(1) Take note of the dates to understand the case.

AIRLINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC.

FACTS:
The present controversy stemmed from a labor dispute between PAL and ALPAP, the legitimate labor
organization and exclusive bargaining agent of all commercial pilots of PAL. Claiming that PAL
committed unfair labor practice, ALPAP filed a notice of strike against respondent PAL with the DOLE.
The DOLE Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute. It ordered that all strikes and lockouts
at the Philippine Airlines, Inc., whether actual or impending, are hereby strictly prohibited.
In a subsequent Order, the DOLE Secretary reiterated the prohibition. Despite such reminder to the
parties, however, ALPAP went on strike on June 5, 1998. This constrained the DOLE to issue a returnto-work order on June 7, 1998. However, it was only on June 26, 1998 when ALPAP officers and
members reported back to work as shown in a logbook signed by each of them. As a consequence,
PAL refused to accept the returning pilots for their failure to comply immediately with the return-to-work
order.
ALPAP filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal lockout against PAL. ALPAP contended that its
counsel received a copy of the return-to-work order only on June 25, 1998, which justified their noncompliance therewith until June 26, 1998. It thus prayed that PAL be ordered to accept unconditionally
all officers and members of ALPAP without any loss of pay and seniority and to pay whatever salaries
and benefits due them pursuant to existing contracts of employment.
The Labor Arbiter consolidated the illegal lockout case with the strike case pending before the DOLE
Secretary since the controversy presented in the lockout case is an offshoot of the labor dispute over
which the DOLE Secretary has assumed jurisdiction and because the factual allegations in both cases
are interrelated. The NLRC sustained the consolidation.
DOLE Secretary rendered a Resolution dated June 1, 1999 declaring the strike conducted by ALPAP
on June 5, 1998 illegal and pronouncing the loss of employment status of its officers and members who
participated in the strike in defiance of the June 7, 1998 return-to-work order.
In a Resolution dated July 23, 1999, ALPAPs motion for reconsideration was denied. Thus, ALPAP
filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA assailing both the June 1, 1999 and July 23, 1999 DOLE
Resolutions.
Meanwhile, several ALPAP members filed separate individual complaints for illegal dismissal and nonpayment of monetary benefits against PAL with the Labor Arbiters of the NLRC, questioning their
termination as a result of the strike staged by other ALPAP members on June 5, 1998.20 While these
cases were pending, the CA affirmed and upheld the June 1, 1999 and July 23, 1999 DOLE
Resolutions in its Decision. ALPAP then sought a review of the CA Decision, thereby elevating the
matter to this Court. This Court dismissed ALPAPs petition for failure to show that the CA committed
grave abuse of discretion or a reversible error. This Courts Resolution attained finality on August 29,
2002.
Proceedings before the DOLE Secretary

On January 13, 2003, ALPAP filed before the Office of the DOLE Secretary requesting the said office to
conduct an appropriate legal proceeding to determine who among its officers and members should be
reinstated or deemed to have lost their employment with PAL for their actual participation in the strike
conducted in June 1998 since not only the striking workers were dismissed by PAL but all of ALPAPs
officers and members, even though some were on official leave or abroad at the time of the strike. A
Supplemental Motion was afterwards filed by ALPAP on January 28, 2003, this time asking the DOLE
Secretary to resolve all issues relating to the entitlement to employment benefits by the officers and
members of ALPAP, whether terminated or not.
On January 24, 2003, DOLE Secretary resolved the motions and held that it had no authority to reopen
an issue that has been passed upon by the Supreme Court. And that there was an implied recognition
on the part of the pilots that the remedy to their present dilemma could be found in the NLRC when in
ALPAP'S memorandum, it admitted that individual complaints for illegal dismissal have been filed by
the affected pilots before the NLRC. The DOLE merely NOTED both the motion and the supplemental
motion as well as the arguments of ALPAP.
Proceedings before the Court of Appeals
ALPAP filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, insisting that the assailed letters dated July 4, 2003 and
July 30, 2003, which merely noted its motions, were issued in grave abuse of discretion. The CA
dismissed the petition.Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
WON there was grave abuse of discretion by DOLE in merely noting ALPAPs twin motions in due
deference to a final and immutable judgment rendered by the Supreme Court.
HELD: NO.
In the instant case, ALPAP seeks for a conduct of a proceeding to determine who among its members
and officers actually participated in the illegal strike because, it insists, the June 1, 1999 DOLE
Resolution did not make such determination. However, as correctly ruled by the DOLE and affirmed by
the CA, such proceeding would entail a reopening of a final judgment which could not be permitted by
this Court.
Settled in law is that once a decision has acquired finality, it becomes immutable and unalterable, thus
can no longer be modified in any respect. Subject to certain recognized exceptions,the principle of
immutability leaves the judgment undisturbed as "nothing further can be done except to execute it."
As was held in Reinsurance Company of the Orient, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, any ambiguity may be
clarified by reference primarily to the body of the decision or supplementary to the pleadings previously
filed in the case. In any case, especially when there is an ambiguity, "a judgment shall be read in
connection with the entire record and construed accordingly."
There is no necessity to conduct a proceeding to determine the participants in the illegal strike or those
who refused to heed the return to work order because the ambiguity can be cured by reference to the
body of the decision and the pleadings filed.
A review of the records reveals that the DOLE Secretary declared the ALPAP officers and members to
have lost their employment status based on either of two grounds, viz: their participation in the illegal

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strike on June 5, 1998 or their defiance of the return-to-work order of the DOLE Secretary. The records
of the case unveil the names of each of these returning pilots. The logbook with the heading "Return To
Work Compliance/ Returnees" bears their individual signature signifying their conformity that they were
among those workers who returned to work only on June 26, 1998 or after the deadline imposed by
DOLE. From this crucial and vital piece of evidence, it is apparent that each of these pilots is bound by
the judgment. Besides, the complaint for illegal lockout was filed on behalf of all these returnees. Thus,
a finding that there was no illegal lockout would be enforceable against them. In fine, only those
returning pilots, irrespective of whether they comprise the entire membership of ALPAP, are bound by
the June 1, 1999 DOLE Resolution.

The LA dismissed the complaints for illegal lockout and unfair labor practice for lack of merit. However,
because Jackbilt did not file a petition to declare the strike illegal before terminating respondents
officers and employees, it was found guilty of illegal dismissal.
Issue: The primordial issue in this petition is whether or not the filing of a petition with the labor arbiter
to declare a strike illegal is a condition sine qua non for the valid termination of employees who commit
an illegal act in the course of such strike.
Ruling: No.
Jackbilt asserts that the filing of a petition to declare the strike illegal was unnecessary since the NLRC
had already found that the union committed illegal acts in the course of the strike.
We grant the petition.

ALPAP harps on the inequity of PALs termination of its officers and members considering that some of
them were on leave or were abroad at the time of the strike. Some were even merely barred from
returning to their work which excused them for not complying immediately with the return-to-work order.
Again, a scrutiny of the records of the case discloses that these allegations were raised at a very late
stage, that is, after the judgment has finally decreed that the returning pilots termination was legal.
These defenses were not raised and discussed when the case was still pending before the DOLE
Secretary, the CA or even before this Court.
2.JACKBILT
INDUSTRIES,
JACKBILT EMPLOYEES WORKERS UNION-NAFLU-KMU

INC., vs.

Facts:
Jackbilt temporarily stopped its business compelling most of its employees to go on leave for 6 months.
The union immediately protested the temporary shutdown. Because its CBA with petitioner was
expiring during the period of the shutdown, the union claimed that Jackbilt halted production to avoid its
duty to bargain collectively. The shutdown was allegedly motivated by anti-union sentiments.
Accordingly, on March 9, 1998, the union went on strike.
Jackbilt then filed a petition for injunction with a prayer for the issuance of a TRO to enjoin respondent
from obstructing free entry to and exit from its production facility. The NLRC issued a TRO directing the
respondents to refrain from preventing access to petitioners property. However, it appeared that the
union violated the order. Union members, stopped and inspected private vehicles entering and exiting
petitioners production facility.
Jackbilt dismissed the concerned officers and members and barred them from entering its premises
since they repeatedly ignored the memoranda which ordered them to explain why they should not be
dismissed for committing illegals acts in the course of a strike.
Aggrieved, the union filed complaints for illegal lockout, runaway shop and damages, unfair labor
practice, illegal dismissal and attorneys fees, and refusal to bargain. It argued that there was no basis
for the temporary partial shutdown as it was undertaken by petitioner to avoid its duty to bargain
collectively.
Jackbilt, on the other hand, asserted that because the union conducted a strike without observing the
procedural requirements provided in Article 263 of the Labor Code, the strike was illegal. Furthermore,
in view of the decision of the NLRC (which found that respondent obstructed the free ingress to and
egress from petitioners premises), petitioner validly dismissed respondents officers and employees for
committing illegal acts in the course of a strike.

The principle of conclusiveness of judgment, embodied in Section 47(c), Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court, holds that the parties to a case are bound by the findings in a previous judgment with
respect to matters actually raised and adjudged therein.
Article 264(e) of the Labor Codeprohibits any person engaged in picketing from obstructing the
free ingress to and egress from the employers premises. Since respondent was found to have
prevented the free entry into and exit of vehicles from petitioners compound, respondents officers and
employees clearly committed illegal acts in the course of strike.
The use of unlawful means in the course of a strike renders such strike illegal. Therefore, pursuant to
the principle of conclusiveness of judgment, the strike was ipso facto illegal. The filing of a petition to
declare the strike illegal was thus unnecessary.
Consequently, the court upheld the legality of the dismissal of respondents officers and employees.
Article 264 of the Labor Code further provides that an employer may terminate employees found
to have committed illegal acts in the course of a strike. Jackbilt clearly had the legal right to
terminate the unions officers and employees
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) and WINSTON F. GARCIA, in his capacity
as
PRESIDENT
and
GENERAL
MANAGER
of
the
GSIS, Petitioners,
vs.
DINNAH VILLAVIZA, ELIZABETH DUQUE, ADRONICO A. ECHAVEZ, RODEL RUBIO, ROWENA
THERESE B. GRACIA, PILAR LAYCO, and ANTONIO JOSE LEGARDA, Respondents.
X prohibited/ Concerted activity
(PGM Garcia) as President and General manager of the GSIS, filed separate formal charges against
respondents for Grave Misconduct and/ or Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service
That respondent wearing red shirt together with some employees, marched to or appeared
simultaneously at or just outside the office of the Investigation Unit in a mass demonstration/ rally of
protest and support for Molina and Velasco, the latter having surreptitiously entered the GSIS
premises;
That some of these employees badmouthed the security guards and the GSIS management and
defiantly raised clenched fists
That respondent, together with other employees caused alarm and heightened some employees and
disrupted the work at the Investigation Unit during office hours
This episode was earlier reported to PGM Garcia

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 Atty. Barbo, issued a memorandum to each of the seven (7) respondents requiring them to explain in
writing and under oath within three (3) days why they should not be administratively dealt with
Respondents denied that there was a planned mass action, the respondents explained that their act
of going to the office of the GSIS-IU was a spontaneous reaction after learning that their former union
president was there.
For her part, respondent Villaviza submitted a separate letter explaining that she had a scheduled
pre-hearing at the GSIS-IU that day and that she had informed her immediate supervisor about it,
attaching a copy of the order of pre-hearing but not under oath.
PGM Garcia issued separate but similarly worded decisions finding all seven (7) respondents guilty of
the charges and meting out the penalty of one (1) year suspension plus the accessory penalties.
Appeal (CSC) found the respondents guilty of the lesser offense.

ISSUE
Whether or not respondents' actions on May 27, 2005 amounted to a "prohibited concerted
activity or mass action - NO
Section 5. Omnibus Rules, states that ''prohibited concerted activity or mass action'' refer to any
collective activity undertaken by government employees, by themselves or through their employees
organizations, with intent of effecting work stoppage or service disruption in order to realize their
demands of force concession, economic or otherwise, from their respective agencies or the
government.
It shall include:
1. mass leaves,
2. walkouts,
3. pickets and
4. acts of similar nature.

In this case, CSC found that the acts of respondents in going to the GSIS-IU office wearing red shirts
to witness a public hearing do not amount to a concerted activity or mass action proscribed above.
CSC even added that their actuations can be deemed an exercise of their constitutional right to
freedom of expression.
The CA found no cogent reason to deviate therefrom.
As defined in Section 5 of CSC Resolution No. 02-1316 which serves to regulate the political rights of
those in the government service, the concerted activity or mass action proscribed must be coupled with
the "intent of effecting work stoppage or service disruption in order to realize their demands of force
concession."
Wearing similarly colored shirts, attending a public hearing at the GSIS-IU office, bringing with them
recording gadgets, clenching their fists, some even badmouthing the guards and PGM Garcia, are acts
not constitutive of an
(i) intent to effect work stoppage or service disruption and
(ii) for the purpose of realizing their demands of force concession.

The said report of Nagtalon as basis of Garcias charges contained only bare facts.
It did not show respondents' unified intent to effect disruption or stoppage in their work.

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 It also failed to show that their purpose was to demand a force concession.

GSIS v. Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa GSIS upheld the position of petitioner GSIS because its
employees, numbering between 300 and 800 each day, staged a walkout and participated in a mass
protest or demonstration outside the GSIS for four straight days.
We cannot say the same for the 20 or so employees in this case.
To equate their wearing of red shirts and going to the GSIS-IU office for just over an hour with that
four-day mass action in Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa GSIS case and to punish them in the
same manner would most certainly be unfair and unjust.
Scott v. Meters New York Transit Authority (NYTA), responsible for operation of New York City's mass
transit service, issued a rule prohibiting employees from wearing badges or buttons on their uniforms.
A number of union members wore union buttons promoting their opposition to a collective bargaining
agreement.
Consequently, the NYTA tried to enforce its rule and threatened to subject these union members to
discipline.
The court, though recognizing the government's right to impose reasonable restrictions, held that the
NYTA's rule was "unconstitutionally overboard."

Communication Workers of America v. Ector County Hospital District

A county hospital employee's wearing of a "Union Yes" lapel pin during a union organization drive
constituted speech on a matter of public concern, and the county's proffered interest in enforcing the
anti-adornment provision of its dress code was outweighed by the employee's interest in exercising his
First Amendment speech and associational rights by wearing a pro-union lapel button.
Here, respondents' freedom of speech and of expression remains intact, and CSC's Resolution No.
02-1316 defining what a prohibited concerted activity or mass action has only tempered or regulated
these rights.
Respondents' actuations did not amount to a prohibited concerted activity or mass action.

4. CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER, INC. vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION

G.R. No. 147080 April 26, 2005
FACTS:
The petitioners refusal to negotiate for a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) resulted in a
union-led strike on April 15, 1993. The Secretary of DOLE rendered a decision directing the
management of the Capitol Medical Center to negotiate a CBA with the Capitol Medical Center
Employees Association-Alliance of Filipino Workers, the certified bargaining agent of the rankand-fie employees. Pursuant thereto, the Union requested for a meeting to discuss matters
pertaining to a negotiation for a CBA but was refused.
Instead of filing a motion with the SOLE for the enforcement of the resolutions of Undersecretary
Laguesma as affirmed by this Court, the Union filed a Notice of Strike with the NCMB. The Union
alleged as grounds for the projected strike the following acts of the petitioner: (a) refusal to
bargain; (b) coercion on employees; and (c) interference/ restraint to self-organization.
A series of conferences was conducted before the NCMB, but no agreement was reached. The
petitioner even filed a Letter with the Board requesting that the notice of strike be dismissed;the
Union had apparently failed to furnish the Regional Branch of the NCMB with a copy of a notice
of the meeting where the strike vote was conducted.
The Union submitted to the NCMB the minutes of the alleged strike vote purportedly held on
November 10, 1997 at the parking lot in front of the petitioners premises. It appears that 178 out
of the 300 union members participated therein, and the results were as follows: 156 members
voted to strike; 14 members cast negative votes; and eight votes were spoiled.
On November 28, 1997, the officers and members of the Union staged a strike. Subsequently,
the Union filed an ex parte motion with the DOLE, praying for its assumption of jurisdiction over
the dispute.
The SOLE issued an Order, assuming jurisdiction over the ongoing labor dispute and directed all
striking workers to return to work within twenty-four (24) hours from the receipt of the Order and
the management to resume normal operations and accept back all striking workers under the
same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike.
For its part, the petitioner filed a petitionto declare the strike illegal. In its position paper, the
petitioner appended the affidavit of Erwin Barbacena, the overseer of the property across the
hospital which was being used as a parking lot. Also included were the affidavits of Simon J.
Tingzon and Reggie B. Barawid, the petitioners security guards assigned in front of the hospital
premises. They attested to the fact that no secret balloting took place at the said parking lot from
6:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. of November 10, 1997.
In their position paper, the respondents appended the joint affidavit of the Union president and
those members who alleged that they had cast their votes during the strike vote held on
November 10, 1997.

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 Labor Arbiter Facundo L. Leda rendered a Decision in favor of the petitioner, and declared the
strike staged by the respondents illegal. The Labor Arbiter ruled that no voting had taken place
on November 10, 1997; moreover, no notice of such voting was furnished to the NCMB at least
twenty-four (24) hours prior to the intended holding of the strike vote.

The requirement of giving notice of the conduct of a strike vote to the NCMB at least 24 hours
before the meeting for the said purpose is designed to (a) inform the NCMB of the intent of the
union to conduct a strike vote; (b) give the NCMB ample time to decide on whether or not
there is a need to supervise the conduct of the strike vote to prevent any acts of violence
and/or irregularities attendant thereto; and (c) should the NCMB decide on its own initiative or
upon the request of an interested party including the employer, to supervise the strike vote, to
give it ample time to prepare for the deployment of the requisite personnel, including peace
officers if need be.

In this case, the respondent Union failed to comply with the 24-hour prior notice requirement
to the NCMB before it conducted the alleged strike vote meeting on November 10, 1997. As a
result, the petitioner complained that no strike vote meeting ever took place and averred that
the strike staged by the respondent union was illegal.

Conformably to Article 264 of the Labor Code of the Philippines and Section 7, Rule XXII of
the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, no labor organization shall declare a strike
unless supported by a majority vote of the members of the union obtained by secret ballot in a
meeting called for that purpose. The requirement is mandatory and the failure of a union to
comply therewith renders the strike illegal.The union is thus mandated to allege and prove
compliance with the requirements of the law.

In the present case, there is a divergence between the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter, on
the one hand, and the NLRC and the CA, on the other, in that the Labor Arbiter found and
declared in his decision that no secret voting ever took place in the parking lot fronting the
hospital on November 10, 1997 by and among the 300 members of the respondent Union.
Erwin Barbacena, the overseer of the only parking lot fronting the hospital, and security
guards Simon Tingzon and Reggie Barawid, declared in their respective affidavits that no
secret voting ever took place on November 10, 1997; 17 employees of the petitioner also
denied in their respective statements that they were not members of the respondent Union,
and were asked to merely sign attendance papers and unnumbered votes. The NLRC and the
CA declared in their respective decisions that the affidavits of the petitioners 17 employees
had no probative weight because the said employees merely executed their affidavits out of
fear of losing their jobs. The NLRC and the CA anchored their conclusion on their finding that
the affidavits of the employees were uniform and pro forma.

We agree with the finding of the Labor Arbiter that no secret balloting to strike was conducted
by the respondent Union on November 10, 1997 at the parking lot in front of the hospital.

The allegations in the affidavit of Barbacena and the joint affidavit of Tingzon and Baraw belie
the claim of the respondents and the finding of the NLRC that a secret balloting took place on
November 10, 1997 in front of the hospital. The respondents failed to prove the existence of a
parking lot in front of the hospital other than the parking lot across from it. Indeed, 17 of those
who purportedly voted in a secret voting executed their separate affidavits that no secret
balloting took place on November 10, 1997, and that even if they were not members of the
respondent Union, were asked to vote and to sign attendance papers.

The respondents appealed to the NLRC which rendered a Decision, granting their appeal and
reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter. The NLRC also denied the petitioners petition to
declare the strike illegal.
The petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of the decision, but the NLRC denied the
said motion. The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA assailing the decision and
resolution of the NLRC. The CA rendered judgment dismissing the petition and affirming the
assailed decision and resolution of the NLRC. The petitioner filed the instant petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the NLRCS finding that respondents complied with
the legal requirements for staging the subject strike. YES
PETITIONERS CONTENTIONS:
The petitioner asserts that the NLRC and the CA erred in holding that the submission of a notice
of a strike vote to the Regional Branch of the NCMB as required by Section 7, Rule XXII of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, is merely directory and not mandatory.
The petitioner contends that the CA erred in affirming the decision of the NLRC which declared
that the respondents complied with all the requirements for a lawful strike. The petitioner insists
that, as gleaned from the affidavits of the 17 union members and that of the overseer, and
contrary to the joint affidavit of the officers and some union members, no meeting was held and
no secret balloting was conducted on November 10, 1997.
The petitioner faults the CA and the NLRC for holding that a meeting for a strike vote was held
on the said date by the respondents, despite the fact that the NLRC did not conduct an ocular
inspection of the area where the respondents members allegedly held the voting.
RULING:

Section 10, Rule XXII of the Omnibus Rules of the NLRC requires that a majority vote by
secret ballot be obtained before declaring a strike. Article 263 further provides that a union
intending to stage a strike is mandated to notify the NCMB of the meeting for the conduct of
strike vote, at least twenty-four (24) hours prior to such meeting (date, place and time) for the
conduct of strike vote, at least 24 hours prior to such meeting. NCMB is to call the parties to a
conference to assist them in an amicable settlement and in the event of its failure, voluntary
arbitration is encouraged. If the parties refuse, the union may hold a strike vote to ensure the
decision to strike rests on the majority of the union members.

6. G.R. Nos. 95494-97 September 7, 1995

LAPANDAY WORKERS UNION VS NLRC

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Cases on Concerted Activities|Labor Relations Class of 2016

FACTS: Petitioner Lapanday Workers' Union (Union) is the duly certified bargaining agent of the rank
and file employees of private respondents has a CBA with private respondents LAPANDAY
AGRICULTURAL & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (LADECO) and CADECO ARGO
DEVELOPMENT PHILS., INC (CADECO) , covering the period from December 5, 1985 to November
30, 1988. A few months before the expiration of their CBA, private respondents initiated certain
management policies which disrupted the relationship of the parties.
1st - private respondents provided security services, security guards posted within the company
premises
2nd - private respondents conducted seminars on Human Development and Industrial Relations
(HDIR) for their managerial and supervisory employees and, later, the rank-and-filers, to promote their
social education and economic growth.
These issues were discussed during a labor-management but such issues were still nit resolved. After
the NCMB called a conciliation conference. An unfortunate event brake the peace of the parties. Danilo
Martinez, a member of the Board of Directors of the Union, was gunned down in his house in the
presence of his wife and children. The gunman was later identified as Eledio Samson, an alleged
member of the new security forces of private respondents. The day after the killing, most of the
members of the Union refused to report for work. They returned to work the following day but they did
not comply with the "quota system" adopted by the management to bolster production output. Allegedly,
the Union instructed the workers to reduce their production to thirty per cent (30%). Private
respondents charged the Union with economic sabotage through slowdown. Private respondents then
filed separate charges against the Union and its members for illegal strike, unfair labor practice and
damages, with prayer for injunction.
On September 17, 1988, petitioners skipped work to pay their last respect to the slain Danilo Martinez
who was laid to rest. Again, on September 23, 1988, petitioners did not report for work. Instead, they
proceeded to private respondents' office at Lanang, carrying placards and posters which called for the
removal of the security guards, the ouster of certain management officials, and the approval of their
mass leave application. Their mass action did not succeed. In a last ditch effort to settle the
deteriorating dispute between the parties, City Mayor Rodrigo Duterte (soon to be president.lol)
intervened but failed.
On October 3, 1988, a strike vote was canducted among the members of the Union and those in favor
of the strike won overwhelming support from the workers. The result of the strike vote was then
submitted to the NCMB on October 10, 1988. Two days later, or on October 12, 1988, the Union struck.
On the bases of the foregoing facts, Labor Arbiter Antonio Villanueva ruled that the Onion staged an
illegal strike. Before the NLRC could resolve the appeal taken on the Villanueva decision, Labor Arbiter
Sancho rendered a decision in the two (2) cases filed by the Union against private respondents
LADECO and CADECO of guilty of unfair labor practices and illegal dismissal and ordered the
reinstatement of the dismissed employees of private respondents, with backwages and other benefits.
Private respondents appealed the Sancho decision, claiming, among others, that labor arbiter Sancho
erred in passing upon the legality of the strike staged by petitioners since said issue had already been
passed upon by the Regional Arbitration Branch and was still on appeal before the NLRC. Petitioners
fileds motion for reconsideration. It did not prosper.

RULING: YES .The applicable laws are Articles 263 and 264 of the Labor Code, as amended by E.O.
No. 111, dated December 24, 1986. Paragraphs (c) and (f) of Article 263 of the Labor Code, as
amended by E.O. 111, provides:
(c) In cases of bargaining deadlocks, the duly certified or recognized bargaining agent may file a notice
of strike or the employer may file, notice of lockout with the Ministry at least 30 days before the
intended date thereof. In cases of unfair labor practice, the notice shall be 15 days and in the absence
of a duly certified or recognized bargaining agent, the notice of strike may be filed by any legitimate
labor organization in behalf of its members. However, in case of dismissal from employment of union
officers duly elected in accordance with the union constitution and by-laws, which may constitute union
busting where the existence of the union is threatened, the 15-daycooling-off period shall not apply and
the union may take action immediately.
xxx xxx xxx
(f) A decision to declare a strike must be approved by a majority of the total union membership in the
bargaining unit concerned, obtained by secret ballot in meetings or referenda called for that purpose. A
decision to declare a lockout must be approved by a majority of the board of directors of the
corporation or association or of the partners in a partnership, obtained by secret ballot in a meeting
called for that purpose. The decision shall be valid for the duration of the dispute based on substantially
the same grounds considered when the strike or lockout vote was taken. The Ministry may, at its own
initiative or upon the request of any affected party, supervise the conduct of secret balloting. In every
case, the union or the employer shall furnish the Ministry the results of the voting at least seven (7)
days before the intended strike or lockout subject to the cooling-off period herein provided.
A strike is "any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an
industrial or labor dispute." It is the most preeminent of the economic weapons of workers which they
unsheathe to force management to agree to an equitable sharing of the joint product of labor and
capital. Undeniably, strikes exert some disquieting effects not only on the relationship between labor
and management but also on the general peace and progress of society. Our laws thus regulate their
exercise within reasons by balancing the interests of labor and management together with the
overarching public interest. Some of the limitations on the exercise of the right of strike are provided for
in paragraphs (c) and (f) of Article 263 of the Labor Code, as amended, supra. They Provide for the
procedural steps to be followed before staging a strike filing of notice of strike, taking of strike vote,
and reporting of the strike vote result to the Department of Labor and Employment.
xxx xxx xxx
So too, the 7-day strike-vote report is not without a purpose. As pointed out by the Solicitor General
. . . The submission of the report gives assurance that a strike vote has been taken and that, if the
report concerning it is false, the majority of the members can take appropriate remedy before it is too
late.

ISSUE: WON the strike held on October 12, 1988 is ILLEGAL.

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The seven (7) day waiting period is intended to give the Department of Labor and Employment an
opportunity to verify whether the projected strike really carries the imprimatur of the majority of the
union members. The need for assurance that majority of the union members support the strike cannot
be gainsaid. Strike is usually the last weapon of labor to compel capital to concede to its bargaining
demands or to defend itself against unfair labor practices of management. It is a weapon that can either
breathe life to or destroy the union and its members in their struggle with management for a more
equitable due of their labors. The decision to wield the weapon of strike must, therefore, rest on a
rational basis, free from emotionalism, unswayed by the tempers and tantrums of a few hotheads, and
firmly focused on the legitimate interest of the union which should not, however, be antithetical to the
public welfare. Thus, our laws require the decision to strike to be the consensus of the majority for
while the majority is not infallible, still, it is the best hedge against haste and error. In addition, a
majority vote assures the union it will go to war against management with the strength derived from
unity and hence, with better chance to succeed.
Applying the law to the case at bar, we rule that strike conducted by the union on October 12, 1988 is
plainly illegal as it was held within the seven (7) day waiting period provided for by paragraph (f), Article
263 of the Labor Code, as amended. The haste in holding the strike prevented the Department of
Labor and Employment from verifying whether it carried the approval of the majority of the union
members. It set to naught an important policy consideration of our law on strike. Considering this
finding, we need not exhaustively rule on the legality of the work stoppage conducted by the union and
some of their members on September 9 and 23, 1988. Suffice to state, that the ruling of the public
respondent on the matter is supported by substantial evidence. We affirm the decision of the public
respondent limiting the penalty of dismissal only to the leaders of the illegal strike. especially the
officers of the union who served as its major players. They cannot claim good faith to exculpate
themselves. They admitted knowledge of the law on strike, including its procedure. They cannot violate
the law which ironically was cast to promote their interest.
We, likewise, agree with the public respondent that the union members who were merely instigated to
participate in the illegal strike should be treated differently from their leaders. Part of our benign
consideration for labor is the policy of reinstating rank-and-file workers who were merely misled in
supporting illegal strikes. Nonetheless, these reinstated workers shall not be entitled to backwages as
they should not be compensated for services skipped during the illegal strike.

All the rank-and-file employees of the company refused to follow their regular two-shift work schedule.
The employees stopped working and left their workplace without sealing the containers and securing
the raw materials they were working on.

To minimize the damage the overtime boycott was causing the company, Salazar immediately asked
for a meeting with the union officers. In the meeting, Enrico Gonzales, a union director, told Salazar
that the employees would only return to their normal work schedule if the company would agree to their
demands as to the effectivity and duration of the new CBA. Salazar again told the union officers that
the matter could be better discussed during the formal renegotiations of the CBA. Since the union was
apparently
unsatisfied
with
the
answer
of
the
company,
the
overtime boycott continued. In addition, the employees started to engage in a work
slowdown campaign during the time they were working, thus substantially delaying the production of
the company.

Respondent company filed with the National NLRC a petition to declare illegal petitioner unions
overtime boycott and work slowdown which, according to respondent company, amounted to illegal
strike. It also filed with Office Secretary of Labor a petition for assumption of jurisdiction. Secretary of
Labor Nieves Confesor issued an assumption order over the labor dispute.

8. INTERPHIL LAB UNION VS. INTERPHIL LAB INC.

Labor Arbiter Caday submitted his recommendation to the then Secretary of Labor Leonardo
A. Quisumbing. Then Secretary Quisumbing approved and adopted the report in his Order,
finding illegal strike on the part of petitioner Union.

Petitioner is the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of Respondent.
They had a CBA.

ISSUE: WON the respondents have engaged in overtime boycott and work slowdown, both
amounting to illegal strike?

Prior to the expiration of the CBA, respondent company was approached by the petitioner, through its
officers. The Union inquired about the stand of the company regarding the duration of the CBA which
was set to expire in a few months. Salazar told the union officers that the matter could be best
discussed during the formal negotiations which would start soon.

RULING: YES.

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The evidence presented is equally crystal clear that the "overtime boycott" and "work slowdown"
committed by the respondents amounted to illegal strike.

9. Club Filipino vs Bautista, GR No. 168406

As undisputably testified to by Mr. Alessandro G. Salazar, the company's Vice-President-Human

Resources Department, sometime in February, 1993, he was approached by the union President
Nestor Ocampo and Union Director Hernando Clemente who asked him as to what was the stand of
the company regarding the duration of the CBA between the company and which was set to expire on
July 31, 1993. He answered that the matter could be best discussed during the formal renegotiations
which anyway was to start soon. This query was followed up sometime in March, 1993, and his answer
was the same. In early April, 1993, the union president requested for a meeting to discuss the duration
and effectivity of the CBA. Acceding to the request, a meeting was held on April 15, 1993 wherein the
union officers asked him if he would agree to make the new CBA effective on August 1, 1993 and the
term thereof to be valid for only two (2) years. When he answered that it was still premature to discuss
the matter, the very next day, April 16, 1993, all the rank and file employees of the company refused to
follow their regular two-shift work schedule of 6:00 A.M. to 6:00 P.M. and 6:00 P.M. to 6:00 A.M., when
after the 8-hours work, they abruptly stopped working at 2:00 P.M. and 2:00 A.M., respectively, leaving
their place of work without sealing the containers and securing the raw materials they were working on.
When he saw the workers leaving before the end of their shift, he asked them why and their reply was
"asked the union officers." Alarmed by the overtime boycott and the damage it was causing the
company, he requested for a meeting with the union officers. In the meeting, he asked them why the
regular work schedule was not being followed by the employees, and union Director Enrico Gonzales,
with the support of the other union officers, told him that if management would agree to a two-year
duration for the new CBA and an effectivity date of August 1, 1993, all employees will return to the
normal work schedule of two 12-hour shifts. When answered that the management could not decide on
the matter at the moment and to have it discussed and agreed upon during the formal renegotiations,
the overtime boycott continued and the employees at the same time employed a work slowdown
campaign during working hours, causing considerable delay in the production and complaints from the
clients/customers. This testimonial narrations of Salazar was, as earlier said, undisputed because the
respondents' counsel waived his cross examination.

FACTS:
-Petitioner Club Filipino, Inc. is a non-stock, nonprofit corporation duly formed, organized and
existing under Philippine laws, with petitioner Atty. Roberto F. de Leon as its president.
-Respondents Ronnie Sualog, Joel Calida, Johnny Arinto and Roberto de Guzman, on the other
hand, were former officers and members of the Club Filipino Employees Association. The
union and the company had a CBA which expired on May 31, 2000. Prior to the expiration
of the CBA and within the freedom period, the union made several demands for
negotiation.
- No negotiations, however, took place for various reasons proffered by the company,
among them the illness of the chairman of the management panel.
-The union then filed a notice of strike on the grounds of bargaining deadlock and failure to
bargain.
-The company formally responded to the demands of the union when it submitted the first part
of its economic counter-proposal; the second part was submitted on May 11, 2001.
Meanwhile, on May 4, 2001, the union conducted a strike vote under the
supervision of the DOLE.
- In response to the companys counter-proposal, the union sent the company its improved
proposal, but the company refused to improve on its offer. This prompted the union to stage
a strike on May 26, 2001 on the ground of a CBA bargaining deadlock. The company then
filed a petition to declare the strike illegal.

Finally, the Court cannot agree with the proposition that respondent company, in extending substantial
separation package to some officers of petitioner union during the pendency of this case, in effect,
condoned the illegal acts they committed.

HELD:

ISSUE: whether or not the strike staged by respondents

was legal?

Respondent company correctly postured that at the time these union officers obtained their separation
benefits, they were still considered employees of the company. Hence, the company was merely
complying with its legal obligations. Respondent company could have withheld these benefits pending
the final resolution of this case. Yet, considering perhaps the financial hardships experienced by its
employees and the economic situation prevailing, respondent company chose to let its employees avail
of their separation benefits. The Court views the gesture of respondent company as an act of
generosity for which it should not be punished.

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Rule XXII, Section 4 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code states:
In cases of bargaining deadlocks, the notice shall, as far as practicable, further state
the unresolved issues in the bargaining negotiations and be accompanied by the
written proposals of the union, the counter-proposals of the employer and the proof of a
request for conference to settle differences. In cases of unfair labor practices, the notice shall,
as far as practicable, state the acts complained of, and efforts taken to resolve the
dispute amicably. In the instant case, the union cannot be faulted for its omission of not
attaching the counter-proposal of the company in the notice of strike it submitted to the NCMB
as there was no such counter-proposal. To recall, the union filed a notice of strike on April 6,
2001 after several requests to start negotiations but it was only on April 22, 2001 when the
company formally responded to the union by submitting the first part of its counterproposal. Worse, it took the company another 3 weeks to complete it by submitting on May 11,
2001 the second part of its counter-proposal. The Implementing Rules use the words "as far as
practicable." In this case, attaching the counter-proposal of the company to the notice of
strike of the union was not practicable. Indeed, compliance with the requirement was
impossible because no counter-proposal existed at the time the union filed a notice of strike.
The law does not exact compliance with the impossible. Nemoteneturadimpossibile.
Moreover, it is hornbook doctrine that a mere finding of the illegality of the strike should not be
automatically followed by the wholesale dismissal of the strikers from employment. The law is
clear: Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union
officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike
may be declared to have lost his employment status. Note that the verb "participates" is
preceded by the adverb "knowingly." This reflects the intent of the legislature to require
"knowledge" as a condition sine qua non before a union officer can be dismissed from
employment for participating in an illegal strike. The provision is worded in such a way as to
make it very difficult for employers to circumvent the law by arbitrarily dismissing employees in
the guise of exercising management prerogative. This is but one aspect of the States
constitutional and statutory mandate to protect the rights of employees to selforganization.

Facts:
1.

Petitioner San Miguel Corporation (SMC) and respondent Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa
(IBM), exclusive bargaining agent of petitioners daily-paid rank and file employees, executed a
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) under which they agreed to submit all disputes to
grievance and arbitration proceedings. The CBA also included a mutually enforceable nostrike no-lockout agreement.

2.

IBM, through its vice-president Alfredo Colomeda, filed with the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board (NCMB) a notice of strike, against petitioner for allegedly committing: (1)
illegal dismissal of union members, (2) illegal transfer, (3) violation of CBA, (4) contracting out
of jobs being performed by union members, (5) labor-only contracting, (6) harassment of
union officers and members, (7) non-recognition of duly-elected union officers, and (8) other
acts of unfair labor practice.

3.

The next day, IBM filed another notice of strike, this time through its president Edilberto
Galvez, raising similar grounds: (1) illegal transfer, (2) labor-only contracting, (3) violation of
CBA, (4) dismissal of union officers and members, and (5) other acts of unfair labor practice.

4.

The Galvez group subsequently requested the NCMB to consolidate its notice of strike with
that of the Colomeda group,[6] to which the latter opposed, alleging Galvezs lack of authority in
filing the same.[7]

5.

Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion for Severance of Notices of Strike with Motion to Dismiss,
on the grounds that the notices raised non-strikeable issues and that they affected four
corporations which are separate and distinct from each other

6.

After several conciliation meetings, NCMB Director Reynaldo Ubaldo found that the real
issues involved are non-strikeable. Hence on May 2, 1994, he issued separate letter-orders to
both union groups, converting their notices of strike into preventive mediation.

7.

On May 16, 1994, while separate preventive mediation conferences were ongoing, the
Colomeda group filed with the NCMB a notice of holding a strike vote. Petitioner opposed by
filing a Manifestation and Motion to Declare Notice of Strike Vote Illegal, [10] invoking the case
of PAL v. Drilon,[11] which held that no strike could be legally declared during the pendency of
preventive mediation. NCMB Director Ubaldo in response issued another letter to the
Colomeda Group reiterating the conversion of the notice of strike into a case of preventive
mediation and emphasizing the findings that the grounds raised center only on an intra-union
conflict, which is not strikeable

8.

Meanwhile, the Galvez group filed its second notice of strike against petitioner. Additional
grounds were set forth therein, including discrimination, coercion of employees, illegal lockout

Case number 10

SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ILAW AT BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA
(IBM),respondents.

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Cases on Concerted Activities|Labor Relations Class of 2016

and illegal closure.[13] The NCMB however found these grounds to be mere amplifications of
those alleged in the first notice that the group filed. It therefore ordered the consolidation of
the second notice with the preceding one that was earlier reduced to preventive mediation.
[14]
On the same date, the group likewise notified the NCMB of its intention to hold a strike
vote.
9.

The Colomeda group notified the NCMB of the results of their strike vote, which favored the
holding of a strike.[15] In reply, NCMB issued a letter again advising them that by virtue of
the PAL v. Drilon ruling, their notice of strike is deemed not to have been filed, consequently
invalidating any subsequent strike for lack of compliance with the notice requirement.
[16]
Despite this and the pendency of the preventive mediation proceedings, IBM went on
strike. The strike paralyzed the operations of petitioner, causing it losses allegedly worth
P29.98 million in daily lost production.

10. Two days after the declaration of strike petitioner filed with public respondent NLRC an
amended Petition for Injunction with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order,
Free Ingress and Egress Order and Deputization Order.[18] After due hearing and ocular
inspection, the NLRC resolved to issue a temporary restraining order (TRO) directing free
ingress to and egress from petitioners plants, without prejudice to the unions right to peaceful
picketing and continuous hearings on the injunction case.[19]
11. To minimize further damage to itself, petitioner, entered into a Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA) with the respondent-union, calling for a lifting of the picket lines and resumption of work
in exchange of good faith talks between the management and the labor management
committees. The MOA, signed in the presence of Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) officials, expressly stated that cases filed in relation to their dispute will continue and
will not be affected in any manner whatsoever by the agreement. [20] The picket lines ended
and work was then resumed.
12. Respondent thereafter moved to reconsider the issuance of the TRO, and sought to dismiss
the injunction case in view of the cessation of its picketing activities as a result of the signed
MOA. It argued that the case had become moot and academic there being no more prohibited
activities to restrain, be they actual or threatened.[21] Petitioner, however, opposed and
submitted copies of flyers being circulated by IBM, as proof of the unions alleged threat to
revive the strike.[22] The NLRC did not rule on the opposition to the TRO and allowed it to
lapse.
13. The NLRC issued the challenged decision, denying the petition for injunction for lack of factual
basis. It found that the circumstances at the time did not constitute or no longer constituted an
actual or threatened commission of unlawful acts. [23] It likewise denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration in its resolution.[24]

14. Hence, this petition.

Issue: WON THE NLRC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED TO ENFORCE, BY
INJUNCTION, THE PARTIES RECIPROCAL OBLIGATIONS TO SUBMIT TO ARBITRATION
AND NOT TO STRIKE.
Ruling: yes

Article 254 of the Labor Code provides that no temporary or permanent injunction or restraining
order in any case involving or growing out of labor disputes shall be issued by any court or other
entity except as otherwise provided in Articles 218 and 264 of the Labor Code. Under the first
exception, Article 218 (e) of the Labor Code expressly confers upon the NLRC the power to enjoin or
restrain actual and threatened commission of any or all prohibited or unlawful acts, or to require the
performance of a particular act in any labor dispute which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may
cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party
x x x. The second exception, on the other hand, is when the labor organization or the employer
engages in any of the prohibited activities enumerated in Article 264.
Pursuant to Article 218 (e), the coercive measure of injunction may also be used to restrain an
actual or threatened unlawful strike. In the case of San Miguel Corporation v. NLRC,[26] where the same
issue of NLRCs duty to enjoin an unlawful strike was raised, we ruled that the NLRC committed grave
abuse of discretion when it denied the petition for injunction to restrain the union from declaring a strike
based on non-strikeable grounds. Further, in IBM v. NLRC,[27] we held that it is the legal duty and
obligation of the NLRC to enjoin a partial strike staged in violation of the law. Failure promptly to issue
an injunction by the public respondent was likewise held therein to be an abuse of discretion.
In the case at bar, petitioner sought a permanent injunction to enjoin the respondents strike. A
strike is considered as the most effective weapon in protecting the rights of the employees to improve
the terms and conditions of their employment. However, to be valid, a strike must be pursued within
legal bounds.[28] One of the procedural requisites that Article 263 of the Labor Code and its
Implementing Rules prescribe is the filing of a valid notice of strike with the NCMB. Imposed for the
purpose of encouraging the voluntary settlement of disputes, [29] this requirement has been held to be
mandatory, the lack of which shall render a strike illegal.[30]
In the present case, NCMB converted IBMs notices into preventive mediation as it found that the
real issues raised are non-strikeable. Such order is in pursuance of the NCMBs duty to exert all efforts
at mediation and conciliation to enable the parties to settle the dispute amicably, [31] and in line with the
state policy of favoring voluntary modes of settling labor disputes. [32] In accordance with the

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Implementing Rules of the Labor Code, the said conversion has the effect of dismissing the notices of
strike filed by respondent.[33] A case in point is PAL v. Drilon,[34] where we declared a strike illegal for
lack of a valid notice of strike, in view of the NCMBs conversion of the notice therein into a preventive
mediation case. We ruled, thus:
The NCMB had declared the notice of strike as appropriate for preventive mediation. The effect of that
declaration (which PALEA did not ask to be reconsidered or set aside) was to drop the case from the
docket of notice of strikes,as provided in Rule 41 of the NCMB Rules, as if there was no notice of
strike. During the pendency of preventive mediation proceedings no strike could be legally
declared... The strike which the union mounted, while preventive mediation proceedings were ongoing,
was aptly described by the petitioner as an ambush. (Emphasis supplied)

he PALEA members of the panel proposed the amount of PHP 3,349 as the minimum salary entry level
for the lowest job classification (Job Grade 1), while the PAL panel members proposed PHP 2,310 and
a PHP 200 across-the-board increase for employees who could not avail of the payscale adjustments.
The panel conferences continued but there was no meeting of minds. PALEA would not accept less
than the amount it proposed, while the PAL panel members alleged that they had no authority to offer
more.
PALEA accused PAL of bargaining in bad faith.
ALEA filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) a notice of strike on account of:
(1) bargaining deadlock; and (2) unfair labor practice by bargaining in bad faith.
On January 3, 1989, PAL filed with the NCMB a motion to dismiss PALEA's notice of strike for being
premature as the issues raised were not strikeable since there still existed a PAL-PALEA CBA which
would not yet expire until September 30, 1989 or with nine (9) more months to run.

Clearly, therefore, applying the aforecited ruling to the case at bar, when the NCMB ordered the
preventive mediation on May 2, 1994, respondent had thereupon lost the notices of strike it had filed.
Subsequently, however, it still defiantly proceeded with the strike while mediation was ongoing, and
notwithstanding the letter-advisories of NCMB warning it of its lack of notice of strike.

During the conciliation meeting, the following evolved as the real issues:

Disregard of the mediation proceedings was a blatant violation of the Implementing Rules, which
explicitly oblige the parties to bargain collectively in good faith and prohibit them from
impeding or disrupting the proceedings.

NCMB-NCR Executive Conciliator/Mediator, advised PALEA president, that the issues raised in the
notice of strike were "appropriate only for preventive mediation," hence, not valid grounds for a lawful
strike. However, when subsequently a representative of NCMB supervised the conduct of PALEA'S
strike vote, PAL's counsel was baffled for it was inconsistent with the NCMB order treating the strike
notice as preventive mediation case.

11. PAL vs. Secretary GR No. 88210, 1991

FACTS:
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between the Philippine Airlines (PAL) and the Philippine
Airlines Employees Association (PALEA) provided for pay increases for various categories of
employees and provided for the formation of a PAL/PALEA Payscale Panel.

1. determination of the minimum entry rate

2. wage adjustment due to payscale study
3. retroactive pay as a consequence of the upgraded payscale or goodwill bonus.

PALEA submitted the strike vote results to the NCMB. PAL petitioned Secretary of Labor Franklin Drilon
to immediately assume jurisdiction over the dispute in order to avert the impending strike. Seven (7)
days passed with no reaction from Secretary Drilon. PALEA declared a strike paralyzing PAL's entire
operations and resulting in serious inconvenience to thousands of passengers who were stranded in 43
airports throughout the country, and the loss of millions of pesos in unearned revenue for PAL.
ISSUE: WON the strike is valid
RULING: NO
The jurisdiction to decide the legality of strikes and lock-outs is vested in Labor Arbiters, not in the
Secretary of Labor.

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In ruling on the legality of the PALEA strike, the Secretary of Labor acted without or in excess of his
jurisdiction.
There is merit in PAL's contention that the Labor Secretary erred in declaring the strike valid and in
prohibiting PAL from taking retaliatory or disciplinary action against the strikers for the damages
suffered by the Airline as a result of the illegal work stoppage.
PALEA's strike on January 20, 1989 was illegal for three (3) reasons:

The Labor Secretary exceeded his jurisdiction when he restrained PAL from taking disciplinary action
against its guilty employees, for, under Art. 263 of the Labor Code, all that the Secretary may enjoin is
the holding of the strike, but not the company's right to take action against union officers who
participated in the illegal strike and committed illegal acts. The prohibition which the Secretary issued to
PAL constitutes an unlawful deprivation of property and denial of due process for it prevents PAL from
seeking redress for the huge property losses that it suffered as a result of the union's illegal mass
action.

1. It was premature for there was an existing CBA which still had nine (9) months to run, i.e.,
up to September 30, 1989. The law expressly provides that neither party to a collective
bargaining agreement shall terminate nor modify such agreement during its lifetime. While
either party can serve a written notice to terminate or modify the agreement at least sixty (60)
days prior to its expiration date (known as the "freedom period") it shall nevertheless be the
duty of both parties to keep the status quo and to continue in full force and effect the terms
and conditions of the existing agreement during the freedom period and/or until a new
agreement is reached by them (Art. 253, Labor Code).

Nevertheless, the Secretary's delay does not excuse the reckless and irresponsible action of the union
in declaring the illegal strike. The liability of the union for that is primary and exclusive.

2. It violated the no-strike provision of the CBA, to wit:

G.R. No. L-59743

May 31, 1982

The Association agrees that there shall be no strikes, walk outs, stoppage, or
slowdown of work, or any other form of interference with any of the operations of the
Company during the period between the signing of the Agreement up to September
30, 1989. (Emphasis supplied, p-118, Rollo.)
3. The NCMB had declared the notice of strike as "appropriate for preventive mediation." The
effect of that declaration (which PALEA did not ask to be reconsidered or set aside) was to
drop the case from the docket of notice of strikes, as provided in Rule 41 of the NCMB Rules,
as if there was no notice of strike. During the pendency of preventive mediation proceedings
no strike could be legally declared. The Secretary must have thought so too, that is why he
failed to act, for a period of seven (7) days, on PAL's petition for him to assume jurisdiction
over the labor dispute. The strike which the union mounted, while preventive mediation
proceedings were ongoing, was aptly described by the petitioner as "an ambush" (p. 2, Rollo).
Since the strike was illegal, the company has a right to take disciplinary action against the union
officers who participated in it, and against any union members who committed illegal acts during the
strike, Art. 264 of the Labor Code provides:
Art. 264. Prohibited activities.. . .
xxx

xxx

xxx

Any worker whose employment has been terminated as a consequence of an unlawful lockout
shall be entitled to reinstatement with full back wages. Any union officer who knowingly
participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in
the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment
status: Provided, That mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute
sufficient ground for termination of his employment, even if a replacement had been hired by
the employer during such lawful strike. (Emphasis supplied.)

12. NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGAR WORKERS (NFSW), petitioner,

vs.
ETHELWOLDO R. OVEJERA et. al., respondents

FACTS:
NFSW struck against private respondent Central Azucarera de la Carlota (CAC) to compel the latter for
the payment of the 13th month pay under PD 851 (13th Month Pay Law) in addition to the Christmas,
milling and amelioration bonuses being enjoyed by CAC workers which amount to 1- months salary.
Labor Arbiter Ovejera declared the strike as illegal and no pronouncement was made as to the demand
on the 13th month pay. This caused petitioner to file an instant petition with SC.
ISSUE:
WON under PD 851, an employer is obliged to give its workers a 13th month salary in addition to
Christmas, milling and amelioration bonuses, the aggregate of which exceeds the 13th month pay.
HELD:
No.
The intention was to grant some relief not to all workers but only to the unfortunate ones not
actually paid a 13th month salary or what amounts to it, by whatever name called; but it was not
envisioned that a double burden would be imposed on the employer already paying his employees a
13th month pay or its equivalent whether out of pure generosity or on the basis of a binding
agreement and, in the latter ease, regardless of the conditional character of the grant, so long as there
is actual payment. Otherwise, what was conceived to be a 13th month salary would in effect become a
14th or possibly 15th month pay.

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No. 16 case: G.R. No. L-25291 January 30, 1971

THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, FGU
INSURANCE GROUP WORKERS and EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, and INSULAR LIFE
BUILDING
EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION-NATU, petitioners,
vs.
THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., FGU INSURANCE GROUP, JOSE M. OLBES and
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.
FACTS:
The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., Employees Association-NATU, FGU Insurance Group
Workers & Employees Association-NATU, and Insular Life Building Employees Association-NATU
(hereinafter referred to as the Unions), while still members of the Federation of Free Workers (FFW),
entered into separate CBAs with the Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. and the FGU Insurance Group
(hereinafter referred to as the Companies). Two of the lawyers of the Unions then were Felipe Enaje
and Ramon Garcia; the latter was formerly the secretary-treasurer of the FFW and acting president of
the Insular Life/FGU unions and the Insular Life Building Employees Association. Garcia, as such
acting president, in a circular issued in his name and signed by him, tried to dissuade the members of
the Unions from disaffiliating with the FFW and joining the National Association of Trade Unions
(NATU), to no avail.
Enaje and Garcia soon left the FFW and secured employment with the Anti-Dummy Board of the
Department of Justice. Thereafter, the Companies hired Garcia in the latter part of 1956 as assistant
corporate secretary and legal assistant in their Legal Department. Enaje was hired as personnel
manager of the Companies, and was likewise made chairman of the negotiating panel for the
Companies in the collective bargaining with the Unions. Unions jointly submitted proposals to the
Companies; negotiations were conducted on the Unions proposals, but these were snagged by a
deadlock on the issue of union shop, as a result of which the Unions filed on January 27, 1958 a notice
of strike for deadlock on collective bargaining. The issue was dropped subsequently but, the parties
negotiated on the labor demands but with no satisfactory result due to a stalemate on the matter of
salary increases.
Meanwhile, 87 unionists were reclassified as supervisors without increase in salary nor in
responsibility while negotiations were going on in the Department of Labor after the notice to
strike was served on the Companies. These employees resigned from the Unions. On May 21,
1958 the Companies through their acting manager and president, sent to each of the strikers a
letter that if they will return to work voluntarily they will be getting some special privileges. Unions,
however, continued on strike, with the exception of a few unionists who were convinced to desist by the
aforesaid letter. From the date the strike was called on May 21, 1958, until it was called off on May 31,
1958, some management men tried to break thru the Unions picket lines xxx succeeded in
penetrating the picket lines in front of the Insular Life Building, thus causing injuries to the
picketers and also to the strike-breakers due to the resistance offered by some picketers. The
company filed criminal charges against strikers and there was another letter that was sent by the
company to the individual strikers threatening them with dismissal if they will not report for work on or
before June 2, 1958.
At any rate, because of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against them as well as the
ultimatum of the Companies giving them until June 2, 1958 to return to their jobs or else be replaced,
the striking employees decided to call off their strike and to report back to work on June 2, 1958.
However, before readmitting the strikers, the Companies required them not only to secure clearances
from the City Fiscals Office of Manila but also to be screened by a management committee among the

members of which were Enaje and Garcia. The screening committee initially rejected 83 strikers with
pending criminal charges. However, all non-strikers with pending criminal charges which arose from the
breakthrough incident were readmitted immediately by the Companies without being required to secure
clearances from the fiscals office. Subsequently, when practically all the strikers had secured
clearances from the fiscals office, the Companies readmitted only some but adamantly refused
readmission to 34 officials and members of the Unions who were most active in the strike, on
the ground that they committed acts inimical to the interest of the respondents, without
however stating the specific acts allegedly committed. Some 24 of the above number were
ultimately notified months later that they were being dismissed retroactively as of June 2, 1958 and
given separation pay checks computed under Rep. Act 1787, while others up to now have not been
readmitted although there have been no formal dismissal notices given to them.
CIR prosecutor filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against the Companies under Republic Act
875. The complaint specifically charged the Companies with (1) interfering with the members of the
Unions in the exercise of their right to concerted action, by sending out individual letters to them urging
them to abandon their strike and return to work, with a promise of comfortable cots, free coffee and
movies, and paid overtime, and, subsequently, by warning them that if they did not return to work on or
before June 2, 1958, they might be replaced; and (2) discriminating against the members of the Unions
as regards readmission to work after the strike on the basis of their union membership and degree of
participation in the strike.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent company is guilty of ULP
HELD: YES
The act of an employer in notifying absent employees individually during a strike following unproductive
efforts at collective bargaining that the plant would be operated the next day and that their jobs were
open for them should they want to come in has been held to be an unfair labor practice, as an active
interference with the right of collective bargaining through dealing with the employees
individually instead of through their collective bargaining representatives. Although the union is
on strike, the employer is still under obligation to bargain with the union as the employees bargaining
representative. Individual solicitation of the employees or visiting their homes, with the employer or his
representative urging the employees to cease union activity or cease striking, constitutes unfair labor
practice. All the above-detailed activities are unfair labor practices because they tend to undermine the
concerted activity of the employees, an activity to which they are entitled free from the employer s
molestation.
Verily, the above actuations of the respondents before and after the issuance of the letters yield the
clear inference that the said letters formed of the respondents scheme to preclude if not destroy
unionism within them. . The respondents did not merely discriminate against all the strikers in general.
They separated the active from the less active unionists on the basis of their militancy, or lack of it, on
the picket lines. Unionists belonging to the first category were refused readmission even after they
were able to secure clearances from the competent authorities with respect to the criminal charges filed
against them. Discrimination undoubtedly exists where the record shows that the union activity of the
rehired strikers has been less prominent than that of the strikers who were denied reinstatement. It is

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Cases on Concerted Activities|Labor Relations Class of 2016

noteworthy that perhaps in an anticipatory effort to exculpate themselves from charges of

discrimination in the readmission of strikers returning to work the respondents delegated the power
to readmit to a committee. The picketers were not legally bound to yield their grounds and withdraw
from the picket lines. Being where the law expects them to be in the legitimate exercise of their rights,
they had every reason to defend themselves and their rights from any assault or unlawful
transgression. Yet the police blotter about adverted to, attests that they did not resort to violence. The
heated altercations and occasional blows exchanged on the picket line do not affect or diminish the
right to strike. Thus, if the employers improper conduct was an initial cause of the strike, all the strikers
are entitled to reinstatement and the dismissal of the replacement employees wherever necessary.
The record shows that not a single dismissed striker was given the opportunity to defend himself
against the supposed charges against him. As earlier mentioned, when the striking employees reported
back for work on June 2, 1958, the respondents refused to readmit them unless they first secured the
necessary clearances; but when all, except three, were able to secure and subsequently present the
required clearances, the respondents still refused to take them back.
Indeed, the individual cases of dismissed officers and members of the striking unions do not indicate
sufficient basis for dismissal.
18. G.R. No. 91025 (192 SCRA 414)
December 19, 1990
UNION OF FILIPRO EMPLOYEES, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION and NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondents.
Facts:
On June 22, 1988, the petitioner Union of the Filipro Employees, the SEBA of all rank-and-file
employees of Nestle Philippines, (respondent) filed a Notice of Strike at the DOLE raising the issues of
CBA deadlock and unfair labor practice. Respondent assailed the legal personality of the proponents of
the said notice of strike to represent the Nestle employees, before the NCMB. This notwithstanding, the
NCMB proceeded to invite the parties to attend the conciliation meetings and to which private
respondent failed to attend contending that it will deal only with a negotiating panel duly constituted and
mandated in accordance with the UFE Constitution and By-laws. Thereafter, Company terminated from
employment all UFE Union officers, and all the members of the negotiating panel for instigating and
knowingly participating in a strike staged at the Makati, Alabang, Cabuyao and Cagayan de Oro on
September 11, 1987 without any notice of strike filed and a strike vote obtained for the purpose. The
union filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.
LA upheld the validity of the dismissal; NLRC en banc affirmed.
Subsequently, company concluded separate CBAs with the general membership of the union
at Cebu/Davao and Cagayan de Oro units; Assailing the validity of these agreements, the union filed a
case of ULP against the company with the NLRC-NCR Arbitration Branch Efforts to resolve the dispute
amicably were taken by the NCMB but yielded negative result.

Petitioner filed a motion asking the Secretary of Labor to assume jurisdiction over the dispute
of deadlock in collective bargaining between the parties. On October 28, 1988, Labor Secretary
Franklin Drilon certified to the NLRC the said dispute between the UFE and Nestle, Philippines which
reads as follows:
xxx The NLRC is further directed to call all the parties immediately and resolve the CBA deadlock
within twenty (20) days from submission of the case for resolution. Second Division of the NLRC
promulgated a resolution granting wage increase and other benefits to Nestles employees, ruling on
non-economic issues, as well as absolving the private respondent of the Unfair Labor Practice charge.
Petitioner finds said resolution to be inadequate and accordingly, does not agree therewith. It filed a
motion for reconsideration, denied.
Hence, this petition.
Issue: WHETHER OR NOT THE SECOND DIVISION OF THE NLRC ACTED WITHOUT
JURISDICTION IN RENDERING THE ASSAILED RESOLUTION, THE SAME BEING RENDERED
ONLY BY A DIVISION OF THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT AND NOT BY EN BANC.
Ruling:
This case was certified on October 28, 1988 when existing rules prescribed that, it is
incumbent upon the Commission en banc to decide or resolve a certified dispute. However, R.A. 6715
took effect during the pendency of this case. Aside from vesting upon each division the power to
adjudicate cases filed before the Commission, said Act further provides that the divisions of the
Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over cases within their respective territorial
jurisdiction. Section 5 of RA 6715 provides as follows:
xxxx The Commission may sit en banc or in five (5) divisions, each composed of three (3) members.
The Commission shall sit en banc only for purposes of promulgating rules and regulations governing
the hearing and disposition of cases before any of its divisions and regional branches and formulating
policies affecting its administration and operations. The Commission shall exercise its adjudicatory and
all other powers, functions and duties through its divisions.
xxxx In view of the enactment of Republic Act 6715, the aforementioned rules requiring the
Commission en banc to decide or resolve a certified dispute have accordingly been repealed.
Confirmed in Administrative Order No. 36 (Series of 1989) promulgated by the Secretary under his
delegated rule-making power.
Moreover, it is to be emphasized and it is a matter of judicial notice that since the effectivity of
R.A. 6715, many cases have already been decided by the 5 divisions of the NLRC. We find no legal
justification in entertaining petitioners claim considering that the clear intent of the amendatory
provision is to expedite the disposition of labor cases filed before the Commission. To rule otherwise
would not be congruous to the proper administration of justice.
ACCORDINGLY, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED. The Resolutions of
the NLRC, dated June 5, 1989 and August 8, 1989 are AFFIRMED, except insofar as the ruling
absolving the private respondent of unfair labor practice which is declared SET ASIDE.
G.R. No. 140518

December 16, 2004

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Cases on Concerted Activities|Labor Relations Class of 2016

MANILA
DIAMOND
HOTEL
EMPLOYEES
UNION,
petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, and THE
MANILA DIAMOND HOTEL, respondents.
FACTS: Manila Diamond Hotel Employees Union filed a petition for a certification election so that it
may be declared the exclusive bargaining representative of the Manila Diamond Hotels employees for
the purpose of collective bargaining, however, the same was dismissed.
Months later, the Union sent a letter to the Hotel informing it of its desire to negotiate for a collective
bargaining agreement. Hotel said the same cannot be recognized as the employees bargaining agent
since its petition for certification election had been earlier dismissed by the DOLE. On that same day,
the Hotel received a letter from the Union stating that they were not giving the Hotel a notice to bargain,
but that they were merely asking for the Hotel to engage in collective bargaining negotiations with the
Union for its members only and not for all the rank and file employees of the Hotel.
The Union, later, staged a strike against the Hotel which was claimed by the Hotel as illegal and that it
had to dismiss some employees for their participation in the allegedly illegal concerted activity. The
Union, on the other hand, accused the Hotel of illegally dismissing the workers. What is pertinent to this
case, however, is the Order issued by the then Secretary of Labor and Employment Cresenciano B.
Trajano assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute thereby directing striking officers and members of
the Manila Diamond Hotel Employees Union to return to work within twenty-four (24) hours upon
receipt of this Order and the Hotel to accept them back under the same terms and conditions prevailing
prior to the strike.
Acting Secretary of Labor Jose M. Espaol modified the earlier one issued by Secretary Trajano.
Instead of an actual return to work, he directed that the strikers be reinstated only in the payroll.
CA - dismissed the Unions petition and affirmed the Secretary of Labors Order for payroll
reinstatement.

Constitution, which was further echoed in Article 211 of the Labor Code. Hence, a voluntary, instead of
compulsory, mode of dispute settlement is the general rule.
However, Article 263, paragraph (g) of the Labor Code, which allows the Secretary of Labor to assume
jurisdiction over a labor dispute involving an industry indispensable to the national interest, provides an
exception:
(g) When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an
industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume
jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory
arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the
intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification order. If one has
already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall
immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all
workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. x x x
This provision is viewed as an exercise of the police power of the State. A prolonged strike or lockout
can be inimical to the national economy and, therefore, the situation is imbued with public necessity
and involves the right of the State and the public to self-protection.
Under Article 263(g), all workers must immediately return to work and all employers must readmit all of
them under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. This Court must
point out that the law uses the precise phrase of "under the same terms and conditions,"
revealing that it contemplates only actual reinstatement. This is in keeping with the rationale that
any work stoppage or slowdown in that particular industry can be inimical to the national economy. It is
clear that Article 263(g) was not written to protect labor from the excesses of management, nor was it
written to ease management from expenses, which it normally incurs during a work stoppage or
slowdown. This Court reiterates that this law was written as a means to be used by the State to protect
itself from an emergency or crisis. It is not for labor, nor is it for management.

ISSUE: Whether or not order of mere "Payroll Reinstatement" of employees involved in the
strike is correct?
RULE: NO. In the present case, there is no showing that the facts called for payroll reinstatement as an
alternative remedy. A strained relationship between the striking employees and management is
no reason for payroll reinstatement in lieu of actual reinstatement.
This question is answered by the nature of Article 263(g). As a general rule, the State encourages an
environment wherein employers and employees themselves must deal with their problems in a manner
that mutually suits them best. This is the basic policy embodied in Article XIII, Section 3 of the

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21. G.R. No. 119381 March 11, 1996

MARCOPPER
MINING
CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ACTING SECRETARY OF LABOR JOSE BRILLANTES, NATIONAL MINES & ALLIED
WORKERS UNION (NAMAWU), MARCOPPER EMPLOYEES LABOR UNION (MELU), respondents.
Facts:
Petitioner Marcopper Mining Corporation is a corporation, 49% of which equity is owned by the
Philippine government. Petitioner is engaged in the exploration, development and extraction of copper
and other mineral ores by virtue of lease and other contracts with the Philippine government, through
the Bureau of Mines and Geosciences and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. It
employs more than 1,000 workers. 2One of petitioner's projects is the operation of the San Antonio
Copper Project, an orebody with an estimated life of at least twenty years.
In December of 1994, petitioner granted its employees a year-end profit bonus, the amount of which
was based on employment category, i.e., 75% of their monthly salary to rank-and-file, 800% to security
guards, and 90% to staff.
Private respondent National Mines and Allied Workers Union and its local chapter Marcopper
Employees Labor Union (collectively "union") filed on December 26, 1994 a preventive mediation case
with the Department of Labor and Employment Regional Office No. IV, alleging the following unfair
labor practices: violation of collective bargaining agreement concerning job evaluation and
discrimination against rank-and-file in connection with the grant of the profit bonus. 3
The National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) conducted conciliation proceedings, but the
parties failed to reach a settlement. Thus, respondents-filed a Notice of Strike on December 28, 1994. 4
In a letter dated January 17, 1995, Conciliator-Mediator Wilfredo P. Santos informed the union that the
issues involved in the Notice of Strike are non-strikeab!e and are appropriate subjects of the grievance
machinery with voluntary arbitration as the terminal step. 5
On February 20, 1995, petitioner filed with the Department of Labor and Employment a petition praying
that the Secretary of Labor and Employment assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute pursuant to
Article 263 of the Labor Code of the Philippines. 7 The petition was endorsed by Labor Undersecretary
Bienvenido E. Laguesma to the NCMB. 8
On February 24, 1995, the Secretary of Labor and Employment issued an order certifying the dispute
for compulsory arbitration under Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, enjoining any actual or intended
strike or lockout, and directing the parties to cease and desist from committing acts which may
exacerbate the dispute. 9
Notwithstanding receipt of the order, on February 27, 1995, the union went on strike. 10
February 28, 1995, the Secretary of Labor and Employment issued an order reiterating his February
24, 1995 order, and directing all striking workers to return to work within twenty-four hours from receipt
of the order and for Management to accept them under the same terms and conditions prevailing
before the strike. 12
On March 4, 1995, petitioner issued a notice to return to work. Petitioner required all its rank-and-file
employees to report for work on their respective regular shift schedule starting at 8:00 a.m. of March 5,
1995. Petitioner further informed the employees that those who fail to report for work within the
specified period shall be considered as terminated for just cause, without need of further notice, and
with loss of all accrued benefits; management would then be at liberty to hire replacement workers. 14

On March 10, 1995, the union filed a Manifestation/Compliance where it acknowledged receipt of the
order and signified the workers' willingness to abide by the same. The union manifested that petitioner
however refused to accept the workers, and thus it prayed that the Secretary of Labor and Employment
order petitioner to reinstate said workers. 19
On March 20, 1995, Acting Secretary Brillantes issued the assailed order subject of this petition
for certiorari.
Petitioner asserts that the Secretary of Labor gravely abused his discretion when he ordered it to
accept workers who defied the return-to-work order, as embodied in the certification order of February
24, 1995 he himself issued. Petitioner prays that the March 20, 1995 order be set aside insofar as it
orders it to reinstate the dismissed workers, and that the Court declare the employees to have been
legally dismissed.
Issue: Won employees were validly dismissed. YES
Ruling: The workers did not return to work.
In the assailed March 20, 1995 order, the Secretary reiterated that "[d]espite the [February 24, 1995]
Order the Union went on strike on February 27, 1995 which constrained us to issue an Order on
February 28, 1995 directing the workers to return to work and for Management to accept them back
under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike." Despite such finding, the Secretary
ordered petitioner to accept the workers.
We
have
held
that
a
return-to-work
order
is
a
"statutory
part
and
parcel" 21 of the Secretary's assumption or certification order. Article 263 (g) succintly provides that:
. . . Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended
or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification order. If one has
already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees
shall immediately return to work and the employer resume operations and readmit all workers
under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. . . .
Thus, following an assumption or certification order, returning to work, on the part of a worker, is "not a
matter of option or voluntariness but of obligation." 22 The sanction for failure to comply with such
obligation, under the law, is loss of employment status. 23 Case law likewise provides that by staging a
strike after the assumption of jurisdiction or certification for arbitration, workers forfeited their right to be
readmitted to work, having abandoned their employment, and so could be validly replaced. 24
We cannot countenance the Secretary's tolerance of the union's willful breach of the provisions of
Article 263 (g) as well as its defiance of the February 28, 1995 order. He cannot gloss over his findings
showing prima facie the illegality of the union's actuations. It would be unfair, indeed unreasonable and
oppressive, to compel petitioner to accept the workers who refused to return to work, pending
arbitration proceedings.
(22 )G.R. No. 178409

June 8, 2011

YOLITO FADRIQUELAN vs. MONTEREY FOODS CORPORATION

FACTS:
On April 30, 2002 the three-year CBA between the union and the company expired. On March 28, 2003
after the negotiation for a new CBA reached a deadlock, the union filed a notice of strike with the

16
Cases on Concerted Activities|Labor Relations Class of 2016

NCMB. In an Order dated May 12, 2003, the DOLE Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the dispute
and enjoined the union from holding any strike.

they did not intend a slowdown, why did they not hold their meetings after work. There is no allegation
that the company prevented the union from holding meetings after working hours.

On May 21, 2003 the union filed a second notice of strike before the NCMB on the alleged ground that
the company committed ULP. On June 10, 2003 the company sent notices to the union officers,
charging them with intentional acts of slowdown. Six days later or on June 16 the company sent new
notices to the union officers, informing them of their termination from work for defying the DOLE
Secretarys assumption order.

2nd issue: yes

On June 23, 2003, the union filed a third notice of strike based on allegations that the company had
engaged in union busting and illegal dismissal of union officers. The company filed a petition for
certification of the labor dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration but the DOLE Secretary denied
the motion.
On November 20, 2003 the DOLE rendered a decision that upheld the companys termination of the 17
union officers. The union and its officers appealed the decision to the CA. CA rendered a decision,
upholding the validity of the companys termination of 10 union officers but declaring illegal that of the
other seven. Hence this petition.

ISSUES
1. Whether or not the CA erred in holding that slowdowns actually transpired at the companys farms
2. Whether or not the CA erred in holding that union officers committed illegal acts that warranted their
dismissal from work.

HELD:
1st issue: No
The law is explicit: no strike shall be declared after the Secretary of Labor has assumed jurisdiction
over a labor dispute. A strike conducted after such assumption is illegal and any union officer who
knowingly participates in the same may be declared as having lost his employment. Here, what is
involved is a slowdown strike. Unlike other forms of strike, the employees involved in a slowdown do
not walk out of their jobs to hurt the company. They need only to stop work or reduce the rate of their
work while generally remaining in their assigned post.
The Court finds that the union officers and members in this case held a slowdown strike at the
companys farms despite the fact that the DOLE Secretary had on May 12, 2003 already assumed
jurisdiction over their labor dispute.
The union of course argues that it merely held assemblies to inform members of the developments in
the CBA negotiation, not protest demonstrations over it. But as the CA correctly observed, if the
meetings had really been for the stated reason, why did the union officers and members from separate
company farms choose to start and end their meetings at the same time and on the same day? And if

A distinction exists, however, between the ordinary workers liability for illegal strike and that of the
union officers who participated in it. The ordinary worker cannot be terminated for merely participating
in the strike. There must be proof that he committed illegal acts during its conduct. On the other hand, a
union officer can be terminated upon mere proof that he knowingly participated in the illegal strike.
Still, the participating union officers have to be properly identified. The CA held that the company
illegally terminated union officers Alvarez, Asotigue, Castillo, Agtay, Abacan, Rolle, and Tenorio,
there being no substantial evidence that would connect them to the slowdowns.
But, although the witnesses did not say that Asotigue, Alvarez, and Rolle took part in the work
slowdown, these officers gave no credible excuse for being absent from their respective working areas
during the slowdown. Tenorio allegedly took a break and never went back to work. He claimed that he
had to attend to an emergency but did not elaborate on the nature of such emergency. In Abacans
case, however, he explained that he was not feeling well so he decided to take a two-hour rest from
work. This claim of Abacan is consistent with the report that only one officer (Tenorio) was involved in
the slowdown at the Calamias farm.
At the Quilo farm, the farm supervisor did not include Castillo in the list of employees who failed to
report for work on May 26, 2003.5 In Agtays case, the evidence is that he was on his rest day. There is
no proof that the unions president, Yolito Fadriquelan, did not show up for work during the slowdowns.
The CA upheld his dismissal, relying solely on a security guards report that the company submitted as
evidence. But, notably, that report actually referred to another employee who allegedly took part in the
Lipa farm slowdown. Besides, Yolito Fadriquelan was then assigned at the General Trias farm in
Cavite, not at the Lipa farm. This clearly shows that his dismissal was mainly based on his being the
union president.
The Court sustains the validity of the termination of the rest of the union officers. The identity and
participations of Eguna, Malaluan, Alonso, Dimaano, Mayuga, Rizaldo, Suico, Escamillas, and
Bautro in the slowdowns were properly established. These officers simply refused to work or they
abandoned their work to join union assemblies.
In termination cases, the dismissed employee is not required to prove his innocence of the charges
against him. The burden of proof rests upon the employer to show that the employees dismissal was
for just cause. The employers failure to do so means that the dismissal was not justified. Here, the
company failed to show that all union officers deserved to be dismissed.
Ordinarily, the illegally dismissed employees are entitled to two reliefs: reinstatement and backwages.
Still, the Court has held that the grant of separation pay, instead of reinstatement, may be proper
especially when as in this case such reinstatement is no longer practical or will be for the best interest
of the parties.
23. PNOC DOCKYARD AND ENGINEERING CORP vs. NLRC

17
Cases on Concerted Activities|Labor Relations Class of 2016

G.R. No. 118223 (1998)

The Constitution mandates the state to afford full protection to labor. To achieve this goal, technical
rules of procedure shall be liberally construed in favor of the working class in accordance with the
demands of substantial justice.

Meditation Board (NCMB), the filing of a notice to strike and the observance of the 15-day cooling-off
period. Respondent Commission opined that the unions had a reason to regard the salary
discrimination, believed to discourage membership in the labor organization, as an unfair labor practice
prohibited by Article 248 (e) 12 of the Labor Code.

On Nov. 22, 1991, the respondent union filed a notice of strike against Phil. National Oil Company
(PNOC) and Monico Jacob as President/Chairman, on the ground of discrimination constituting
unfair labor practice. The dispute arose from the grant by petitioner and PNOC of the amount of
P2,500.00 increase in monthly salaries to Managerial, Professionals and Technical Employees (MPT)
but not to Non-Managerial, Professional and Technical Employees (NMPT).

Thus, although rejecting that PNOC and its subsidiaries were guilty of discrimination, the NLRC
reiterated the policy enunciated in several labor cases "that a strike does not automatically carry the
stigma of illegality even if no unfair labor practice were committed by the employer. It suffices if
such a belief in good faith is entertained by labor as the inducing factor for staging a strike."
Indeed, the presumption of legality prevails even if the allegation of unfair labor practice is
subsequently found to be untrue, provided that the union and its members believed in good faith in the
truth of such averment.

On December 13, 1991, Acting Secretary Nieves Confesor certified the dispute subject of the notice of
strike to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration. The certification reads:

As to the alleged violation of the strike prohibition in their CBA, the NLRC held that there should be no
automatic verdict of illegality on the strike conducted.

Facts:

Any strike or lock-out is hereby strictly enjoined.

Parties are ordered to CEASE and DESIST from committing any and all acts that might
exacerbate the situation.
However, the Order was not served to the respondent union's President, Felimon Paglinawan, who is
authorized to receive notices. The process server of DOLE merely left the Order with the guard on duty
at the gate of the premises which is a distance away from the union office
In the morning of December 18, 1991, the day when respondent union was poised to strike, its officers
and members decided to report for work but petitioner padlocked the gate and refused entry to the
employees. Some officers and members of respondent union were able to enter the premises of
petitioner and punch-in their timecards; however, they were immediately escorted back outside.
Subsequently, petitioner filed before the DOLE a petition to declare the strike illegal with a motion to
cite the striking workers in contempt for defying the DOLE.
Later, the President, Secretary, Auditor and Treasurer of the respondent union were dismissed by
petitioner from their employment on the ground, among others of their participation in the work
stoppage on December 18 to 21, 1991. The dismissed union officers filed before the NLRC a complaint
for illegal dismissal.
First Issue: W/N the Strike was legal.
Yes.
In resolving that the strike was legal, the labor tribunal took note of the following facts:
(1) the notice of strike was filed only after the union members lost hope for the redress of their
grievance arising from their exclusion from the P2,500 salary increase;
(2) the union members honesty believed that they were discriminated against, since the company
practice in the past was to grant salary increases to all employees regardless of whether they were
MPTs (managerial, professional, and technical employees) or NMPTs (non-managerial, professional,
and technical employees);
(3) such discriminatory grant appeared to be an unfair labor practice intended to discourage union
membership, since MPTs were non-union members; and
(4) the labor unions complied with the legal requirements before going on strike, such as the members'
strike vote by secret ballot, the submission of the results thereof to the National Conciliation and

Even on the assumption that the illegality of the strike is predicated on its being a violation of the ban or
prohibition of strike in export-oriented industries, lack of notice to strike, and as a violation of the nostrike clause of the CBA, still, the automatic finding of the illegality of the strike finds no authoritative
support in the light of the attendant circumstances. As this Court held in Cebu Portland Cement Co. vs.
Cement Workers Union, a strike staged by the workers, inspired by good faith, does not automatically
make the same illegal. In Ferrer vs. Court of Industrial Relations, the belief of the strikers that the
management was committing unfair labor practice was properly considered in declaring an otherwise
premature strike, not unlawful, and in affirming the older of the Labor Court for the reinstatement
without backwages of said employees.
The NLRC noted further that the strike was peaceful and orderly, unmarred by any form of violence or
untoward incident.
Petitioner argues that the notice of strike was invalid, since (1) it erroneously named PNOC as the
employer, which is actually a corporate entity separate and distinct from petitioner; (2) it did not indicate
the specific acts which respondent union considered as unfair labor practices; and (3) there was no
reasonable attempt or effort on the part of respondent union to amicably settle the alleged labor
dispute.
The NLRC ruled, and we agree, that respondent union merely committed an honest mistake, because
it appears on record that PNOC has the same set of corporate officers as petitioner; and matters as to
wages and other official policies all emanated from PNOC, the mother company.
Lastly, we agree with the solicitor general that, under the circumstances, there was sufficient indication
of the nature and cause of the labor dispute subject of the notice of strike unfair labor practice in the
form of discrimination. The unions merely filled out the standard form furnished for the purpose by the
Department of Labor and Employment, and they were indeed not expected to write in detail the history
of their dispute. By supplying the information required in the DOLE form and submitting the other
explicitly required documents, respondent unions have substantially complied with the law.
A well-recognized norm in labor law is that technical rules of procedure are not to be strictly interpreted
and applied in a manner that would defeat substantial justice or be unduly detrimental to the work
force. Rules may be relaxed in order to give full meaning to the constitutional mandate of affording full
protection to labor. As provided in Article 4 of the Labor Code, "all doubts in the implementation and
interpretation of this Code, including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be rendered in favor
of labor."

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In addition, we disagree with petitioner's contention that the strike became automatically illegal upon
the labor secretary's certification of the dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration. Basic is the rule
that no order, decision or resolution not even one that is "immediately executory" is binding and
automatically executory unless and until the proper parties are duly notified thereof. The Labor Code
requires that both the party and its counsel must be duly served their separate copies of the order,
decision or resolution; unlike in ordinary judicial proceedings where notice to counsel is deemed notice
to the party.
Private respondent precisely impugn the validity of the service of the DOLE certification. They maintain
that said order was not validly served on them, since their supposed copy was left only with a security
guard at the gate of the office premises of the union. Allegedly, no effort was made to serve the same to
an authorized person inside their office. The service of the order upon counsel for the umbrella union
FUEL-GAS should not be deemed a valid service upon Respondent KMM-PDEC. Nevertheless, upon
verified information of the existence of the certification order, members of respondent labor unions
promptly ended their strike and returned to their jobs.

Time and again, we have held that the employment status of workers cannot be trifled with, such that
their constitutional and statutory rights as well as those arising from valid agreements will, in effect, be
defeated or circumvented. The Constitution itself guarantees workers of security of tenure in their
employment.
Third Issue: W/N PNOC is entitled to damages.
No.
The actual and exemplary damages sought by petitioner have no basis in law, much less in equity and
fair play. The strike was staged by respondent unions in the honest belief that petitioner was guilty of
unfair labor practice due to the discrimination in the grant of salary increase believed to discourage
union membership, and to its refusal to bargain collectively on the matter. There was good faith on the
part of the striking unions. Thus, they cannot be penalized by imposing upon them payment of
damages.

All in all, we find that the conclusions of Respondent NLRC on the legality of the strike are in
accordance with law and jurisprudence. Petitioner has failed to show grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the NLRC.
Second Issue: W/N the Dismissals were legal
No. The Dismissals Were Illegal.
Having ruled that the strike staged by respondent unions was legal, the subsequent dismissals of their
officers due to their staging of said strike cannot be countenanced.
The NLRC correctly observed that, although petitioner averred that the dismissals of individual
respondent were due to infractions of company rules and regulations, the alleged infractions actually
arose from their participation in the strike.
Furthermore, such investigations conducted by petitioner were in flagrant disregard of the authority and
jurisdiction of Respondent Commission and in defiance of the Memorandum of Agreement with the
striking unions. The issues relating to the strike and lockout were already submitted before the NLRC
through the corresponding complaints filed by petitioner itself and private respondents. By filing a
formal complaint for illegal strike, it behooved petitioner to desist from undertaking its own investigation
on the same matter, concluding upon the illegality of the union activity and dismissing outright the union
officers involved. The latter objected, in fact, to the conduct of such investigations precisely due to the
pendency before the NLRC of an action based on the same grounds. Instead, petitioner preempted the
NLRC from ascertaining the merits of the complaints.
Moreover, the Memorandum of Agreement, other than enjoining the striking workers to return to work,
likewise ordered the management to "accept them under the same terms and conditions prevailing
prior to the work stoppage," and ruled that the matter of "staggered" wage and holiday pay deductions
for the strike period be discussed in the labor-management committee (LMC). In glaring defiance,
petitioner arbitrarily undertook to change the work schedule of some employee on the very day they
resumed work, aside from deducting in full the wages and holiday pays of the striking employees
pertaining to the strike period, even before the LMC could convene.
The actions of petitioner are clearly tainted with abuse of power and with illegality. While we recognize
the prerogative of management to regulate all aspects of employment, the power to discipline and
terminate an employee's services may not exercised in a despotic or whimsical manner as to erode or
render meaningless the constitutional guarantees of security of tenure and due process. 25

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25. ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION

G.R. No. 116128 July 12, 1996

It appears that the problem of reinstating striking employees except those who had accepted
separation pay was reduced a bit when 71 of 112 affected employees were additionally
reinstated. Thus, only 41 among the individual respondents were not reinstated.

FACTS:
The dispute between petitioner and respondent Union started when their collective bargaining
agreement which was to expire on June 30, 1984 came up for renewal. They failed to reach an
amicable settlement particularly on the wage increase issue. Respondent Union thereupon filed
a notice of strike with the Bureau of Labor Relations.
Then Minister of Labor and Employment, Blas Ople assumed jurisdiction over the dispute
pursuant to Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended. The orders
enjoined the Union from declaring a strike and the management from effecting a lock out.The
orders notwithstanding, respondent Union nevertheless filed a report on the results of the strike
vote that it earlier conducted. On January 3, 1985, respondent Union staged a strike upon the
Union president's contention that the Labor Minister's assumption order was a mere scrap of
paper.
Petitioner filed a Manifestation and Urgent Motion praying for a return-to-work order. Minister
Ople granted the motion and issued a return-to-work order which included a P1,000.00 grant per
employee chargeable to future CBA benefits.
Minister Ople directed the parties to continue negotiations until January 31, 1985; otherwise, if
no compromise agreement is reached, he will personally resolve the bargaining deadlock.
The parties failed to break the deadlock and so, Minister Ople issued an Order directing them to
incorporate in their collective agreement the awards granted.
"Certain members of the Union resumed the strike and, on the following days, acts of violence
were committed . . . resulting in the filing of criminal charges against some of the strikers."
Petitioner, through notices, directed the striking employees to return to work.
In spite of these notices, respondents failed to report for work on the stated deadline.
Minister Ople issued a Resolution modifying his Order and so the union lifted its picket lines and
notified petitioner that the striking employees were returning back to work. Petitioner refused to
accept them back on the ground that the strikers have already been dismissed for abandonment
of work when they failed to obey the assumption order.
Minister Ople issued an Order which directed the bank to reinstate provisionally all striking
workers except (a) those who have already accepted their separation pay; (b) officers of the
union; and (c) those with pending criminal charges.
Minister Augusto Sanchez, the successor of Minister Ople, modified the last Order of the latter
by ordering the reinstatement of all striking employees, except those who have already accepted
their separation pay.

In view of this development, the respondents, including the forty-one (41) individual
respondents, led by Rolando Ocampo, Rowena Rebosa and Alfredo del Pilar, were not
reinstated by the bank.
Subsequently, arbitration of the Bank's petition continued with the issues confined to these
matters, viz:
whether or not the subject strikes, i.e., one that took place on January 3 and 4, 1985
to March 11, 1985, were illegal; (b) whether or not anyone of the individual
respondents committed illegal acts during the duration of the strikes; (c) whether or
not the individual respondents were illegally dismissed and/or locked out; and (d)
whether or not the respondent-employees are entitled to moral and exemplary
damages.
After weighing the arguments of both parties, the Arbiter ruled that:
There is not dispute that under Art. 263, paragraph (g) of the Labor code, as
amended, the assumption by the Secretary of Labor and Employment over a labor
dispute has the automatic effect of enjoining any intended or impending strike or
lockout. When then Minister Blas Ople assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute
between the bank and the union on December 19, 1984, by operation of law, the
intended strike of the respondent union was automatically enjoined.
The Labor Arbiter qualified that, under Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code, the individual
respondents other than the union officers can be subjected to dismissal only in cases where
they knowingly participated in the commission of illegal acts during the strike. Finding that all the
individual respondents who were not officers of the union did not commit the illegal acts
complained of, the Labor Arbiter held that they cannot validly be declared to have lost their
employment status.
With regard to the question of whether or not the Bank validly dismissed the respondents for
their failure to obey the return-to-work notices, the Labor Arbiter held Implicit in the petitioner's
argument is that the individual respondents by their failure to comply with the published returnto-work order are liable for abandonment of work. Abandonment as a ground for dismissal must
be shown to be deliberate and that the employee involved has shown no more inclination to
resume work. This is not true in the instant case. At the time they were terminated by the bank,
the individual respondents were then on strike, and until the legality or illegality of the strike is
resolved, the petitioner did not have any basis for terminating the individual respondents'
services.
Hence, the Labor Arbiter's disposition of the case, viz:
o Declaring the strikes complained of as illegal and consequently, all union officers.
o Dismissing the petition to declare the strike illegal as against the other individual
respondents;

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o Declaring the dismissal of the abovenamed 163 counter-complainants as illegal and

ordering the petitioner Allied Banking Corporation to pay their aggregate back wages
and other computed benefits;
o Ordering the petitioner Allied Banking Corporation to reinstate the forty-one (41)
counter-complainants led to their former or substantially equivalent position with all
the rights, privileges and benefits appertaining.
The forty-one (41) respondents who were ordered reinstated filed a "Motion to Issue Partial Writ
of Execution." This was granted by the Labor Arbiter.
Petitioner appealed from the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Respondents, on the other hand, filed
a partial appeal from the aforesaid decision of the Labor Arbiter praying that the decision be
modified: (1) to reflect in the computation of back wages the actual basic monthly rates of the
individual union members, including the other employees' benefits; (2) to order the payment of
actual, moral, and exemplary damages, including attorney's fees to all 163 dismissed
employees; (3) to order the reinstatement of all dismissed 163 employees; and (4) to include
"Innocence Salvador ". . . as one of the Union officers deemed to have lost their employment
status."
Petitioner filed with the NLRC a consolidated petition for injunction docketed as NLRC NCR IC
NO. 000316-92.
The NLRC issued an Order directing the reinstatement of forty-one (41) respondents pending
appeal and at the same time dismissing the bank's petition for injunction.
The NLRC upheld the Labor Arbiter's finding that the strikes staged by the employees of the
bank on January 3 & 4, 1985 and from February 11 to March 11, 1985 were in violation of the
provisions of Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, as amended, as well as the Assumption Order of
December 19, 1984 and as such the striking union members had lost their employment status.
However, in spite of its conclusion that the respondents were validly dismissed the NLRC opined
that "the 41 . . . respondents earned for themselves the right to be reinstated not only under
Article 223 of the Labor Code, as amended by R.A. 6715, on March 2, 1989, but retroactive
September 15, 1986, the date the Supreme Court ordered the implementation of the Order of
MOLE Minister Sanchez directing the reinstatement of 'all striking employees except those who
have accepted separation pay' [as 'only 71 of the 112 affected employees' were reinstated by
the Bank.
The opposing parties moved for a reconsideration of the said decision, which motions were
denied in a Resolution of the NLRC, dated July 8, 1994.
Hence, these petitions.

Respondents contend that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that
their dismissal is legal considering that mere participation of union members in an illegal strike
should not automatically result in their termination from employment.
We agree with respondents' contention that mere participation of union members in an illegal
strike should not automatically result in their termination from employment. However, the case at
bar involves a different issue as a perusal of the records shows that respondents were
terminated from employment by reason of their defiance to the return-to-work order of the
Secretary of Labor. Respondents staged a strike on January 3 and 4, 1985 or fourteen (14) days
after then Labor Minister Ople assumed jurisdiction over the dispute between them and the
bank. Thereafter, respondents again staged a strike from February 11 up to March 11, 1985
while their labor dispute with the Bank was still pending before Minister Ople.
Hence, respondents' failure to immediately comply with the return-to-work order dated,
December 16, 1984 and January 6, 1985 cannot be condoned.
Respondents also contend that there is nothing on record to prove that they knowingly
participated in an illegal strike.
Private respondents' contentions are belied by the records as there was an assumption order
already issued by the Minister of Labor when they first conducted a strike on January 3 and 4,
1985, and this assumption order was still in effect when they struck continuously from February
11 to March 11, 1995.
Furthermore, private respondents contend that a strike is not synonymous with abandonment of
work as the employer-employee relationship is not terminated during the duration of the strike
but merely suspended.
However, private respondents' failed to take into consideration the cases recently decided by
this Court which emphasized on the strict adherence to the rule that defiance of the return-towork order of the Secretary of Labor would constitute a valid ground for dismissal.
The respective liabilities of striking union officers and members who failed to immediately
comply with the return-to-work order, are clearly spelled out in Article 264 of the Labor Code
which provides that any declaration of a strike or lockout after the Secretary of Labor and
Employment has assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute is considered an illegal act.
Therefore, any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in a strike defying a return-towork order may as a result thereof be considered to have lost his employment status.
In the case at bar, we fully agree with the ruling of the NLRC in declaring that respondents were
validly dismissed considering their defiance of the return-to-work order issued by the Secretary
of Labor. As a consequence of such defiance, they are considered severed from their
employment.

ISSUE: Whether or not the striking union members terminated for abandonment of work after failing to
obey the return-to-work order of the Secretary of Labor and Employment, should be reinstated with
back wages.

27. G.R. No. 127422

April 17, 2001
LMG CHEMICALS CORPORATION vs. THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT

RULING:

FACTS: LMG Chemicals Corporation, (petitioner) is a domestic corporation engaged in the

manufacture and sale of various kinds of chemical substances, including aluminum sulfate which is

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essential in purifying water, and technical grade sulfuric acid used in thermal power plants. Petitioner
has three divisions, namely: the Organic Division, Inorganic Division and the Pinamucan Bulk
Carriers. There are two unions within petitioner's Inorganic Division. One union represents the daily
paid employees and the other union represents the monthly paid employees. Chemical Workers
Union, respondent, is a duly registered labor organization acting as the collective bargaining agent of
all the daily paid employees of petitioner's Inorganic Division.
Sometime in December 1995, the petitioner and the respondent started negotiation for a new CBA as
their old CBA was about to expire. They were able to agree on the political provisions of the new CBA,
but no agreement was reached on the issue of wage increase. The economic issues were not also
settled.
The positions of the parties with respect to wage issue were:
"Petitioner Company
P40 per day on the first year
P40 per day on the second year
P40 per day on the third year
Respondent Union
P350 per day on the first 18 months, and
P150 per day for the next 18 months"
In the course of the negotiations, respondent union pruned down the originally proposed wage increase
quoted above to P215 per day, broken down as follows:
"P142 for the first 18 months
P73 for the second 18 months"
With the CBA negotiations at a deadlock, on March 6, 1996, respondent union filed a Notice of Strike
with the NCMB. Despite several conferences and efforts of the designated conciliator-mediator, the
parties failed to reach an amicable settlement.
On April 16, 1996, respondent union staged a strike. In an attempt to end the strike early, petitioner, on
April 24, 1996, made an improved offer of P135 per day, spread over the period of three years, as
follows:
"P55 per day on the first year;
P45 per day on the second year;
P35 per day on the third year."
On May 9, 1996, another conciliation meeting was held between the parties. In that meeting, petitioner
reiterated its improved offer of P135 per day which was again rejected by the respondent union. On
May 20, 1996, the Secretary of Labor and Employment, finding the instant labor dispute impressed with
national interest, assumed jurisdiction over the same.
In its position paper, petitioner made a turn-around, stating that it could no longer afford to grant its
previous offer due to serious financial losses during the early months of 1996. It then made the
following offer:
Zero increase in the first year;
P30 per day increase in the second year; and

P20 per day increase in the third year.

In its reply to petitioner's position paper, respondent union claimed it had a positive performance in
terms of income during the covered period.
On October 7, 1996, the Secretary of Labor and Employment issued the first assailed order, pertinent
portions of which read:
"xxx. In the light of the Company's last offer and the Union's last position, We decree that the
Company's offer of P135 per day wage increase be further increased to P140 per (day), which
shall be incorporated in the new CBA, as follows:
P90 per day for the first 18 months, and
P50 per day for the next 18 months.
After all, the Company had granted its supervisory employees an increase of P4,500 per month
or P166 per day, more or less, if the period reckoned is 27 working days. In regard to the
division of the three-year period into two sub-periods of 18 months each, this office take
cognizance of the same practice under the old CBA.
2. Other economic demands
Considering the financial condition of the Company, all other economic demands except those
provided in No. 3 below are rejected. The provisions in the old CBA as well as those contained
in the Company's Employee's Primer of Benefits as of Aug. 1, 1994 shall be retained and
incorporated in the new CBA.
3. Effectivity of the new CBA
Article 253-A of the Labor Code, as amended, provides that when no new CBA is signed during
a period of six months from the expiry date of the old CBA, the retroactivity period shall be
according to the parties' agreement, Inasmuch as the parties could not agree on this issue and
since this Office has assumed jurisdiction, then this matter now lies at the discretion of the
Secretary of labor and Employment. Thus the new Collective Bargaining Agreement which the
parties will sign pursuant to this Order shall retroact to January 1, 1996.
x
x
x
Forthwith, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.
ISSUE: WON THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN DISREGARDING THE EVIDENCE OF
PETITIONER'S FINANCIAL LOSSES AND IN GRANTING A P140.00 WAGE INCREASE TO THE
RESPONDENT UNION.
RULING: NO. As aptly stated by the Solicitor General in his comment on the petition dated July 1,
1996, respondent Secretary considered all the evidence and arguments adduced by both parties. In
ordering the wage increase, the Secretary ratiocinated as follows:
"xxx
In the Company's Supplemental Comment, it says that it has three divisions, namely: the Organic
Division, Inorganic Division and the Pinamucan Bulk Carriers. The Union in this instant dispute
represent the daily wage earners in the Inorganic Division. The respective income of the three divisions
is shown in Annex B to the Company's Supplemental Comment. The Organic Division posted an
income of P369,754,000 in 1995. The Inorganic Division realized an income of P261,288,000 in the
same period. The tail ender is the Pinamucan Bulk Carriers Division with annual income of
P11,803,000 for the same period. Total Company income for the period was P642,845,000.
It is a sound business practice that a Company's income from all sources are collated to determine its
true financial condition. Regardless of whether one division or another losses or gains in its yearly
operation is not material in reckoning a Company's financial status. In fact, the loss in one is usually

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offset by the gains in the others. It is not a good business practice to isolate the employees or workers
of one division, which incurred an operating loss for a particular period. That will create demoralization
among its ranks, which will ultimately affect productivity. The eventual loser will be the company.
So, even if We believe the position of the company that its Inorganic Division lost last year and during
the early months of this year, it would not be a good argument to deny them of any salary increase.
When the Company made the offer of P135 per day for the three year period, it was presumed to have
studied its financial condition properly, taking into consideration its past performance and projected
income. In fact, the Company realized a net income of P10,806,678 for 1995 in all its operations, which
could be one factor why it offered the wage increase package of P135 per day for the Union
members.1wphi1.nt
Besides, as a major player in the country's corporate field, reneging from a wage increase package it
previously offered and later on withdrawing the same simply because this Office had already assumed
jurisdiction over its labor dispute with the Union cannot be countenanced. It will be worse if the
employer is allowed to withdraw its offer on the ground that the union staged a strike and consequently
subsequently suffered business setbacks in its income projections. To sustain the Company's position
is like hanging the proverbial sword of Damocles over the Union's right to concerted activities, ready to
fall when the latter clamors for better terms and conditions of employment.
But we cannot also sustain the Union's demand for an increase of P215 per day. If we add the overload
factors such as the increase in SSS premiums, medicare and medicaid, and other multiplier costs, the
Company will be saddled with additional labor cost, and its projected income for the CBS period may
not be able to absorb the added cost without impairing its viability. xxx"
Verily, petitioner's assertion that respondent Secretary failed to consider the evidence on record lacks
merit. It was only the Inorganic Division of the petitioner corporation that was sustaining losses. Such
incident does not justify the withholding of any salary increase as petitioner's income from all sources
are collated for the determination of its true financial condition. As correctly stated by the Secretary,
"the loss in one is usually offset by the gains in the others." Moreover, petitioner company granted its
supervisory employees, during the pendency of the negotiations between the parties, a wage increase
of P4,500 per month or P166 per day, more or less. Petitioner justified this by saying that the said
increase was pursuant to its earlier agreement with the supervisions. Hence, the company had no
choice but to abide by such agreement even if it was already sustaining losses as a result of the
strike of the rank-and-file employees.
Petitioner's actuation is actually a discrimination against respondent union members. If it could
grant a wage increase to its supervisors, there is no valid reason why it should deny the same to
respondent union members. Significantly, while petitioner asserts that it sustained losses in the first
part of 1996, yet during the May 9, 1996 conciliation meeting, it made the offer of P135 daily wage to
the said union members.
As to effectivity, this Court held:
"xxx Finally, the effectivity of the Order of January 28, 1991, must retroact to the date of the expiration
of the previous CBA, contrary to the position of the petitioner. Under the circumstances of the case, Art.
253-A cannot be properly applied to herein case. As correctly stated by public respondent in his
assailed Order of April 12, 1991 "Anent the alleged lack of basis for retroactivity provisions awarded,
We would stress that the provision of law invoked by the Hospital, Article 253-A of the Labor Code,
speaks of agreement by and between the parties, and not arbitral awards.' Therefore in the absence of
the specific provision of law prohibiting retroactivity of the effectivity of the arbitral awards issued by the
Secretary of Labor pursuant to Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, such as herein involved, public
respondent is deemed vested with plenary powers to determine the effectivity thereof." Finally, to
deprive respondent Secretary of such power and discretion would run counter to the well-established
rule that all doubts in the interpretation of labor laws should be resolved in favor of labor.

29. UNIVERSITY OF SAN AGUSTIN EMPLOYEES VS. CA

Respondent University of San Agustin (University) is a non-stock, non-profit educational institution
which offers both basic and higher education courses. Petitioner Union is the duly recognized collective
bargaining unit for teaching and non-teaching rank-and-file personnel of the University while the other
individual petitioners are its officers.
On July 27, 2000, the parties entered into a 5-year CBA which, among other things, provided that the
economic provisions thereof shall have a period of three (3) years or up to 2003. Complementary to
said provisions is Section 3 of Article VIII of the CBA providing for salary increases for School Years
(SY) 2000-2003, such increase to take the form of either a lump sum or a percentage of the tuition
incremental proceeds (TIP).
The CBA contained a "no strike, no lockout" clause and a grievance machinery procedure to resolve
management-labor disputes, including a voluntary arbitration mechanism should the grievance
committee fail to satisfactorily settle such disputes.
Pursuant to the CBA, the parties commenced negotiations for the economic provisions for the
remaining two years, i.e., SY2003-2004 and SY2004-2005. During the negotiations, the parties could
not agree on the manner of computing the TIP, thus the need to undergo preventive mediation
proceedings before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB), Iloilo City.
The impasse respecting the computation of TIP was not resolved. This development prompted the
Union to declare a bargaining deadlock grounded on the parties failure to arrive at a mutually
acceptable position on the manner of computing the seventy percent (70%) of the net TIP to be allotted
for salary and other benefits for SY2003-2004 and SY2004-2005.
Thereafter, the Union filed a Notice of Strike before the NCMB which was expectedly opposed by the
University in a Motion to Strike Out Notice of Strike and to Refer the Dispute to Voluntary
Arbitration, invoking the "No strike, no lockout" clause of the parties CBA. The NCMB, however, failed
to resolve the Universitys motion.
The parties then made a joint request for the SOLE to assume jurisdiction over the dispute. On
September 18, 2003, an Assumption of Jurisdiction Order (AJO) was issued by the SOLE.
Finally, to expedite resolution of the dispute, the parties are directed to submit their respective position
papers and evidence to this Office within TEN (10) calendar days from receipt hereof, with proof of
service to the other party. REPLY thereto shall be submitted with proof of service to the other party,
within five (5) calendar days from receipt of the other partys POSITION PAPER.

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On September 19, 2003, the Union staged a strike. At 6:45 a.m. of the same day, Sheriffs Francisco L.
Reyes and Rocky M. Francisco had arrived at San Agustin University to serve the AJO on the Union. At
the main entrance of the University, the sheriffs saw some elements of the Union at the early stages of
the strike. There they met Merlyn Jara, the Unions vice president, upon whom the sheriffs tried to
serve the AJO, but who, after reading it, refused to receive the same, citing Union Board Resolution
No. 3 naming the union president as the only person authorized to do so. The sheriffs explained to Ms.
Jara that even if she refused to acknowledge receipt of the AJO, the same would be considered
served. Sheriff Reyes further informed the Union that once the sheriffs post the AJO, it would be
considered received by the Union.6
At approximately 8:45 a.m., the sheriffs posted copies of the AJO at the main gate of San Agustin
University, at the main entrance of its buildings and at the Unions office inside the campus. At 9:20
a.m., the sheriffs served the AJO on the University.
Notwithstanding the sheriffs advice as to the legal implication of the Unions refusal to be served with
the AJO, the Union went ahead with the strike.
At around 5:25 p.m., the Union president arrived at the respondent Universitys premises and received
the AJO from the sheriffs.

On September 24, 2003, the University filed a Petition to Declare Illegal Strike and Loss of Employment
Status at the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Sub-regional Arbitration Branch No. VI in
Iloilo City.
On April 6, 2004, the SOLE rendered a Decision that the petition to declare the strike illegal is hereby
DISMISSED for want of legal and factual basis.
On appeal, the CA ordered a decision and held the strike was illegal, hence, the union officer are
deemed to have lost their employment status.
ISSUE:
WON the refusal to receive the Assumption of Jurisdiction Order amounts to defiance of the order
which defiance makes the continuation of the strike an illegal act, thus subjecting the strikers to loss
their employment status?

AJOs as duly served upon posting of copies thereof on designated places. The procedure was adopted
in order to prevent the thwarting of AJOs by the simple expedient of refusal of the parties to receive the
same, as in this case. The Union cannot feign ignorance of this procedure because its counsel Atty.
Mae M. Gellecanao-Laserna was a former Regional Director of the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE).
In this case, the AJO was served at 8:45 a.m. of September 19, 2003. The strikers then should have
returned to work immediately. However, they persisted with their refusal to receive the AJO and waited
for their union president to receive the same at 5:25 p.m. The Unions defiance of the AJO was evident
in the sheriffs report:
We went back to the main gate of the University and there NCMB Director Dadivas introduced
us to the Union lawyer, Atty. Mae Lacerna a former DOLE Regional Director. Atty. Lacerna
however refused to be officially served the Order again pointing to Board Resolution No. 3
passed by the Union officers. Atty. Lacerna then informed the undersigned Sheriffs that the
Union president will accept the Order at around 5:00 oclock in the afternoon. Atty. Lacerna
told the undersigned Sheriff that only when the Union president receives the Order at 5:00
p.m. shall the Union recognize the Secretary of Labor as having assumed jurisdiction over the
labor dispute.
Thus, we see no reversible error in the CAs finding that the strike of September 19, 2003 was illegal.
Consequently, the Union officers were deemed to have lost their employment status for having
knowingly participated in said illegal act.
The Unions assertion of a well settled practice that the SOLE always gives twenty-four hours (24) to
the striking workers within which to return to work, offers no refuge. Aside from the fact that this alleged
well settled practice has no basis in law and jurisprudence, Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, supra, is
explicit that if a strike has already taken place at the time of assumption of jurisdiction or certification,
all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall
immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions
prevailing before the strike or lock-out. This is compounded further by this Courts rulings which have
never interpreted the phrase "immediately return to work" found in Article 263(g) to mean "within twenty
four (24) hours." On the other hand, the tenor of these ponencias indicates an almost instantaneous or
automatic compliance for a striker to return to work once an AJO has been duly served.
Case number 30

RULING: YES.
The sheriffs report unequivocally stated the union officers refusal to receive the AJO when served on
them in the morning of September 19, 2003. The September 16, 2003 Unions Board Resolution No. 3
which gave sole authority to its president to receive the AJO must not be allowed to circumvent the
standard operating procedure of the Office of the Undersecretary for Labor Relations which considers

. NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS IN THE HOTEL RESTAURANT AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES

(NUWHRAIN-APL-IUF) DUSIT HOTEL NIKKO CHAPTER vs CA
GR 163942 and 166295

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Cases on Concerted Activities|Labor Relations Class of 2016

 Because of the collective bargaining deadlock, petitioner Union staged a strike against the
Hotel, herein private respondent. This strike was declared illegal by the SC.

Facts:
On January 18, 2002, Dusit Hotel prevented its workers from reporting to work- after many male
staff cropped their hairs in protest of managements dilatory tactics in the collective bargaining
negotiations- forcing them to hold a picket outside the hotel.
On January 26, 2002 Dusit terminated 90 of the workers, including 29 union officers of the
NUWHRAIN-Dusit Hotel Nikko Chapter that virtually wiped out the union leadership, and
suspended 136 union members who did not even cut short their hair.
Unfortunately, the government agencies concerned, in an apparent conspiracy with Dusit
management, dismissed the unions complaints for illegal dismissal and ULP. First the NLRC,
second, the CA, and finally the SC. Hence, the case.

Issue: The effects of an illegal strike on employees.

Held:
Regarding the Union officers and members liabilities for their participation in the illegal
picket and strike, Article 264(a), paragraph 3 of the Labor Code provides that any union officer
who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who
knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have
lost his employment status x x x. The law makes a distinction between union officers and mere
union members. Union officers may be validly terminated from employment for their participation
in an illegal strike, while union members have to participate in and commit illegal acts for them to
lose their employment status. Thus, it is necessary for the company to adduce proof of
the participation of the striking employees in the commission of illegal acts during the strikes.
Clearly, the 29 Union officers may be dismissed pursuant to Art. 264(a), par. 3 of the Labor Code
which imposes the penalty of dismissal on any union officer who knowingly participates in an
illegal strike. We, however, are of the opinion that there is room for leniency with respect
to the Union members. It is pertinent to note that the Hotel was able to prove before the
NLRC that the strikers blocked the ingress to and egress from the Hotel. But it is quite apparent
that the Hotel failed to specifically point out the participation of each of the Union members in the

commission of illegal acts during the picket and the strike. For this lapse in judgment
or diligence, we are constrained to reinstate the 61 Union members.
Further, we held in one case that union members who participated in an illegal strike but
were not identified to have committed illegal acts are entitled to be reinstated to their former
positions but without backwages.
32. C. Alcantara and Sons vs CA, GR No. 155109, 2010
FACTS:
The Company and the Union entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) that bound them to
hold no strike and no lockout in the course of its life. At some point the parties began negotiating the
economic provisions of their CBA but this ended in a deadlock, prompting the Union to file a notice of
strike. After efforts at conciliation by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) failed,
the Union conducted a strike vote that resulted in an overwhelming majority of its members favoring
it. The Union reported the strike vote to the DOLE and, after the observance of the mandatory coolingoff period, went on strike.
During the strike, the Company filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction with
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) Ex Parte with the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) to enjoin the strikers from intimidating, threatening, molesting, and
impeding by barricade the entry of non-striking employees at the Companys premises. The NLRC first
issued a 20-day TRO and, after hearing, a writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining the Union and its
officers and members from performing the acts complained of. But several attempts to implement the
writ failed. Only the intervention of law enforcement units made such implementation
possible. Meantime, the Union filed a petition with the Court of Appeals (CA), questioning the
preliminary injunction order. The latter court dismissed the petition. The Union did not appeal from such
dismissal.
The Company, on the other hand, filed a petition to declare the Unions strike illegal, citing its violation
of the no strike, no lockout, provision of their CBA. Subsequently, the Company amended its petition to
implead the named Union members who allegedly committed prohibited acts during the strike.
ISSUE: WON the union staged an illegal strike
RULING: YES
A strike may be regarded as invalid although the labor union has complied with the strict
requirements for staging one as provided in Article 263 of the Labor Code when the same is held
contrary to an existing agreement, such as a no strike clause or conclusive arbitration clause. [19] Here,
the CBA between the parties contained a no strike, no lockout provision that enjoined both the Union
and the Company from resorting to the use of economic weapons available to them under the law and
to instead take recourse to voluntary arbitration in settling their disputes.
No law or public policy prohibits the Union and the Company from mutually waiving the strike
and lockout maces available to them to give way to voluntary arbitration.Indeed, no less than the 1987

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Constitution recognizes in Section 3, Article XIII, preferential use of voluntary means to settle
disputes. Thus
The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between
workers and employers and the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling
disputes, including conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual compliance
therewith to foster industrial peace.
The Court finds no compelling reason to depart from the findings of the Labor Arbiter, the
NLRC, and the CA regarding the illegality of the strike. Social justice is not one-sided. It cannot be used
as a badge for not complying with a lawful agreement.
Since the Unions strike has been declared illegal, the Union officers can, in accordance with
law be terminated from employment for their actions. This includes the shop stewards. They cannot be
shielded from the coverage of Article 264 of the Labor Code since the Union appointed them as such
and placed them in positions of leadership and power over the men in their respective work units.
As regards the rank and file Union members, Article 264 of the Labor Code provides that
termination from employment is not warranted by the mere fact that a union member has taken part in
an illegal strike. It must be shown that such a union member, clearly identified, performed an illegal act
or acts during the strike.[20]
Here, although the Labor Arbiter found no proof that the dismissed rank and file Union
members committed illegal acts, the NLRC found following the injunction hearing in NLRC IC M000126-98 that the Union members concerned committed such acts, for which they had in fact been
criminally charged before various courts and the prosecutors office in Davao City. Since the CA held
that the existence of criminal complaints against the Union members did not warrant their dismissal, it
becomes necessary for the Court to go into the records to settle the issue.
The striking Union members allegedly committed the following prohibited acts:
a. They threatened, coerced, and intimidated non-striking employees,
officers, suppliers and customers;
b. They obstructed the free ingress to and egress from the company
premises; and
c. They resisted and defied the implementation of the writ of preliminary
injunction issued against the strikers.
Cornelio Caguiat, Ruben Tungapalan, and Eufracio Rabusa depicted the above prohibited
acts in their affidavits and testimonies. The Sheriff of the NLRC said in his Report [21] that, in the course
of his implementation of the writ of injunction, he observed that the striking employees blocked the exit
lane of the Alson drive with their tent.Tungapalan, a non-striking employee, identified the Union
members who threatened and coerced him. Indeed, he filed criminal actions against them. Lastly, the
photos taken of the strike show the strikers, properly identified, committing the acts complained
of. These constitute substantial evidence in support of the termination of the subject Union members.
The mere fact that the criminal complaints against the terminated Union members were
subsequently dismissed for one reason or another does not extinguish their liability under the Labor
Code. Nor does such dismissal bar the admission of the affidavits, documents, and photos presented

to establish their identity and guilt during the hearing of the petition to declare the strike illegal. The
technical grounds that the Union interposed for denying admission of the photos are also not binding
on the NLRC.
33. NORTON & HARRISON CO. & JACKBILT CONCRETE BLOCKS CO. LABOR UNION
(NLU) petitioner,
vs.
NORTON & HARRISON CO. & JACKBILT CONCRETE BLOCKS CO., INC. and ALBERTO
GOLDEN,respondents.
Facts :
Jaime Arcania was employed since 1953 in Norton & Harrison Co. &Jackbilt Concrete Blocks Co., as a
mechanic.
Arcania joined the Norton & Harrison &Jackbilt Concrete Blocks Co. Labor Union-NLU. From
September of 1956 to September of 1957, he was the president of said union. And as a president
Arcania followed up a petition of the union setting forth several demands, however none of the
demands were granted during his term. After his term Arcania became a member of the said union after
losing the presidency to Jorge Dakila.
On May 24, 1958 (Saturday) Arcania went off at 5pm on a 12pm to 8pm shift, causing such dismissal
which was given to him on the following working day May 26 1958 (Monday), its alleged reason was
having left his work without permission and in violation of the rules of the company and continuous
disregard of orders from his superiors.
Jorge Dakila wrote a letter to the company asking Arcania to be reinstated to work but of no avail.
Thus, a notice of strike alleging unfair labor practice by the company. The union struck.
Thus Arcania and 300 other workers were dismissed by the company for such strike and not subject to
reinstatement because the work of 300 has been replace by other hired workers.
The Court of Industrial Relations rendered thru Presiding Judge Jose S. Bautista (as trial judge) a
decision ordering Arcaina's reinstatement with back wages and the reinstatement of the strikers who
were refused acceptance when they offered to return to work, also with back wages. For the reason
that it was under unfair labor practice.
However, the Court of Industrial Relations en banc reversed said decision per resolution finding that
Arcaina's dismissal was not due to union activities but for a just cause, that is, leaving his work without
permission. It further held, as a result, that the strike was not an unfair labor practice strike but merely
an economic strike, so that strikers replaced by other workers cannot demand reinstatement.
Issue :
Whether or not Arcania was dismissed and was covered by unfair labor practice.
Held :
Yes, the dismissal of Arcania was in violation of the CBA that has been agreed upon by the company
and the union. The former acted in posthaste, since Arcaina was the former president of the union and

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Cases on Concerted Activities|Labor Relations Class of 2016

his activities for and in the union which were well known had continued even after his presidency,
as a member of said union, his swift dismissal without benefit of the required procedure, for an
infraction of a rule of the company that resulted in no appreciable damage to the latter, could not but
reasonably lead the union and its members into believing that said dismissal was in reality predicated
upon his union activities.

without definite and clear permission from his superiors, a fact duty ascertained only in the course of
the proceedings in the Court of Industrial Relations.

It also cited the cases of Ferrer, et al. vs. C.I.R., L-24267-68, May 31, 1966

PROGRESSIVE WORKER'S UNION AND ITS 3,000 OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, petitioners,
vs.
HON. FLAVIO P. AGUAS, THE COMMANDING GENERAL, P.C. METROCOM, THE DISTRICT
COMMANDER,EASTERN POLICE DISTRICT, METROPOLITAN POLICE FORCE, THE STATION
COMMANDER, MUNTINLUPA POLICE STATION, and SOLID MILLS INC., respondents.

Although the Management may have had the strict legal right to take against union members the
disciplinary and other administrative measures above referred to, there is no denying the fact that the
time chosen by the Management therefor, when considered in relation with the attending
circumstances, reasonably justified the belief of the Union that the real or main purpose of the
Management was to discourage membership in the Union, to discredit the officers thereof, to weaken
the Union and to induce or compel the same to sign the draft of agreement Exhibit D as amended, on
May 29 and 30 or 31, 1963. As stated in the decision of His Honor, the trial Judge, said belief was
confirmed by the fact that prosecutors of the Court of Industrial Relations found sufficient grounds to file
and did file, against the Management, a complaint for unfair labor practice.
In other words, both parties had, performed acts which understandably induced each to believe that the
other was guilty of such practices although, as we now analyze the whole situation, without the
excitement, the heat and the passion of the direct participants in the labor dispute, at the peak thereof,
such belief may not turn out to be borne out by the objective realities and both were reasonably
justified in taking the counter measures adopted by them. As a consequence, we hold that the strike in
question had been called to off-set what petitioners were warranted in believing in good faith to be
unfair labor practices on the part of Management, that petitioners were not bound, therefore, to wait for
the expiration of thirty (30) days from notice of strike before staging the same, that said strike was not,
accordingly, illegal and that the strikers had not thereby lost their status as employees of respondents
herein. Upon the other hand, considering that the latter have been absolved from the charge of unfair
labor practice, the reinstatement of the strikers must be without backpay.
So, also, in this case, the act of the company in dismissing Arcaina, done without the required fair
hearing, and, therefore, not tenable even under strict legal ground, induced the union and its members
to believe that said company was guilty of unfair labor practice, although viewed now in retrospect said
act would fall short of unfair labor practice. Since the strike of the union was in response to what it was
warranted in believing in good faith to be unfair labor practice on the part of the management, said
strike, following the Ferrer ruling, did not result in the termination of the striking members' status as
employees, and, therefore, they are still entitled to reinstatement but without back wages..
Anent the company's argument that reinstatement of said strikers would be unfair to those who had
been taken in to replace them, during the strike, when the company direly needed their services, suffice
it to consider two other points. The first is that said other workers must be deemed to have accepted
their employment as replacements with the knowledge that the same is subject to the consequences of
the labor dispute between the strikers and the company on the resolution of which depended the
effects of the strike as to right to reinstatement of the strikers. The second point is that said workers
had by now been engaged for almost nine years, so that it is not inequitable for them to be made to
yield their positions to those finally ruled to be with right to occupy the same.
As to Arcaina himself, as heretofore said, his dismissal cannot be sustained for lack of the requisite fair
hearing; he should therefore also be reinstated, without back wages, the intervening period without pay
between his dismissal and reinstatement being deemed sufficient penalty for his leaving his work

No. 37 case: G.R. No. L-59711-12 May 29, 1987

FACTS:
Petitioner Progressive Workers Union is the local chapter of the Federation of Free Workers
(FFW) in respondent company, Solid Mills, Inc. In the CBA entered into between Solid Mills and FFW
as the certified bargaining representative of the rank-and-file employees, company agreed to grant
across the board wage increases to covered bargaining unit employees. Respondent company
implemented the CBA stipulation by giving the union members a retroactive pay for the first year wage
increase without further including wage increase into the basic wage rate of the rank and file
employees. Contending that the wage increase for a particular period should be included in the basic
wage rate, the individual petitioners presented a grievance to respondent company demanding strict
and faithful compliance with said CBA provision. Grievance meetings thereafter held between the
representatives of the union and company proved to be unavailing. Hence, the union filed with the
Conciliation Division, BLR, Ministry of Labor & Employment (MOLE), a notice of strike for ULP, violation
of CBA, violation of SS law, job evaluation and failure to restate work week. The union went on strike
and on the same day, company filed with the NLRC, MOLE, petitions praying that the strike staged by
the union be declared illegal and the participating officers and members thereof be declared to have
lost their employment status. The company likewise prayed for a preliminary injunction/restraining order
commanding the union, its members, agents, representatives and sympathizers to lift their picket lines
and allow free and unobstructed ingress to and egress from the company and to refrain from
committing coercion, threats and other illegal acts. The union filed a motion to dismiss the complaints
on the ground that under BP 130, the labor arbiter has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
complaints or the nature of actions.
ISSUE: WON the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition.
HELD:
The Labor Arbiter have jurisdiction over the case. Declaring a strike or lockout to be illegal requires the
exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial authority which in this instance is located in the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC). Under Article 217 of the Labor Code, as amended, Labor Arbiters
have original and exclusive jurisdiction over among other disputes, all other claims arising from
employer-employee relations, and the Commission has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases
decided by Labor Arbiters. The statement of jurisdiction is intended to cover all disputes between
employers and employees arising from their relationship as such including those involving the legality
of concerted actions. Furthermore, peaceful ingress and egress of workers who may want to work and
those of third parties transacting lawful business with the company under strike is legal.
39. G.R. Nos. 171618-19

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March 20, 2009

JACKBILT INDUSTRIES, INC., Petitioner, vs. JACKBILT EMPLOYEES WORKERS UNIONNAFLU-KMU, Respondent.
(same case sa second gud)
Facts:
Due to economic crisis on construction industry, petitioner decided to temporarily stop its
business of producing concrete hollow blocks compelling most of its employees to go on leave for six
months. Respondent protested the temporary shutdown and later on went on strike.
Petitioner filed a petition for injunction with prayer for the issuance of TRO in NLRC which
NLRC issued. Reports of both the implementing officers and Labor Arbiter revealed that respondent
violated the TRO. Respondent wrote letters to respondent participated in strike to explain why they
should not be dismissed for committing illegal acts in the course of a strike. Failure of respondent to
comply despite the extensions granted, petitioner dismissed the concerned employees.
Hence, respondent filed a complaint for illegal lockout, runaway shop and damages. In its decision,
LA dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. However, because the petition did not declare the strike
illegal before terminating some employees, the company is found guilty of illegal dismissal.

FACTS:
NATIONAL LABOR UNION filed with the Court of Industrial Relations a complaint for alleged unfair
labor practice committed by Benedicto Dinglasan, in that he locked out from employment 46 drivers,
members of the respondent union. Dinglasan asked for the dismissal. He claims that there existed no
employer-employee relationship between him and the drivers, members of the respondent union, the
relationship being one of lessor and lessee only, as the jeeps being used by the said drivers were
rented out by the petitioner under the so-called "boundary system".
He further denied the (1) the legitimacy of the respondent union, and (2) the charge unfair labor
practice, claiming that he acted in good faith based on his honest belief that he was not an employer of
the drivers, members of the respondent union, but only a lessor of his jeepneys. As such, he was
ordered by the Court to cease and desist from further committing the unfair labor practices complained
of; to reinstate the drivers listed in the complaint, except those who have been already reinstated and
to pay back wages to all drivers listed in the complaint.
Dinglasan filed a motion for reconsidering which was denied by the court in its resolution en banc.
ISSUE: Whether or not Dinglasan is guilty of Unfair Labor Practice?
RULE: NO.

On appeal, the NLRC modified the decision of LA and held that petitioner should be held liable
for monetary awards granted to respondent. Petitioner appeal before the CA. The CA dismissed the
petition but modified the NLRC decision and held that the temporary shutdown was moved by antiunion sentiments. Petitioner was guilty therefore of unfair labor practice.

While we agree with the lower court that the act of the petitioner in suspending the operation of his
jeepneys on June 27, is legally and technically not in consonance with the industrial Peace Act (the
court a quo termed it "a virtual lockout") so as to entitle the drivers to be reinstated nevertheless, as the
trial court correctly stated in its decision, there are certain aspects of this case which merit
consideration.

Issue:

This very Court itself, unanimously were of the same opinion that there was no employer-employee
relationship. In the application of the affirmative reliefs granted by law, this good faith of the respondent
must be taken into consideration in those portions where the law allows this court or use its sound
discretion and judgment. The particular portion we have in mind is Section 5 of Republic Act No. 875.

Whether the filing of a petition with the LA to declare a strike illegal is a condition sine qua non
for the valid termination of employees who commit an illegal act in the course of strike.
Ruling:
The use of unlawful means in the course of a strike renders such strike illegal. Therefore,
pursuant to the principle of conclusiveness of judgment, the March 9, 1998 strike was ipso facto illegal.
The filing of a petition to declare the strike illegal was thus unnecessary.
Consequently, we uphold the legality of the dismissal of respondent. Article 264 of the Labor
Code further provides that an employer may terminate employees found to have committed illegal acts
in the course of a strike. Petitioner clearly had the legal right to terminate respondent.

In the exercise of this discretion, that is, whether the reinstatement will be with or without back pay,
aside from the fact that there was no willful violation of the Industrial Peace Act, there is an additional
circumstance that may be considered in favor of herein petitioner. As already mentioned above,
petitioner, the day following his suspension of the operation of the jeepneys, urged the drivers to return
and resume the work, notwithstanding which, the latter not only refused, but even compelled those who
did, to joint the strike.
It is clear therefrom that the cessation or stoppage of the operation after June 27, was not the direct
consequence of petitioner's locking them up or of any willful unfair or discriminatory act of the former,
but the result of their (the drivers) voluntary and deliberate refusal to return to work.

The petition is granted.

41. BENEDICTO DINGLASAN, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR UNION, respondent.

Taking into account the foregoing circumstances and considering their similarity to those in the case of
Philippines marine Radio Officers' Association vs. Court of Industrial Relation et al., 102 Phil., 373,
wherein it was held that there is no reason for granting backpay if there is not been any willful unfair
labor practice or refusal of the respondent companies to admit their laborers back to work, while the
drivers members of respondent union may, in this case, be entitled to reinstatement, we find no
justification for their receiving back wage for the period that they themselves refused to return to work.

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Cases on Concerted Activities|Labor Relations Class of 2016

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is accordingly modified in the sense that the reinstatement will
be without back pay. In all other respects, the same is affirmed, without costs. So ordered.
42.
NATIONAL
FEDERATION
OF
LABOR
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION FIFTH DIVISION (NLRC)

(NFL), vs.

Facts:
Respondent PERMEX Producer and Exporter Corporation (PERMEX)is a Zamboanga City-based
corporation engaged in the business of fish and tuna export while its co-respondents are its corporate
officers. Petitioners, on the other hand, are the National Federation of Labor (NFL), a legitimate labor
federation represented by its Regional Director, and 141 members of said union, who are dismissed
employees of respondent corporation.
On January 23, 1993, NFL contends that 10 union officials who had attended a scheduled certification
election conference the previous day were barred from entering the company premises and were
prohibited to work therein, allegedly due to their union activities. The NLRC, however, upheld the
contention of PERMEX that three of said workers asked to be excused from work while the rest were
given time off in order to attend to union activities and were told to return on January 30, 1993. It thus
found that the company's actuations did not consist in a lockout but were related to disciplinary matters
not in any way connected with a labor dispute. Furthermore, the record shows that the ten (10) workers
concerned did not report for work in the morning of January 22, 1993, although the pre-election
conference was yet to be held at 1:30 in the afternoon of the same day. Yet another group of workers
which attended the conference reported for work the next day. In the words of the NLRC:
. . . if the group of ten were subjected to some disciplinary action by management, the same
was justified not because of their union affiliations but for breach of company discipline. In
other words, the group of ten were (sic) using their union activities to go on undertime or to
justify their constant and frequent absences which evidently was a violation of company
policy. 1
Be that as it may, on January 25, 1993 said workers attempted to re-enter the company premises but
were prevented from doing so, prompting several of their co-workers to seek an audience with the
President and General Manager who was then within the premises. Their efforts having been allegedly
rebuffed, over 200 workers staged a picket outside company premises. The gates were barricaded,
thus blocking ingress and egress of company vehicles, trapping 50 workers inside and paralyzing
company operations. Additionally, 700 non-striking workers were prevented from working on January
26, 1997. The workers only returned to work on January 27, 1993 when a memorandum of agreement
was forged the same day between representatives of PERMEX and NFL. Pursuant to the agreement,
PERMEX issued a memorandum requiring the workers concerned to fully explain their participation in
the above-mentioned strike. However, most workers refused to submit explanations, prompting the
management to place them under preventive suspension effective February 13, 1993. Only about 40
workers who proffered satisfactory explanations were allowed to return to work.
On January 29, 1993, NFL filed a Notice of Strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation BoardRegion IX of Zamboanga City. Said notice was contested by PERMEX on February 5, 1993 during the
conciliation meeting, prompting NFL to file a new Notice of Strike the same day. Said Notice alleged
discrimination, coercion, union busting, blacklisting of union members, intimidation and dismissal of
union officers and members.
On March 11, 1993 the Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction over the dispute pursuant to a petition
of the NFL filed on January 29, 1993. He likewise issued a Return-to-Work Order to take effect within
24 hours from receipt thereof PERMEX publicly announced through print and radio that all striking
workers should return by March 15, 1993. However, the intercession of PNP agents notwithstanding,
the same was ignored. It was only on March 29, 1993 that the workers finally lifted their picket lines.
Petitioner contends that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion when it upheld the dismissal of 141
employees on this basis of a resolution of the City Fiscal's Office finding a prima facie case against said
employees for illegal acts committed during the strikes in question.

29
Cases on Concerted Activities|Labor Relations Class of 2016

Issue: WON dismissal of the employees was valid. YES

Ruling:
A strike (or lockout), to enjoy the protection of law, must observe certain procedural requisites
mentioned in Art. 263 and the Implementing Rules, namely:
1) A notice of strike, with the required contents, should be filed with the DOLE, specifically the
Regional Branch of the NCMB, copy furnished the employer of the union;
2) A cooling-off period must be observed between the filing of notice and the actual execution
of the strike thirty (30) days in case of bargaining deadlock and fifteen (15) days in case of
unfair labor practice. However, in the case of union busting where the union's existence is
threatened, the cooling-off period need not be observed.
xxx xxx xxx
4) Before a strike is actually commenced, a strike vote should be taken by secret balloting,
with a 24-hour prior notice to NCMB. The decision to declare a strike requires the secret-ballot
approval of majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned.
5) The result of the strike vote should be reported to the NCMB at least seven (7) days before
the intended strike or lockout, subject to the cooling-off period. 6
The provisions hardly leave any room for doubt that the cooling-off period in Art. 264(c) and
the seven-day strike ban after the strike-vote report prescribed in Art. 264(f) were meant to be,
and should be deemed, mandatory [Art. 264 should now read Art. 263]. 7
In the case at bar, no notice of strike, as required by Art. 263 (c) was filed by NFL prior to the strike on
January 25 and 26. No prior notice of the taking of a strike vote was furnished the NCMB, nor was the
seven-day strike ban after the strike vote observed. Instead, the workers immediately barricaded
company premises in the afternoon of January 25, 1996, completely disregarding the procedural steps
prescribed by Art. 263 (c) and (f).

As for the strike commenced on February 11, only six days had elapsed from the filing of the Notice to
Strike on February 5, 1993. In addition, various illegal acts were committed by the strikers during said
strike. It can be gleaned from the record that the strikers destroyed company property and intimidated
and harassed non-striking workers in violation of Art. 264 (e) of the Labor Code. Likewise, barricading,
chaining and padlocking of dates to prevent free ingress and egress into company premises are also
violations of the self-same article. 8
Arguing that despite its failure to comply with the statutory requirements necessary for a valid strike,
NFL asserts that the same can be declared legal for it was done in good faith, citing the cases
of People's Industrial and Commercial Employees and Workers Organization (FFW) v. People's
Industrial and Commercial Corp. 9 andPhilippine Metal Foundries, Inc. v. Court of Industrial
Relations. 10 The reliance is misplaced. People's Industrial did not rule that the procedural steps can be
dispensed with even if the union believed in good faith that the company was committing an unfair
labor practice. While, it is true that Philippine Metal held that a strike cannot be declared as illegal for
lack of notice, however, it is important to note that said case was decided in 1979. At this juncture, it
must be stressed that with the enactment of Republic Act No. 6715 11 which took effect on March 21,
1989, the rule now is that such requirements as the filing of a notice of strike, strike vote, and notice
given to the Department of Labor are mandatory in nature. 12
Thus, even if the union acted in good faith in the belief that the company was committing an unfair
labor practice, if no notice of strike and a strike vote were conducted, the said strike is illegal. 13
Second, it is alleged that the dismissal of the 141 workers is based solely on a prima facie finding that
they committed various unlawful acts while staging their strike, as certified by the City Prosecutor's
Office. This allegation is not true. The dismissal is principally based on their refusal to return to work
after the Secretary of Labor had assumed jurisdiction over the case on March 11, 1993. In fact, despite
the efforts of PNP personnel through the District Commander to persuade the workers to comply with
the Return-to-Work Order, the strike continued until March 29, 1993 when the workers dismantled their
pickets. As held in St. Scholastica's College v.Hon. Ruben Torres and Samahan ng Manggagawang
Pang-edukasyon sa Sta. Escolastika 14 "(a) strike undertaken despite the issuance by the Secretary of
Labor of an assumption or certification order becomes a prohibited activity and thus illegal, pursuant to
the second paragraph of Art. 264 of the Labor Code, as amended . . . The union officers and members,
as a result, are deemed to have lost their employment status for having knowingly participated in an
illegal act.""Case law, likewise, provides that by staging a strike after the assumption or certification for
arbitration, the workers forfeited their right to be readmitted to work, having abandoned their
employment." 15

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Cases on Concerted Activities|Labor Relations Class of 2016