Tayag v. Benguet Consolidated Inc.

Summary: mere excerpt to show the relevance of

ancillary administration
Facts:
-Decedent: Idonah Slade Perkins - left 2 stock
certificates covering 33,002 shares in BCMI
-BCMI Stock certificates: in possession of Country Trust
Company of NY (domiciliary administrator of Idonah's
estate)
-ancillary administration proceedings instituted in
Manila: appointed finally Renato Tayag
-BCMI was compelled by the court to deliver to Tayag
the Certificates. BCMI did not comply
WON Tayag (and not Country Trust Company of
NY) is entitled to administration of the BCMI
Certificate of Stocks? TAYAG as ancillary
administrator
1 No contest that ancillary administrator has
control and possession of all assets of the
decedent w/n the jurisdiction of the Philippines
1 An administrator appointed in one state or
country has no power over property in another
state or country
1 Principal vs. Ancillary administration:
Principal administration: that which is granted in the
jurisdiction of the decedent's last domicile
Ancillary administration: any other administration
Why? A grant of administration does not ex proprio
vigore (by its own force) have any effect beyond the
limits of the country in which it is granted.
When proper? When a person dies leaving property in a
country other than that of his last domicile
1 BCMI, as a domestic corporation, owes full
allegiance and subject to the unrestricted
jurisdiction of lower courts.
1 The situs of the shares of stocks is here in RP
[Wells Fargo Bank and Union v. CIR]
A Trusts
-right of property, real or personal, held by one party
for the benefit of another
-may be created by deed during the lifetime of the
settler or by will
PRIL problem: When properties are located in places
other than where the trustor is domiciled and where
the trust was made - does the effect of that trust
extend extraterritorially?
Validity

Essential propriety of the trust

Compliance with formalities

Choice-of-law provision: courts of the place where trust

is being administered will normally apply the chosen
law (carry out intent of the trustor)
>if none: follow the law that will sustain the validity of
the trust
Testamentary trusts :: contained in a will :: follow the
law of the place to which extrinsic validity of the will
depend (usu. Lex loci contractus)
But since it involves properties: lex situs
1

Administration of Estate
1 manage and settle decedent's debts
1 Distribute the residuum of the estate to the
deceased's heirs

UNITED AIRLINES, INC., Petitioner

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ANICETO FONTANILLA, in his
personal capacity and in behalf of his minor son
MYCHAL ANDREW FONTANILLA, Respondents.
FACTS:
Aniceto Fontanilla bought from United Airlines, through
the Philippine Travel Bureau in Manila, three Visit the
U.S.A. tickets from himself, his wife and his minor son,
Mychal, to visit the cities of Washington DC, Chicago
and Los Angeles. All All flights had been confirmed
previously by United Airlines. Having used the first
coupon to DC and while at the Washington Dulles
Airport, Aniceto changed their itinerary, paid the
penalty for rewriting their tickets and was issued
tickets with corresponding boarding passes with the
words: Check-in-required. They were then set to
leave but were denied boarding because the flight was
overbooked.
The CA ruled that private respondents failure to
comply with the check-in requirement will not defeat
his claim as the denied boarding rules were not
complied with applying the laws of the USA, relying on
the Code of Federal Regulation Part on Oversales of the
USA.
ISSUE: WON the CA is correct in applying the laws of
USA.
HELD:

No. According to the doctrine of lex loci contractus,

the law of the place where a contract is made or
entered into governs with respect to its nature and
validity, obligation and interpretation shall govern. This
has been said to be the rule even though the place
where the contract was made is different from the
place where it is to be performed. Hence, the court
should apply the law of the place where the airline
ticket was issued, where the passengers are residents
and nationals of the forum and the ticket is issued in
such State by the defendant airline. Therefore,
although, the contract of carriage was to be performed
in the United States, the tickets were purchased
through petitioners agent in Manila. It is true that the
tickets were "rewritten" in D.C., however, such fact did
not change the nature of the original contract of
carriage entered into by the parties in Manila.

In Cadalin v. POEA's Administrator,[27] we held that

Article 291 covers all money claims from employeremployee relationship and is broader in scope than
claims arising from a specific law. It is not limited to
money claims recoverable under the Labor Code, but
applies also to claims of overseas contract workers.

Thus, in our considered view, respondent's complaint

was filed well within the three-year prescriptive period
under Article 291 of our Labor Code. This point,
Executor
Administrator however, has already been mooted by our finding that
respondent's service award had been paid, albeit the
When there's a person named in the will When there's no person named, or the person named
payroll termed such payment as severance pay.
unqualified

Why appoint an administrator of the estate?

For the protection of creditors, incidentally only
for the distribution of the estate
Scope of Title of domiciliary administration?
Only as regards properties w/n 1 state
ANCILIARY ADMINISTRATOR: one appointed by the
court of the foreign country where the assets or
property are located

G.R. No. 124110

April 20, 2001

CADALIN vs POEA ADMINISTRATOR 238 SCRA 721

Borrowing Statute
Ex: Sec. 48, Rule on Civil Procedure if by the
laws of the State or country where the cause of
action arose the action is barred, it is also
barred in the Philippines.
Facts:
Cadalin et al. are Filipino workers recruited by Asia Intl
Builders Co. (AIBC), a domestic recruitment

corporation, for employment in Bahrain to work for

Brown & Root Intl Inc. (BRII) which is a foreign
corporation with headquarters in Texas. Plaintiff
instituted a class suit with the POEA for money claims
arising from the unexpired portion of their employment
contract which was prematurely terminated. They
worked in Bahrain for BRII and they filed the suit after 1
yr. from the termination of their employment contract.
As provided by Art. 156 of the Amiri Decree aka as
the Labor Law of the Private Sector of Bahrain:
a claim arising out of a contract of employment shall
not be actionable after the lapse of 1 year from the
date of the expiry of the contract, it appears that their
suit has prescribed.
Plaintiff contends that the prescription period should
be 10 years as provided by Art. 1144 of the Civil
Code as their claim arise from a violation of a contract.
The POEA Administrator holds that the 10 year period
of prescription should be applied but the NLRC provides
a different view asserting that Art 291 of the Labor
Code of the Phils with a 3 years prescription
period should be applied. The Solicitor General
expressed his personal point of view that the 1 yr
period provided by the Amiri Decree should be applied.

reimbursement of SSS and premium not remitted to

the SSS; refund of withholding tax not remitted to the
BIR; penalties for committing prohibited practices; as
well as the suspension of the license of AIBC and the
accreditation of BRII
On October 2, 1984, the POEA Administrator denied the
Motion to Strike Out of the Records filed by AIBC but
required the claimants to correct the deficiencies in the
complaint pointed out.
AIB and BRII kept on filing Motion for Extension of Time
to file their answer. The POEA kept on granting such
motions.
On November 14, 1984, claimants filed an opposition
to the motions for extension of time and asked that
AIBC and BRII declared in default for failure to file their
answers.
On December 27, 1984, the POEA Administrator issued
an order directing AIBC and BRII to file their answers
within ten days from receipt of the order.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that as a general rule a
foreign procedural law will not be applied in our
country as we must adopt our own procedural laws.
EXCEPTION:
Philippines may adopt foreign procedural law under
the Borrowing Statute such as Sec. 48 of the Civil
Procedure Rule stating if by the laws of the State or
country where the cause of action arose the action is
barred, it is also barred in
the Philippines. Thus, Bahrain law must be
applied. However, the court contends that Bahrains
law on prescription cannot be applied because the
court will not enforce any foreign claim that is
obnoxious to the forums public policy and the 1 yr.
rule on prescription is against public policy on labor as
enshrined in the Phils. Constitution.
The court ruled that the prescription period applicable
to the case should be Art 291 of the Labor Code of
the Phils with a 3 years prescription period since
the claim arose from labor employment.
FACTS:
This is a consolidation of 3 cases of SPECIAL CIVIL
ACTIONS in the Supreme Court for Certiorari.
On June 6, 1984, Cadalin, Amul and Evangelista, in
their own behalf and on behalf of 728 other OCWs
instituted a class suit by filing an Amended Complaint
with the POEA for money claims arising from their
recruitment by ASIA INTERNATIONAL BUILDERS
CORPORATION (AIBC) and employment by BROWN &
ROOT INTERNATIONAL, INC (BRI) which is a foreign
corporation with headquarters in Houston, Texas, and is
engaged in construction; while AIBC is a domestic
corporation licensed as a service contractor to recruit,
mobilize and deploy Filipino workers for overseas
employment on behalf of its foreign principals.
The amended complaint sought the payment of the
unexpired portion of the employment contracts, which
was terminated prematurely, and secondarily, the
payment of the interest of the earnings of the Travel
and Reserved Fund; interest on all the unpaid benefits;
area wage and salary differential pay; fringe benefits;

(at madami pang motions ang na-file, new

complainants joined the case, ang daming inavail na
remedies ng both parties)
On June 19, 1987, AIBC finally submitted its answer to
the complaint. At the same hearing, the parties were
given a period of 15 days from said date within which
to submit their respective position papers. On February
24, 1988, AIBC and BRII submitted position paper. On
October 27, 1988, AIBC and BRII filed a Consolidated
Reply, POEA Adminitartor rendered his decision which
awarded the amount of $824, 652.44 in favor of only
324 complainants. Claimants submitted their Appeal
Memorandum For Partial Appeal from the decision of
the POEA. AIBC also filed its MR and/or appeal in
addition to the Notice of Appeal filed earlier.
NLRC promulgated its Resolution, modifying the
decision of the POEA. The resolution removed some of
the benefits awarded in favor of the claimants. NLRC
denied all the MRs. Hence, these petitions filed by the
claimants and by AlBC and BRII.
The case rooted from the Labor Law enacted by
Bahrain where most of the complainants were
deployed. His Majesty Ise Bin Selman Al Kaifa, Amir of
Bahrain, issued his Amiri Decree No. 23 on June 16,
1176, otherwise known re the Labour Law for the
Private Sector. Some of the provision of Amiri Decree
No. 23 that are relevant to the claims of the
complainants-appellants are as follows:
Art. 79: x x x A worker shall receive payment for each
extra hour equivalent to his wage entitlement
increased by a minimum of twenty-rive per centurn
thereof for hours worked during the day; and by a
minimum off fifty per centurn thereof for hours worked
during the night which shall be deemed to being from
seven oclock in the evening until seven oclock in the
morning .
Art. 80: Friday shall be deemed to be a weekly day of
rest on full pay.
If employee worked, 150% of his normal wage shall be
paid to him x x x.

Art. 81; x x x When conditions of work require the

worker to work on any official holiday, he shall be paid
an additional sum equivalent to 150% of his normal
wage.
Art. 84: Every worker who has completed one years
continuous service with his employer shall be entitled
to Laos on full pay for a period of not less than 21 days
for each year increased to a period not less than 28
days after five continuous years of service.
A worker shall be entitled to such leave upon a
quantum meruit in respect of the proportion of his
service in that year.
Art. 107: A contract of employment made for a period
of indefinite duration may be terminated by either
party thereto after giving the other party prior notice
before such termination, in writing, in respect of
monthly paid workers and fifteen days notice in
respect of other workers. The party terminating a
contract without the required notice shall pay to the
other party compensation equivalent to the amount of
wages payable to the worker for the period of such
notice or the unexpired portion thereof.
Art. Ill: x x x the employer concerned shall pay to such
worker, upon termination of employment, a leaving
indemnity for the period of his employment calculated
on the basis of fifteen days wages for each year of the
first three years of service and of one months wages
for each year of service thereafter. Such worker shall
be entitled to payment of leaving indemnity upon a
quantum meruit in proportion to the period of his
service completed within a year.
ISSUE:
1. WON the foreign law should govern or the contract
of the parties.(WON the complainants who have
worked in Bahrain are entitled to the above-mentioned
benefits provided by Amiri Decree No. 23 of Bahrain).
2. WON the Bahrain Law should apply in the case.
(Assuming it is applicable WON complainants claim for
the benefits provided therein have prescribed.)
3. Whether or not the instant cases qualify as; a class
suit (siningit ko nalang)
(the rest of the issues in the full text of the case refer
to Labor Law)
RULING:
1. NLRC set aside Section 1, Rule 129 of the 1989
Revised Rules on Evidence governing the pleading and
proof of a foreign law and admitted in evidence a
simple copy of the Bahrains Amiri Decree No. 23 of
1976 (Labour Law for the Private Sector).
NLRC applied the Amiri Deere, No. 23 of 1976, which
provides for greater benefits than those stipulated in
the overseas-employment contracts of the claimants. It
was of the belief that where the laws of the host
country are more favorable and beneficial to the
workers, then the laws of the host country shall form
part of the overseas employment contract. It approved
the observation of the POEA Administrator that in labor
proceedings, all doubts in the implementation of the

provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing

regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor.
The overseas-employment contracts, which were
prepared by AIBC and BRII themselves, provided that
the laws of the host country became applicable to said
contracts if they offer terms and conditions more
favorable than those stipulated therein. However there
was a part of the employment contract which provides
that the compensation of the employee may be
adjusted downward so that the total computation plus
the non-waivable benefits shall be equivalent to the
compensation therein agree, another part of the
same provision categorically states that total
remuneration and benefits do not fall below that of the
host country regulation and custom.
Any ambiguity in the overseas-employment contracts
should be interpreted against AIBC and BRII, the
parties that drafted it. Article 1377 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines provides:
The interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a
contract shall not favor the party who caused the
obscurity.
Said rule of interpretation is applicable to contracts of
adhesion where there is already a prepared form
containing the stipulations of the employment contract
and the employees merely take it or leave it. The
presumption is that there was an imposition by one
party against the other and that the employees signed
the contracts out of necessity that reduced their
bargaining power.
We read the overseas employment contracts in
question as adopting the provisions of the Amiri Decree
No. 23 of 1976 as part and parcel thereof. The parties
to a contract may select the law by which it is to be
governed. In such a case, the foreign law is adopted as
a system to regulate the relations of the parties,
including questions of their capacity to enter into the
contract, the formalities to be observed by them,
matters of performance, and so forth. Instead of
adopting the entire mass of the foreign law, the parties
may just agree that specific provisions of a foreign
statute shall be deemed incorporated into their
contract as a set of terms. By such reference to the
provisions of the foreign law, the contract does not
become a foreign contract to be governed by the
foreign law. The said law does not operate as a statute
but as a set of contractual terms deemed written in the
contract.
A basic policy of contract is to protect the expectation
of the parties. Such party expectation is protected by
giving effect to the parties own choice of the
applicable law. The choice of law must, however, bear
some relationship the parties or their transaction.
There is no question that the contracts sought to be
enforced by claimants have a direct connection with
the Bahrain law because the services were rendered in
that country.
2. NLRC ruled that the prescriptive period for the filing
of the claims of the complainants was 3 years, as
provided in Article 291 of the Labor Code of the
Philippines, and not ten years as provided in Article
1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines nor one year
as provided in the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976.

Article 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976

provides:
A claim arising out of a contract of employment shall
not actionable after the lapse of one year from the date
of the expiry of the Contract.
As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not be
applied in the forum (local court), Procedural matters,
such as service of process, joinder of actions, period
and requisites for appeal, and so forth, are governed
by the laws of the forum. This is true even if the action
is based upon a foreign substantive law.
A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict
of Laws in the sense that it may be viewed either as
procedural or substantive, depending on the
characterization given such a law. In Bournias v.
Atlantic Maritime Company (220 F. 2d. 152, 2d Cir.
[1955]), where the issue was the applicability of the
Panama Labor Code in a case filed in the State of New
York for claims arising from said Code, the claims would
have prescribed under the Panamanian Law but not
under the Statute of Limitations of New York. The U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Panamanian Law
was procedural as it was not specifically intended to
be substantive, hence, the prescriptive period
provided in the law of the forum should apply. The
Court observed: . . . we are dealing with a statute of
limitations of a foreign country, and it is not clear on
the face of the statute that its purpose was to limit the
enforceability, outside as well as within the foreign
country concerned, of the substantive rights to which
the statute pertains. We think that as a yardstick for
determining whether that was the purpose, this test is
the most satisfactory one.
The Court further noted: Applying that test here it
appears to us that the libellant is entitled to succeed,
for the respondents have failed to satisfy us that the
Panamanian period of limitation in question was
specifically aimed against the particular rights which
the libellant seeks to enforce. The Panama Labor Code
is a statute having broad objectives. The American
court applied the statute of limitations of New York,
instead of the Panamanian law, after finding that there
was no showing that the Panamanian law on
prescription was intended to be substantive. Being
considered merely a procedural law even in Panama, it
has to give way to the law of the forum (local Court) on
prescription of actions.
However the characterization of a statute into a
procedural or substantive law becomes irrelevant when
the country of the forum (local Court) has a borrowing
statute. Said statute has the practical effect of
treating the foreign statute of limitation as one of
substance. A borrowing statute directs the state of
the forum (local Court) to apply the foreign statute of
limitations to the pending claims based on a foreign
law. While there are several kinds of borrowing
statutes, one form provides that an action barred by
the laws of the place where it accrued will not be
enforced in the forum even though the local statute
was not run against it.
Section 48 of Code of Civil Procedure is of this kind. It
provides: If by the laws of the state or country where
the cause of action arose, the action is barred, it is also
barred in the Philippine Islands.

Section 48 has not been repealed or amended by the

Civil Code of the Philippines. In the light of the 1987
Constitution, however, Section 48 cannot be enforced
ex proprio vigore insofar as it ordains the application in
this jurisdiction of Section 156 of the Amiri Decree No.
23 of 1976.
The courts of the forum (local Court) will not enforce
any foreign claim obnoxious to the forums public
policy. To enforce the one-year prescriptive period of
the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as regards the claims
in question would contravene the public policy on the
protection to labor.
In the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the
1987 Constitution emphasized that:The state shall
promote social justice in all phases of national
development (Sec. 10).
The state affirms labor as a primary social economic
force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote
their welfare (Sec. 18).
In Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, the
1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor,
local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and
promote full employment and equality of employment
opportunities for all.
Thus, the applicable law on prescription is the
Philippine law.
The next question is whether the prescriptive period
governing the filing of the claims is 3 years, as
provided by the Labor Code or 10 years, as provided by
the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
provides:
The following actions must be brought within ten
years from the time the right of action accross:
(1) Upon a written contract; (2) Upon an obligation
created by law; (3) Upon a judgment
In this case, the claim for pay differentials is primarily
anchored on the written contracts between the
litigants, the ten-year prescriptive period provided by
Art. 1144(l) of the New Civil Code should govern.
3. NO. A class suit is proper where the subject matter
of the controversy is one of common or general
interest to many and the parties are so numerous that
it is impracticable to bring them all before the court.
When all the claims are for benefits granted under the
Bahrain law many of the claimants worked outside
Bahrain. Some of the claimants were deployed in
Indonesia under different terms and condition of
employment.
Inasmuch as the First requirement of a class suit is not
present (common or general interest based on the
Amiri Decree of the State of Bahrain), it is only logical
that only those who worked in Bahrain shall be entitled
to rile their claims in a class suit.
While there are common defendants (AIBC and BRII)
and the nature of the claims is the same (for
employees benefits), there is no common question of
law or fact. While some claims are based on the Amiri
Law of Bahrain, many of the claimants never worked in

that country, but were deployed elsewhere. Thus, each

claimant is interested only in his own demand and not
in the claims of the other employees of defendants. A
claimant has no concern in protecting the interests of
the other claimants as shown by the fact, that
hundreds of them have abandoned their co-claimants
and have entered into separate compromise
settlements of their respective claims. The claimants
who worked in Bahrain can not be allowed to sue in a
class suit in a judicial proceeding.
WHEREFORE, all the three petitioners are DISMISSED.

HUNTINGTON V. ATTRILL FACTS The appellant, in June,

1880, became a creditor for money lent to the
Rockaway Beach Improvement Company, Limited,
which carried on business in the State of New York,
being incorporated pursuant to Chapter 611 of the
State laws of 1875. Sect. 21 of the Act provides that: "If
any certificate or report made, or public notice given,
by the officers of any such corporation, shall be false in
any material representation, all the officers who shall
have signed the same shall be jointly and severally
liable for all the debts of the corporation contracted
while they are officers thereof." The respondent was, in
June, 1880, a director, and in that capacity an officer of
the company within the meaning of the statute. On the
30th of that month he, along with other officers of the
company, signed and verified on oath, as prescribed by
sect. 37, a certificate setting forth that the whole
capital stock had, at its date, been paid up in cash. In
the year 1883, the appellant instituted a suit against
the respondent before the Supreme Court of New York
State for the unpaid balance of his loan to the
company, alleging that the certificate contained
representations which were material and false, and
that the respondent had incurred personal
responsibility for the debt as provided by sect. 21. The
respondent defended the action; but, a verdict having
been found against him, the Court, on the 15th of June,
1886, gave final judgment, ordering him to pay to the
appellant the sum of $100,240. Having failed to
recover payment, the appellant, in September, 1886,
brought an action upon his decree in the Common
Pleas Division of the High Court of Justice for the
Province of Ontario, where the respondent resided. The
only plea stated in defence was to the effect that the
judgment sued on was for a penalty inflicted by the
municipal law of New York; and that the action being
one of a penal character ought not to be entertained
by the Courts of a foreign State. HOLDING
Characterisation as penal is a matter for the forum
court Their Lordships cannot assent to the proposition
that, in considering whether the present action was
penal in such sense as to oust their jurisdiction, the
Courts of Ontario were bound to pay absolute
deference to any interpretation which might have been
put upon the Statute of 1875 in the State of New York.
They had to construe and apply an international rule,
which is a matter of law

Bellis vs Bellis, G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967

TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased,
PEOPLES BANK & TRUST COMPANY,
executor, MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA
BELLIS, oppositors-appellants, VS.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET. AL., heir-appellees
G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967
FACTS:
Amos Bellis, born in Texas, was a citizen of the State of
Texas and of the United States. He had 5 legitimate

children with his wife, Mary Mallen, whom he had

divorced, 3 legitimate children with his 2nd wife, Violet
Kennedy and finally, 3 illegitimate children.
Prior to his death, Amos Bellis executed a will in the
Philippines in which his distributable estate should be
divided in trust in the following order and manner:
a. $240,000 to his 1st wife Mary Mallen;
b. P120,000 to his 3 illegitimate children at P40,000
each;
c. The remainder shall go to his surviving children by
his 1st and 2nd wives, in equal shares.
Subsequently, Amos Bellis died a resident of San
Antonio, Texas, USA. His will was admitted to probate in
the Philippines. The Peoples Bank and Trust Company,
an executor of the will, paid the entire bequest therein.
Preparatory to closing its administration, the executor
submitted and filed its Executors Final Account,
Report of Administration and Project of Partition where
it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of
Mary Mallen by the shares of stock amounting to
$240,000 delivered to her, and the legacies of the 3
illegitimate children in the amount of P40,000 each or
a total of P120,000. In the project partition, the
executor divided the residuary estate into 7 equal
portions
for the benefit of the testators 7 legitimate children by
his 1st and 2nd marriages.
Among the 3 illegitimate children, Mari Cristina and
Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective opposition to
the project partition on the ground that they were
deprived of their legitimates as illegitimate children.
The lower court denied their respective motions for
reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether Texan Law of Philippine Law must apply.
RULING:
It is not disputed that the decedent was both a national
of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his
death. So that even assuming Texan has a conflict of
law rule providing that the same would not result in a
reference back (renvoi) to Philippine Law, but would
still refer to Texas Law.
Nonetheless, if Texas has conflict rule adopting the
situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of
the law of the place where the properties are situated,
renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved
are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however of
proofs as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should
not be presumed different from our appellants, position
is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos Bellis, was
a citizen of the State of Texas, USA and that under the
Laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimates.
Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision
of the will and the amount of successional rights has to
be determined under Texas Law, the Philippine Law on
legitimates can not be applied to the testate of Amos
Bellis.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Philippine law be applied in the
case in the determination of the illegitimate childrens
successional rights
RULING:
Court ruled that provision in a foreigners will to the
effect that his properties shall be distributed in
accordance with Philippine law and not with his
national law, is illegal and void, for his national law
cannot be ignored in view of those matters that Article
10 now Article 16 of the Civil Code states said
national law should govern.
Where the testator was a citizen of Texas and domiciled
in Texas, the intrinsic validity of his will should be
governed by his national law. Since Texas law does not
require legitimes, then his will, which deprived his
illegitimate children of the legitimes, is valid.
The Supreme Court held that the illegitimate children
are not entitled to the legitimes under the texas law,
which is the national law of the deceased.

ISSUE: W/N Texas laws or national law of Amos should

govern the intrinsic validity of the will
HELD: YES. Order of the probate court is hereby
affirmed

Doctrine of Processual Presumption:

The foreign law, whenever applicable,

should be proved by the proponent thereof,
otherwise, such law shall be presumed to be
exactly the same as the law of the forum.

In the absence of proof as to the

conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be
presumed different from ours. Apply Philippine
laws.

Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil

Code, render applicable the national law of the
decedent, in intestate or testamentary
successions, with regard to four items: (a) the
order of succession; (b) the amount of
successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of
the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity
to succeed. They provide that

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal

property is subject to the law of the country
where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both
with respect to the order of succession and to the
amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic
validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated
by the national law of the person whose succession is
under consideration, whatever may he the nature of
the property and regardless of the country wherein
said property may be found.

ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by

the law of the nation of the decedent.

The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G.

Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas,
U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there
are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly,
since the intrinsic validity of the provision of
the will and the amount of successional rights
are to be determined under Texas law, the
Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied
to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.

ZALAMEA V. CA. Court rigorously applied the

rule requiring proof of foreign law, held that
since foreign law pleaded but not proven,
private respondent's conduct was excused
ZALAMEA V. CA
(case of bumping off, WON overbooking is
allowed in US)
-Zalamea spouses and their daughter
purchased 3 airline tickets from Manila agent of
Tans World Airlines Inc. - 2 on 75% discount,
and one full-fare. All tickets confirmed in Manila
and re-confirmed in NY
-Probably in NY, the 3 were wait-listed as their
seats were already taken. As Mr. Zalamea was
holding the full-fare ticket, he was allowed to
board the plane and Mrs. Zalamea and their
daughter were compelled to buy tickets back to
Manila from other airlines
-Zalameas filed ACTION FOR DAMAGES based
on breach of contract of carriage before RTC
Makati
-RTC: for Zalameas, refund ticket price + MD +
Atty's fees
-CA: MD cannot be recovered, overbooking
being an accepted practice in US Airlines so no
fraud nor bad faith on the part of TransWorld
Airlines
WON MD should have been awarded for BF on
part of TransWorld Airlines? YES. Overbooking =
BF
US law allowing overbooking never proved. Just
presented statement of Ms. Gwendolyn Lather
(customer service agent) in her deposition
wherein she said that OVERBOOKING WAS
ALLOWED based on the Code of Federal
Regulations fo the Civil Aeronautics Board.
-what is required to be able to prove foreign
law:
*official publication
*copy of the written law attested by the officers
having the legal custody of the record, or his
deputy + certificate that such officer has
custody + seal of the office of the officer who
made the certification
>who can make the certification:
secretary of an embassy or legation
consul general
consul
vice consul
consular agent
any officer in the foreign service of the
Philippines
-here, none presented to prove contents of the
Code of Federal Regulations for the Civil
Aeronautics Board
-so CA erred in finding that overbooking is
allowed under US laws
Even if there is such US law existing allowing
overbooking, it's irrelevant!
-lex loci contractus applies: tickets sold,
issued in RP so RP law applicable
Overbooking = BF
-where an airline had deliberately overbooked,
it took the risk of having to deprive some
passengers of their seats in case all of them
would show up for check in. For the indignity
and inconvenience of being refused a confirmed
seat on the last minute, said passenger is
entitled to an award of moral damages
-even if overbooking allowed, TWA still guilty for
not informing its passengers beforehand

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO,

petitioner, VS. RODERICK A. RECIO,

respondent
October 2, 2001
FACTS:
The respondent, a Filipino was married to Editha
Samson, an Australian citizen, in Rizal in 1987. They
lived together as husband and wife in Australia. In
1989, the Australian family court issued a decree of
divorce supposedly dissolving the marriage. In 1992,
respondent acquired Australian citizenship. In 1994, he
married Grace Garcia, a Filipina, herein petitioner, in
Cabanatuan City. In their application for marriage
license, respondent was declared as single and
Filipino. Since October 1995, they lived separately;
and in 1996 while in Autralia, their conjugal assets
were divided. In 1998, petitioner filed Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of
bigamy, claiming that she learned of the respondents
former marriage only in November. On the other hand,
respondent claims that he told petitioner of his prior
marriage in 1993, before they were married.
Respondent also contended that his first marriage was
dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australia in
1989 and hence, he was legally capacitated to marry
petitioner in 1994. The trial court declared that the first
marriage was dissolved on the ground of the divorce
issued in Australia as valid and recognized in the
Philippines. Hence, this petition was forwarded before
the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the divorce between respondent and
Editha Samson was proven.
2. Whether or not respondent has legal capacity to
marry Grace Garcia.
RULING:
The Philippine law does not provide for absolute
divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. In mixed
marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article
26 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a
subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him
or her to remarry. A divorce obtained abroad by two
aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided
it is consistent with their respective laws. Therefore,
before our courts can recognize a foreign divorce, the
party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing
it.
In this case, the divorce decree between the
respondent and Samson appears to be authentic,
issued by an Australian family court. Although,
appearance is not sufficient; and compliance with the
rules on evidence regarding alleged foreign laws must
be demonstrated, the decree was admitted on account
of petitioners failure to object properly because he
objected to the fact that it was not registered in the
Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City, not to its
admissibility.
Respondent claims that the Australian divorce decree,
which was validly admitted as evidence, adequately
established his legal capacity to marry under
Australian law. However, there are two types of
divorce, absolute divorce terminating the marriage and
limited divorce merely suspending the marriage. In this
case, it is not known which type of divorce the
respondent procured.
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court
may under some foreign statutes, still restrict
remarriage. Under the Australian divorce decree a
party to a marriage who marries again before this
decree becomes absolute commits the offense of
bigamy. This shows that the divorce obtained by the
respondent might have been restricted. Respondent
also failed to produce sufficient evidence showing the
foreign law governing his status. Together with other
evidences submitted, they dont absolutely establish
his legal capacity to remarry according to the alleged
foreign law.
Case remanded to the court a quo. The marriage
between the petitioner and respondent can not be

declared null and void based on lack of evidence

conclusively showing the respondents legal capacity to
marry petitioner. With the lack of such evidence, the
court a quo may declare nullity of the parties marriage
based on two existing marriage certificates.
ISSUE: W/N the divorce between Recio and Samson
was valid and proven
HELD: NO. Remand the case to the court a quo for the
purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively show
respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner; and
failing in that, of declaring the parties' marriage void
on the ground of bigamy

Divorces:
A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved
even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles
15 and 17 of the Civil Code.
2. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner,
Article 26 of the Family Code allows the former to
contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is
"validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry."
3. A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both
aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided
it is consistent with their respective national laws.

Before a foreign divorce decree can be

recognized by our courts, the party pleading it
must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
allowing it
o legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by
the national law of the party concerned
o A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce
decree itself
The decree purports to be a written act or record of an
act of an officially body or tribunal of a foreign country
o Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other
hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public
or official record of a foreign country by either:
1. an official publication; or
2. a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal
custody of the document.
If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy
must be:
1. accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign
service stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept; and
2. authenticated by the seal of his office

Since the divorce was a defense raised by

Recio, the burden of proving the pertinent
Australian law validating it falls squarely upon
him

In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal

dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising
after marriage. But divorces are of different
types:
1. absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii - terminates
the marriage
2. limited divorce or a mensa et thoro - suspends it and
leaves the bond in full force

Recio presented a decree nisi or an

interlocutory decree a conditional or
provisional judgment of divorce
o On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree
contains a restriction that reads:
"1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this
decree becomes absolute (unless the other party has
died) commits the offence of bigamy."
1.

Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad vs Court

of Appeals
361 SCRA 489 Conflict of Laws Private International
Law Foreign Judgments How Assailed

In 1985, the High Court of Malaysia ordered the

Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC) to
pay $5.1 million to Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M)
Berhad. This was the result of a recovery suit filed by
Asiavest against PNCC in Malaysia for PNCCs failure to
complete a construction project there despite due
payment from Asiavest. Despite demand, PNCC failed
to comply with the judgment in Malaysia hence
Asiavest filed a complaint for the enforcement of the
Malaysian ruling against PNCC in the Philippines. The
case was filed with the Pasig RTC which eventually
denied the complaint. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision of the RTC.
Asiavest appealed. In its defense, PNCC alleged that
the foreign judgment cannot be enforced here because
of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to PNCC,
collusion and/or fraud, and there is a clear mistake of
law or fact. Asiavest assailed the arguments of PNCC
on the ground that PNCCs counsel participated in all
the proceedings in the Malaysian Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Malaysian Court judgment
should be enforced against PNCC in the Philippines.
HELD: Yes. PNCC failed to prove and substantiate its
bare allegations of want of jurisdiction, want of notice,
collusion and/or fraud, and mistake of fact. On the

contrary, Asiavest was able to present evidence as to

the validity of the proceedings that took place in
Malaysia. Asiavest presented the certified and
authenticated copies of the judgment and the order
issued by the Malaysian Court. It also presented
correspondences between Asiavests lawyers and
PNCCs lawyers in and out of court which belied PNCCs
allegation that the Malaysian court never acquired
jurisdiction over it. PNCCs allegation of fraud is not
sufficient too, further, it never invoked the same in the
Malaysian Court.
The Supreme Court notes, to assail a foreign judgment
the party must present evidence of want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact. Otherwise, the judgment enjoys
the presumption of validity so long as it was duly
certified and authenticated. In this case, PNCC failed to
present the required evidence.