Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Joseph Cheng and Jaime Cheng, on the other hand, claim to be Antonio
Ching's illegitimate children with his housemaid, Mercedes Igne. 12 While
Ramon Ching disputed this,13 both Mercedes and Lucina have not. 14
Lucina Santos alleged that when Antonio Ching fell ill sometime in 1996, he
entrusted her with the distribution of his estate to his heirs if something were
to happen to him. She alleged that she handed all the property titles and
business documents to-Ramon Ching for safekeeping. 15 Fortunately, Antonio
Ching recovered from illness and allegedly demanded that Ramon Ching return
all
the
titles
to
the
properties
and
business
documents. 16
On July 18, .1996, Antonio Ching was murdered. 17 Ramon Ching allegedly
induced Mercedes igne and her children, Joseph Cheng and Jaime Cheng, to
sign an agreement and waiver18 to Antonio Ching's estate in consideration of
P22.5 million. Mercedes Igne's children alleged that Ramon Ching never paid
them.19 On October 29, 1996, Ramon Ching allegedly executed an affidavit of
settlement of estate,20 naming himself as the sole heir and adjudicating upon
himself
the
entirety
of
Antonio
Ching's
estate.21
Ramon Ching denied these allegations and insisted that when Antonio Ching
died, the Ching family association, headed by Vicente Cheng, unduly
influenced him to give Mercedes Igne and her children financial aid considering
that they served Antonio Ching for years. It was for this reason that an
agreement and waiver in consideration of P22.5 million was made. He also
alleged that he was summoned by the family association to execute an affidavit
of settlement of estate declaring him to be Antonio Ching's sole heir. 22
After a year of investigating Antonio Ching's death, the police found Ramon
Ching to be its primary suspect. 23 Information24 was filed against him, and a
warrant
of
arrest25cralawred
was
issued.
On October 7, 1998, Joseph Cheng, Jaime Cheng, and Mercedes Igne (the
Chengs) filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of titles against Ramon
Ching before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. This case was docketed
as Civil
Case
No.
98-91046 (the
first
case).26
On March 22, 1999, the complaint was amended, with leave of court, to
implead additional defendants, including Po Wing Properties, of which Ramon
Ching was a primary stockholder. The amended complaint was for "Annulment
of Agreement, Waiver, Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate and the Certificates
During the pendency of the motion for reconsideration, the Chengs and Lucina
Santos filed a complaint for "Disinheritance and Declaration of Nullity of
Agreement and Waiver, Affidavit of Extrajudicial Agreement, Deed of Absolute
Sale, and Transfer Certificates of Title with Prayer for TRO and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction" against Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties. This
case was docketed as Civil Case No. 02-105251 (the third case) and was
eventually
raffled
to
Branch
6.38
On December 10, 2002, Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties filed their
comment/opposition to the application for temporary restraining order in the
third case. They also filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of res jiidicata,
litis pendencia, forum-shopping, and failure of the complaint to state a cause of
action. A series of responsive pleadings were filed by both parties. 39
On July 30, 2004, Branch 6 issued an omnibus order 40 resolving both the
motion for reconsideration in the second case and the motion to dismiss in the
third case. The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration and the
motion to dismiss, holding that the dismissal of the second case was without
prejudice and, hence, would not bar the filing of the third case. 41
On October 8, 2004, while their motion for reconsideration in the third case
was pending, Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties filed a petition for certiorari
(the first certiorari case) with the Court of Appeals, assailing the order dated
November 22, 2002 and the portion of the omnibus order dated July 30,.2004,
which
upheld
the
dismissal
of
the
second
case. 42
On December 28, 2004, the trial court issued an order denying the motion for
reconsideration in the third case. The denial prompted Ramon Ching and Po
Wing Properties to file a petition for certiorari and prohibition with application
for a writ of preliminary injunction or the issuance of a temporary restraining
order (the second certiorari case) with the Court of Appeals. 43
On March 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered the decision 44 in the first
certiorari case dismissing the petition. The appellate court ruled that Ramon
Ching and Po Wing Properties' reliance on the "two-dismissal rule" was
misplaced since the rule involves two motions for dismissals filed by the
plaintiff only. In this case, it found that the dismissal of the first case was upon
the motion of the defendants, while the dismissal of the second case was at the
instance
of
the
plaintiffs.45
Upon the denial of their motion for reconsideration,46 Ramon Ching and Po
Wing Properties filed this present petition for review 47 under Rule 45 of the
Rules
of
Civil
Procedure.
Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties argue that the dismissal of the second
case was with prejudice since the non-filing of an amended complaint in the
first case operated as a dismissal on the merits. 48 They also argue that the
second case should be dismissed on the ground of res judicatasince there was
a previous final judgment of the first case involving the same parties, subject
matter,
and
cause
of
action.49
Lucina Santos was able to file a comment 50 on the petition within the period
required.51 The Chengs, however, did not comply.52 Upon the issuance by this
court of a show cause order on September 24, 2007, 53 they eventually filed a
comment with substantially the same allegations and arguments as that of
Lucina
Santos'.54
In their comment, respondents allege that when the trial court granted the
motion to dismiss, Ramon Ching's counsel was notified in open court that the
dismissal was without prejudice. They argue that the trial court's order became
final and executory when he failed to file his motion for reconsideration within
the
reglementary
period.55
Respondents argue that the petition for review should be dismissed on the
ground of forum shopping and litis pendencia. since Ramon Ching and Po Wing
Properties are seeking relief simultaneously in two forums by filing the two
petitions for certiorari, which involved the same omnibus order by the trial
court.56 They also argue that the "two-dismissal rule" and res judicata did not
apply since (1) the failure to amend a complaint is not a dismissal, and (2) they
only
moved
for
dismissal
once
in
the
second
case. 57
In their reply,58 petitioners argue that they did not commit forum shopping
since the actions they commenced against respondents stemmed from the
complaints filed against them in the trial courts. 59 They reiterate that their
petition for review is only about the second case; it just so happened that the
assailed omnibus order resolved both the second and third cases. 60
Upon the filing of the parties' respective memoranda, 61 the case was submitted
for
decision.62
Whether the trial court's dismissal of the second case operated as a bar
to the filing of a third case, as per the "two-dismissal rule"; and
II.
17
suit shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court.
SEC. 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. If, for no justifiable cause, the
plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief
on the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time,
or to comply with these Rules or any order of the court, the complaint may be
dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court's own motion,
without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in
the same or in a separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an
adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by the court. (Emphasis
supplied)chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The first section of the rule contemplates a situation where a plaintiff requests
the dismissal of the case before any responsive pleadings have been filed by the
defendant. It is done through notice by the plaintiff and confirmation by the
court. The dismissal is without prejudice unless otherwise declared by the
court.
The second section of the rule contemplates a situation where a counterclaim
has been pleaded by the defendant before the service on him or her of the
plaintiffs motion to dismiss. It requires leave of court, and the dismissal is
generally without prejudice unless otherwise declared by the court.
The third section contemplates dismissals due to the fault of the plaintiff such
as the failure to prosecute. The case is dismissed either upon motion of the
defendant or by the court motu propio. Generally, the dismissal
is with prejudice
unless
otherwise
declared
by
the
court.
In all instances, Rule 17 governs dismissals at the instance of the plaintiff, not
of the defendant. Dismissals upon the instance of the defendant are generally
governed
by
Rule
16,
which
covers
motions
to
dismiss. 63
In Insular Veneer, Inc. v. Hon. Plan,64 Consolidated Logging and Lumber Mills
filed a complaint against Insular Veneer to recover some logs the former had
delivered to the latter. It also filed ex parte a motion for issuance of a
restraining order. The complaint and motion were filed in a trial court in
Isabela.65
The trial court granted the motion and treated the restraining order as a writ of
preliminary injunction. When Consolidated Logging recovered the logs, it filed a
notice of dismissal under Rule 17, Section 1 of the 1964 Rules of Civil
Procedure.66
While the action on its notice for dismissal was pending, Consolidated Logging
filed the same complaint against Insular Veneer, this time in a trial court in
Manila. It did not mention any previous action pending in the Isabela court. 67
The Manila court eventually dismissed the complaint due to the nonappearance of Consolidated Logging's counsel during pre-trial. Consolidated
Logging subsequently returned to the Isabela court to revive the same
complaint. The Isabela court apparently treated the filing of the amended
complaint
as
a
withdrawal
of
its
notice
of
dismissal. 68
Insular Veneer also filed in the Isabela court a motion to dismiss, arguing that
the dismissal by the Manila court constituted res judicata over the case. The
Isabela court, presided over by Judge Plan, denied the motion to dismiss. The
dismissal was the subject of the petition for certiorari and mandamus with this
court.69
This court stated that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In resolving that issue, we are confronted with the unarguable fact that
Consolidated Logging on its volition dismissed its action for damages and
injunction in the Isabela court and refiled substantially the same action in the
Manila court. Then, when the Manila court dismissed its action for failure to
prosecute, it went hack [sic] to the Isabela court and revived its old action by
means
of
an
amended
complaint.
Consolidated Logging would like to forget the Manila case, consign it to oblivion
as if it were a bad dream, and prosecute its amended complaint in the Isabela
court as if nothing had transpired in the Manila court. We hold that it cannot
elude the effects of its conduct in junking the Isabela case and in giving that
case a reincarnation in the Manila court. Consolidated Logging' [sic] filed a
new case in Manila at its own risk. Its lawyer at his peril failed to appear at the
pre-trial.70chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
This court ruled that the filing of the amended complaint in the Isabela court
was barred by the prior dismissal of the Manila court, stating
that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The provision in section 1(e), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court that an action may
be dismissed because "there is another action pending between the same
parties for the same cause" presupposes that two similar actions are
simultaneously pending in two different Courts of First Instance. Lis
pendens as a ground for a motion to dismiss has the same requisites as the
plea
of res
judicata.
On the other hand, when a pleading is amended, the original pleading is
deemed abandoned. The original ceases to perform any further function as a
pleading. The case stands for trial on the amended pleading only. So, when
Consolidated Logging filed its amended complaint dated March 16, 1970 in
Civil Case No. 2158, the prior dismissal order dated January 5, 1970 in the
Manila case could he [sic] interposed in the Isabela court to support the
defense of res judicata.71chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
As a general rule, dismissals under Section 1 of Rule 17 are without prejudice
except when it is the second time that the plaintiff caused its dismissal.
Accordingly, for a dismissal to operate as an adjudication upon the merits,
i.e, with prejudice to the re-filing of the same claim, the following requisites must
be present:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(1) There was a previous case that was dismissed by a competent court;
(2)
Both cases were based on or include the same claim;
(3)
Both notices for dismissal were filed by the plaintiff; and
(4) When the motion to dismiss filed by the plaintiff was consented to by the
defendant on the ground that the latter paid and satisfied all the claims of the
former.72chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The purpose of the "two-dismissal rule" is "to avoid vexatious litigation." 73 When
a complaint is dismissed a second time, the plaintiff is now barred from
seeking
relief
on
the
same
claim.
The
dismissal
was
without
"two-dismissal
of
prejudice
the
in
second
view
of
case
the
rule"
Here, the first case was filed as an ordinary civil action. It was later amended to
include not only new defendants but new causes of action that should have
been adjudicated in a special proceeding. A motion to dismiss was inevitably
filed by the defendants on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
The
trial
court
granted
that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
that
motion
to
dismiss,
stating
SO ORDERED.74
Petitioners are of the view that when Atty. Mirardo Arroyo Obias failed to file
the appropriate pleading within fifteen (15) days, he violated the order of the
court. This, they argue, made the original dismissal an adjudication upon the
merits, in accordance with Rule 17, Section 3, i.e., a dismissal through the
default of the plaintiff. Hence, they argue that when respondents filed the
second case and then caused its dismissal, the dismissal should have been
with prejudice according to Rule 17, Section 1, i.e., two dismissals caused by
the
plaintiff
on
the
same
claim.
Unfortunately,
petitioners'
theory
is
erroneous.
The trial court dismissed the first case by granting the motion to dismiss
filed by the defendants. When it allowed Atty. Mirardo Arroyo Obias a period of
fifteen (15) days to file an appropriate pleading, it was merely acquiescing to a
request made by the plaintiffs counsel that had no bearing on the dismissal of
the
case.
Under Rule 17, Section 3, a defendant may move to dismiss the case if the
plaintiff defaults; it does not contemplate a situation where the dismissal was
due to lack of jurisdiction. Since there was already a dismissal prior to
plaintiffs default, the trial court's instruction to file the appropriate pleading
will not reverse the dismissal. If the plaintiff fails to file the appropriate
pleading, the trial court does not dismiss the case anew; the order dismissing
the
case
still
stands.
The dismissal of the first case was done at the instance of the defendant under
Rule 16, Section 1(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which
states:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SECTION 1. Grounds. Within the time for but before filing the answer to the
complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on
any
of
the
following
grounds:
.
(b) That the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
claim;chanrobleslaw
....
Under Section 5 of the same rule,75 a party may re-file the same action or claim
subject
to
certain
exceptions.
Thus, when
same claim
jurisdiction.
dismiss can
respondents filed the second case, they were merely refiling the
that had been previously dismissed on the basis of lack of
When they moved to dismiss the second case, the motion to
be considered as the first dismissal at the plaintiffs instance.
[T]he trial court has no discretion or option to deny the motion, since dismissal
by the plaintiff under Section 1, Rule 17 is guaranteed as a matter of right to
the plaintiffs.Even if the motion cites the most ridiculous of grounds for
dismissal, the trial court has no choice but to consider the complaint as
dismissed, since the plaintiff may opt for such dismissal as a matter of right,
regardless of ground77 (Emphasis supplied)chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
For this reason, the trial court issued its order dated November 22, 2002
dismissing
the
case, without
prejudice.
The
order
states:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
When this Motion was called for hearing, all the plaintiffs namely, Joseph
Cheng, Jaime Cheng, Mercedes Igne and Lucina Santos appeared without their
counsels. That they verbally affirmed the execution of the Motion to Dismiss,
as shown by their signatures over their respective names reflected thereat.
Similarly, none of the defendants appeared, except the counsel for defendant,
Ramon Chang [sic], who manifested that they have not yet filed their Answer as
there was a defect in the address of Ramon Cheng [sic] and the latter has not
yet
been
served
with
summons.
Under the circumstances, and further considering that the defendants herein
have not yet filed their Answers nor any pleading, the plaintiffs has [sic] the
right to out rightly [sic] cause the dismissal of the Complaint pursuant to
Section 2, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure without prejudice.
Thereby, and as prayed for, this case is hereby ordered DISMISSED without
prejudice.
SO ORDERED.78 (Emphasis supplied)
When respondents filed the third case on substantially the same claim, there
was already one prior dismissal at the instance of the plaintiffs and one prior
dismissal at the instance of the defendants. While it is true that there were two
previous dismissals on the same claim, it does not necessarily follow that the
re-filing of the claim was barred by Rule 17, Section 1 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure. The circumstances surrounding each dismissal must first be
examined to determine before the rule may apply, as in this case.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the failure of Atty. Mirardo Arroyo
Obias to file the appropriate pleading in the first case came under the purview
of Rule 17, Section 3 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the dismissal in the
rule
the
against
forum
"twin-dismissal
shopping
rule"
In Yap v. Chua:81
Forum shopping is the institution of two or more actions or proceedings involving
the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or
successively, on the supposition that one or the other court would make a
favorable disposition. Forum shopping may be resorted to by any party against
whom an adverse judgment or order has been issued in one forum, in an
attempt to seek a favorable opinion in another, other than by appeal or a
special civil action for certiorari. Forum shopping trifles with the courts, abuses
their processes, degrades the administration of justice and congest court dockets.
What is critical is the vexation brought upon the courts and the litigants by a
party who asks different courts to rule on the same or related causes and grant
the same or substantially the same reliefs and in the process creates the
possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the different fora upon the
same issues. Willful and deliberate violation of the rule against forum shopping
is a ground for summary dismissal of the case; it may also constitute direct
contempt.
To determine whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping, the
most important factor to ask is whether the elements of litis pendentia are
present, or whether a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in
another; otherwise stated, the test for determining forum shopping is whether
in the two (or more) cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights or causes
of action, and reliefs sought.82(Emphasis supplied)
When respondents filed the third case, petitioners' motion for reconsideration
of the dismissal of the second case was still pending. Clearly, the order of
dismissal was not yet final since it could still be overturned upon
reconsideration,
or
even
on
appeal
to
a
higher
court.
Moreover, petitioners were not prohibited from filing the motion for
reconsideration. This court has already stated in Narciso v. Garcia83 that a
defendant has the right to file a motion for reconsideration of a trial court's
order denying the motion to dismiss since "[n]o rule prohibits the filing of such
a motion for reconsideration."84 The second case, therefore, was still pending
when
the
third
case
was
filed.
The prudent thing that respondents could have done was to wait until the final
disposition of the second case before filing the third case. As it stands, the
dismissal of the second case was without prejudice to the re-filing of the same
claim, in accordance with the Rules of Civil Procedure. In their haste to file the
third case, however, they unfortunately transgressed certain procedural
safeguards, among which are the rules on litis pendentia and res judicata.
In Yap:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Litis pendentia as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action refers to that
situation wherein another action is pending between the same parties for the
same cause of action, such that the second action becomes unnecessary and
vexatious. The underlying principle of litis pendentia is the theory that a party is
not allowed to vex another more than once regarding the same subject matter
and for the same cause of action. This theory is founded on the public policy
that the same subject matter should not be the subject of controversy in courts
more than once, in order that possible conflicting judgments may be avoided
for the sake of the stability of the rights and status of persons.
The requisites of litis pendentia are: (a) the identity of parties, or at least such
as representing the same interests in both actions; (b) the identity of rights
asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and
(c) the identity of the two cases such that judgment in one, regardless of which
party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other.85 (Emphasis
supplied)chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
There is no question that there was an identity of parties, rights, and reliefs in
the second and third cases. While it may be true that the trial court already
dismissed the second case when the third case was filed, it failed to take into
account that a motion for reconsideration was filed in the second case and,
thus, was still pending. Considering that the dismissal of the second case was
the subject of the first certiorari case and this present petition for review, it can
be reasonably concluded that the second case, to this day, remains pending.
Hence, when respondents filed the third case, they engaged in forum shopping.
Any judgment by this court on the propriety of the dismissal of the second case
will
inevitably
affect
the
disposition
of
the
third
case.
This, in fact, is the reason why there were two different petitions for certiorari
before the appellate court. The omnibus order dated July 30, 2004 denied two
pending motions by petitioners: (1) the motion for reconsideration in the second
case and (2) the motion to dismiss in the third case. Since petitioners are
barred from filing a second motion for reconsideration of the second case, the
first certiorari case was filed before the appellate court and is now the subject
of
this
review.
The denial of petitioners' motion for reconsideration in the third case, however,
could still be the subject of a separate petition for certiorari. That petition
would be based now on the third case, and not on the second case.
This multiplicity of suits is the very evil sought to be avoided by the rule on
forum shopping. In Dy v. Mandy Commodities Co., Inc.,86 the rule is
that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Once there is a finding of forum shopping, the penalty is summary dismissal
not only of the petition pending before this Court, but also of the other case
that is pending in a lower court. This is so because twin dismissal is a punitive
measure to those who trifle with the orderly administration of
justice.87 (Emphasis supplied)chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The rule originated from the 1986 case of Buan v. Lopez, Jr.88 In Buan,
petitioners filed a petition for prohibition with this court while another petition
for prohibition with preliminary injunction was pending before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila involving the same parties and based on the same set of
facts.
This
court,
in
dismissing
both
actions,
stated:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Indeed, the petitioners in both actions . . . have incurred not only the sanction
of dismissal of their case before this Court in accordance with Rule 16 of the
Rules of Court, but also the punitive measure of dismissal of both their
actions, that in this Court and that in the Regional Trial Court as well. Quite
recently, upon substantially identical factual premises, the Court en banc had
occasion to condemn and penalize the act of litigants of filing the same suit in
different
courts,
aptly
described
as
"forum89
shopping[.]" chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The rule essentially penalizes the forum shopper by dismissing all pending
actions on the same claim filed in any court. Accordingly, the grant of this
petition would inevitably result in the summary dismissal of the third case.
Any action, therefore, which originates from the third case pending with any
court
would
be
barred
by res
judicata.
Because of the severity of the penalty of the rule, an examination must first.be
made on the purpose of the rule. Parties resort to forum shopping when they
file several actions of the same claim in different forums in the hope of
obtaining a favorable result. It is prohibited by the courts as it "trifle[s] with the
orderly
administration
of
justice."90
In this case, however, the dismissal of the first case became final and executory
upon the failure of respondents' counsel to file the appropriate pleading. They
filed the correct pleading the second time around but eventually sought its
dismissal as they "[suspected] that their counsel is not amply protecting their
interests as the case is not moving for almost three (3) years." 91 The filing of the
third case, therefore, was not precisely for the purpose of obtaining a favorable
result but only to get the case moving, in an attempt to protect their rights.
It appears that the resolution on the merits of the original controversy between
the parties has long been mired in numerous procedural entanglements. While
it might be more judicially expedient to apply the "twin-dismissal rule" and
disallow the proceedings in the third case to continue, it would not serve the
ends of substantial justice. Courts of justice must always endeavor to resolve
cases on their merits, rather than summarily dismiss these on
technicalities:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
[C]ases should be determined on the merits, after all parties have been given
full opportunity to ventilate their causes and defenses, rather than on
technicalities or procedural imperfections. In that way, the ends of justice
would be served better. Rules of procedure are mere tools designed to expedite
the decision or resolution of cases and other matters pending in court. A strict
and rigid application of rules, resulting in technicalities that tend to frustrate
rather than promote substantial justice, must be avoided. In fact, Section 6 of
Rule 1 states that the Rules [on Civil Procedure] shall be liberally construed in
order to promote their objective of ensuring the just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition
of
every
action
and
proceeding. 92 (Emphasis
supplied)chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The rule on forum shopping will not strictly apply when it can be shown that
(1) the original case has been dismissed upon request of the plaintiff for valid
procedural reasons; (2) the only pending matter is a motion for reconsideration;
and (3) there are valid procedural reasons that serve the goal of substantial
justice
for
the
fresh
new
case
to
proceed.
The motion for reconsideration filed in the second case has since been
dismissed and is now the subject of a petition for certiorari. The third case filed
apparently contains the better cause of action for the plaintiffs and is now
being prosecuted by a counsel they are more comfortable with. Substantial
justice will be better served if respondents do not fall victim to the labyrinth in
the procedures that their travails led them. It is for this reason that we deny
the
petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 6 is ordered to proceed with Civil Case No. 02-105251 with due and
deliberate
dispatch.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 199990, February 04, 2015
SPOUSES ROLANDO AND HERMINIA SALVADOR, Petitioners, v. SPOUSES
ROGELIO AND ELIZABETH RABAJA AND ROSARIO
GONZALES, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the
August 22, 2011 Decision1 and the January 5, 2012 Resolution 2 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 90296 which affirmed with modification the
March 29, 2007 Decision of the Regional Trial Court Branch 214 (RTC-Branch
214), Mandaluyong City in Civil Case No. MC-03-2175, for rescission of a
contract
(rescission
case).
The
Facts
This case stemmed from a dispute involving the sellers, petitioner spouses
Rolando and Herminia Salvador (Spouses Salvador); the sellers agent, Rosario
Gonzales (Gonzales); and the buyers, respondent Spouses Rogelio and
Elizabeth Rabaja (Spouses Rabaja), over a parcel of land situated at No. 25,
Merryland Village, 375 Jose Rizal Street, Mandaluyong City (subject property),
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 13426 and registered in the
names of Spouses Salvador. From 1994 until 2002, Spouses Rabaja were
leasing
an
apartment
in
the
subject
lot.
Sometime in July 1998, Spouses Rabaja learned that Spouses Salvador were
looking for a buyer of the subject property. Petitioner Herminia Salvador
(Herminia) personally introduced Gonzales to them as the administrator of the
said property. Spouses Salvador even handed to Gonzales the owners duplicate
certificate of title over the subject property. On July, 3, 1998, Spouses Rabaja
made an initial payment of P48,000.00 to Gonzales in the presence of
Herminia. Gonzales then presented the Special Power of Attorney 3 (SPA),
executed by Rolando Salvador (Rolando) and dated July 24, 1998. On the same
day, the parties executed the Contract to Sell 4 which stipulated that for a
consideration of P5,000,000.00, Spouses Salvador sold, transferred and
conveyed in favor of Spouses Rabaja the subject property. Spouses Rabaja
made several payments totalling P950,000.00, which were received by Gonzales
pursuant to the SPA provided earlier as evidenced by the check vouchers
signed by Gonzales and the improvised receipts signed by Herminia.
Sometime in June 1999, however, Spouses Salvador complained to Spouses
Rabaja that they did not receive any payment from Gonzales. This prompted
Spouses Rabaja to suspend further payment of the purchase price; and as a
consequence, they received a notice to vacate the subject property from
Spouses
Salvador
for
non-payment
of
rentals.
Thereafter, Spouses Salvador instituted an action for ejectment against
Spouses Rabaja. In turn, Spouses Rabaja filed an action for rescission of
contract against Spouses Salvador and Gonzales, the subject matter of the
present
petition.
In the action for ejectment, the complaint was filed before the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 60 (MeTC), where it was docketed as
Civil Case No. 17344. In its August 14, 2002 Decision, 5 the MeTC ruled in favor
of Spouses Salvador finding that valid grounds existed for the eviction of
Spouses Rabaja from the subject property and ordering them to pay back
rentals. Spouses Salvador were able to garnish the amount of
P593,400.006 from Spouses Rabajas time deposit account pursuant to a writ of
execution issued by the MeTC.7 Spouses Rabaja appealed to the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 212, Mandaluyong City (RTC-Br. 212) which reversed the MeTC
ruling in its March 1, 2005 decision. 8 The RTC-Br. 212 found that no lease
agreement existed between the parties. Thereafter, Spouses Salvador filed an
appeal with the CA which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 89259. On March
31, 2006, the CA ruled in favor of Spouses Salvador and reinstated the MeTC
ruling ejecting Spouses Rabaja. 9 Not having been appealed, the CA decision in
CA-G.R. SP No. 89259 became final and executory on May 12,
2006.10chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Meanwhile, the rescission case filed by Spouses Rabaja against Spouses
Salvador and Gonzales and docketed as Civil Case No. MC No. 03-2175 was
also raffled to RTC-Br. 212. In their complaint, 11dated July 7, 2003, Spouses
Rabaja demanded the rescission of the contract to sell praying that the amount
of P950,000.00 they previously paid to Spouses Salvador be returned to them.
They likewise prayed that damages be awarded due to the contractual breach
committed
by
Spouses
Salvador.
Spouses Salvador filed their answer with counterclaim and crossclaim12 contending that there was no meeting of the minds between the parties
and that the SPA in favor of Gonzales was falsified. In fact, they filed a case for
falsification against Gonzales, but it was dismissed because the original of the
alleged falsified SPA could not be produced. They further averred that they did
not receive any payment from Spouses Rabaja through Gonzales. In her
defense, Gonzales filed her answer13 stating that the SPA was not falsified and
that the payments of Spouses Rabaja amounting to P950,000.00 were all
handed
over
to
Spouses
Salvador.
The pre-trial conference began but attempts to amicably settle the case were
unsuccessful. It was formally reset to February 4, 2005, but Spouses Salvador
and their counsel failed to attend. Consequently, the RTC issued the pre-trial
order14declaring Spouses Salvador in default and allowing Spouses Rabaja to
present their evidence ex parte against Spouses Salvador and Gonzales to
present
evidence
in
her
favor.
A motion for reconsideration,15 dated March 28, 2005, was filed by Spouses
Salvador on the said pre-trial order beseeching the liberality of the court. The
rescission case was then re-raffled to RTC-Br. 214 after the Presiding Judge of
RTC-Br. 212 inhibited herself. In the Order,16 dated October 24, 2005, the RTCBr. 214 denied the motion for reconsideration because Spouses Salvador
provided a flimsy excuse for their non-appearance in the pre-trial conference.
Thereafter, trial proceeded and Spouses Rabaja and Gonzales presented their
respective
testimonial
and
documentary
evidence.
RTC
Ruling
On March 29, 2007, the RTC-Br. 214 rendered a decision 17 in favor of Spouses
Rabaja. It held that the signature of Spouses Salvador affixed in the contract to
sell appeared to be authentic. It also held that the contract, although
denominated as contract to sell, was actually a contract of sale because
Spouses Salvador, as vendors, did not reserve their title to the property until
the vendees had fully paid the purchase price. Since the contract entered into
was a reciprocal contract, it could be validly rescinded by Spouses Rabaja, and
in the process, they could recover the amount of P950,000.00 jointly and
severally from Spouses Salvador and Gonzales. The RTC stated that Gonzales
was undoubtedly the attorney-in-fact of Spouses Salvador absent any taint of
irregularity. Spouses Rabaja could not be faulted in dealing with Gonzales who
was
duly
equipped
with
the
SPA
from
Spouses
Salvador.
The RTC-Br. 214 then ruled that the amount of P593,400.00 garnished from
the time deposit account of Spouses Rabaja, representing the award of rental
arrearages in the separate ejectment suit, should be returned by Spouses
Salvador.18 The court viewed that such amount was part of the purchase price
of the subject property which must be returned. It also awarded moral and
exemplary damages in favor of Spouses Rabaja and attorneys fees in favor of
Gonzales.
The
dispositive
portion
of
the
said
decision
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE,
this
court
renders
judgment
as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
a. Ordering the Contract to Sell entered into by the plaintiff and
defendant spouses Rolando and Herminia Salvador on July 24, 1998 as
RESCINDED;chanrobleslaw
b. Ordering defendant spouses Rolando and Herminia Salvador and
defendant Rosario S. Gonzales jointly and severally liable to pay
plaintiffs:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. the amount of NINE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P950,000.00), representing the payments made by the latter for
the purchase of subject property;chanrobleslaw
2. the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00), as
moral damages;chanrobleslaw
Ruling
On March 29, 2007, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC-Br. 114 with
modifications. It ruled that the contract to sell was indeed a contract of sale
and that Gonzales was armed with an SPA and was, in fact, introduced to
Spouses Rabaja by Spouses Salvador as the administrator of the property.
Spouses Rabaja could not be blamed if they had transacted with Gonzales.
The CA then held that Spouses Salvador should return the amount of
P593,400.00 pursuant to a separate ejectment case, reasoning that Spouses
Salvador misled the court because an examination of CA-G.R. SP No.
89260 showed that Spouses Rabaja were not involved in that case. CA-G.R. SP
No. 59260 was an action between Spouses Salvador and Gonzales only and
involved a completely different residential apartment located at 302-C Jupiter
Street,
Dreamland
Subdivision,
Mandaluyong
City.
The CA, however, ruled that Gonzales was not solidarily liable with Spouses
Salvador. The agent must expressly bind himself or exceed the limit of his
authority in order to be solidarily liable. It was not shown that Gonzales as
agent of Spouses Salvador exceeded her authority or expressly bound herself to
be solidarily liable.
The decretal portion of the CA decision
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated
March 29, 2007 and the Order dated September 12, 2007, of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 214, Mandaluyong City, in Civil Case No. MC-03-2175, are
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that Rosario Gonzalez is not jointly and
severally liable to pay Spouses Rabaja the amounts enumerated in paragraph
(b)
of
the
Decision
dated
March
29,
2007.
SO ORDERED.21
Spouses Salvador filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA
in
its
January
5,
2012
Resolution.
Hence, this petition.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE LOWER
COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DECLARING PETITIONERS
IN DEFAULT AND IN DEPRIVING THEM OF THE OPPORTUNITY TO CROSSEXAMINE RESPONDENTS SPS. RABAJA AS WELL AS TO PRESENT
EVIDENCE FOR AND IN THEIR BEHALF, GIVEN THE MERITORIOUS
DEFENSES RAISED IN THEIR ANSWER THAT CATEGORICALLY AND
DIRECTLY DISPUTE RESPONDENTS SPS. RABAJAS CAUSE OF ACTION.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE TRIAL
COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF
RESPONDENT GONZALES THAT PAYMENTS WERE INDEED REMITTED TO
AND RECEIVED BY PETITIONER HERMINIA SALVADOR EVEN AS THE
questions of fact,28 but the Court finds no reason to disturb the findings of fact
of the lower courts absent any compelling reason to the contrary.
The failure of Spouses Salvador to attend pre-trial conference warrants the
presentation
of
evidence
ex
parte
by
Spouses
Rabaja
On the procedural aspect, the Court reiterates the rule that the failure to
attend the pre-trial conference does not result in the default of an absent party.
Under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a defendant is only declared in default
if he fails to file his Answer within the reglementary period. 29On the other
hand, if a defendant fails to attend the pre-trial conference, the plaintiff can
present his evidence ex parte. Sections 4 and 5, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court
provide:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sec.
4.
Appearance
of
parties.
It shall be the duty of the parties and their counsel to appear at the pre-trial.
The non-appearance of a party may be excused only if a valid cause is shown
therefor or if a representative shall appear in his behalf fully authorized in
writing to enter into an amicable settlement, to submit to alternative modes of
dispute resolution, and to enter into stipulations or admissions of facts and of
documents.
Sec.
5.
Effect
of
failure
to
appear.
The failure of the plaintiff to appear when so required pursuant to the next
preceding section shall be cause for dismissal of the action. The dismissal shall
be with prejudice, unless otherwise ordered by the court. A similar failure on
the part of the defendant shall be cause to allow the plaintiff to present
his evidence ex parte and the court to render judgment on the basis
thereof.
[Emphasis supplied]
The case of Philippine American Life & General Insurance Company v. Joseph
Enario30 discussed the difference between the non-appearance of a defendant
in a pre-trial conference and the declaration of a defendant in default in the
present
Rules
of
Civil
Procedure.
The
decision
instructs:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Prior to the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the phrase "as in default"
was initially included in Rule 20 of the old rules, and which read as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
the pre-trial conference set on February 4, 2005 despite proper notice. Spouses
Salvador aver that their non-attendance was due to the fault of their counsel as
he forgot to update his calendar.34 This excuse smacks of carelessness, and
indifference to the pre-trial stage. It simply cannot be considered as a
justifiable excuse by the Court. As a result of their inattentiveness, Spouses
Salvador could no longer present any evidence in their favor. Spouses Rabaja,
as plaintiffs, were properly allowed by the RTC to present evidence ex
parte against Spouses Salvador as defendants. Considering that Gonzales as
co-defendant was able to attend the pre-trial conference, she was allowed to
present her evidence. The RTC could only render judgment based on the
evidence
presented
during
the
trial.
Gonzales, as agent of Spouses Salvador, could validly receive the payments of
Spouses
Rabaja
Even on the substantial aspect, the petition does not warrant consideration.
The Court agrees with the courts below in finding that the contract entered
into by the parties was essentially a contract of sale which could be validly
rescinded. Spouses Salvador insist that they did not receive the payments
made by Spouses Rabaja from Gonzales which totalled P950,000.00 and that
Gonzales was not their duly authorized agent. These contentions, however,
must fail in light of the applicable provisions of the New Civil Code which
state:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Art. 1900. So far as third persons are concerned, an act is deemed to have
been performed within the scope of the agent's authority, if such act is within
the terms of the power of attorney, as written, even if the agent has in fact
exceeded the limits of his authority according to an understanding between the
principal and the agent.
xxxx
Art. 1902. A third person with whom the agent wishes to contract on behalf of
the principal may require the presentation of the power of attorney, or the
instructions as regards the agency. Private or secret orders and instructions of
the principal do not prejudice third persons who have relied upon the power of
attorney or instructions shown them.
xxxx
Art. 1910. The principal must comply with all the obligations which the agent
may have contracted within the scope of his authority.cralawred
Persons dealing with an agent must ascertain not only the fact of agency, but
also the nature and extent of the agents authority. A third person with whom
the agent wishes to contract on behalf of the principal may require the
presentation of the power of attorney, or the instructions as regards the agency.
The basis for agency is representation and a person dealing with an agent is
put upon inquiry and must discover on his own peril the authority of the
agent.35chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
According to Article 1990 of the New Civil Code, insofar as third persons are
concerned, an act is deemed to have been performed within the scope of the
agent's authority, if such act is within the terms of the power of attorney, as
written. In this case, Spouses Rabaja did not recklessly enter into a contract to
sell with Gonzales. They required her presentation of the power of attorney
before they transacted with her principal. And when Gonzales presented the
SPA to Spouses Rabaja, the latter had no reason not to rely on it.
The law mandates an agent to act within the scope of his authority which what
appears in the written terms of the power of attorney granted upon him. 36 The
Court holds that, indeed, Gonzales acted within the scope of her authority. The
SPA precisely stated that she could administer the property, negotiate the sale
and collect any document and all payments related to the subject property. 37 As
the agent acted within the scope of his authority, the principal must comply
with all the obligations.38As correctly held by the CA, considering that it was
not shown that Gonzales exceeded her authority or that she expressly bound
herself to be liable, then she could not be considered personally and solidarily
liable with the principal, Spouses Salvador.39chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Perhaps the most significant point which defeats the petition would be the fact
that it was Herminia herself who personally introduced Gonzalez to Spouses
Rabaja as the administrator of the subject property. By their own ostensible
acts, Spouses Salvador made third persons believe that Gonzales was duly
authorized to administer, negotiate and sell the subject property. This fact was
even affirmed by Spouses Salvador themselves in their petition where they
stated that they had authorized Gonzales to look for a buyer of their
property.40 It is already too late in the day for Spouses Salvador to retract the
representation
to
unjustifiably
escape
their
principal
obligation.
As correctly held by the CA and the RTC, considering that there was a valid
SPA, then Spouses Rabaja properly made payments to Gonzales, as agent of
Spouses Salvador; and it was as if they paid to Spouses Salvador. It is of no
moment, insofar as Spouses Rabaja are concerned, whether or not the
payments were actually remitted to Spouses Salvador. Any internal matter,
arrangement, grievance or strife between the principal and the agent is theirs
alone and should not affect third persons. If Spouses Salvador did not receive
the payments or they wish to specifically revoke the SPA, then their recourse is
to institute a separate action against Gonzales. Such action, however, is not
any
more
covered
by
the
present
proceeding.
The amount of P593,400.00 should not be returned by Spouses Salvador
Nevertheless, the assailed decision of the CA must be modified with respect to
the amount of P593,400.00 garnished by Spouses Salvador and ordered
returned to Spouses Rabaja. The RTC ordered the return of the amount
garnished holding that it constituted a part of the purchase price. The CA ruled
that Spouses Salvador misled the Court when they improperly cited CA-G.R.
SP No. 89260 to prove their entitlement to the said amount. Both courts erred
in
their
ruling.
First, the garnishment of the amount of P593,400.00 against Spouses Rabaja
was pursuant to the CA decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 89259, an entirely different
case involving an action for ejectment, and it does not concern the rescission
case which is on appeal before this Court. Moreover, the decision on the
ejectment case is final and executory and an entry of judgment has already
been made.41 Nothing is more settled in law than that when a final judgment is
executory, it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. The judgment may
no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to
correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and
regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court
which rendered it or by the highest Court of the land. The doctrine is founded
on consideration of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of
occasional errors, judgments must become final at some definite point in
time.42chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The March 31, 2006 CA decision43in CA-G.R. SP No. 89259 has long been
final and executory and cannot any more be disturbed by the Court. Public
policy dictates that once a judgment becomes final, executory and
unappealable, the prevailing party should not be denied the fruits of his victory
award
of
actual,
moral
and
exemplary
damages
show that Spouses Salvador acted in a fraudulent manner or with bad faith
when it breached the contract of sale. Thus, the award of moral damages
cannot
be
warranted.
As to the award of exemplary damages, Article 2229 of the New Civil Code
provides that exemplary damages may be imposed by way of example or
correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages.54 The claimant must first establish his right to moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. In this case, considering that
Spouses Rabaja failed to prove moral or compensatory damages, then there
could
be
no
award
of
exemplary
damages.
With regard to attorneys fees, neither Spouses Rabaja nor Gonzales is entitled
to the award. The settled rule is that no premium should be placed on the right
to litigate and that not every winning party is entitled to an automatic grant of
attorneys fees.55 The RTC reasoned that Gonzales was forced to litigate due to
the acts of Spouses Salvador. The Court does not agree. Gonzales, as agent of
Spouses Salvador, should have expected that she would be called to litigation
in
connection
with
her
fiduciary
duties
to
the
principal.
In view of all the foregoing, the CA decision should be affirmed with the
following modifications:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. The order requiring defendant Spouses Rolando and Herminia Salvador
to pay plaintiffs the amount of Five Hundred Ninety Three Thousand
(P593,000.00) Pesos, representing the amount garnished from the
Metrobank deposit of plaintiffs as for their back rentals should be
deleted;chanrobleslaw
2. The award of moral damages in the amount of Twenty Thousand
(P20,000.00) Pesos; exemplary damages in the amount of Twenty
Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos, and attorneys fees in the amount of One
Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos in favor of Spouses Rabaja
should be deleted; and
3. The award of attorneys fees in amount of One Hundred Thousand
(P100,000.00) Pesos in favor of Gonzales should be deleted.
The other amounts awarded are subject to interest at the legal rate of 6% per
annum, to be reckoned from the date of finality of this judgment until fully
paid.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The March 29, 2007
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 214, Mandaluyong City, in Civil
Case
No.
MC-03-2175,
is MODIFIED to
read
as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE,
this
Court
renders
judgment
as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
a. Ordering the Contract to Sell entered into by Spouses Rogelio and
Elizabeth Rabaja and Spouses Rolando and Herminia Salvador on July
24, 1998 as RESCINDED;chanrobleslaw
b. Ordering Spouses Rolando and Herminia Salvador to pay Spouses
Rogelio and Elizabeth Rabaja:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. The amount of Nine Hundred Fifty Thousand (P950,000.00) Pesos,
representing the payments made by the latter for the purchase of
the subject property; and
2. The cost of suit;chanrobleslaw
c. Dismissing the counterclaims of Spouses Rolando and Herminia
Salvador and Rosario Gonzales against Spouses Rogelio and Elizabeth
Rabaja
The amounts awarded are subject to interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum
to be reckoned from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.
As aforestated, this is without prejudice to the invocation by either party of the
Civil Code provisions on legal compensation or set-off under Articles 1278,
1279
and
1270.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 157583, September 10, 2014
FRUMENCIO E. PULGAR, Petitioner, v. THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MAUBAN, QUEZON, BRANCH 64, QUEZON POWER (PHILIPPINES) LIMITED,
CO., PROVINCE OF QUEZON,AND DEPARTMENT OF
FINANCE, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This is a direct recourse to the Court via a petition for review
on certiorari1assailing the Orders dated December 2, 20022 and March 13,
20033 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Mauban, Quezon, Branch 64 (RTC)
which dismissed Civil Case No. 0587-M on jurisdictional grounds and,
environment whereon the power plant of [QPL] stands. 13Pulgars motion was
initially granted and his Answer-in-Intervention was admitted. 14cralawred
Sometime in June 2002, QPL and the Province of Quezon agreed to submit
their dispute before the Secretary of Finance, which resulted in a
Resolution15 dated August 30, 2002 where the basic issues between the
principal parties were passed upon.
The RTC Ruling
In an Order16 dated December 2, 2002, the RTC dismissed Civil Case No. 0587M for lack of jurisdiction in the absence of a payment of the tax assessed under
protest, which requirement QPL attempted to skirt by alleging in its complaint
that it is the very authority of the Municipal Assessor to impose the
assessment and the treasurer to collect the tax that it was questioning.
Declaring that QPLs complaint essentially challenged the amount of the taxes
assessed, the RTC ruled that it is the Local Board of Assessment Appeals that
had jurisdiction over the complaint. Consequently, it also dismissed Pulgars
motion for intervention since with the dismissal of the main case, the same had
no
leg
to
stand
on.17cralawred
Aggrieved, Pulgar filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied
in an Order18 dated March 13, 2003, hence, this petition.
The Issue Before The Court
The issue advanced before the Court is whether or not the RTC erred in
dismissing Pulgars motion for intervention as a consequence of the dismissal
of the main case. While acknowledging the RTCs lack of jurisdiction, Pulgar
nonetheless prays that the Court pass upon the correctness of the Municipal
Assessors assessment of QPLs realty taxes, among others.
The Courts Ruling
The
petition
lacks
merit.
In this case, Pulgar does not contest the RTCs dismissal of Civil Case No.
0587-M for lack of jurisdiction, but oddly maintains his intervention by asking
in this appeal a review of the correctness of the subject realty tax assessment.
This recourse, the Court, however, finds to be improper since the RTCs lack of
jurisdiction over the main case necessarily resulted in the dismissal of his
intervention. In other words, the cessation of the principal litigation on
jurisdictional grounds at that means that Pulgar had, as a matter of course,
lost his right to intervene. Verily, it must be borne in mind
that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
[I]ntervention is never an independent action, but is ancillary and
supplemental to the existing litigation. Its purpose is not to obstruct nor x xx
unnecessarily delay the placid operation of the machinery of trial, but merely
to afford one not an original party, yet having a certain right or interest in the
pending case, the opportunity to appear and be joined so he could assert or
protect such right or interests.
Otherwise stated, the right of an intervenor should only be in aid of the right of
the original party. Where the right of the latter has ceased to exist, there is
nothing to aid or fight for; hence, the right of intervention ceases. 21cralawred
WHEREFORE,
SO ORDERED.
the
petition
is DENIED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 201427, March 18, 2015
TEOFILO B. ADOLFO, Petitioner, v. FE. T. ADOLFO, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 seeks to set aside: 1) the October 6, 2009
Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 01783 reversing the
October 2, 2006 Order3 of the Regional Trial Court, 7th Judicial Region,
Mandaue City (RTC Mandaue), Branch 55 in Civil Case No. MAN-4821; as well
as 2) the CAs March 2, 2012 Resolution 4 denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration5 and
Supplement6 thereto.
Civil
Case
No.
MAN-4821
On April 14, 2004, petitioner Teofilo B. Adolfo filed with the RTC Mandaue a
Petition7 for judicial separation of property against his estranged wife,
respondent Fe Adolfo, nee Tudtud. Docketed as Civil Case No. MAN-4821 and
assigned to Branch 55, the petition alleged that the parties were married on
November 26, 1966; that the union bore one child; that during the marriage,
they acquired through conjugal funds Lot 1087-A-2-E, a 3,652-square meter
property in Brgy. Cabancalan, Mandaue City, Cebu (the subject property)
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. (TCT) 18368; that later on, the
parties separated due to irreconcilable differences; that since reunion was no
longer feasible, petitioner suggested a separation of the conjugal property, but
respondent adamantly refused; that respondent denied petitioners coownership of the subject property, claiming the same as her paraphernal
property; that several earnest efforts to amicably settle the matter between
them proved unavailing; and that a judicial separation of property is proper
under the circumstances and pursuant to Article 135(6) of the Family Code. 8
Petitioner thus prayed that judgment be rendered decreeing a separation of the
conjugal property and the subdivision or sale thereof, to the end of dividing the
same or the proceeds thereof; and ordering respondent to pay petitioner
P50,000.00 as attorneys fees, appearance fees (P2,000.00 per hearing), and
P20,000.00
litigation
costs.
Case
No.
MAN-2683
Answer thereto, and the trial courts May 15, 2002 Decision in said case.
On August 1, 2005, petitioner filed a Request for Admission 17 of 1) the
genuineness of the duly marked certified true copies of the Complaint, Answer,
and Decision in Civil Case No. MAN-2683 (Exhibits F, G and H,
respectively); 2) respondents declaration in said Answer that the subject
property constituted conjugal property of the marriage; and 3) the trial courts
pronouncement in said case that the subject property forms part of the
conjugal
estate.
Respondent failed to file her answer or response to the request for admission.
On September 5, 2005, petitioner filed a Motion for Judgment Based on the
Pleadings,18 stating that since respondent failed to answer his request for
admission, the matters contained in the request are deemed admitted pursuant
to Rule 26, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure 19 (1997 Rules); that
as a consequence of the application of the rule, respondent is in effect
considered to have admitted that the subject property is a conjugal asset of
their subsisting marriage which may thus be the subject of his petition for
judicial separation of property; and that on account of said admission, a
hearing on the merits becomes unnecessary and, instead, Rule 34 20 of the
1997 Rules on judgments on the pleadings should apply. Petitioner thus
prayed that the trial court render judgment in his favor based on the pleadings.
Respondent filed an Opposition.21
In her Opposition to Plaintiffs
22
Memorandum, respondent argued among others that the request for
admission was premature considering that the decision in Civil Case No. MAN2683 was the subject of an appeal, and thus not yet final.
In an October 11, 2005 Order,23 the trial court directed the transfer of Civil
Case No. MAN-4821 to Branch 55 of the RTC Mandaue, since it is said court
which
decided
the
closely
related
Civil
Case
No.
MAN-2683.
On October 2, 2006, Branch 55 issued an Order 24 granting petitioners motion
for judgment on the pleadings. It held as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
This court has painstakingly exerted effort in going over the record and took
serious note of all the pleadings, documents and others on file. After serious
consideration, the court believes and so holds that there is basis in rendering
judgment. The Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings though
the
same
case,
it
was
held
2683 that Lot 1087-A-2-E was no longer paraphernal property but rather a
conjugal property of Spouses Teofilo and Fe Adolfo and; c) that RTC, Branch
55, Mandaue City, sustained and/or held the view of defendant (Fe Tudtud)
that Lot 1087-A-2-E is a conjugal property of Spouses Teofilo and Fe Adolfo,
thus, dismissed Civil Case No. MAN-2683 and awarded damages to the
defendant.
Judicial admissions may be made in (a) the pleadings filed by the parties, (b) in
the course of the trial either by verbal or written manifestations or stipulations,
or (c) in other stages of the judicial proceeding, as in the pre-trial of the case.
Admissions obtained through depositions, written interrogatories or requests
for admission are also considered judicial admissions. Page 686, Remedial Law
Compendium,
Vol.
II,
9thRev.
Ed.,
Regalado
With the admission that Lot 1087-A-2-E is a conjugal property, it follows as its
necessary and logical consequence, that plaintiff 26 is entitled to the relief
demanded.chanrobleslaw
x
A DECISION in Civil Case No. MAN-2683 had already been rendered by RTC,
Branch 55, on the 15th day of May 2002 with the court finding that Lot 1087A-2-E
is
a
conjugal
property
x
x
x
For reason[s] of expediency and convenience, the court may even take judicial
notice of its earlier decision finding Lot 1087-A-2-E as a conjugal
property.27cralawred
x
share of what remains after allocating to Nilo Adolfo a portion of Nine hundred
thirteen (913) square meters representing his presumptive legitime.
The plaintiff is directed to submit to this court the proposed subdivision plan
for its consideration before submitting the same for approval to the Bureau of
Lands.
In case of disagreement as to their respective location, the same shall be done
through raffle to be conducted by the sheriff who shall see to it that judgment
in
this
case
shall
be
fully
implemented.
SO ORDERED.28cralawlawlibrary
Respondent instituted an appeal with the CA, which was docketed as CA-G.R.
CV
No.
01783.
Court
of
Appeals
Decision
in
CA-G.R.
CV
No.
78971
Meanwhile, on May 30, 2007, the CA rendered its Decision 29 in CA-G.R. CV No.
78971. It reversed the May 15, 2002 Decision of the trial court in Civil Case
No. MAN-2683. It declared, among others, that the subject property was
respondents paraphernal property. Thus, it held:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Proceeding from the foregoing consideration, the finding that Lot No. 1087-A-2E is a conjugal property does not have any basis, hence, does not have any
merit at all. On the contrary, plaintiffs-appellants30 sufficiently proved that the
aforesaid lot was defendant-appellees31 paraphernal property as the latter even
admitted that she inherited the same from her mother although she claimed it
as a conjugal property based on the TCTs attached to her answer. Another
strong indication that Lot No. 1087-A-2-E is solely owned by defendantappellee is the fact that in another case (Civil Case No. MAN-2008) involving
the same property and the same parties but for a different issue (road right of
way), defendant-appellee alone signed the compromise agreement ceding a
portion of the subject lot as a right of way perpetually open and unobstructed
for the benefit of plaintiffs-appellants, defendant-appellee, their respective
heirs, assigns and transferees and guests. The same compromise agreement
which became the decision of the case attained finality without defendantappellee questioning the absence of her husbands signature.chanrobleslaw
x
SO
cralawlawlibrary
On June 23, 2007,
executory.33cralawred
Ruling
of
the
Court
the
of
above
CA
Appeals
decision
in
CA-G.R.
became
CV
final
No.
and
01783
In CA-G.R. CV No. 01783, respondent filed her Appellants Brief, 34 where she
argued that the trial court erred in issuing its October 2, 2006 Order directing
the partition or sale of the subject property; that it was error for the trial court
to take judicial notice of its own judgment in Civil Case No. MAN-2683 and
thus declare that the subject property is conjugal, since the issue of whether it
constitutes conjugal or paraphernal property was still pending in the appeal in
CA-G.R. CV No. 78971; that since the proceedings in Civil Case No. MAN-2683
have not been terminated and the issue regarding the character of the subject
property has not been resolved with finality, then petitioners resort to a request
for admission and motion for judgment on the pleadings was premature; and
that with the May 30, 2007 Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 78971, petitioner and
the trial court should submit to the finding therein that the subject property is
her
paraphernal
property.
In his Appellees Brief,35 petitioner insisted that the trial court did not err in
treating his motion for judgment on the pleadings as one for summary
judgment; that respondents Answer in Civil Case No. MAN-2683 constituted a
judicial admission that the subject property was a conjugal asset, which
required no further proof; that respondents failure to reply to his written
request for admission also resulted in the acknowledgment that the subject
property is a conjugal asset; that the trial court correctly took judicial notice of
the proceedings in Civil Case No. MAN-2683, as they were relevant and
material to the resolution of Civil Case No. MAN-4821; that since it was not
respondent who appealed the May 15, 2002 decision in Civil Case No. MAN2683, then the finding therein that the subject property is conjugal should
bind her; and that the CAs eventual finding in CA-G.R. CV No. 78971 that the
subject lot was respondents paraphernal property cannot bind him because he
was
not
a
party
to
Civil
Case
No.
MAN-2683.
On October 6, 2009, the CA issued the assailed Decision containing the
following decretal portion:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, based from the foregoing premises, the Order of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 55, Mandaue City, in Civil Case No. MAN-4821, is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the records of this case are remanded to RTC
(Branch
55),
Mandaue
City,
for
further
proceedings.
SO ORDERED.36cralawlawlibrary
In arriving at the above conclusion, the CA held that the trial court cannot
treat petitioners motion for judgment on the pleadings as one for summary
judgment. It stated that in a proper case for judgment on the pleadings, there
are no ostensible issues at all on account of the defending partys failure to
raise an issue in his answer, while in a proper case for summary judgment,
such issues exist, although they are sham, fictitious, or not genuine as shown
by affidavits, depositions or admissions. In other words, a judgment on the
pleadings is a judgment on the facts as pleaded, while a summary judgment is
a judgment on the facts as summarily proved by affidavits, depositions, or
admissions.37 It added that respondents Answer appeared on its face to tender
an issue; it disputed petitioners claim that the subject property is their
conjugal property. The next thing to be determined is whether this issue is
fictitious
or
sham
as
to
justify
a
summary
judgment.
The CA added that although respondent was bound by the resulting admission
prompted by her failure to reply to petitioners request for admission, her
claims and documentary exhibits clearly contradict what petitioner sought to
be admitted in his request; that the trial court disregarded the fact that the
issue of whether the subject property is conjugal was still unresolved as CAG.R. CV No. 78971 was still pending; and that finally, the trial court should
have been guided by the principles that trial courts have but limited authority
to render summary judgments and that summary judgments should not be
rendered
hastily.38cralawred
Arguments
In his Petition seeking to reverse and set aside the assailed CA dispositions and
thus reinstate the October 2, 2006 Order of the trial court, petitioner insists
that respondents failure to reply to his written request for admission resulted
in her admitting that the subject property is a conjugal asset, applying Rule
26, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules; that the CA grossly erred in disregarding the
rule; that with the resulting admission, there remains no genuine issue to be
resolved in Civil Case No. MAN-4821, such that judgment based on the
pleadings is proper. Finally, petitioner adds that respondents trifling with the
law and rules of procedure by conveniently claiming in one case that the
subject property is conjugal, and then in another that it is paraphernal
should not be countenanced; she should be held to her original declaration
that
the
subject
property
is
conjugal.
Respondents
Arguments
property, and petitioners case for partition on the claim that the subject
property is conjugal should be dismissed for being moot and academic.
Our Ruling
The
Court
denies
the
Petition.
On the other hand, whether x x x the issues raised by the Answer are genuine
is not the crux of inquiry in a motion for judgment on the pleadings. It is so
only in a motion for summary judgment. In a case for judgment on the
pleadings, the Answer is such that no issue is raised at all. The essential
question in such a case is whether there are issues generated by the
pleadings.47 A genuine issue is an issue of fact which requires the
presentation of evidence as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or
false claim. When the facts as pleaded appear uncontested or undisputed,
then there is no real or genuine issue or question as to the facts, and summary
judgment
is
called
for.48cralawred
In rendering summary judgment, the trial court relied on respondents failure
to reply to petitioners request for admission, her admission in Civil Case No.
MAN-2683, as well as its May 15, 2002 Decision declaring that the subject
property is a conjugal asset. It took judicial notice of the proceedings in said
case. While there is nothing irregular with this as courts may take judicial
notice of a decision or the facts prevailing in another case sitting in the same
court if (1) the parties present them in evidence, absent any opposition from
the other party; or (2) the court, in its discretion, resolves to do so 49 the trial
court however disregarded the fact that its decision was then the subject of a
pending appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 78971. It should have known that until the
appeal is resolved by the appellate court, it would be premature to render
judgment on petitioners motion for judgment on the pleadings; that it would be
presumptuous to assume that its own decision would be affirmed on appeal.
One of the issues raised in the appeal is precisely whether the subject property
is conjugal, or a paraphernal asset of the respondent. Thus, instead of
resolving petitioners motion for judgment on the pleadings, the trial court
should have denied it or held it in abeyance. It should have guided petitioner
to this end, instead of aiding in the hasty resolution of his case. In the first
place, Civil Case No. MAN-4821 was transferred to it from Branch 56 precisely
for the reason that it was the court which tried the closely related Civil Case
No.
MAN-2683.
Even if respondent is deemed to have admitted the matters contained in
petitioners request for admission by her failure to reply thereto, the trial court
should have considered the pending appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 78971. It
cannot take judicial notice solely of the proceedings in Civil Case No. MAN2683, and ignore the appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 78971. After all, CA-G.R. CV
No. 78971 is merely a continuation of Civil Case No. MAN-2683; an appeal is
deemed a continuation of the same case commenced in the lower
court.50cralawred
On the part of petitioner, it must be said that he could not have validly resorted
to a motion for judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment. While it may
appear that under Rules 34 and 35 of the 1997 Rules, he may file a motion for
judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment as a result of the consequent
admission by respondent that the subject property is conjugal, this is not
actually the case. Quite the contrary, by invoking the proceedings and decision
in Civil Case No. MAN-2683, petitioner is precluded from obtaining judgment
while the appeal in said case is pending, because the result thereof determines
whether the subject property is indeed conjugal or paraphernal. He may not
preempt
the
appeal
in
CA-G.R.
CV
No.
78971.
While it is true that a judgment cannot bind persons who are not parties to the
action,51 petitioner cannot, after invoking the proceedings in Civil Case No.
MAN-2683 to secure affirmative relief against respondent and thereafter failing
to obtain such relief, be allowed to repudiate or question the CAs ruling in CAG.R. CV No. 78971. The principle of estoppel bars him from denying the
resultant pronouncement by the appellate court, which became final and
executory, that the subject property is respondents paraphernal property. In
estoppel, a person, who by his deed or conduct has induced another to act in a
particular manner, is barred from adopting an inconsistent position, attitude or
course of conduct that thereby causes loss or injury to another. It further bars
him from denying the truth of a fact which has, in the contemplation of law,
become settled by the acts and proceeding of judicial or legislative officers or by
the act of the party himself, either by conventional writing or by
representations,
express
or
implied
or in
pais.52cralawred
Finally, the Court notes that the appellate court overlooked the May 30, 2007
Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 78971, which became final and executory on June
23, 2007. The respondent included this development in her appellees brief,
but the CA did not take it into account. As an unfortunate consequence, the
case
was
not
appreciated
and
resolved
completely.
Thus, with the development in Civil Case No. MAN-2683 brought upon by the
final and executory decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 78971, petitioners case is left
with no leg to stand on. There being no conjugal property to be divided
between the parties, Civil Case No. MAN-4821 must be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The October 6, 2009 Decision and
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 202989, March 25, 2015
COMGLASCO CORPORATION/AGUILA GLASS, Petitioner, v. SANTOS CAR
CHECK CENTER CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
On August 16, 2000, respondent Santos Car Check Center Corporation
(Santos), owner of a showroom located at 75 Delgado Street, in Iloilo City,
leased out the said space to petitioner Comglasco Corporation (Comglasco), an
entity engaged in the sale, replacement and repair of automobile windshields,
for a period of five years at a monthly rental of P60,000.00 for the first year,
P66,000.00 on the second year, and P72,600.00 on the third through fifth
years.1
On October 4, 2001, Comglasco advised Santos through a letter 2 that it was
pre-terminating their lease contract effective December 1, 2001. Santos
refused to accede to the pre-termination, reminding Comglasco that their
contract was for five years. On January 15, 2002, Comglasco vacated the
leased premises and stopped paying any further rentals. Santos sent several
demand letters, which Comglasco completely ignored. On September 15, 2003,
Santos sent its final demand letter,3 which Comglasco again ignored. On
October 20, 2003, Santos filed suit for breach of contract.4
Summons and a copy of the complaint, along with the annexes, were served on
Comglasco on January 21, 2004, but it moved to dismiss the complaint for
improper service. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City, Branch 37,
dismissed the motion and ordered the summons served anew. On June 28,
2004, Comglasco filed its Answer.5 Santos moved for a judgment on the
pleadings, which the RTC granted. On August 18, 2004, the trial court
rendered its judgment,6 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of [Santos] and against
[Comglasco]:
1. Ordering [Comglasco] to faithfully comply with [its] obligation under the
Contract of Lease and pay its unpaid rentals starting January 16, 2002 to
August 15, 2003 in the total amount of Php1,333,200.00, plus 12% interest
per
annum
until
fully
paid;
2. To pay [Santos]:
a) Php200,000.00 as attorneys fees;
b) [Php]50,000.00 as litigation expenses;
c) [Php]400,000.00 as exemplary damages.
In its Decision9 dated August 10, 2011, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the
judgment of the RTC but reduced the award of attorneys fees to P100,000.00
and deleted the award of litigation expenses and exemplary damages.
Petition for Review to the Supreme Court
In this petition, Comglasco raises the following issues:
1. Whether or not judgment on the pleadings was properly invoked by the
trial court as basis for rendering its decision?
2. Whether or not material issues were raised in [Comglascos] answer?
3. Whether or not summary judgment or judgment on the pleadings is the
proper remedy for [Santos] under the circumstances of the present case?
4. Whether or not the amount deposited for advance rental and deposit
should be credited to [Comglascos] account?
5. Whether or not attorneys fees may be granted by the trial court without
proof and legal basis?10
cause in the first three years and without cause after the third year. Citing
business reverses which it ascribed to the 1997 Asian financial crisis,
Comglasco insists that under Article 1267 of the Civil Code it is exempted from
its obligation under the contract, because its business setback is the cause
contemplated in their lease which authorized it to pre-terminate the same.
Article 1267 provides:
Art. 1267. When the service has become so difficult as to be manifestly beyond
the contemplation of the parties, the obligor may also be released therefrom, in
whole or in part.
Comglasco argues that it cannot be said to have admitted in its Answer the
material allegations of the complaint precisely because it invoked therein a
valid cause for its decision to pre-terminate the lease before the lapse of three
years; that therefore, in view of its pleaded cause for reneging on its rentals
(the 1997 Asian financial crisis), the RTC should have ordered the reception of
evidence for this purpose, after which a summary judgment would then have
been proper, not a judgment on the pleadings. After all, Santos has claimed in
its Motion for Summary Judgment that Comglascos cited cause for pretermination was fictitious or a sham, whereas in truth the prevailing business
climate which ensued after the 1997 currency crisis resulted in great difficulty
on its part to comply with the terms of the lease as to be manifestly beyond
the contemplation of the parties; thus, Comglasco should be deemed released
from
the
lease.
Next, Comglasco insists that its advance rentals and deposit totaling
P309,000.00 should be deducted from any sum awarded to Santos while it also
insists that there is no factual and legal basis for the award of damages.
Ruling of the Court
The
The
petition
first
three
issues
being
is
related
will
denied.
be
discussed
together.
Comglasco maintains that the RTC was wrong to rule that its answer to
Santos complaint tendered no issue, or admitted the material allegations
therein; that the court should have heard it out on the reason it invoked to
justify its action to pre-terminate the parties lease; that therefore a summary
judgment would have been the proper recourse, after a hearing.
Anent petitioners alleged poor financial condition, the same will neither release
petitioner from the binding effect of the contract of lease. As held in Central
Bank v. Court of Appeals, cited by private respondents, mere pecuniary inability
to fulfill an engagement does not discharge a contractual obligation, nor does it
constitute a defense to an action for specific performance.14
Relying on Article 1267 of the Civil Code to justify its decision to preterminate its lease with Santos, Comglasco invokes the 1997 Asian currency
crisis as causing it much difficulty in meeting its obligations. But
in PNCC,15 the Court held that the payment of lease rentals does not involve a
prestation to do envisaged in Articles 1266 and 1267 which has been
rendered legally or physically impossible without the fault of the obligorlessor. Article 1267 speaks of a prestation involving service which has been
rendered so difficult by unforeseen subsequent events as to be manifestly
beyond the contemplation of the parties. To be sure, the Asian currency crisis
befell the region from July 1997 and for sometime thereafter, but Comglasco
cannot be permitted to blame its difficulties on the said regional economic
phenomenon because it entered into the subject lease only on August 16,
2000, more than three years after it began, and by then Comglasco had known
what business risks it assumed when it opened a new shop in Iloilo City.
This situation is no different from the Courts finding in PNCC wherein PNCC
cited the assassination of Senator Benigno Aquino Jr. (Senator Aquino) on
August 21, 1983 and the ensuing national political and economic crises as
putting it in such a difficult business climate that it should be deemed released
from its lease contract. The Court held that the political upheavals, turmoils,
almost daily mass demonstrations, unprecedented inflation, and peace and
order deterioration which followed Senator Aquinos death were a matter of
judicial notice, yet despite this business climate, PNCC knowingly entered into
a lease with therein respondents on November 18, 1985, doing so with open
eyes of the deteriorating conditions of the country. The Court rules now, as in
PNCC, that there are no absolutely exceptional changes of circumstances that
equity
demands
assistance
for
the
debtor. 16
As found by the CA, Comglascos Answer admitted the material allegations in
the complaint, to wit: a) that Santos holds absolute title to a showroom space;
b) that Comglasco leased the said showroom from Santos; c) that after a little
over a year, Comglasco pre-terminated the lease; d) that, disregarding Santos
rejection of the pre-termination of their lease, Comglasco vacated the leased
premises on January 15, 2002; e) that Comglasco never denied the existence
and validity of the parties lease contract. Specifically, the CA noted that
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 200759, March 25, 2015
FAJ CONSTRUCTION & DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. SUSAN M. SAULOG,Respondent.
DECISION
Antecedents
pre-trial,
the
case
was
set
for
trial
on
the
merits.
Petitioner presented its first witness on March 11, 2003. However, the
presentation of the witnesss testimony was not concluded as petitioners
counsel did not have the required documentary evidence. 10 Thus, petitioner
moved
for
a
continuance.
After several opportunities for the presentation of its first witness, petitioner
failed to proceed with trial. Its counsel moved and asked for several
postponements of trial, which the trial court granted despite respondents
opposition. However, petitioners counsel and witness failed to appear during
the scheduled April 29, 2003 hearing, prompting the trial court, upon
respondents motion, to dismiss the case for failure to prosecute. 11
Petitioner filed an unverified motion for reconsideration 12 of the April 29, 2003
dismissal order, claiming that its counsel was unable to attend the scheduled
hearing because he suffered arthritis of the knee; however, the motion was not
of
the
Regional
Trial
Court
In Civil Case No. Q-02-45865, respondent was allowed to present her evidence
on the counterclaim. As found by the CA, respondents evidence is as follows:
x x x. She presented the testimony of Rhodora Calinawan, the architect who
conducted a complete inspection of the project first in September 2000, and,
second, in November 2000, after typhoon Seniang. Rhodora Calinawan
narrated her findings and identified the photographs submitted as proofs of
appellants29 substandard work. Among the defects she pointed out were the
sloppily done flooring, the unaligned electrical outlet and switch, dried cement
and paint stained flooring, incorrect colored cement used to fill the gap
between the tiles, need to repair door jamb, sloppily done grouting of tiles,
PARTICULARS
Bestbuilt Steel Builders
Sub-Contractor: Fizcon Enterprises
Labor Contracts & Quotations
Cash Advances for Materials by FAJ
Professional Fees
Rectification of Major Defective Works
Other Charges
Other Additional Construction Expenses
Rectification & Repair Works
GRAND TOTAL AMOUNT
AMOUNT
785,299.12
375,166.17
243,461.40
186,236.62
631,666.46
422,563.77
647,629.71
for 528,772.96
3,820,796.21
The penalty for delay is P12,500.00 per day. From July 30, 2000 up to
November 17, 2000, the total penalty amounted to P1,387,500.00. She
suffered sleepless nights because she started to experience frozen shoulder and
trigger finger that necessitated the services of Dr. Alberto Lu, an
acupuncturist. Exhibits 30-34 comprised five receipts issued by Alberto M.
Lou, evidencing payment of P400 for services rendered. She claimed
16-Q).
(3) That defendant had to finish the work abandoned by plaintiff, incurring
substantial additional expenses therefor. This is also supported not only by
her testimony, but by documentary evidence presented by her (Exhs. 21; 20
20-A; 21 21-F; 22 22-CCC; 23 23-M; 24 24-JJJ; 25 25-S; 26 26-QQ;
28
28-AAAA-130;
29
29-JJJ).
(4) As to the claim of defendant for moral damages, the Court finds that she is
entitled to moral damages, but not for the amount she is claiming. The
testimony given by defendant on how the problems created by plaintiff affected
her personally is believable; and furthermore, it is supported by official receipts
of an Acupuncture Consultant (Exhs. 30-34). This is one of the cases wherein
moral damages are allowed by Article 2220 of the New Civil Code. Breach of
Contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
(5) With respect to exemplary damages, the Court perceives that same should
be granted, but moderates the same. Plaintiff being in the construction
business to the public, should be deterred from doing to others, what it did to
defendant. This is one of the situations envisioned by Article 2229 of the New
Civil
Code,
for
exemplary
damages.
(6) The Court is convinced that attorneys fees should also be adjudicated,
considering the work that counsel for defendant undertook. Attorneys fees
should be adjudicated, in accordance with Article 2208 of the New Civil Code.
(7) The Court is also persuaded to grant penalties for delay, as provided for in
the agreement between the parties (Exhs. 11-B-1 and 11-B-2).
(8) The Court, however, is not inclined to grant additional consequential
damages of P1,600,000.00, because this court finds that this claim has not
been
properly
supported.
(9) Finally, the Court is inclined to grant defendants claim, for lost rentals,
which is properly supported by the testimony of defendant and very plausible
under the circumstances, because one of the duplex apartments was
constructed for rental income purposes and its completion and rental was very
much
delayed,
because
of
the
fault
of
plaintiff.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, plaintiff FAJ Construction & Development
Corporation is hereby ordered to pay defendant Susan Saulog, the following
amounts:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Ruling
of
the
Court
of
Appeals
Petitioner filed an appeal with the CA. Docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 88385, the
appeal essentially argued that the trial court erred in holding petitioner liable
to the respondent for the amounts stated in the decretal portion of the trial
courts decision. In addition, petitioner contended that it was erroneous for the
trial court to have dismissed its complaint for failure to prosecute, as it should
not be penalized for the negligence of its counsel in the handling of Civil Case
No. Q-02-45865, which is the sole reason for the dismissal thereof.
On November 29, 2011, the CA rendered the assailed Decision affirming with
modification the January 30, 2006 Decision of the trial court, pronouncing
thus:
Appellant35 now questions anew the propriety of the dismissal of the complaint
on ground of failure to prosecute. Appellant argues that it should not be made
to suffer the consequences of the negligence or mistakes of its counsel.
This Court finds that any disquisition on this issue is improper for being
barred
by res
judicata.
x
x
x
More, appellants case was dismissed for failure to prosecute because of the
numerous delays caused by its counsel. Appellant cannot be excused from the
actions of its counsel since it is likewise a settled rule that mistake[s] of
counsel binds the client. It is only in case of gross or palpable negligence of
counsel when courts must step in and accord relief to a client who suffered
thereby.
x
x
x
The next issue is: did appellee36 adequately prove her right to actual damages
for rectification of appellants defective work? Article 1715 of the Civil Code
provides:
Article 1715. The contractor shall execute the work in such a manner that it
has the qualities agreed upon and has no defects which destroy or lessen its
value or fitness for its ordinary or stipulated use. Should the work be not of
such quality, the employer may require that the contractor remove the defect or
execute another work. If the contractor fails or refuses to comply with this
obligation, the employer may have the defect removed or another work
executed,
at
the
contractors
cost.
Evidently, Article 1715 gives the employer the options to require the removal of
the work, to rectify the flaws in their work, or to have the work done at the
expense
of
the
contractor.
Here, the defective workmanship was amply proven by Architect Rhodora
Calinawans testimony and documentary evidence i.e., photographs, receipts,
and list of the expenses needed to rectify appellants poorly crafted work.
Hence, We sustain the award of actual damages based on these testimonial and
documentary
evidence.
Regarding the penalty for delay in the amount of One Million Three Hundred
Eighty Seven Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P1,387,500.00), the same should
also be sustained. A contract is the law between the parties, and they are
bound by its stipulations so long as they are not contrary to law, customs,
public policy and public morals. The penalty for delay is agreed upon by the
parties themselves. The fact that appellant was already delayed in the
completion of the duplex is undisputed. In fact, record shows that on January
24, 2000, appellee approved the extension requested by appellant. This request
for extension, by itself, is already proof of delay. Thus, at the time appellant
abandoned the project, it already incurred delay. Verily, it is only proper that
appellant be made to pay the penalty for delay after appellee no longer agreed
to
any
further
extension.
We
now
go
to
the
issue
of
damages.
Moral damages are recoverable for breach of contract where the breach was
wanton, reckless, malicious or in bad faith, oppressive or abusive. However,
moral damages are improperly awarded, absent a specific finding and
pronouncement from the trial court that a party acted in such manner. Here,
the only basis of the trial court in granting moral damages of P500,000.00 was
appellees gratuitous claim that she suffered sleepless nights for her frozen
shoulder and trigger finger, supposedly evidenced by 5 official receipts issued
by her acupuncturist whom she paid P400.00 per receipt. No evidence,
however, was adduced showing that her frozen shoulder and trigger finger were
the direct result of the delayed project. The basis for such award is too shallow
and
evidently
untenable,
hence,
the
same
must
be
deleted.
As a consequence, the award of exemplary damages should also be vacated. x x
x
Also, appellee does not dispute the fact that the total contract price was
P12,500,000.00. After paying more than P10,500,000.00, appellee made
several demands for the parts that did not meet the agreed specifications. On
the other hand, appellant was of the firm belief that it had the right to work
stoppage, as authorized under the contractors manual. Both parties honestly
believed that their respective actions were justified, hence, no bad faith can be
attributed
to
either
party
to
merit
the
award
of
damages.
Too, this Court finds that the trial court erred in holding appellant liable for
lost rentals in the amount of Five Million Three Hundred Ninety One Thousand
Four Hundred Fifty Six Pesos (P5,391,456.00). Unrealized profits fall under the
category of actual or compensatory damages. If there exists a basis for
reasonable expectation of profits had there been no breach of contract,
indemnification for damages based on such expected profits is proper. Here,
appellee did not present any evidence to show that there was already a
potential lessee to one of the units of the duplex. Even assuming that appellee
may have presented evidence to show the existence of a future lessee, she
should have presented a contract of lease showing the contract price. She
should have also shown that the rental rate, at that time and in that area was,
similar or at least approximately close to the amount of P160,000.00 per
month. Without any of these evidence, damages based on lost rental is purely
speculative. In the same way that one could speculate that the unit will be
rented out, a person cannot be precluded from speculating that the other unit
may be occupied by a close relative for free. The court must rely on competent
evidence and must avoid any speculation or give premium to self-serving
allegations. As stated, the award of P5,391,456.00 is in the nature of actual
damages. To be recoverable, actual damages must not only be capable of proof,
but must actually be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. Courts
cannot simply rely on speculation, conjecture, or guesswork in determining the
fact and amount of damages. To justify an award of actual damages, there
must be competent proof of the actual amount of loss. Credence can be given
only to claims which are duly supported by receipts x x x. These are not
present
in
the
case
at
bar.
As for attorneys fees, it is well settled that the law allows judicial discretion to
determine whether or not attorneys fees are appropriate. The surrounding
circumstances of each case are to be considered. Here, We resolve to delete the
award of attorneys fees since the trial court did not make any particular
finding that any of the instances enumerated in Art. 2208 of the Civil Code
exists. More, it is settled that the award of attorneys fees is the exception
rather than the general rule. Counsels fees are not awarded every time a party
prevails in a suit because of the policy that no premium should be placed on
the
right
to
litigate.
The trial court correctly imposed 6% interest on all awarded amounts
commencing from the date of the filing of the complaint. When an obligation,
not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, interest on the
amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at
6%
per
annum.
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION,
deleting the award of lost rentals, moral damages, exemplary damages, and
attorneys
fees,
including
appearance
fee.
SO ORDERED.37
Petitioner filed a Partial Motion for Reconsideration, but in a February 24, 2012
Resolution, the CA denied the same. Hence, the present Petition.
Issues
In a January 28, 2013 Resolution,38 this Court resolved to give due course to
the Petition, which raises the following assignment of errors:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT
CONCLUDED THAT RES JUDICATA APPLIES IN THE INSTANT CASE.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT
CONCLUDED THAT PETITIONER IS LIABLE FOR ACTUAL DAMAGES, AND IN
IMPOSING THE PENALTY FOR DELAY AND AWARDING INTEREST ON ALL
AMOUNTS DUE.39
Petitioners
Arguments
In its Petition and Reply40 seeking to reverse and set aside the assailed CA
Arguments
In her Comment,42 respondent contends that the issue of whether the trial and
appellate courts correctly decided the amount of damages is a factual issue
which is beyond the jurisdiction of this Court; that with respect to the
dismissal of petitioners case in Civil Case No. Q-02-45865 for failure to
prosecute, res judicata applies; that petitioners claim that it should not be
bound by the negligence of its counsel cannot stand because it was itself
negligent in the prosecution of its case despite having been given by the trial
court all the opportunity to present evidence; that with respect to the issue of
damages, the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts may not be
disturbed; that petitioner failed to present evidence to controvert the trial and
appellate courts findings; that the pecuniary liabilities were justified as
petitioner was guilty of delay, abandonment, and defective workmanship; that
there is no ground to reduce the amount of penalties for petitioners delay; and
that the award of interest was proper.
Our Ruling
The
Court
denies
the
Petition.
Petitioners claim that res judicata cannot apply has no merit. This Court, in
G.R. No. 166336, found nothing wrong in the judgment of the CA in CA-G.R.
SP No. 82239 affirming the dismissal of petitioners Complaint in Civil Case No.
Q-02-45865 for failure to prosecute. In fact, the Court found that the appellate
court had not committed any reversible error. This finding of lack of any
reversible error is now final with the entry of judgment in G.R. No. 166336.
Thus, petitioner could no longer prove its case, other than to present
controverting evidence on respondents counterclaim.
The Court has repeatedly said that minute resolutions dismissing the actions
filed before it constitute actual adjudications on the merits. They are the result
of thorough deliberation among the members of the Court. When the Court
does not find any reversible error in the decision of the CA and denies the
petition, there is no need for the Court to fully explain its denial, since it
already means that it agrees with and adopts the findings and conclusions of
the CA. The decision sought to be reviewed and set aside is correct. It would
be an exercise in redundancy for the Court to reproduce or restate in the
minute resolution denying the petition the conclusions that the CA reached.43
Next, petitioners argument that it should not be punished for the negligence of
its counsel deserves the same treatment. Suffice it to state that we have not
seen any reason to reverse the CAs ruling on this matter; on the other hand,
the record will disclose that petitioner was itself neglectful of its duties relative
to its case, and it continued to retain the services of its counsel which it now
conveniently claims to be negligent, even after repeatedly suffering from the
latters claimed lack of care. It appears that despite witnessing firsthand the
caliber of its lawyer during the initial presentation of its evidence in 2003,
petitioner changed counsel only after the trial courts January 30, 2006
Decision on respondents counterclaim.44 The general rule still applies that the
mistakes
of
counsel
bind
his
client.
On the issue of liability, we find relying on the identical findings of the trial
and appellate courts that petitioner is guilty of violating the construction
agreement, for its defective and incomplete work, delay, and for unjustified
abandonment of the project. Indeed, we find no reason to disturb the identical
pronouncements of the trial court and the CA. The same holds true with
respect to the issue of damages raised by petitioner; it requires an inquiry into
the facts, which is no longer this Courts realm. In a case previously decided
by this ponente concerning a construction contract and where similar
dirty, or that windows lacked the necessary screws and rubber, or that the roof
panels are damaged, or that the installation of asphalt shingles on the roof was
improper. Any ordinary individual building a home would readily notice such
defects.
Since respondent suffered damages as a result of petitioners defective and
delayed work and unjustified abandonment of the project, the principle
of damnum absque injuria cannot apply. The principle cannot apply when
there
is
an
abuse
of
a
persons
right. 46
Coming now to the issue of delay, we find that the trial and appellate courts
grant of P1,387,500.00 not excessive; it is, in fact, liberal. Construction period
was agreed upon at 240 days from receipt by petitioner of a notice to proceed. 47
Said notice was issued on June 18, 1999, 48 thus giving petitioner
approximately eight months from said date, or roughly computed up to
February 18, 2000, to complete the project. Yet, petitioner was still working on
the project as late as on November 22, 2000, after which it stopped work and
abandoned the project; this fact is not denied by petitioner. 49 Thus, petitioner
was already delayed for more than nine months that is, beginning March
2000 and ending November of the same year or approximately 270 days. At
P12,500.00 agreed penalty imposed for each day of delay, petitioner should be
correspondingly liable to respondent for P3,375,000.00 liquidated damages,
more or less, under the construction agreement. 50 Yet, the courts below
awarded a mere P1,387,500.00; this award is certainly not excessive and
should remain, accepted as it is without question by the respondent.
Finally, the imposition of 6% interest per annum is proper. Indeed, as correctly
held by the CA, when an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of
money, is breached, an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be
imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum,51 from the
filing
of
the
complaint
until
its
full
satisfaction.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The November 29, 2011 Decision and
February 24, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88385
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 198223, February 18, 2015
HEIRS OF TIMBANG DAROMIMBANG DIMAAMPAO, NAMELY: CABIB D.
ALAWI, ACMAD D. ALAWI, KALIKO D. ALAWI, ABU ALI D. ALAWI,
MOKHAYMA D. ABAB, AND MARIAM ABAB, REPRESENTED BY CABIB D.
the ownership and possession of the land until their deaths and were survived
by
herein
petitioners.
Petitioners claimed that sometime on April 10, 1978, without their knowledge
and that of their predecessors, Cota executed a deed of sale in favor of
respondents involving the subject land; that respondents were in bad faith
since at the time of purchase, petitioners by themselves were in actual
possession of the land in the concept of owners; that the deed of sale was
invalid because Cota had no right to sell any portion of the subject land as he
was not the owner thereof; that the deed of sale cast a cloud of doubt on
petitioners' title; that despite such deed of sale, respondents have never
occupied any portion of the subject land. Petitioners stated that the subject
land was allegedly sold by Cota to deceased Sheik Pangandaman Daromimbang
(Timbang's brother) who then donated the same to his daughter and son-in-law
which deeds of sale and donation, however, were annulled by the RTC Lanao
del Sur, Branch 9, in Civil Case No. 2410; that they were not impleaded as
parties in that case even if they were in possession of the land; that the RTC
decision was affirmed by the CA and became final which cast a cloud of doubt
on their title and ownership of the land. Petitioners prayed that the Deed of
Sale dated April 10, 1978 between Cota and respondents be declared null and
void, and for them to be declared as the rightful owners and lawful possessors
of
the
subject
land.
Respondents filed their Answer4 denying petitioners' claim of ownership and
possession of the subject land as they owned and possessed the same since
1978; that the validity of the Deed of Sale dated April 10, 1978 involving the
subject land was already upheld by the RTC Lanao del Sur, Branch 9, in Civil
Case No. 2410, entitled Cota Dimaampao, et al. v. Sheik Pangandaman
Daromimbang, et al., a case that had already attained finality. In their Special
and Affirmative Defenses, respondents claimed that petitioners have no cause
of action against them because the latter's claim of dowry or donation by
reason of marriage was belied by the issuance of OCT No. RP-335 in Cota's
name; that their claim of dowry or donation was not supported by any written
memorandum or agreement and now barred under the Statute of frauds; that
the action is barred by prescription or estoppel or laches; and, that the
complaint violates the rule on judicial stability or rule on non-interference.
On March 6, 2006, the RTC issued its Order 5 with the following dispositive
portion, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The allegations contained in the Special and Affirmative Defenses are matters
of evidence that can be properly ventilated in the trial of the case. The same is
therefore denied for lack of merit. The parties are directed to submit their pretrial brief at least 3 days before the scheduled pre-trial conference on April 6,
2006.
WHEREFORE, set the Pre-trial conference to April 6, at 9:00 o'clock in the
morning.
SO ORDERED.6
On May 2, 2006, respondents filed a Manifestation7 stating that they just
received the RTC Order on April 17, 2006 and moved for time to file a motion
for reconsideration and to defer the submission of pre-trial brief and the
scheduled pre-trial conference. A motion for reconsideration8 was filed on May
17, 2006. The motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC in its
Order9 dated
February
29,
2008.
On June 6, 2008, respondents filed with the CA Cagayan de Oro City, a
petition for certiorari with prayer for issuance of a preliminary injunction.
Petitioners filed their Comment and respondents their Reply thereto.
On July 2, 2010, the CA rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
FOR THESE REASONS, the writ of certiorari is GRANTED. The challenged
Orders of the respondent court, dated March 6, 2006 and February 29, 2008,
respectively, areSET ASIDE, and another Resolution/Order will be entered in
Civil Case No. 2046-05 dismissing the Complaint.10
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In so ruling, the CA found that the RTC had unduly disregarded the decision in
Civil Case No. 2410 which had already attained finality; that it was already
determined that the subject land was the very same land in Civil Case No.
2410 which was declared to be owned and lawfully possessed by Cota and to
grant petitioners' demand would result to an unending litigation of the case.
The CA found thatres judicata applied in this case. The CA also found that the
action had already prescribed as it took petitioners more than 26 years to
institute
the
instant
case.
Hence
this
petition
wherein
issues:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
petitioners
raise
the
following
find
no
merit
in
the
arguments.
appeal
An
order
denying
may
a
motion
be
for
new
taken
trial
or
from:
reconsideration;
(b) An order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion seeking relief
from
judgment;
(c)
(d)
An
An
order
interlocutory
disallowing
or
order;
dismissing
an
appeal;
An
order
of
execution;
(g) A judgment or final order for or against one or more of several parties or in
separate claims, counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party complaints, while
the main case is pending, unless the court allows an appeal therefrom; and
(h)
An
order
dismissing
an
action
without
prejudice.
In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable,
the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.
In Denso (Phils.), Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,12 we expounded on the
differences between a final judgment and an interlocutory order, to
wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
x x x A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving
nothing more to be done by the Court in respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication
on the merits which, on the basis of the evidence presented at the trial,
declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are and
which party is in the right; or a judgment or order that dismisses an action on
the ground, for instance, of res judicata or prescription. Once rendered, the
task of the Court is ended, as far as deciding the controversy or determining
the rights and liabilities of the litigants is concerned. Nothing more remains to
be done by the Court except to await the parties' next move x x x and
ultimately, of course, to cause the execution of the judgment once it becomes
final or, to use the established and more distinctive term, final and
executory.
x
Conversely, an order that does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end
the Court's task of adjudicating the parties' contentions and determining their
rights and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously indicates that other
things remain to be done by the Court, is interlocutory, e.g., an order denying
a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules x x x Unlike a final
judgment or order, which is appealable, as above pointed out, an
interlocutory order may not be questioned on appeal except only as part of an
appeal that may eventually be taken from the final judgment rendered in the
case.13
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Given the differences between a final judgment and an interlocutory order, the
RTC Order dated March 6, 2006 denying respondents' special and affirmative
defenses contained in their answer is no doubt interlocutory since it did not
finally dispose of the case but will proceed for the reception of the parties'
respective evidence to determine the rights and obligations of each other. As
such, the RTC Order dated March 6, 2006 may not be questioned on appeal
except only as part of an appeal that may eventually be taken from the final
judgment
rendered
in
the
case.14cralawlawlibrary
An interlocutory order is always under the control of the court and may be
modified or rescinded upon sufficient grounds shown at any time before final
judgment.15 This prescinds from a courts inherent power to control its process
and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice, 16 and a motion
for reconsideration thereof was not subject to the limiting fifteen-day period of
appeal prescribed for final judgments or orders.17 We, therefore, find no merit
to petitioners claim that the Order dated March 6, 2006 had already become
final and could not be the subject of a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals.
The petition for certiorari was timely filed with the CA. The RTC Order dated
February 29, 2008 denying respondents' motion for reconsideration was
received by the latter on April 9, 2008. They had 60 days from receipt thereof to
file the petition for certiorari with the CA. The last day to file the petition fell on
June 8, 2008, a Sunday, while June 9 was declared a holiday, hence, the
filing of the petition on the next working day which was June 10, 2008 was
still
on
time.
Going now on the merits, petitioners claim that they did not violate the rule on
judicial stability as the parties in the instant case and the earlier decided Civil
Case No. 2410 of the RTC Lanao del Sur, Branch 9, are entirely different and
petitioners were not parties in the latter case. There is no absolute identity of
causes of action and the issues involved are not similar. The main issue in
Civil Case No. 2410 was which of the two deeds of sale appeared to have been
executed by Cota Dimaampao, i.e., one in favor of Sheik Pangandaman
Daromimbang (Timbangs brother) and the other one in favor of Alug, Balt and
Pangarungan, now herein respondents, was really signed and executed by him.
On the other hand, the main issue in the instant case is whether or not the
subject land was given by Cota as a dowry to his ex-wife Timbang, if so, the
land exclusively belongs to petitioners as compulsory heirs of Timbang and the
sale made by Cota to respondents was void. In the alternative, even assuming
that the subject land was not given as a dowry but acquired by the spouses
Cota and Timbang during their marriage, petitioners contend that the subject
land is a conjugal property to which Timbang is entitled to a share thereof
which Cota had no right to sell. Petitioners insist that respondents are buyers
in bad faith as they were aware of the former's possession of the subject land at
the time it was sold to them by Cota. These issues, as petitioners claim, are
factual which can only be determined after a full blown trial.
We
are
not
persuaded.
We find no error committed by the CA in ruling that the RTC committed a grave
abuse of discretion in not dismissing petitioners' complaint on the ground that
the issue of ownership and possession of the subject land had already been
previously decided in Civil Case No. 2410 which had attained finality. We agree
with the CA that res judicata is applicable in the instant case.
Under the rule of res judicata, a final judgment or order on the merits,
rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the
parties, is conclusive in a subsequent case between the same parties and their
successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action
or special proceeding litigating for the same thing and under the same title and
in the same capacity.18 To state simply, a final judgment or decree on the
merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the
parties or their privies in all later suits on all points and matters determined in
the
former
suit.19cralawlawlibrary
The requisite essential of res judicata are: (1) the judgment sought to bar the
new action must be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a court
having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition
of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be as
between the first and second action, identity of parties, subject matter, and
Since (Cota) Dimaampao is still the owner of the subject land, he could validly
convey the same to his co-plaintiffs below (herein respondents). Dimaampao's
ownership of the land in question coupled with his right to alienate the same
necessarily renders moot and academic the issue of whether plaintiffsappellees Alug, Pangarungan and Balt (herein respondents) are buyers in bad
faith.
In any event, the purported bad faith of Alug, Pangarungan and Balt (herein
respondents) is negated by the diligence they exercised in ascertaining
Dimaampao's ownership of the disputed land at the time it was offered to them
for sale. As testified to by Alug, he verified OCT No. RP-355 with the Register of
Deeds and found out that the subject land is registered in the name of
Dimaampao but encumbered by way of mortgage in favor of Luna. No other
encumbrance or transfer is annotated on OCT No. RP-355. When Alug
inspected the subject parcel of land, it was being cultivated by Soliman Bilao,
the tenant of Dimaampao. Thus, he and Pangarungan and Balt concluded the
sale
with
Dimaampao.
x
x
x
Finally contrary to the contention of defendants-appellants, plaintiffs-appellees
(herein respondents) are under no obligation to check the status of the subject
property with (Sheik) Daromimbang, it being sufficient that they verified the
title thereof with the Register of Deeds of Marawi City and conducted an ocular
inspection thereon. The investigation they had diligently pursued to confirm
the validity of Dimaampao's title effectively negates any bad faith in their
purchase of the property.24 (Emphasis supplied )
The CA decision became final with our denial of the petition for review
on certiorari in G.R. No. 161438 on February 23, 2004 and an Entry of
Judgment was made on April 22, 2004. 25 Consequently, the issue of Cota's
ownership and possession of the subject land as well as the validity of the 1978
deed of sale between Cota and herein respondents are already settled issues
which could not be relitigated anew. When a right or fact has been judicially
tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains
unreversed, it should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with
them
in
law
or
estate.26cralawlawlibrary
The validity of the 1978 deed of sale in respondents' favor had already been
declared with finality, and if affirmative relief is granted to petitioners in the
instant case, i.e., by the annulment of the deed of sale, then the decision will
nroblesvirtuallawlib
EN BANC
G.R. No. 187836, November 25, 2014
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) OFFICERS, NAMELY, SAMSON S.
ALCANTARA, AND VLADIMIR ALARIQUE T.
CABIGAO, Petitioners, v. ALFREDO S. LIM, IN HIS CAPACITY AS MAYOR OF
THE CITY OF MANILA, Respondent.
G.R. NO. 187916
JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., BIENVINIDO M. ABANTE, MA. LOURDES M. ISIPGARCIA, RAFAEL P. BORROMEO JOCELYN DAWIS-ASUNCION, MINORS
MARIAN REGINA B. TARAN, MACAILA RICCI B. TARAN, RICHARD
KENNETH B. TARAN, REPRESENTED AND JOINED BY THEIR PARENTS
RICHARD AND MARITES TARAN, MINORS CZARINA ALYSANDRA C.
RAMOS, CEZARAH ADRIANNA C. RAMOS, AND CRISTEN AIDAN C. RAMOS
REPRESENTED AND JOINED BY THEIR MOTHER DONNA C. RAMOS,
MINORS JAZMIN SYLLITA T. VILA AND ANTONIO T. CRUZ IV,
REPRESENTED AND JOINED BY THEIR MOTHER MAUREEN C.
TOLENTINO, Petitioners,v. MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, VICE MAYOR
FRANCISCO DOMAGOSO, COUNCILORS ARLENE W. KOA, MOISES T. LIM,
JESUS FAJARDO LOUISITO N. CHUA, VICTORIANO A. MELENDEZ, JOHN
MARVIN C. NIETO, ROLANDO M. VALERIANO, RAYMUNDO R. YUPANGCO,
EDWARD VP MACEDA, RODERICK D. VALBUENA, JOSEFINA M. SISCAR,
SALVADOR PHILLIP H. LACUNA, LUCIANO M. VELOSO, CARLO V. LOPEZ,
ERNESTO F. RIVERA,1 DANILO VICTOR H. LACUNA, JR., ERNESTO G.
ISIP, HONEY H. LACUNA-PANGAN, ERNESTO M. DIONISO, JR. AND ERICK
IAN O. NIEVA, Respondents.
Manila
taxpayer;
Officer Not mentioned in the One of the petitioners in SJS v.
S. petition;
holding Atienza(G.R.
No.
156052);*
office
in
Ermita, Pesident of ABAKADA GURO PARTY
Manila
LIST with members who are
residents of the City of Manila
Officer
Alarique
Pandacan
Cabigao
Bienvinido M. Abante
Sta.
Ana
San
Incumbent City Councilor
Miguel of the City of Manila
Rafael P. Borromeo
Paco
Jocelyn Dawis-Asuncion
Sta.
Mesa
Minors
Czarina
Alysandra
C.
and taxpayers
Respondents
Nature of Business
Inc. (CHEVRON)
Pilipinas
Shell
manufacturing, refining, importing, distributing and
Petroleum Corporation
marketing of petroleum products in the Philippines
(SHELL)
Petron
Corporation manufacturing, refining, importing, distributing and
(PETRON)
marketing of petroleum products in the Philippines
They claim that their rights with respect to the oil depots in Pandacan would
be directly affected by the outcome of these cases.chanrobleslaw
The Antecedents
These petitions are a sequel to the case of Social Justice Society v. Mayor
Atienza, Jr.8 (hereinafter referred to as G.R. No. 156052), where the Court
found: (1) that the ordinance subject thereof Ordinance No. 8027 was
enacted to safeguard the rights to life, security and safety of the inhabitants of
Manila;9 (2) that it had passed the tests of a valid ordinance; and (3) that it is
not superseded by Ordinance No. 8119.10 Declaring that it is constitutional and
valid,11 the Court accordingly ordered its immediate enforcement with a specific
directive on the relocation and transfer of the Pandacan oil
terminals.12chanrobleslaw
Highlighting that the Court has so ruled that the Pandacan oil depots should
leave, herein petitioners now seek the nullification of Ordinance No. 8187,
which contains provisions contrary to those embodied in Ordinance No. 8027.
Allegations of violation of the right to health and the right to a healthful and
balanced
environment
are
also
included.
For a better perspective of the facts of these cases, we again trace the history of
the Pandacan oil terminals, as well as the intervening events prior to the
reclassification of the land use from Industrial II to Commercial I under
Ordinance No. 8027 until the creation of Medium Industrial Zone and Heavy
Industrial
Zone
pursuant
to
Ordinance
No.
8187.
History
Oil
of
the
Pandacan
Terminals
We quote the following from the Resolution of the Court in G.R. No. 156052:
Pandacan (one of the districts of the City of Manila) is situated along the banks
of the Pasig [R]iver. At the turn of the twentieth century, Pandacan was
unofficially designated as the industrial center of Manila. The area, then largely
uninhabited, was ideal for various emerging industries as the nearby river
facilitated the transportation of goods and products. In the 1920s, it was
classified as an industrial zone. Among its early industrial settlers were the oil
companies.
x
x
x
On December 8, 1941, the Second World War reached the shores of the
Philippine Islands. x x x [I]n their zealous attempt to fend off the Japanese
Imperial Army, the United States Army took control of the Pandacan Terminals
and hastily made plans to destroy the storage facilities to deprive the advancing
Japanese Army of a valuable logistics weapon. The U.S. Army burned unused
petroleum, causing a frightening conflagration. Historian Nick Joaquin
recounted the events as follows:
After the USAFFE evacuated the City late in December 1941, all army fuel
storage dumps were set on fire. The flames spread, enveloping the City in
smoke, setting even the rivers ablaze, endangering bridges and all riverside
buildings. For one week longer, the open city blazeda cloud of smoke by
day, a pillar of fire by night.
The fire consequently destroyed the Pandacan Terminals and rendered its
network
of
depots
and
service
stations
inoperative.
After the war, the oil depots were reconstructed. Pandacan changed as Manila
rebuilt itself. The three major oil companies resumed the operation of their
depots. But the district was no longer a sparsely populated industrial zone; it
had evolved into a bustling, hodgepodge community. Today, Pandacan has
become a densely populated area inhabited by about 84,000 people, majority of
whom are urban poor who call it home. Aside from numerous industrial
installations, there are also small businesses, churches, restaurants, schools,
daycare centers and residences situated there. Malacaang Palace, the official
residence of the President of the Philippines and the seat of governmental
power, is just two kilometers away. There is a private school near the Petron
depot. Along the walls of the Shell facility are shanties of informal settlers.
More than 15,000 students are enrolled in elementary and high schools
situated near these facilities. A university with a student population of about
25,000 is located directly across the depot on the banks of the Pasig [R]iver.
The 36-hectare Pandacan Terminals house the oil companies distribution
terminals and depot facilities. The refineries of Chevron and Shell in Tabangao
and Bauan, both in Batangas, respectively, are connected to the Pandacan
Terminals through a 114-kilometer underground pipeline system. Petrons
refinery in Limay, Bataan, on the other hand, also services the depot. The
terminals store fuel and other petroleum products and supply 95% of the fuel
requirements of Metro Manila, 50% of Luzons consumption and 35%
nationwide. Fuel can also be transported through barges along the Pasig [R]iver
or tank trucks via the South Luzon Expressway.13 (Citations omitted)
Memorandum
of
Agreement
(MOA)
dated
12
October
2001
between
the
oil
companies
and
the
Department
of
Energy
(DOE)
On 12 October 2001, the oil companies and the DOE entered into a MOA 14 in
light of recent international developments involving acts of terrorism on civilian
and government landmarks,15potential new security risks relating to the
Pandacan oil terminals and the impact on the surrounding community which
may be affected,16 and to address the perceived risks posed by the proximity
of communities, businesses and offices to the Pandacan oil terminals,
consistent with the principle of sustainable development. 17 The stakeholders
acknowledged that there is a need for a comprehensive study to address the
economic, social, environmental and security concerns with the end in view of
formulating a Master Plan to address and minimize the potential risks and
hazards posed by the proximity of communities, businesses and offices to the
Pandacan oil terminals without adversely affecting the security and reliability
of supply and distribution of petroleum products to Metro Manila and the rest
of Luzon, and the interests of consumers and users of such petroleum products
in
those
areas.18chanrobleslaw
The
against
The
enactment
of
the
continued
MOA,
Ordinance
stay
of
the
however,
was
No.
oil
8027
depots
short-lived.
Ordinance
within
which
to
stop
the
operation
of
their
businesses.
Justice
filing
enforce
Society
of
the
v.
Atienza
(G.R.
No.
156052):
an
action
for mandamus
Supreme
Court
Ordinance
No.
8027
In the interim, an original action for mandamus entitled Social Justice Society
v. Atienza, Jr. docketed as G.R. No. 15605225 was filed on 4 December 2002 by
Tumbokon and herein petitioners SJS and Cabigao against then Mayor Atienza.
The petitioners sought to compel former Mayor Atienza to enforce Ordinance
No. 8027 and cause the immediate removal of the terminals of the oil
companies.26chanrobleslaw
Issuance
by
the
Regional
Trial
Court
(RTC)
of
writs
of
preliminary
prohibitory
injunction
and
preliminary
mandatory
injunction,
and
status
quo
order
in
favor
of
the
oil
companies
Unknown to the Court, during the pendency of G.R. No. 156052, and before
the expiration of the validity of Resolution No. 13, the oil companies filed the
following actions before the Regional Trial Court of Manila: (1) an action for the
annulment of Ordinance No. 8027 with application for writs of preliminary
prohibitory injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction by Chevron; (2)
a petition for prohibition and mandamus also for the annulment of the
Ordinance with application for writs of preliminary prohibitory injunction and
preliminary mandatory injunction by Shell; and (3) a petition assailing the
validity of the Ordinance with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction
and/or
temporary
restraining
order
(TRO)
by
27
Petron. chanrobleslaw
Writs of preliminary prohibitory injunction and preliminary mandatory
injunction were issued in favor of Chevron and Shell on 19 May 2003. Petron,
on the other hand, obtained a status quo order on 4 August
2004.28chanrobleslaw
The
defining
and
Enactment
the
of
Manila
zoning
Ordinance
land
No.
use
8119
plan
regulations
On 16 June 2006, then Mayor Atienza approved Ordinance No. 8119 entitled
An Ordinance Adopting the Manila Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Zoning
Regulations of 2006 and Providing for the Administration, Enforcement and
Amendment
thereto.29chanrobleslaw
Pertinent
provisions
relative
following:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
to
these
cases
are
the
(a) Article IV, Sec. 730 enumerating the existing zones or districts in the City of
Manila;
(b) Article V, Sec. 2331 designating the Pandacan oil depot area as a Planned
Unit
Development/Overlay
Zone
(O-PUD);
and
(c) the repealing clause, which reads:
SEC. 84. Repealing Clause. All ordinances, rules, regulations in conflict with
the provisions of this Ordinance are hereby repealed; PROVIDED, That the
rights that are vested upon the effectivity of this Ordinance shall not be
impaired.32
7
The
to
the
March
2007
Decision
in
G.R.
No.
156052;
mayor
has
the
mandatory
legal
duty
enforce
Ordinance
No.
8027
and
order
removal
of
the
Pandacan
terminals
On 7 March 2007, the Court granted the petition for mandamus, and directed
then respondent Mayor Atienza to immediately enforce Ordinance No.
8027.33chanrobleslaw
Confined to the resolution of the following issues raised by the petitioners, to
wit:
1. whether respondent [Mayor Atienza] has the mandatory legal duty to enforce
Ordinance No. 8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals, and
2. whether the June 26, 2002 MOU and the resolutions ratifying it can amend
or repeal Ordinance No. 8027.34
the Court declared:
x x x [T]he Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as city
mayor, to enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the
city. One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the city, he
has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed
by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has no other choice. It is his
ministerial
duty
to
do
so.
x
x
x
x
The question now is whether the MOU entered into by respondent with the oil
companies and the subsequent resolutions passed by the Sanggunian have
made the respondents duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 doubtful, unclear or
uncertain.
x
x
x
We need not resolve this issue. Assuming that the terms of the MOU were
inconsistent with Ordinance No. 8027, the resolutions which ratified it and
made it binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it full force and effect only
until April 30, 2003. Thus, at present, there is nothing that legally hinders
respondent
from
enforcing
Ordinance
No.
8027.
Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted right after the Philippines, along with the rest
of the world, witnessed the horror of the September 11, 2001 attack on the
Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City. The objective of the
ordinance is to protect the residents of Manila from the catastrophic
devastation that will surely occur in case of a terrorist attack on the
Pandacan Terminals. No reason exists why such a protective measure
should be delayed.35 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
13
February
2008
Resolution
in
G.R.
No.
156052;
Ordinance
No.
8027
is
constitutional
The oil companies and the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the DOE,
filed their motions for leave to intervene and for reconsideration of the 7 March
2007 Decision. During the oral arguments, the parties submitted to the power
of the Court to rule on the constitutionality and validity of the assailed
Ordinance despite the pendency of the cases in the RTC. 36chanrobleslaw
On 13 February 2008, the Court granted the motions for leave to intervene of
the oil companies and the Republic of the Philippines but denied their
respective motions for reconsideration. The dispositive portion of the Resolution
reads:
WHEREFORE,
x
x
x
We reiterate our order to respondent Mayor of the City of Manila to enforce
Ordinance No. 8027. In coordination with the appropriate agencies and other
parties involved, respondent Mayor is hereby ordered to oversee the relocation
and transfer of the Pandacan Terminals out of its present site.37
13
February
2008
Resolution
in
G.R.
No.
156052;
Ordinance
No.
8027
was
not
impliedly
repealed
by
Ordinance
No.
8119
The Court also ruled that Ordinance No. 8027 was not impliedly repealed by
Ordinance No. 8119. On this score, the Court ratiocinated:
For the first kind of implied repeal, there must be an irreconcilable conflict
between the two ordinances. There is no conflict between the two ordinances.
Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the Pandacan area from Industrial II to
Commercial I. Ordinance No. 8119, Section 23, designated it as a Planned
Unit Development/Overlay Zone (O-PUD). In its Annex C which defined the
zone boundaries, the Pandacan area was shown to be within the High Density
Residential/Mixed Use Zone (R-3/MXD). x x x [B]oth ordinances actually have
a common objective, i.e., to shift the zoning classification from industrial to
commercial (Ordinance No. 8027) or mixed residential commercial (Ordinance
No.
x
8119)
x
Ordinance No. 8027 is a special law since it deals specifically with a certain
area described therein (the Pandacan oil depot area) whereas Ordinance No.
8119 can be considered a general law as it covers the entire city of
Manila.cralawred
x
28
April
Second
denied
likewise
without
2009
Resolution
Motion
with
finality;
denied
or
in
for
G.R.
No.
156052;
Reconsideration
succeeding
motions
otherwise
noted
action
On 28 April 2009, pending the resolution of the Manifestation and Motion, the
Court denied with finality the second motion for reconsideration dated 27
February 2008 of the oil companies.41 It further ruled that no further pleadings
shall
be
entertained
in
the
case.42chanrobleslaw
Succeeding motions were thus denied and/or noted without action. And, after
the Very Urgent Motion to Stop the Mayor of the City of Manila from Signing
Draft Ordinance No. 7177 and to Cite Him for Contempt if He Would Do So
filed on 19 May 2009 was denied on 2 June 2009 for being moot, 43 all pleadings
pertaining to the earlier motion against the drafting of an ordinance to amend
Ordinance
No.
8027
were
noted
without
action. 44chanrobleslaw
The
allowing
Enactment
of
the
continued
Ordinance
stay
of
the
No.
oil
8187
depots
refineries
and
oil
depots
are
now
among
those
expressly
allowed.
No.
187836
3. Despite the finality of the Decision in G.R. No. 156052, and notwithstanding
that the conditions and circumstances warranting the validity of the Ordinance
remain the same, the Manila City Council passed a contrary Ordinance,
thereby refusing to recognize that judicial decisions applying or interpreting
the laws or the Constitution form part of the legal system of the
Philippines;49 and
4. Ordinance No. 8187 is violative of Sections 15 and 16, Article II of the
Constitution of the Philippines on the duty of the State to protect and promote
the right to health of the people50 and protect and advance the right of the
people
to
a
balanced
and
healthful
ecology.51chanrobleslaw
Petitioners pray that Ordinance No. 8187 of the City of Manila be declared null
and void, and that respondent, and all persons acting under him, be prohibited
from
enforcing
G.R.
the
same.
No.
187916
The petition for Prohibition, Mandamus and Certiorari with Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Injunction against the enforcement of
Ordinance No. 8187 of former Secretary of Department of Environment and
Natural Resources and then Mayor Atienza, together with other residents and
taxpayers of the City of Manila, also alleges violation of the right to health of
the people and the right to a healthful and balanced environment under
Sections
15
and
16
of
the
Constitution.
Petitioners likewise claim that the Ordinance is in violation of the following
health and environment-related municipal laws, and international conventions
and
treaties
to
which
the
Philippines
is
a
state
party:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1. Municipal Laws
(a) Sections 4,52 12,53 1954 and 3055 of Republic Act No. 8749 otherwise known
as
the
Philippine
Clean
Air
Act;
(b)
(c)
Environment
Toxic
and
Code
Hazardous
(Presidential
Wastes
Law
Decree
(Republic
Act
No.
No.
1152);
6969);
and
human
right
to
the
highest
attainable
standard
of
health[;]
3.
the
human
right
to
ecologically
sustainable
development[;]
steps to implementing (sic) and/or enforce the same and after due hearing, the
temporary restraining order be converted to a permanent injunction;
3. x x x Manila City Ordinance 8187 [be declared] as null and void for being
repugnant to the Constitution and existing municipal laws and international
covenants;
4. x x x the respondents [be ordered] to refrain from enforcing and/or
implementing
Manila
City
Ordinance
No.
8187;
5. x x x respondent City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim [be enjoined] from issuing any
permits (business or otherwise) to all industries whose allowable uses are
anchored under the provisions of Manila Ordinance No. 8187; and
6. x x x respondent Mayor of Manila Alfredo S. Lim [be ordered] to comply with
the Order of the Honorable Court in G.R. 156052 dated February 13, 2008. 60
The
Respondents
Position
on the Consolidated Petitions
Respondent
former
Mayor
Lim
In his Memorandum,61 former Mayor Lim, through the City Legal Officer,
attacks the petitioners lack of legal standing to sue. He likewise points out that
the petitioners failed to observe the principle of hierarchy of courts.
Maintaining that Ordinance No. 8187 is valid and constitutional, he expounds
on
the
following
arguments:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On the procedural issues, he contends that: (1) it is the function of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod to enact zoning ordinances, for which reason, it
may proceed to amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8119 without prior referral to
the Manila Zoning Board of Adjustment and Appeals (MZBAA) as prescribed
under Section 80 (Procedure for Re-Zoning) and the City Planning and
Development Office (CPDO) pursuant to Section 81 (Amendments to the Zoning
Ordinance) of Ordinance No. 8119, especially when the action actually
originated from the Sangguniang Panlungsod itself; (2) the Sangguniang
Panlungsod may, in the later ordinance, expressly repeal all or part of the
zoning ordinance sought to be modified; and (3) the provision repealing Section
23 of Ordinance No. 8119 is not violative of Section 26, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, which requires that every bill must embrace only one subject and
that
such
shall
be
expressed
in
the
title.
On the substantive issues, he posits that the petitions are based on unfounded
fears; that the assailed ordinance is a valid exercise of police power; that it is
consistent with the general welfare clause and public policy, and is not
unreasonable; that it does not run contrary to the Constitution, municipal
laws, and international conventions; and that the petitioners failed to overcome
the
presumption
of
validity
of
the
assailed
ordinance.
Respondents
and
the
in
favor
City
of
Vice-Mayor
Councilors
who
the
assailed
Domagoso
voted
ordinance
On 14 September 2012, after the Court gave the respondents several chances
to
submit
their
Memorandum,62 they,
through
the
Secretary
of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod, prayed that the Court dispense with the filing
thereof.
In their Comment,63 however, respondents offered a position essentially similar
to those proffered by former Mayor Lim.chanrobleslaw
The
Intervenors
on the Consolidated Petitions
Position
On the other hand, the oil companies sought the outright dismissal of the
petitions based on alleged procedural infirmities, among others, incomplete
requisites of judicial review, violation of the principle of hierarchy of courts,
improper remedy, submission of a defective verification and certification against
forum
shopping,
and
forum
shopping.
As to the substantive issues, they maintain, among others, that the assailed
ordinance is constitutional and valid; that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is in
the best position to determine the needs of its constituents; that it is a valid
exercise of legislative power; that it does not violate health and environmentrelated provisions of the Constitution, laws, and international conventions and
treaties to which the Philippines is a party; that the oil depots are not likely
targets of terrorists; that the scaling down of the operations in Pandacan
pursuant to the MOU has been followed; and that the people are safe in view of
the
safety
measures
installed
in
the
Pandacan
terminals.
the same will be forwarded to the President for his consideration in the event
that
his
veto
is
overridden
again.69chanrobleslaw
On 11 December 2012, Shell also filed a similar Manifestation. 70chanrobleslaw
Meanwhile, three days after former Mayor Lim vetoed the new ordinance, Atty.
Luch R. Gempis, Jr. (Atty. Gempis), Secretary of the Sangguniang Panlungsod,
writing on behalf of respondents Vice-Mayor Domagoso and the City Councilors
of Manila who voted in favor of the assailed Ordinance, finally complied with
this Courts Resolution dated 17 July 2012 reiterating its earlier directives 71 to
submit
the
said
respondents
Memorandum.
In his Compliance/Explanation with Urgent Manifestation72 dated 13
September 2012, Atty. Gempis explained that it was not his intention to show
disrespect to this Court or to delay or prejudice the disposition of the cases.
According to him, he signed the Comment prepared by respondents Vice-Mayor
and the City Councilors only to attest that the pleading was personally signed
by the respondents. He clarified that he was not designated as the legal
counsel of the respondents as, in fact, he was of the impression that, pursuant
to Section 481(b)(3) of the Local Government Code, 73 it is the City Legal Officer
who is authorized to represent the local government unit or any official thereof
in a litigation. It was for the same reason that he thought that the filing of a
Memorandum may already be dispensed with when the City Legal Officer filed
its own on 8 February 2010. He further explained that the Ordinance subject
of these cases was passed during the 7th Council (2007-2010); that the
composition of the 8th Council (2010-2013) had already changed after the
2010 elections; and that steps were already taken to amend the ordinance
again. Hence, he was in a dilemma as to the position of theSangguniang
Panlungsod at the time he received the Courts Resolution of 31 May 2011.
Atty. Gempis, thus, prayed that the Court dispense with the filing of the
required memorandum in view of the passing of Ordinance No.
8283.chanrobleslaw
Issue
The petitioners arguments are primarily anchored on the ruling of the Court in
G. R. No. 156052 declaring Ordinance No. 8027 constitutional and valid after
finding that the presence of the oil terminals in Pandacan is a threat to the life
and security of the people of Manila. From thence, the petitioners enumerated
constitutional provisions, municipal laws and international treaties and
conventions on health and environment protection allegedly violated by the
enactment of the assailed Ordinance to support their position.
The resolution of the present controversy is, thus, confined to the
determination of whether or not the enactment of the assailed Ordinance
allowing the continued stay of the oil companies in the depots is, indeed,
invalid and unconstitutional.chanrobleslaw
Our Ruling
We see no reason why Ordinance No. 8187 should not be stricken down insofar
as the presence of the oil depots in Pandacan is concerned.chanrobleslaw
I
We first rule on the procedural issues raised by the respondents and the oil
companies.
At the outset, let it be emphasized that the Court, in G.R. No. 156052, has
already pronounced that the matter of whether or not the oil depots should
remain in the Pandacan area is of transcendental importance to the residents
of
Manila.74chanrobleslaw
We may, thus, brush aside procedural infirmities, if any, as we had in the past,
and take cognizance of the cases75 if only to determine if the acts complained of
are no longer within the bounds of the Constitution and the laws in
place.76chanrobleslaw
Put otherwise, there can be no valid objection to this Courts discretion to
waive one or some procedural requirements if only to remove any impediment
to address and resolve the serious constitutional question 77 raised in these
petitions of transcendental importance, the same having far-reaching
implications insofar as the safety and general welfare of the residents of Manila,
and
even
its
neighboring
communities,
are
concerned.
Proper
Remedy
dismissed for failure on the part of the petitioners to properly apply related
provisions of the Constitution, the Rules of Court, and/or the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases relative to the appropriate remedy available
to
them.
To begin with, questioned is the applicability of Rule 65 78 of the Rules of Court
to
assail
the
validity
and
constitutionality
of
the
Ordinance.
there
speedy,
in
the
is
no
and
ordinary
appeal,
or
adequate
course
any
of
plain,
remedy
law
Rule 65 specifically requires that the remedy may be availed of only when
there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course
of
law.79chanrobleslaw
Shell argues that the petitioners should have sought recourse before the first
and second level courts under the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases,80 which govern the enforcement or violations of environmental and
other related laws, rules and regulations. 81 Petron additionally submits that
the most adequate remedy available to petitioners is to have the assailed
ordinance repealed by the Sangguniang Panlungsod. In the alternative, a local
referendum may be had. And, assuming that there were laws violated, the
petitioners may file an action for each alleged violation of law against the
particular
individuals
that
transgressed
the
law.
It would appear, however, that the remedies identified by the intervenors prove
to be inadequate to resolve the present controversies in their entirety owing to
the
intricacies
of
the
circumstances
herein
prevailing.
The scope of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases is embodied in
Sec. 2, Part I, Rule I thereof. It states that the Rules shall govern the procedure
in civil, criminal and special civil actions before the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts, and the Regional Trial Courts involving enforcement or violations
of environmental and other related laws, rules and regulations such as but not
limited to the following:
(k) R.A. No. 6969, Toxic Substances and Hazardous Waste Act;
x
(r)
x
R.A.
No.
x
8749,
Clean
x
Air
Act;
x
(y) Provisions in C.A. No. 141, x x x; and other existing laws that relate to
the conservation, development, preservation, protection and utilization of
the environment and natural resources.82 (Emphasis supplied)
Notably, the aforesaid Rules are limited in scope. While, indeed, there are
allegations of violations of environmental laws in the petitions, these only serve
as collateral attacks that would support the other position of the petitioners
the
protection
of
the
right
to
life,
security
and
safety.
Moreover, it bears emphasis that the promulgation of the said Rules was
specifically intended to meet the following objectives:
SEC.
3. Objectives.The
objectives
of
these
Rules
are:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) To protect and advance the constitutional right of the people to a balanced
and healthful ecology;
(b) To provide a simplified, speedy and inexpensive procedure for the
enforcement of environmental rights and duties recognized under the
Constitution, existing laws, rules and regulations, and international
agreements;
(c) To introduce and adopt innovations and best practices ensuring the
effective enforcement of remedies and redress for violation of environmental
laws; and
(d) To enable the courts to monitor and exact compliance with orders and
judgments in environmental cases.83
Surely, the instant petitions are not within the contemplation of these Rules.
Relative to the position of Petron, it failed to consider that these petitions are
already a sequel to G.R. No. 156052, and that there are some issues herein
raised that the remedies available at the level of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod could not address. Neither could the filing of an individual action
for each law violated be harmonized with the essence of a plain, speedy, and
adequate
remedy.
From another perspective, Shell finds fault with the petitioners direct recourse
to this Court when, pursuant to Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, the
Supreme Court exercises only appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the
constitutionality or validity of an ordinance.84 Thus:
Section
5. The
Supreme
Court
shall
have
the
following
powers:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
xxxx
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the
law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower
courts in:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation,
order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. (Emphasis supplied)
To further support its position, it cites the case of Liga ng mga Barangay
National v. City Mayor of Manila,85 where the petitioners sought the nullification
of the mayors executive order and the councils ordinance concerning certain
functions of the petitioners that are vested in them by law. There, the Court
held:
Second, although the instant petition is styled as a petition for certiorari, in
essence, it seeks the declaration by this Court of the unconstitutionality or
illegality of the questioned ordinance and executive order. It, thus, partakes of
the nature of a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has only
appellate, not original, jurisdiction.86 Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution
provides:
x
x
x
As such, this petition must necessary fail, as this Court does not have original
jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief even if only questions of law are
involved.87
Assuming that a petition for declaratory relief is the proper remedy, and that
the petitions should have been filed with the Regional Trial Court, we have,
time and again, resolved to treat such a petition as one for prohibition, provided
that the case has far-reaching implications and transcendental issues that
need
to
be
resolved,88 as
in
these
present
petitions.
On a related issue, we initially found convincing the argument that the
petitions should have been filed with the Regional Trial Court, it having
concurrent jurisdiction with this Court over a special civil action for
prohibition, and original jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief.
arguments
are
misplaced.
In G.R. No. 156052, we ruled that the petitioners in that case have a legal right
to seek the enforcement of Ordinance No. 8027 because the subject of the
petition concerns a public right, and they, as residents of Manila, have a direct
interest in the implementation of the ordinances of the city. Thus:
To support the assertion that petitioners have a clear legal right to the
enforcement of the ordinance, petitioner SJS states that it is a political party
registered with the Commission on Elections and has its offices in Manila. It
claims to have many members who are residents of Manila. The other
petitioners, Cabigao and Tumbokon, are allegedly residents of Manila.
We need not belabor this point. We have ruled in previous cases that when
amandamus proceeding concerns a public right and its object is to compel a
public duty, the people who are interested in the execution of the laws are
regarded as the real parties in interest and they need not show any specific
interest. Besides, as residents of Manila, petitioners have a direct interest in
the enforcement of the citys ordinances.99x x x (Citations omitted)
No different are herein petitioners who seek to prohibit the enforcement of the
assailed ordinance, and who deal with the same subject matter that concerns a
public right. Necessarily, the people who are interested in the nullification of
such an ordinance are themselves the real parties in interest, for which reason,
they are no longer required to show any specific interest therein. Moreover, it is
worth mentioning that SJS, now represented by SJS Officer Alcantara, has
been recognized by the Court in G.R. No. 156052 to have legal standing to sue
in connection with the same subject matter herein considered. The rest of the
petitioners are residents of Manila. Hence, all of them have a direct interest in
the prohibition proceedings against the enforcement of the assailed ordinance.
In the case of Initiatives for Dialogue and Empowerment through Alternative
Legal Services, Inc. (IDEALS, INC.) v. Power Sector Assets and Liabilities
Management Corporation (PSALM),100 involving a petition for certiorari and
In like manner, the preservation of the life, security and safety of the people is
indisputably a right of utmost importance to the public. Certainly, the
petitioners, as residents of Manila, have the required personal interest to seek
relief
from
this
Court
to
protect
such
right.
in
excess
of
or
with
grave
amounting
to
lack
its
or
abuse
or
excess
his
of
of
jurisdiction,
discretion
jurisdiction
Petron takes issue with the alleged failure of the petitioners to establish the
facts with certainty that would show that the acts of the respondents fall
within the parameters of the grave abuse of discretion clause settled by
jurisprudence, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
x x x [G]rave abuse of discretion means such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
Requisites
of
judicial
review
For a valid exercise of the power of judicial review, the following requisites shall
concur: (1) the existence of a legal controversy; (2) legal standing to sue of the
party raising the constitutional question; (3) a plea that judicial review be
exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is
the lis
mota of
the
case.105chanrobleslaw
Only
the
first
two
requisites
are
put
in
issue
in
these
cases.
second
Proof
of
of
the
shopping
requisite
has
already
been
exhaustively
discussed.
identification
required
in
the
notarization
verification
and
certification
against
forum
in
G.R.
No.
187916
disagree.
of
the
2004
Rules
on
Notarial
Practice.
Section 6108 of the latter Rules, specifically, likewise provides that any
competent evidence of identity specified under Section 12 thereof may now be
presented before the notary public, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 12. Competent Evidence of Identity. - The phrase competent evidence of
identity
refers
to
the
identification
of
an
individual
based
on:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Forum
shopping
Shell contends that the petitioners in G.R. No. 187836 violated the rule against
forum shopping allegedly because all the elements thereof are present in
relation
to
G.R.
No.
156052,
to
wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1. identity of parties, or at least such parties who represent the same interests
in
both
actions
According to Shell, the interest of petitioner SJS in G.R. No. 156052 and the
officers of SJS in G.R. No. 187836 are clearly the same. Moreover, both actions
implead the incumbent mayor of the City of Manila as respondent. Both then
respondent Mayor Atienza in G.R. No. 156052 and respondent former Mayor
Lim in G.R. No. 187836 are sued in their capacity as Manila mayor.
2. identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on
the
same
fact(s)
Shell contends that, in both actions, petitioners assert the same rights to
health and to a balanced and healthful ecology relative to the fate of the
Pandacan terminal, and seek essentially the same reliefs, that is, the removal
of
the
oil
depots
from
the
present
site.
3. the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment
rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would
amount
to res
judicata in
the
other
Relative to the filing of the Manifestation and Motion to: a) Stop the City Council
of Manila from further hearing the amending ordinance to Ordinance No. 8027 x
x x (Manifestation and Motion) and Very Urgent Motion to Stop the Mayor of the
City of Manila from Signing Draft Ordinance No. 7177 [now Ordinance No.
8187] and to Cite Him for Contempt if He Would Do So (Urgent Motion) both in
G.R. No. 156052, Shell points out the possibility that the Court would have
rendered conflicting rulings on cases involving the same facts, parties, issues
and
reliefs
prayed
for.110chanrobleslaw
We
are
not
persuaded.
forum shopping to exist, both actions must involve the same transactions,
same essential facts and circumstances and must raise identical causes of
actions, subject matter, and issues. x x x112 (Citations omitted)
It bears to stress that the present petitions were initially filed, not to secure a
judgment adverse to the first decision, but, precisely, to enforce the earlier
ruling
to
relocate
the
oil
depots
from
the
Pandacan
area.
As to the matter of the denial of the petitioners Manifestation and Urgent
Motion in G.R. No. 156052, which were both incidental to the enforcement of
the decision favorable to them brought about by the intervening events after
the judgment had become final and executory, and which involve the same
Ordinance assailed in these petitions, we so hold that the filing of the instant
petitions
is
not
barred
byres
judicata.
In the same case of Spouses Cruz v. Spouses Caraos involving the re-filing of a
complaint, which had been earlier dismissed without qualification that the
dismissal was with prejudice, and which had not been decided on the merits,
the Court declared that such re-filing did not amount to forum shopping. It
ratiocinated:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
It is not controverted that the allegations of the respective complaints in both
Civil Case No. 95-1387 and Civil Case No. 96-0225 are similarly worded, and
are identical in all relevant details, including typographical errors, except for
the additional allegations in support of respondents prayer for the issuance of
preliminary injunction in Civil Case No. 95-1387. It is similarly not disputed
that both actions involve the same transactions; same essential facts and
circumstances; and raise identical causes of actions, subject matter, and
issues.cralawred
x
x x x The dismissal of Civil Case No. 95-1387 was without prejudice. Indeed,
the Order dated 20 November 1995, dismissing Civil Case No. 95-1387 was an
unqualified dismissal. More significantly, its dismissal was not based on
grounds under paragraphs (f), (h), and (i) of Section 1 of Rule 16 of the Rules of
Court, which dismissal shall bar the refiling of the same action or claim as
crystallized in Section 5 of Rule 16 thereof, thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
From the foregoing, it is clear that dismissals under paragraphs (f), (h), and (i)
of Section 1 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court constitute res judicata, to
wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(f) That the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment or by the statute of
limitations;
x
(h) That the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiffs pleading has been paid,
waived,
abandoned,
or
otherwise
extinguished;
(i) That the claim on which the action is founded is unenforceable under the
provisions of the statute of frauds.
Res judicata or bar by prior judgment is a doctrine which holds that a matter
that has been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction must be deemed
to have been finally and conclusively settled if it arises in any subsequent
litigation between the same parties and for the same cause. Res judicata exists
when the following elements are present: (a) the former judgment must be final;
(b) the court which rendered judgment had jurisdiction over the parties and
the subject matter; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) and
there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject
matter, and cause of action.113 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
Here,
it
should
be
noted
that
this
Court
denied
the
said Manifestation and Urgent Motion, and refused to act on the succeeding
pleadings, for being moot.114 Clearly, the merits of the motion were not
considered by the Court. The following disquisition of the Court in Spouses
Cruz v. Spouses Caraos is further enlightening:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The judgment of dismissal in Civil Case No. 95-1387 does not constitute res
judicata to sufficiently bar the refiling thereof in Civil Case No. 96-0225. As
earlier underscored, the dismissal was one without prejudice. Verily, it was not
a judgment on the merits. It bears reiterating that a judgment on the
merits is one rendered after a determination of which party is right, as
distinguished from a judgment rendered upon some preliminary or formal
or merely technical point. The dismissal of the case without prejudice
indicates the absence of a decision on the merits and leaves the parties free to
litigate the matter in a subsequent action as though the dismissed action had
not been commenced.115 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
The Local Government Code of 1991 expressly provides that the Sangguniang
Panlungsod is vested with the power to reclassify land within the jurisdiction
of the city116 subject to the pertinent provisions of the Code. It is also settled
that an ordinance may be modified or repealed by another ordinance. 117 These
have been properly applied in G.R. No. 156052, where the Court upheld the
position of the Sangguniang Panlungsod to reclassify the land subject of the
Ordinance,118 and declared that the mayor has the duty to enforce Ordinance
No. 8027, provided that it has not been repealed by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod or otherwise annulled by the courts. 119 In the same case, the Court
also used the principle that the Sanguniang Panlungsod is in the best position
to determine the needs of its constituents 120 that the removal of the oil depots
from the Pandacan area is necessary to protect the residents of Manila from
catastrophic devastation in case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan
Terminals.121chanrobleslaw
Do all these principles equally apply to the cases at bar involving the same
subject matter to justify the contrary provisions of the assailed Ordinance?
We
answer
in
the
negative.
claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in
an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees
to them.chanrobleslaw
III
The measures taken by the intervenors to lend support to their position that
Manila is now safe despite the presence of the oil terminals remain ineffective.
These have not completely removed the threat to the lives of the inhabitants of
Manila.
In G.R. No. 156052, the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 8027
was declared as a guarantee for the protection of the constitutional right to life
of the residents of Manila. There, the Court said that the enactment of the said
ordinance was a valid exercise of police power with the concurrence of the two
requisites: a lawful subject to safeguard the rights to life, security and safety
of all the inhabitants of Manila;125 and a lawful method the enactment of
Ordinance No. 8027 reclassifying the land use from industrial to commercial,
which effectively ends the continued stay of the oil depots in
Pandacan.126chanrobleslaw
In the present petitions, the respondents and the oil companies plead that the
Pandacan Terminal has never been one of the targets of terrorist
attacks;127 that the petitions were based on unfounded fears and mere
conjectures;128 and that the possibility that it would be picked by the terrorists
is nil given the security measures installed thereat. 129chanrobleslaw
The intervenors went on to identify the measures taken to ensure the safety of
the people even with the presence of the Pandacan Terminals.
Thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1. Chevron claims that it, together with Shell and Petron, continues to enhance
the safety and security features of the terminals. They likewise adopt fire and
product spill prevention measures in accordance with the local standards set
by the Bureau of Fire Protection, among others, and with the international
standards of the American Petroleum Industry (API) and the National Fire
Prevention and Safety Association (NFPSA); that since 1914, the oil depots
had not experienced any incident beyond the ordinary risks and
expectations130 of the residents of Manila; and that it received a passing
grade on the safety measures they installed in the facilities from the
representatives of the City of Manila who conducted an ocular inspection on 22
May
2009;
and
2. Referring to the old MOU entered into between the City of Manila and the
DOE, on the one hand, and the oil companies, on the other, where the parties
thereto conceded and acknowledged that the scale-down option for the
Pandacan Terminal operations is the best alternative to the relocation of the
terminals, Shell enumerates the steps taken to scale down its operations.
As to the number of main fuel tanks, the entire Pandacan Terminal has already
decommissioned twenty-eight out of sixty-four tanks. Speaking for Shell alone,
its LPG Spheres, which it claims is the only product that may cause explosion,
was part of those decommissioned, thereby allegedly removing the danger of
explosion. Safety buffer zones and linear/green parks were likewise created to
separate the terminal from the nearest residential area. Shells portion of the
oil depot is likewise allegedly equipped with the latest technology to ensure airquality control and water-quality control, and to prevent and cope with possible
oil spills with a crisis management plan in place in the event that an oil spill
occurs. Finally, Shell claims that the recommendations of EQE International in
its Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) study, which it says is one of the
leading independent risk assessment providers in the world and largest risk
management consultancy, were sufficiently complied with; and that, on its own
initiative, it adopted additional measures for the purpose, for which reason,
the individual risk level resulting from any incident occurring from the
Pandacan Terminal, per the QRA study, is twenty (20) times lower compared
to the individual risk level of an average working or domestic
environment.131chanrobleslaw
We
are
not
persuaded.
The issue of whether or not the Pandacan Terminal is not a likely target of
terrorist attacks has already been passed upon in G. R. No. 156052. Based on
the assessment of the Committee on Housing, Resettlement and Urban
Development of the City of Manila and the then position of theSangguniang
Panlungsod,132 the Court was convinced that the threat of terrorism is
imminent.
It
remains
so
convinced.
Even assuming that the respondents and intervenors were correct, the very
nature of the depots where millions of liters of highly flammable and highly
It is the removal of the danger to life not the mere subdual of risk of
catastrophe, that we saw in and made us favor Ordinance No. 8027. That
reason, unaffected by Ordinance No. 8187, compels the affirmance of our
Decision
in
G.R.
No.
156052.
In striking down the contrary provisions of the assailed Ordinance relative to
the continued stay of the oil depots, we follow the same line of reasoning used
in G.R. No. 156052, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted for the purpose of promoting sound urban
planning, ensuring health, public safety and general welfare of the residents of
Manila. TheSanggunian was impelled to take measures to protect the residents
of Manila from catastrophic devastation in case of a terrorist attack on the
(1) the depot facilities contained 313.5 million liters of highly flammable and
highly volatile products which include petroleum gas, liquefied petroleum
gas, aviation fuel, diesel, gasoline, kerosene and fuel oil among others;
(2) the depot is open to attack through land, water or air;
(3) it is situated in a densely populated place and near Malacaang Palace;
and
(4) in case of an explosion or conflagration in the depot, the fire could spread
to the neighboring communities.
The ordinance was intended to safeguard the rights to life, security and safety
of all the inhabitants of Manila and not just of a particular class. The depot is
perceived, rightly or wrongly, as a representation of western interests which
means that it is a terrorist target. As long as it (sic) there is such a target in
their midst, the residents of Manila are not safe. It therefore became necessary
the
threat.
According
to
Such a public need became apparent after the 9/11 incident which showed
that what was perceived to be impossible to happen, to the most powerful
country in the world at that, is actually possible. The destruction of property
and the loss of thousands of lives on that fateful day became the impetus for a
public need. In the aftermath of the 9/11 tragedy, the threats of terrorism
continued [such] that it became imperative for governments to take measures
to combat their effects.
The same best interest of the public guides the present decision. The Pandacan
oil depot remains a terrorist target even if the contents have been lessened. In
the absence of any convincing reason to persuade this Court that the life,
security and safety of the inhabitants of Manila are no longer put at risk by the
presence of the oil depots, we hold that Ordinance No. 8187 in relation to the
Pandacan
Terminals
is
invalid
and
unconstitutional.
There
is,
therefore,
no
need
to
resolve
the
rest
of
the
issues.
Neither is it necessary to discuss at length the test of police power against the
assailed ordinance. Suffice it to state that the objective adopted by
the Sangguniang Panlungsod to promote the constituents general welfare in
terms of economic benefits cannot override the very basic rights to life, security
and
safety
of
the
people.
In. G.R. No. 156052, the Court explained:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Essentially, the oil companies are fighting for their right to property. They allege
that they stand to lose billions of pesos if forced to relocate. However, based on
the hierarchy of constitutionally protected rights, the right to life enjoys
precedence over the right to property. The reason is obvious: life is
irreplaceable, property is not. When the state or LGUs exercise of police power
clashes with a few individuals right to property, the former should prevail.135
We
thus
conclude
with
the
156052:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
very
final
words
in
G.R.
No.
As in the prequel case, we note that as early as October 2001, the oil
companies
signed
a
MOA
with
the
DOE
obliging
themselves
to:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
... undertake a comprehensive and comparative study ... [which] shall include
the preparation of a Master Plan, whose aim is to determine the scope and
timing of the feasible location of the Pandacan oil terminals and all associated
facilities and infrastructure including government support essential for the
relocation such as the necessary transportation infrastructure, land and right
of way acquisition, resettlement of displaced residents and environmental and
social acceptability which shall be based on mutual benefit of the Parties and
the public.
such that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Now that they are being compelled to discontinue their operations in the
Pandacan Terminals, they cannot feign unreadiness considering that they had
years to prepare for this eventuality.137
On the matter of the details of the relocation, the Court gave the oil companies
the following time frames for compliance:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
To ensure the orderly transfer, movement and relocation of assets and
personnel, the intervenors Chevron Philippines Inc., Petron Corporation and
Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation shall, within a non-extendible period of
ninety (90) days, submit to the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 39, the
comprehensive plan and relocation schedule which have allegedly been
prepared. The presiding judge of Manila RTC, Branch 39 will monitor the strict
enforcement of this resolution.138
The periods were given in the Decision in G.R. No. 156052 which became final
on 23 April 2009. Five years have passed, since then. The years of noncompliance may be excused by the swing of local legislative leads. We now stay
the
sway
and
begin
a
final
count.
A comprehensive and well-coordinated plan within a specific time-frame shall,
therefore, be observed in the relocation of the Pandacan Terminals. The oil
companies shall be given a fresh non-extendible period of forty-five (45) days
from notice within which to submit to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 39,
Manila an updated comprehensive plan and relocation schedule. The
relocation, in turn, shall be completed not later than six months from the date
of
their
submission.
Finally, let it be underscored that after the last Manifestation filed by Shell
informing this Court that respondent former Mayor Lim vetoed Ordinance No.
8283 for the second time, and was anticipating its referral to the President for
the latters consideration, nothing was heard from any of the parties until the
present petitions as to the status of the approval or disapproval of the said
ordinance. As it is, the fate of the Pandacan Terminals remains dependent on
this final disposition of these cases.chanrobleslaw
VI
On the matter of the failure of Atty. Gempis to immediately comply with the
directives of this Court to file the Memorandum for the Vice-Mayor and the city
councilors who voted in favor of the assailed Ordinance, the records do not
bear proof that he received a copy of any of the resolutions pertaining to the
filing
of
the
Memorandum.
A narration of the events from his end would show, however, that he was aware
of the directive issued in 2009 when he stated that when the City Legal Officer
filed its Memorandum dated 8 February 2010, [he] thought the filing of a
Memorandum for the other respondent city officials could be dispensed
with.139 There was also a categorical admission that he received the later
Resolution of 31 May 2011 but that he could not prepare a Memorandum
defending the position of respondents vice-mayor and the city councilors who
voted in favor of Ordinance No. 8187 in view of the on-going drafting of
Ordinance No. 8283, which would change the position of the Sanggunian, if
subsequently
approved.
The
reasons
he
submitted
are
not
impressed
with
merit.
That he was not officially designated as the counsel for the vice-mayor and the
city councilors is beside the point. As an officer of the court, he cannot feign
ignorance of the fact that a resolution of this Court is not a mere request but
an order which should be complied with promptly and completely. 140 As early
as 2009, he should have immediately responded and filed a Manifestation and
therein set forth his reasons why he cannot represent the vice-mayor and the
city councilors. And, even assuming that the 31 May 2011 Resolution was the
first directive he personally received, he had no valid excuse for disregarding
the same. Worse, the Court had to issue a show cause order before he finally
heeded.
Atty. Gempis should strive harder to live up to his duties of observing and
maintaining the respect due to the courts, respect for law and for legal
processes and of upholding the integrity and dignity of the legal profession in
order to perform his responsibilities as a lawyer effectively. 141chanrobleslaw
In Sibulo v. Ilagan,142 which involves a lawyers repeated failure to comply with
the directives of the Court, the penalty recommended by the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines was reduced from suspension to reprimand and a warning. The
Court ratiocinated:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Considering, however, that respondent was absolved of the administrative
charge against him and is being taken to task for his intransigence and lack of
respect, the Court finds that the penalty of suspension would not be warranted
under
the
circumstances.cralawred
x
To the Courts mind, a reprimand and a warning are sufficient sanctions for
respondents disrespectful actuations directed against the Court and the IBP.
The imposition of these sanctions in the present case would be more consistent
with the avowed purpose of disciplinary case, which is not so much to punish
the individual attorney as to protect the dispensation of justice by sheltering
the judiciary and the public from the misconduct or inefficiency of officers of
the court.143
We consider the participation of Atty. Gempis in this case and opt to be lenient
even as we reiterate the objective of protecting the dispensation of justice. We
deem it sufficient to remind Atty. Gempis to be more mindful of his duty as a
lawyer
towards
the
Court.
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, Ordinance No. 8187 is hereby
declaredUNCONSTITUTIONAL and INVALID with respect to the continued stay
of
the
Pandacan
Oil
Terminals.
The incumbent mayor of the City of Manila is hereby ordered
to CEASE and DESIST from enforcing Ordinance No. 8187. In coordination
with the appropriate government agencies and the parties herein involved, he is
further ordered to oversee the relocation and transfer of the oil terminals out of
the
Pandacan
area.
As likewise required in G.R. No. 156052, the intervenors Chevron Philippines,
Inc., Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, and Petron Corporation shall,
within a non-extendible period of forty-five (45) days, submit to the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 39, Manila an updated comprehensive plan and relocation
schedule, which relocation shall be completed not later than six (6) months
from the date the required documents are submitted. The presiding judge of
Branch
39
shall
monitor
the
strict
enforcement
of
this
Decision.
For failure to observe the respect due to the Court, Atty. Luch R. Gempis, Jr.,
Secretary of theSangguniang Panlungsod, is REMINDED of his duties towards
the Court and WARNED that a repetition of an act similar to that here
committed
shall
be
dealt
with
more
severely.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 173168, September 29, 2014
PHILIPPINE AMANAH BANK (NOW AL-AMANAH ISLAMIC INVESTMENT
BANK
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
ALSO
KNOWN
AS
ISLAMIC
BANK), Petitioner, v. EVANGELISTA CONTRERAS,Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Philippine
Amanah Bank (now Al-Amanah Islamic Investment Bank of the
Philippines)1 against respondent Evangelista Contreras assailing the
decision2 and resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated May 4, 2004 and
May 26, 2006, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 47053.
The Antecedents
On July 21, 1981, the respondent filed a complaint for annulment of real estate
mortgage, cancellation of original certificate of title, reconveyance, recovery of
possession and damages4 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 19,
Cagayan de Oro City against spouses Calinico and Elnora Ilogon and the
petitioner
bank,
docketed
as
Civil
Case
No.
7950.
The respondent alleged that he was the owner of Cadastral Lot No. 19316-D, a
640 square meter parcel of land located in Cagayan de Oro City. On August 1,
1980, the respondent went to the house of his brother-in-law, Calinico Ilogon,
to seek assistance in obtaining a loan from the petitioner bank since he
(Calinico) is a friend of the banks Chief of the Loan Division. The respondent
brought with him the documents of the subject lot, and told Calinico that he
was willing to mortgage this property as security for the loan. Three days later,
Calinico told the respondent that the petitioner bank could grant a loan up to
P200,000.00
if
the
subject
property
would
be
titled.
On August 3, 1980, the respondent and Calinico, upon the suggestion of the
Chief of the petitioner banks Loan Division, entered into a Deed of
Confirmation of Sale5 under which they transferred the title of the land to
Calinico6 who, in turn, mortgaged it to the petitioner bank. On October 25,
1980, Calinico and the respondent executed an Agreement7 stating, among
others, that the deed of sale they executed was for the purpose of securing a
loan
with
the
petitioner
bank.
On May 20, 1981, the respondent wrote a letter and went to the petitioner bank
directing the latters manager not to release the loan to Calinico. The
respondent handed a copy of the letter to the bank on the same day. On the
next day, the respondent again went to the petitioner bank, but was informed
that the loaned amount of P50,000.00 had already been given to Calinico
earlier that morning. The respondent thereafter learned that the petitioner
released
another
P50,000.00
as
loan
to
Calinico.
That petitioner bank subsequently extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage due
to the Ilogon spouses failure to pay the loan. On January 9, 1989, the
Provincial Sheriff sold the mortgaged property at public auction to the
petitioner bank as the highest bidder. On October 31, 1989, the Provincial
Sheriff issued a Certificate of Sale in favor of the petitioner bank.
For the mortgagors failure to redeem the mortgaged property within the period
prescribed by law, the title to the property was consolidated in the petitioner
bank's name. Consequently, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-20348 was
cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-633319 was issued in the
petitioner bank's name.
The RTC and the CA Rulings
In its decision dated September 13, 1993, the RTC dismissed the complaint for
lack of merit. It held that the petitioner bank was not aware of the agreement
between the respondent and the Ilogon spouses, and that the respondent failed
to present any evidence as basis to annul the mortgage contract. To quote the
RTC ruling:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
xxxx
Plaintiff has not presented any evidence to be a basis for the annulment of the
real estate mortgage, the banks certificate of title, as well as justification for an
order from this court to return the possession of the lot to the plaintiff. The
agreement between plaintiff and defendant Ilogon spouses about the purpose(s)
of the loan and how they would dispose of it had until the filing of this case,
been unknown to the bank. The latter has been a lender in good faith, later a
buyer
in
good
faith.
The court finds that plaintiff has failed to prove his allegations, and that the
preponderance of evidence has been in favor of the bank.10cralawlawlibrary
xxxx
The respondent moved to reconsider this decision,11 but the RTC denied his
motion for having been filed out of time. Accordingly, the RTC declared its
September
13,
1993
decision
final
and
executory.
The respondent filed a petition for relief from judgment 12 before the RTC,
claiming that he had been prevented from moving for the timely reconsideration
of the trial courts decision or to appeal this decision on time due to the
excusable negligence arising from the death of his wife on September 13, 1993.
He explained that his counsel, Atty. Bienvenido Valmorida, only informed him
of the trial courts adverse decision thirty-seven (37) days from his counsel's
receipt of the decision. The respondent also claimed that the petitioner bank
was not a lender in good faith since it knew that the Ilogon spouses did not
own
the
mortgaged
property.
In its order13 dated July 1, 1994, the RTC denied the respondents petition for
relief
from
judgment
for
lack
of
merit.
The respondent appealed to the CA and the appeal was docketed as CA-G.R.
CV No. 47053. In its decision of May 4, 2004, the CA set aside the RTCs July
1, 1994 order, and declared the real estate mortgage null and void. It also
ordered the petitioner bank to reconvey the land covered by TCT No. T-63331 to
the respondent within sixty (60) days from entry of judgment.
It further directed the petitioner bank to pay the equivalent monetary value of
the land based on the price of the property at the public auction, with 6%
interest per annum from the date of the sheriffs auction sale or the amount of
the sale of the lot by the bank to third persons plus 6% interest per annum, in
the event that the property had already been conveyed by the petitioner bank to
third
persons.
The CA held that while the respondent was late in filing his motion for
reconsideration, the rules of procedure should be relaxed since the matters he
raised
in
his
petition
were
meritorious.
It disagreed with the RTCs ruling that the respondent did not present any
evidence that the petitioner bank had knowledge of the defect in Calinicos title
to the mortgaged land. According to the CA, the petitioner bank knew that
there were conflicting claims over the land, and that the OCT of this land
carried a prohibition of any encumbrance on the lot for five (5) years. It added
that the petitioner bank failed to exercise diligence in ascertaining the
ownership of the land, and ignored the respondents representations that
Calinicos title was defective and was only for loan purposes.
The Ilogon spouses and the petitioner bank moved to reconsider this decision,
but the CA denied their motion in its resolution dated May 26, 2006.
The Petition for Review on Certiorari
In the present petition, the petitioner bank alleged that the respondents
petition for relief from judgment is unmeritorious as it was filed only after the
lapse of ninety-one (91) days from his (respondents) notice of the adverse
judgment. The bank also claimed that the failure of the respondents counsel to
file a timely motion for reconsideration from the RTCs judgment did not
constitute excusable negligence so as to warrant the granting of the
respondents
petition.
The petitioner bank further maintained that the real estate mortgage over the
land was valid because: (1) its validity was never raised as an issue before the
trial court; and (2) the petitioner bank is exempted from the 5-year prohibitory
period since it is a Government branch, unit or institution.
In his comment, the respondent,14 represented by his heirs, maintained that
his counsels negligence was excusable, and that the petitioner bank was a
mortgagee in bad faith.
Our Ruling
After
RTC
due
consideration,
judgment
we
resolve
already
to
final
grant
the
petition.
and
executory
We note at the outset that the RTCs September 13, 1993 decision which
dismissed the respondents complaint for annulment of real estate mortgage,
cancellation of original certificate of title, reconveyance, recovery of possession
and damages had already become final and executory due to the failure of his
counsel to file a timely motion for reconsideration. This fact was admitted by
the respondent himself in his various pleadings before the lower and appellate
courts,
as
well
as
in
his
comment
before
this
Court.
Both the law and jurisprudence hold that the perfection of an appeal in the
manner and within the period prescribed by law is mandatory. Failure to
conform to the rules on appeal renders the judgment final, executory and
unappealable. Finality means that the decision can no longer be disturbed or
reopened no matter how erroneous the ruling might have been. The decision
fully binds, and should be complied with by the parties and their successors in
interest.
The
Petition
for
Relief
was
filed
out
of
time
We sustain the trial courts denial of the respondents petition for relief from
judgment
to
challenge
its
final
and
executory
decision.
Section 3, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure lays down the
requirements
for
a
petition
for
relief
from
judgment,
thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 3. Time for filing petition; contents and verification. - A petition
provided for in either of the preceding sections of this Rule must be verified,
filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final
order, or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months
after such judgment or final order was entered, or such proceeding was taken;
and must be accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake,
or excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting the petitioner's
good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be.
A party filing a petition for relief from judgment must strictly comply with two
(2) reglementary periods: first, the petition must be filed within sixty (60) days
from knowledge of the judgment, order or other proceeding to be set aside;
and second, within a fixed period of six (6) months from entry of such
judgment,
order
or
other
proceeding.
Strict compliance with these periods is required because a petition for relief
from judgment is a final act of liberality on the part of the State, which remedy
cannot be allowed to erode any further the fundamental principle that a
judgment, order or proceeding must, at some definite time, attain finality in
order
to
put
an
end
to
litigation.15cralawlawlibrary
In the present case, the respondents counsel received a copy of the RTCs
decision dated September 13, 1993 on September 15, 1993. Thus, the petition
for relief from judgment should have been filed on or before November 14,
1993. However, the records showed that the petition was filed only on
December
15,
1993,
or
ninety-one
(91)
days
later.
Strict compliance with the periods stated under Rule 38 stems from the
equitable character and nature of the petition for relief. Indeed, relief is allowed
only in exceptional cases such as when there is no other available or adequate
remedy. As a petition for relief is actually the "last chance" given by law to
litigants to question a final judgment or order, the failure to avail of this final
chance within the grace period fixed by the Rules is fatal. 16cralawlawlibrary
The respondents cited circumstances are not the proper subject of a petition for
relief
from
the
judgment
Section 1, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that [w]hen a
judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken
against a party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence, he may file a petition in the same court and in the same case
praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside.
Relief from judgment is a remedy provided by law to any person against whom
a decision or order is entered through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence. It is a remedy, equitable in character, that is allowed only in
do
not
find
this
explanation
persuasive.
adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants alike are enjoined to abide strictly
by the rules. While in certain instances, we allow a relaxation in the
application of the rules, we never intend to forge a weapon for erring litigants to
violate the rules with impunity. The liberal interpretation and application of the
rules apply only in proper cases of demonstrable merit and under justifiable
causes and circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a game of
technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in
accordance with the prescribed procedure to ensure an orderly and speedy
administration of justice. Party litigants and their counsel are well advised to
abide by, rather than flaunt, procedural rules; these rules illumine the path of
the law and place the pursuit of justice in reasonable and orderly basis.
In his petition for relief, the respondent also claimed that the petitioner bank
was not a lender in good faith since it knew that the mortgaged land was not
owned by the Ilogon spouses. He added that the petitioner bank and the Ilogon
spouses connived with each other to release the loan to Calinico.
We stress that the mistake contemplated by Rule 38 of the Rules of Court
pertains generally to one of fact, not of law. It does not refer to a judicial errors
that the court might have committed. Such judicial errors may be corrected by
means of an appeal. To recall, the respondent already raised these grounds in
his complaint for annulment of real estate mortgage, cancellation of original
certificate of title, reconveyance, recovery of possession and damages before the
RTC. Indeed, relief will not be granted to a party who seeks avoidance from the
effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own
(or that of his counsels) negligence; otherwise, the petition for relief can be
used to revive the right to appeal which had been lost through inexcusable
negligence.18cralawlawlibrary
At any rate, the grounds raised by the respondent are unmeritorious.
We are aware of the rule that banks are expected to exercise more care and
prudence than private individuals in their dealings, even those involving
registered lands, since their business is impressed with public interest. The
rule that persons dealing with registered lands can rely solely on the certificate
of title does not apply to banks.19 Simply put, the ascertainment of the status
or condition of a property offered to it as security for a loan must be a standard
and
indispensable
part
of
a
banks
operations.20cralawlawlibrary
In the present case, however, nothing in the documents presented by Calinico
would arouse the suspicion of the petitioner bank to prompt a more extensive
inquiry. When the Ilogon spouses applied for a loan, they presented as
collateral a parcel of land evidenced by OCT No. P-2034 issued by the Office of
the Register of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro, and registered in the name of Calinico.
This document did not contain any inscription or annotation indicating that
the respondent was the owner or that he has any interest in the subject land.
In fact, the respondent admitted that there was no encumbrance annotated on
Calinicos title at the time of the latters loan application. Any private
arrangement between Calinico and the respondent regarding the proceeds of
the loan was not the concern of the petitioner bank, as it was not a privy to
this agreement. If Calinico violated the terms of his agreement with the
respondent on the turn-over of the proceeds of the loan, then the latter's proper
recourse was to file the appropriate criminal action in court.
The respondent also failed to prove its allegation that the petitioner bank knew,
thru a letter sent by the formers lawyer, Atty. Crisanto Mutya, Jr., that the sale
of the subject land between him and Calinico was made only for loan purposes,
and that failure of Calinico to turn over the proceeds of the loan will invalidate
the sale. In his November 6, 1991 testimony, the respondent admitted that it
was his son who gave the letter to the manager of the petitioner bank,
thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ATTY. REYNALDO LLEGO:
Q:
Mr. Contreras, may I just show to you Exhibit C, the letter addressed to
Amanah Bank. You said that, this letter Exhibit C was received by the
Manager of the bank. May I know from you the name of the Manager at
that time?
EVANGELISTA CONTRERAS:
A:
I did not know the name of the Manager at that time. Because it was
my son who brought this Exhibit C to the bank, and according to
him it was the personnel of the bank who received Exhibit C.
Q:
And this was received on what date?
A:
May 20, 1981.
Q:
Directing your attention to Exhibit B which is the supposed counter
agreement. You will of course agree with me that the bank has no
knowledge of the execution of that agreement, is that correct?
A:
When my lawyer wrote a letter to the bank at that time, he attached
one of the Xerox copy of this Exhibit B.
xxxx
Q:
The title of the land was already in the name of the spouses Ilogon.
A:
Clearly, the respondent testified on matters not of his own personal knowledge,
hence hearsay. Corollarily, the respondents son was never presented in court.
Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the petitioner bank received a
copy of Atty. Mutyas letter,22 it was still well-within its discretion to grant or
deny the loan application after evaluating the documents submitted for loan
applicant. As earlier stated, OCT No. P-2034 issued in Calinicos favor was free
from any encumbrances. The petitioner bank is not anymore privy to whatever
arrangements the owner entered into regarding the proceeds of the loan.
Finally, we point out that the petitioner bank is a government owned or
controlled corporation. While OCT No. P-2034 (issued in favor of Calinico by
virtue of the deed of confirmation of sale) contained a prohibition against the
alienation and encumbrance of the subject land within five (5) years from the
date of the patent, the CA failed to mention that by the express wordings of the
OCT itself, the prohibition does not cover the alienation and encumbrance in
favor
of the
Government
or any of its branches, units or
23
institutions. cralawlawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, we GRANT the present petition,
and SET ASIDE the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals dated May
4, 2004 and May 26, 2006, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 47053. Accordingly,
the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Cagayan de Oro City dated
September
13,
1993
is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.cralawred
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 191101, October 01, 2014
SPOUSES MARIO OCAMPO AND CARMELITA F.
OCAMPO, Petitioners, v. HEIRS OF BERNARDINO U. DIONISIO,
REPRESENTED BY ARTEMIO SJ. DIONISIO, Respondents.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court seeking to annul and set aside the Decision 2 dated July 2, 2009
and Resolution3 dated January 27, 2010 issued by the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 106064, which affirmed the Decision 4 dated September 3, 2008
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Binangonan, Rizal, Branch 69, in SCA Case
No. 08-014.
The Facts
On August 28, 1996, Bernardino U. Dionisio (Dionisio) filed a complaint 5 for
forcible entry with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Cardona, Rizal, docketed
as Civil Case No. 96-0031 (forcible entry case), against Mario Ocampo (Mario)
and Felix Ocampo (Felix). Dionisio sought to recover the possession of a portion
of his property, covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. M-4559,
situated in Dalig, Cardona, Rizal, alleging that Mario and Felix built a piggery
thereon without his consent. In his answer,6 Mario denied Dionisio's allegation,
claiming that the disputed parcel of land is owned by his wife, Carmelita
Ocampo (Carmelita), who inherited the same from her father. Mario further
claimed that they have been in possession of the said parcel of land since
1969.
On September 12, 1997, the MTC rendered a decision,7 which dismissed the
complaint for forcible entry filed by Dionisio. The MTC opined that Dionisio
failed to establish his prior possession of the disputed parcel of land. Dionisio's
notice of appeal was denied by the MTC in its Order 8 dated January 26, 1998
for
having
been
filed
beyond
the
reglementary
period.
Dionisio died on September 27, 1997. Consequently, on July 3, 1998, the heirs
of Dionisio (respondents), filed a complaint9 for recovery of possession with the
MTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 98-0006 (recovery of possession case), against
the spouses Mario and Carmelita (petitioners). The respondents sought to
recover the same portion of the parcel of land subject of Civil Case No. 960031.
The respondents averred that the subject property was acquired by Dionisio on
February 10, 1945 when he purchased the same from Isabelo Capistrano. That
Dionisio thereafter took possession of the subject property and was able to
obtain a free patent covering the subject property. OCT No. M-4559 was
subsequently issued in the name of Dionisio on December 22, 1987. The
respondents further claimed that sometime in 1995, Mario constructed a
piggery on a portion of the subject property without their consent. 10cralawred
In their answer,11 the petitioners maintained that the subject parcel of land is
owned by Carmelita, having acquired the same through inheritance and that
they have been in possession thereof since 1969. Additionally, the petitioners
claimed that the respondents' complaint for recovery of possession of the
subject property is barred by res judicata in the light of the finality of the
decision
in
the
forcible
entry
case.
On February 18, 2008, the MTC rendered a decision 12 dismissing the complaint
for recovery of possession filed by the respondents on the ground of res
judicata. Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Court has taken cognizance of the fact that the earlier case for forcible
entry docketed as Civil Case No. 96-0031 was filed by Bernardino U. Dionisio
against the same defendant Mario Ocampo before this Court on August 28,
1996, and a decision based on the merit was rendered on September 12, 1997
where this Court ruled to dismiss the complaint for failure on the part of the
plaintiff to establish their prior possession of the land and sufficient evidence
to
establish
cause
of
action
by
preponderance
of
evidence.
x
the
of cause of action as between the forcible entry case and the recovery of
possession case. The CA likewise affirmed the RTC's finding that the
respondents, as successors-in-interest of Dionisio, have sufficiently established
their ownership of the subject property and, hence, are entitled to the
possession thereof. Further, the CA held that the respondents' cause of action
is
not
barred
by laches.
The petitioners sought a reconsideration of the Decision dated July 2, 2009,
but it was denied by the CA in its Resolution 17 dated January 27, 2010.
Hence, the instant petition.
Issues
Essentially, the issues set forth by the petitioners for this Court's resolution are
the following: (1) whether the finality of the decision in the forcible entry case
constitutes res judicata, which would warrant the dismissal of the respondents'
complaint for recovery of possession; (2) whether the respondents were able to
establish their ownership of the subject property; and (3) whether the
respondents' cause of action is already barred by laches.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is denied.
First Issue: Res Judicata
The doctrine of res judicata is laid down under Section 47, Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court, which pertinently provides that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sec. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. The effect of a judgment or final
order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce
the judgment or final order, may be as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
x
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter
directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in
relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest
by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding,
litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity;
and
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties of their successors in
interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or
final order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was
actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.
This provision comprehends two distinct concepts of res judicata: (1) bar by
former judgment and (2) conclusiveness of judgment.18 In Judge Abelita III v.
P/Supt. Doria, et al.,19 the Court explained the two aspects of res judicata,
thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
There is "bar by prior judgment" when, as between the first case where the
judgment was rendered and the second case that is sought to be barred, there
is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. In this instance, the
judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the second action.
Otherwise put, the judgment or decree of the court of competent jurisdiction on
the merits concludes the litigation between the parties, as well as their privies,
and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same cause of action
before
the
same
or
other
tribunal.
But where there is identity of parties in the first and second cases, but no
identity of causes of action, the first judgment is conclusive only as to those
matters actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to
matters merely involved therein. This is the concept of res judicata known as
"conclusiveness of judgment." Stated differently, any right, fact or matter in
issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an
action before a competent court in which judgment is rendered on the merits is
conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated
between the parties and their privies whether or not the claim, demand,
purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the same.20
For res judicata under the first concept, bar by prior judgment, to apply, the
following requisites must concur, viz: (a) finality of the former judgment; (b) the
court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be, between
the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter and causes of
action.21cralawred
The first three requisites are present in this case. The Decision dated
September 12, 1997 in the forcible entry case rendered by the MTC, a court
which has jurisdiction over the subject property and the parties, had long
become final. The said MTC decision is an adjudication on the merits. However,
the fourth requisite is not present. Although there is identity of parties and
subject matter as between the forcible entry case and recovery of possession
case,
there
is
no
identity
of
causes
of
action.
As correctly found by the RTC and the CA, the forcible entry case only involves
the issue of possession over the subject property while the recovery of
possession case puts in issue the ownership of the subject property and the
concomitant right to possess the same as an attribute of ownership.
In an action for forcible entry and detainer, the only issue is possession in fact,
or physical possession of real property, independently of any claim of
ownership that either party may put forth in his pleading. If plaintiff can prove
prior physical possession in himself, he may recover such possession even from
the owner, but, on the other hand, if he cannot prove such prior physical
possession, he has no right of action for forcible entry and detainer even if he
should
be
the
owner
of
the
property. 22cralawred
Thus, even the MTC, in its Decision dated September 12, 1997 in the forcible
entry case, stressed that its determination is only limited to the issue of who
has "actual prior possession" of the subject property regardless of the
ownership
of
the
same.23cralawred
On the other hand, the recovery of possession case is actually an accion
reinvindicatoria or a suit to recover possession of a parcel of land as an element
of ownership. A perusal of the complaint filed by the respondents in the
recovery of possession case shows that the respondents, as successors-ininterest of Dionisio, are asserting ownership of the subject property and are
seeking
the
recovery
of
possession
thereof.
A judgment rendered in a forcible entry case will not bar an action between the
same parties respecting title or ownership because between a case for forcible
entry and an accion reinvindicatoria, there is no identity of causes of
action.24 Such determination does not bind the title or affect the ownership of
the land; neither is it conclusive of the facts therein found in a case between
the same parties upon a different cause of action involving possession.
The decision in the forcible entry case is conclusive only as to the MTC's
determination that the petitioners are not liable for forcible entry since the
respondents failed to prove their prior physical possession; it is not conclusive
as to the ownership of the subject property. Besides, Section 18, Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court expressly provides that a "judgment rendered in an action for
forcible entry or detainer shall be conclusive with respect to the possession
only and shall in no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the land."
Second Issue: Ownership of the Subject Property
The respondents were able to prove that they have a superior right over the
subject property as against the petitioners. It is undisputed that the subject
property is indeed covered by OCT No. M-4559, which is registered in the name
of
Dionisio,
the
respondents'
predecessor-in-interest.
Between the petitioners' unsubstantiated and self-serving claim that the
subject property was inherited by Carmelita from her father and OCT No. M4559 registered in Dionisio's name, the latter must prevail. The respondents'
title over the subject property is evidence of their ownership thereof. That a
certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title
to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein and that a
person who has a Torrens title over a land is entitled to the possession thereof
are fundamental principles observed in this jurisdiction. 25cralawred
Further, it is settled that a Torrens Certificate of Title is indefeasible and
binding upon the whole world unless and until it has been nullified by a court
of competent jurisdiction. Under existing statutory and decisional law, the
power to pass upon the validity of such certificate of title at the first instance
properly belongs to the Regional Trial Courts in a direct proceeding for
cancellation of title.26Accordingly, the petitioners may not assail the validity of
the issuance of OCT No. M-4559 in the name of Dionisio in their answer to the
complaint filed by the respondents for recovery of possession of the subject
property; it is a collateral attack to the validity of OCT No. M-4559, which the
RTC and the CA aptly disregarded.
Third Issue: Laches
Equally untenable is the petitioners' claim that the respondents' right to
recover the possession of the subject property is already barred by laches. As
owners of the subject property, the respondents have the right to recover the
possession thereof from any person illegally occupying their property. This right
October 31, 2007 (October 31, 2007 Decision) of the RTC in Civil Case No.
2002-058, but limiting the amount of petitioner Centennial Guarantee
Assurance Corporations (CGAC) liability to only P1,000,000.00.
The Facts
The instant petition originated from a Complaint for Breach of Contract with
Damages and Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraning
Order filed by Nissan Specialist Sales Corporation (NSSC) and its President and
General Manager, Reynaldo A. Orimaco (Orimaco), against herein respondents
Universal Motors Corporation (UMC), Rodrigo T. Janeo, Jr. (Janeo, Jr.), Gerardo
Gelle (Gelle), Nissan Cagayan de Oro Distributors, Inc. (NCOD), Jefferson U.
Rolida (Rolida), and Peter Yap (Yap). The case was raffled to the RTC and
docketed
as
Civil
Case
No.
2002-058.6cralawlawlibrary
The temporary restraining order (TRO) prayed for was eventually issued by
the RTC upon the posting by NSSC and Orimaco of a P1,000,000.00
injunction bond7issued by their surety, CGAC. The TRO enjoined
respondents UMC, Rolida,Gelle, Janeo, Jr., NCOD, and Yap (respondents) from
selling, dealing, and marketing all models of motor vehicles and spare parts of
Nissan, and from terminating the dealer agreement between UMC and NSSC. It
likewise restrained UMC from supplying and doing trading transactions with
NCOD, which, in turn, was enjoined from entering and doing business on
Nissan Products within the dealership territory of NSSC as defined in the
Dealer Agreement. The TRO was converted to a writ of preliminary injunction
on
April
2,
2002.8cralawlawlibrary
Respondents filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 70236, to assail the issuance of the aforesaid
injunctive writ. On July 24, 2002, the CA rendered a Decision holding that the
RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ absent a clear
legal right thereto on the part of NSSC and Orimaco. Consequently, the April
2, 2002 Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by the RTC was
ordered dissolved.9cralawlawlibrary
On May 27, 2004, respondents filed an application for damages against the
injunction
bond
issued
by
CGAC
in
the
amount
of
10
P1,000,000.00. cralawlawlibrary
The RTC Ruling
On October 31, 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision 11 dismissing the complaint
for breach of contract with damages for lack of merit. 12cralawlawlibrary
It further ruled that respondents were entitled to recover damages against the
injunction bond following the CAs pronouncement in CA-G.R. SP No.
70236, i.e., that NSSC and Orimaco had no clear legal right to justify the
issuance of the April 2, 2002 Writ of Preliminary Injunction, warranting its
dissolution.13cralawlawlibrary
Accordingly, the RTC ordered NSSC, Orimaco, and CGAC to jointly and
severally pay respondents the following amounts: actual damages and lost
opportunities suffered by UMC in the amounts of P928,913.68 and
P14,271,266.00, respectively; P50,000.00 as attorneys fees and P500,000.00
as lost income in favor of NCOD, Rolida, and Yap; and exemplary damages of
P300,000.00
for
each
of
the
respondents. 14cralawlawlibrary
Upon respondents motion,15 the RTC granted Execution Pending Appeal of its
October 31, 2007 Decision through an Order16dated January 16, 2008. It
ruled that there exists good reasons to justify the immediate execution of
the Decision, namely: (a) that NSSC is in imminent danger of insolvency being
admittedly in a state of rehabilitation under the supervision of the Regional
Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 40 through Special Proceeding No.
2002-095; (b) that it has ceased its business operation as the authorized dealer
of Nissan Motor Philippines, Inc.; (c) that Orimaco, NSSCs President and
General Manager, has migrated abroad with his family; and (d) that NSSC
failed to file the necessary supersedeas bond to forestall the immediate
execution of the Decision pending appeal.17 The RTC thereupon issued the
corresponding
writ.18cralawlawlibrary
CGAC assailed the RTCs January 16, 2008 Order before the CA through a
petition for certiorari,docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 02459-MIN, questioning the
existence of good reasons to warrant the grant of execution pending appeal and
the propriety of enforcing it against one which is not the losing party in the
case but a mere bondsman whose liability is limited to the surety bond it
issued.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision19 dated February 25, 2009, the CA affirmed in part the assailed
order by allowing the execution pending appeal of the RTCs October 31, 2007
Decision but limiting the amount of CGACs liability to only
P1,000,000.00.20cralawlawlibrary
It upheld the trial courts findings that there are good reasons warranting the
execution of the latters Decision pending appeal, not only against NSSC and
Orimaco, but also against CGAC whose liability, however, was declared to be
limited only to the extent of the amount of the bond it issued in favor of its
principals,
NSSC
and
Orimaco.21cralawlawlibrary
Aggrieved, CGAC filed a motion for reconsideration22 which was, however,
denied in a Resolution23dated August 14, 2009, hence, this petition.
The Issues Before the Court
The central issues in this case are: (a)whether or not good reasons exist to
justify execution pending appeal against CGAC which is a mere surety; and (b)
whether or not CGACs liability on the bond should be limited to P500,000.00.
The Courts Ruling
The
petition
is
unmeritorious.
President and General Manager Orimaco had permanently left the country with
his family, constitute such superior circumstances that demand urgency in the
execution of the October 31, 2007 Decision because respondents now run the
risk of its non-satisfaction by the time the appeal is decided with finality.
Notably, as early as April 22, 2008, the rehabilitation receiver had manifested
before the rehabilitation court the futility of rehabilitating NSSC because of the
latters
insincerity
in
the
implementation
of
the
rehabilitation
28
process. Clearly, respondents diminishing chances of recovery from the
favorable Decision is a good reason to justify immediate execution; hence,
it would be improper to set aside the order granting execution pending
appeal.
That CGACs financial standing differs from that of NSSC does not negate the
order of execution pending appeal. As the latters surety, CGAC is considered by
law as being the same party as the debtor in relation to whatever is adjudged
touching the obligation of the latter, and their liabilities are interwoven as to be
inseparable.29 Verily,in a contract of suretyship, one lends his credit by joining
in the principal debtors obligation so as to render himself directly and
primarily responsible with him, and without reference to the solvency of the
principal.30 Thus, execution pending appeal against NSSC means that the same
course of action is warranted against its surety, CGAC. The same reason stands
for CGACs other principal, Orimaco, who was determined to have permanently
left the country with his family to evade execution of any judgment against
him.
Now, going to the second issue as above-stated, the Court resolves that CGACs
liability should as the CA correctly ruled be confined to the amount of
P1,000,000.00,
and
not
P500,000.00
as
the
latter
purports.
Section 4(b), Rule 58 of the Rules provides that the injunction bond is
answerable for all damages that may be occasioned by the improper issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction.31 The Court has held in Paramount Insurance
Corp. v. CA32 that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The bond insures with all practicable certainty that the defendant may sustain
no ultimate loss in the event that the injunction could finally be dissolved.
Consequently, the bond may obligate the bondsmen to account to the
defendant in the injunction suit for all: (1) such damages; (2) costs and
damages; (3) costs, damages and reasonable attorneys fees as shall be
facts
are
culled
from
the
records
of
the
case.
and that it would be better to take this opportunity rather than pursue a
prolonged legal battle with Ducat. Gomezs recommendation was brought to
Zobels attention. The property-for-debt exchange was subsequently approved
by the AIFL Board of Directors even without a prior appraisal of the Harris
County property. However, before the exchange actually closed, an AIFL
director
asked
respondent
to
obtain
such
an
appraisal.
William Craig (Craig), a former owner of the Harris County property, conducted
the appraisal of the market value of the said property. In his January 1983
appraisal, Craig estimated the fair market value of the Harris County property
at
US$3,365,000.
Negotiations finally culminated in an Agreement, 6 executed on January 27,
1983 in Makati City, Philippines, among 1488, Inc., represented by Daic;
Ducat, represented by Precioso Perlas (Perlas); AIFL, represented by Joselito
Gallardo (Gallardo); and PHILSEC and Athona Holdings, N. V. (ATHONA), both
represented by respondent. Under the Agreement, the total amount of Ducats
debts was reduced from US$3.1 million to US$2.5 million; ATHONA, a
company wholly owned by PHILSEC and AIFL, would buy the Harris County
property from 1488, Inc. for the price of US$2,807,209.02; PHILSEC and AIFL
would grant ATHONA a loan of US$2.5 million, which ATHONA would entirely
use as initial payment for the purchase price of the Harris County property;
ATHONA would execute a promissory note in favor of 1488, Inc. in the sum of
US$307,209.02 to cover the balance of the purchase price for the Harris
County property; upon its receipt of the initial payment of US$2.5 million from
ATHONA, 1488, Inc. would then fully pay Ducats debts to PHILSEC and AIFL
in the same amount; for their part, PHILSEC and AIFL would release and
transfer possession of Ducats pledged stock portfolio to 1488, Inc.; and 1488,
Inc. would become the new creditor of Ducat, subject to such other terms as
they
might
agree
upon.
The series of transactions per the Agreement was eventually executed. However,
after acquiring the Harris County property, ATHONA had difficulty selling the
same. Despite repeated demands by 1488, Inc., ATHONA failed to pay its
promissory note for the balance of the purchase price for the Harris County
property, and PHILSEC and AIFL refused to release the remainder of Ducats
stock portfolio, claiming that they were defrauded into believing that the said
property had a fair market value higher than it actually had.
Civil
Action
No.
H-86-440
before
the
U.S.
of
District
Court
Texas,
of
Southern
Houston
District
Division
On October 17, 1985, 1488, Inc. instituted a suit against PHILSEC, AIFL, and
ATHONA for (a) misrepresenting that an active market existed for two shares of
stock included in Ducats portfolio when, in fact, said shares were to be
withdrawn from the trading list; (b) conversion of the stock portfolio; (c) fraud,
as ATHONA had never intended to abide by the provisions of its promissory
note when they signed it; and (d) acting in concert as a common enterprise or
in the alternative, that ATHONA was the alter ego of PHILSEC and AIFL. The
suit was docketed as Civil Action No. H-86-440 before the U.S. District Court.
PHILSEC, AIFL, and ATHONA filed counterclaims against 1488, Inc., Daic,
Craig, Ducat, and respondent, for the recovery of damages and excess payment
or, in the alternative, the rescission of the sale of the Harris County property,
alleging fraud, negligence, and conspiracy on the part of counter-defendants
who knew or should have known that the value of said property was less than
the
appraisal
value
assigned
to
it
by
Craig.
Before the referral of the case to the jury for verdict, the U.S. District Court
dropped respondent as counter-defendant for lack of evidence to support the
allegations against him. Respondent then moved in open court to sanction
petitioner (formerly PHILSEC), AIFL, and ATHONA based on Rule 11 of the U.S.
Federal
Rules
of
Civil
Procedure.7
In its Order dated March 13, 1990, the U.S. District Court stated that on
February 14, 1990, after trial, the jury returned a verdict for 1488, Inc. In the
same Order, the U.S. District Court ruled favorably on respondents pending
motion for sanction, thus:
During the course of the trial, the Court was required to review plaintiffs
Exhibit No. 91 to determine whether the exhibit should be admitted. After
reviewing the exhibit and hearing the evidence, the Court concluded that the
defendants counterclaims against Edgardo V. Guevara are frivolous and
brought against him simply to humiliate and embarrass him. It is the opinion
of the Court that the defendants, Philsec Investment Corporation, A/K/A BPI
Securities, Inc., and Ayala International Finance Limited, should be sanctioned
appropriately based on Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 and the Courts inherent powers to
punish unconscionable conduct. Based upon the motion and affidavit of
Edgardo V. Guevara, the Court finds that $49,450 is reasonable punishment.
(4)
(5)
(6)
Stone v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 554 S.W.2d 183, 185 (Tex.1977). We agree
with the district courts decision to grant a directed verdict against the
defendants. The defendants failed to allege sufficient facts to establish the
elements necessary to demonstrate fraud. In particular, the defendants have
failed to allege any facts that would tend to show that the plaintiff or any of the
third party defendants made a false representation or a representation with
reckless
disregard
as
to
its
truth.
The Houston real estate market was extremely volatile during the late 1970s
and the early 1980s. Like a stream of hot air, property values rose rapidly as
the heat and fury generated by speculation and construction plans mounted,
but, just as rapidly, the climate cooled and the high-flying market came
crashing to an all time low. The real estate transaction involved in this case
was certainly affected by this environment of capriciousness. Moreover, a
number of additional variables may have contributed to the uncertainty of its
value. For instance, the land abutted a two-lane asphalt road that had been
targeted by the state for conversion into a major multi-lane divided highway.
Water and sewage treatment facilities were located near the boundary lines of
the property. In addition, Houstons lack of conventional zoning ordinances
meant that the value of the property could fluctuate depending upon the use
(commercial or residential) for which the property would ultimately be used.
[3] The fact that the defendants were unable to sell the property at the price for
which it had been appraised does not demonstrate that the plaintiff or the
third party defendants knew that the value of the property was less than the
appraised value, nor does it establish that the opposing parties were guilty of
negligent
misrepresentation
or
negligence.
[4] In support of their allegation of fraud, the defendants rely heavily on a loan
application completed by 1488 shortly before the subject property was
transferred to Athona. See Defendants Exhibit 29. At the time, 1488 still owed
approximately $300,000 to Republic of Texas Savings Association on its
original loan for the subject property. The debt had matured and 1488 was
planning to move the loan to Home Savings Association of Houston, that is,
take out a loan from Home Savings to pay off the debt to Republic. 1488 had
planned to borrow $350,000 for that purpose. A line item on the Home
Savings loan application form asked for the amount of the loan as a percentage
of the appraised value of the land. A figure of thirty-nine percent was typed
into that space, and the defendants suggest that this proves that the plaintiff
knew Craigs appraisal was erroneous. The defendants reason that if the
$350,000 loan amount was only thirty-nine percent of the lands appraised
value, then the real estate must have been worth approximately $897,436.
Although their analysis is sound, the conclusion reached by the defendants
cannot withstand additional scrutiny. At the time that the loan application
was completed, 1488 did not request to have a new appraisal done for the
property. Instead, 1488 planned to use the numbers that had been generated
for a quasi-appraisal done in 1977. The 1977 report purported only to
supplement an earlier appraisal that had been conducted in 1974, and the
[9] In their briefs, the defendants fail to provide an adequate explanation for
their failure to identify their expert witness in accordance with the district
courts pretrial order. This law suit was initiated in 1985, and the defendants
had until November of 1988 to designate their expert witnesses. The
defendants were aware of the condemnation proceedings, and they, therefore,
had approximately three years to determine the identity of any appraiser used
by the state. The defendants simply failed to make this inquiry.
Enforcement of the district courts pretrial order did not leave the defendants
without an expert witness on the issue of valuation, and the available expert
had also conducted appraisals for the Texas Highway Department in the area
surrounding
the
subject
property.
x
x
x
Although the degree of prejudice suffered by the plaintiff due to the late
designation of an expert would not have been great, a district court still has the
discretion to control pretrial discovery and sanction a partys failure to follow a
scheduling order. See id. at 791. Such action is particularly appropriate here,
where the defendants have failed to provide an adequate explanation for their
failure to identify their expert within the designated timetable.
x
The defendants failed to produce enough evidence from which fraud could be
inferred to justify the submission of the issue to a jury. Conclusional
allegations or speculation regarding what the plaintiff knew or did not know
concerning the value of the subject property are insufficient to withstand a
motion for a directed verdict. The district court committed no error in granting
the
motion.
x
Since the defendants failed to present the district court with any facts that
would tend to show that the plaintiffs committed a fraud against them, their
claim of a conspiracy to commit fraud must also fail.9
The U.S. Court of Appeals likewise adjudged that petitioner, AIFL, and ATHONA
failed to prove negligence on the part of 1488, Inc., Daic, Craig, and Ducat in
the appraisal of the market value of the said property:
[10, 11] The defendants have likewise failed to present any facts that would
tend to support their claim of negligent misrepresentation or negligence. The
Public Safety and Corrections, 901 F.2d 1288, 1293-94 (5th Cir.1990).
Providing specific notice and an opportunity to respond is particularly
important in cases, such as the one before us, in which the sanctions have
been imposed on the clients and not the attorneys. See Donaldson v. Clark,
819 F.2d 1551, 1560 (11th Cir.1987) (If sanctions are proposed to be imposed
on the client, due process will demand more specific notice because the client
is likely unaware of the existence of Rule 11 and should be given the
opportunity to prepare a defense.). A separate hearing is not a prerequisite to
the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions, see Donaldson, 819 F.2d at 1560 n. 12,
but the defendants in this case, should have been given more of an opportunity
to respond to the motion than that provided at the hearing in which the motion
was first raised. Providing the defendant with an opportunity to mount a
defense on the spot does not comport with due process. Given that the
defendants were not provided with adequate notice or an opportunity to be
heard, we vacate the award of sanctions and remand so that the district court
can provide the defendants with an adequate opportunity to be heard.11
Finally, the U.S. Court of Appeals similarly vacated the award of attorneys fees
and remanded the matter to the U.S. District Court for recalculation to
conform with the requirements provided in the promissory note.
In accordance with the Decision dated September 3, 1991 of the U.S. Court of
Appeals, the U.S. District Court issued an Order 12 dated October 28, 1991
giving petitioner, AIFL, and ATHONA 20 days to formally respond to
respondents motion for Rule 11 sanctions. Petitioner, AIFL, and ATHONA
jointly filed before the U.S. District Court their opposition to respondents
motion for Rule 11 sanctions.13 Respondent filed his reply to the opposition, to
which petitioner, AIFL, and ATHONA, in turn, filed a reply-brief. 14
In an Order15 dated December 31, 1991, the U.S. District Court still found
respondents motion for Rule 11 sanctions meritorious and reinstated its Order
dated March 13, 1990:
The basis of the Courts prior decision as well as now is the fact that the
defendants filed suit against Guevara with knowledge that the basis of the suit
was unfounded. In the defendants file was an appraisal from an international
appraisal firm, which the defendants refused to disclose during discovery and
was only discovered at a bench conference during a discussion about
appraisers. Based on the defendants own appraisers, no basis existed for a
suit
by
the
defendants
against
their
employee.
Case
57
No.
of
the
RTC
92-1445
of
Makati
before
City
In his Complaint for the enforcement of the Order dated March 13, 1990 of the
U.S. District Court in Civil Action No. H-86-440, respondent prayed that
petitioner be ordered to pay:
1. The sum of US$49,450.00 or its equivalent in Philippine Pesos x x x with
interest from date of demand;
2. Attorneys fees and litigation expenses in the sum of P250,000.00;
3. Exemplary damages of P200,000.00; and
4. Costs of the suit.16
Thereafter, the parties formally offered their respective evidence which entirely
consisted of documentary exhibits. Respondent submitted authenticated and
certified true copies of Rule 11 of the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure;19 the Orders dated March 13, 1990, October 28, 1991, and
December 31, 1991 of the U.S. District Court in Civil Action No. H-86440;20 the Decision dated September 3, 1991 of the U.S. Court of Appeals in
Case No. 90-2370;21 and the opposition to respondents motion for Rule 11
sanctions and reply-brief filed by PHILSEC, AIFL, and ATHONA before the U.S.
District Court.22 Petitioner presented photocopies of pleadings, documents,
and transcripts of stenographic notes in Civil Action No. H-86-440 before the
U.S. District Court;23 the pleadings filed in other cases related to Civil Case No.
92-1440;24 and a summary of lawyers fees incurred by petitioner in the U.S. 25
The RTC admitted in evidence the documentary exhibits of the parties in its
Orders dated September 21, 1998 and February 8, 1999,26 and then deemed
the
case
submitted
for
decision.
The RTC rendered a Decision on September 11, 2000 with the following
dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of [respondent] Edgardo V.
Guevara ordering [petitioner] BPI Securities Corporation to pay [respondent]
the following:
1. the sum of US$49,500.00 with legal interest from the filing of this case
until fully paid;
2. the sum of P250,000.00 as attorneys fees and litigation expenses; and
3. the costs of suit.
An award of exemplary damages for P200,000.00 is denied for being
speculative.27
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, assigning the following errors on
the part of the RTC:
A. The trial court erred in not passing upon the merit or validity of
[petitioners] defenses against the enforcement of the foreign judgment in
the
Philippines.
In its Decision dated December 19, 2003, the Fifth Division of the Court of
Appeals decreed:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 11 September 2000 in Civil Case No. 921445 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 57, is hereby AFFIRMED in
all respect with costs against [petitioner].29
In its Motion for Reconsideration,30 petitioner lamented that the Fifth Division
of the Court of Appeals failed to resolve on its own petitioners appeal as the
Decision dated December 19, 2003 of the said Division was copied
almost verbatim from respondents brief. Thus, petitioner prayed that the Fifth
Division of the Court of Appeals recuse itself from deciding petitioners Motion
for Reconsideration and that the case be re-raffled to another division.
The Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals maintained in its Resolution dated
May 25, 2004 that the issues and contentions of the parties were all duly
passed upon and that the case was decided according to its merits. The said
Division, nonetheless, abstained from resolving petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration
and
directed
the
re-raffle
of
the
case. 31
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was re-raffled to and subsequently
resolved by the Tenth Division of the Court of Appeals. In its Resolution dated
February 9, 2005, the Tenth Division of the appellate court denied the said
Motion
for
lack
of
merit.32
Hence, petitioner seeks recourse from this Court via the instant Petition for
Review, insisting that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the RTC
judgment which enforced the Order dated March 13, 1990 of the U.S. District
Court
in
Civil
Action
No.
H-86-440.
Petitioner contends that it was not accorded by the Court of Appeals the right
to refute the foreign judgment pursuant to Rule 39, Section 48 of the Rules of
Court because the appellate court gave the effect of res judicata to the said
foreign judgment. The Court of Appeals copied wholesale orverbatim the
respondents brief without addressing the body of evidence adduced by
petitioner showing that it had reasonable grounds to implead respondent in
Civil
Action
No.
H-86-440.
Petitioner asserts that the U.S. District Court committed a clear mistake of law
and fact in its issuance of the Order dated March 13, 1990, thus, said Order is
unenforceable in this jurisdiction. Petitioner discusses in detail its evidence
proving that respondent, together with 1488, Inc., Ducat, Craig, and Daic,
induced petitioner to agree to a fraudulent deal. Petitioner points out that
respondent had the duty of looking for an independent and competent
appraiser of the market value of the Harris County property; that instead of
choosing an unbiased and skilled appraiser, respondent connived with 1488,
Inc., Ducat, and Daic in selecting Craig, who turned out to be the former owner
of the Harris County property and a close associate of 1488, Inc. and Daic; and
that respondent endorsed to petitioner Craigs appraisal of the market value of
the Harris County property, which was overvalued by more than 400%.
According to petitioner, it had reasonable grounds to implead respondent in
Civil Action No. H-86-440 so the sanction imposed upon it under Rule 11 of the
Court
finds
the
Petition
bereft
of
merit.
the complainant will have to establish before the court the tortious act or
omission committed by the tortfeasor, who in turn is allowed to rebut these
factual allegations or prove extenuating circumstances. Extensive litigation is
thus conducted on the facts, and from there the right to and amount of
damages are assessed. On the other hand,in an action to enforce a foreign
judgment, the matter left for proof is the foreign judgment itself, and not
the
facts
from
which
it
prescinds.
As stated in Section 48, Rule 39, the actionable issues are generally
restricted to a review of jurisdiction of the foreign court, the service of
personal notice, collusion, fraud, or mistake of fact or law. The limitations
on review [are] in consonance with a strong and pervasive policy in all
legal systems to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues.
Otherwise known as the policy of preclusion, it seeks to protect party
expectations resulting from previous litigation, to safeguard against the
harassment of defendants, to insure that the task of courts not be
increased by never-ending litigation of the same disputes, and in a larger
sense to promote what Lord Coke in the Ferrers Case of 1599 stated to
be the goal of all law: rest and quietness. If every judgment of a foreign
court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on
his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously
concluded litigation.36 (Emphases supplied, citations omitted.)
Also relevant herein are the following pronouncements of the Court in Minoru
Fujiki v. Marinay37:
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not
require relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot
presume to know the foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was
rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition
and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of
another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign
judgment as
a
fact according
to
the
rules
of
evidence.
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or
final order against a person creates a presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.
Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of Court states that the judgment or final
order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to
the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Thus, Philippine
courts exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not
allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign
judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be
repelled on grounds external to its merits, i.e., want of jurisdiction, want
of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
The rule on limited review embodies the policy of efficiency and the
protection of party expectations, as well as respecting the jurisdiction of
other states. (Emphases supplied, citations omitted.)
As the foregoing jurisprudence had established, recognition and enforcement of
a foreign judgment or final order requires only proof of fact of the said
judgment or final order. In an action in personam, as in the case at bar, the
foreign judgment or final order enjoys the disputable presumption of validity. It
is the party attacking the foreign judgment or final order that is tasked with
the burden of overcoming its presumptive validity.38 A foreign judgment or final
order may only be repelled on grounds external to its merits, particularly, want
of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
law
or
fact.
The fact of a foreign final order in this case is not disputed. It was duly
established by evidence submitted to the RTC that the U.S. District Court
issued an Order on March 13, 1990 in Civil Action No. H-86-440 ordering
petitioner, AIFL, and ATHONA, to pay respondent the sum of US$49,450.00 as
sanction for filing a frivolous suit against respondent, in violation of Rule 11 of
the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The said Order became final when
its reinstatement in the Order dated December 31, 1991 of the U.S. District
Court was no longer appealed by petitioner, AIFL, and/or ATHONA.
The Order dated March 13, 1990 of the U.S. District Court in Civil Action No.
H-86-440 is presumptive evidence of the right of respondent to demand from
petitioner the payment of US$49,450.00 even in this jurisdiction. The next
question then is whether petitioner was able to discharge the burden of
overcoming
the
presumptive
validity
of
said
Order.
The
Court
rules
in
the
negative.
none
of
these
documents
show
that
[respondent]
had
any
COURT
x
I am disturbed about that. I dont see any evidence at all in this case, after
listening to all of this evidence, that there ever was a lawsuit that could have
been brought against Guevara, and even after all of the discovery was done,
there was still no evidence of a conspiracy. There is no evidence of any
conspiracy to this good day that he could have been, but there is no proof of it,
and thats what we base these lawsuits on. Thats what the Rule 11 is designed
to
do,
to
deal
with
the
circumstance.
So, I brought it up to Mr. Guevara because I know the frustration, and irrespective
as to whether or not he brought it up, it would have been my position, my own
position as an officer of this Court to sanction the defendants in this case. That
is my opinion, that they are to be sanctioned because they have brought all of the
power that they have in the Philippines to bear and put pressure on this man so
that he would have to come over 10,000 miles to defend himself or to hire
lawyers to defend himself against a totally frivolous claim. 39 (Emphases
supplied.)
As for petitioners contention that the Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals, in
its Decision dated December 19, 2003, copied verbatim or wholesale from
respondents brief, the Court refers to its ruling in Halley v. Printwell,
Inc.,40 thus:
It is noted that the petition for review merely generally alleges that starting
from its page 5, the decision of the RTC copied verbatim the allegations of
herein Respondents in its Memorandum before the said court, as if the
Memorandum was the draft of the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig, but fails to specify either the portions allegedly lifted verbatim from the
memorandum, or why she regards the decision as copied. The omission
The general rule is that a client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of his
counsel in the realm of procedural technique. The basis is the tenet that an
act performed by counsel within the scope of a general or implied authority is
regarded as an act of the client. While the application of this general rule
certainly depends upon the surrounding circumstances of a given case, there
are exceptions recognized by this Court: (1) where reckless or gross negligence
of counsel deprives the client of due process of law; (2) when its application will
result in outright deprivation of the clients liberty or property; or (3) where the
interests
of
justice
so
require.
The present case does not fall under the said exceptions. In Amil v. Court of
Appeals,the Court held that to fall within the exceptional circumstance relied
upon x x x, it must be shown that the negligence of counsel must be so gross
that the client is deprived of his day in court. Thus, where a party was given
the opportunity to defend [its] interests in due course, [it] cannot be said to
have been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the
very essence of due process. To properly claim gross negligence on the part of
the counsel, the petitioner must show that the counsel was guilty of nothing
short of a clear abandonment of the clients cause. (Citations omitted.)
Finally, it is without question that the U.S. District Court, in its Order dated
March 13, 1990 in Civil Action No. H-86-440, ordered petitioner, AIFL, and
ATHONA to pay respondent US$49,450.00 as sanction for violating Rule 11 of
the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court noticed that throughout
its Decision dated September 11, 2000 in Civil Case No. 92-1445, the RTC
variably mentioned the amount of Rule 11 sanction imposed by the U.S.
District Court as US$49,450.00 and US$49,500.00, the latter obviously being
a typographical error. In the dispositive portion, though, the RTC ordered
petitioner to pay respondent US$49,500.00, which the Court hereby
corrects motu proprio to US$49,450.00 in conformity with the U.S. District
Court
Order
being
enforced.
The Court notes that during the pendency of the instant Petition before this
Court, respondent passed away on August 17, 2007, and is survived and
substituted by his heirs, namely: Ofelia B. Guevara, Ma. Leticia G. Allado, Jose
Edgardo B. Guevara, Jose Emmanuel B. Guevara, and Ma. Joselina G.
Gepuela.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The
Decision dated December 19, 2003 and Resolution dated February 9, 2005 of
the Court Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69348, affirming the Decision dated
September 11, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 57 in
Civil Case No. 92-1445, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that
petitioner BPI Securities Corporation is ordered to pay respondent Edgardo V.
Guevara the sum of US$49,450.00 or its equivalent in Philippine Peso, with
interest at six percent (6%) per annum from the filing of the case before the
trial
court
on
May
28,
1992
until
fully
paid. 43
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 213525, January 27, 2015
FORTUNE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON
AUDIT (COA) PROPER; COA REGIONAL OFFICE NO. VI-WESTERN VISAYAS;
AUDIT GROUP LGS-B, PROVINCE OF ANTIQUE; AND PROVINCIAL
GOVERNMENT OF ANTIQUE, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Petitioner Fortune Life Insurance Company, Inc. seeks the reconsideration 1 of
the resolution promulgated on August 19, 2014,2 whereby the Court dismissed
its petition for certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court due to its non-compliance with the provisions of Rule 64, particularly for:
(a) the late filing of the petition; (b) the non-submission of the proof of service
and verified declaration; and (c) the failure to show grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the respondents.3chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Antecedents
Respondent Provincial Government of Antique (LGU) and the petitioner
executed a memorandum of agreement concerning the life insurance coverage
of qualified barangay secretaries, treasurers andtanod, the former obligating
P4,393,593.60 for the premium payment, and subsequently submitting the
corresponding disbursement voucher to COA-Antique for pre-audit. 4 The latter
office disallowed the payment for lack of legal basis under Republic Act No.
7160 (Local Government Code). Respondent LGU appealed but its appeal was
denied.
Consequently, the petitioner filed its petition for money claim in the COA. 5 On
November 15, 2012, the COA issued its decision denying the petition, 6 holding
that under Section 447 and Section 458 of theLocal Government Code only
municipal or city governments are expressly vested with the power to secure
group insurance coverage for barangay workers; and noting the LGUs failure to
comply with the requirement of publication under Section 21 of Republic Act
No.
9184
(Government
Procurement
Reform
Act).
The petitioner received a copy of the COA decision on December 14, 2012, 7 and
filed its motion for reconsideration on January 14, 2013. 8 However, the COA
denied the motion,9 the denial being received by the petitioner on July 14,
2014.10chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Hence, the petitioner filed the petition for certiorari on August 12, 2014, but the
petition for certiorariwas dismissed as earlier stated through the resolution
promulgated on August 19, 2014 for (a) the late filing of the petition; (b) the
non-submission of the proof of service and verified declaration; and (c) the
failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
respondents.cralawred
Issues
In its motion for reconsideration, the petitioner submits that it filed the petition
for certiorari within the reglementary period following the fresh period rule
enunciated in Neypes v. Court of Appeals;11 and that the petition for certiorari
included an affidavit of service in compliance with Section 3, Rule 13 of
the Rules of Court. It admits having overlooked the submission of a verified
declaration; and prays that the declaration attached to the motion for
reconsideration be admitted by virtue of its substantial compliance with the
not
comply
with
The petitioner claims that the affidavit of service attached to the petition
for certiorari complied with the requirement on proof of service.
The claim is unwarranted. The petitioner obviously ignores that Section 13,
Rule 13 of the Rules of Court concerns two types of proof of service, namely: the
affidavit and the registry receipt, viz:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 13. Proof of Service. x x x. If service is made by registered mail, proof
shall be made by such affidavit and the registry receipt issued by the
mailing office. The registry return card shall be filed immediately upon its
receipt by the sender, or in lieu thereof the unclaimed letter together with the
certified or sworn copy of the notice given by the postmaster to the addressee.
Section 13 thus requires that if the service is done by registered mail, proof of
service shall consist of the affidavit of the person effecting the mailing and the
registry receipt, both of which must be appended to the paper being served. A
compliance with the rule is mandatory, such that there is no proof of service if
either
or
both
are
not
submitted. 13chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Here, the petition for certiorari only carried the affidavit of service executed by
one Marcelino T. Pascua, Jr., who declared that he had served copies of the
petition by registered mail under Registry Receipt Nos. 70449, 70453, 70458,
70498 and 70524 attached to the appropriate spaces found on pages 64-65 of
the petition.14 The petition only bore, however, the cut print-outs of
what appeared to be the registry receipt numbers of the registered matters, not
the registry receipts themselves. The rule requires to be appended the registry
receipts, not their reproductions. Hence, the cut print-outs did not
substantially comply with the rule. This was the reason why the Court held in
the resolution of August 19, 2014 that the petitioner did not comply with the
requirement of proof of service.15chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
II
Fresh
Period
did
not
apply
to
under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court
the
The petitioner posits that the fresh period rule applies because its Rule 64
petition is akin to a petition for review brought under Rule 42 of the Rules of
Court; hence, conformably with the fresh period rule,the period to file a Rule 64
petition should also be reckoned from the receipt of the order denying the
motion
for
reconsideration
or
the
motion
for
new
16
trial. chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The
petitioners
position
cannot
be
sustained.
There is no parity between the petition for review under Rule 42 and the
petition
for certiorari under
Rule
64.
As to the nature of the procedures, Rule 42 governs an appeal from the
judgment or final order rendered by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of
its appellate jurisdiction. Such appeal is on a question of fact, or of law, or of
mixed question of fact and law, and is given due course only upon aprima
facie showing that the Regional Trial Court committed an error of fact or law
warranting the reversal or modification of the challenged judgment or final
order.17 In contrast, the petition forcertiorari under Rule 64 is similar to the
petition for certiorari under Rule 65, and assails a judgment or final order of
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), or the Commission on Audit (COA).
The petition is not designed to correct only errors of jurisdiction, not errors of
judgment.18 Questions of fact cannot be raised except to determine whether the
COMELEC or the COA were guilty of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack
or
excess
of
jurisdiction.
The reglementary periods under Rule 42 and Rule 64 are different. In the
former, the aggrieved party is allowed 15 days to file the petition for review from
receipt of the assailed decision or final order, or from receipt of the denial of a
motion for new trial or reconsideration. 19 In the latter, the petition is filed
within 30 days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought
petition
for certiorari is
also
dismissible
for
its
lack
of
merit.
The petitioner insists on having fully shown that the COA committed grave
abuse of discretion, to wit: (1) the challenged decision was rendered by a
divided COA proper; (2) the COA took almost a year before promulgating its
decision, and more than a year in resolving the motion for reconsideration, in
contravention of the express mandate of the Constitution; (3) the resolution
denying the motion for reconsideration was made up of only two sentences; (4)
the matter involved a novel issue that called for an interpretation of the
pertinent provisions of the Local Government Code; and (5) in issuing the
resolution, COA Commissioners Grace Pulido-Tan and Heidi L. Mendoza made
it appear that they knew the Local Government Code better than former Senator
Aquilino
Pimentel
who
offered
an
opinion
on
the
25
matter. chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
its
and
counsel
disrespect
The petitioner contends that the Court erred in appreciating the petitioners
non-compliance with the requirement of the proof of service, alleging that even
a perfunctory scrutiny of the petition forcertiorari and its annexes could have
easily shown that it had attached an affidavit of service to the petition. It goes
on to make the following statements, viz:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
25. Apparently, the staff of the Justice-in-charge failed to verify the PETITION
and its annexes up to its last page, thus, the erroneous finding that there was
non-submission
of
the
proof
of
service;
26. In turn, the same omission was hoisted upon the other members of this
Honorable Court who took the observation from the office of the Justice-incharge, to be the obtaining fact, when in truth and in fact, it is not; 27
The petitioner and its counsel thereby exhibited their plain inability to accept
the ill consequences of their own shortcomings, and instead showed an
unabashed propensity to readily lay blame on others like the Court and its
Members. In doing so, they employed harsh and disrespectful language that
accused the Court and its Members of ignorance and recklessness in the
performance
of
their
function
of
adjudication.
We do not tolerate such harsh and disrespectful language being uttered against
the Court and its Members. We consider the accusatory language particularly
offensive because it was unfounded and undeserved. As this resolution earlier
clarifies, the petition for certiorari did not contain a proper affidavit of service.
We do not need to rehash the clarification. Had the petitioner and its counsel
been humbler to accept their self-inflicted situation and more contrite, they
would have desisted from their harshness and disrespect towards the Court
and its Members. Although we are not beyond error, we assure the petitioner
and its counsel that our resolutions and determinations are arrived at or
reached with much care and caution, aware that the lives, properties and
rights of the litigants are always at stake. If there be errors, they would be
unintended, and would be the result of human oversight. But in this instance
the Court and its Members committed no error. The petition bore only cut
reproductions of the supposed registry receipts, which even a mere
perfunctory scrutiny would not pass as the original registry receipts required
by
the Rules
of
Court.
Accordingly, the petitioner and its counsel, Atty. Eduardo S. Fortaleza, should
fully explain in writing why they should not be punished for indirect contempt
of court for their harsh and disrespectful language towards the Court and its
Members; and, in his case, Atty. Fortaleza should further show cause why he
should
not
be
disbarred.chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the Motion for Reconsideration for its lack of
merit; ORDERS the petitioner and its counsel, Atty. Eduardo S. Fortaleza, to
show cause in writing within ten (10) days from notice why they should not be
punished for indirect contempt of court; and FURTHER DIRECTSAtty.
Fortaleza to show cause in the same period why he should not be disbarred.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 189850, September 22, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. REYNALDO TORRES,
JAY TORRES, BOBBY TORRES @ ROBERTO TORRES Y NAVA, BRION, AND
RONNIE TORRES, Accused, BOBBY TORRES @ ROBERTO TORRES Y
NAVA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This is an appeal from the July 23, 2009 Decision1of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02925, which modified the December 5, 2006
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Manila, Branch 27 in Criminal
Case No. 02-200171. The RTC found appellant Bobby Torres @ Roberto Torres
y Nava (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder but
on appeal, the CA found appellant guilty of the special complex crime of
robbery
with
homicide.
Factual
Antecedents
On January 28, 2004, an Amended Information3 was filed before the RTC,
charging siblings Reynaldo Torres (Reynaldo), Jay Torres (Jay), Ronnie Torres
(Ronnie) and appellant with the special complex crime of robbery with homicide
committed against Jaime M. Espino (Espino). The Amended Information
contained the following accusatory allegations:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
That on or about September 21, 2001, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused, armed with bladed weapons, conspiring and confederating
together with one malefactor whose true name, real identity and present
whereabouts [is] still unknown and helping one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of gain and by means of force,
violence, and intimidation, to wit: while one JAIME M. ESPINO was on board
his car and travelling along C.M. Recto Avenue corner Ylaya St., Tondo , this
City, by blocking his path and forcibly grabbing from the latter his belt-bag;
that on the occasion of the said robbery and by reason thereof, the herein
accused, in pursuance of their conspiracy, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, attack, assault, use personal
violence and abuse of superior strength upon the said JAIME M. ESPINO and
that when the latter resisted, by then and there stabbing the latter with bladed
weapons on x x x different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon the latter
multiple stab wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death
thereafter, and afterwhich, divest, take, rob and carry away a belt-bag, wallet,
necklace, watch and ring of undetermined amount, belonging to said JAIME M.
ESPINO.
Contrary to law.4cralawred
Only appellant was arrested. Reynaldo, Jay and Ronnie remain at-large to
date. During arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. 5 After the
termination
of
the
pre-trial
conference,
trial
ensued.6cralawred
Version
of
the
Prosecution
path. Espino alighted from his vehicle and approached Ronnie, who tried to
grab his belt-bag. Espino resisted and struggled with Ronnie for the
possession of his belt-bag but the latters brothers, Jay, Rey, appellant, and an
unidentified companion suddenly appeared. With all of them brandishing
bladed weapons, appellant and his brothers took turns in stabbing Espino in
different parts of his body while the unidentified companion held him by the
neck. When Espino was already sprawled on the ground, they took his beltbag,
wallet
and
jewelries
and
immediately
fled.
Espino was rushed to the hospital but was pronounced dead on arrival. In his
Medico-Legal Report No. W-658-2001,8 Dr. Salen concluded that Espino died of
multiple stab wounds caused by sharp bladed instruments. The back portion
of his head bore two stab wounds while his body suffered four stab wounds
which proved fatal. Considering the number and varying measurements of the
wounds, Dr. Salen opined that there were more than one assailant.
To prove the civil aspect of the case, Espinos daughter, Winnie Espino-Fajardo
(Winnie) testified that the pieces of jewelry stolen from her father consisted of a
necklace worth P35,000.00, bracelet worth P15,000.00, wristwatch worth
P10,000.00 and two rings worth P10,000.00 each. As for their expenses,
Winnie said that P25,000.00 was spent for the burial lot and P37,000.00 for
the funeral services. She stated further that Espino was 51 years old at the
time of his death and was earning P3,000.00 a day as a meat vendor. 9cralawred
Version
of
the
Defense
In the evening of September 21, 2001, Jorna and Ronnie were sharing jokes
with other vendors in Divisoria when a car stopped a few meters from their
stall. The driver alighted and asked why they were laughing. Ronnie replied
that it had nothing to do with him. The driver seemed drunk since he walked
back to his vehicle in an unsteady manner. Moments later, the driver returned
and stabbed Ronnie on the wrist with a knife. Jay saw the assault on his
brother, Ronnie, and got a bolo which he used to hack the driver repeatedly.
Thereafter,
Ronnie
and
Jay
fled.12cralawred
Ditas Biescas-Mangilya, a vegetable vendor in Divisoria, corroborated Jornas
version
of
the
incident
in
her
testimony. 13cralawred
Ruling
of
the
Regional
Trial
Court
In its December 5, 2006 Decision, 14 the RTC held that appellant could not have
committed robbery. It ratiocinated, viz:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Prosecution witness Merlito D. Macapar testified that Ronnie took the belt bag
of the deceased while Bobby and the rest took his wristwatch, ring and
necklace. However, on cross-examination, witness admitted that he did not see
who took the ring, wristwatch and necklace because as soon as the deceased
fell on the ground, accused and companions surrounded him. Merlitos
testimony was contradicted by Eduardo Umali on a vital point. Thus, Merlito
testified that there was an exchange of heated words. There was no intimation
whatsoever what the altercation was about. He was ten meters away. No such
altercation, however, took place according to Eduardo who was barely five
meters away. This tainted the testimony of Merlito and Eduardo with
suspicion. When material witnesses contradict themselves on vital points, the
element of doubt is injected and cannot be lightly disregarded. That was not all
though. Merlito testified [that] several people witnessed the incident. The stall
of the victims daughter was about ten meters from the crime scene, which was
a few meters from the stall of Ronnie. They both had been in their respective
stalls for quite sometime. The principal prosecution witnesses are familiar with
the deceased and the accused except for the unidentified companion as they
often see them at the vicinity. Thus, in all likelihood, accused and the victim
are familiar if not know each other very well. The perpetration of robbery at the
place
was
thus
unlikely.
Even granting that the element of taking is present, still, accused cannot be
held liable for the complex crime of robbery with homicide for the reason that it
was not indubitably shown that the main purpose of the accused was to rob
the victim. To the mind of the Court, this is precisely the reason why the
prosecution skipped the utterances made by the protagonist[s] during the
attack. To sustain a [conviction] for the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide, the original criminal design of the culprit must be robbery and the
homicide is perpetrated with a view to the consummation of the robbery, or by
reason or on the occasion of the robbery (People vs. Ponciano, 204 SCRA 627).
x
The crime of robbery not having been indubitably established, the accused
cannot be convicted of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.15
The RTC thus concluded that appellant can only be liable for the killing of
Espino. It held him guilty of murder after it found the qualifying circumstance
of abuse of superior strength, which was alleged in the Information and duly
established by the prosecution. Moreover, the RTC ruled that conspiracy
among
the
accused
attended
the
crime.
Anent the civil aspect of the case, the RTC granted civil indemnity, actual and
moral damages to the heirs of Espino, but denied the claim for loss of earning
capacity
for
lack
of
documentary
evidence.
The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds accused
Bobby Torres y Nava, Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder
as the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength attended the
commission of the crime and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of the victim the sum of
P50,000.00, the additional sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages, actual
damages in the amount of P62,000.00 and to pay the costs.
Let alias warrant of arrest issue against accused Reynaldo Torres, Jay Torres
and
Ronnie
Torres.
SO ORDERED.16
Appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration17 which was denied in an
Order18 dated
April
10,
2007.
Hence,
appellant
Ruling
of
appealed
the
to
Court
CA. 19cralawred
the
of
Appeals
In modifying the ruling of the RTC, i.e., finding appellant guilty of robbery with
homicide instead of murder, the CA found that the primary intention of
appellant and his co-accused was to rob Espino and his killing was only
incidental to the robbery. The blocking of Espinos car and the struggle for
possession of his belt-bag after he alighted are clear manifestations of the
intent to commit robbery. The dispositive portion of the July 23, 2009
Decision20 of the CA reads as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of foregoing, the appealed decision of the RTC Manila,
Branch 27 dated December 5, 2006 is hereby MODIFIED in that appellant is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of ROBBERY with
HOMICIDE and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. The trial courts award to the heirs of the victim, Jaime Espino, of
civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00, moral damages in the amount of
P50,000.00, and actual damages in the amount of P62,000.00 as well as its
order to appellant to pay the costs of suit, are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.21
Hence,
Assignment
this
present
of
appeal.
Errors
appeal
appeal
not
is
by
to
an
be
unmeritorious.
accused,
subject
he
to
waives
double
Appellant maintains that the CA erred in finding him liable for robbery with
homicide as charged in the Amended Information. He argues that his appeal to
the CA was limited to his conviction for murder and excluded his acquittal for
robbery. And by appealing his conviction for murder, he does not waive his
constitutional right not to be subject to double jeopardy for the crime of
robbery. He claims that even assuming that the RTC erred in acquitting him of
the robbery charge, such error can no longer be questioned on appeal.
We cannot give credence to appellants contentions. An appeal in [a] criminal
case opens the entire case for review on any question including one not raised
by the parties.26 [W]hen an accused appeals from the sentence of the trial
court, he waives the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and
throws the whole case open to the review of the appellate court, which is then
called upon to render such judgment as law and justice dictate, whether
favorable or unfavorable to the appellant.27 In other words, when appellant
appealed the RTCs judgment of conviction for murder, he is deemed to have
abandoned his right to invoke the prohibition on double jeopardy since it
became the duty of the appellate court to correct errors as may be found in the
appealed judgment. Thus, appellant could not have been placed twice in
jeopardy when the CA modified the ruling of the RTC by finding him guilty of
robbery with homicide as charged in the Information instead of murder.
Appellant
robbery
is
guilty
of
with
the
crime
of
homicide.
testimonies
are
of
worthy
the
of
prosecution
credence.
Appellant attempts to discredit Umali and Macapar by asserting that there are
glaring contradictions in their testimonies. He calls attention to the RTCs
observation that Macapar gave conflicting testimonies on whether he actually
witnessed who among appellant and his cohorts took Espinos valuables after
he fell to the ground. Appellant asserts further that Umalis testimony that an
altercation did not precede the commission of the crime contradicts the
testimony of Macapar that a heated exchange of words occurred prior to the
incident. He also claims that it is contrary to human nature for Espino to
alight from his car at 10:00 p.m. while in possession of a large amount of
money
without
fear
of
an
impending
hold-up.
weapons
are
not
the
corpus
delicti.
Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient for his conviction since the
weapons used in the stabbing of Espino were not presented. In other words, he
asserts that it was improper to convict him because the corpus delicti had not
been
established.
We disagree. [C]orpus delicti refers to the fact of the commission of the crime
charged or to the body or substance of the crime. In its legal sense, it does not
refer to the ransom money in the crime of kidnapping for ransom or to the body
of the person murdered or, in this case, [the weapons used in the commission
of robbery with homicide]. Since the corpus delicti is the fact of the
commission of the crime, this Court has ruled that even a single witness
uncorroborated testimony, if credible may suffice to prove it and warrant a
conviction therefor. Corpus delicti may even be established by circumstantial
evidence.32cralawred
In this case, the corpus delicti was established by the evidence on record. The
prosecution eyewitnesses testified that appellant and his cohorts used knives
to perpetrate the crime. Their testimonies on the existence and use of weapons
in committing the offense was supported by the medical findings of Dr. Salen
who conducted the post-mortem examination. Dr. Salen found that Espino
sustained several stab wounds with varying measurements which were caused
by sharp bladed instruments. Appellant is therefore mistaken in arguing that
the failure to present the weapons used in killing Espino was fatal to the cause
of
the
prosecution.
The
defenses
of
denial
and
alibi
cannot
prosper.
We are in complete agreement with the RTC and the CA in finding lack of merit
in
appellants
defenses
of
denial
and
alibi.
Appellant claims that he was in a drinking session in his friends house in
Villaruel, Tayuman, Manila, from 10:00 p.m. of September 21, 2001 until 1:00
a.m. of the following day. He alleges to have slept at the place and went home
at around 7:00 a.m. of September 22, 2001. According to appellant, he did not
depart from his friends house from the time they started drinking until he
went
home
the
following
morning.
Appellants alibi is unworthy of credence. Appellant himself testified that
Villaruel is less than two kilometers away from Divisoria and that it would only
take a few minutes to go to Divisoria from Villaruel. 33 Clearly, it was not
impossible for appellant to be physically present at the crime scene during its
commission. For alibi to prosper, it must strictly meet the requirements of
time and place. It is not enough to prove that the accused was somewhere else
when the crime was committed, but it must also be demonstrated that it was
physically impossible for him to have been at the crime scene at the time the
crime
was
committed.34cralawred
The fact that appellant presented witnesses to corroborate his alibi deserves
scant consideration. Their testimonies are viewed with skepticism due to the
very nature of alibi the witnesses affirm. 35 Appellant can easily fabricate an
alibi and ask relatives and friends to corroborate it. 36cralawred
We have always ruled that alibi and denial are inherently weak defenses and
must be brushed aside when the prosecution has sufficiently and positively
ascertained the identity of the accused. Moreover, it is only axiomatic that
positive
testimony
prevails
over
negative
testimony.37cralawred
The
the
evidence
presence
of
was
abuse
sufficient
of
to
superior
establish
strength.
Appellant argues that mere superiority in numbers does not indicate the
presence of abuse of superior strength. In the same manner, appellant claims
that the number of wounds inflicted on the victim is not the criterion for the
appreciation
of
this
circumstance.
There is abuse of superior strength when the offenders took advantage of their
combined strength in order to consummate the offense. 38 Here, appellant and
his four companions not only took advantage of their numerical superiority,
they were also armed with knives. Espino, on the other hand, was unarmed
and defenseless. While Ronnie was wrestling with Espino, appellant and his
co-accused simultaneously assaulted the latter. The unidentified companion
locked his arm around the neck of Espino while appellant and his co-accused
stabbed and hacked him several times. While Espino was lying defenseless on
the ground, they divested him of all his valuables. Thereafter, they immediately
fled the scene of the crime. 39 It is clear that they executed the criminal act by
employing
physical
superiority
over
Espino.
The
Proper
Penalty
Civil
Liabilities
In robbery with homicide, civil indemnity and moral damages are awarded
automatically without need of allegation and evidence other than the death of
the victim owing to the commission of the crime. 43 Here, the RTC and CA
granted civil indemnity and moral damages to Espinos heirs in the amount of
P50,000.00 each. These courts were correct in granting the awards, but the
awards should have been P100,000.00 each. Recent jurisprudence44 declares
that when the imposable penalty is death, the awards of civil indemnity and
moral
damages
shall
be
P100,000.00
each.
In granting compensatory damages, the prosecution must prove the actual
amount of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent
proof and the best evidence obtainable to the injured party. 45 Receipts
should support claims of actual damages. Thus, as correctly held by the [RTC]
and affirmed by the CA, the amount of [P62,000.00] incurred as funeral
expenses can be sustained since these are expenditures supported by
receipts.46cralawred
The existence of one aggravating circumstance also merits the grant of
exemplary damages under Article 2230 of the New Civil Code. Pursuant to
prevailing jurisprudence, we likewise award P100,000.00 as exemplary
damages to the victims heirs.47 An interest at the legal rate of 6% per
annum on all awards of damages from the finality of this judgment until fully
paid should likewise be granted to the heirs of Espino. 48cralawred
Lastly, the RTC did not err in refusing to award indemnity for loss of earning
capacity of Espino despite the testimony of his daughter that he earned
P3,000.00 a day as a meat dealer. Such indemnity is not awarded in the
absence of documentary evidence except where the victim was either selfemployed or was a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage
under current labor laws. Since it was neither alleged nor proved that the
victim was either self-employed or was a daily wage earner, indemnity for loss
of earning capacity cannot be awarded to the heirs of the victim. 49cralawred
WHEREFORE, the July 23, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 02925 that affirmed with modifications the December 5, 2006
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 27, in Criminal Case No.
02-200171 is AFFIRMED with further MODIFICATIONS. Appellant Bobby
Torres @ Roberto Torres y Nava is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim, Jaime
M. Espino, P100,000.00 as civil indemnity; P100,000.00 as moral damages,
and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages. The interest rate of 6% per annum is
imposed on all damages awarded from the finality of this Decision until fully
paid.
SO ORDERED.cralawlaw library
SECOND DIVISION
No. 13-B-1 for the years 1993 to 2008 in the amount of P2,678,439.04, the
Office of the City Treasurer of Caloocan City sold at public auction Lot No. 13B-1, in which private respondent emerged as the highest bidder.
The Office of the City Treasurer, through the City Treasurer of Caloocan,
Evelina M. Garma (respondent Garma), issued on 15 October 2009, a
Certificate of Sale of Delinquent Property to Purchaser9 and on 21 January
2011, a Final Deed of Conveyance 10 over Lot 13-B-1 in favor of private
respondent.
Petitioner was not made aware of any of the proceedings before the Office of the
City Treasurer, as the Notice of Levy 11 and Warrant of Levy12 issued by the
Office of the City Treasurer, through respondent Garma, were sent to petitioner
at an inexistent office in Tondo, Manila and were, thus, returned
unserved.13cralawred
By virtue of the above-mentioned final deed of conveyance, private respondent
on 4 May 2011 filed LRC-Case No. C-5748 with the RTC Caloocan praying for
the consolidation of the ownership of the property covered by TCT No. 33341,
the cancellation of the same TCT in the name of petitioner, and the issuance of
a new title in the name of private respondent, notwithstanding the fact that the
delinquency
sale
involved
only
Lot
No.
13-B-1. 14cralawred
The RTC issued an Order on 13 June 2011 setting the initial hearing on the
Petition, and directing that copies of the said order be posted at the subject
premises and furnished petitioner. However, the records of the case,
particularly the Certificate of Posting 15 dated 16 July 2011 and the Process
Server's Returns dated 13 and 16 July 2011 16 executed by respondent Jimmy
T. Soro (respondent Soro), the Process Server of RTC Caloocan, will show that
the order was not posted at the subject premises, and that petitioner did not
receive any such copies of the Order, as respondent Soro sought to serve the
same
at
the
inexistent
offices.
On 31 August 2011, after private respondent adduced its evidence, the RTC
Caloocan issued an Order17 granting private respondent's petition. Inasmuch
as petitioner was unaware of the proceedings, the same order became final and
executory. Thereafter, RTC Caloocan, upon motion18of private respondent,
issued another Order dated 26 April 2012 directing the issuance of a Writ of
Possession in favor of private respondent. The said writ, 19 signed by the Branch
Clerk of the RTC Caloocan, respondent Emily P. Dizon (respondent Dizon), was
issued
on
27
April
2012.
Petitioner learned of the auction sale only after 9 May 2012, when the Sheriff of
the RTC Caloocan, respondent Renebert B. Baloloy (respondent Baloloy), left a
Notice to Vacate20 in the subject premises. Petitioner claimed that it was very
much surprised at the auction sale of Lot 13-B-1 because it had been
religiously paying its real property taxes thereon up to 2012. In fact, it had in
its possession a Certification21 dated 19 September 2011 issued by the Office of
the City Treasurer of Caloocan, through its OIC Land Tax Division, respondent
Phillip L. Yam (respondent Yam), stating that the real property taxes due on
Lots 1-A and 13-B-1, with a combined assessed value of P8,697,870.00, up to
the
4th quarter
of
2011,
have
been
duly
paid
by
petitioner.
Notwithstanding the representations made by petitioner with the RTC
Caloocan22 and Office of the City Treasurer, Baloloy, proceeded to implement
the Writ of Possession on 15 May 2012 over both Lots Nos. 1-A and 13-B-1 and
their improvements. As a result thereof, private respondent wrested physical
possession of the entire property covered by TCT No. 33341 from petitioner.
Feeling aggrieved, petitioner filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari23 under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, but later withdrew 24 the same, reasoning that
the withdrawal would enable it to comply with the rules on forum shopping.
The
CA
granted
petitioners
prayer
to
withdraw.25cralawred
On 14 January 2013, petitioner, filed with the CA a Petition for Annulment of
Judgment praying, among others, for the annulment and setting aside of the
Orders dated 31 August 2011 and 26 April 2012 and the Writ of Possession
issued by the RTC Caloocan. Petitioner likewise prayed that the CA direct
private respondent to vacate the property and surrender possession thereof to
petitioner.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On 27 February 2013, the CA issued a Resolution 26 dismissing CA G.R. SP No.
128187 on the ground that the Petition for Annulment of Judgment that
petitioner filed is not the proper remedy, as it had other available remedies to
question the Orders of the RTC Caloocan. Citing Estate of the late Mercedes
Jacob v. Court of Appeals27 the CA, stated that where the land subject of the
case was already registered in the name of the buyer in the auction sale, the
proper remedy to annul said transfer was to file an action for reconveyance on
the ground of fraud. The CA added that the Petition for Certiorari petitioner
had earlier filed but later withdrew showed that other remedies were available
to petitioner.
The CA, likewise, denied petitioner's motion for
28
reconsideration. cralawred
Hence, this Petition.
Our Ruling
Petitioner questions the dismissal by the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 128187, and
contends that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
a. Under the particular factual circumstances surrounding this case, a petition
for annulment of judgment is the only and appropriate remedy of petitioner to
question the Orders of the RTC Caloocan, which allowed private respondent to
consolidate ownership and take possession of the property covered by TCT No.
33341;
andChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
b. All the requisite elements for the filing of a petition for annulment of
judgment on the grounds of extrinsic fraud, lack of jurisdiction, and want of
due process, are present in this case.
We
grant
the
Petition.
We first tackle the procedural issue. Based on the records of this case, it is
undisputed that the Order of the RTC Caloocan dated 31 August 2011 became
final and executory on 11 October 2011, when the latter issued an Entry of
Judgment for the same. The general rule is that a final and executory
judgment can no longer be disturbed, altered, or modified in any respect, and
that nothing further can be done but to execute it. A final and executory
decision may, however, be invalidated via a Petition for Relief or a Petition to
Annul the same under Rules 38 or 47, respectively, of the Rules of
Court.29cralawred
Under Rule 38, when a judgment or final order is entered, or any other
proceeding is thereafter taken against a party in any court through fraud,
accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such court
and in the same case praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set
aside. The verified petition must be filed within sixty (60) days after the
petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be set
aside, and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or final order was
entered. However, it is uncontested that petitioner learned about the
proceedings in LRC-Case No. C-5748 more than six (6) months after the Order
dated 31 August 2011 had become final and executory on 11 October 2011.
Thus, this remedy under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court was clearly unavailing.
Thus, the only remedy left to petitioner in this case is a petition for annulment
of
judgment
under
Rule
47,
which
it,
in
fact,
filed.
The principle we laid down in Estate of the late Mercedes Jacob v. Court of
Appeals is not applicable. We disagree with the reasoning of the CA and
respondents that petitioner in this particular case should have filed either an
action for reconveyance or annulment of the auction sale, because to do so
would have required the court hearing the action to modify or interfere with the
judgment or order of another co-equal court, especially in this case where the
said judgment or order had attained finality. Well-entrenched in our
jurisdiction is the doctrine that a court has no power to do so, as that action
may lead to confusion and seriously hinder the administration of
justice.30cralawred
We have repeatedly ruled that a Petition for Annulment of Judgment under
Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is a remedy granted only under exceptional
circumstances where a party, without fault on his part, has failed to avail of the
ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate
remedies. The same petition is not available as a substitute for a remedy which
was lost due to the partys own neglect in promptly availing of the
same.31 There is here no attempted substitution; annulment of judgment is the
only
remedy
available
to
petitioner.
Regarding the previous filing of a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 such is of
no moment as petitioner timely withdrew the same before any relief could be
afforded
by
the
CA.
We now proceed to the substantive and more pressing issue. We agree with the
position of petitioner that all the requisite elements for the filing of a petition
for annulment of judgment on the grounds of extrinsic fraud, lack of
jurisdiction, and want of due process, are present in this case.
It should be stressed that petitioner instituted the case before the CA precisely
to seek relief from the declaration of nullity of TCT No. 33341, which had been
issued
without
first
giving
petitioner
In Castigador
v.
Nicolas,32 we
that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
had
an
opportunity
the
to
occasion
be
heard.
to
state
The petition filed with the CA contained the following allegations, among
others: (1) the auction sale of the land is null and void for lack of actual and
personal notice to herein petitioner; (2) the RTC did not comply with the
procedure prescribed in Section 71, Presidential Decree No. 1529 requiring
notice by the Register of Deeds to the registered owner as to the issuance of a
certificate of sale; and (3) petitioner was not afforded due process when she
was not notified of the proceedings instituted by respondent for the cancellation
of her title. The petition need not categorically state the exact words extrinsic
fraud; rather, the allegations in the petition should be so crafted to easily point
out the ground on which it was based. The allegations in the petition filed with
the CA sufficiently identify the ground upon which the petition was based extrinsic fraud. Fraud is extrinsic where it prevents a party from having a trial
or from presenting his entire case to the court, or where it operates upon
matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is
procured. The overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that
the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having
his day in court. The allegations clearly charged the RTC and respondent with
depriving petitioner of the opportunity to oppose the auction sale and the
cancellation of her title and ventilate her side. This allegation, if true,
constitutes extrinsic fraud.chanrobleslaw
Petitioner not only puts in question the complete lack of due process in the
conduct of the auction sale and the proceedings before the RTC Caloocan, but
the absolute lack of basis for the declaration by the Office of the City Treasurer
that it had been delinquent in the payment of real property taxes due on its
property,
particularly
Lot
13-B-1.
Technicalities aside, we are particularly alarmed by the material allegations
and serious charges brought up by petitioner in its pleadings, which go into the
very core of the action for annulment of judgment and, more importantly,
which none of
the
respondents
dispute.
Petitioner
fully
paid
its
real
estate
taxes
due
on
Lot
13-B-1.
Receipts33 issued by the Office of the City Treasurer of the City of Caloocan
spanning the period from 2000 to 2012, as well as the Payment History 34 from
1995 to 2011 evidencing full payment of real property taxes due on its land,
whose assessed value was adjusted in 2005 to P8,697,870.00.
Petitioner likewise confronts respondents with the Certification 35 dated 19
September 2011 issued by the Office of the City Treasurer of Caloocan, through
its OIC Land Tax Division, respondent Yam, certifying that the real property
taxes due on Lots 1-A and 13-B-1, with an assessed value of P8,697,870.00,
up to the 4th quarter of 2011, and previous years, have been duly paid by
petitioner.
We note that respondents, particularly respondents Garma and Yam, the City
Treasurer and the OIC Land Tax Division, have been inexplicably silent as
regards
all
that
petitioner
presented
for
our
consideration.
Multiple
Tax
Declarations
refer
to
one
and
the
same
property.
Petitioner alleges and brings to our attention the matter that it religiously paid
in full its real property taxes due on its land, Lots Nos. 1-A and 13-B-1, with an
assessed value of P8,697,870.00, under a single tax declaration issued by the
Office of the City Assessor of Caloocan, 36 no. D12-109-00012-C under Property
Index No. 113-12-109-01-013, as certified by the OIC City Assessor,
respondent
Anthony
L.
Pulmano
(respondent
Pulmano).37cralawred
The alleged delinquency of petitioner in its real property taxes and the basis for
the auction sale stemmed from the supposed non-payment of real property
taxes due on Lot 13-B-1, with an assessed value of P4,866,350.00 covered by
another tax declaration,38 D12-109-00013-C under Property Index No. 113-12109-01-014.
Shortly before private respondent took over the property of petitioner in 2012,
the Office of the City Assessor, through respondent Pulmano, issued yet
another tax declaration, no. 12-109-00153-12-C under Property Index No. 11312-109-01-013, this time covering only Lot No. 1-A, with an assessed value of
P3,831,520.00. This new issuance cancelled petitioners original Tax
Declaration No. D12-109-00012-C under Property Index No. 113-12-109-01013, which previously covered both Lots Nos. 1-A and 13-B-1.
As petitioner duly points out, 39 a simple mathematical application would show
that if the assessed values in the 2nd and 3rd tax declarations were added,
P4,866,350.00 and P3,831,520.00, the same would amount to P8,697,870.00,
the assessed value of the property as indicated in the original tax declaration.
Therefore, if all the tax declarations issued by respondent Pulmano refer to one
and the same property of petitioner, and the latter fully paid all its realty taxes
due on the same, then it would follow that the finding of delinquency did not
have
any
basis.
We note that respondent Pulmano, much like respondents Garma and Yam,
has
been
inexplicably
silent
as
regards
the
foregoing.
Private respondent took possession of both Lots Nos. 1-A and 13-B-1.
Notwithstanding the foregoing serious anomalies attending the delinquency
sale, petitioner, again, confronts respondents, particularly public respondents
Judge Oscar P. Barrientos, Dizon and Baloloy, as well as private respondent,
with the charge that the latter, with the assistance of respondent Baloloy,
forcibly ejected petitioner from the whole property, even if it was only Lot 13-B1
that
was
the
subject
of
the
writ
of
possession.
Again,
none
of
the
respondents
contested
this
claim.