. The IBP questioned the validity of the
deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in
law enforcement.
ISSUE:
general.
CONCLUSION: The Court reversed the lower appellate court's
judgment.
For his part, one of the issues raised by Cu Unjieng is that, the
Prosecution, representing the State as well as the People of
the Philippines, cannot question the validity of a law, like Act
4221, which the State itself created. Further, Cu Unjieng also
castigated the fiscal of Manila who himself had used the
Probation Law in the past without question but is now
questioning the validity of the said law (estoppel).
ISSUE:
1. May the State question its own laws?
Lessons Applicable:
Consti Overbreadth doctrine, void-for-vagueness doctrine
1.
2.
3.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and
other John Does & Jane Does
2. NO.
Mirasol V. CA
o , G.R. No. 128448, February 1, 2001
BRIEF: Under a crop loan financing scheme for
crop years 1973-1974 and 19741975, the Mirasols signed a Chattel Mortgage
which empowered PNB to sell
their sugar and to apply the proceeds as payment
of their obligations to PNB.
Thereafter, petitioners continued to avail of other
loans from and make unfunded
withdrawals from their accounts with PNB. PNB
foreclosed their mortgaged
properties for their failure to pay. Petitioners
claim that the foreclosure is invalid
since their debt has been fully paid by virtue of
legal compensation, that is, it
should be offset by the amount PNB owes them
from the sale of sugar. PNB
contends that under PD 579 issued by Marcos in
1974, all earnings from the
export sales of sugar pertained to the National
Government and were subject to
the Presidents disposition for public purposes.
The Court ruled that legal
compensation cannot take place since the
requisites for which have not been
met; the foreclosure is valid.
RULING: No, the CA did not err in upholding the
validity of the foreclosure on
petitioners property. Set-off or compensation
cannot take place because:
(1) neither of the parties are mutually creditors
and debtors of each other.
(see Art 1279[1])
provides.
We likewise reject the COMELEC and the private
respondents proposition that the Court erred in
exercising its limited certiorari
jurisdiction.Although the COMELEC is admittedly
the final arbiter of all factual issues as the
Constitution And the Rules of Court provide, we
stress that in the presence of grave abuse of
discretion, our constitutional duty is to intervene
and not to shy away from intervention simply
because a specialized agency has been given the
authority to resolve the factual issues.
As we emphasized in our Decision, we have in the
past recognized exceptions to the general rule
that the Court ordinarily does not review in
acertioraricase the COMELECs appreciation and
evaluation of evidence.One such exception is
when the COMELECs appreciation and evaluation
of evidence go beyond the limits of its discretion
to the point of being grossly unreasonable.In this
situation, we are duty bound under the
Constitution to intervene and correct COMELEC
errors that, because of the attendant grave abuse
of discretion, have mutated into errors of
jurisdiction.
Our Decision clearly pointed out Mitras
submissions and arguments on grave abuse of
discretion, namely, that the COMELEC failed to
appreciate that the case is a cancellation of a
COC proceeding and that the critical issue is the
presence of deliberate false material
representation to deceive the electorate.In fact,
Mitras petition plainly argued that the COMELECs
grave abuse of discretion was patent when it
failed to consider that the ground to deny a COC
is deliberate false representation.We completely
addressed this issue and, in the process,
analyzed the reasoning in the assailed COMELEC
decision. At every step, we found that the
PACIFICADOR, respondents.
Raul S. Roco and Lorna Patajo-Kapunan for petitioner.
Facts:
The petitioner and the private respondent were candidates in
Antique for the Batasang Pambansa in the May 1984 elections.
On May 13, 1984, the eve of the elections, the bitter contest
between the two came to a head when several followers of the
petitioner were ambushed and killed, allegedly by the latters
men. Seven suspects, including respondent Pacificador, are
now facing trial for these murders.
It was in this atmosphere that the voting was held, and the
post-election developments were to run true to form. Owing to
what he claimed were attempts to railroad the private
respondents proclamation, the petitioner went to the
Commission on Elections to question the canvass of the
election returns. His complaints were dismissed and the
private respondent was proclaimed winner by the Second
Division of the said body. The petitioner thereupon came to
this Court, arguing that the proclamation was void because
made only by a division and not by the Commission on
Elections en banc as required by the Constitution.
On May 18, 1984, the Second Division of the Commission on
Elections directed the provincial board of canvassers of
Antique to proceed with the canvass but to suspend the
proclamation of the winning candidate until further orders. On
June 7, 1984, the same Second Division ordered the board to
immediately convene and to proclaim the winner without
prejudice to the outcome of the case before the Commission.
On certiorari before this Court, the proclamation made by the
board of canvassers was set aside as premature, having been
made before the lapse of the 5-day period of appeal, which the
petitioner had seasonably made. Finally, on July 23, 1984, the
Second Division promulgated the decision now subject of this
petition which inter alia proclaimed Arturo F. Pacificador the
elected assemblyman of the province of Antique. The
petitioner then came to this Court, asking to annul the said
decision on the basis that it should have been decided by
COMELEC en banc.
The case was still being considered when on February 11,
1986, the petitioner was gunned down in cold blood and in
broad daylight. And a year later, Batasang Pambansa was
abolished with the advent of the 1987 Constitution.
The fact that the Court did not annul the sale of the land to an
alien did not validate the transaction. It was still contrary to
the constitutional proscription against aliens acquiring lands of
the public or private domain.
As earlier mentioned, a reconstitution of title is the reissuance of a new certificate of title lost or destroyed in its
original form and condition. It does not pass upon the
ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title.
Any change in the ownership of the property must be the
subject of a separate suit. Thus, although petitioners are in
possession of the land, a separate proceeding is necessary to
thresh out the issue of ownership of the land.
The SC Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the
CA.
Held:
Yes. In the year 1895, the private respondents grandfather,
Ong Te, arrived in the Philippines from China and established
his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar. The father
of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China
in 1905 but was brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915,
he filed with the court an application for naturalization and
was declared a Filipino citizen.
In 1984, the private respondent married a Filipina named
Desiree Lim. For the elections of 1984 and 1986, Jose Ong, Jr.
registered himself as a voter of Laoang, Samar, and voted
there during those elections.
Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and
those born of Filipino mothers with an alien father were placed
on equal footing. They were both considered as natural born
citizens. Besides, private respondent did more than merely
exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here
in the Philippines.
On the issue of residence, it is not required that a person
should have a house in order to establish his residence and
domicile. It is enough that he should live in the municipality or
in a rented house or in that of a friend or relative. To require
him to own property in order to be eligible to run for Congress
would be tantamount to a property qualification. The
Constitution only requires that the candidate meet the age,
citizenship, voting and residence requirements.
YES
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however
reacquire the same in the manner provided by law. C.A. No. 63
enumerates the 3 modes by which Philippine citizenship may
be reacquired by a former citizen:
1. by naturalization,
2. by repatriation, and
3. by direct act of Congress.
**
Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who
lost their citizenship due to:
1. desertion of the armed forces;
2. services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World
War II;
3. service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any
other time,
4. marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and
5. political economic necessity
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality
This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship
will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino
citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born
citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be
restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
R.A. No. 2630 provides:
Sec 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by
rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed
Forces of the United States, or after separation from the
Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States
citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the place
where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said
oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other
citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the
Republic and having registered the same in the Civil Registry
of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited
provision, Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status
as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as
the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of
RULING:
No. The supreme court ruled that Private respondent is
declared NOT a citizen of the Philippines and therefore
disqualified from continuing to serve as governor of the
Province of Sorsogon. He is ordered to vacate his office and to
surrender the same to the Vice-Governor of the Province of
Sorsogon once this decision becomes final and executory. The
proceedings of the trial court was marred by the following
irregularities:
(1) the hearing of the petition was set ahead of the scheduled
date of hearing, without a publication of the order advancing
the date of hearing, and the petition itself;
(2) the petition was heard within six months from the last
publication of the petition;
(3) petitioner was allowed to take his oath of allegiance before
the finality of the judgment; and
(4) petitioner took his oath of allegiance without observing the
two-year waiting period.
COQUILLA VS COMELEC
G.R. No. 151914
FACTS:
Coquilla was born on 1938 of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern
Samar. He grew up and resided there until 1965, when he was
subsequently naturalized as a U.S. citizen after joining the US
Navy. In 1998, he came to the Philippines and took out a
residence certificate, although he continued making several
trips to the United States.
Coquilla eventually applied for repatriation under R.A. No.
8171 which was approved. On November 10, 2000, he took his
oath as a citizen of the Philippines.
On November 21, 2000, he applied for registration as a voter
of Butunga, Oras, Eastern Samar which was approved in 2001.
On February 27, 2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy
stating that he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for
2 years.
Incumbent mayor Alvarez, who was running for re-election
sought to cancel Coquillas certificate of candidacy on the
ground that his statement as to the two year residency in Oras
was a material misrepresentation as he only resided therein
RULING:
No. The statement in petitioners certificate of candidacy that
he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for two years
at the time he filed such certificate is not true. The question is
whether the COMELEC was justified in ordering the
cancellation of his certificate of candidacy for this reason.
Petitioner made a false representation of a material fact in his
certificate of candidacy, thus rendering such certificate liable
to cancellation. In the case at bar, what is involved is a false
statement concerning a candidates qualification for an office
for which he filed the certificate of candidacy. This is a
misrepresentation of a material fact justifying the cancellation
of petitioners certificate of candidacy. The cancellation of
petitioners certificate of candidacy in this case is thus fully
justified.
YU vs. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO
GR No. L-83882, January 24, 1989
FACTS:
Petitioner Yu was originally issued a Portuguese passport in
1971. On February 10, 1978, he was naturalized as a
Philippine citizen. Despite his naturalization, he applied for and
was issued Portuguese Passport by the Consular Section of the
Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo on July 21, 1981. Said Consular
Office certifies that his Portuguese passport expired on 20 July
1986. He also declared his nationality as Portuguese in
commercial documents he signed, specifically, the Companies
FRIVALDO VS COMELEC
G.R. No. 87193, 23 June 1989 [Naturalization; Reacquisition]
FACTS:
Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor of the province of
Sorsogon and assumed office in due time. The League of
Municipalities filed with the COMELEC a petition for the
annulment of Frivaldo on the ground that he was not a Filipino
citizen, having been naturalized in the United States.
Frivaldo admitted the allegations but pleaded the special and
affirmative defenses that he was naturalized as American
citizen only to protect himself against President Marcos during
the Martial Law era.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Frivaldo is a Filipino citizen.
RULING:
No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a
qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen
of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for
suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.
He claims that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by
virtue of valid repatriation. He claims that by actively
participating in the local elections, he automatically forfeited
American citizenship under the laws of the United States of
America. The Court stated that that the alleged forfeiture was
between him and the US. If he really wanted to drop his
American citizenship, he could do so in accordance with CA
No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD 725. Philippine
citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by
naturalization, or by repatriation.
FACTS:
Juan G. Frivaldo ran for Governor of Sorsogon again and won.
Raul R. Lee questioned his citizenship. He then petitioned
for repatriation under Presidential Decree No. 725 and was
able to take his oath of allegiance as a Philippine citizen.
However, on the day that he got his citizenship, the Court had
already ruled based on his previous attempts to run as
governor and acquire citizenship, and had proclaimed Lee,
who got the second highest number of votes, as the newly
elect Governor of Sorsogon.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Frivaldos repatriation was valid.
HELD:
The Court ruled his repatriation was valid and legal and
because of the curative nature of Presidential Decree No. 725,
his repatriation retroacted to the date ofthe filing of
his application to run for governor. The steps to reacquire
Philippine Citizenship by repatriation under Presidential Decree
No. 725 are: (1) filing theapplication; (2) action by the
committee; and (3) taking of the oath of allegiance if
the application is approved. It is only upon taking the oath of
allegiance that theapplicant is deemed ipso jure to have
reacquired Philippine citizenship. If the decree had intended
the oath taking to retroact to the date of the filing of
theapplication, then it should not have explicitly provided
otherwise. He is therefore qualified to be proclaimed governor
of Sorsogon.
However, on the day that he got his citizenship, the Court had
already ruled based on his previous attempts to run as
governor and acquire citizenship, and had proclaimed Lee,
who got the second highest number of votes, as the newly
elect Governor of Sorsogon.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Frivaldos repatriation was valid.
HELD:
The Court ruled his repatriation was valid and legal and
because of the curative nature of Presidential Decree No. 725,
his repatriation retroacted to the date ofthe filing of
his application to run for governor. The steps to reacquire
Philippine Citizenship by repatriation under Presidential Decree
No. 725 are: (1) filing theapplication; (2) action by the
committee; and (3) taking of the oath of allegiance if
the application is approved. It is only upon taking the oath of
allegiance that theapplicant is deemed ipso jure to have
reacquired Philippine citizenship. If the decree had intended
the oath taking to retroact to the date of the filing of
theapplication, then it should not have explicitly provided
otherwise. He is therefore qualified to be proclaimed governor
of Sorsogon.
TABASA VS CA
G.R. No. 125 793, 29 August 2006 [Naturalization;
Reacquisition; R.A. No. 8171]
FACTS:
When he was 7 years old, Joevanie A. Tabasa acquired
American citizenship when his father became a naturalized
citizen of the US. In 1995, he arrived in the Philippines and was
admitted as "balikbayan"; thereafter, he was arrested and
detained by the agent of BIR. Th Consul General of the US
embassy of Manila filed a request with the BID that his
passport has been revoked and that Tabasa had a standing
warrant for several federal charges against him.
Petitioner alleged that he acquired Filipino citizenship by
repatriation in accordance with the RA No. 8171, and that
FACTS:
Gerardo Angat, a natural born Filipino citizen, asked to regain
his status as a Philippine citizen before the RTC Marikina. RTC
allowed him to take his Oath of Allegiance on October 3, 1996
and the following day, the RTC declared him as citizen of the
Philippines pursuant to R.A. No. 8171.
OSG filed a Manifestation and Motion in March 1997, asserting
that the petition should have been dismissed by the court for
lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction in deciding over
repatriation case.
RULING:
No. A petition for repatriation should be filed with the Special
Committee on Naturalization and not with the RTC which has
no jurisdiction.Therefore, the court's order was null and void.
FACTS:
The petitioner filed a petition in the CFI of Davao for
repatriation under Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended,
alleging therein that although her father was Chinese, she was
a citizen of the Philippines because her mother was a Filipina
who was not legally married to her Chinese husband; that
she lost her Philippine citizenship when she married Go Wan, a
Chinese; and that Go Wan died in September 6, 1962.
Petitioner further alleged that her illiterate mother
erroneously registered her as an alien with the Bureau
ofImmigration, by virtue of which she was issued Alien
Certificate of Registration. The petition contains no prayer for
relief.
The petition was not published, but notice thereof was served
on the Provincial Fiscal who appeared at the hearing but
presented no evidence. After receiving the evidence of the
petitioner, the trial court issued an Order declaring the
petitioner as "judicially repatriated," and ordering the
cancellation of her alien certificate of registration. The
Provincial Fiscal, in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines,
took this appeal.
ISSUE:
WON one may be repatriated by judicial proceedings
HELD:
The proceedings taken in the trial court are
a complete nullity. There is no law requiring or
authorizing that repatriation should be effected by a
judicial proceeding. All that is required for a female
citizen of the Philippines who lost her citizenship to an
alien to reacquire her Philippine citizen, upon the
termination of her marital status, "is for her to take
necessary oath of allegianceto the Republic of the
Philippines and to register the said oath in the proper
civil registry" (Lim vs. Republic, 37 SCRA 783).
Moreover, the petitioner's claim of Philippine citizenship
prior to her marriage for being allegedly an illegitimate
child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother may not
be established in an action where the mother or her
heirs are not parties (Tan Pong vs. Republic, 30 Phil.
380). It is the consistent rule in this jurisdiction
that Philippine citizenship may not be declared in a nonadversary suit where the persons whose rights are
affected by such a declaration are not parties, such as
an action for declaratory relief (Tiu Navarro vs.
Commissioner of Immigration, 107 Phil. 632) a petition
for judicial repatriation (Lim vs. Republic, supra), or an
action to cancel registration as an alien (Tan vs.
Republic, L-16108, Oct. 31, 1961). As was held in Lim
vs. Republic, supra, "there is no proceeding established
by law or the rules by which any person claiming to be a
citizen may get a declaration in a court of justice to that
effect or in regard to his citizenship."
Note: Although Jaos citizenship prior to her marriage to
a Chinese husband needed judicial confirmation, the
process of repatriation itself (i.e., of reacquiring that
citizenship) involves a purely administrative proceeding.
Ruling:
The Court held that those who retained or reacquired
their citizenship under RA 9225 may exercise their right
to vote under the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of
2003, RA 9189.
The Court held that present day duals may now exercise
their right of suffrage provided they meet the
requirements under Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution in relation to R.A. 9189
ISSUE:
HELD:
NO. The respondent did not lose his Filipino Citizenship and
thereby qualified as a candidate for the Provincial Governor of
Cebu Province. The petitioner failed to present direct proof
FACTS:
Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano were both
candidates for Vice-Mayor of Makati in the May 11, 1998
elections.
Based on the results of the election, Manzano garnered the
highest number of votes. However, his proclamation was
suspended due to the pending petition for disqualification filed
by Ernesto Mercado on the ground that he was not a citizen of
the Philippines but of the United States.
From the facts presented, it appears that Manzano is both a
Filipino and a US citizen.
The Commission on Elections declared Manzano disqualified as
candidate for said elective position.
However, in a subsequent resolution of the COMELEC en banc,
the disqualification of the respondent was reversed.
Respondent was held to have renounced his US citizenship
when he attained the age of majority and registered himself as
a voter in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.
Manzano was eventually proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of
Makati City on August 31, 1998.
Thus the present petition.
ISSUE:
FACTS:
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill
his undertaking made under oath. Should he betray that trust,
there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his
Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate
proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, the court sustained
the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground
that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied
for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in
commercial documents executed abroad that he was a
Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against
any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his
foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act
constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
HELD:
The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus
sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or
citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her
birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which determines
nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth.
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born a year before the 1935
Constitution took into effect and at that time, what served as
the Constitution of the Philippines were the principal organic
acts by which the United States governed the country. These
were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine
Autonomy Act of Aug. 29, 1916, also known as the Jones Law.
Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who
were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein
including their children are deemed to be Philippine citizens.
Private respondents father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born on Jan.
5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines Norte.... Thus, under the Philippine
Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was deemed