Professional Documents
Culture Documents
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28 December, 1943.
(C)
(D) Report D-4 3ection -p. -fo
(2) Report Division Air 'Officer -p- 53
(F) Reoort 3d Marines -r >''
(G) Reoort 9th Marines -.'-- * 1
combat. m
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DISTRIBUTION: ComSoPac (4)
CliC (10) one (1) Historical Section.
VPhibCorps (2)
IllPhibComs (2)
CTF 31 (2)
MC3 (2)
3d Marines (4)
3pTrs3dMarDiv
ServTrs3di4arDiv
CGiZxec Staff
File
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-. -\u0084^i^iK«B(h
70991 FllHni photUofiiW declassified DOD »'« swiw
• HEnDgJARTERS,
•
THIRD MARINE DIVISION, FLEET MARINE FORCE,
IN THE FIELD.
lURRaIIVS OF THE
-
CAMPAIGN
(D 3 REPORT)
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DECLASSIFIED
1975
J/i3/rn HEaD'^JARTZRS,
DKtASSIFifI)r
THIRD MaAIUE DIVISION, FL££T M*Ai;i£ FOxiCS,
—-\u25a0
NARRATIVE OF THE C*MP*iaH
-1
DECLASSIFIED
DECLASSIFIED
• _ •
(2) Unload the ships simultaneously in a minimum
of time bo thoy could withdraw.
(3) Obtain maximum dispersal of men and supplies con
sistent with tactical safety for protection against
air attack.
(4) Be so disposed as to develop without delay a beach
head in whatever direction ground reconnaissance
dictated after landing.
(5) Be prepared to resist immediately a seaborne attack.,
and/or counter landing.
(6) Provide air defonso of the beachhead as soon as
practicable.
The considerations listed dictated the following
deolsions:
(1) To embark three task units in the ships allotted,
two to be reinforced Infantry regiments of 4
Landing Teams each, and the third basically anti
aircraft artillery of the 3d Def Bn. With each
of these units were assigned the detachments of
Engineer, *ir, llaval Base, Signal and 3ervice
Trooos whose mission was the Immediate development
of the ;»ir and Haval Base facilities.
(2) To restrict the loading of the shloa to about 500
tons each in order to be able to unload within
five to six hours total elapsod time.
(3) To land all elements simultaneously, combatant
elements covering non-combatant elements.
(4) To seize a broad shallow beachhead, initially,
in order to contain immediately whatever Japanese
defenses had been Installed, to institute vigorous
terrain reconnaissance inland for location of
routes of ingress and airfield sites, and to dis
perse troops and stores against air attack.
(5) To be prepared to shift elements laterally
without
delay in order, either to reinforce, or to develop
the beachhead to the direction reconnaissance
dictated*
(6) To bo prepared to organize beach and
air defenses
immediately on landing.
(7) To transport to impress
*£usta Bay area the
remaining echelons of the Division as rapidly
as the availability of ships and distance permitted.
The plan as completed divided the equipment and sullies
or toe organization into three categories:
m
- Those items essential to live and fight for ten
days. This included at least ten days rations,
3 units of fire for the weapons embarked,^nd^
fuel for the same period.
Btbtn- SSiflEß^"- - - -°"->:
C
- development of the beachhead area and airfields*
All other items not Included in * or B.
Category A was to accompany the assault echelon,
Category B vac to be forwarded with subsequent echelons, and
Category C was to remain stored with the rear eohelon on Guadal
canal pending further instructions. Thus the equipment and supplies
carried initiallycame within the tonnage limitation* imposed for
tactioal safety of the transports.
The plan of landing was to employ twelve beaches, one
per ship, eleven extending west from CLiPg MROKIHA some 8000 yards
and one on the north (inner) shore of FUHU*Jp I?JUnj JP *11 elements
were to land simultaneously, the 3d Mar reinforced by the Raider
Regiment (less one Landing Team) in the right seotor (6 beaches),
the 9th Mar reinforced by one LandlxurXoam (Raider) in the loft
sector (5 beaohes), and on PUKLUIA laLiJip (1 beach). Two groups
of the 3d Def Bn were to land in the right seotor and two in the
left sector. Each combat team was to overrun and destroy all
enemy beach defenses, seise an initial shallow beachhead and
institute vigorous reoonnalssanoe Immediately to the front and
flanks, meanwhile unloading the ships as rapidly as possible and
installing beach defenses, and prepared to shift laterally in
either direction.
2. REHEARSAL.
7
(Cont'd).
the 3d Bn SwiTray,
Before the 9ZbTWav t landed
land Initially on the
left,could be shifted to the right sector,
mated as a composite
an enemy fo?ce
battalion, transported from RABAUL inestl
e 5J r2? er ?» made a counter-landing on 7 Ilov 43,
?left
e5? flank Prompt developmeAt of the
Jußt beyond the
of the beachhead.
employment Snemv
arrived SeSJet
by X Co, 3d Bn 9th Mar, and rapid of the left
reserve battalion (Ist Bn 3d Mar), plus the newly tor
2l8 Bn
destroyed the major portions of the enemy and completely
!!*?&
routed the remainder, so that by the evening of a Uov
« they
no longer constituted a threat to our beachhead
On the afternoon of 8 Uov 43, the enemy made mnt-«nr
with the daider company blocking the
the 3d flaider Bn (less two PJV* ?LIL? oTt \w
oomptnlesJ^lSs^twrcoopanle; 43
of 2d
aaider Bn. four companies in all,
and mortars, and drove the enemy back
attacked,supported by artillery
towards Ply* VlLL«a£ after
a very heavy fire fight. Movement to the
for both flafeTWaT^itrlcted
forces due to deep swamp on each side of the PIvII^XL
On the morning of 10 Ilov 43, the 9th Mar (less 1Bn]
a close support air strike, passed through the Haiders TOTwTna
in
of Bns; found the enemy had withdrawn, occupied PIV* VILLAGE column
and
SiS8
off J?
r imme4la i; ******
The poor coordination and tiaing-oTtEirenemy
at^i^^i*
offensive reaction, caught the Japanese
balance, so that the threat to both or either flank
moved irt the spaoe of three days. In both these actions was re
artillery
*. -i*
* * The 148th InfCT, having arrived on 8 Nov 43, commenced
1 t
Sf iS'r? 55
on 10 l,ov S
r
Bn 9th l^
K'J^S?
43. The 3d
8 On 9 Wov «5 thle waa comoleted
Mar moved to the right flenk of the
?i^ r BeC 0 p Or t0 tha aUac^ of 10 Nov 43.
inland and ito ri w
the east, thus
The 3d Mar moved
creating a center sector of the
beachhead.
*' * '
On 8 i:ov 43, Ca, IM*C arrived
and, at 1200, 9 Hoy 43, assumed command ofat
*****
SMPRS33 AUSL'STA BAY
all forcesTrTtnat
area, relieving the CO, 3d Mar Dlv as CG, SMPRS33 jkUGPSi* Attk
l^rl^r^t^ vcre'lffT^er^ ia^rcal~
control of CO, 3d Mar 5
2 ac «t
Div until a later date.
L
4J^ Battle
O1 B,vr8 . v
*
J*1 fxception of the engagement of tho 2d Bn
«J
of %jte in^!!
,vr
of the Cocoanut Orbve, near the Junction
j^H, and jy^J W£^ TxUIL across the PIV iivai,
12-1^ i,ovWJ^
43,
subsequent to which the enemy
A
elements of
*! 37th Div, U3A, continued to arrive,
*w *._
the
beachhead was extended inland with the 37th Div
tne left (west) sector
and the 3d Mar Div defending
occupying
(east) sector, the right
extension of the beachhead in the 3d I4ar Div
sector was necessarily slow due to:
kcussi ED
ll^^tdwvltlGV^--"
(1) Enemy resistance
forks area,
1 (Cont'd).
-6
DECLASSIFIED
most obvious one being to transport labor troops whose sole pur
pose is to handle the details of the unloading. This is not
which are not suitable for ground oombet at a time when they may
also provide the vital labor. When the estimate of the strength
-
LST's and accompany the assault. aKA's cannot accommodate suffi
cient personnel aboard to constitute their own shore parties, and
mftttfflEfl 10
• •
wetAsstfe
.. * ,«.
"JYiJJV
?Justif beachhead
led by providing
(Cont'd).
'
weeks and very probably acre. •Aaphlbs* were the only «esjn of
tr#Mßort that could negotiate the ewaapy areas at all time..
Ftob DJJay on they vere in constant use tor forward displacement
!f!S!^ M *Ad oquMnt, anT?orcvi«ttttion of wounded. To say
that they were "invaluable* would constitute an understatement.
In this ease they wore a vital necessity.
In the seisure of suooescive objeotlvee in Jungle war
fare the mm ot action usually become broader and broader and
»BS9SS/f/rn
• •
UcpXU A BiOJC|E|IImp*IQU (Confd).
EJEULft•udinLU
The Jap is not a cross-country fighter. As a general
rule he operate on or near a road, trail, or beach line which
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. HEADQUARTERS,
THIRD MARINE DIVISION, FLEET MARINE FORCE,
flCsUl A AAm IN THE FIELD.
lr«wl?flo XlfffII
r V^fHf|(||;G|uloM
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17 March 1944>
REPORT CF STRENGTH
AKD CASUALTIE^TR THZ. OPERATIC AT EMPRESS
BAY,
AUGUSTA 30UGAl:rVTLLE.
1. Casualty figures for this division durir^ the
KjA WIA
0 WO £ni 0 Enl C WO E, 0 V.O Enl
SpTre r~ 0 3 2 0 31 0 0 1 3 0 35
ServTrs i 0 5
5 2 1 30 0 0 1 3 1
1 55
4 1 79 20 0 378 2 0 15 26 1 472
3dMar
9thMar 1 0 30
30 7 2 125 0 0 3 8 2 158
12thKar 1 0 9
9 3 1 25 0 0 1 4 1 35
19thHar 0 0 4
4 1 0 49 0 0 1 1 0 54
21stKar
TOTAL 15 1 177 41 6 833 2 0 61 58 6 1071
0 i£ Enl
10 0 256
Losses in non-effectives throughout period of operation:
5.
KZA
MIA 2 0
tI- >? -Wh
61
*
Slok(Evao) 79 9 1431
Wounded( EvaoJjy^C^Sgg
TOTAL 106 10 1925
Died of wounds reoelved in oombat:
4 0 66
7. Average strength present
C. 8. WITS,
LtCol., U3MC,
D-l.
E!JCLO3UHE (P)
# Ma^/fki
HJT/fr
IHTELLIOE'TCS SECTION, HSAD^UARTtSS,
§^MgkM m WARIMS DIVISION,
TVIRD MAQTW?
i TVrVTHTfiW
MARINE FORC2,
Vt V>r"V MAQTVT SYIRr
FLSST
DECMSSIOE»
DECLASSIFIED
\ %' (3) The lnngurge personnel performed outstandingly
documents. Two epptured documents, «h:n
eneny
In Interrogating prisoners md translatingtrpnslax.a,
\u25\a0; gpve information as to plannrd rnsmy schemes of mnneuv-r
which pernltted our forcre to take cffectlv? counter
men sure e. Prior to the op-rption two rierl iSseona oy
generation Jrpancse) were pp signed to the division
ComSoPac. An Additional one we assigned r.ft-r tn:
lpndlng. The >!isei p-rform:d lnvplupblc work km v
• ...
DECLASSIFIED
«... #
• •
\u25a0^ \u25a0\u25a0^F Wmluni^atlon while on patrols. The scout company ac re
organised to be lnoluded ac an integral unit of the Division
Headquarters Battalion; but under the control of D-2 for
operations and training.
(c) irs
JEtIASSIFIB fJL
DECLASSIFIED
(d) After D plus 20 days # twice weekly coverage of
of the beaoh head ares .was of marked assistance In the trac
ing and correct orienting of the Increasing road network
within th# beaoh he*d area; and in terrain lntsrpretation.
(c) The Piper Cubs assigned to the artillery for
air spot missions were also used for air reconnaissance
missions and as such were invaluable. It is recommended
thpt Pt least ona flfflfehlblnn ol*ne be r>lrcd under ths
oontrol of ths Division initially. Th?se
planes Capable of operating from vne water, wouxd be avail
able to the division possibly from D^day. until the estab
lishing of air fields ashore, thus initiallygreatly expedi
ting requests for reconnaissance and small photographic
missions. During the early stages of the landing end t>rlor
to the establishing of the fighter strip on Caps Toroklna,
reconnaissance and photographio planes were based at such
a distanoe from' the beach head and performing so many other
missions that on occasions there was an Interval of two or
three days between the reouest for and the fulfilling of a
mission*
6. R
(a) All combat photographers mutt be thoroughly trained,
not only in the technique of taking photogt-rphaj bit alto
what to take. Insufficient pictures of aotual oombat opera
tions were made.
,fb) The processing of all photographic prints and
negatives should be done by the Division Intelligence Section.
The regiments were not oapablo of p*ooe«slng prints or
developing negatives on the operation due to the lots or
destruction or their equipment upon landing. If all film
liprocessed by the Division Photographio Officer he it able
to maintain a much greater degree of supervision over the
type of pioturVs submitted by the combat photographers and
can issue instructions and orders accordingly. Ruining of
good negatives due to poor processing would also be eliminated
(o) A total of 1587 still photographs and 38,000 feet
of motion picture film were taken and submitted during the
operation.
<*a . .
- *
rolls of 9 inoh aerial film being processed. 3,124 9 x 18
J.noh prints were made from film developed.
• itciircsfii
,4
• #
Thirteen oombat correspondent e (one officer and 12 enlieted)
wrote a combined total of 734 neve artlolee b/»eed on various
notions of the oampalgn. Seven magazine articles, including.
two based on picture sequenoes, were transmitted, A total
of 680 nevs pictures, with complete captions by correspond
ents, have been transmitted. It is considered that the
performance ejf the combat correspondents during the operation
was highly satisfactory and they continually exposed them
selves under fire at great personal ride in order to obtain
stories of greater nevs value. Orsat emphasis vas placed
on the forwarding of the initial photographs taken for press
purposes vith the greatest possible apeed.
7.
(a) Sufficient tentage to house the office personnel
was not available until P plus seven days. As a result,
the Intelligence Seetlon suffered extreme difficulty in
fmnot lotting during the frequent rains of the first week,
•ufflt&eftt tentaf e to protect eaulpsient and essential
personnel M*t be made available a* soon as possible After
landing.
(b) In general., Intelligence information vas rsoelved
from lover mnlts with a minimum of delay. All oomsmnloatlon
agencies functioned satlsfaetorifjr throughout the operation
and itit ooneidercd that the prison t agencies of oommunlca
tlon are ample for normal 'lntelligence requlrments.
(c) The usual local security patrols vere maintained:
at all times for a distance of from 400 to 2,000 yards to
the front. After the establishing of the final beaoh bead
line, eeoh regiment sent a dally oombat patrol to cover
the ar«a in front of the regimental sector for a distance
of 4,000 yards. Zn addition oombat units provided 9000181
recomalssanos patrols to aooomplish missions designated
by Division. Patrol reports vere In general satisfactory
and in some oats* were outstanding* Zn many oases patrol
leaders vere not sufficiently trained or Instructed in what
to look for and hoy to rsport It vith the. result that their
Information was praotioally without value. Zn jungle terrain,
patrols are the only oertaln renns of obtaining definite
information on the terrain to the front; and all unit intell
igence offie ere and potential patrol leaders should be in
doctrinated with the fact that aoeurate terrain information
advances. -
Is almost a vital as enemy Information, especially during
6
flffltt»f/fl>
p{
- -^^^^fc#
AMfAPvW&WBBBF
number of
cpptured
weapons" turnfa^n was
equipment pnd the
unsatisfactory due, It is
considered, to the following conditions:
(a) The persistent Instinct of personnsl to
retain Items as souvenirs even though they had been thorough
ly Instructed to the contrary *>rtor to' the landing.
(b) The drain on personnel required for supply
and evacuation purposes did not leeve, in organisations,
sufficient personnel to collect, segregate, and guard captured
material on the scene of oombrt.
(o) Transportation problems ovor poor trails
were so aoutc that, due to the demands of supply and evacua
tion, captured material oould not be moved and therefore
vpB abandoned or destroyed In the Jungle.
(2) It Is considered that the only practicable
method of assuring that captured material, and documents
are not lost, destroyed, or retained as souvenirs is to
have special units, supervised by offlocrs, right on the
scene whose primary miselon Is to gather, segregate, protect
from the clem ants, and safeguard captured material and
doouments until proper disposition 6f same can be made.
Regiments do not have suff latent spare personnel to perform
the above tasks and It is believed that special units sent
down from higher echelons to assist organisation tommandera in
the gathering and safeguarding of captured material would
prove to be of inestimable value. See discussion on special
scout company under paragraph 3 above.
jP*
H.
V TURSON
vtv*cfccv\
Lt.cox, uacc.
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•fflttHß
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• •
KMJSIFIED
HJT/Jmh
INTELLIGENCE SECTION, HEADQUARTERS,
THIRD MARINE DIVISION, FLEET MARINE FORCE,
IN THE FIELD.
1 February, 1944
ANNEX NA tt to D-? SPECIAL ACTION REPORT
ENEMY OPERATIONS
I •GROUND.
The Cape Torolcina area was defended on Nov. Ist by the
2d Company, Ist3n, 83d Infantry plus 30 men from the regi
mental gun company and T one ?smm gun, type 41. Total
strength was 270. On lov. sth the strength of this company
wpB 63 end the company commander, Carat. ICHIKAWA had been
replaced by the CO of the 2d Platoon, a probationary officer.
The Cape Itself was fortified with 19 pillboxes solidly
constructed of coconut logs and dirt. The one piece oi ar
tillery was located on the Cape. 3each Green 1 (on PURUATA
ISLAND) and Beach Green 2 were defended by a platoon each
and TOROKINA ISLAND by a squad which was later reinforced
by a few Japs who escaped from FURUATA ISLAND. All other
beaches on T<*hlch our troot>B landed were undefended. It
became known subsequently that the enemy hpd based his dis
positions on an estimate thpt allied forces vould attack
East of CAPE TCROKINA and West of CAPE MUTUPSNA.
On D-day, 1 November, as our landing boats rounded
PURUATA ISLAND on their way to 3epchee Blue 1, Green 1, and
Green 2, they were taken under cross fire by machine guns
on PURUATA ISLAND, TOROKINA ISLAND, and CAPS TOROKINA as
well as by one 75mm gun on the Cape. 3 boats were sunk and
3 damaged. As our troops hit the above beaches they were
also fired on by mortars. There were 18 enemy pillboxes
on CAPE TOROKINA and the last one was not reduced until
1900, 1November. Enemy troops defending Baach Green 2
were overcome after they had inflioted several casualties
on our troops. Enemy resistance on FJRUATA ISLAND was very
determined and consisted of several enrolaced machine guns
and well-concealed snipers*
During 2 Novaaber, fighting oontlnued on PURUATA ISLAND.
The remnants of enemy forces which had been on the Cape and
on Beach Green 2 retired to the East.
On 3 November, resistance on PURUATA ISLAND finally
eeasod during the morning. After an artillery preparation
at 1315, our troops landed on TOROKINA ISLAND and enemy
resistance cc«eed shortly thereafter.
-1
KMttS/flfl)
#>
DEMOTED
• »
ftOttSfflEß
• tf
I
-
on both flanks. Hastily abandoned bivouac areas extending
for 2200 yards along the NUMA NUMA trail North of PIVA No.
2, were estimated to have contained a battalion. Abandoned
gear included demolitions, grenades, personal pa ok 8, l-75mm
mountain gun (Type 41). l-37mm "Rapid Fire gun, 1 heavy
ma oh ine gun, several light machine guns, 80am grenade dis
chargers, and small anas*
The enemy* e first serious effort to oounter-attaok our
beachhead wns thus defeated by vigorous attacks of our
forces whenever and wherever oontaot was mads. He lost 561
killed in the 3 days of fighting. The ertmy scheme of ma
neuver was as follows: The provisional battalion which
landed on our Vest flank vas to go inland and harass our
perimeter on the loft flank and In front* Vhile they at
tracted attention to the Vest and North sectors of the per*»
lmcter, the East flank was to be hit vigorously at 0600,
9 November, by the Ist and 3d Bne, of the 23d Infantry sup
ported by Field Artillery, the Regimental Gun Company, ana
a Light Trench Mortar Company. This foroe was to attack
South and Vest from an assembly area near PHCO (Northeast
of HOPARA) and effeot a Junction with the foroe on our Left
flank In tha vicinity of PIVA No 2, Another foroe (else
unknown) was to make a landing Immediately Vest of TOROKINA
RIVER, and a platoon of 40 men and 1 officer Just East of
TOROKINA RIVER, The enemy estimated our beaohhead wi fur
ther to the East than It actually was and his estimate of
our strength was 6-10,000 troops. There are tome Indications
that the enemy planned to send further echelons down from
RA3AUL but was prevented by 9.8*Naval and air action. The
two landings scheduled to be made East and Vest of the
mouth of the TOROKINA RIVER were not carried out*
10, 11 pnd 12 November: The enemy wns contacted only
In small patrol actions resulting in the killing of 24 Japs.
13 November: A strong enemy position was established
ft.
•
NUMA NUMA trail to & point due North of CAPS TOROKINA and
thence South toward? tho Cape; ono '.-Jest along the East-West
trail, thence South alonp the FIVAv.NUMA NUMA trail to the
vicinity of the bench; and one swinging South find West in
p. wide eves^p to
Join tho previous ftttnok nonr tho beach.
25 November: An attack by our forces ran Into strong
resistance in the area (136.2-219.1) and vac held up all
day; but the enemy withdrew during the night. Imnydi&'-ely
South of this area the enemy fired sporadio urchin* ;u.i
fire into our lines during the dry. At 1845 enomy artillery,
both 15od. and 75mn, started shelling our artillery positions
on CAPS TOROKINA, the division dumps on Beach Blue 1 nnd ar
tillery positions Northeast of CAPE TOROKINA. This firing
continued »t Intervals until doming of 26 November nhen
all enemy activity quieted down. The second large- scale
attempt to break up our beachhead had been defected after
6 days of heavy fighting. The enony had lost 1196 dead in
this attempt. It la estimated that 450 of this number hrd
been killed by artillery fire and the balence by Infantry,
A prisoner of wpr, orotured 27 November stated that tha 23d
Infantry had suffered at least 40 t>er oent oaeualtiee end
the Regimental Commander had been killed. Units identified
vere as follows:
23d Inf (less Cd3n and 9th Co, 3d3n)
7th Co, 2dßn, 23 Inf.
lstßn, 13th Inf.
2 Go's, 45th Inf.
6th Engineers
One lOoa. platoon.
lstßn, 6th FA. (2-2 sun batteries)
2d3n, 4th Heavy FA. [2-2 gun batteries)
3d Light Mortar Bn. (less Ist Company)
sth Co, 54th Inf.
6th Co, 54th Inf.
6th Div. Signal Unit.
Ist Co, 53 Inf (t) (Co rotter only evidenoe)
'
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#>
MttASSIFIED
11, 18, 13 and 14 Dtotnbtrt Thert vtrt minor
eklrmlehee vlth tht rennantt of tht 3dßn, 23rd Inf vho were
holding potltlont in tht general vlolnlty of mil 1000
(139.6-C19.2). Tht tntmy foroe oontltttd of about 800-300
troops During thlt ptrlod our Northeaet ttotor rtoelved
eporadio ihtlllnf from 75mm art ill try and 90mm aftratart at
wtll at 50mm mortar and machine gun firt.
16 Btoambtri After a preparation by artillery and dive
bombart our troop e attacked tht Jap p© el tlone on Rill 1000
and by dark had oooupltd tht vttttrn part of tht Jap po
altions*
16 Dtotnbtrt Tht enemy gtvt up all tht higher ground
after further attaoke by our foroee and vlthdrev into a
pooktt optn to tht Morta; but turrowndtd by our troop e on
tht Meet, South and Eatt, A Ftinforbed platoon madt ton
taot vith oat ojf our patxolt on tht baath Satt of tht mouth
Of tht TORdCZMA XXTSU
e^aouattd, k
• fern* b»t|tt nejrt fxmmd ant «ft%lont-e>f
ttrtral o%'ff%
18 T^enamjptrt H>trt patfol tmntattt in tht
nolalty
of 'ItoaJipm «N» Hap%jgßU *b#y and 9 Japt
WBBIOII
mm) «m !»•*%•* fee tat*
fin «ma laid dew
potlttona*
oa thla
i
• • 3>
\u25a0"^TeotmbTr:
... *_
_•:
—.-. _ _ patrol
A platoon If ran Into Jap prepared po
sitions nsar (140.50-211.85; at 1000. The point was a marine
with a military dog. As coon as tne dog alerted, the Japs
opened fire, killing 4 (plus the dog) and wounding 10.
Our patrol withdrew while an Qlmm mortar concentration was
laid in. Reinforce* by another platoon, the attaok was re
eumed but was unsuocecoful and our troops withdrew Ueut
aoross the TOROKIKA RIVER. The Jape were dug in arciml the
bases of trees and had 1 heavy mpyhine gun, 3 light machine
guns as well as 60mm mortare. Another unsuoceecful etJtaok
was made on the Jap positions in the saddle of Hill 600A.
24 Deoember: Patrols on Hill 600 Areported the eneay
had withdrawn to the No~th. About 30 covered emplacements
were found. The Jape were reported to be organising a de
fensive position extending from the North end of Kill600 A
on a2O degrree azimuth for 500 yards. One of our patrols
had a brief fire fight at (140.6-219.8).
26 and 26 Deoembert Minor patrol oontaots were made
and on 26 Daoeoibar. Fire from enemy 76mm. lOoa artillery
and COmm mortars was reoelved in different parte of the
division sector.
27 and 28 Deoemberr There were minor patrol oontaots.
One oompany oroe fed the TOROKINA going Sast and North of
the old Jap position "and attacked it from the last. 10
Japs were killed and 10-20 fled into the bath. Our troops
wired the positions for demolition before withdrawing to
the ve S t aoross the TOROIINA RIVZR.
1600, 28 December: Oommand of the Division sector was
turned over to the Amtrtoal Division commander. There were
no enemy forces In oontaot with our lines and no known
enemy Vest of the TOROXINA RIVER. The Third Marine Division
and attached units had killed 2,111 Japs.
II NAVAL ACTION:
l Nov ember: At 0760, 2 heavy orulsers, 2 light cruisers,
and 6 destroyers were reported heading Northwest at 26 knots
about 70 miles West of 3CTKA PASSAGE.
2 November: At 0248, CTF 39 reported that he was at
tacking on enemy surface force of cruisers and destroyers
at 6-208, 164-308. At 0438, the enemy had been defeated
and fled to the North leaving one cruiser and four des
troyers sunk. A transport group, oomposad of 3-APA's
(Hunter Liggett, Aaerloan Legion, and Oresent City) and 1
AKA (ALCHI3A) had not been able to complete unloading all
gear and equipment on D-day and was waiting offshore for
daylight to return to CAPE TOROKIHA to oomplete their un
loading. This group was only 35 miles from the scene of the
battle. Task Foroe 39 was heavily attacked by 100 enemy
planes at 0824 tfiioh probably diverted a similar attack from
the transports.
-7
DECLASSIFIED 32
\u25a0eT.P^^'^^ovomDef: too onemy succeeded In transporting and
landing a provisionalbattalion on the Woe t flank of our
beachhead during the night of 6-7 November. Four destroyers
wcr: used for this purpose.
25 November: At 0145, 6 Japanosc destroyers were inter
oeptod by 4of our destroyers. 2 enemy destroyers were
sunk by torpedoes, 1 by torpedoes and gunfire, and 1 by to
11 *
November: The beachhead aree vac straf* at 0746 by
enemy fightere. During the day and early hours of darkness
tneri
to stop
wIS three bombing attacks.
unloading and put to eea
The convoy was forced
iftusflnn
• ~ • 33
• •
DECLASSIFIED
i 9November: From 0130 to 0515 there wero four
27 bombs were dropped killing1 marine officer
listed end wounding 12 enlisted.
put out of action and one battery
alerts.
and 4 :n
l-75m= pack tovitser was
galley and switchboard
were destroyed.
DECLASSIFIED
si
DECLASSIFIED
dropped 25-35 bombs In various parts of the beachhead area.
2 men vere killed And 9 were wounded. One Jap plane was
ehot down by a night fightor.
24 December: The enemy dropped 2 small bombs 1 nonr
the boat pool nnd lon PURUATA ISLAND. One piano straf 3d
the TOROKINA fighter etrip.
25 December: 135 alerts to date since 1 November.
27 December: One alert but the bogey did not close.
28 December: Surnnnry: For the whole period 1 November
2Q December inclusive, there wore 136 nir nlerts. Bombs
were dropped during 27 of these plerts. Approxtnrte
casualties were 28 dead, 10 missing, And 136 wounded among
all forces located in the beach head area. One APD oarry
ing Marines from the 3d Division was sunk by an onemy
torpedo plane on its way to CAPE TOROKINA and 38 Marines
were lost. Damage was rolntivoly small and was confined
ohicfly to dumps on PURUATA ISLAND and boats in the boat
pool.
H. V. TURTON
LtCol. UBMC
D-2
10-
-• >
Bttussma
HJT/fr INTELLIGENCE SECTION, HEADQUARTERS,
ufcyLnvSii \u25a0tU'
Appendix 1 to Annex A, Enemy Operations
x rcbruKry> 1944
#*: St^
Lt.Col. USMC.
D-2
DECLASSIFIED
• .* •
SKETCH NO I
GENERfL DEFENSIVE SCHCM£ Of CAPE TOROKINfi
<i
Ii
!
37
6KETCH NO I
SINGLE BUNKER LJ/TH TUO MACHINE GUNS
MEUCf\r\Qi\TLhGtvUfr// SffA/DC, SPROUTING COCONUT 6
ENTRGNCE
THIGH I'U/OE
BERCH
QNGU OF F/RE
m r m3
i%
SKETCH MO S
TLJMBIinKERA EGCH QUMKER FROM 8' TO /Q'HfGH
uell cnnouFtAGta ljth debris a vegetat/cu
Trip wfi.j
Oh£ BUMMER.
EWNZyiEL'.._
kkv z mz
M
$1
•f
SKETCH NO 5
~TnpYiF_s*i
—AQNZJu^ut
Hvi I"* I<W3 *l
SKETCH A/0 6
IWIW/>U/?L RIFLE PITS tfLOA/G BE/9CH AW fiMOUG BUkIKERS.
SCATTERED THROUGHOUT UERE LIGHT MOCHIUE GUU&
MO C <UKO Oft.ACS
t'DEEP I
i
—*-H
h—*-Hh
BERQH-
\u25a0
L'DEEP -5-
-5 I'DEEP
1 Z'
*
t •
•
*
%
#
•
» <
• #
f
HEADQUARTERS, THIRD MAPIIIE DIVI^N,
FLEST KAftiNE FORCE
29'7a;&M^, l'J*J*
MARINE DIVISION
1. PLANNING.
Third Marine Division participation in the DIPPER o^era.
tion commenced October 4, 19 W with the submission of an embarkation
plan for the movement of the Division reinforced by 3d Defense Bat
talion, 2d Marine Raider Regt {Pro -lJional) , Ist 155 mm Arty Bn, IMAC
Naval Construction Bn, Detachment CuMAIRUORSOLS, Advance Naval Base
Unit #7, ACORN 13, Branch #3, 4th Base Depot, Advance Echelon Head
quarters IMAC, let Echelon H&S Bn lI£AC and let Echelon Ist Corps
Signal. Bn. This plan (based on the shipping available together with
certain restrictions on the amount of cargo that could be carried)
called for some 13,900 men and 6,£GO tons of cargo in the first
echelon of eight APA's and four A&A!s for the D day landing, followed
by five LST echelons five days epart, eaoh carrying approximately
3000 troops and 5,500 tons of cargo * The organization of the 3d
Marine Division, reinforced, for this operation ie shown in Annex "A*.
COMMENT: This plan, with the addition of echelons to
transport the 3?th Division ana with minor changes to meet the situa
tion as it developed, was successfully carried out substantially as
planned.
The AKA'e were formed into a separate transport group.
Buch a group has an excess of cargo over personnel for combat loading
and has no place In a landing against possible enemy opposition. It
is recommended that AXA's to be used on D day be fitted into other
transport groups in aooordanoe with the tactical plan rather than
being formed into a separate group.
SBPPLXKt.
The embarkation plan contemplated that the first echelon
would carry three unite of fire for troops embarked (except two unite
for heavy AA units), ten days landing rations, ten days B rations
and ttoft days fuel; and that svoosedlng echelons would carry similar
amounts for troops embarked plus additional quantities lntonded to
bring levels on hand at D plus 90 days to five units of fire and
thirty days of other supplies. Eaoh combat team was also furnished
a thirty day supply of malaria control and medical items.
OQNMEHT: This scheme worked satisfactorily but for future
operations such items as malaria control and medical supplies should
be Intrusted to the combat teams only, in amounts to mee£ immediate
requirements, the bulk of such supplies should be shipped later
after division dumps have been established* Also replenishment s in
equipment and clothing (TBA Oroup 12) should be scheduled for ship
ment at intervals beginning about D plus 10 days.
3. SHIPMENT.
The equipment of the division was divided into three cate
gories as indicated below.
Category kx Equipment required to live and to fight for
a limited period in a limited space.
Category B: Equipment necessary for the continuation of
combat and extension of the combat zor.u.
Category C: Equipment for which uo need was contemplated
within the first 30 days, (to be sent forward
on call).
Equipment ism assigned to the several categories axter
consideration of the the terrain of the proposed
theater and the minm mtmjmfi W^wf 03#ecJLpd. These same principles
a
were applied to the formation of the battalion landing teams to lar.*
on D day (for example, no tanks or antitank units were attached to
these landing teams).
COMMENT: The application of these rules produced a rcin
forccd'tjattnllon landing team which could be acebmodated on one A?A
necessary
with a load limit of 500 tone (category A equipment with
supplies), with the remaining category B equipment and units to
follow in successive ochelons. This plan worked satisfactorily
spaced.
but
can bo applied only when the several echelons are closely
Troops landed with the haversack only, the knapsack and
blanket roll being embarked as organisation baggage (sea any bags, cots
ccnelon).
and pads were classed as category C and not embarked In
recommended that the knapsack be lei u
For future movements it is
behind as category B equipment.
4. shore parties.
party
Each APA was required to furnish a complete shore
of oome 550 officers and mSn, of which lj» wore for work in J-'C
the
on the beach "j^tnbeing
ship, 60 were used as "boat riders" and 200remainlngpersonnel
sole duty of unloading cargo from boats"; work,
vehicle fivers,
used for shore party fieadquartors, pioneeroorsonnol,
dunro supervisors, communicators, medical supposed teach party and
for work at inland dumps. Each AKA was furnish 120 men
Jo
to work in the holds, 50 men to ride the boats and 200 on the beach
boats. As the AKA's
with the sole duty of unloading cargo fromnecessary
carried only 350 officers and men, it was (in to make up the
difference by drawing men from the APA's addition to the regular
APA shore party). Each AFA was Joined with an adjacent; APA, the APA
shore party headquarters supervising the work on both beaches.
COMMENT: The application of those rules meant about 40#
of the entire landing force was initiallyengaged on shore party
duties. It Is believed that this number is excessive. and that with
proper organization a shore party composed of 30% of the landing
force should be sufficient (450 for an average APA). It is also
believed that the personnel capacity of the AKA's to be employed on
D day should be lnoreased so that an AKA can unload itself without
the need of drawing additional working details from the APA's.
5. FIRST PHASE.
Twelve ships unloaded simultaneously on D day (November Ist)
on a front of 8000 yards. Difficult hydrographic conditions caused
the lose of some 86 boats on their initial trip. Difficult terrain
inland (swamps) made the formation of inland dumps impracticable and
all cargo was placed on the beach itself, Just above the high water
mark. Heavy surf caused the abandonment of the three western beaches
after the personnel had landed, all cargo originally intended for'
those beaches was diverted to other beaches. The loss of large
numbers of boats slowed the unloading; this condition was aggravated
by frequent alerts which caused the ships to cease unloading and put,
to sea. Eight of the twelve ships completed unloading on D day, the
remaining four returning on D plus 1 to complete unloading.
COMMENT: Regiments gradually assumed control of their
beaches and consolidated their dumps but it was not until November 12
that division was able to assume control of the supply of rations,
ammunition and fuel. During this period organl rat ions and unite
obtained tholr supplies from the nearest shore party dump. Tc pcrrcit
the regiments to perform this function, many units remained attacn^u.
to the rogimonts that would normally have reverted to organic control
earlier. For example, the dates on which certain units reverted to
organic control is indicated below:
Nov 3d: CB Battalion (to construct roads)
Nov 4th: Artillery battalions
Nov 6th: Pioneer Bn (for permanent shore party to handle
succeeding echelons)
Nov 9th: Engineer Battalion
•)
•
The long delay Indicated by the above table vac ca'.uod '\\
the lack of roads Inland which made it necessary (in ao far ac eupyly
and evacuation was concerned) to leave the problem in the hands of
the regimental commanders until the situation clarified and the ro
qulrod supply routes could bo devoloped.
6, ROADS.
Initiallythere were- no roads. (The one native traM
leading inland on the right flunk broke dorvas soon as it wan sub
jected to heavy traffic.) The beach itself was used, as a rosxi for
all lateral traffic and amphibian traotors wero used for the nov«
ment of supplies and for the n\ acuatAon of wounded; track layli'f^
trailers pulLed by traotors wh*c aXco used where practicable. C&lffht
een track laying trailers wi 5h rt -9 traotors had been obtained .e^ec
lally for this operation). Tho front linos gradually advanced in
land across the swamps until dry ground was reached. A division
inland dump was then established vDump No. 2, three miles by road
inland from tho beach). Until a road was built supplies were trans
ported to ,thiB dumo by amphibian tractors; joeps and trailers were
also porto-ed forward by amphibian tractor for local distribution
from this forward dump. This procua6 was repeated at- a.later etap:e
of the operation to raoet a similar condition, i.e. the front lines
advanced again across swanros beyond the existing road not. The table
below show 8 the various stages.
Nov 1 to 14: Supply from boaoh dumps.
Nov 15 to 24: Bupply via amphibian traotor trail to
dump Ho. 2.
Nov 26 to D»# 8: Supply by truck to Dump No. 2.
Deo 0 to 23: Supply by truck to Dump Ho. 2 thenoe by
Thereafter:
miles inland from Dump No. 2) .
amphibian traotor to Dump No. 3 (Sir
•
COMMENT: On November" 13, the date on vhloh the first major
movement of supplies by amphibian traotor oommenoed, there were 64
amphibian traotors available. (XINovember 86, the date the road
opened and amphibian tractors were relieved by trucks, there were
only 28 amphibian traotors still in operation. By December 9th, 48
amphibian traotor e had been repaired and made serviceable, but by
Deoember 23rd only 12 remained In running condition. It la obvious
_.
_
that amphibian traotore are special instruments for special opera
tions and cannot bo depended upon for hard servioe• over extended
periods. _ _\u25a0
\u25a0
7. AMMUNITIONEXPENDITURES.
Ammunition expenditures for the two month period are in
dloated in Annex B.
W i
8. LOSS OF ESJIPMEUT.
A quantity of equipment was lost during this operation.
This matter is being handled by separate correspondence.
COMMENT. In spite of all that can be done, tromendous
losses must bo expected under difficult campaign conditions. To mc«3t
this fact, salvage operations should be started early and plans should
provide for the shipment forward, commencing about D plus 10 rays,
of replenishments in all typos of equipment. This equipment should
be earmarked for this purpose and shipping space provided for it
in the original embarkation plan. As a rough figure the TBA 90 day
replenishment allowance should be provided for c ach 30 days of active
operations.
-4-
• • W
• #
13. CONCLUSION:
This report covers only selected Important points of the
operation which are believed to have a boarlng on future operations.
No attempt is mado to report on matters of supply and evacuation
which, while difficult, require no special solution.
a!:itsxe3: "a" organization
of 3D uarine division reinforced.
--
nnB M
AJfftJHITIOH SXPSUPTTUrSS DURING DI^ER OP^ATION.
"C" EMPRESS AUGUSTA SAX 19TH MaRII-^S !IAP, BUD
"DI?IO!T 1:20,000 V^TH ADHI'TIST^ATr^ Ii»S7AL
LA?IO!TS Am ROAD !ST AS <^P 20 15CSH3SR 1940
T
lIPOS3D TH^RSon.
*'. C. KALL
Colonel, USMC
D-4
50