INTERNATIONAL FIRE TRAINING CENTRE

RFFS SUPERVISOR INITIAL

AERODROME SAFETY
Areas of information in bold type are considered to be of prime importance.

Throughout this note he means he/she and his means his/hers.

INTRODUCTION
This training note is intended to provide information to students attending RFFS Supervisor courses on
the subject of Aerodrome Safety as relevant to the Rescue and Firefighting Services (RFFS) employed at
airports. This training note should be read in conjunction with CAP 700, CAP 642 and CAP 748.

AIM
The aim of this training note is to outline some of the safety related guidance that is specific to aerodrome
operations.

OBJECTIVES
At the end of the instructional session dealing with this subject, and after studying this training note and
the associated CAPs, you will be able to:

State the purpose of CAP 700

Describe the aerodrome safety matters detailed in CAP 642
State the fire precautions to be taken with regard to aircraft fuelling operations

INTRODUCTION TO AERODROME SAFETY

Aerodromes are a necessary part of 21st century life. Whether they are small airfields training the
pilots of the future, regional airports that form part of the local economic and transport network or
a large global hub, they are here to stay and they are growing in size and complexity.
Although necessary, they bring with them many hazards. These hazards have the potential to,
and on occasions have, caused harm to:

The aerodrome workforce

Aircraft crews and passengers
The local community
Aircraft
The environment

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Some hazards, such as runway incursions and refuelling operations are obvious. Others may not,
to untrained people, be quite so apparent. These could include hazards arising from work in
progress where multiple tasks are undertaken in close proximity to each other by workers from
different organisations, or hazards that only arise at certain times of the year such as fog, ice or
snow.
What is not obvious, regardless of the hazard, is what to do about them. The aerodrome licensee
has a duty to ensure that the operations that take place at the aerodrome are done so as safely as
practicable.
As some of the hazards cannot be removed, the level of risk arising from them must be reduced to
acceptable levels. This is normally achieved by having

Procedures
Equipment
Controls
Education and Training
Competent staff at all levels
Emergency plans
Audit and reviews
Positive safety culture

Both the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) and the UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) Aerodrome
Standards Department (ASD) have been charged with ensuring that a regulatory framework exists
to ensure that aerodromes are safe. Both organisations recognise the possibility of some
duplication. In order to foster close liaison, to minimise duplication and to provide clarity to
licensees about areas of responsibility, a memorandum of understanding has been produced.
This note concerns itself more with the safety guidance issued by the CAA, in particular:
CAP 700 Operational Safety Competences
A UK Code of Practice
CAP 642 Airside Safety Management
CAP 748 Aircraft Fuelling and Fuel Installation Management

CAP 700 OPERATIONAL SAFETY COMPETENCES A UK CODE OF PRACTICE

Historically, aerodrome licensees have demonstrated that their overall level of competence in operational
safety matters has been met without the need of a published Code of Practice. This was possible
because the majority of aerodrome managers had gained experience in the aviation industry through
operational roles.
More recently, the advent of privatisation and the consequent commercially oriented approach to the
management of licensed aerodromes has created significant change; business driven objectives have
assumed a higher priority and management structures and skills have shifted towards a more business
focused culture.
To ensure that as these commercial and other pressures increased there would be no reduction in the
priority attached to safety, nor any dilution of the skills available in aviation operations at executive
management level, the Airport Operators Association (AOA) and the Aerodrome Standards Department
of the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) worked together in a joint initiative to identify the key areas of
operational safety competence for aerodrome licensees.
This co-operation resulted in a Code of Practice, which details the competences appropriate to various
operational tasks.
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THE PURPOSE OF CAP 700

The purpose of CAP 700 is to enable licensees to assess the level of operational safety
management competence existing within their respective organisations including any areas that
are contracted out, and to ensure that they have the necessary expertise, at the appropriate level,
to formulate and implement systems to adequately manage safety. Some tasks associated with
some topic areas may be contracted out by the aerodrome licensee; whilst day-to-day
operational management is the responsibility of the contractor, the aerodrome licensee continues
to have overall responsibility for the safe integration of contracted activities with the rest of the
aerodrome operation.
In the absence of any alternative means of determining if the competence requirement of Article
103 of the Air Navigation Order 2000 is met, the CAAs Safety Regulation Group, specifically its
Aerodrome Standards Department, will seek the adoption and application of the appropriate parts
of CAP 700 by aerodrome licensees and potential licensees.
The Code of Practice also takes account of the need to accommodate a range of licensed aerodromes
and their varied scope of operations.

Not all of the tasks listed will be appropriate or necessary for all aerodromes, an issue of
particular interest to the smaller aerodromes.
Not all of the areas of competence have to be vested in one person, an issue of particular interest
to the larger aerodromes.

CAP 700 will assist the aerodrome licensee to:

Be satisfied that persons within the management structure possess the relevant operational
safety competence.
Identify the post and person that have accountability for a specific task.
Identify gaps that may exist in the areas of competence for their particular aerodrome.
Develop job specifications, and in recruitment and succession planning, provide for aerodrome
licensing purposes the safety assurance sought by the CAA.

There are 25 areas of competence detailed in CAP 700, these are:

Aerodrome Licensing, Legal Framework

Aerodrome Physical Characteristics
Airside Safety Management and Flight Safety
Risk Assessment
Safety Management and Human Factors
Airfield Work in Progress
Aerodrome Safeguarding
Aircraft Operations and Loading
Airside Vehicle Operations
Runway Surface Friction
Snow and Ice Procedures and Runway Contamination
Bird Hazard Control
Local Airspace Management
Integration of Mixed Aircraft Operations
Air Traffic Services
Radio, Navigation and Approach Aids
Aeronautical Information Systems
Low Visibility and Night Operations
Fire and Rescue Operations

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Aviation Fuel Safety

Aviation Emergency Procedures
Environmental Issues and Noise Monitoring
Aviation Security
Media Relations on Safety Matters
HM Customs, HM Immigration, Port Police and Port Health Requirements.

Although not all of these have relevance to the RFFS, there are many areas where the competence
applies, either wholly or in part, such as Risk Assessment and Airside Vehicle Operations. It is the
responsibility of the aerodrome licensee to identify which post has responsibility in which area and to
ensure that the post holder has sufficient experience and background knowledge to be considered
competent.
Area 19 Rescue and Firefighting has been reproduced (see Appendix A) as an indication of the layout
of each area of competence. CAP 700 can be accessed in full at www.caa.co.uk

CAP 642
ORIGIN
CAP 642 has been produced in response to a need for guidance about safe operating practices for all
those engaged in activities taking place on the airside areas of airports and aerodromes. The airline and
airport industry and their safety regulators have been concerned about the level and extent of damage
caused to aircraft during ground handling and also about the high rate of occurrences and the
associated safety risks for aircraft, passengers and airport workers. This concern is shared
internationally by various groups and organisations. With the support of industry and the UK Health and
Safety Executive (HSE), the UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) established a joint Working Group (WG) to
look at specific issues concerning aircraft and individual safety in the ground handling phase of airport
operations. This move was in accordance, generally, with the views of the UKs Air Accident Investigation
Branch. The WG set itself the task of reviewing ground handling airside operations and airside safety
with the objective of seeking to identify problems and solutions.
The WG decided firstly that it had to work closely with industry in order to use the experience, expertise
and imagination of those working hands on in airside operations and, secondly, that it should collect a
comprehensive range of opinions from industry about the underlying causes of problems before
attempting to develop solutions. The WG consulted widely amongst the various intere3st groups
concerned directly and indirectly with safety in airside operations. The task of the WG was to order the
information so gained into suitable topic areas and then to submit each topic package to a formal industry
consultation process for approval and comment before acceptance.
The resultant document is the creation of the whole industry and has the acceptance of the regulatory
authorities responsible for overseeing the safety of aircraft and individuals on airports.
PURPOSE
The advice and guidance in CAP 642 is best described as Accepted Good Practice and
represents an acceptable way of doing things. It illustrates how risks might be identified and
provides advice about how airside safety can be placed within the context of a systematic and
structured management approach a Safety Management System.
It is impossible to guarantee that adherence to CAP 642 will always satisfy all regulatory
requirements under all possible circumstances. This is simply because service providers
themselves are ultimately responsible for deciding on the appropriateness and applicability of any
particular safety arrangements with respect to their own specific circumstances.
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CAP 642 illustrates the sort of things which organisations are expected to consider in the
interests of airside safety; it is not intended to be totally comprehensive in the detail provided.
CAP 642 does not absolve those responsible for securing a safe operating and working
environment from thinking for themselves. It indicates the safety organisational elements which,
if provided, will help persuade regulatory bodies that the effort to discharge safety
accountabilities under the law is effective, well directed and responsible.
Nevertheless, the compilers of CAP 642 have sought to give good coverage to those operational
situations which contain elements of risk and which might be considered commonplace. For a
number of these, the document provides practical examples, through a series of model safety
instructions, which can be utilised by airports as the basis for their own orders and instructions.
Where examples are not provided or material to cover a particular situation is not included it is expected
that users will be guided by the general principles set out and illustrated in order to identify and create the
circumstances of a safe working and operating environment appropriate to their own requirements.
APPLICABILITY
CAP 642 is intended as a guide to accepted practice for all those engaged in working on and around the
operational areas of airports, aerodromes or heliports: in fact, anywhere where aircraft are attended and
handled. That is, it applies to everybody working airside. Whilst CAP 642 is primarily aimed at Licensed
Aerodromes, it is equally applicable in most cases to Unlicensed Aerodromes. In these cases the term
Aerodrome Licensee should be read a Person in charge of the aerodrome. Any organisation,
regardless of size or complexity of operation, can establish an acceptable Safety Management System
through the application of the general principles outlined in the following Parts of CAP 642.
THE STATUS OF CAP 642
CAP 642 is not a legal document but represents an accepted way or organising and operating safe
working practices and which is endorsed by Industry. The CAA, as part of the ongoing aerodrome
licensing process, in conducting its routine inspections and audits of the airside safety
environment will lean heavily on these guidelines. The CAA, with endorsement from the HSE,
makes it clear that the general principles, processes and procedures set out within CAP 642 form
the basis of acceptable safety arrangements airside. It is accepted that the principle of an
equivalent level of safety that is the achievement of a safe operating regime by a method other
than that recommended is an acceptable means of compliance with statutory responsibilities.
Parts 1 and 2 of CAP 642 stem directly from legislation protecting workers and members of the public
affected by work activities. The legislation frequently requires employers to take certain actions but that
requirement is often qualified by the phrase so far as is reasonably practicable. This basically means
that the action taken must allow for the amount of risk placed on one side of the scale and the sacrifice
(money, time, trouble) needed to avert the risk on the other side of the scale. In other instances there
may be a duty on employers to undertake an assessment and then take the action identified by the
assessment. It is also necessary to ensure that the action taken is proportional to the risk.
In Parts 3-7 (of CAP 642) there are references to requirements that are3 additional to the requirements of
the HSE. The additional requirements are needed to ensure aerodrome safety.

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COMPLIANCE WITH STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS

The requirements for the safe operation of aerodromes, with respect to aircraft safety, and for the safety
of individuals at their places of work are contained within formal legislative requirements which form part
of United Kingdom law. It is therefore legally incumbent on those who provide the workplace, all
employers and all employees to comply with the safety requirements that are set out in the relevant
statutory instruments. Nothing in CAP 642 substitutes the requirements of the law.
Concern is sometimes expressed by those responsible for securing safety airside at airports about the
apparent overlap of regulatory responsibility between the Civil Aviation Authority and the Health and
Safety Executive. The area of responsibility for the two regulatory bodies is clear; the CAA is responsible
for securing adequate provision for the safety of aircraft and the HSE is responsible for securing adequate
provisions for the safety of individuals in the work place. These responsibilities can, of course, overlap;
for example, when a piece of equipment is maintained in such a way that, through incorrect functioning, it
hazards its operator whilst also causing damage to an aircraft. However, it is the declared intention of the
CAA and the HSE to work together to resolve any overlaps and to detect any potential areas where
neither has assumed responsibility.
Users of CAP 642 must be aware of further statutory provisions covering, for example, the duty to report
aircraft accidents and certain occurrences. It is the responsibility of all those involved with the operation
of airports, aircraft and the provision of services to be familiar with any legal obligations which arise from
such activities.

THE AIR NAVIGATION ORDER

The Air Navigation Order (No 2) 1995 (The Order) is the principal statement of detailed legislative
requirements for the regulation of the UK Civil Aviation. The Order is made under provisions contained in
Section 60 of the Civil Aviation Act 1982, and forms part of the criminal law. ICAO Standards form the
basis of many of the requirements set out in the Order.
The principal points of interest with respect to CAP 642 relate to the requirements about which the CAA
will need to be satisfied before it will grant an aerodrome licence. These are set out in Articles contained
in Part X of the Order.

CAP 168 LICENSING OF AERODROMES

CAP 168 is essentially a minimum requirements statement of what the CAA will require with respect to
the physical characteristics of aerodrome licensing in order to be satisfied about safety. CAP 168 is
based almost exclusively upon the Standards and Recommended Practices of ICAO Annex 14.
Documents like CAP 168 may be referred to as guidance material. They are not part of the law, unless
conditions are placed on the aerodrome licence requiring compliance with a particular provision of the
guidance document. Otherwise, failure to comply with the guidance material will not in itself be a criminal
offence but may indicate a failure to comply with a general obligation or duty contained in the legislation.
In the event of a prosecution for failure to comply with that general duty, the guidance material may well
be referred to by the regulator in identifying the precise steps which it would have thought appropriate in
order to discharge that general duty. Quite apart from prosecution action, the CAA may wish to consider
taking action against the aerodrome licence itself; in an extreme case, perhaps, proposing to revoke the
licence where it considers that safety is being prejudiced as a result.

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AIRPORT BY-LAWS
Where special rules apply at an airport, such as airport by-laws, it is imperative that, where applicable,
these rules form part of the airports Safety Management System and that the specific rules are
communicated to all users.
Where formal by-laws are not enacted, it is for an airports management to decide on which rules and
regulations need to be in place to satisfy the circumstances of their own airport and to ensure that these
are promulgated. This may take the form of conditions of use of the airport.
This information is intended to give guidance to the RFFS when attending fuelling incidents, fuelling
standbys or acting as fuelling overseers when aircraft fuelling or de-fuelling is in operation.

CAP 748 AIRCRAFT FUELLING AND FUEL INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT

INTRODUCTION
Negligence or errors made in the receipt, storage and handling of fuel can endanger an aircraft and the
lives of all on board. It is essential that the correct grade and quantity of fuel is supplied and that it is in a
condition fit for use in aircraft.
Licensees of aerodromes that have facilities for the storage of fuel are required under the Air Navigation
Order (ANO) 2000 Article 103 to include, within the Aerodrome Manual, procedures to ensure that
throughout the processes of receiving, storing, managing and distributing fuel, it is handled in a way that
minimises the risk to personnel, aircraft and the environment.

FUEL STORAGE, MANAGEMENT, HANDLING AND DISTRIBUTION

General
Licensees should consider:
a)
the fire risk associated with the handling of fuel, e.g. fuel leaks, sprays or vapour emissions;
b)
the possibility of fuel quality deterioration, e.g. contamination by; other liquids or solid particles;
the passage of time; poorly maintained fuel installations and storage equipment and inappropriate
handling procedures; and
c)
the risk associated with delivery to the aircraft and apron safety.
NOTE: Licensees should note that fuel vapour will be released from aircraft vents during fuelling, and
from fuelling vehicle vents during de-fuelling.
Licensees should also consider the risks associated with those stages of the fuel handling and distribution
process that relate in particular to personnel e.g. passengers and crew, apron staff, and fuelling
operatives; to fuel installations and fuel equipment; and in doing should:
a)
b)
c)

identify the key responsibilities of individuals involved in the management and distribution of fuel;
ensure that all personnel involved in the processes of receiving, storing and dispensing of fuel are
suitably trained or experienced to carry out the associated tasks; and
perform periodic audits of all fuel installations on the aerodrome to ensure compliance with the
Aerodrome Manual and procedures. The aerodrome inspector may wish to see records of these
audits.

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Licensees should provide quality control and maintenance procedures for preventing the deterioration or
contamination of fuel stored in the fuel installation, procedures for the safe delivery into an aircraft of fuel
fit for use, and procedures for the retention of records as required under the ANO.
Fuel management procedures should include, but not be limited to, the following elements:
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)
g)
h)
i)
j)
k)

fuel reception, storage and quality maintenance

the assessment of fuel quality
the safe delivery into an aircraft of fuel fit for the purpose
the taking and storing of fuel samples
the onward distribution of fuel
Incident prevention
Incident management
preventing or minimising electrostatic discharge during the handling of fuel
handling fuel during extremes of weather e.g. electric storms in the aerodrome vicinity or in high
ambient temperatures
the actions to be taken should fuel be found to be contaminated; and
regular and periodic maintenance and cleaning of fuel installations and equipment.

APRON SAFETY MANAGEMENT

In general, passengers should be disembarked prior to the commencement of fuelling, however
circumstances might prevail where this is deemed to be impractical. In such cases, licensees should
determine the risks associated with passengers embarking, disembarking or remaining on board the
aircraft during fuelling, and should establish procedures to mitigate those risks. These procedures
should:
a)
b)
c)

d)
e)
f)
g)

be designed to enable the most rapid evacuation of passengers from the aircraft should the need
arise
ensure the ground area into which passengers would evacuate is kept clear of equipment and
obstacles
ensure vehicles attending the aircraft do not impede access to the site by Rescue and Fire
Fighting Service (RFFS) vehicles and personnel, or the egress of passengers evacuating the
aircraft
include appropriate attendance of RFFS
in the case of medical flights, take into account the ability, or inability, of the patient and attendant
staff to effect a rapid evacuation from the aircraft
take into account the ability of those whose mobility is impaired to effect a rapid evacuation from
the aircraft
comply with the requirements of the Joint Aviation Authorities and the European Aviation Safety
Agency.

HELICOPTERS
Passengers should not remain on the helicopter whilst fuelling is in progress:
a)
b)

except under exceptional circumstances, in which case all main exits should be available for
immediate use and the external area adjacent to the exits should be kept clear; or
with engines or rotors running if the only normal exit is on the same side as the fuelling points

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The fuelling of helicopters with engines or rotors running should be prohibited when fuelling with:
a)
b)

gasoline or with wide-cut turbine fuels not containing an antistatic additive; or

kerosene or wide-cut turbine fuels containing an antistatic additive if the fuel inlet is positioned so
that the exhaust system is at the same height or lower, or if it is on the same side of the
helicopter.

FIRE RISKS
Licensees should address the fire risk associated with the processes involved in the handling of
fuel, taking into account the volatility of the fuels involved, the method of delivery and the
potential for a hazardous fuel/air mixture and a heat/ignition source to be present at the same
time.
Fuel storage, management, handling and distribution procedures required of the licensee by the
ANO should also be developed in accordance with Health and Safety at Work Regulations and
fuelling industry codes of best practice.
DSEAR regulations define Zones in which a potentially explosive atmosphere might exist (see
below). Licensees should establish the circumstances in which such an atmosphere might be
present in the process of fuel storage, management, handling and distribution at the aerodrome,
and should develop procedures to mitigate the associated risks.
The use of any equipment with the potential to create or induce a source of ignition should be
identified and excluded from any Fuelling Zone. Equipment maintenance, repairs and testing
procedures, including the operation of switches, radios and other devices, with the potential to
create a source of ignition within the Fuelling Zone, should be deferred until fuelling has finished.
Procedures should be established to prevent fuel ignition from other heat sources e.g. aircraft
Auxiliary Power Unit exhausts, overheated wheel brakes, jet efflux from other aircraft etc.
NOTE: The Dangerous Substances and Explosive Atmospheres Regulations (DSEAR) define the
following zones. Clearly the atmosphere around an aircraft or fuelling equipment during fuelling
operations could fall into the definitions of Zone 0/Zone 1.

CLASSIFICATION OF HAZARDOUS PLACES

Hazardous places are classified in terms of zones on the basis of the frequency and duration of
the occurrence of an explosive atmosphere.
Zone 0
A place in which an explosive atmosphere consisting of a mixture with air of dangerous
substances in the form of gas, vapour or mist is present continuously or for long periods or
frequently.
Zone 1
A place in which an explosive atmosphere consisting of a mixture with air of dangerous
substances in the form of gas, vapour or mist is likely to occur in normal operation occasionally.
Zone 2
A place in which an explosive atmosphere consisting of a mixture with air of dangerous
substances in the form of gas, vapour or mist is not likely to occur in normal operation but, if it
does occur, will persist for a short period only.
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PORTABLE ELECTRONIC DEVICES (PEDs)

There are three primary risks associated with the use of PEDs in the vicinity of aircraft: Fire,
Distraction, and Aircraft System Interference.
Fire: The risk of a PED creating or inducing a spark of sufficient intensity to ignite fuel vapour
released during fuelling is extremely remote under normal circumstances, however, licensees
should be aware of the proliferation of below-specification mobile telephone batteries that have
the potential to fail dangerously. It is not known whether such a failure would be of sufficient
magnitude to ignite a fuel/air mixture, but licensees should be aware that such a possibility exists.
It is recommended that they consider the circumstances under which such an event might occur
on the apron, and mitigate the associated risks accordingly.
Distraction: The known potential for a PED user to be distracted presents three associated risks:
a)
b)
c)

physical contact with the aircraft by the distracted PED user could cause damage or injury
equipment being operated by a distracted PED user could cause damage to an aircraft;
and
PED users, distracted while performing essential safety related tasks, could leave those
tasks incomplete or unattended.

NOTE: Licensees should be aware that the hazards above are associated with actions or
inactions by apron staff and carry the potential for the effect to be concealed until a stage of flight
where the safety of the aircraft could be compromised.

AIRCRAFT SYSTEM INTERFERENCE

Reports have been received that the use of PEDs close to modern aircraft can interfere with fuel
gauges, some navigation equipment, and can cause spurious fire warnings in cargo/baggage
holds. Such interference could contribute to the risks associated with any of the following:
a)
b)
c)
d)

an overweight take-off due to excessive fuel

a flight with insufficient fuel
navigational errors; and
a degradation of confidence in the aircraft fire warning system.

Licensees should prohibit the use of PEDs on the apron area, or should restrict their use to
clearly defined and promulgated circumstances that mitigate the risks associated with their use.
These mitigations should be considered against the volatility of the fuel type involved, the
proximity of vehicle and aircraft vents, the circumstances under which they may be operated, the
category of the hazard, and the provision of an alternative non-interfering communication system.
Passengers boarding or disembarking the aircraft should be discouraged from using PEDs when
outside, but in the vicinity of, the aircraft.

SUMMARY
CAP 700 is a code of practice that has been produced to allow licensees to assess the level of
competence that exists within their organisation and to address any shortfalls.

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The advice and guidance in CAP 642 is best described as Accepted Good Practice and represents an
acceptable way of doing things. It illustrates how risks might be identified and provides advice about how
airside safety can be placed within the context of a systematic and structured management approach a
Safety Management System.
CAP 748 should be considered an important part of the airport by-laws and incorporated into the Airport
Safety Management System.
NOTE: This training note contains extracts from CAP 700, CAP 642 and CAP 748 and this source
is duly acknowledged.

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APPENDIX A EXTRACT FROM CAP 700

Fire and Rescue Operations

Tasks
19.1

Ensure emergency fire and rescue facilities are compatible with

sizes, types and frequency of aircraft in accordance with company
and legislative requirements.

19.2

Ensure that rescue and firefighting policies, procedures and training

fulfil the aims of the aerodrome and meet legislative requirements

19.3

Review policy and procedures as appropriate taking into account

legislative changes, accidents/incident data and changes to
aerodrome layout, buildings and facilities

19.4

Plan and implement the co-ordination between internal staff and

external personnel involved in firefighting and emergency
operations.

19.5

Assess the feasibility of continuing aerodrome operations in an

emergency situation.

19.6

Establish an aerodrome process for the reporting and follow-up of

accidents, incidents and emergencies on the aerodrome.

Specified
Post(s)

Named
Person(s)

Background Knowledge
Categorisation of Rescue and Firefighting Services (RFFS)

CAP 32 UK Aeronautical Information Publication RFF promulgation

CAP 168 Licensing of Aerodromes

CAP 699 Standards for the Competence of RFFS Personnel Employment at UK Licensed
Aerodromes

Remission factors

Temporary depletion

Training

Certification of Personnel

Fire and rescue training practices

Medical/First Aid training

Relevant Health and Safety legislation

The impact of dangerous goods regulation

Policies and procedures for maintaining the adequacy of:

Additional water supplies

Communication facilities and procedures

Difficult terrain/environments

Emergency access roads

Equipment performance and functionality

Equipment testing
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Handling dangerous cargo

Hazards arising from aircraft construction
LVPs
Medical services
Medical standards
Response times
Staffing levels, rosters etc

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