[A.M. No. RTJ-96-1353.

March 11, 1997]

DANILO B. PARADA, complainant, vs. JUDGE LORENZO B. VENERACION, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH
47, MANILA, respondent.
DECISION
TORRES, JR., J.:
The case before us stems from a verified complaint filed by Danilo B. Parada against respondent Judge Lorenzo B.
Veneracion for gross ignorance of the law, abuse of authority and rendering unjust and erroneous interlocutory orders and
judgment in connection with Criminal Cases Nos. 93-121385 to 88, entitled People vs. Danilo Parada, which led to
complainant Paradas premature incarceration at the Makati City Jail and Muntinlupa National Penitentiary.
The undisputed facts of the case as found by the Office of the Court Administrator are as follows :
Complainant herein is the accused in the aforementioned case for four (4) counts of estafa which were initially
raffled to Branch 30, RTC, Manila presided by Judge Senecio Ortile. Complainant is also duly bonded with the
Eastern Assurance and Surety Corporation (EASCO). On October 23, 1993 complainant notified said court
formally thru counsel of his change of address from 219 Cityland Condominium, Buendia Extension, Makati,
Metro Manila to 2412 Nobel St., Bo. San Isidro, Makati, Metro Manila. On October 27, 1993 he also notified the
Manager of the bonding company of his change of address. On February 8, 1994, Judge Ortile inhibited himself
from trying the said case and thus, the case was re-raffled to the sala of respondent Judge Lorenzo Veneracion,
and per order of April 26, 1994, the hearing of the case was set for June 3, 6, 7 and 8, 1994. Apparently, the
notice of hearing dated April 27, 1994 was sent to complainants former address and that for failure of accusedcomplainant to appear on June 3, 1994, respondent ordered the arrest of herein accused-complainant, ordering
the confiscation of the bond and a trial in absentia was conducted.Respondent Judge likewise assigned a
counsel de officio, Atty. Jesse Tiburan of the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) as counsel for the accused.
xxx Furthermore, a warrant of arrest was issued on June 3, 1994 with no bail recommended.
On June 6, 7 and 8, 1994, respondent court issued orders noting the failure of the petitioner to appear and
proceeded with the trial in absentia. On the hearing of June 8, 1994, the motion of counsel de officio of accusedcomplainant that defense be allowed to present evidence upon petitioners arrest, was denied and further held
that the failure of the accused to appear is a waiver of his right to adduce evidence.
xxx. On November 25, 1994, a decision was rendered convicting herein accused-appellant of the crime and the
decision was promulgated despite his absence. Accused-complainant was arrested and brought to the Makati
City Jail.
Accused-complainant filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus, Certiorari and Annulment of Judgment with prayer for
immediate relief with the Court of Appeals and was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 37340 entitled Danilo
Parada vs. Judge Lorenzo B. Veneracion, et. al..
On August 18, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision declaring the decision dated November 25,
1995 of respondent court null and void and further ordering the case to be remanded to respondent for further
proceeding in order to afford accused-complainant the opportunity to rebut the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses and documentary evidence against him as well as present his evidence. [1]
Subsequently, Parada filed with this Court the instant complaint dated March 11, 1996 against the respondent Judge
Veneracion in connection with the decision and interlocutory ordersrendered by the latter in Criminal Cases Nos. 93121385 to 88. He alleged, inter alia, that the respondent Judge is guilty of ignorance of the law when he did not follow the
legal requirements of a valid trial in absentia which led to his conviction and premature incarceration, that the order of his
arrest with no recommendation for bail was erroneous, and that respondent Judge abused his authority when he issued
the June 8, 1994 order denying the motion of Paradas counsel de oficio to allow him to present his evidence upon his
arrest. Parada thus prayed for the dismissal from service of the respondent Judge and that the latter be barred from
railroading the subject Criminal Cases Nos. 93-121385 to 88.
On June 4, 1996, the Office of the Court Administrator received the respondent Judges comment to Paradas
complaint, the pertinent portion of which reads:
xxx
1. That the herein complaint is purely and plainly a harassment suit arising from the Decision rendered in the
case of People vs. Danilo Parada for estafa;
2. That the charges therein are denied because they are not based on the facts and of the records of the case,
the herein Judge merely acted with compassion upon receipt of the records of these cases from another sala,
after having been informed that the private complainants merely borrowed from loan sharks the money given to
the accused Danilo Parada and that they are only interested in compelling said accused to return their money,
not in sending said accused to jail;
3. That the herein Judge acted in good faith in the trial of the said cases. [2]
Unfazed by the foregoing assertions of the respondent Judge, the Office of the Court Administrator on the contrary
held that:
xxx

Respondents general denial of the allegations imputed to him does not belie any of the facts which lead to the
incarceration of the complainant. Thus, his failure to deny each and every specific allegations can be construed
as admission on his part.
Moreover, trial in absentia may proceed only if the accused failed to appear at the trial without justification despite
due notice. In this case, complainant was never notified of any hearing from the time he changed his address up
to the promulgation of the decision despite the fact that he notified the court and his bonding company.
xxx
Respondent issued a warrant for the arrest of the accused-complainant with no bail recommended despite the
fact that the crime charged was bailable and denied the motion of his counsel for the accused to adduce
evidence upon accuseds arrest. Clearly, respondent denied complainant his right to due process. [3]
On the basis of these observations, the Office of the Court Administrator recommended that respondent Judge
Veneracion be fined in the amount of P10,000.00 with a warning that a commission of the same or similar infraction shall
be dealt with more severely.
We agree with the findings of the Office of the Court Administrator.
Section 14 (2), Article 3 of the Constitution provides, inter alia, that trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of
the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. The requisites then of a
valid trial in absentia are: (1) the accused has already been arraigned; (2) he has been duly notified of the trial; and (3) his
failure to appear is unjustifiable.[4]
In the subject criminal cases, requisite numbers two (2) and three (3) of a valid trial in absentia are clearly
wanting. Parada had not been duly notified of the trial because the notice of hearing dated April 27, 1994 was sent to the
former address of Paradas counsel despite the fact that the latter formally notified the court of his change of address. His
failure to appear therefore in the June 3, 6, 7 and 8, 1994 hearings is justified by the absence of a valid service of notice of
hearing to him.
As a rule, where a party appears by attorney in an action or proceeding in a court of record, all notices required to be
given therein must be given to the attorney of record. [5]Accordingly, notices to counsel should be properly sent to his
address of record and unless the counsel files a notice of change of address, his official address remains to be that of his
address of record.[6]
It is undisputed that Paradas counsel filed a notice of change of address on October 23, 1993. As such, the
respondent judge should have already taken cognizance of the new address when it sent the notice of hearing dated April
27, 1994. It is thus unwarranted for the respondent judge to still send the notice of hearing to the old address of Paradas
counsel because it is not his official address nor his address of record. Concomitantly, the sending of notice of hearing to
his former address is an invalid service and cannot in any way bind Parada.
It is worthy to stress that due process of law in judicial proceedings requires that the accused must be given an
opportunity to be heard. He has the right to be present and defend in person at every stage of the
proceedings. Incidentally, the right to a hearing carries with it the right to be notified of every incident of the proceedings in
court. Notice to a party is essential to enable him to adduce his own evidence and to meet and refute the evidence
submitted by the other party.[7] No less than the Constitution provides that no person shall be held to answer for a criminal
offense without due process of law. A violation therefore of any of the rights accorded the accused constitutes a denial of
due process of law. The circumstantial setting of the instant case as weighed by the basic standards of fair play impels us
to so hold that the trial in absentia of Parada and his subsequent conviction are tainted with the vice of nullity, for evidently
Parada was denied due process of law.
Judges, by the very delicate nature of their functions in dispensing justice, should be more circumspect in the
performance of their duties.[8] In resolving matters in litigation, they should endeavor assiduously to ascertain the facts and
the applicable laws. Had respondent judge carefully and diligently studied the records of the case, he would have surely
noticed the change of address, and his questioned orders, which eventually led to Paradas unwarranted deprivation of
liberty, could not have been precipitately issued.
Likewise, the warrant of arrest with no recommendation for bail that was issued by respondent Judge on June 3, 1994
is a downright violation of Paradas constitutional right to bail. The rule is clear that unless charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua and the evidence of guilt is strong, all persons detained, arrested or otherwise under the
custody of the law are entitled to bail as a matter of right. It should be noted that the crime with which Parada was charged
is estafa[9] which is undoubtedly a bailable offense. This circumstance could not have escaped the attention of the
respondent judge when he issued on June 3, 1994 the order of arrest of Parada with no recommendation for his bail. In so
doing, respondent judge exhibited that degree of ignorance so gross which the Court can not countenance. Judges are
required by Canon 3, Rule 3.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct to be faithful to the law and maintain professional
competence.[10] They are called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules; it
is imperative that he be conversant with basic legal principles. [11]
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Lorenzo B. Veneracion is FINED P10,000.00 for disregarding Paradas right to
procedural due process and for showing gross ignorance of the law,with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of a similar
act in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, (Chairman), Romero, Puno, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 109287. April 18, 1996]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANTOLIN CUIZON y ORTEGA, STEVE PUA y CLOFAS alias
STEPHEN P0 y UY or TOMMY SY and PAUL LEE y WONG alias PAUL LEUNG, accused-appellants.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; LAWFUL ARRESTS WITHOUT WARRANT; REQUIREMENTS; NOT
PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. - Re-assessing the factual backdrop of the case at bench, this Court cannot agree with
and accept the conclusion of the trial court that the appellants were caught in flagrante delicto which would justify the
search without a warrant. The shaky reasoning of the court a quo gives away the baselessness of its findings and
conclusion: x x x the search conducted on their bags in the hotel room could still be regarded as valid for being
incidental to a lawful arrest. x x x The arrest of accused Pua and Lee without a warrant of arrest was lawful, as they
could be considered to have committed the crime of transporting shabu in the presence of the arresting officers from
the time they received the bags containing the regulated drug in the airport up to the time they brought the bags to the
hotel. Or their arrest without a warrant was legal as falling under the situation where an offense had in fact just been
committed, and the arresting officers had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the said accused were the ones
who committed it. x x x Scrutinizing the provisions of Sec. 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court on lawful arrests without
warrant, we note that par. (c) of said section is obviously inapplicable, the appellants not being escapees from a penal
institution at the time of arrest. Par. (a) on the other hand requires that the person be arrested (1) after he has
committed or while he is actually committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense, (ii) in the presence of the
arresting officer(s). These requirements are not present in the case at bench, for at the time of their arrest, appellants
Pua and Lee were merely resting in their hotel room, and appellant Cuizon for his part was in bed resting with his wife
and child inside his home. No offense had just been committed, or was being actually committed or being attempted
by any of the accused in the presence of the lawmen.
2. ID.; ID.; RULE 113, SECTION 5; PARAGRAPH (b) THEREOF; NOT APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. - Par. (b) of
Rule 113, Section 5 is likewise inapplicable since its equally exacting requirements have also not been met. The
prosecution failed to establish that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been committed and the
arresting officers had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused-appellants had committed it. Appellant
Cuizon could not, by the mere act of handing over four pieces of luggage to the other two appellants, be considered
to have committed the offense of carrying and transporting prohibited drugs. Under the circumstances of the case,
there was no sufficient probable cause for the arresting officers to believe that the accused were then and there
committing a crime. The act per se of handing over the baggage, assuming the prosecutions version to be true,
cannot in any way be considered a criminal act. It was not even an act performed under suspicious circumstances as
indeed, it took place in broad daylight, practically at high noon, and out in the open, in full view of the public.
Furthermore, it can hardly be considered unusual, in an airport setting, for travellers and/or their welcomers to be
passing, handing over and delivering pieces of baggage, especially considering the somewhat obsessive penchant of
our fellow countrymen for sending along (pakikipadala) things and gifts through friends and relatives. Moreover, one
cannot determine from the external appearance of the luggage that they contained shabu hidden beneath some
secret panel or false bottom. The only reason why such act of parting with luggage took on the color and dimensions
of a felonious deed, at least as far as the lawmen were concerned, was the alleged tip that the NBI agents purportedly
received that morning, to the effect that appellant Cuizon would be arriving that same day with a shipment of shabu.
To quote from another decision of like import, (A)ll they had was hearsay information (from the telephone caller), and
about a crime that had yet to be committed.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROBABLE CAUSE; NOT ESTABLISHED IN CASE AT BAR. - We therefore hold that under the
circumstances obtaining, the prosecution failed to establish that there was sufficient and reasonable ground for the
NBI agents to believe that appellants had committed a crime at the point when the search and arrest of Pua and Lee
were made; hence, said search and arrest do not come under the exception in par. (b) of Sec. 5 of Rule 113, and
therefore should be deemed illegal.
4. CRIMINAL LAW; CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH AFFECT CRIMINAL LIABILITY; CONSPIRACY; NOT ESTABLISHED
IN CASE AT BAR. - Because of the way the operation actually turned out, there is no sufficient proof of conspiracy
between Pua and Lee on the one hand, and Cuizon on the other, inasmuch as there is no clear and convincing
evidence that the four (4) bags handed by Cuizon to Pua and Lee at the airport were the very same ones found in the
possession of the latter in Room 340 of the Peninsula Hotel. Not one of the NBI agents when testifying could
definitely and positively state that the bags seized from Room 340 were the very same ones passed by Cuizon at the
airport; at best, they could only say that they looked like the ones they saw at the airport. And even assuming them to
be the same bags, there remains doubt and uncertainty as to the actual ownership of the said bags at the alleged
turnover vis-a-vis the time they were seized by the agents. For these reasons, we cannot sustain the finding of
conspiracy as between Cuizon on the one hand and Pua and Lee on the other. Well-settled is the rule that conspiracy
must be proved independently and beyond reasonable doubt.

5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT AGAINST UNLAWFUL SEARCHES AND SEIZURES; DEEMED
WAIVED BY FAILURE TO CHALLENGE ITS VALIDITY; CASE AT BAR. - What has been said for Cuizon cannot,
alas, be said for appellant Pua. While the search and arrest carried out on him and Lee may have been illegal for not
being incident to a lawful warrantless arrest, the unfortunate fact is that appellant Pua failed to challenge the validity
of his arrest and search, as well as the admission of the evidence obtained thereby;he did not raise the issue or
assign the same as an error before this Court. Accordingly, any possible challenge thereto based on constitutional
grounds is deemed waived. This Court has upheld and recognized waivers of constitutional rights, including,
particularly, the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, in cases such as People vs. Malasugui (63 Phil.
221 [1936]) and De Garcia vs. Locsin (65 Phil. 689 [1938]).
6. ID.; ID.; THE JUDICIARY WHOSE MAIN FUNCTION IS THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE WOULD HAVE NO
RIGHT TO EXPECT ORDINARY PEOPLE TO BE LAW ABIDING IF WE DO NOT INSIST ON THE FULL
PROTECTION OF THEIR RIGHTS. - It is evident and clear to us that the NBI agents gravely mishandled the drug
bust operation and in the process violated the constitutional guarantees against unlawful arrests and illegal searches
and seizures. Because of the large haul of illegal drugs that the government officers claimed to have recovered, this
Court agonized over the case before us and struggled to apply the law with an even hand. In the final analysis, we in
the administration of justice would have no right to expect ordinary people to be law-abiding if we do not insist on the
full protection of their rights.
7. ID.; ID.; LAW ENFORCERS MUST ACT WITH DELIBERATE CARE AND WITHIN THE PARAMETERS SET BY
CONSTITUTION AND THE LAW. Some lawmen, prosecutors and judges may still tend to gloss over an illegal search
and seizures as long as the law enforcers show the alleged evidence of the crime regardless of the methods by which
they were obtained. This kind of attitude condones law-breaking in the name of law enforcement. Ironically, it only
fosters the more rapid breakdown of our system of justice, and the eventual denigration of society. While this Court
appreciates and encourages the efforts of law enforcers to uphold the law and to preserve the peace and security of
society, we nevertheless admonish them to act with deliberate care and within the parameters set by the Constitution
and the law. Truly, the end never justifies the means.
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorneys Office and The Law Firm of Ross B. Bautista for Antolin Cuizon.
Marcial P. Pe Benito for Steve Pua and Paul Lee.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In deciding the case at bench, the Court reiterates doctrines on illegal searches and seizures, and the requirements
for a valid warrantless search incident to a valid warrantless arrest. While the Court appreciates and encourages proactive law enforcement, it nonetheless upholds the sacredness of constitutional rights and repeats the familiar maxim, the
end never justifies the means.
This is an appeal from the Decision 1 dated January 5, 1993 Criminal Case No. 92-0230) of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 116,2 Pasay City finding appellants guilty of violating Section 15 of R.A. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous
rugs Act of 1972.
On March 10, 1992, an Information3 was filed against the appellants charging them as follows:
That on or about February 21, 1992 in Pasay City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously carry and transport into the country, without lawful authority, 16 kilograms, more or less, of
METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE, also popularly known as SHABU, a regulated drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment, appellant Antolin Cuizon, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty. During the arraignment
of appellants Paul Lee and Steve Pua, the latter translated the Information into Chinese-Cantonese for the understanding
of appellant Lee, who does not speak nor understand English, Pilipino or any other Philippine dialect. Both of them, duly
assisted by their counsel, also pleaded not guilty.4 Trial ensued and on January 5, 1993, the court a quo found appellants
guilty as charged and rendered the following disposition:5

WHEREFORE, accused Antolin Cuizon y Ortega, Steve Pua y Clofas alias Stephen Po y Uy or Tommy Sy, and Paul Lee y
Wong, alias Paul Leung, are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of transporting, without legal authority,
methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu, a regulated drug, as charged in the aforequoted Information; and they are
each sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00.
The methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu involved in this case is declared forfeited in favor of the government and is
ordered turned over to the Dangerous Drug Board for proper disposal.
The Facts
According to the Prosecution
The facts as summarized by the trial court and adopted by the Solicitor General, who added the page references to
the transcript of stenographic notes as indicated in brackets, are as follows: 6
In January 1992, the Reaction Group of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) gathered an information regarding the
drug activities of accused Antolin Cuizon y Ortega and his wife, Susan Cuizon. A surveillance was conducted on them. The
residence of the spouses was traced to Caloocan City (tsn, May 19, 1992, pp. 17-18, 21).
In the morning of February 21, 1992, the Reaction Group received a report from its informant in Hong Kong that accused
Cuizon, together with his wife, was arriving on the same day at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) in Pasay City,
Metro Manila, from the British crown colony, carrying with him a big quantity of shabu. A team was organized to intercept
the suspects. Heading the team was Jose Yap, with Ernesto Dio, Marcelino Amurao, Jose Bataller and Alfredo Jacinto, as
members. Some belonged to the Narcotics Division and the others to the Reaction Group of the NBI (tsn, May 19, 1992,
pp. 4, 18).
Arriving at the NAIA shortly before 12:00 noon of February 21, 1992, Dio positioned himself at the Arrival Area,
while Yap and the other members of the team posted themselves at the parking area of the airport. At about 12:45 in the
afternoon of the same date, accused Cuizon and his wife, who had just returned from Hong Kong, after passing through
the Immigration and Customs Areas at the NAIA, proceeded to the Arrival Area of the airport preparatory to their boarding
a car. While there, accused Cuizon, together with his wife, handed four (4) travelling bags to accused Steve Pua y Clofas
and accused Paul Lee y Wong, who were at the vicinity of the Arrival Area. Accused Pua and Lee loaded the bags in a
taxicab which they boarded in leaving the airport. Accused Cuizon and his wife took another vehicle (tsn, May 19, 1992,
pp. 4-5, 8-9).
At this juncture, Dio, who was observing the activities of the accused, radioed the group of Yap at the parking area,
describing the vehicle boarded by accused Pua and Lee so that Yap and his companions could apprehend the two.
However, the message of Dio was not completely received by his teammates as the radio he was using ran short of
battery power (tsn, May 19, 1992, pp. 25-26).
Immediately after the vehicle boarded by Pua and Lee had left, Dio proceeded to the place where his companions were
stationed for the purpose of giving assistance to them, believing that they were already in the process of apprehending
accused Pua and Lee. When he realized that the two accused were not apprehended, Dio told the group of Yap to follow
him as he was following the vehicle taken by Pua and Lee which, according to an earlier tip he learned, was proceeding to
the Manila Peninsula Hotel in Makati, Metro Manila (tsn, May 19, 1992 pp. 25-26; tsn, May 21, 1992 pp. 6, 15).
Upon arriving at about 2:00 p.m. of the same date of February 21, 1992, in the Manila Peninsula Hotel, in whose premises
the taxicab boarded by accused Pua and Lee entered, Dio and the other members of the team coordinated with Cot.
Regino Arellano, Chief Security Officer of the hotel, for the purpose of apprehending the two accused. A verification made
by the Chief Security Officer showed that accused Pua and Lee occupied Room 340 of the hotel. The two accused
allowed Dio and Yap, together with Col. Arellano, to enter their room. Found inside Room 340 were four (4) travelling
bags, which were similar to the ones handed by accused Cuizon to accused Pua and Lee at the Arrival Area of the NAIA.
After having introduced themselves as NBI agents, Dio and Yap were permitted by accused Pua and Lee to search their
bags in the presence of Col. Arellano. The permission was made in writing.(Exh. I). Three (3) of the four (4) bags each
yielded a plastic package containing a considerable quantity of white crystalline substance suspected to be
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Each package was sandwiched between two (2) pieces of board which appear
to be lawanit placed at the bottom of each of the three (3) bags. The suspected shabu contained in one bag weighed
2.571 kilos, that found in the other had a weight of 2.768 kilos, and the suspected shabu retrieved from the third bag
weighed 2.970 kilos. Pua and Lee were then apprehended by Dio and his companions (tsn, May 20, 1992, pp. 9-13;
tsn, May 7, 1992, p. 9, Exh. F-2, p. 75, Records).
Immediately thereafter, Dio and the other members of the team proceeded to the house of accused Cuizon
in Caloocan City, taking with them accused Pua and Lee and the bags with their contents of suspected dangerous drugs.
They reached the place at about 5:50 in the afternoon of the same date of February 21, 1992. Retrieved from accused

Cuizon in his residence was another bag also containing a white crystalline substance weighing 2.695 kilos, likewise
believed to be methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. In addition, a .38 Cal. firearm was taken from accused Cuizon
(tsn, May 19, 1992, pp. 10-11).
Pua, Lee, Cuizon and his wife were then brought by the arresting officers to the NBI headquarters at Taft Avenue, Manila,
for further investigation. They were subsequently referred to the Prosecution Division of the Department of Justice for
inquest. However, only the present three accused were charged in court (tsn, May 19, 1992, pp. 12-13, 16-17).
In the meantime, at about 5:30 p.m. of the same date of February 21, 1992, Joselito Soriano, roomboy of the Manila
Peninsula Hotel, while cleaning Room 340, observed that a portion of the ceiling was misaligned. While fixing it, he
discovered in the ceiling a laundry bag containing suspected shabu of more than five (5) kilos (Exh. X, p. 110). Informed of
the discovery while they were already in their office in the NBI, Yap and some companions returned to the hotel. The
suspected shabu was turned over to them (tsn, May 20, 1992, pp. 19-22).
When examined in the Forensic Chemistry Section of the NBI, the white crystalline substance taken from the three (3)
travelling bags found in the room of accused Pua and Lee in the Manila Peninsula Hotel, the white crystalline substance
retrieved from the bag confiscated from accused Cuizon in his house in Caloocan City, and the white crystalline substance
hidden in the ceiling of Room 340 of the hotel were confirmed to be methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a
regulated drug. (Board Regulation No. 6, dated December 11, 1972, of the Dangerous Drugs Board) (tsn, May 7, 1992, p.
12).
The Defenses Version(s)
Appellant Pua, on his part, interposed the defense of alibi. On direct examination, he testified that at the time of the
alleged commission of the offense, he and his co-appellant Lee were in their room at the Manila Peninsula Hotel. 7 His
version of what happened on February 21, 1992 can be summarized as follows:
At around 9:30 in the morning, he accompanied appellant Paul Lee to check-in at the Manila Peninsula Hotel for and
in behalf of the latters personal friend named Leong Chong Chong or Paul Leung, who was expected to arrive that
evening because of a delayed flight. Appellant Pua was engaged by appellant Lee to act as interpreter as Lee does not
know how to speak English and the local language.8
While in Room 340, past 1:00 in the afternoon, they received a call from the lobby informing them of the arrival of
Paul Leungs luggage. At Puas instructions, the said luggage were brought to the room by a bellboy. Thereafter, two
persons knocked on their door, accompanied by a tomboy and a thin man with curly hair. The two men identified
themselves as NBI agents and asked appellant Pua to let them in. He declined since he did not know who they were.
However, when Col. Arellano, the Chief Security Officer of the hotel, arrived and identified the two NBI agents, he and Lee
relented and permitted them to enter. Thereafter, he and Lee were told by the agents to sign a piece of paper. Made to
understand that they were merely giving their consent for the agents to enter their room, Pua and Lee signed the same.
Whereupon, the agents told them that they will open Paul Leungs bags. Again appellant Pua refused, saying that the bags
did not belong to them. Just the same, the agents, without appellants Pua and Lees consent, opened the bags and found
the shabu. Pua and Lee were then apprehended and brought to the NBI headquarters. 9
Appellant Cuizon, on the other hand, flatly rejected the prosecutions version of the incident. While admitting that
on February 21, 1992, he and his wife Susan did arrive from Hong Kongwith several pieces of luggage, he denied that he
met Pua and Lee at the arrival area of the airport, much less passed to them the four pieces of luggage. According to him,
only his two-year old son, accompanied by his cousin, Ronald Allan Ong, met them outside the airport. Ong fetched them
from the airport and brought them to their home in Caloocan City. They arrived at their house around 3:00 in the
afternoon.10
About two hours later, while he was resting together with his wife and son on his bed, two NBI agents suddenly
barged in and poked a gun at him. They manhandled him in front of his wife and son. His hands were tied with a necktie
and he was forcibly brought out of their house while the NBI agents ransacked the place without any warrant. He, his wife
Susan, and his cousin Ronald Allan Ong, were afterwards brought to the NBI Headquarters in Manila and there the NBI
agents continued mauling him.11
Appellant Cuizons wife Susan, his cousin Ronald Allan Ong, and his nephew Nestor Dalde, testified in his favor
basically reiterating or confirming his testimony.12
Unfortunately, appellant Paul Lee, who does not speak or understand a word of English or Pilipino and only knows
Chinese-Cantonese, was not able to take the witness stand for lack of an interpreter who would translate his testimony to
English. In the hearing set on October 28, 1992, the last trial date allotted to the defense for the reception of Lees
testimony, his counsel, although notified of the proceedings, did not appear. Thus, the trial court deemed him and Pua to
have waived their right to present additional evidence,13 and the case was considered submitted for decision after the filing

of memoranda. The counsel for Pua and Lee did not ask for the reconsideration of such ruling; neither did he submit any
memorandum. Only accused Cuizon, who was assisted by another counsel, was able to submit his memorandum.
The Issues
In their brief, appellants Pua and Lee made the following assignments of errors: 14
I. The trial court erred in finding conspiracy among the accused.
II. The trial court erred in giving credence to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Marcelino Amurao, Jose Yap and
Ernesto Dio despite contradictions made on material points.
III. The trial court erred in not giving accused Paul Lee the opportunity to present his evidence in his defense in violation of
his constitutional right to due process.
Appellant Cuizon, in a separate brief, essentially reiterates the first two assignments of errors above-quoted, and in
addition challenges the legality and validity of his warrantless arrest and the search and seizure incidental thereto. 15
As this Court sees it, the resolution of this case hinges on the pivotal question of the legality of the arrest and search
of herein appellants effected by the NBI operatives. Put differently, were the warrantless arrests and the warrantless
searches conducted by the NBI legal and constitutional?
The answer to this threshold question determines whether the judgment of the court a quo will stand or fall.
Consequently, there is a need to resolve first this issue before endeavoring to consider the other issues raised by
appellants.
A necessary side issue to be considered is, assuming the searches and arrests to have been illegal, whether failure
by appellants Pua and Lee to explicitly assign the same as errors before this Court amounted to a waiver of their
constitutional rights against such illegal searches and arrests.
The Courts Ruling
General Rule on Warrantless
Arrests, Searches, & Seizures
Well entrenched in this country is the rule that no arrest, search and seizure can be made without a valid warrant
issued by a competent judicial authority. So sacred is this right that no less than the fundamental law of the land 16 ordains
it:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose, shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
It further decrees that any evidence obtained in violation of said right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding. 17
However, the right against warrantless arrest and search and seizure is not absolute. Thus, under Section 5 of Rule
113 of the Revised Rules of Court, an arrest without a warrant may be lawfully made by a peace officer or a private
person:
a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.

On the occasion of any of the aforementioned instances of legitimate arrest without warrant, the person arrested may
be subjected to a search of his body and of his personal effects or belongings, for dangerous weapons or anything which
may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, likewise without need of a search warrant. 18
However, where a person is searched without a warrant, and under circumstances other than those justifying a
warrantless arrest, as discussed above, upon a mere suspicion that he has embarked on some criminal activity, and/or for
the purpose of discovering if indeed a crime has been committed by him, then the search made of such person as well as
his arrest are deemed illegal.19 Consequently, any evidence which may have been obtained during such search, even if
tending to confirm or actually confirming such initial suspicion, is absolutely inadmissible for any purpose and in any
proceeding,20 the same being the fruit of the poisonous tree. 21 Emphasis is to be laid on the fact that the law requires that
the search be incident toa lawful arrest, in order that the search itself may likewise be considered legal. Therefore, it is
beyond cavil that a lawful arrest must precede the search of a person and his belongings. Were a search first undertaken,
then an arrest effected based on evidence produced by the search, both such search and arrest would be unlawful, for
being contrary to law.
The Instant Case Does Not Fall Under
The Exceptions for Warrantless Searches, etc.
Re-assessing the factual backdrop of the case at bench, this Court cannot agree with and accept the conclusion of
the trial court that the appellants were caught in flagrante delictowhich would justify the search without a warrant. The
shaky reasoning of the court a quo gives away the baselessness of its findings and conclusion:
x x x the search conducted on their bags in the hotel room could still be regarded as valid for being incidental to a lawful
arrest. x x x The arrest of accused Pua and Lee without a warrant of arrest was lawful, as they could be considered to
have committed the crime of transporting shabu in the presence of the arresting officers from the time they received the
bags containing the regulated drug in the airport up to the time they brought the bags to the hotel. Or their arrest without a
warrant was legal as falling under the situation where an offense had in fact just been committed, and the arresting officers
had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the said accused were the ones who committed it. x x x 22
Scrutinizing the provisions of Sec. 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court on lawful arrests without warrant, we note that
par. (c) of said section is obviously inapplicable, the appellants not being escapees from a penal institution at the time of
arrest. Par. (a) on the other hand requires that the person be arrested (i) after he has committed or while he is actually
committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense, (ii) in the presence of the arresting officer(s). These
requirements are not present in the case at bench, for at the time of their arrest, appellants Pua and Lee were merely
resting in their hotel room, and appellant Cuizon for his part was in bed resting with his wife and child inside his home. No
offense had just been committed, or was being actually committed or being attempted by any of the accused in the
presence of the lawmen.23
Par. (b) of the same provision is likewise inapplicable since its equally exacting requirements have also not been met.
The prosecution failed to establish that at the time of the arrest, anoffense had in fact just been committed and the
arresting officers had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused-appellants had committed it. Appellant
Cuizon could not, by the mere act of handing over four pieces of luggage to the other two appellants, be considered to
have committed the offense of carrying and transporting prohibited drugs. Under the circumstances of the case, there was
no sufficient probable cause for the arresting officers to believe that the accused were then and there committing a crime.
The act per se of handing over the baggage, assuming the prosecutions version to be true, cannot in any way
be considered a criminal act. It was not even an act performed under suspicious circumstances as indeed, it took place in
broad daylight, practically at high noon, and out in the open, in full view of the public. 24 Furthermore, it can hardly be
considered unusual, in an airport setting, for travellers and/or their welcomers to be passing, handing over and delivering
pieces of baggage, especially considering the somewhat obsessive penchant of our fellow countrymen for sending along
(pakikipadala) things and gifts through friends and relatives. Moreover, one cannot determine from the external
appearance of the luggage that they contained shabu hidden beneath some secret panel or false bottom. The only reason
why such act of parting with luggage took on the color and dimensions of a felonious deed, at least as far as the lawmen
were concerned, was the alleged tip that the NBI agents purportedly received that morning, to the effect that appellant
Cuizon would be arriving that same day with a shipment of shabu. To quote from another decision of like import, (A)ll they
had was hearsay information (from the telephone caller), and about a crime that had yet to be committed. 25
In the leading case of People vs. Burgos,26 this Court laid down clear guidelines, as follows:
Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has just committed, is committing, or is about to commit
an offense must have personal knowledge of that fact. The offense must also be committed in his presence or within his
view. (Sayo v. Chief of Police, 80 Phil. 859).
The same decision is highly instructive as it goes on to state:

The Solicitor General is of the persuasion that the arrest may still be considered lawful under Section 6(b) using the test of
reasonableness. He submits that the information given by Cesar Masamlok was sufficient to induce a reasonable ground
(for belief) that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.
In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not enough that there is reasonable ground to believe that
the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A crime must in fact or actually have been committed first. That a crime
has actually been committed is an essential precondition. It is not enough to suspect that a crime may have been
committed. The fact of the commission of the offense must be undisputed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to
the identity of the perpetrator.
In this case, the accused was arrested on the sole basis of Masamlok s verbal report. Masamlok led the authorities to
suspect that the accused had committed crime. They were still fishing for evidence of a crime not yet ascertained. The
subsequent recovery of the subject firearm on the basis of information from the lips of a frightened wife cannot make the
arrest lawful. x x x
The foregoing doctrine was affirmed in the case of Alih vs. Castro,27 where this Court ruled that x x x under the
Revised Rule 113, Section 5(b), the officer making the arrest must havepersonal knowledge of the ground therefor as
stressed in the recent case of People v. Burgos.
In the case at bench, not only did the NBI agents rely merely on hearsay information (tips), but they were completely
uncertain that anything was really going down that day. That much is undisputed, from a reading of the testimony of
Agent Dio:
Q - Now, but you were informed by the personnel of the airport that the spouses Cuizon were going to bring in or
transport into the country shabu on February 21, 1992?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - Now, you were not sure or your group was not sure that they indeed would bring in shabu, is it not? That was
only the information relayed to your group?
A - Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q - But then you were jumping ahead. You were not sure is it not that they were bringing in shabu?
A - Yes, sir. (TSN, May 19, 1992, pp. 37-38.)
In his testimony, NBI Investigator Jose Justo Yap, who was with Agent Dio during the operation, likewise admitted in
substantially the same tenor their uncertainty regarding the commission of the offense (cf. TSN, May 20, 1992, pp. 29 &
34).
We therefore hold that under the circumstances obtaining, the prosecution failed to establish that there was sufficient
and reasonable ground for the NBI agents to believe that appellants had committed a crime at the point when the search
and arrest of Pua and Lee were made; hence, said search and arrest do not come under the exception in par. (b) of
Sec. 5 of Rule 113, and therefore should be deemed illegal. We might add that the search conducted on Pua and Lee was
not incident to a lawful warrantless arrest, having preceded the same and produced the justification therefor. On the other
hand, the search on Cuizon s residence, without the benefit of a search warrant, was clearly illegal and the shabu seized
thereat cannot but be considered inadmissible in evidence. More on these points later.
Comparison Between The Present Case
and Earlier Decisions of This Court
For claritys sake, it is imperative to compare the foregoing holding with previous decisions by this Court in various
drug cases, in which apparently different conclusions were reached, in order to distinguish them from the instant case and
avoid any potential misunderstanding of the foregoing holding as well as the constitutional and legal principles on which it
is based.
1. In People vs. Claudio,28 the accused, a passenger on a bus bound for Baguio City, was arrested by a policeman on
the same bus because of the distinctive odor of marijuana emanating from the plastic bag she was carrying. The Court
held the warrantless arrest under the circumstances to be lawful, the search justified and the evidence thus discovered
admissible in evidence.

2. In People vs. Tangliben,29 the accused, carrying a travelling bag at a bus terminal, was noticed by lawmen to
be acting suspiciously, and was also positively fingered by an informer as carrying marijuana, and so he was accosted by
policemen who happened to be on a surveillance mission; the lawmen asked him to open the bag, in which was found a
package of marijuana leaves. It was held that there was a valid warrantless arrest and search incident thereto. The Court
in effect considered the evidence on hand sufficient to have enabled the law enforcers to secure a search warrant had
there been time, but as the case presented urgency, and there was actually no time to obtain a warrant since the accused
was about to board a bus, and inasmuch as an informer had given information on the spot that the accused was carrying
marijuana, the search of his person and effects was thus considered valid.
3. In Posadas vs. Court of Appeals,30 the accused was seen acting suspiciously, and when accosted by two members
of the Davao INP who identified themselves as lawmen, he suddenly fled, but was pursued, subdued and placed in
custody. The buri bag he was carrying yielded an unlicensed revolver, live ammunition and a tear gas grenade. This Court
upheld his conviction for illegal possession of firearms, holding that there was under the circumstances sufficient probable
cause for a warrantless search.
4. In People vs. Moises Maspil, Jr., et al., 31 agents of the Narcotics Command set up a checkpoint on a highway in
Atok, Benguet, to screen vehicular traffic on the way to Baguio Citydue to confidential reports from informers that Maspil
and a certain Bagking would be transporting a large quantity of marijuana. At about 2 a.m. of November 1, 1986, the two
suspects, riding a jeepney, pulled up to the checkpoint and were made to stop. The officers noticed that the vehicle was
loaded with some sacks and tin cans, which, when opened, were seen to contain marijuana leaves. The Court upheld the
search thus conducted as being incidental to a valid warrantless arrest.
5. In People vs. Lo Ho Wing, et al., 32 the Court ruled that the search of the appellants moving vehicles and the seizure
of shabu therefrom was legal, in view of the intelligence information, including notably, clandestine reports by a planted
deep penetration agent or spy who was even participating in the drug smuggling activities of the syndicate, to the effect
that appellants were bringing in prohibited drugs into the country. The Court also held that it is not practicable to secure a
search warrant in cases of smuggling with the use of a moving vehicle to transport contraband, because the vehicle can
be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
6. In People vs. Malmstedt,33 NARCOM agents stationed at Camp Dangwa, Mountain Province, set up a temporary
checkpoint to check vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region, due to persistent reports that vehicles from Sagada were
transporting marijuana and other drugs, and because of particular information to the effect that a Caucasian would be
travelling from Sagada that day with prohibited drugs. The bus in which accused was riding was stopped at the
checkpoint. While conducting an inspection, one of the NARCOM men noticed that accused, the only foreigner on board,
had a bulge at the waist area. Thinking it might be a gun, the officer sought accuseds passport or other identification
papers. When the latter failed to comply, the lawman directed him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging at his
waist. It was a pouch bag which, when opened by the accused, was found to contain packages of hashish, a derivative of
marijuana. Invited for questioning, the accused disembarked from the bus and brought along with him two pieces of
luggage; found inside were two teddy bears stuffed with more hashish. The Court held that there was sufficient probable
cause in the premises for the lawmen to believe that the accused was then and there committing a crime and/or trying to
hide something illegal from the authorities. Said probable cause arose not only from the persistent reports of the transport
of prohibited drugs from Sagada, and the tip received by the NARCOM that same day that a Caucasian coming from
Sagada would be bringing prohibited drugs, but also from the failure of the accused to present his passport or other
identification papers when confronted by the lawmen, which only triggered suspicion on the part of the law enforcers that
accused was trying to hide his identity, it being the normal thing expected of an innocent man with nothing to hide, that he
readily present identification papers when asked to do so. The warrantless arrest and search were thus justified.
In all the cases discussed hereinabove, there were facts which were found by the Court to provide probable cause
justifying warrantless arrests and searches, i.e., distinct odor of marijuana, reports about drug transporting or positive
identification by informers, suspicious behaviour, attempt to flee, failure to produce identification papers, and so on. Too,
urgency attended the arrests and searches because each of the above-mentioned cases involved the use of motor
vehicles and the great likelihood that the accused would get away long before a warrant can be procured. And, lest it be
overlooked, unlike in the case before us now, the law enforcers in the aforementioned cases acted immediately on the
information received, suspicions raised, and probable causes established, and effected the arrests and searches without
any delay.
Unexplained Matters in the Instant Case
In the case before us, the NBI agents testified that they purportedly decided against arresting the accused-appellants
inside the airport as they allegedly wanted to discover the identities of the airport immigration, security or customs
personnel who might be protecting the accused or otherwise involved in the drug smuggling activities, and also in order to
avoid the possibility of an armed encounter with such protectors, which might result in injuries to innocent bystanders.
These excuses are simply unacceptable. They are obviously after-thoughts concocted to justify their rank failure to effect
the arrest within constitutional limits. Indeed, the NBI men failed to explain how come they did not apprehend the

10

appellants at the moment Cuizon handed over the baggage to Pua and Lee, or even afterwards, in relative safety. Such
arrest would have been consistent with the settled constitutional, legal and jurisprudential precedents earlier cited.
The spouses Cuizon had already passed through the airport security checks allegedly with their contraband cargo
undetected in their luggage. Apparently, the NBI agents did not see (as indeed they did not testify that they saw) anyone
from the airport immigration, security or customs who could have escorted the spouses Cuizon, and therefore, there was
no danger ofany live ammo encounter with such group(s). The alleged drug couriers had already made their way outside
the NAIA, had allegedly made contact with the accused Pua and Lee, and were in the very act of handing over the
luggage to the latter. Why the NBI men did not move in and pounce on them at that very instant has not been satisfactorily
explained. Instead, one of the agents, Dio, merely watched as Pua and Lee loaded the luggage into a cab and took off
for Makati. Furthermore, it taxes the imagination too much to think that at the most critical and climactic moment, when
agent Dio radioed his companions for help to close in on the suspects, the most amazing and stupendous thing actually
happened: Murphys Law kicked in - whatever could go wrong, did, and at the worst possible time - the batteries in Agent
Dios hand-held radio supposedly went dead and his message was not transmitted. Thus the departing Pua and Lee
proceeded merrily and unimpeded to the Peninsula Hotel, while the spouses Cuizon simultaneously sped off to their
residence in Caloocan City, leaving the lawmen empty-handed and scampering madly to catch up. Such absolutely
astounding and incredible happenstance might find a place in a fourth-rate movie script, but expecting the courts to
swallow it- hook, line and sinker - is infinite naivete, if not downright malevolence.
Even granting arguendo that the radio really went dead, nevertheless, the agents were not thereby rendered helpless
or without recourse. The NBI agents, numbering five in all, not counting their so-called informant, claimed to have piled
into three cars (TSN, May 19, 1992) and tailed the suspects Pua and Lee into Makati, keeping a safe two-car distance
behind (TSN, May 20, 1992). The lawmen and the prosecutors failed to explain why the agents did not intercept the
vehicle in which Pua and Lee were riding, along the way, pull them over, arrest them and search the luggage. And since
the agents were in three (3) cars, they also could have easily arranged to have agents in one vehicle follow, intercept and
apprehend the Cuizons while the others went after Pua and Lee. All or any of these possible moves are mere ordinary,
common-sense steps, not requiring a great deal of intelligence. The NBI men who testified claimed to have conducted or
participated in previous drug busts or similar operations and therefore must have been familiar with contingency planning,
or at least should have known what to do in this situation where their alleged original plan fell through. At any rate, what
the lawmen opted to do, i.e., allow Pua and Lee to freely leave the airport, allegedly bringing the drug cache to the hotel,
and Cuizon to leave unimpededly the airport and reach his residence with one of the luggage, increased significantly the
risk of the suspects (and/or the drugs) slipping through the lawmens fingers, and puts into question the regularity of
performance of their official functions. The agents alleged actions in this case compare poorly with the forthright and
decisive steps taken by lawmen in the cases earlier cited where this Court held the arrests and seizures to be valid.
Had the arrests and searches been made in transitu, i.e., had the agents intercepted and collared the suspects on the
way to Makati and Caloocan, or better yet, at the very moment of the hand-over, then there would not have been any
question at all as to the legality of their arrest and search, as they would presumably have been caught red-handed with
the evidence, and consequently for that reason and by the very nature and manner of commission of the offense charged,
there would have been no doubt also as to the existence of conspiracy among the appellant to transport the drugs.
However, because of the way the operation actually turned out, there is no sufficient proof of conspiracy between Pua and
Lee on the one hand, and Cuizon on the other, inasmuch as there is no clear and convincing evidence that the four (4)
bags handed by Cuizon to Pua and Lee at the airport were the very same ones found in the possession of the latter in
Room 340 of the Peninsula Hotel. Not one of the NBI agents when testifying could definitely and positively state that the
bags seized from Room 340 were the very same ones passed by Cuizon at the airport; at best, they could only say that
they looked like the ones they saw at the airport. And even assuming them to be the same bags, there remains doubt and
uncertainty as to the actual ownership of the said bags as at the alleged turnover vis-a-vis the time they were seized by
the agents. For these reasons, we cannot sustain the finding of conspiracy as between Cuizon on the one hand and Pua
and Lee on the other. Well-settled is the rule that conspiracy must be proved independently and beyond reasonable
doubt.34
Additionally, in light of the foregoing discussion, we find it extremely difficult to subscribe to the trial courts finding as
to the existence and sufficiency of probable cause in this case, one major component of which would have been the
alleged information or tip purportedly received by the agents as to the expected arrival of the spouses Cuizon that fateful
day with a large cache of shabu. The question that defies resolution in our minds is why, if indeed the information or tip
was genuine and from a highly reliable source as claimed by the government agents, did they not act on it? Throw in the
alleged month-long surveillance supposedly conducted by some of the NBI people on the Cuizon couple, and the mystery
only deepens. Even with the so-called tip and the results of surveillance, the government officers were still seemingly
hesitant, reluctant, uncertain, or perhaps afraid, to arrest and search the accused appellants, so much so that the NBI
agents who went after Pua and Lee at the Peninsula Hotel, instead of outrightly cuffing and searching them, as they were
supposed to, opted instead to play it safe and meekly beseeched the two to sign a written consent for the agents to search
their personal effects! Indeed, this is one for the books. If this is how confident the agents were about their hot tips, reliable
informers and undercover surveillance, then we cannot be blamed for failing to appreciate the existence/sufficiency of
probable cause to justify a warrantless arrest and search in this case. There is a whole lot more that can be said on this
score, but we shall leave it at that for now. We shall now dispose of the appeals of the accused-appellants individually.
11

Re: Appellant Antolin Cuizon

The search of the house of appellant Cuizon, having been conducted without any warrant, and not on the occasion or
as an incident of a valid warrantless arrest, was indubitably illegal, and the shabu seized thereat could not be admissible in
evidence. That is why even the trial judge did not make an effort to hold him liable under such seizure. He lamely argued:
(A)t any rate, accused Cuizon is not held criminally liable in this case in connection with the bag containing shabu
confiscated from his residence. His responsibility is based on the bags containing shabu which he handed to Pua and Lee
at the NAIA. Consequently, even if the bag and its contents of shabu taken from his house were not admitted in evidence,
the remaining proofs of the prosecution would still be sufficient to establish the charge against him. However, contrary to
the trial judges conclusion, we hold that insofar as Cuizon is concerned, all the evidence seized are considered fruit of the
poisonous tree and are inadmissible as against him, and thus, he should be acquitted, since, as shown hereinabove, (i)
the warrantless search conducted on Pua and Lee was clearly illegal per se, not being incident to a valid warrantless
arrest either; (ii) and even if the search on Pua and Lee were not illegal, conspiracy as between Cuizon on the one hand
and appellants Pua and Lee on the other had not been established by sufficient proof beyond reasonable doubt; and (iii)
appellant Cuizon had timely raised before this Court the issue of the illegality of his own arrest and the search and seizure
conducted at his residence, and questioned the admission of the seized shabu in evidence.
Re: Appellant Steve Pua @ Tommy Sy
What has been said for Cuizon cannot, alas, be said for appellant Pua. While the search and arrest carried out on him
and Lee may have been illegal for not being incident to a lawful warrantless arrest, the unfortunate fact is that appellant
Pua failed to challenge the validity of his arrest and search as well as the admission of the evidence obtained thereby; he
did not raise the issue or assign the same as an error before this Court. Accordingly, any possible challenge thereto based
on constitutional grounds is deemed waived. This Court has upheld and recognized waivers of constitutional rights,
including, particularly, the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, in cases such as People vs.
Malasugui35 and De Garcia vs. Locsin.36
Additionally, the prosecution had argued and the trial court agreed that by virtue of the handwritten consent (Exhibit I)
secured by the arresting officers from appellants Pua and Lee, the latter freely gave their consent to the search of their
baggage, and thus, the drugs discovered as a result of the consented search is admissible in evidence. The said written
permission is in English, and states plainly that they (Pua and Lee) freely consent to the search of their luggage to be
conducted by NBI agents to determine if Pua and Lee are carrying shabu. It appears that appellant Pua understands both
English and Tagalog; he is born of a Filipino mother, had resided in Vito Cruz, Manila, and gave his occupation as that of
salesman. He admitted that he was asked to sign the written consent, and that he did in fact sign it (TSN, May 28, 1992,
pp. 33-34). His barefaced claim made during his direct and cross-examinations to the effect that he did not really read the
consent but signed it right away, and that by signing it he only meant to give permission for the NBI agents to enter the
room (and not to search) is hardly worthy of belief, considering that prior to the search, he seemed to have been extra
careful about who to let into the hotel room.
Thus, the full weight of the prosecutions testimonial evidence plus the large amount of prohibited drugs found, must
be given full force vis-a-vis Puas claim of innocent presence in the hotel room, which is weak and not worthy of credence.
Re: Appellant Paul Lee @ Paul Leung
Appellant Lees situation is different from that of Pua. We agree with the Solicitor General when he noted that the trial
judge did not exert sufficient effort to make available compulsory process and to see to it that accused appellant Lee was
given his day in court. It is clear that appellant Lee was effectively denied his right to counsel, for although he was
provided with one, he could not understand and communicate with him concerning his defense such that, among other
things, no memorandum was filed on his behalf; further, he was denied his right to have compulsory process to guarantee
the availability of witnesses and the production of evidence on his behalf, including the services of a qualified and
competent interpreter to enable him to present his testimony. 37 In sum, he was denied due process. For this reason, we
hold that the case as against Lee must be remanded to the court of origin for a re-trial.
Epilogue
It is evident and clear to us that the NBI agents gravely mishandled the drug bust operation and in the process
violated the constitutional guarantees against unlawful arrests and illegal searches and seizures. Because of the large
haul of illegal drugs that the government officers claimed to have recovered, this Court agonized over the case before us
and struggled to apply the law with an even hand. In the final analysis, we in the administration of justice would have no
right to expect ordinary people to be law-abiding if we do not insist on the full protection of their rights. Some lawmen,
prosecutors and judges may still tend to gloss over an illegal search and seizure as long as the law enforcers show the
alleged evidence of the crime regardless of the methods by which they were obtained. This kind of attitude condones lawbreaking in the name of law enforcement. Ironically, it only fosters the more rapid breakdown of our system of justice, and
the eventual denigration of society. While this Court appreciates and encourages the efforts of law enforcers to uphold the

12

law and to preserve the peace and security of society, we nevertheless admonish them to act with deliberate care and
within the parameters set by the Constitution and the law. Truly, the end never justifies the means.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, accused-appellant Antolin Cuizon y Ortega is hereby
ACQUITTED on constitutional grounds. His immediate release is ordered unless he is detained for other valid causes.
Accused-appellant Steve Pua y Clofas is hereby found GUILTY of the crime of Illegal Transport of Regulated Drugs,
penalized under Section 15, R.A. No. 6425, as amended, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua; the Decision appealed from, as herein modified, is hereby affirmed as to appellant Pua. Finally, the case as to
appellant Lee is hereby ordered REMANDED to the trial court in order that said accused may be given his day in court.
The Decision appealed from is also AFFIRMED with respect to the disposition of the prohibited drugs involved in the case.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 95207-17 January 10, 1994

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ENRIQUE TAGUBA AND MIRAFE TAGUBA, accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Sycip, Salazar, Hernandez & Gatmaitan for Mirafe Taguba.
Public Attorney's Office for Enrique Taguba.

CRUZ, J.:
Enrique Taguba and Mirafe Taguba were both charged with eight counts of illegal recruitment and three counts of estafa in
separate informations 1 commonly worded (except only as to the date of the offense, the name of the complainant and the
amount involved) as follows:
The undersigned Assistant City Fiscal accuses ENRIQUE C. TAGUBA, MIRAFE TAGUBA and JANE DOE, true name, real
identity and present whereabouts of the last-mentioned accused still unknown, of the crime of "ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT",
committed as follows:
That (date of commission) in Caloocan City, Metro manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring together and mutually helping one another, representing themselves to have the
capacity to contract, enlist and recruit workers for employment abroad did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, for a fee recruit and promise employment/job placement to one (name of complainant), without first securing
the required license or authority from the Ministry of Labor and Employment.
Contrary to law.
xxx xxx xxx
The undersigned Assistant City Fiscal accuses ENRIQUE C. TAGUBA, MIRAFE TAGUBA and JANE DOE, true name, real
identity and present whereabouts of the last-mentioned accused still unknown, of the crime of "ESTAFA," committed as
follows:
That (date of commission) in Caloocan City, Metro Manila, the above-named and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and mutually helping one another, defrauded and deceived one
(name of plaintiff ) in the following manner, to wit: said accused, by means of false manifestations and fraudulent
representation which they made to said complainants to the effect that they have the capacity or power to recruit or
employ complainant abroad and could facilitate the necessary papers in connection therewith if given the necessary
amount to meet the requirements thereof, knowing said manifestations and representations to be false and fraudulent and
were made only to induce said complainant to give and deliver, as in fact the latter did give and deliver to said accused the
amount of P________ ,but said accused, once in possession of the said amount, with intent to defraud, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misapply, misappropriate and convert to their on personal use and benefit, to the
damage and prejudice of the complainant in the aforementioned amount of P__________ .
Contrary to law.
Trial of the cases was held jointly.

13

The complainants, namely, Jesus Garcia, Gilbert Fabrigas, Josefina Sarrion, Myrna Roxas, Elena Santiago, Federico
Sagurit, Manuel Aquiban, Violeta Porte, Renelito Cerbito, Danilo Pacheco, narrated almost identical versions of the
deception practiced on them by the accused.
These witnesses testified that Enrique an Mirafe approached them on separate occasions and assured them that upon
their payment of a specified sum of money they would be sent to Korror, Palau, to work variously as a
waiter, 2 fisherman, 3 master cutter, 4 dressmaker, 5 farmer, 6 laborer, 7 mason carpenter 8 or macho dancer. 9
The consideration for their recruitment ranged from P2,200.00 to P20,000.00 while the promised monthly wages ranged
from $300.00 top $500.00.
The required payments were made by them from loans they had contracted or from the proceeds of the sale of their
properties. However, no overseas employment materialized. Only Gilbert Fabrigas and Norman Sarrion (the son of
Josefina Sarrion) were able to reach Korror but after three months, during which they were not given any work, they were
deported to Manila for expired visas. 10 The rest of the complainants were never even able to leave the Philippines.
In his defense, Enrique Taguba first claimed that he merely happened to be at RAY/DECO office when the complainants
submitted their papers. RAY/DECO is a corporation licensed to recruit workers for employment abroad with which he had
entered into a joint venture. From the office, the documents were submitted to the foreign employer, who brought them to
Korror. 11
He later declared that a special power of attorney issued to him by RAY/DECO authorized him to recruit and hire contract
workers. It was by virtue of this authorization that he recruited the complainants. At the same hearing, however, he
retracted his statement, reiterating his earlier claim that he had no participation in the complainants' transactions with the
company. The sole exception was when he accompanied Gilbert Fabrigas and Norman Sarrion to Korro upon
RAY/DECO's request. 12
Mirafe, on the other hand, averred that she was working as a domestic helper in Korror when the alleged irregularities
happened. She presented a round-trip Continental Airline ticket issued in her name on May 3, 1985, for Manila - Korror Manila 13 and a certification issued by the Manager of Air Nauru that on March 3, 1986, she was a passenger of Air Nauru
Flight No. 420 bound for Manila from Korror. 14
After trial, Judge Adoracion C. Angeles of the Regional Trial Court in Caloocan City declared them guilty of all the charges
in a decision dated June 4, 1990. 15
For the offense of illegal recruitment on a grand scale, each was sentenced to a penalty of reclusion perpetuaand a fine of
P100,000.00. They were also held jointly and severally liable for the reimbursement of the money they received from the
complainants. 16
For each of the three counts of estafa, they were both meted the penalty of four years, two months and one day of prision
correccional. In addition, they were held solidarily liable for the return of the money given them by the complainants. 17
In their challenged to the decision, the appellants stress that they call the failure of the prosecution to prove that they were
not holders of licenses to engage in the recruitment and placement of workers abroad; the unrebutted evidence of Marife
Taguba's absence in the Philippines during the commission of the alleged crimes; the imposition of a penalty which was
not yet in effect and the alleged crime of illegal recruitment on a grand scale were committed; and the lack of sufficient
evidence to support their conviction for estafa.
The appellants argue that before one can be held guilty of illegal recruitment, two elements have to be established, to wit,
that (1) the offender is not a licensee or holder of authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers;
and (2) the offender undertook the recruitment activities defined under Article 13(b) or any of the prohibited practices
enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor Code. Their argument is that the prosecution has the burden of proving beyond
reasonable doubt each of the elements of the offense charged and that this burden had not been discharged in the cases
against them.
The appellants also contend that the penalty of life imprisonment for illegal recruitment committed on a large scale is not
applicable to them because the presidential decree imposing this penalty was published in the Official Gazette only on
February 10, 1986. P.D. 2018 was thus not yet effective at the time of the alleged commission of the crimes imputed to
them. Only two of the eight complainants for illegal recruitment testified that they were recruited after February 10, 1986. If
at all, therefore, the appellants can only be convicted of eight separate counts of illegal recruitment under Art. 39 (c) of the
Labor Code, which is subject to a lesser penalty.
Regarding the charges of estafa, the appellants' claim they had made no representation they had the capacity to recruit
and send the complainants abroad. This is clear from the testimony of Josefina Sarrion herself, who declared as follows:
Q. The accused in this case did not say that they had (a) recruitment office to you (sic)?
A. They did not, sir.
Q. The accused did not say to you or represent to you that they had (a) permit to recruit?
A. They did not, sir. 18

14

The Solicitor General maintains in the appellee's brief that it was incumbent on the accused to prove that they were
licensed to recruit workers, conformably to the well-settled rule that any party who asserts the affirmative of an issue has
the burden of presenting evidence required to obtain a favorable judgment. 19 He agrees, however, that PD 2018 is
inapplicable and that the appellants can only be held guilty of eight counts of illegal recruitment and penalized in
accordance with Sec. 39 (c) of the Labor Code.
Our rulings follow.
The record shows that the prosecution indeed failed to establish that the appellants had not been issued licenses to recruit
for overseas employment. It had moved to present Cecilia E. Curso, Chief of the Licensing and Evaluation Division of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Agency, so she could testify that the accused were not licensed recruiters, but this was
never done.
Rule 131 Sec. 2, of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 2. Burden of proof in criminal cases. In criminal cases the burden of proof as to the offense charged lies on the
prosecution. A negative fact alleged by the prosecution need not be proved unless it is an essential ingredient of the
offense.
Non-possession of a license to recruit is an essential ingredient of the crime of illegal recruiting. As it is an indispensible
requisite for the conviction of the pretended recruiter, the burden of establishing this element is upon the prosecution. In
the case before us, the prosecution cannot deny its failure to show that no license had indeed been issued to either of the
appellees by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration.
This would have been a fatal omission under ordinary circumstances. Fortunately for the prosecution, however, this flaw
was repaired by appellant Enrique Taguba himself when he testified as follows:
Q. In connection with the operation of your office, do you have the authority to recruit?
A. I have a special power of attorney issued by the general manager of Ray/Deco, International Development Corporation.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Mr. Taguba you stated that you were clothed with a special power of attorney, is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And according to the special power of attorney you were then authorized as attorney-in-fact of Ray/Deco to recruit and
hire Filipino contract workers?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And this is the only evidence or authority for your having recruited Filipino contractual workers?
A. I have submitted several papers, sir.
Q. By virtue of the special power of attorney you recruited all these complainants namely: (At this juncture, the prosecuting
fiscal read the names listed in the information)?
A. Yes, sir. 20
The special power of attorney 21 granted to Enrique by RAY/DECO did not operate as a license to recruit workers on his
own behalf, which is what he did. Besides, the special power of attorney only authorized him:
1. To represent our Agency, RAY/DECO International Development and Employment Corporation, and to negotiate and
deal with any person, company, Employer or Principal in foreign countries who may be interested in engaging the services
of and appointing our Agency in the recruitment and hiring of Filipino contractual workers for employment abroad.
2. To enter into such negotiations he may deem proper, reasonable and advantageous to the Agency and to see to it that
all documents and papers necessary, required and proper in the appointment of our Agency by the Principal or Employer
as well as in the recruitment and hiring of the workers are all in proper order; and
3. Finally, it is a condition of this Power of Attorney that our aforesaid Legal Representative shall not demand, collect and
receive from the Principal or Employer any fee or sums of money without our prior consent and approval.
It is clear from the above-quoted document that Enrique's authority was confined to negotiating with foreign employers for
the appointment of RAY/DECO as their agency in the recruiting of Filipino workers for employment abroad. What he was
supposed to recruit was not Filipino overseas workers but the foreign employers to which the workers were to be
assigned.
It is significant that the only authority the appellants could invoke was this special power of attorney although he did not
speak of "several papers". These did not include any license. It strikes us that if they had been issued a license to recruit,
there would have been no reason why they did not present it in evidence to exculpate them from liability under the Labor
Code.

15

Mirafe's defense of alibi is not acceptable either. The fact that she left for Korror on May 3, 1985, and arrived in Manila on
march 3, 1986, does not prove that in between these dates, she did not come back to the Philippines to practice her
deceptions. The tickets and certification she submitted were not the best evidence to establish her absence from the
Philippines on the dates the offenses were committed. What she should have submitted to the trial court was her passport,
where the holder's departure/arrivals are officially indicated.
Curiously, the ticket issued to her on may 3, 1985, by Continental for
Manila - Korror - Manila was used by her in going to Korror but not in coming back to Manila. She claims to have returned
to Manila on March 3, 1986, but via Air Nauru instead. Why she did not avail herself of the pre-paid Continental return trip
ticket to Manila raises some doubt on her credibility. Could it be that she had earlier used her return ticket in coming back
to Manila and that she went back later to Korror, from which she returned to the Philippines on March 3, 1986, on board Air
Nauru Flight 420? At any rate, the certification by the manager of Air Nauru is hearsay and inadmissible because he was
not presented at the trial to affirm it.
The appellees argue that they cannot be held liable for estafa because they were prevented from complying with their
promise due to their incarceration. This is not true. Enrique Taguba accompanied Norman Sarrion and Gilbert Fabrigas to
Korror on December 29, 1985. After a week, Taguba came back to the Philippines, leaving the two to stay there for three
months and fend for themselves without any work. All this happened before Enrique and Marife were arrested and
detained on March 9, 1986 and March 10, 1986, respectively. 22
In the case of Jesus Garcia, the promised employment on March 2, 1986, never came. Learning that Enrique had been
apprehended, Garcia even gave him money for his bail. The money was an additional consideration for his overseas
employment, but even after Enrique's release, Garcia remained unemployed. In fact, Enrique cannot validly argue that his
detention prevented him from fulfilling his obligation because he had in fact already defaulted prior to his arrest.
The appellants' claim that they had made no representation that they could send complainants abroad is belied by the
following testimonies of the complainants:
Myrna Roxas:
Q. Did you talk with the two accused at that time?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What did you talk about?
A. They told us, sir, that they are having us employed as dressmakers at Palau.
Q. Who is this who told you that you would be employed at Palau?
A. Enrique Taguba and Mirafe Taguba, your Honor.
Q. What was or what were the conditions for your employment at Palau, Guam?
A. They told us sir that if we give P5,000.00 we will have medical examination, NBI clearance and then passport.

23

Gilbert Fabrigas:
Q. Did he tell you how you were supposed go for employment abroad?
A. Yes, sir. He told me as long as I pay.
Q. For how much did he require you to pay for your employment abroad?
A. P20,000.00, sir.
Q. Were you able to comply with that requirement to pay P20,000.00 in order to go abroad for employment?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. When did you pay that or give that amount of P20,000.00 to Atty. Taguba?
A. On November 23, 1985, I gave him P10,000.00 and on December 27, 1985, I gave him another P10,000.00, sir. 24
Substantially similar narrations were made by other complainants.
The indisputable fact is that the appellants gave the distinct assurance that they had the ability to send the complainants
abroad, employing false pretenses and imaginary business transactions to beguile their victims. The complainants willingly
gave their hard-earned money to the appellants in hopes of the overseas employment deceitfully promised them by the
latter.
It is also evident from the testimonies of the complainants that the deceptions were practiced on them by both appellants,
who cooperated with each other in fleecing the complainants of their money. A conspiracy exists when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. 25 It is clear from the
evidence of record that appellants, who were live-in partners, were moved by a common design to victimize the
16

complainants. As a consequence, they are enmeshed in the same criminal liability for their conspiracy, which make the act
of one the act of both.
The Court agrees that the appellants cannot be convicted of illegal recruitment on a large scale because only two of the
complainants, Jesus Garcia and Elena Santiago, categorically testified that their recruitment came after February 10,
1986. This was the date when P.D. 2018, the law defining and penalizing illegal recruitment in a large scale, took effect.
P.D. 2018 has amended Articles 38 and 39 of the Labor Code by providing inter alia as follows:
Art. 38. Illegal Recruitment. . . .
(b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in a large scale shall be considered an offense involving
economic sabotage and shall be penalized in accordance with Article 39 hereof.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring
and/or confederating with one another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme defined
under this first paragraph hereof. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or
more persons individually or as a group.
xxx xxx xxx
(d) Art. 39. Penalties. (a) The penalty of the imprisonment and a fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000) shall
be imposed if illegal recruitment constitutes economic sabotage as defined herein;
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Any person who is neither a licensee nor a holder of authority under this Title found violating any provision thereof or its
implementing rules and regulations shall, upon conviction thereof, suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than four
years nor more than eight years or a fine of not less than P20,000 nor more than P100,00 or both such imprisonment and
fine, at the discretion of the Court.
P.D. 2018 cannot apply to the appellants retroactively as it would be an ex post facto law to them. A law is ex post facto if it
refers to a criminal act, punishes an act which was innocent when done, and retroacts to the disadvantage of the
accused. 26 Prior to the said date, recruiting on a large scale was not yet punished with the penalty imposed in the said
decree.
Moreover, each of the eight informations for illegal recruitment charged the appellants with illegally recruiting only one
person. It is a basic right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him and, if he is
found guilty, to be penalized only for the offense specified in the information or necessarily included in such
offense. 27 Under the decree, illegal recruiting on a large scale can take place only when it is committed against three or
more persons, individually or as a group.
The proper penalty for the illegal recruitment committed by appellants is provided for in Art. 39 (c) of the Labor Code, to
wit, imprisonment of not less than four years nor more than eight years or fine of not less than P20,000.00 nor more than
P100,000.00 or both such imprisonment and fine, at the court's discretion. We hereby fix the penalty at from four to eight
years and a fine of P50,000.00 for each of the eight charges. The amounts ordered reimbursed to the complainants are
affirmed except the amount reimbursable to Manuel Aquiban, which was reduced form P10,000.00 to P6,000.00, the
amount actually delivered by him to the appellants.
Regarding the estafa, we shall accept the modification of the penalty as suggested by the Solicitor General, after applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, to two years, eleven months and ten days of prision correccional, as minimum, to six
years, eight months and twenty days of prision mayor, as maximum, for each count of the offense. The monetary awards
by the trial court are affirmed.
Duplicity is condemnable under any circumstance but it becomes doubly deplorable when exercised on the poor and
unemployed, as in the case before us. The complainants were desperate for a living and were willing to work even away
from their families so they could lift themselves from their penury. The appellants took advantage of their plight and enticed
them with dollar earnings. The complainants succumbed to their wiles and raised the money demanded of them,
borrowing what they could and selling what little they had. All they got was disenchantment. The appellants were like
vultures preying on the victims and feeding on their broken dreams.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED, but with the following modifications:
(1) For each of the 8 counts of illegal recruiting in Criminal Cases
Nos. C-26359; C-26364; C-26367; C- 26370; C-26371; C-26374 and C-26389, the appellants are sentenced to a penalty
of four to eight years imprisonment and a fine of P50,000.00. The amounts ordered by the trial court to be reimbursed to
the respective complainants are affirmed except the amount reimbursable to Manuel Aquiban, which is reduced to
P6,000.00.
(2) For each of the three counts of estafa in Criminal Cases Nos.
C-26343; C-26347 and C-26348, the appellants are sentenced to two years, eleven months and ten days ofprision

17

correccional, as minimum, to six years, eight months and twenty days of prision mayor, as maximum. The amounts
ordered reimbursed to the respective complainants are affirmed.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 133191-93. July 11, 2000]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. WILFREDO ALARCON, EDDIE TOMPONG and
EDUARDO GUMAWA, accused.
EDDIE TOMPONG and EDUARDO GUMAWA, accused-appellants.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
In the joint decision[1] of 26 January 1998, of the Regional Trial Court of Bugasong, Antique, Branch 64, in
Criminal Case No. 5630, for rape with homicide, Criminal Case No. 5631, for rape, and Criminal Case No. 5632,
for rape, accused Wilfredo Alarcon, Eddie Tompong, and Eduardo Gumawa, hereafter ALARCON, TOMPONG
and GUMAWA, respectively, were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged therein. The
victim in these cases was Aisha Dava (hereafter AISHA). The decretal portion of the decision reads as follows:
In view thereof, this court finds the accused WILFREDO ALARCON, EDDIE TOMPONG AND EDUARDO GUMAWA, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as co-conspirators in three (3) crimes with their corresponding penalties, as follows:
1. Criminal Case No. 5630, for RAPE WITH HOMICIDE: EDDIE TOMPONG AND EDUARDO GUMAWA are sentenced to
DEATH. WILFREDO ALARCON being a minor of 17 years old at the time of commission of the offense is sentenced to
Reclusion Perpetua with the accessories imposed by law.
Accused are ordered to pay, jointly and solidarily, Lucia Dava, the offended party, the amount of P50,000 as indemnity for
the death of Aisha Dava; P50,000 as exemplary damages and P150,000 as moral damages.
2. Criminal Case No. 5631, for RAPE, resulting to the death of Aisha Dava, committed by more than two (2) persons,
aggravated by superior strength, EDDIE TOMPONG and EDUARDO GUMAWA are sentenced to Death; WILFREDO
ALARCON is sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua with the accessories imposed by law.
Accused are ordered to pay the offended party, jointly and solidarily, the amount of P50,000 as exemplary damages and
P100,000 as moral damages.
3. Criminal Case No. 5632, for RAPE, resulting to the death of Aisha Dava committed by more than two (2) persons,
aggravated by superior strength, EDDIE TOMPONG and EDUARDO GUMAWA are sentenced to Death. WILFREDO
ALARCON is sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua with the accessories imposed by law.
Accused are ordered to pay the offended party, jointly and solidarily, the amount of P50,000 as exemplary damages and
P100,000 as moral damages.[2]
In the Information[3] in Criminal Case No. 5630, the crime of rape with homicide was allegedly committed in
this manner:
That on or about May 26, 1995, in the Municipality of Bugasong, Province of Antique, Republic of the Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused surprised one Aisha Dava who was alone at a
tree-covered hillside, conspiring, confederating, mutually helping each other and one after the other, by means of force
and intimidation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously did lie and succeed in having carnal knowledge of said Aisha Dava
who was then only eleven (11) years old and by reason or on the occasion thereof, the accused willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously stabbed and slashed the neck of the victim with a knife/scythe and killed her in the process.
Contrary to the provisions of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 249 of the same code and
Republic Act 7659.[4]
The Informations[5] in Criminal Case No. 5631 and Criminal Case No. 5632 each charged the crime of rape
and are similarly worded with the crime allegedly committed in this manner:
That on or about May 26, 1995, in the Municipality of Bugasong, Province of Antique, Republic of the Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused being then armed with a knife/scythe surprised
one Aisha Dava who was alone at a trees-covered [sic] hillside, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping each other
and one after the other, by means of force and intimidation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously did lie and succeed in
having carnal knowledge of said Aisha Dava who was then only eleven (11) years old, against her will.
Contrary to the provisions of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and as amended by R.A. 7659.

18

Upon their arraignment ALARCON, TOMPONG and GUMAWA each pleaded not guilty. Joint trial on the
merits ensued. The prosecution presented five witnesses, namely: Dr. Irma J. Adayon, Lucia Dava, Melita
Cancer, Ostimiano Untalan and Amador Martinesio and rebuttal witness Pedro Enque.
The evidence for the prosecution is faithfully summarized in the Appellees' Brief, as follows:
On May 26, 1995 at around 7:00 o'clock in the morning, accused Wilfredo Alarcon, 17 years of age, was proceeding to
Sitio Casoy, Bagtason, Bugasong, Antique to gather firewood (pp. 3 to 4 & 15, tsn. May 8, 1997). On his way, he met "Lola
Magang", the grandmother of the eleven [ 11 ] year old victim Aisha Dava (p. 5, tsn. May 8, 1997; Exh. B; pp. 5, 14, t7 &
18, tsn. June 14, 1996), carrying goods to be sold at the market in Valderrama (p. 5, tsn. May 8, 1997).
Upon reaching Sitio Casoy, Alarcon saw appellant Eddie Tompong, 42 years old, with her wife Gloria Tompong, and
appellant Eduardo Gumawa gathering firewood and tying them in bundles (p. 6, tsn. May 8, 1997; p. 2, tsn. July 2,
1997). The victim was also there watching the group bundle the firewood (p. 6, tsn. May 8, 1997). As the victim watched,
appellants Tompong and Gumawa were teasing her telling her that they will court her. The victim reacted by throwing
pebbles at both appellants, and left the place saying that she will just look for the carabao she was tending (pp. 7-8, tsn.
May 8, 1997).
After finishing her task, Gloria Tompong left, leaving appellants and Alarcon behind (p. 8, ibid.). Appellant Tompong
approached Alarcon and said that they will follow the victim. Appellants and Alarcon then proceeded to the place where the
victim was grazing her carabao (pp. 8-9, id,).
The victim saw them approaching and she stood up and looked at them (pp. 9-10, id.). Upon reaching the place where the
victim was standing, appellant Tompong suddenly pushed Alarcon towards the victim causing them both to fall to the
ground and roll together (p. 10, id.). As they rolled, the victim scratched the face of Alarcon to defend herself (pp. 22 to 23,
tsn. July 15, 1997). But while the victim was lying flat on her back Tompong ran towards her and got the knife tucked on
her waist. The victim shouted and cried as appellants and Alarcon ganged upon her (p. 11, tsn. May 8, 1997).
At that instant, prosecution eyewitness Melita Cancer heard the cry of the victim. Cancer was on her way home after
coming from the victim's house which is situated at around 80 meters from the crime scene. She had gone there to collect
money from the victim's mother Lucia Dava, but left after discovering that nobody was around. Hearing the victim's cry,
Cancer looked around and saw, around 40 meters away, appellants Tompong and Gumawa, and their co-accused
Alarcon, holding and undressing the victim. Cancer immediately fled the area startled and afraid of what she saw (vide: pp.
2-6, tsn. June 6, 1996).
Another person, Ostimiano Untalan, 68 years old, a retired PC officer, saw the incident. He was on his way to the bamboo
plantation of Mr. Salvador Dava in Sitio Sio, to inquire into the availability of bamboo poles he intended to buy. While
walking along a pathway in Sitio Sio, Untalan heard the shouts of the victim (pp. 5-8, tsn. Sept. 18, 1996). Untalan felt
afraid and took cover and concealed himself inside a thick "bungargar" bush around four [4] feet tall (pp. 8, 25, 51 &
52, ibid.). He saw three [3] malefactors about seven [7] meters away from him sexually molesting the victim (pp. 8-9 & 40,
tsn. Id.). Untalan saw the victim lying flat on her back with both hands being held by one of the malefactors whose name
he later learned to be Wilfredo Alarcon. The other malefactor, whose name he later learned to be Eddie Tompong, laid on
top of the victim. And the third malefactor, whose name he later learned to be Eduardo Gumawa, was covering the victim's
mouth. Untalan saw Tompong, Gumawa and Alarcon took turns in sexually abusing the victim for about half an hour.
Thereafter, Alarcon struck the neck of the victim with a piece of wood and slashed further the throat and left cheek of the
victim using a knife about six (6) or seven (7) inches long. Gumawa dragged the body of the victim towards the canal.
Tompong and Alarcon followed and covered it with twigs of "bungargar". Gumawa told his companions that "they will
separate and nobody will tell what happened". Untalan left his hiding place and went home five (5) minutes after the
malefactors had fled (vide: pp. 9-16, 38-41, & 47-53, id.; see also pp. 11-16, tsn. May 8, 1997).
Three [3] days thereafter, on May 29, 1995, the cadaver of the victim in the state of decomposition was found by the police
in Sitio Sio (pp. 32-33, tsn. May 30, 1996; Exhs. C to C-7, Brown Envelope pasted on Folder I, Crim. Case No. 5630). An
autopsy was performed by Dr. Irma J. Adayon, Rural Health Physician of Bugasong, Antique, at about 3:30 o'clock in the
afternoon that same day (Exh. A, pp. 17-18, Folder I, Crim. Case No. 5630). The Autopsy Report dated May 30, 1995
prepared by Dr. Adayon disclosed the following findings:
1. General Appearance:
Dead; lying with his head and trunk slightly elevated from the rest of the body; supine position; both arms slightly flexed
and perpendicular to the body; both thighs and knees flexed; knees separated from each other 40 cms. apart; wearing Tshirt stained with blood and rolled upward to the level just below the nipples; wearing panty and short pants stained with
blood; short pants rolled upwards to the inguinal area.
2. Wound, 6 cms. long, gaping, neck, right, involving right sternocleidomastoid muscle, right common carotid
artery and vein.
3. Wound, stabbed, 2.5 cms. long, gaping, left buccinator area, running mediolaterally, involving buccinator
muscle thru and thru.
4. Labia majora and labia minora;

19

Medical borders not prominent because it is markedly covered by a swollen clittoris; gaping.
5. Clittoris:
Swollen and elevated by 2.5 cms.; 6.5 cms. long; 3 cms. wide; oblong in shape; presence of somewhat fresh blood in the
superior third; wound in the inferior half.
5. Vaginal canal:
Presence of old mucuslike material in the opening, left, lower quadrant; edges irregular; rugosities not discint; admits one
finger.
6. Fourchette:
Rounded base.
7. Hymen:
Not clearly identified because of the extremely swollen clittoris.
(Exh. A, [supra])
On May 30, 1995, at 8:00 o'clock in the morning, a certain Jose Pacete executed his sworn statement before the Chief of
Police, Bugasong Police Station pointing to Tompong, Gumawa and Alarcon as the victims assailants (pp. 6-9, Folder I,
Crim. Case No. 5630). At 12:00 noon of the same day, a certain Margarita Pacete y Magbanua likewise appeared at said
police station and executed his sworn statement pointing to the same culprits (pp. 10-13, Ibid). The following day, on May
31, 1995 at 4:25 p.m., a certain Luther Valenzuela went to the police station also attesting to the fact that he saw
Tompong, Gumawa and Alarcon rape and kill the victim (pp. 4-5, id.). On June 5, 1995, prosecution eyewitness Melita
Cancer also executed an affidavit also identifying appellants and Alarcon as the assailants (p. 3, Id.). These sworn
statements supported the criminal complaint for rape and homicide filed against appellants and Alarcon (p. 1, id.).
On June 5, 1995, appellants and Alarcon were arrested and detained by the police (p. 20, id.)
Upon the other hand, ALARCON testified on his behalf. The witnesses presented for TOMPONG and
GUMAWA were TOMPONG himself, Richard Bernabe and Edna Apolinario. The testimony of GUMAWA was
dispensed with since it would only corroborate that of TOMPONG.
ALARCON, 19 years old, single and resident of Sitio Sio, Bagtason, Bugasong, Antique, testified that at
around seven o'clock in the morning of 26 May 1995 he went to Sitio Casoy in Barangay Bagtason to gather
firewood. He met Lola Magang on the way. Upon reaching Sitio Casoy he saw TOMPONG, GUMAWA, Gloria
Tompong and AISHA. The first three were bundling firewood while AISHA was watching them. TOMPONG and
GUMAWA were teasing AISHA telling her they would court her. AISHA threw pebbles at the two while ALARCON
and Gloria Tompong remained silent. After bundling the firewood, Gloria went home. After she left, TOMPONG
and GUMAWA kept on teasing AISHA, but the latter grew weary of their teasing and left them to look for her
carabao. After AISHA left, TOMPONG and GUMAWA approached ALARCON and told him to go with them to
follow AISHA. He refused but TOMPONG pushed him. He fell on the root of a santol tree and he was leaning on
it when GUMAWA approached him. GUMAWA pointed a bolo at him and threatened him that if he did not go with
them, GUMAWA would hack him. Scared, ALARCON went with TOMPONG and GUMAWA to follow AISHA.
Upon finding AISHA, TOMPONG pushed ALARCON toward her. ALARCON fell on AISHA, and both fell to the
ground. TOMPONG then ran towards them and got the knife tucked in AISHAs waist. TOMPONG covered
AISHAs mouth while ALARCON rose to run away, but GUMAWA held him and pointed the bolo at him.
GUMAWA instructed him to hold the hands of AISHA. ALARCON could not refuse because the bolo was still
pointed at him, and TOMPONG also pointed his bolo at ALARCON's neck while covering AISHA's mouth.
ALARCON was thus forced to hold both of AISHA's hands. GUMAWA held AISHA's feet and removed her shorts
while she was lying on her back. TOMPONG told GUMAWA that he (TOMPONG) would go first. ALARCON
understood this to mean TOMPONG would be the first to have sex with AISHA. TOMPONG spread the legs of
AISHA, and inserted his finger then his organ into her vagina. TOMPONG got AISHA's shorts and wiped her
sexual organ with it. ALARCON saw blood on AISHA's vagina when TOMPONG wiped it. Then GUMAWA took
his turn to rape AISHA. While GUMAWA was raping AISHA, TOMPONG was pointing his bolo at ALARCON and
after GUMAWA finished raping AISHA, TOMPONG faced ALARCON and told him to take his turn, but ALARCON
cried and said that he would not do it. Because he did not, TOMPONG told GUMAWA: "We cannot do otherwise."
GUMAWA then took a piece of wood beside him and struck the neck of AISHA, put on her shorts and pulled her
towards a hole near some shrubs. GUMAWA warned ALARCON not to tell anybody about what happened.
TOMPONG then slashed AISHA's neck with the knife he took from her waist and dropped the knife beside
AISHA's body. TOMPONG approached ALARCON and told him not to tell anybody about the incident and, if he
was caught, to just admit it. GUMAWA and TOMPONG each promised to pay ALARCON P500 if the latter
admitted to the crime.[6]

20

ALARCON further testified that he was arrested without a warrant by Quioyo, a policeman, the following
Monday, 29 May 1995. He was brought to the Municipal Building where after one night he implicated his coaccused. He told AISHA'S uncle that it was TOMPONG and GUMAWA who killed AISHA. He was made to sign
some papers, but he did not know what he signed. [7]
Richard Bernabe, first witness for TOMPONG and GUMAWA, declared that at around noon of 26 May 1995,
his neighbor ALARCON went to his house to ask for help as he had raped a child. ALARCON confessed to him
that he did it alone. He accompanied ALARCON to the place of the incident and there he saw the dead body of
AISHA. On their way back, he again asked ALARCON who his companions were in raping AISHA. ALARCON
replied that he was alone. He also admitted that he killed AISHA by slashing her head. ALARCON spent the night
at Bernabe's house. Bernabe then reported ALARCON's confession to his father, who then later narrated the
incident to Gloria Tompong, TOMPONG's wife, at the time of the apprehension of GUMAWA and TOMPONG.
Richard Bernabe further declared that GUMAWA and TOMPONG told him that they were leaving Sitio Sio on 26
May 1995 to work at Apgahan, Patnongon, Antique. He did not see the two at Sitio Sio from 26 May to 28 May
1995.[8]
Edna Apolinario, the second witness for TOMPONG and GUMAWA, testified that on 22 May 1995,
TOMPONG, GUMAWA and her husband began the construction of her house in Apgahan, Patnongon, Antique.
TOMPONG and GUMAWA worked continuously from 22 May up to 27 May 1995. At six o'clock in the morning of
28 May 1995, the two went home. She expected them to come back the following Monday as the house was not
yet finished but then she heard over the radio that the two were arrested by police. As laborers, TOMPONG and
GUMAWA worked the whole day, from 7:30 in the morning to about 4:30 or 5:00 in the afternoon, and slept in her
old house adjacent to the one being constructed. [9]
Accused TOMPONG testified that he was 42 years old, married, a carpenter and resident of Sitio Sio,
Bagtason, Bugasong, Antique. In May 1995, he and GUMAWA worked as carpenters in the construction of the
house of Edna Apolinario. The two left Bagtason for Apgahan, Patnongon, Antique, on 21 May 1995 at 7:30 a.m.
Before he left Bagtason, he met Richard Bernabe and informed the latter that he was going to Apgahan to work
on the house of Edna Apolinario. He and GUMAWA began working on the house of Edna on 22 May 1995. Their
work schedule was from 7:30 to 11:00 a.m. and 1:00 to 5:00 p.m. everyday. They spent the nights at the old
house of Edna. They worked for six days, and went home to Bagtason on the morning of 28 May 1995. On 26
May 1995, when the crimes in question were allegedly committed, he and GUMAWA were working on Edna's
house and they never left the site.[10]
TOMPONG further declared that in the morning of 29 May 1995, he and GUMAWA were apprehended by
policemen in Bugasong and brought to the Municipal Building of Bugasong. They were released that night at
eight o'clock but were re-arrested on 30 May 1995. They were told that they had committed the crime of rape and
they had been detained from that date until the time he testified. He denied raping AISHA, forcing ALARCON to
have sexual intercourse with AISHA, and meeting ALARCON in the morning of 26 May 1995. [11]
The prosecution presented Pedro Engue as rebuttal witness. He testified that he had resided in Sitio Sio for
the last five years and TOMPONG is his neighbor. TOMPONG's usual work was selling firewood which he
gathered from the land owned by the Davas. Engue did not know whether TOMPONG had ever constructed a
house in Sitio Sio for other people. He added though that GUMAWA is also a firewood gatherer in Sitio Sio. [12]
ALARCON was recalled to rebut the testimony of Richard Bernabe and TOMPONG. ALARCON denied that
he asked anybody for help or to accompany him to bury AISHA at Sitio Casoy at around 12:00 noon of 26 May
1995. He admitted seeing Richard Bernabe on 26 May 1995 at his house chopping firewood but he did not talk to
him. He contradicted TOMPONG's claim that he, TOMPONG and GUMAWA were in Patnongon on said date. On
the contrary, ALARCON maintained that the two were at Sitio Sio gathering and bundling firewood. ALARCON
also declared that TOMPONG and GUMAWA are not carpenters. He likewise admitted that the scratches on his
face on 26 May 1995 were caused by AISHA's nails when the girl tried to push him away after TOMPONG
pushed him towards her.[13]
After evaluating all the evidence before it, the trial court found the theory of TOMPONG and GUMAWA hard
to believe. It disregarded the defense of alibi interposed by them in the face of the positive identification by
prosecution witnesses Ostimiano Untalan, Melita Cancer and ALARCON, their co-accused. The trial court also
believed it was not impossible for TOMPONG and GUMAWA to be at the scene of the crimes at the time of their
commission. It explained that "Apgahan to Ibaures is only seventeen (17) kilometers in distance. Ibaures to
Barangay Bagtason is four (4) kilometers and Bagtason to Sitio Sio is only one (1) kilometer away. There are
jeepneys plying along this route including motorized tricycles. From Apgahan, Ilaures could be reached in thirty
(30) minutes and five minutes from Ilaures to Bagtason."
Accordingly, it rendered the appealed judgment earlier quoted.
The judgment against TOMPONG and GUMAWA is before us on automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 22 of R.A. No. 7659. ALARCON did not appeal from the
judgment. A notice of appeal should have been filed pursuant to Section 3, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court. As to
him, the decision has become final.
This decision then treats only of the review of the judgment against TOMPONG and GUMAWA.
We quote verbatim the assignment of errors in the Appellants' Brief:

21

I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN BASING ITS DECISION ON THE CONTRADICTORY AND OUT OF THIS
WORLD TESTIMONIES OF THE TWO (2) ALLEGED EYE WITNESS, MELITA CANCER AND OSTIMIANO
UNTALAN AND OTHER PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE DEFENSE OF THE ACCUSED EDDIE TOMPONG
AND EDUARDO GUMAWA OF ALIBI.
TOMPONG and GUMAWA find incredible Melita Cancer's failure to do anything to help the victim who was
only 10-1/2 years old and the daughter of her good friend, secure help for the girl, and report the incident
immediately upon arriving home. They also found the testimony of Ostimiano Untalan improbable and
contradictory. Finally, they fault the trial court for not giving any weight to their defense of alibi.
In the Brief for the Plaintiff-Appellee filed on 26 January 2000, the Office of the Solicitor General debunks the
claims of TOMPONG and GUMAWA and urges us to affirm the challenged judgment, except as to the civil
liabilities which, pursuant to our rulings in People vs. Victor,[14] People v. Robles,[15] and People v. Maglente,
[16]
should be modified: the civil indemnity in Criminal Case No. 5630 should be increased from P50,000
to P100,000, and in each of Criminal Case No. 5631 and Criminal Case No. 5632, civil indemnity of P75,000 and
moral damages of P50,000 should be awarded but the exemplary damages should be vacated.
After a thorough review of the evidence on record, we affirm the judgment of conviction of accusedappellants TOMPONG and GUMAWA.
Once again, as is often the case in appeals from convictions in criminal cases, at the core of this petition is
the credibility of eyewitnesses. The trial court found worthy of belief the accounts of Melita Cancer, Ostimiano
Untalan and co-accused ALARCON. We can do no less. Appellate courts accord the highest respect to the trial
court's assessment of the testimonies of eyewitnesses by the trial court because of its unequaled opportunity to
observe on the stand their demeanor and manner of testifying and to detect whether they are telling the truth or
not.[17] This rule admits of exceptions, such as when the evaluation was reached arbitrarily or when the trial court
overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which could
affect the result of the case.[18] None of the exceptions obtains in these cases.
TOMPONG and GUMAWA capitalize on Melita Cancer's running away, not attempting to secure help for
AISHA, and not telling anybody what she had witnessed, as attributes of the falsity of her testimony.
We do not agree. As clearly and candidly explained by Melita Cancer she was afraid when she saw what
was happening. As for not telling anybody, this was adequately explained when she testified:
Q: You did not tell anybody about the incident which you have witnessed?
A: No, sir.
Q: Why?
A: I was frightened so my mind was empty, sir.
Q: What was the reason why you are afraid?
A: I cannot understand why I was afraid of what I know, sir.
Q: Afraid of what?
A: I cannot understand my mind why I was afraid.
Q: Up to now are you afraid?
A: I am afraid, sir.[19]
There is no accounting for the varied reactions an eyewitness might have relative to what he might be
seeing. There is no standard form of human behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling
or frightful experience.[20] Fear has been known to render some people immobile, if not useless, in some life-anddeath situations.[21] At any rate, Melita Cancer firmly attested to the following: GUMAWA held the thighs of AISHA,
TOMPONG removed AISHA's panty and ALARCON held AISHA's hands.
TOMPONG and GUMAWA impute the same lack of credibility on Ostimiano Untalan for his failure to report
the matter to the police and for inconsistencies in his testimony. But Untalan explained his lapse thus:
Q: Now since you are interested in this case you did not volunteer to any policeman in Bugasong, Antique telling
them to take your affidavit in order that you will be believed upon during the trial of this case?
A:

No, I just went to Salvador Dava, Sir.

Q: When was that when you went to Salvador Dava?

A:

Three (3) months after the incident in the month of September, 1995, Sir.

ATTY. SALVANI (Cont'd.)

In other words you kept it for yourself about this incident and the only person whom you revealed this incident for
the first time is Salvador Dava three (3) months after the incident?
A:

Yes, Sir, because I was afraid that they might go against me, Sir.[22]

22

It is not uncommon for a witness to a crime to show some reluctance about getting involved in a criminal
case, and in fact the natural reticence of most people to get involved is of judicial notice. [23] It is understandable
for a witness to fear for his safety especially when townmates are involved in the commission of the crime.
[24]
Moreso in Untalan's circumstances: he is old and disabled.
Neither is there merit to the alleged inconsistency that Untalan made it appear that only TOMPONG and
GUMAWA had sexual intercourse with AISHA, while ALARCON merely stood and hit AISHA with a piece of
wood, yet under examination by the court, he testified that three persons raped AISHA. Untalan never did
categorically state that ALARCON didnot rape AISHA. Accused- appellants failed to elevate this supposed
inconsistency to the level sufficient to strip the witness of credibility.[25] In any case, Untalan was unswerving in his
identification of TOMPONG and GUMAWA as the perpetrators of the rape and killing of AISHA. What is vital is
his testimony that he saw the victim being raped and killed. We find no contradiction or hesitancy in Untalan's
detailed account of the rape and killing which conforms with the medical findings of Dr. Irma Adayon.
Lastly, TOMPONG and GUMAWA controvert ALARCON's admission in court that they raped the victim. They
point out that ALARCON's admission that he sustained scratches on his face from AISHA is proof that he was the
one who attacked her and he was acting alone, as he supposedly confessed to Richard Bernabe. They are
clutching at straws. We note that ALARCON testified that he sustained scratches on his face as a result of his
being pushed by TOMPONG towards AISHA. Even without considering the testimony of ALARCON there were
two other credible witnesses to the episode. These witnesses identified TOMPONG and GUMAWA, as well as
ALARCON, as the perpetrators of the crimes. The record being bereft of any evidence that the prosecution
witnesses were motivated by ill considerations and intent, their testimony must be accorded full probative value.
[26]

Let us now address the defense of alibi put up by TOMPONG and GUMAWA. They claim that they could not
have raped AISHA since they were working that day in Apgahan constructing the house of Edna Apolinario. To
establish alibi, an accused must show that he was at some other place for such a period of time that it was
impossible for him to have been at the place where the crime was committed at the time of its commission. [27] The
trial court, after noting the distance between Apgahan to Sitio Sio in Barangay Bagtason where the crimes were
committed, held that it was not physically impossible for TOMPONG and GUMAWA to be present in Bagtason at
the commission of the offenses. The burden of proving alibi lies with TOMPONG and GUMAWA and they have
failed to discharge this burden. Justifiably, courts have always looked upon the defense of alibi with suspicion
and have received the same with caution, not only because it is inherently weak and unreliable but also because
of its easy fabrication. [28] It cannot prevail over, and is worthless in the face of, positive identification by credible
witnesses that the accused perpetrated the crime. [29] In light of the positive identification of TOMPONG and
GUMAWA by credible eyewitnesses Melita Cancer and Ostimiano Untalan, as well as the testimony of their coaccused ALARCON, their defense of alibi cannot be given any weight. As for Richard Bernabe's assertion that
TOMPONG told him they would be working in Apgahan, the same has little value as Bernabe did not actually see
for himself that TOMPONG and GUMAWA were indeed in Apgahan working on the morning of 26 May 1995.
We are convinced beyond any doubt that TOMPONG, GUMAWA and ALARCON each raped AISHA. Since
the facts adduced prove beyond doubt that they conspired and mutually helped each other in committing the
rapes, each should be held criminally liable for these rapes. Since AISHA was killed on the occasion thereof,
each should be liable for three complex crimes of rape with homicide.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, provides, inter alia:
when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death.
Fortunately for TOMPONG and GUMAWA it was only in Criminal Case No. 5630 that they were charged with
ALARCON with the crime of rape with homicide. They were charged only with rape in Criminal Case Nos. 5631
and 5632. The trial court imposed on them in each of such cases the penalty of death because the crime in each
case was "committed by more than two (2) persons, aggravated by superior strength." We do not agree with the
trial court on this issue. While it may be true that Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No.
7659 provides, inter alia, that:
whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall
be reclusion perpetua to death.
and that the presence of an aggravating circumstance would justify the imposition of the graver penalty of death,
the fact of commission "by two or more persons," which partake of the nature of a qualifying circumstance, was
not alleged in the information in Criminal Cases Nos. 5631 and 5632. The mere fact that three were accused
therein did not amount to a specification of the qualifying circumstance in question and was insufficient for the
purpose of complying with the constitutional requirement that the accused be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against them.[30]
Also, abuse of superior strength as a generic aggravating circumstance, which may be appreciated against
the accused even if not alleged, was not proven in this case. Mere superiority in number is not enough, there
must be proof of deliberate intent to take advantage of superior strength. [31]
It follows then that in Criminal Cases Nos. 5631 and 5632, there being no evidence of any modifying
circumstance, the penalty to be imposed pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, is reclusion

23

perpetua, the lesser of the penalties prescribed by Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A.
No. 7659.
As regards the imposition of the death penalty in Criminal Case No. 5630, four Members of the Court have
continued to maintain their view that R.A. No. 7659 is unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death penalty.
Nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the majority that this law is constitutional and that the death penalty
was lawfully imposed in this case.
As to the damages awarded, modifications thereof are in order. In Criminal Case No. 5630 for rape with
homicide, the indemnity should be increased from P50,000 to P100,000,[32] while the moral damages and
exemplary
damages
should
be
reduced
from P150,000
to P50,000
and
from P50,000
to P25,000,33[33] respectively.
In each of Criminal Cases nos. 5631 and 5630, there should be an award of P50,000 as indemnity, while the
award of moral and exemplary damages should be reduced fromP100,000 to P50,000, and from P50,000
to P25,000, respectively.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered affirming the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Bugasong, Antique, Branch 34, finding accused-appellants EDDIE TOMPONG and
EDUARDO GUMAWA guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crimes of rape with homicide in
Criminal Case No. 5630, rape in Criminal Case No. 5631 and rape in Criminal Case No. 5632, and
1) IMPOSING upon each of them the penalty of death in Criminal Case No. 5630, but modifying the damages
awarded by increasing the civil indemnity from P50,000 to P100,000 and reducing the awards of moral
damages from P 150,000 to P50,000 and exemplary damages from P50,000 to P25,000;
2) IMPOSING upon each of them in Criminal Case No. 5631 and Criminal Case No. 5632 the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, thereby modifying the sentence of death imposed by the trial court, and modifying
further the awards of damages in each of said cases by ordering each of them to pay P50,000 as indemnity,
and reducing the awards of moral damages from P100,000 to P50,000 and of exemplary damages
from P50,000 to P25,000.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo,
Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ.,concur.

G.R. No. 16444

September 8, 1920
EMETERIA VILLAFLOR, petitioner,
vs.
RICARDO SUMMERS, sheriff of the City of Manila, respondent.
Alfredo Calupitan, and Gibbs, McDonough & Johnson for petitioner.
Assistant City of Fiscal Felix for respondent.
MALCOLM, J.:
The petitioner prays that a writ of habeas corpus issue to restore her to her liberty.
The facts are not dispute. In a criminal case pending before the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, Emeteria
Villaflor and Florentino Souingco are charged with the crime of adultery. On this case coming on for trial before the Hon.
Pedro Concepcion, Judge of First Instance, upon the petitioner of the assistant fiscal for the city of Manila, the court
ordered the defendant Emeteria Villaflor, nor become the petitioner herein, to submit her body to the examination of one or
two competent doctors to determine if she was pregnant or not. The accused refused to obey the order on the ground that
such examination of her person was a violation of the constitutional provision relating to self-incrimination. Thereupon she
was found in contempt of court and was ordered to be committed to Bilibid Prison until she should permit the medical
examination required by the court.
The sole legal issue from the admitted facts is whether the compelling of a woman to permit her body to be examined by
physicians to determine if she is pregnant, violates that portion of the Philippine Bill of Rights and that portion of our Code
of Criminal Procedure which find their origin in the Constitution of the United States and practically all state constitutions
and in the common law rules of evidence, providing that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself. (President's Instructions to the Philippine Commission; Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, section 5,
paragraph 3; Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, section 3; paragraph 3; Code of Criminal Procedure, section 15 [4];
United States Constitution, fifth amendment.) Counsel for petitioner argues that such bodily exhibition is an infringement of
the constitutional provision; the representative of the city fiscal contends that it is not an infringement of the constitutional
provision. The trial judge in the instant case has held with the fiscal; while it is brought to our notice that a judge of the
same court has held on an identical question as contended for by the attorney for the accused and petitioner.

24

The authorities are abundant but conflicting. What may be termed the conservative courts emphasize greatly the
humanitarianism of the constitutional provisions and are pleased to extend the privilege in order that its mantle may cover
any fact by which the accused is compelled to make evidence against himself. (Compare State vs. Jacobs [1858], 50 N.
C., 259 with State vs. Ah Chuey [1879], 14 Nev., 79. See further State vs. Ah Nordstrom [1893], 7 Wash., 506; State vs.
Height [1902]. 117 Iowa., 650; Thornton vs. State [1903], 117 Wis., 338.) A case concordant with this view and almost
directly in point is People vs. McCoy ([1873], 45 How. Pr., 216). A woman was charged with the crime of infanticide. The
corner directed two physicians to go to the jail and examine her private parts to determine whether she had recently been
delivered of a child. She objected to the examination, but being threatened with force, yielded, and the examination was
had. The evidence of these physicians was offered at the trial and ruled out. The court said that the proceeding was in
violation of the spirit and meaning of the Constitution, which declares that "no person shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself." Continuing, the court said: "They might as well have sworn the prisoner, and
compelled her, by threats, to testify that she had been pregnant, and had been delivered of a child, as to have compelled
her, by threats, to allow them to look into her person, with the aid of a speculum, to ascertain whether she had been
pregnant and been delivered of a child. . . . Has this court the right to compel the prisoner now to submit to an examination
they are of the opinion she is not a virgin, and has had a child? It is not possible that this court has that right; and it is too
clear to admit of argument that evidence thus obtained would be inadmissible against the prisoner."
It may be revealing a judicial secret, but nevertheless we cannot refrain from saying that, greatly impressed with the
weight of these decisions, especially the one written by Mr. Justice McClain, in State vs. Height, supra, the instant case
was reported by the writer with the tentative recommendation that the court should lay down the general rule that a
defendant can be compelled to disclose only those parts of the body which are not usually covered. Buth having
disabused our minds of a too sensitive appreciation of the rights of accused persons, and having been able, as we think,
to penetrate through the maze of law reports to the policy which lies behind the constitutional guaranty and the common
law principle, we have come finally to take our stand with what we believe to be the reason of the case.
In contradistinction to the cases above-mentioned are others which seem to us more progressive in nature. Among these
can be prominently mentioned decisions of the United States Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court of these Islands.
Thus, the always forward looking jurist, Mr. Justice Holmes, in the late case of Holt vs. United States ([1910], 218 U. S.,
245), in resolving an objection based upon what he termed "an extravagant extension of the Fifth Amendment," said: "The
prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or
moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material."
(See also, of same general tenor, decision of Mr. Justice Day in Adams vs. New York [1903], 192 U. S., 585.) The
Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands, in two decisions, has seemed to limit the protection to a prohibition against
compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. The constitutional limitation was said to be "simply a prohibition against legal
process to extract from the defendant's own lips, against his will, an admission of his guilt." (U. S. vs. Tan Teng [1912], 23
Phil., 145; U. S. vs. Ong Siu Hong [1917], 36 Phil., 735, and the derivatory principle announced in 16 Corpus Juris, 567,
568, citing the United States Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands as authority.)
Although we have stated s proposition previously announced by this court and by the highest tribunal in the United States,
we cannot unconcernedly leave the subject without further consideration. Even in the opinion Mr. Justice Holmes, to which
we have alluded, there was inserted the careful proviso that "we need not consider how far a court would go in compelling
a man to exhibit himself." Other courts have likewise avoided any attempt to determine the exact location of the dividing
line between what is proper and what is improper in this very broad constitutional field. But here before us is presented
what would seem to be the most extreme case which could be imagined. While the United States Supreme Court could
nonchalantly decree that testimony that an accused person put on a blouse and it fitted him is not a violation of the
constitutional provision, while the Supreme Court of Nuevada could go so far as to require the defendant to roll up his
sleeve in order to disclose tattoo marks, and while the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands could permit substances
taken from the person of an accused to be offered in evidence, none of these even approach in apparent harshness an
order to make a woman, possibly innocent, to disclose her body in all of its sanctity to the gaze of strangers. We can only
consistently consent to the retention of a principle which would permit of such a result by adhering steadfastly to the
proposition that the purpose of the constitutional provision was and is merely to prohibit testimonial compulsion.
So much for the authorities. For the nonce we would prefer to forget them entirely, and here in the Philippines, being in the
agrreable state of breaking new ground, would rather desire our decision to rest on a strong foundation of reason and
justice than on a weak one blind adherence to tradition and precedent. Moreover, we believe that an unbiased
consideration of the history of the constitutional provisions will disclose that our conclusion is in exact accord with the
causes which led to its adoption.
The maxim of the common law, Nemo tenetur seipsum accusare, was recognized in England in early days, but not in the
other legal systems of the world, in a revolt against the thumbscrew and the rack. A legal shield was raised against odious
inquisitorial methods of interrogating an accused person by which to extort unwilling confessions with the ever present
temptation to commit the crime of perjury. The kernel of the privilege as disclosed by the textwriters was testimonial
compulsion. As forcing a man to be a witness against himself was deemed contrary to the fundamentals of republican
government, the principle was taken into the American Constitutions, and from the United States was brought to the
Philippine Islands, in exactly as wide but no wider a scope as it existed in old English days. The provision should
here be approached in no blindly worshipful spirit, but with a judicious and a judicial appreciation of both its benefits and its
abuses. (Read the scholarly articles of Prof. Wigmore in 5 Harvard L. R. [1891], p. 71, and 15 Harvard L. R., 1902, p. 610
found in 4 Wigmore on Evidence, pp. 3069 et seq., and U. S. vs. Navarro [1904], Phil., 143.)

25

Perhaps the best way to test the correctness of our position is to go back once more to elements and ponder on what is
the prime purpose of a criminal trial. As we view it, the object of having criminal laws is to purgue the community of
persons who violate the laws to the great prejudice of their fellow men. Criminal procedure, the rules of evidence, and
constitutional provisions, are then provided, not to protect the guilty but to protect the innocent. No rule is intemended to
be so rigid as to embarrass the administration of justice in its endeavor to ascertain the truth. No accused person should
be afraid of the use of any method which will tend to establish the truth. For instance, under the facts before us, to use
torture to make the defendant admit her guilt might only result in including her to tell a falsehood. But no evidence of
physical facts can for any substantial reason be held to be detrimental to the accused except in so far as the truth is to be
avoided in order to acquit a guilty person.
Obviously a stirring plea can be made showing that under the due process of law cause of the Constitution every person
has a natural and inherent right to the possession and control of his own body. It is extremely abhorrent to one's sense of
decency and propriety to have the decide that such inviolability of the person, particularly of a woman, can be invaded by
exposure to another's gaze. As Mr. Justice Gray in Union Pacific Railway Co. vs. Botsford ([1891], 141 U. S., 250) said,
"To compel any one, and especially a woman, to lay bare the body, or to submit to the touch of a stranger, without lawful
authority, is an indignity, an assault, and a trespass." Conceded, and yet, as well suggested by the same court, even
superior to the complete immunity of a person to be let alone is the inherent which the public has in the orderly
administration of justice. Unfortunately, all too frequently the modesty of witnesses is shocked by forcing them to answer,
without any mental evasion, questions which are put to them; and such a tendency to degrade the witness in public
estimation does not exempt him from the duty of disclosure. Between a sacrifice of the ascertainment of truth to personal
considerations, between a disregard of the public welfare for refined notions of delicacy, law and justice cannot hesitate.
The protection of accused persons has been carried to such an unwarranted extent that criminal trials have sometimes
seemed to be like a game of shuttlecocks, with the judge as referee, the lawyers as players, the criminal as guest of
honor, and the public as fascinated spectators. Against such a loose extension of constitutional guaranties we are here
prepared to voice our protest.
Fully conscious that we are resolving a most extreme case in a sense, which on first impression is a shock to one's
sensibilities, we must nevertheless enforce the constitutional provision in this jurisdiction in accord with the policy and
reason thereof, undeterred by merely sentimental influences. Once again we lay down the rule that the constitutional
guaranty, that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, is limited to a prohibition
against compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. The corollary to the proposition is that, an ocular inspection of the body
of the accused is permissible. The proviso is that torture of force shall be avoided. Whether facts fall within or without the
rule with its corollary and proviso must, of course, be decided as cases arise.
It is a reasonable presumption that in an examination by reputable and disinterested physicians due care will be taken not
to use violence and not to embarass the patient any more than is absolutely necessary. Indeed, no objection to the
physical examination being made by the family doctor of the accused or by doctor of the same sex can be seen.
Although the order of the trial judge, acceding to the request of the assistant fiscal for an examination of the person of the
defendant by physicians was phrased in absolute terms, it should, nevertheless, be understood as subject to the
limitations herein mentioned, and therefore legal. The writ of habeas corpus prayed for is hereby denied. The costs shall
be taxed against the petitioner. So ordered.
Mapa, C.J., Araullo, Avancea, Moir and Villamor, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
CARSON, J., concurring:
I concur.
I think, however, that the scope of our ruling in this matter should be expressly limited, in positive and definite terms, so as
to make it clear that the examination of the person of the accused shall not be carried beyond a mere ocular inspection,
wherein the use of instruments or of physical force upon the person of the accused would be prohibited.

[G.R. No. 133191-93. July 11, 2000]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
TOMPONG and EDUARDO GUMAWA, accused.

WILFREDO ALARCON,

EDDIE

EDDIE TOMPONG and EDUARDO GUMAWA, accused-appellants.

DECISION
26

PER CURIAM:
In the joint decision[1] of 26 January 1998, of the Regional Trial Court of Bugasong, Antique, Branch 64, in
Criminal Case No. 5630, for rape with homicide, Criminal Case No. 5631, for rape, and Criminal Case No. 5632,
for rape, accused Wilfredo Alarcon, Eddie Tompong, and Eduardo Gumawa, hereafter ALARCON, TOMPONG
and GUMAWA, respectively, were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged therein. The
victim in these cases was Aisha Dava (hereafter AISHA). The decretal portion of the decision reads as follows:
In view thereof, this court finds the accused WILFREDO ALARCON, EDDIE TOMPONG AND EDUARDO GUMAWA, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as co-conspirators in three (3) crimes with their corresponding penalties, as follows:
1. Criminal Case No. 5630, for RAPE WITH HOMICIDE: EDDIE TOMPONG AND EDUARDO GUMAWA are sentenced to
DEATH. WILFREDO ALARCON being a minor of 17 years old at the time of commission of the offense is sentenced to
Reclusion Perpetua with the accessories imposed by law.
Accused are ordered to pay, jointly and solidarily, Lucia Dava, the offended party, the amount of P50,000 as indemnity for
the death of Aisha Dava; P50,000 as exemplary damages and P150,000 as moral damages.
2. Criminal Case No. 5631, for RAPE, resulting to the death of Aisha Dava, committed by more than two (2) persons,
aggravated by superior strength, EDDIE TOMPONG and EDUARDO GUMAWA are sentenced to Death; WILFREDO
ALARCON is sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua with the accessories imposed by law.
Accused are ordered to pay the offended party, jointly and solidarily, the amount of P50,000 as exemplary damages and
P100,000 as moral damages.
3. Criminal Case No. 5632, for RAPE, resulting to the death of Aisha Dava committed by more than two (2) persons,
aggravated by superior strength, EDDIE TOMPONG and EDUARDO GUMAWA are sentenced to Death. WILFREDO
ALARCON is sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua with the accessories imposed by law.
Accused are ordered to pay the offended party, jointly and solidarily, the amount of P50,000 as exemplary damages and
P100,000 as moral damages.[2]
In the Information[3] in Criminal Case No. 5630, the crime of rape with homicide was allegedly committed in
this manner:
That on or about May 26, 1995, in the Municipality of Bugasong, Province of Antique, Republic of the Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused surprised one Aisha Dava who was alone at a
tree-covered hillside, conspiring, confederating, mutually helping each other and one after the other, by means of force
and intimidation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously did lie and succeed in having carnal knowledge of said Aisha Dava
who was then only eleven (11) years old and by reason or on the occasion thereof, the accused willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously stabbed and slashed the neck of the victim with a knife/scythe and killed her in the process.
Contrary to the provisions of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 249 of the same code and
Republic Act 7659.[4]
The Informations[5] in Criminal Case No. 5631 and Criminal Case No. 5632 each charged the crime of rape
and are similarly worded with the crime allegedly committed in this manner:
That on or about May 26, 1995, in the Municipality of Bugasong, Province of Antique, Republic of the Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused being then armed with a knife/scythe surprised
one Aisha Dava who was alone at a trees-covered [sic] hillside, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping each other
and one after the other, by means of force and intimidation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously did lie and succeed in
having carnal knowledge of said Aisha Dava who was then only eleven (11) years old, against her will.
Contrary to the provisions of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and as amended by R.A. 7659.
Upon their arraignment ALARCON, TOMPONG and GUMAWA each pleaded not guilty. Joint trial on the
merits ensued. The prosecution presented five witnesses, namely: Dr. Irma J. Adayon, Lucia Dava, Melita
Cancer, Ostimiano Untalan and Amador Martinesio and rebuttal witness Pedro Enque.
The evidence for the prosecution is faithfully summarized in the Appellees' Brief, as follows:
On May 26, 1995 at around 7:00 o'clock in the morning, accused Wilfredo Alarcon, 17 years of age, was proceeding to
Sitio Casoy, Bagtason, Bugasong, Antique to gather firewood (pp. 3 to 4 & 15, tsn. May 8, 1997). On his way, he met "Lola
27

Magang", the grandmother of the eleven [ 11 ] year old victim Aisha Dava (p. 5, tsn. May 8, 1997; Exh. B; pp. 5, 14, t7 &
18, tsn. June 14, 1996), carrying goods to be sold at the market in Valderrama (p. 5, tsn. May 8, 1997).
Upon reaching Sitio Casoy, Alarcon saw appellant Eddie Tompong, 42 years old, with her wife Gloria Tompong, and
appellant Eduardo Gumawa gathering firewood and tying them in bundles (p. 6, tsn. May 8, 1997; p. 2, tsn. July 2,
1997). The victim was also there watching the group bundle the firewood (p. 6, tsn. May 8, 1997). As the victim watched,
appellants Tompong and Gumawa were teasing her telling her that they will court her. The victim reacted by throwing
pebbles at both appellants, and left the place saying that she will just look for the carabao she was tending (pp. 7-8, tsn.
May 8, 1997).
After finishing her task, Gloria Tompong left, leaving appellants and Alarcon behind (p. 8, ibid.). Appellant Tompong
approached Alarcon and said that they will follow the victim. Appellants and Alarcon then proceeded to the place where the
victim was grazing her carabao (pp. 8-9, id,).
The victim saw them approaching and she stood up and looked at them (pp. 9-10, id.). Upon reaching the place where the
victim was standing, appellant Tompong suddenly pushed Alarcon towards the victim causing them both to fall to the
ground and roll together (p. 10, id.). As they rolled, the victim scratched the face of Alarcon to defend herself (pp. 22 to 23,
tsn. July 15, 1997). But while the victim was lying flat on her back Tompong ran towards her and got the knife tucked on
her waist. The victim shouted and cried as appellants and Alarcon ganged upon her (p. 11, tsn. May 8, 1997).
At that instant, prosecution eyewitness Melita Cancer heard the cry of the victim. Cancer was on her way home after
coming from the victim's house which is situated at around 80 meters from the crime scene. She had gone there to collect
money from the victim's mother Lucia Dava, but left after discovering that nobody was around. Hearing the victim's cry,
Cancer looked around and saw, around 40 meters away, appellants Tompong and Gumawa, and their co-accused
Alarcon, holding and undressing the victim. Cancer immediately fled the area startled and afraid of what she saw (vide: pp.
2-6, tsn. June 6, 1996).
Another person, Ostimiano Untalan, 68 years old, a retired PC officer, saw the incident. He was on his way to the bamboo
plantation of Mr. Salvador Dava in Sitio Sio, to inquire into the availability of bamboo poles he intended to buy. While
walking along a pathway in Sitio Sio, Untalan heard the shouts of the victim (pp. 5-8, tsn. Sept. 18, 1996). Untalan felt
afraid and took cover and concealed himself inside a thick "bungargar" bush around four [4] feet tall (pp. 8, 25, 51 &
52, ibid.). He saw three [3] malefactors about seven [7] meters away from him sexually molesting the victim (pp. 8-9 & 40,
tsn. Id.). Untalan saw the victim lying flat on her back with both hands being held by one of the malefactors whose name
he later learned to be Wilfredo Alarcon. The other malefactor, whose name he later learned to be Eddie Tompong, laid on
top of the victim. And the third malefactor, whose name he later learned to be Eduardo Gumawa, was covering the victim's
mouth. Untalan saw Tompong, Gumawa and Alarcon took turns in sexually abusing the victim for about half an hour.
Thereafter, Alarcon struck the neck of the victim with a piece of wood and slashed further the throat and left cheek of the
victim using a knife about six (6) or seven (7) inches long. Gumawa dragged the body of the victim towards the canal.
Tompong and Alarcon followed and covered it with twigs of "bungargar". Gumawa told his companions that "they will
separate and nobody will tell what happened". Untalan left his hiding place and went home five (5) minutes after the
malefactors had fled (vide: pp. 9-16, 38-41, & 47-53, id.; see also pp. 11-16, tsn. May 8, 1997).
Three [3] days thereafter, on May 29, 1995, the cadaver of the victim in the state of decomposition was found by the police
in Sitio Sio (pp. 32-33, tsn. May 30, 1996; Exhs. C to C-7, Brown Envelope pasted on Folder I, Crim. Case No. 5630). An
autopsy was performed by Dr. Irma J. Adayon, Rural Health Physician of Bugasong, Antique, at about 3:30 o'clock in the
afternoon that same day (Exh. A, pp. 17-18, Folder I, Crim. Case No. 5630). The Autopsy Report dated May 30, 1995
prepared by Dr. Adayon disclosed the following findings:
1. General Appearance:
Dead; lying with his head and trunk slightly elevated from the rest of the body; supine position; both arms slightly flexed
and perpendicular to the body; both thighs and knees flexed; knees separated from each other 40 cms. apart; wearing Tshirt stained with blood and rolled upward to the level just below the nipples; wearing panty and short pants stained with
blood; short pants rolled upwards to the inguinal area.
2. Wound, 6 cms. long, gaping, neck, right, involving right sternocleidomastoid muscle, right common carotid
artery and vein.
3. Wound, stabbed, 2.5 cms. long, gaping, left buccinator area, running mediolaterally, involving buccinator
muscle thru and thru.
4. Labia majora and labia minora;
Medical borders not prominent because it is markedly covered by a swollen clittoris; gaping.

28

5. Clittoris:
Swollen and elevated by 2.5 cms.; 6.5 cms. long; 3 cms. wide; oblong in shape; presence of somewhat fresh blood in the
superior third; wound in the inferior half.
5. Vaginal canal:
Presence of old mucuslike material in the opening, left, lower quadrant; edges irregular; rugosities not discint; admits one
finger.
6. Fourchette:
Rounded base.
7. Hymen:
Not clearly identified because of the extremely swollen clittoris.
(Exh. A, [supra])
On May 30, 1995, at 8:00 o'clock in the morning, a certain Jose Pacete executed his sworn statement before the Chief of
Police, Bugasong Police Station pointing to Tompong, Gumawa and Alarcon as the victims assailants (pp. 6-9, Folder I,
Crim. Case No. 5630). At 12:00 noon of the same day, a certain Margarita Pacete y Magbanua likewise appeared at said
police station and executed his sworn statement pointing to the same culprits (pp. 10-13, Ibid). The following day, on May
31, 1995 at 4:25 p.m., a certain Luther Valenzuela went to the police station also attesting to the fact that he saw
Tompong, Gumawa and Alarcon rape and kill the victim (pp. 4-5, id.). On June 5, 1995, prosecution eyewitness Melita
Cancer also executed an affidavit also identifying appellants and Alarcon as the assailants (p. 3, Id.). These sworn
statements supported the criminal complaint for rape and homicide filed against appellants and Alarcon (p. 1, id.).
On June 5, 1995, appellants and Alarcon were arrested and detained by the police (p. 20, id.)
Upon the other hand, ALARCON testified on his behalf. The witnesses presented for TOMPONG and
GUMAWA were TOMPONG himself, Richard Bernabe and Edna Apolinario. The testimony of GUMAWA was
dispensed with since it would only corroborate that of TOMPONG.
ALARCON, 19 years old, single and resident of Sitio Sio, Bagtason, Bugasong, Antique, testified that at
around seven o'clock in the morning of 26 May 1995 he went to Sitio Casoy in Barangay Bagtason to gather
firewood. He met Lola Magang on the way. Upon reaching Sitio Casoy he saw TOMPONG, GUMAWA, Gloria
Tompong and AISHA. The first three were bundling firewood while AISHA was watching them. TOMPONG and
GUMAWA were teasing AISHA telling her they would court her. AISHA threw pebbles at the two while ALARCON
and Gloria Tompong remained silent. After bundling the firewood, Gloria went home. After she left, TOMPONG
and GUMAWA kept on teasing AISHA, but the latter grew weary of their teasing and left them to look for her
carabao. After AISHA left, TOMPONG and GUMAWA approached ALARCON and told him to go with them to
follow AISHA. He refused but TOMPONG pushed him. He fell on the root of a santol tree and he was leaning on
it when GUMAWA approached him. GUMAWA pointed a bolo at him and threatened him that if he did not go with
them, GUMAWA would hack him. Scared, ALARCON went with TOMPONG and GUMAWA to follow AISHA.
Upon finding AISHA, TOMPONG pushed ALARCON toward her. ALARCON fell on AISHA, and both fell to the
ground. TOMPONG then ran towards them and got the knife tucked in AISHAs waist. TOMPONG covered
AISHAs mouth while ALARCON rose to run away, but GUMAWA held him and pointed the bolo at him.
GUMAWA instructed him to hold the hands of AISHA. ALARCON could not refuse because the bolo was still
pointed at him, and TOMPONG also pointed his bolo at ALARCON's neck while covering AISHA's mouth.
ALARCON was thus forced to hold both of AISHA's hands. GUMAWA held AISHA's feet and removed her shorts
while she was lying on her back. TOMPONG told GUMAWA that he (TOMPONG) would go first. ALARCON
understood this to mean TOMPONG would be the first to have sex with AISHA. TOMPONG spread the legs of
AISHA, and inserted his finger then his organ into her vagina. TOMPONG got AISHA's shorts and wiped her
sexual organ with it. ALARCON saw blood on AISHA's vagina when TOMPONG wiped it. Then GUMAWA took
his turn to rape AISHA. While GUMAWA was raping AISHA, TOMPONG was pointing his bolo at ALARCON and
after GUMAWA finished raping AISHA, TOMPONG faced ALARCON and told him to take his turn, but ALARCON
cried and said that he would not do it. Because he did not, TOMPONG told GUMAWA: "We cannot do otherwise."
GUMAWA then took a piece of wood beside him and struck the neck of AISHA, put on her shorts and pulled her
towards a hole near some shrubs. GUMAWA warned ALARCON not to tell anybody about what happened.
TOMPONG then slashed AISHA's neck with the knife he took from her waist and dropped the knife beside
AISHA's body. TOMPONG approached ALARCON and told him not to tell anybody about the incident and, if he

29

was caught, to just admit it. GUMAWA and TOMPONG each promised to pay ALARCON P500 if the latter
admitted to the crime.[6]
ALARCON further testified that he was arrested without a warrant by Quioyo, a policeman, the following
Monday, 29 May 1995. He was brought to the Municipal Building where after one night he implicated his coaccused. He told AISHA'S uncle that it was TOMPONG and GUMAWA who killed AISHA. He was made to sign
some papers, but he did not know what he signed. [7]
Richard Bernabe, first witness for TOMPONG and GUMAWA, declared that at around noon of 26 May 1995,
his neighbor ALARCON went to his house to ask for help as he had raped a child. ALARCON confessed to him
that he did it alone. He accompanied ALARCON to the place of the incident and there he saw the dead body of
AISHA. On their way back, he again asked ALARCON who his companions were in raping AISHA. ALARCON
replied that he was alone. He also admitted that he killed AISHA by slashing her head. ALARCON spent the night
at Bernabe's house. Bernabe then reported ALARCON's confession to his father, who then later narrated the
incident to Gloria Tompong, TOMPONG's wife, at the time of the apprehension of GUMAWA and TOMPONG.
Richard Bernabe further declared that GUMAWA and TOMPONG told him that they were leaving Sitio Sio on 26
May 1995 to work at Apgahan, Patnongon, Antique. He did not see the two at Sitio Sio from 26 May to 28 May
1995.[8]
Edna Apolinario, the second witness for TOMPONG and GUMAWA, testified that on 22 May 1995,
TOMPONG, GUMAWA and her husband began the construction of her house in Apgahan, Patnongon, Antique.
TOMPONG and GUMAWA worked continuously from 22 May up to 27 May 1995. At six o'clock in the morning of
28 May 1995, the two went home. She expected them to come back the following Monday as the house was not
yet finished but then she heard over the radio that the two were arrested by police. As laborers, TOMPONG and
GUMAWA worked the whole day, from 7:30 in the morning to about 4:30 or 5:00 in the afternoon, and slept in her
old house adjacent to the one being constructed. [9]
Accused TOMPONG testified that he was 42 years old, married, a carpenter and resident of Sitio Sio,
Bagtason, Bugasong, Antique. In May 1995, he and GUMAWA worked as carpenters in the construction of the
house of Edna Apolinario. The two left Bagtason for Apgahan, Patnongon, Antique, on 21 May 1995 at 7:30 a.m.
Before he left Bagtason, he met Richard Bernabe and informed the latter that he was going to Apgahan to work
on the house of Edna Apolinario. He and GUMAWA began working on the house of Edna on 22 May 1995. Their
work schedule was from 7:30 to 11:00 a.m. and 1:00 to 5:00 p.m. everyday. They spent the nights at the old
house of Edna. They worked for six days, and went home to Bagtason on the morning of 28 May 1995. On 26
May 1995, when the crimes in question were allegedly committed, he and GUMAWA were working on Edna's
house and they never left the site.[10]
TOMPONG further declared that in the morning of 29 May 1995, he and GUMAWA were apprehended by
policemen in Bugasong and brought to the Municipal Building of Bugasong. They were released that night at
eight o'clock but were re-arrested on 30 May 1995. They were told that they had committed the crime of rape and
they had been detained from that date until the time he testified. He denied raping AISHA, forcing ALARCON to
have sexual intercourse with AISHA, and meeting ALARCON in the morning of 26 May 1995. [11]
The prosecution presented Pedro Engue as rebuttal witness. He testified that he had resided in Sitio Sio for
the last five years and TOMPONG is his neighbor. TOMPONG's usual work was selling firewood which he
gathered from the land owned by the Davas. Engue did not know whether TOMPONG had ever constructed a
house in Sitio Sio for other people. He added though that GUMAWA is also a firewood gatherer in Sitio Sio. [12]
ALARCON was recalled to rebut the testimony of Richard Bernabe and TOMPONG. ALARCON denied that
he asked anybody for help or to accompany him to bury AISHA at Sitio Casoy at around 12:00 noon of 26 May
1995. He admitted seeing Richard Bernabe on 26 May 1995 at his house chopping firewood but he did not talk to
him. He contradicted TOMPONG's claim that he, TOMPONG and GUMAWA were in Patnongon on said date. On
the contrary, ALARCON maintained that the two were at Sitio Sio gathering and bundling firewood. ALARCON
also declared that TOMPONG and GUMAWA are not carpenters. He likewise admitted that the scratches on his
face on 26 May 1995 were caused by AISHA's nails when the girl tried to push him away after TOMPONG
pushed him towards her.[13]
After evaluating all the evidence before it, the trial court found the theory of TOMPONG and GUMAWA hard
to believe. It disregarded the defense of alibi interposed by them in the face of the positive identification by
prosecution witnesses Ostimiano Untalan, Melita Cancer and ALARCON, their co-accused. The trial court also
believed it was not impossible for TOMPONG and GUMAWA to be at the scene of the crimes at the time of their
commission. It explained that "Apgahan to Ibaures is only seventeen (17) kilometers in distance. Ibaures to
Barangay Bagtason is four (4) kilometers and Bagtason to Sitio Sio is only one (1) kilometer away. There are

30

jeepneys plying along this route including motorized tricycles. From Apgahan, Ilaures could be reached in thirty
(30) minutes and five minutes from Ilaures to Bagtason."
Accordingly, it rendered the appealed judgment earlier quoted.
The judgment against TOMPONG and GUMAWA is before us on automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 22 of R.A. No. 7659. ALARCON did not appeal from the
judgment. A notice of appeal should have been filed pursuant to Section 3, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court. As to
him, the decision has become final.
This decision then treats only of the review of the judgment against TOMPONG and GUMAWA.
We quote verbatim the assignment of errors in the Appellants' Brief:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN BASING ITS DECISION ON THE CONTRADICTORY AND OUT OF THIS
WORLD TESTIMONIES OF THE TWO (2) ALLEGED EYE WITNESS, MELITA CANCER AND OSTIMIANO
UNTALAN AND OTHER PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE DEFENSE OF THE ACCUSED EDDIE TOMPONG
AND EDUARDO GUMAWA OF ALIBI.
TOMPONG and GUMAWA find incredible Melita Cancer's failure to do anything to help the victim who was
only 10-1/2 years old and the daughter of her good friend, secure help for the girl, and report the incident
immediately upon arriving home. They also found the testimony of Ostimiano Untalan improbable and
contradictory. Finally, they fault the trial court for not giving any weight to their defense of alibi.
In the Brief for the Plaintiff-Appellee filed on 26 January 2000, the Office of the Solicitor General debunks the
claims of TOMPONG and GUMAWA and urges us to affirm the challenged judgment, except as to the civil
liabilities which, pursuant to our rulings in People vs. Victor,[14] People v. Robles,[15] and People v. Maglente,
[16]
should be modified: the civil indemnity in Criminal Case No. 5630 should be increased from P50,000
to P100,000, and in each of Criminal Case No. 5631 and Criminal Case No. 5632, civil indemnity of P75,000 and
moral damages of P50,000 should be awarded but the exemplary damages should be vacated.
After a thorough review of the evidence on record, we affirm the judgment of conviction of accusedappellants TOMPONG and GUMAWA.
Once again, as is often the case in appeals from convictions in criminal cases, at the core of this petition is
the credibility of eyewitnesses. The trial court found worthy of belief the accounts of Melita Cancer, Ostimiano
Untalan and co-accused ALARCON. We can do no less. Appellate courts accord the highest respect to the trial
court's assessment of the testimonies of eyewitnesses by the trial court because of its unequaled opportunity to
observe on the stand their demeanor and manner of testifying and to detect whether they are telling the truth or
not.[17] This rule admits of exceptions, such as when the evaluation was reached arbitrarily or when the trial court
overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which could
affect the result of the case.[18] None of the exceptions obtains in these cases.
TOMPONG and GUMAWA capitalize on Melita Cancer's running away, not attempting to secure help for
AISHA, and not telling anybody what she had witnessed, as attributes of the falsity of her testimony.
We do not agree. As clearly and candidly explained by Melita Cancer she was afraid when she saw what
was happening. As for not telling anybody, this was adequately explained when she testified:
Q: You did not tell anybody about the incident which you have witnessed?
A: No, sir.
Q: Why?
A: I was frightened so my mind was empty, sir.
Q: What was the reason why you are afraid?
A: I cannot understand why I was afraid of what I know, sir.
Q: Afraid of what?

31

A: I cannot understand my mind why I was afraid.

Q: Up to now are you afraid?
A: I am afraid, sir.[19]
There is no accounting for the varied reactions an eyewitness might have relative to what he might be
seeing. There is no standard form of human behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling
or frightful experience.[20] Fear has been known to render some people immobile, if not useless, in some life-anddeath situations.[21] At any rate, Melita Cancer firmly attested to the following: GUMAWA held the thighs of AISHA,
TOMPONG removed AISHA's panty and ALARCON held AISHA's hands.
TOMPONG and GUMAWA impute the same lack of credibility on Ostimiano Untalan for his failure to report
the matter to the police and for inconsistencies in his testimony. But Untalan explained his lapse thus:
Q: Now since you are interested in this case you did not volunteer to any policeman in Bugasong, Antique telling
them to take your affidavit in order that you will be believed upon during the trial of this case?
A:

No, I just went to Salvador Dava, Sir.

Q: When was that when you went to Salvador Dava?

A:

Three (3) months after the incident in the month of September, 1995, Sir.

ATTY. SALVANI (Cont'd.)

In other words you kept it for yourself about this incident and the only person whom you revealed this incident for
the first time is Salvador Dava three (3) months after the incident?
A:

Yes, Sir, because I was afraid that they might go against me, Sir.[22]

It is not uncommon for a witness to a crime to show some reluctance about getting involved in a criminal
case, and in fact the natural reticence of most people to get involved is of judicial notice. [23] It is understandable
for a witness to fear for his safety especially when townmates are involved in the commission of the crime.
[24]
Moreso in Untalan's circumstances: he is old and disabled.
Neither is there merit to the alleged inconsistency that Untalan made it appear that only TOMPONG and
GUMAWA had sexual intercourse with AISHA, while ALARCON merely stood and hit AISHA with a piece of
wood, yet under examination by the court, he testified that three persons raped AISHA. Untalan never did
categorically state that ALARCON didnot rape AISHA. Accused- appellants failed to elevate this supposed
inconsistency to the level sufficient to strip the witness of credibility.[25] In any case, Untalan was unswerving in his
identification of TOMPONG and GUMAWA as the perpetrators of the rape and killing of AISHA. What is vital is
his testimony that he saw the victim being raped and killed. We find no contradiction or hesitancy in Untalan's
detailed account of the rape and killing which conforms with the medical findings of Dr. Irma Adayon.
Lastly, TOMPONG and GUMAWA controvert ALARCON's admission in court that they raped the victim. They
point out that ALARCON's admission that he sustained scratches on his face from AISHA is proof that he was the
one who attacked her and he was acting alone, as he supposedly confessed to Richard Bernabe. They are
clutching at straws. We note that ALARCON testified that he sustained scratches on his face as a result of his
being pushed by TOMPONG towards AISHA. Even without considering the testimony of ALARCON there were
two other credible witnesses to the episode. These witnesses identified TOMPONG and GUMAWA, as well as
ALARCON, as the perpetrators of the crimes. The record being bereft of any evidence that the prosecution
witnesses were motivated by ill considerations and intent, their testimony must be accorded full probative value.
[26]

Let us now address the defense of alibi put up by TOMPONG and GUMAWA. They claim that they could not
have raped AISHA since they were working that day in Apgahan constructing the house of Edna Apolinario. To
establish alibi, an accused must show that he was at some other place for such a period of time that it was
impossible for him to have been at the place where the crime was committed at the time of its commission. [27] The
trial court, after noting the distance between Apgahan to Sitio Sio in Barangay Bagtason where the crimes were
committed, held that it was not physically impossible for TOMPONG and GUMAWA to be present in Bagtason at
the commission of the offenses. The burden of proving alibi lies with TOMPONG and GUMAWA and they have
failed to discharge this burden. Justifiably, courts have always looked upon the defense of alibi with suspicion
and have received the same with caution, not only because it is inherently weak and unreliable but also because

32

of its easy fabrication. [28] It cannot prevail over, and is worthless in the face of, positive identification by credible
witnesses that the accused perpetrated the crime. [29] In light of the positive identification of TOMPONG and
GUMAWA by credible eyewitnesses Melita Cancer and Ostimiano Untalan, as well as the testimony of their coaccused ALARCON, their defense of alibi cannot be given any weight. As for Richard Bernabe's assertion that
TOMPONG told him they would be working in Apgahan, the same has little value as Bernabe did not actually see
for himself that TOMPONG and GUMAWA were indeed in Apgahan working on the morning of 26 May 1995.
We are convinced beyond any doubt that TOMPONG, GUMAWA and ALARCON each raped AISHA. Since
the facts adduced prove beyond doubt that they conspired and mutually helped each other in committing the
rapes, each should be held criminally liable for these rapes. Since AISHA was killed on the occasion thereof,
each should be liable for three complex crimes of rape with homicide.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, provides, inter alia:
when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death.
Fortunately for TOMPONG and GUMAWA it was only in Criminal Case No. 5630 that they were charged with
ALARCON with the crime of rape with homicide. They were charged only with rape in Criminal Case Nos. 5631
and 5632. The trial court imposed on them in each of such cases the penalty of death because the crime in each
case was "committed by more than two (2) persons, aggravated by superior strength." We do not agree with the
trial court on this issue. While it may be true that Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No.
7659 provides, inter alia, that:
whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall
be reclusion perpetua to death.
and that the presence of an aggravating circumstance would justify the imposition of the graver penalty of death,
the fact of commission "by two or more persons," which partake of the nature of a qualifying circumstance, was
not alleged in the information in Criminal Cases Nos. 5631 and 5632. The mere fact that three were accused
therein did not amount to a specification of the qualifying circumstance in question and was insufficient for the
purpose of complying with the constitutional requirement that the accused be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against them.[30]
Also, abuse of superior strength as a generic aggravating circumstance, which may be appreciated against
the accused even if not alleged, was not proven in this case. Mere superiority in number is not enough, there
must be proof of deliberate intent to take advantage of superior strength. [31]
It follows then that in Criminal Cases Nos. 5631 and 5632, there being no evidence of any modifying
circumstance, the penalty to be imposed pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, is reclusion
perpetua, the lesser of the penalties prescribed by Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A.
No. 7659.
As regards the imposition of the death penalty in Criminal Case No. 5630, four Members of the Court have
continued to maintain their view that R.A. No. 7659 is unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death penalty.
Nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the majority that this law is constitutional and that the death penalty
was lawfully imposed in this case.
As to the damages awarded, modifications thereof are in order. In Criminal Case No. 5630 for rape with
homicide, the indemnity should be increased from P50,000 to P100,000,[32] while the moral damages and
exemplary
damages
should
be
reduced
from P150,000
to P50,000
and
from P50,000
to P25,000,33[33] respectively.
In each of Criminal Cases nos. 5631 and 5630, there should be an award of P50,000 as indemnity, while the
award of moral and exemplary damages should be reduced fromP100,000 to P50,000, and from P50,000
to P25,000, respectively.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered affirming the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Bugasong, Antique, Branch 34, finding accused-appellants EDDIE TOMPONG and
EDUARDO GUMAWA guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crimes of rape with homicide in
Criminal Case No. 5630, rape in Criminal Case No. 5631 and rape in Criminal Case No. 5632, and
1) IMPOSING upon each of them the penalty of death in Criminal Case No. 5630, but modifying the damages
awarded by increasing the civil indemnity from P50,000 to P100,000 and reducing the awards of moral
damages from P 150,000 to P50,000 and exemplary damages from P50,000 to P25,000;

33

2) IMPOSING upon each of them in Criminal Case No. 5631 and Criminal Case No. 5632 the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, thereby modifying the sentence of death imposed by the trial court, and modifying
further the awards of damages in each of said cases by ordering each of them to pay P50,000 as indemnity,
and reducing the awards of moral damages from P100,000 to P50,000 and of exemplary damages
from P50,000 to P25,000.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo,
Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ.,concur.

A.M. No. MTJ-93-849 October 26, 1994

CARAM RESOURCES CORP. and RAYMUND B. TEJADA, complainants,
-versusJUDGE MAXIMO C. CONTRERAS, MeTC, Branch 61, Makati, Metro Manila, respondent.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In a verified complaint filed on 2 June 1993 by Caram Resources Corporation (hereinafter CARAM) and Raymund B.
Tejada, respondent Judge Maximo C. Contreras, Presiding Judge of Branch 61 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Makati, was charged with gross ignorance of the law and gross misconduct allegedly committed in relation to Criminal
Case
Nos. 142359-142362, which involved the violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, also known as the Bouncing Checks Law.
The complainants allege that on 4 February 1991, the accused in the aforesaid cases, Teresita J. Dizon, applied for and
obtained a personal loan from CARAM payable in installments. She issued a promissory note and postdated Bank of the
Philippine Islands (BPI) checks for the installments due and payable on specified dates. Four of these checks, dated 31
July 1991,
31 August 1991, 30 September 1991, and 31 October 1991, each for P1,259.00, were dishonored when presented to the
bank because the account against which they were drawn had been closed.
CARAM then charged Dizon with the violation of B.P. Blg. 22 and in due course the aforesaid criminal cases were filed
against her. After joint trial, the MeTC, per the respondent Judge, handed down a decision 1 acquitting Dizon on the ground
of reasonable doubt. The court made the following ratiocinations in support of its judgment, which are quoted in full due to
their importance to the resolution of this complaint:
These cases are classic examples of the principal reason why there is at present a proliferation of criminal
cases for violation of BP 22. It appears that lending and financing institutions are now imposing as a
condition precedent to the approval and grant of loan applications the issuance of postdated checks by
their borrowers to cover the installment payments due on the loans. While the issue of whether or not BP
22 covers checks dishonored by reason of "Account Closed" or "Without Funds" had been resolved in the
case of Miller vs. CA, et al. 189 SCRA XI and that what the law sought to penalize is the mere issuance of
rubber checks irrespective of the nature of the obligation to be paid by them and that
such act constitutes malum prohibitum, the factual circumstances of these four (4) cases cast serious
doubts on the applicability of the doctrine in the Miller case. In fact, its application to these cases would
violate the cardinal rule under our Constitution that no person shall be imprisoned for failure to pay his
debt. Consider the following facts duly established.
1. Accused Teresita J. Dizon is a borrower of the private complainant Caram Resources
Corporation which is a corporation engaged, among others, in the lending business;
2. The accused applied for a loan of P10,000.00 payable within one year (Exhibit "B") and
she was required to execute a promissory note with two (2) co-makers for P15,548.00
payable within one year at P1,259.00 a month starting April 4, 1991;
3. Under the promissory note, the monthly installments of P1,259.00 for twelve months
obviously included already interests and charges to the principal otherwise there would be
34

no reason or explanation why a loan of P10,000.00 would become more than P15,000.00
upon the execution of the promissory note;
4. Before the approval of this loan, the accused was required as a condition precedent to
open a checking account and to issue at one time in favor of the financing company all the
twelve postdated checks at a face value of P1,259.00 each to correspond to the twelve
months installments under the promissory note;
5. The accused opened the account with the BPI Family Bank but because the account
was made without any deposit, the same was closed by the bank also in the same month it
was opened and before the due date of the first postdated check;
6. When the first postdated check bounced for the reason "Account Closed," the accused
verbally informed the financing company that her account was already closed and
consequently, all the twelve postdated checks she had issued would certainly bounced [sic]
upon presentment;
7. The first four (4) postdated checks having been dishonored for reason of "Account
Closed," she replaced them with cash (Exhibits "1", "2", "3" and "4");
8. When she failed to settle the face value of the succeeding four (4) postdated checks
namely: BPI Check No. 55155 dated July 31, 1991, Check No. 55156 dated August 31,
1991, Check No. 55157 dated September 30, 1991 and Check No. 55158 dated October
31, 1991 (Exhibits "A", "A-1", "B", "B-1", "C", "C-1", "D", and "D-1") which were dishonored
for the same reason of 'Account Closed', the instant criminal charges for violation of BP 22
were instituted;
9. During the pendency of these cases the accused paid P5,000.00 in replacement of the
four postdated checks subject matter of the present charges against her; but the private
complainant Caram Resources Corporation contends that this payment was credited only
to interests and insufficient to settle her account under her promissory note;
10. The record is bereft of any showing that the accused was advised orally or in writing by
the Caram Resources Corporation that her payment of P5,000.00 (Exhibit "5") was only to
settle the interests and insufficient to cover the face value of the four (4) checks in question;
11. That only the first postdated check was returned to the accused by the private
complainant which retained the other postdated checks notwithstanding the payments in
replacement thereof already made by the accused.
It had been held that the gravamen of the offense under BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless
check or a check which is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. But the question is, what if the
issuance of the worthless checks were without consideration and made with the consent, encouragement
and instigation of the payee who kept the worthless postdated checks for its own private reason? The court
finds that the twelve postdated checks were issued by the accused without any consideration. These
checks were issued at one time and were merely used as guarantees to insure the monthly collection of
the loan granted to the accused under the promissory note, Exhibit "B". As a matter of fact, this court
believes that the issuance of the postdated checks did not affect public interest since the unfunded
postdated checks were merely kept on file by the payee to be used as a Damocles sword over the head of
the borrower to insure compliance and collection of the monthly installments. Under these circumstances,
has the accused committed an offense malum prohibitum? If so, what about the payee who encouraged,
instigated and promoted the act constituting the gravamen of the offenses? In the case of Magno vs. Court
of Appeals, et al., G.R. 96132, June 26, 1992 it was held therein, among others:
This maneuvering has serious implications especially with respect to the threat of the penal
sanction of the law in issue, as in this case. And, with a willing court system to apply the full
harshness of the special law in question, using the "mala prohibita" doctrine, the noble
objective of the law is tainted with materialism and opportunism in the highest degree.
"For all intends and purposes, the law was devised to safeguard the interests of the
banking system and the legitimate public checking account user. It did not intend to shelter
or favor nor encourage users of the system to enrich themselves through manipulations
and circumvention of the noble purpose and objective of the law. Least, should it be used

35

also as a means of jeopardizing honest-to-goodness transactions with some color of "getrich" scheme to the prejudice of well-meaning businessmen who are the pillars of society."
". . . In the instant case, there is no doubt that petitioner's four (4) checks were used to
collaterized an accommodation, and not to cover the receipt of an actual "account or credit
for value" as this was absent, and therefore petitioner should not be punished
for mere issuance of the checks in question. Following the aforecited theory (that criminal
law is founded upon . . . moral disapprobation . . . of action which are immoral, i.e., which
are detrimental (or dangerous) to those conditions upon which depend the existence and
progress of human society. . . . that morality is generally founded and built upon a certain
concurrence in the moral opinions of all . . . ). In petitioner's stead the "potential
wrongdoer," whose operation could be a menace to society, should not be glorified by
convicting the petitioner."
As heretofore stated, the postdated checks issued by the accused were without any consideration but
merely employed as coercive guarantees that the monthly installments due under the promissory note
would be complied with by the borrower. The payee Caram Resources Corporation thru its credit and
collection officer is aware of the unfunded account by the accused even before the first postdated check
fell due. When they approved the loan of the accused after the execution of the promissory note and the
issuance of the twelve postdated checks, Caram Resources Corporation never took any step to verify
whether or not the account opened by the accused was funded. In fact, this court is inclined to believe that
the financing company Caram Resources Corporation was not interested on whether or not the postdated
checks issued by their borrowers were funded or not. It merely kept the checks on file to be brought out
only on its respective due dates to coerce payment under pain of criminal charges in case of failure of the
borrower to replace them with cash. It is quite obvious that this law BP 22 has been used by Caram
Resources Corporation contrary to its purpose. It has encouraged their borrowers to commit unwittingly
criminal offenses in their urgent financial need. The financial company had taken undue advantage of BP
22 to the extent that they had assumed an arbitrary power and authority to apply whatever payments their
borrowers had made to interests, charges, penalties, etc. other than the principal loans of their borrowers.
As a result, accounting problems arise between lender and borrower. This is one of the reasons the
accused refused to make further payment on her four postdated checks in question claiming excessive
collection on the part of the financing company. Borrowers, like the accused, who had complied with the
issuance of postdated checks are absolutely helpless to question the application of their payments. Either
they conform or face criminal charges for violation of
BP 22. However, this court refuses to become a tool to this highly anomalous practice of financing
companies to coerce their borrowers to pay according to their demands under pain of imprisonment if they
resist. This court entertains serious doubts that the accused had committed a criminal offense penalized
under BP 22.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, on ground of reasonable doubt, the court hereby acquits Teresita J. Dizon in these four (4)
criminal cases without prejudice on the part of the private complainant to institute the proper civil action
regarding the civil liability of the said accused. The cash bond posted for the provisional liberty of said
accused is accordingly cancelled. Without cost.
SO ORDERED.
The complainants argue that in view of the respondent's findings that Dizon had obtained a loan payable in one year, that
as security therefor she had executed a promissory note, and that her payment of P5,000.00 was in replacement of the
subject four dishonored checks, then there was no basis at all for the respondent's conclusion that "the postdated checks
issued by the accused were without any consideration but merely employed as coercive guarantees." They further assail
the respondent's declaration that "the factual circumstances of [the] four (4) cases cast serious doubts on the applicability
of the doctrine in the Miller case," 2 and that its application to these cases would even "violate the cardinal rule under the
Constitution that no person shall be imprisoned for failure to pay his debt." According to the complainants, it has long been
settled that B.P. Blg. 22 is constitutional; accordingly, if its constitutionality is still doubtful to the respondent then he has
failed to keep abreast with the rulings of this Court, thus showing his incompetence and gross ignorance of law.
As further proof of such incompetence and ignorance of law, the complainants cite the following portions from the
respondent's decision wherein he indulged in baseless and general conclusions: (a) "before the approval of her loan the
accused was required as a condition precedent to open a checking account"; (b) "the accused opened the account with
the BPI Family Bank but because the account was made without any deposit, the same was closed by the bank also in the
same month it was opened but before the due date of the first postdated check"; (c) there was no showing that "the
accused was advised orally in writing by the Caram Resources Corporation that the payment of P5,000.00 (Exhibit "5")

36

was only to settle the interests and insufficient to cover the face value of the four (4) checks in question"; (d) "the issuance
of the postdated checks did not affect public interest since the unfunded postdated checks were merely kept on file by the
payee to be used as a Damocles sword over the head of the borrower to insure compliance and collection of the monthly
installments"; (e) "the Caram Resources Corporation never took any step to verify whether or not the account opened by
the accused was funded"; and (f) "the court was even inclined to believe that the financing company Caram Resources
Corporation was not interested on whether or not the postdated checks issued by their borrower were funded or not."
The complainants assert that there is no evidence that CARAM required Dizon to open a checking account with the BPI.
No bank would allow the opening of a checking account without any deposit. They aver that the payment of P5,000.00
was made during the pendency of the cases in his sala and any compromise or payment for settlement is tantamount to
an admission of guilt. The subject checks were never kept on file and were never used as a damocles sword because the
demand letter was in fact sent to the accused requiring her to make good her dishonored checks and despite her receipt
of the letter, she did not avail of the 5-day period granted her by B.P. Blg. 22 to make good the checks, and it was not the
duty of CARAM to verify whether or not Dizon opened the account or funded it as such inquiry is even prohibited under
R.A. No. 1405, the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Law.
In his Comment, the respondent defends his decision by contending that the postdated checks in question were issued
without consideration "for the reason that the loan was covered by the promissory note which also served as the receipt of
consideration"; hence, the "promissory note is a complete and perfected contract" and since "it constitutes the law
between the parties," nothing else outside it "may bind the borrower." Accordingly, "to require Dizon to issue the postdated
checks to cover the installment payments under the promissory note was highly anomalous, superfluous and
unnecessary," and the only reason for requiring the issuance thereof was "to coerce Dizon to pay the amount the Caram
Resources was demanding." He further avers that he is not biased when he held that the four criminal cases against the
accused are the principal reasons for the proliferation of criminal cases for the violation of B.P. Blg. 22, for he took judicial
notice of the fact that for the period from January to September 1993, the MeTC of Makati received 662 criminal cases for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
The respondent does not question the constitutionality of B.P. Blg. 22; in fact, he states, it is "a sound and good law." What
he detests is the manner employed by CARAM which took undue advantage of the law contrary to its intention to protect
the public interest.
As to his assailed conclusion that the accused was asked to open a checking account, he asserts that this was due to the
"vagueness of the testimonial evidence." And refuting the complainants' assertion that the payment by Dizon of P5,000.00
during the pendency of the cases was an admission of guilt, he asseverates that since the loan was covered by a
promissory note, and the postdated checks were issued without consideration, the partial settlement of the obligation was
not an admission of guilt.
Further, the respondent contends that while the facts in Magno vs. Court of Appeals 3 are different, the doctrine it laid down
"is relevant and applicable to the cases in question."
By way of special defense, the respondent expresses his suspicion that this administrative complaint "was filed by Caram
Resources Corporation and its credit manager obviously to harass, if not to control, the undersigned and the other judges
of this court who are handling several criminal cases being filed by complainant Caram Resources for violation of the
bouncing checks against their delinquent borrowers"; and that nothing supports the claim of Tejada that he was or is the
duly authorized representative of CARAM to institute the four criminal cases and this complaint.
On 17 January 1994, the complainants filed their Reply to the Comment.
In the Resolution of 31 January 1994, the parties were required to inform this Court if they would submit this case for
decision on the basis of the pleadings already filed. In their respective manifestations filed on 18 February 1994 and 4
March 1994, the parties informed the Court that they were submitting this case for decision on the basis of the pleadings
already filed.
It has long been settled that B.P. Blg. 22 is not unconstitutional or, more specifically, that it does not transgress the
constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for non-payment of debt.
In the Decision of 18 December 1986 in Lozano vs. Martinez and seven other companion cases, 4 this Court explicitly
ruled:
The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a
check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation
which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust
of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in

37

circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law.
The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order.
Admittedly, the distinction may seem at first blush to appear elusive and difficult to conceptualize. But
precisely in the failure to perceive the vital distinction lies the error of those who challenge the validity of
BP 22.
It may be constitutionally impermissible for the legislature to penalize a person for non-payment of a
debt ex contractu. But certainly it is within the prerogative of the lawmaking body to proscribe certain acts
deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Acts mala in se are not the only acts which the law can
punish. An act may not be considered by society as inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se, but because
of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed and criminally punished as malum
prohibitum. The state can do this in the exercise of its police power.
The police power of the state has been described as "the most essential, insistent and illimitable of
powers" which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society. It is a
power not emanating from or conferred by the constitution, but inherent in the state, plenary, "suitably
vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that man in organizing the state and
imposing upon the government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to
enable individual citizens or group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary
measures to ensure communal peace, safety, good order and welfare."
The enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of public policy, the making and
issuance of a worthless check
is deemed a public nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions. 5
This Court further stated that the clear intent of the legislature was to make the offense malum prohibitum. 6 Malice and
intent in issuing a worthless check are thus immaterial. 7 It is committed by the very fact of its performance, 8 i.e., the mere
act of issuing a worthless check. 9
In the four criminal cases before him, the prosecution proved and the accused Dizon admitted that a loan was granted to
her and in connection therewith she executed a promissory note wherein she bound herself to pay the loan in twelve
installments. She then issued postdated checks to cover the installments as they fall due. The checks were drawn against
her current account with the BPI. She closed her account in the same month when she obtained the loan so that when the
four checks were presented for payment they were dishonored. The respondent even found that:
On cross-examination, she testified that . . . she issued the four checks in question in payment of this
promissory note; that she closed her checking account also in February because the bookkeeper of the
bank to whom she entrusted the money failed to deposit it on the same date. 10
Clearly, the facts irretrievably brought the accused within the purview of Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22, and the respondent was
bound by his oath to apply the law. He was not at liberty to ignore it.
When the respondent stated in effect that to hold her liable thereunder "would violate the cardinal rule under the
Constitution that no person shall be imprisoned for failure to pay his debt" and that the postdated checks were without
consideration and were in the nature of "guarantees to ensure the monthly collection" despite Dizon's admission that they
were payments for the loan and that she herself closed her account resulting in the dishonor of the checks upon
presentment, the respondent either exposed his ignorance of the law and the jurisprudence built thereon or simply ignored
or disregarded the above pronouncements of this Court and chose to make his own.
Canon 18 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics provides that:
A judge should be mindful that his duty is the application of the general law to particular instances, that
ours is a government of laws and not of men, and that he violates his duty as a minister of justice under
such a system if he seeks to do what he may personally consider substantial justice in a particular case
and disregards the general law as he knows it to be binding on him. Such action may have detrimental
consequences beyond the immediate controversy. He should administer his office with a due regard to the
integrity of the system of law itself, remembering that he is not a depository of arbitrary power, but a judge
under the sanction of law.
And considering that by tradition and in our system of judicial administration this Court has the last word on what the law
is, and that its decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of the legal system of the
country, 11 all other courts should take their bearings from the decisions of this Court, 12ever mindful of what this Court said

38

fifty-seven years ago in People vs. Vera 13 that "[a] becoming modesty of inferior courts demands conscious realization of
the position that they occupy in the interrelation and operation of the integrated judicial system of the nation."
In Vivo vs. Cloribel, 14 this Court stressed what it said in the 1958 case of People vs. Santos 15 thus:
Now, if a Judge of a lower Court feels, in the fulfillment of his mission of deciding cases, that the
application of a doctrine promulgated by this Superiority is against his way of reasoning, or against his
conscience, he may state his opinion on the matter, but rather than disposing of the case in accordance
with his personal views he must first think that it is his duty to apply the law as interpreted by the Highest
Court of the Land, and that any deviation from the principle laid down by the latter would unavoidably
cause, as a sequel, unnecessary inconveniences, delays and expenses to the litigants. And if despite of
what is here said, a Judge, still believes that he cannot follow Our rulings, than he has no other alternative
than to place himself in the position that he could properly avoid the duty of having to render judgment on
the case concerned (Art. 9, C.C.), and he has only one legal way to do that.
The case of Magno v. Court of Appeals 16 which the respondent cited is inapplicable to the four cases before him. It was
established in that case that the postdated checks were not in fact drawn or issued "to apply on account or for value" but
to cover a warranty deposit which the accused therein did not withdraw.
As shown in his ratiocinations earlier quoted, the respondent could not hide his bias against CARAM, whose business
practice he loathes. The expression of his sentiments was uncalled for in the cases against Teresita Dizon and prejudged
CARAM's other transactions regardless of their legality and morality. Such expression deviates from that norm of conduct
which is essential in the fair and impartial administration of justice.
WHEREFORE, for ignorance of the law and misconduct, respondent JUDGE MAXIMO C. CONTRERAS is hereby
ordered to pay a fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will
be dealt with more severely by this Court.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. Nos. 139225-28. May 29, 2002]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ARNEL ALCALDE y PASCASIO, accusedappellant.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
For automatic review[1] is the Consolidated Judgment[2] of 30 April 1999 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, Santa
Cruz, Laguna, in Criminal Cases Nos. SC-6651 to SC-6654, convicting accused-appellant Arnel Alcalde y Pascasio
(hereafter ARNEL) of two counts of parricide committed against his wife WENDY and his 11-month-old son ARWIN and
two counts of frustrated parricide committed against his two daughters BERNALYN and ERICA.
On 24 September 1997, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Laguna filed before the trial court two informations
for parricide and two informations for frustrated parricide.
Upon his arraignment on 22 October 1997, [3] ARNEL, who was assisted by a counsel de parte, refused to
speak. Pursuant to Section 1(c) of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, the trial court entered for him a plea of not guilty in each
of the cases. On the same occasion, the defense waived pre-trial. The cases were then consolidated and jointly tried.
The witnesses initially presented by the prosecution were SPO2 Nicanor Avendao, Dr. Nilo Pempengco, Dr. June
Mendoza, and Salud Suillan.
SPO2 Nicanor Avendao testified that upon his arrival at the house of ARNEL in Barangay Bubukal, Santa Cruz,
Laguna, at about 1:00 p.m. of 29 August 1997, he found the house in disarray. He saw a naked woman lying dead on a
wooden bed with both hands and feet tied from behind, as well as a dead child on a crib. The dead woman was WENDY,
and the dead child was ARWIN. Some clothes and a puppy were also burned. Avendao and his team recovered a piece of
steel near WENDYs face and empty bottles of gin and Royal Tru-Orange on top of the cabinet. They took pictures of the
dead bodies and caused the entry of the incident in the police blotter. He learned later that ARNEL's two daughters,

39

BERNALYN and ERICA, had been rushed to the provincial hospital for treatment before he and his team arrived at the
crime scene.[4]
Dr. Nilo Pempengco, the physician who conducted an examination of the dead bodies of WENDY and ARWIN,
testified that the cause of their death was cardio-respiratory arrest due to severe traumatic head injury and multiple
contusion hematoma.[5] The injuries could have been caused by any hard and blunt object like a piece of metal, piece of
wood, or even a hand.
Dr. June Mendoza, a physician-surgeon of the Laguna Provincial Hospital, testified that he treated BERNALYN and
ERIKA on 29 August 1997. He found in BERNALYN multiple contusion hematoma, [6] which could have been inflicted by a
blunt and hard object and by a rope but which would not have caused immediate death even if not properly treated. [7] He
found in ERIKA contusions and lacerated and incised wounds, [8] which would not have caused death even if no immediate
medical attention had been given.[9]
Salud Suillan, WENDYs mother, declared that WENDY and ARNEL lived with her at her residence in Banca-Banca,
Victoria, Laguna, for nine months after their marriage and that during their sojourn at her house she noticed ARNELs
uncontrollable jealousy. ARNEL used drugs, which frequently caused his tantrums. [10] When asked whether she knew who
killed WENDY and ARWIN, Salud answered that according to Jose Alcalde, ARNEL was the killer. [11] On crossexamination, she admitted that ARNEL had been continuously treated at the University of Sto. Tomas Hospital in Manila
from 1993 up to 1997.However, she did not know whether he was treated for a mental illness. [12]
After the prosecution rested its case and formally offered its exhibits, the defense filed a motion for leave of court to
file a demurrer to evidence,[13] which was granted. On 27 April 1998, the defense, through counsel de parte Atty. Renato B.
Vasquez, Sr., filed a demurrer to evidence[14] based on the following grounds:
(a) The accused has not been adequately informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him during the
arraignment;
(b) Not an iota of incriminatory evidence, direct or circumstantial, has been adduced and presented by
the prosecution during the trial; and
(c) The constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused has not been overcome by any evidence or
contrary presumption.
In support thereof, the defense alleged that ARNEL was afflicted with psychosis and could not comprehend, and that
despite his strange behavior characterized by his deafening silence, motionless appearance, and single direction blank
stare the trial court insisted on his arraignment. Thus, ARNEL was not adequately apprised of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. Moreover, no concrete evidence pointing to ARNEL as the culprit was presented by the
prosecution. Hence, the constitutional presumption of innocence of an accused prevails.
In its Order of 22 May 1998, [15] the trial court denied the demurrer to evidence and set the dates for the presentation of
the evidence for the defense. However, in a Manifestation dated 4 June 1998, [16]Atty. Vasquez informed the court that the
defense opted not to present evidence for ARNELs defense, as the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
On 16 July 1998, the prosecution filed its Comment [17] on the manifestation and prayed for the re-opening of the
presentation of prosecutions evidence for the purpose of proving that ARNEL was at the scene of the crime. In its Order of
21 August 1998,[18] the trial court allowed the prosecution to present additional evidence. The defense questioned the
propriety of the said order before the Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari.
In its resolution of 17 December 1998, [19] the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for non-compliance with Section
1, Rule 65, Rules of Court, and for the further reason that the order sought to be set aside was interlocutory in character
and could not, therefore, be the subject of a petition for certiorari; and that even granting that the exception applied, the
trial court committed no capriciousness in issuing the assailed order.
The prosecution thereafter presented SPO1 Neptali de la Cruz and Jose Alcalde as additional witnesses.
SPO1 Neptali dela Cruz, testified that at around 1:30 p.m. of 29 August 1997, while he was on duty at the Police
Assistance Center Base, Barangay Bubukal, Santa Cruz, Laguna, he received a report of a killing incident at the house of
ARNEL. He proceeded to the place with SPO2 Edilberto Apuada. There, he saw ARNEL seated outside the house while
being held by two persons. He and Apuada entered the house and saw the dead bodies of WENDY and ARWIN. He
noticed that ARNEL was motionless and silent when the dead bodies were being brought out of their house. [20]

40

Jose Alcalde, father of ARNEL, testified that at 1:30 p.m. of 29 August 1997 he heard the news that ARNELs house
was burning. Along with one Martin, his carpenter, Jose proceeded to ARNELs house.Upon entering the house, he saw
ARNEL with raging eyes, holding a kitchen knife and a hammer. Jose tried to pacify and convince ARNEL to surrender his
weapons to him. Joses effort proved futile. It was only upon the intervention of ARNELs two brothers that ARNEL was
successfully disarmed. Jose left ARNEL to the care of his brothers because he had to bring to the hospital the almost
lifeless bodies of BERNALYN and ERIKA.[21]
After the prosecution finally rested its case, the trial court set on 8 October 1998 the presentation of the evidence for
the defense. However, on 7 October 1998, counsel for ARNEL, Atty. Vasquez Sr., informed the trial court of his inability to
communicate with ARNEL because of ARNELs out of touch of the world behavior. Atty. Vasquez manifested that the
defense was constrained to submit the case for decision.[22]
In its decision of 30 April 1999, [23] the trial court found that the prosecutions evidence has duly established a
succession of circumstantial evidence that leads to the inescapable conclusion that ARNEL committed the crimes
charged. It gave due credence to the testimony of Jose Alcalde. It found significant the fact that right from the start of the
investigation of the incident up to the time the cases were submitted for decision, no other person was suspected of
having anything to do with the gruesome family massacre. The trial court added that ARNELs culpability was further
bolstered by his failure to offer any evidence for his defense despite ample opportunity to do so.
In determining the appropriate penalty in Criminal Case Nos. SC-6651 and SC-6654 for the killing of WENDY and
ARWIN, the trial court applied Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 5, R.A. No. 7659, which
reads:
ART. 246. Parricide. -- Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his
ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death.
Taking into account the two aggravating circumstances of treachery and abuse of superior strength, it imposed the death
penalty in both cases.
As for Criminal Cases Nos. SC-6652 and SC-6653, the trial court found ARNEL guilty of the crime of frustrated
parricide after considering the severity of the wounds suffered by his daughters BERNALYN and ERIKA, which clearly
showed his intent to kill them.
In the Appellants Brief, the defense, through a new counsel, Atty. Eduardo A. Cagandahan, states that the trial court
committed the following errors:
1. in proceeding with the case against the accused who had not been duly informed of the nature and cause of
accusation against him during the arraignment or trial.
2. when it failed to have the accused medically examined to ascertain whether he was in possession of his
mental faculties when he allegedly committed the acts imputed to him, or that he was suffering from mental
aberration at the time the crime was committed, and when he entered the plea and during the trial on the
merits despite the observation of the court a quo, as contained in the order dated August 21, 1998.
In support thereof, the defense assails the validity of ARNELs arraignment, and asserts that with ARNELs
questionable mental state he could not have understood the proceedings. It then cites the trial courts Order dated 21
August 1998, wherein the trial court made its own observation regarding ARNELs strange behavior at the time of
arraignment. The Order reads in part:
Finally, it is worthwhile to recall that when the accused was arraigned in all the four cases, the Court was constrained to
enter for him a PLEA OF NOT GUILTY in all said cases as the accused acted strangely in a manner as if he [was] out of
touch with the world and would not utter any word. But since the defense opted not to present any evidence, no defense
whatsoever could be entertained for the accused.
Furthermore, the defense calls our attention to the Medical Certificate [24] issued by Dr. Ramon S. Javier, M.D., FPPA,
FPNA, of Sto. Tomas University Hospital, stating that ARNEL was first brought to his clinic on 3 December 1993, and was
confined at the psychiatric ward several times for bipolar mood disorder (manic-depressive psychosis). His last
confinement in that hospital was from 12 to 24 February 1997, or six months before the family massacre. The medical
abstract[25] issued by Dr. Ma. Corazon S. Alvarez, which was also submitted by the defense, likewise shows the several
hospitalizations of ARNEL while in detention at the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City, and the finding that ARNEL
was suffering from bipolar mood disorder with psychotic features. The defense then prays for ARNELs acquittal or, in the
alternative, the remand of the case to the lower court for further proceedings and for the determination of ARNELs mental
state.

41

In the Brief for the Appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) maintains that under Section 11, paragraph (a),
Rule 116 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, suspension of arraignment on the ground that accused appears to be
suffering from an unsound mental condition, which effectively renders him unable to fully understand the charge against
him and to plead intelligently thereto, may be granted upon motion by the party. In these cases neither accused nor his
counsel de parte asked for the suspension of the arraignment on that ground. Such failure was tantamount to an
admission that ARNEL was not suffering from any mental disorder or to a waiver of the right to move for suspension of
arraignment. Besides, for the defense of insanity to prosper, it must be proved that the accused was insane at the very
moment when the crime was committed. The trial court was not duty-bound to initiate the determination of ARNELs
alleged mental incapacity.
Finally, the OSG agrees with the trial court that the chain of circumstances in these cases proved beyond reasonable
doubt that ARNEL committed the crimes charged. It, however, submits that ARNEL should be meted the penalty
of reclusion perpetua only, instead of death, in Criminal Cases Nos. SC-6651 and SC-6654 because the aggravating
circumstances of treachery and abuse of superior strength cannot be appreciated against ARNEL. It agreed with the trial
court insofar as Criminal Cases Nos. SC-6652 and SC-6653 are concerned.
After a painstaking scrutiny of the records of these cases, we rule for ARNEL.
We cannot subscribe to the claim of the OSG that the failure of ARNELs counsel de parte to ask for the suspension of
his arraignment on the ground that ARNEL was suffering from an unsound mental health amounted to a waiver of such
right. It must be recalled that ARNELs arraignment was on 22 October 1997. At the time, what was applicable was Section
12(a) of Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which reads:
SEC. 12. Suspension of arraignment. The arraignment shall be suspended, if at the time thereof:
(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively renders him unable to fully
understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall order his mental
examination and, if necessary, his confinement for such purpose.
Nowhere in that Section was it required that a motion by the accused be filed for the suspension of
arraignment. Hence, the absence of such motion could not be considered a waiver of the right to a suspension of
arraignment. True, Section 11(a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which was invoked by the OSG, requires a
motion by the proper party, thus:
SEC. 11. Suspension of arraignment. -- Upon motion by the proper party, the arraignment shall be suspended in the
following cases:
(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively renders him unable to fully
understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall order his mental
examination and, if necessary, his confinement for such purpose. [Emphasis supplied].
This new requirement of motion by the proper party could not be applied to these cases because the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which prescribes such requirement, took effect only on 1 December 2000.
Besides, a waiver must be knowingly and intelligently made by the person possessing such right. [26] Unfortunately,
ARNEL was apparently deprived of such mental faculties. Thus, no waiver, impliedly or expressly, could have been made
by ARNEL at the time of his arraignment by reason of his mental condition. [27]
Settled is the rule that when a judge is informed or discovers that an accused is apparently in a present condition of
insanity or imbecility, it is within his discretion to investigate the matter. If it be found that by reason of such affliction the
accused could not, with the aid of counsel, make a proper defense, it is the duty of the court to suspend the proceedings
and commit the accused to a proper place of detention until his faculties are recovered. [28] Moreover, the aforementioned
Section 12(a) of Rule 116 mandates the suspension of the arraignment and the mental examination of the accused should
it appear that he is of unsound mind.
In these cases, the trial court should have ascertained ARNELs mental state instead of proceeding with his
arraignment and its subsequent proceedings. The following were enough for the trial court to take seriously the issue of
whether ARNEL was in full possession of his mental faculties at the time of the arraignment and trial:
(a) At his arraignment, the trial court observed that ARNEL acted strangely in a manner as if he [was] out of touch
with the world and would not utter any word.[29]

42

(b) In its Motion and Waiver of Presence [of the Accused] During the Trial, [30] the defense expressed its
apprehension that ARNEL might explode into another violence while in transit to attend his trial or while in the
courtroom.
(c) ARNELs continued strange behavior characterized by his deafening silence, motionless behavior and blank
stares was raised as an issue by the defense in its demurrer to evidence. [31]
(d) The persistent out of touch with the world behavior of ARNEL, which prevented his counsel from effectively
communicating with him for his defense was pointed out in the Manifestation and Motion submitted by the
defense.[32]
(e) ARNELs questionable mental state was reiterated by the defense in its memorandum. [33]
The physical and outward manifestations of ARNEL at the time of his arraignment, which were brought to the
attention of the trial court, indicated substantial demonstration of a mental disorder that rendered ARNEL unfit to be
arraigned or tried in the four criminal cases at bar. The trial court failed to exercise utmost circumspection in assuming that
ARNEL was in full possession of his mental faculties and understood the proceedings against him.
The constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him under the Bill of
Rights[34] carries with it the correlative obligation to effectively convey to the accused the information to enable him to
effectively prepare for his defense. [35] At the bottom is the issue of fair trial. While not every aberration of the mind or
exhibition of mental deficiency on the part of the accused is sufficient to justify suspension of the proceedings, the trial
court must be fully satisfied that the accused would have a fair trial with the assistance the law secures or gives. [36] Under
the circumstances in these cases, the trial court gravely failed in this regard.
While at first glance, the remarkable enthusiasm by which the trial court adjudicated these cases should earn
emulation, it however cannot be countenanced considering its disregard of the constitutional rights of ARNEL. Courts
should be mindful of their responsibility to see to it that the paramount interests of justice are not sacrificed for the sake of
speed and efficiency.[37]
It is also worthy to mention Atty. Vasquezs apparent lackadaisical attitude in these cases which amounted to disregard
of the strict demands of fidelity to his oath as a lawyer, duty to his client, and responsibility as an officer of the court. [38] He
knew, or ought to know, from the very beginning that ARNEL was hospitalized for mental disorder. The latters strange
appearance at his arraignment was enough reason for a counsel to ask for the deferment of arraignment and for leave of
court to have ARNEL subjected to psychological examination and psychiatric evaluation. Then, too, he should have, at the
very least, presented the doctor who treated ARNEL in the University of Santo Tomas Hospital for his recurring mental
illness. Irrefutably, Atty. Vasquezs behavior in the defense of ARNEL fell short of the demanding duty to present every
defense that the law permits to the end that no person may be deprived of life or liberty but by due process of law.[39]
Even if Atty. Vasquezs zeal for ARNELs cause fell short of that required of him, that is, for him to have asked the court
to suspend the arraignment of ARNEL on the ground of the latters unsound mental health, the greater demand of due
process overwhelms such inadequate zeal.
Solemn and inflexible is the constitutional behest that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law. Absolute heedfulness of this constitutional injunction is most pronounced in criminal cases where the
accused is in the gravest jeopardy of losing his life. It constantly behooves every court to proceed with utmost care in each
of such cases before it, and nothing can be more demanding of judges in that respect than when the possible punishment
would be in its severest form like death -- a penalty that, once carried out, is irreversible and irreparable. [40]
In light of the foregoing fatal infirmities committed by the trial court, as well as by the defense counsel, we have no
other alternative except to set aside the joint decision in question and remand the cases to the trial court for further
proceedings to allow the defense to present evidence to prove that ARNEL was either unfit for arraignment and trial or was
insane at the time the crimes charged were committed.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Consolidated Judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
28, Santa Cruz, Laguna, in Criminal Cases Nos. SC-6651 to SC-6654 promulgated on 30 April 1999 is hereby SET
ASIDE. These cases are ordered REMANDED to the trial court for further and appropriate proceedings in accordance with
the foregoing observations.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

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Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr.,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, and Corona, JJ., concur.

44