Athens - Radical Interactionism

Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 37:2
00218308
Radical Interactionism: Going Beyond Mead*

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Original
Radical
Interactionism:
Articles
Going
Beyond
Mead
Blackwell
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2007 Athens
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the
Author
Theory
Journal
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of
Social
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The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2007
LONNIE ATHENS
Let us arise and take up the work he has left unfinished, and preserve the treasure that he has won.
from the eulogy delivered by Edward Scribner Ames at George Herbert Meads memorial
service on April 30, 1931.
INTRODUCTION
The Problem
Although George Herbert Mead was a philosopher, he has now entered the
pantheon of classic sociological thinkers (Alexander, 1989: 3738; Athens, 2007a;
Joas, 1997: xi; Rhea, 1981: xivxi; Strauss, 1984: 14413). According to John Dewey
(1931: 3112), Mead was the chief force in this country of turning psychology
away from mere introspection and aligning it with biological and social facts and
conceptions. It would be hard to find any living sociologist, at least in North America
or Europe, who has not heard of Mead. He is not only regarded as a classic figure
in sociology, but also as the progenitor of symbolic interactionism, a major sociological
perspective that is now taught in almost every introductory sociology course. As
in the case of Freud with psychoanalysis, Husserl with phenomenology, and Watson
with behaviorism, Meads name has now become synonymous with symbolic
interactionism. Mead, however, is much more than merely a historical figure in
sociology. His work not only provides the main theoretical underpinnings of the
symbolic interactionists perspective (Blumer, 1937: 153, 1969: 1), but it also continues
to provide a major source of new ideas and hypotheses for sociologists of all persuasions.
Dewey (1931: 311) observed that Meads ideas are so genuinely original that
they started one thinking in directions where it had never occurred to one that
it was worthwhile even to look. Deweys observation is as true today as when he
made it some 75 years ago. Thus, Meads importance in the field of sociology has
never been greater than it is today.
In my opinion, sociologists have not found Meads analysis of society particularly
helpful in their work for two main reasons (Athens, 2005a: 310). First, until
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recently, most sociologists probably had no clue that he had even developed a
theory of society, but rather knew him for his theory combining social interaction
and the self (e.g., Chang, 2004; Maines, 1977; Turner, 2003). Their ignorance of
the breadth of his sociological thought can be attributed partly to his rather opaque
discussions of society and partly to the negligence of his chief sociological interpreters.
First, Blumer (1966, 1969, 1981) equated Meads notion of society with social
interaction and then Joas (1985) later reduced it to practical intersubjectivity (Athens,
2005a: 30610). More importantly, for our present argument, even the few perceptive
sociologists who recognized that Mead had, in fact, proffered a theory of society
found it seriously deficient. In their minds, his downplaying of the importance of
domination in our communal existence greatly diminishes the value of his theory.1
To underscore this point, I will quote the criticisms repeatedly directed toward
Mead on this matter over the last three quarters of a century by first T.V. Smith,
second by Irving Zeitlind, next by Jurgen Habermas, and finally by Dimitri Shalin:
His own more distinctive and more central contribution to the pragmatic movement, his social
psychology, may be best understood . . . , as his attempt to lay an impregnable foundation for
ethical and social optimism . . . [However] the mere social nature of the self does not suffice to
demonstrate this desired result when the self arises as much from social evils and conflicts as from
harmony. A microcosm mirrors, it does not reconstruct, the macrocosm (Smith, 1931: 383
emphasis added).
Because Mead was not primarily concerned with social structure, particularly property and power
relations, his conception of society appears to carry with it a certain political naivety and
technocratic bias. Often one gets the impression that to solve its problems all society needs is
intelligent social engineering and better communications (Zeitlind, 1973, 251 emphasis added).
The second, more radical reservation has to do . . . with the idealism of Meads theory of society
. . . The material reproduction of society . . . is blended out of the picture of society understood
as a communicatively understood life world. The neglect of economics, warfare, and the struggle for
political power . . . are detrimental, above all, to Meads reflections on social evolution
(Habermas, 1987, vol. 2: 110, emphasis both added and not added).
The problem with Meads political theory is that it does not confront head on the issue of power.
Mead . . . understates the barriers that the market economy places on the equitable distribution
of resources and underestimates the extent to which economic, cultural, racial, ethnic, and other
divisions subvert the universal nature of intelligence . . . his take on American political institutions
and their democratic promise needs to be complemented by a closer analysis of power, class and
privilege (Shalin, 2001: 34142 emphasis added).
Although we could definitely argue over many of the finer points in Smiths,
Shalins, Habermas, and Zeitlinds criticisms of Mead, I do not believe we can
challenge their overall thrust. They all hit the target, but none of them hit the bulls
eye. The real problem with Meads treatment of domination in society is not that
he ignored it altogether. On the contrary, Mead (1934: 277, 310316) definitely
recognized that institutions are the cornerstones on which every society is organized
and that domination impacts one of societys major institutionsthe polity. Thus,
what he overlooked was not dominations impact on the polity, but its impact on
all our institutions.2
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Radical Interactionism: Going Beyond Mead
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Although Robert Park and Ernest Burgess (1921: 668) held many ideas similar
to those that Mead professed and their careers overlapped with his at the University
of Chicago, they recognized far more than him the degree to which domination
impacts almost every aspect of our social existence:
Slavery and caste are manifestly forms of [domination]. The facts of subordination are quite
real, though not as obvious, in other phases of social life. The peculiar intimacy which exists, for
example between lovers, between husband and wife, or between physician and patient, involves
relations of subordination and super-ordination, not recognized as such. The personal
domination which a coach exercises over a ball-team, a minister over a congregation, the
political leader over his party followers are instances of the same phenomena.
Thus, unlike Mead, Park and Burgess recognized that the impact of domination
was not limited to the polity, but extended to every institution that comprises a
society. By overlooking dominations impact on all our societal institutions, Mead
and his students, such as Herbert Blumer (1966, 1981, 2004) and David Miller
(1973a,b; 1982) failed to make it the basic principle on which all societies, past,
present, and future, ultimately operate.
PURPOSE:
Despite the legitimacy of the general criticisms that Mead fails to recognize the
great impact of domination on every institution in society, sociologists have not
really made any major modifications to Meads original sociological thought during
the past 70 years. If Meads work is to be saved from becoming irrelevant in sociology
and is to remain an invaluable intellectual resource for this field in the 21st century,
then now is the crucial time to revise his theory (Denzin, 1996: 634, 73). Significant
changes are needed not only in Meads present basic operating ideas, but also in
the master principle from which he believes that these ideas operate. Neither our
strenuous denial of the need to improve upon Meads basic ideas and the master
principle on which they operate (for example, see: Maines, 2000) nor taking only
piecemeal measures, such as grafting this or that latest idea here and there onto
his thought, will get the job done (Denzin, 1992: 1656; Musolf, 1992). Instead, such
well-intended actions on the part of interactionists will only cover up the need for
fundamental changes, and, thereby, only further delay their realization (Denzin,
1996: 645).
My paper has three main goals. I wish to explain in Meads own terms, that
is, using his own notions of the social act, institutions, and society rather than
using notions borrowed from other scholars (for example, see: Habermas, 1987,
Zeitlind, 1973), why his theory of society needs to be fundamentally changed to
take domination much more into account. I also wish to make at least some of
the necessary fundamental changes to Meads theory so that domination now can
be finally taken much more directly into account. In making these modifications,
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I will draw primarily on the work of Robert Park (Elsner, 1972; Hughes, 1952, 1954;
Turner, 1967). By accomplishing these two penultimate goals, I hope to accomplish
my ultimate goal of laying the foundation for a new form of interactionism: radical
interactionism. In trying to achieve these three goals, I will proceed as follows. First,
I will try to demonstrate how his shortchanging of domination thwarts his answering
of these four vital questions that he poses about society: (1) What is the nature of the
master principle on which institutions and, in turn, societies operate? (2) How did
human institutions and, in turn, human societies originally arise? (3) How do human
societies change through the modification of their basic institutions? (4) How do
institutions operate in everyday life to organize human communal existence? Next,
I will seek to demonstrate how substituting my notion of the principle of domination
for Meads principle of sociality and my special notion of the phantom community
for his notion of the generalized other largely resolves the problems uncovered
in his answers to these four questions.
A CRITIQUE OF MEADS THEORY OF SOCIETY
The Master Principle Behind the Operation of Human Societies

Although rarely recognized by sociologists, Mead provides the quintessential
institutional view of society (Athens, 2005a: 31920; see also: Campbell, 1992: 12).
He sees society as rooted in institutions. The six basic institutions that he explicitly
identifies as comprising society are (1) language, (2) the family, (3) the economy,
(4) religion, (5) the polity, and (6) science. According to Mead, all institutions are
rooted in social action, and he sees social acts as constituted by any activity that
requires the efforts of two or more persons to be completed (1932: 1802; 1934:
811). For Mead (1934: 152, 1623, 2289) however, an institution does not merely
represent any type of social act, but only a special form of social action. Institutions
specifically refer to social acts that people carry out with the help of pre-established
maxims to satisfy their recurrent impulses (Lee, 1973a: 73). For Mead (1915: 167; 1934:
26073; 1936: 36184), institutions are the key to both the creation and evolution
of human society. Without institutions, human society could have never arisen, and
without their alteration, no society could subsequently change (Athens, 2005a,
310).3 It needs to be underscored that in both Meads published articles (1922:
1612; 1925: 228) and posthumously published lectures (1934: 380), he not only
uses the term maxim, but also the closely related one, axiom, so that for him
(1934: 152, 386; 1936: 375), there can be no doubt that institutions operate on
the bases of rules of action. Thus, before human societies can significantly change,
the maxims that underlie the operation of their basic institutions must also change.
I agree with Mead (1915: 167; 1934: 26073; 1936: 36184) that institutions
are the backbone of any society. If it were not for institutions, we would live in
disorganized masses instead of organized communities. Nevertheless, the conclusion
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that Mead ultimately draws about the master principle on which institutions and,
in turn, societies operate is wrong (see Foucalt, 1980: 114115). He (1932: 627,
857; 1934: 2535; 1938: 60613) makes the monumental mistake of concluding
that institutions, and thereby societies, operate on the master principle of sociality
rather than domination, a term to which I attach a special meaning. To oversimplify,
domination refers to the construction of complex social actions through some
participants in the social act performing super-ordinate roles, other participants
performing subordinate roles, and everyone assuming the attitudes of others
(see: Park, 1904: 5154; Simmel, 1950: 183300). Conversely, sociality refers to the
construction of complex social acts by participants merely assuming each others
attitudes without any special regard to whether they are performing the superordinate or subordinate role.
I completely agree with Mead (1934: 25354; 3278) that sociality is of supreme
importance in creating institutions and, in turn, society. Unlike him, however, I
(2002: 378) believe that sociality gains its importance from operating as part of
domination instead of independently from it. Thus, domination rather than sociality is
the master principle responsible for the creation of all our institutions (see Park and
Burgess, 1921: 668; Park, 1934: 160164; 1936: 151). Domination not only provides
the master principle from which all major institutions in society are created, but
also the master principle for their ongoing operation after their creation (see: Park,
1934: 161163; 1941: 145165). Domination is not only what starts the ball of
institutionalized social action rolling, but also what keeps it moving along. Thus,
like it or not, domination is a necessary evil in human group life. To believe that human
group life is somehow possible without the exercise of any form of domination is
to fall victim to utopian thinking (see Lee, 1973a: 74; Giddens, 1984: 32, 257).
According to an old quoted aphorism, need is the mother of invention. If need
is the mother of invention, then the need to perform complex social acts is the mother
of domination. Complex social acts are social acts that require the performance
of three or more different roles for their successful completion. Human beings need
to perform complex social acts to ensure their survival as a species. It is obvious
that one man or woman hunting alone with a bow and arrow or spear could not
bring down a mammoth. In fact, it has only been by joining forces with other human
beings to complete increasingly more complex social acts that we have become
the predominant species on our planet (Athens, 2002: 26; Mead, 1934: 2278;
249252; see also: Lippmann, 1927: 88; Park, 1927: 185188, 1942: 32728).4
Domination is a requirement for human beings to complete any type of complex
social act. By definition, the completion of a complex social act requires not only
more than one person to perform all the necessary roles, but also different people
to perform them at just the right points in time. As I (2002: 302) have argued
elsewhere, this requires a division of labor or what Mead (1917: 2147; 1934:
3238) prefers to call functional differentiation (see Park and Burgess, 1921: 42;
Park, 1927: 185 8; Shibutani, 1961: 329; 1986: 67). Whether it is called the former
or the latter is not important. What matters is that the different participants must
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perform different roles or parts in the social act. Before this can be done, however,
some person or other must assign the roles for other people to perform and monitor
their performance of these roles during the construction of the social act to ensure
its smooth execution (Couch, 1990: 39, 25774). The first and most important
roles that must be, as Mead says, functionally differentiated are the super-ordinate
from subordinate ones (see: Shalin 2000, 342). There is an old joke told by activists
that underscores this point. It goes something like this: When I was young, I was
a member of an anarchists society, but I quit going to their meetings after a few years
because all we ever did was argue over who should be the chairperson. In short,
without domination, complex social action would be impossible and without complex
social action, our major institutions, such as the family, economy, religion, polity
or science could have neither arisen, nor stayed in operation for very long.
Of course, sociality plays an indispensable part in the operation of domination.
It is necessary for the successful completion of complex social acts. If a complex
social act is to be executed smoothly, all the participants in the act must be able
to assume each others attitudes. Subordinates must be able to assume the attitudes
of super-ordinates to know how and when they should perform their respective roles
and, conversely, super-ordinates must be able to assume the attitudes of their
subordinates to know the problems that they can confront in performing their
respective roles as expected in the social act (Mead, 1934: 277; 1936: 375381).
Thus, as in the case of a busted play in football, if the super-ordinates do not assume
the attitudes of their subordinates, and vice versa, then the execution of the social
act can end in chaos.
It is language that makes their assumption of each others attitudes possible.
People can tell each other what they plan to do, and how and when they plan to
do it (Mead, 1934: 244, 268, 3278, 335). With the invention of language, human
beings could coordinate the performance of the super-ordinate and subordinate
roles not only in a single elemental social act, but also in composite social acts formed
from the merger of different elemental social acts. Thus, language makes it possible
to impose dominative maxims over and to differentiate super-ordinate from subordinate
roles in composite social acts comprising literally hundreds of separate elemental
social acts, and, thereby, to complete composite social acts with a degree of complexity
that would be otherwise unimaginable. A good example is General Dwight D.
Eisenhowers planning and execution of the allied invasion of Normandy on D
Day. This invasion required coordinating the movements of thousands of troops
and tons of military equipment across the English Channel.
As far as the evolution of domination is concerned, I would argue that dominance
precedes the evolution of domination. It is appropriate to underscore here that I
do not use the terms dominance and domination as interchangeable terms.
On the one hand, I use dominance to refer to the swaying of the actions of another
organism implicated in some common undertaking without consciously assuming
that organisms role. On the other hand, I use domination to refer to the swaying
of the actions of another organisms action by consciously assuming that organisms
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role, which necessarily requires the use of language. Thus, before human beings
developed language, they could only engage in dominance, whereas it is only after
their acquisition of language that they can engage in domination. Likewise, lower
animals that are incapable of language can only engage in dominance, whereas
higher animals, such as human beings, who do possess linguistic ability can engage
in domination (see Park, 1904: 53; Mead, 1934: 2345). Because the exercise of
domination is far more efficient than the exercise of dominance, this gives human
beings not only the greatest power to oppress not only lower animals, but also
each other. Thus, the human species may be said to possess the most dominative
potential of any creature on earth (Mead, 1934: 24952; Park, 1927: 733738).
Mead (1936: 372) muses that If you think of it, the human being . . . has actually
got relatively complete control over his environment . . . [It] can determine what
vegetation shall grow, what animals shall exist besides itself; it can control its own
climate, erect its own buildings. He importantly adds that of course, we cannot
change the chemical and physical structure of things, but we can make them over
into those forms that we ourselves need.
Finally, in the preface to his monumental critique of Mead, Habermas (1987,
volume 2: 3) claims that the reproduction of society as a whole can surely not be
adequately explained in terms of communicative rationality, upon which he contends
Meads theory of society is ultimately based. I believe that in drawing this conclusion
about Meads theory of society, Habermas (1987, vol. 2: 23, 11720) is correct, but
only under a certain condition. If sociality is retained as the master principle on which
Mead views society as operating, then Habermas conclusion is right; however, if
the principle of sociality is replaced with the principle of domination, then Habermas
conclusion is definitely wrong because the principle of domination makes it possible
to explain the reproduction of society as a whole. Unlike sociality, the principle
of domination can explain who does what for whom and when.
The Origin of Institutions and Domination

Meads explanation for how human institutions and, in turn, human societies
originally arose is as misguided as his conclusion about the master principle on
which they operate. It may be surmised that for Mead (1930: 397403; 1934: 89
90; 2667), the order in which our institutions evolved depends on the proportion
of a communitys members who participate in them or what may be labeled their
social universality. The greater the proportion of a communitys members
participating in an institution, then the more inclusive it is and the greater the
institutions social universality, whereas the smaller the proportion of a communitys
members participating in an institution, then the more exclusive it is and the less
the institutions social universality (Athens, 2005a: 3134).
To help clarify Meads explanation of the origin of institutions, I will use the notion
of an evolutionary ladder in which each institutions position on the ladder is
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based on the timing of its evolution and degree of social universality, with the
most universal institutions placed on the bottom rung and the least universal one
placed on the top rung. As one moves up from the bottom rung of the institutional
evolutionary ladder to its top rung, the institutions are, respectively, (1) language,
(2) the family, (3) the economy, (4) religion, (5) polity, and (6) science. If, as I argued
earlier, domination is the master principle on which society is based, then domination
should have a demonstrable impact on every major institution that evolved after
the previous one.
In the case of language, domination is so pervasive that it can often fall under
the radar screen. Nevertheless, its operation can be easily made visible. By the time
the age of interpersonal competence is reached, we all have become painfully aware
that there are both unwritten and written rules about who can speak first, who
gets the last word, who can interrupt whom, and who can say what to whom and
when and how they can say it. For example, there is the old adage that children
should not speak until they are spoken to. Similar rules to those that govern speaking
also govern our published prose. For example, in academic writing the use of the first
person is to be reserved for venerated scholars. All these rules that govern our
written and spoken words are direct or indirect reflections of a dominance order
(Kollack, Blumstein, and Pepper, 1985). The very existence of such maxims provides
us with indisputable proof that domination operates in language (see Giddens,
1984: 3133).
In the case of the family, the second rung on the ladder, the impact of domination
can be demonstrated just as easily as in the case of language. Although I am no expert
on the history of the family, I believe that there are no past or present familial
institutions on earth without the operation of maxims concerning the dominance
order of different family members. During Meads lifetime, patriarchy was still the
predominant maxim on which this institution operated in western societies. The
oldest male usually performed the super-ordinate role while females and younger
males performed the subordinate ones in most familial activities. According to an
unknown source, the old adage dont throw the baby out with the bath water
originates from a patriarchal maxim that was in effect in 15th century England:
Baths consisted of a big tub filled with hot water. The man of the house had the privilege of the
nice clean water, followed by his sons, and other men living under the same roof. Then, came
the women, and finally the children. Last of all were the babies. By then, the water was so dirty
that you could actually lose someone in it, hence [came] the saying Dont throw the baby out
with the bath water.
Today, in western societies at least, there is on-going movement away from patriarchy
and toward equality, although so far it has not been a striking success (Hartmann,
1981: 376386). The doctrine of equality between the sexes calls for neither sex
to be overly subservient to the other. According to the master principle of domination,
however, the egalitarian maxim, at least as stated, is a prescription for anarchy because
sooner or later someone must take charge of a complex social acts construction
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to ensure its successful completion. Thus, to be tenable, the egalitarian maxim must
be restated so that people of either rather than neither sex can perform super-ordinate
or subordinate roles in complex social actions.
In the case of economic institutions, the next rung on the institutional evolutionary
ladder, Mead (1915: 168169; 1934: 258) argues that in economic transactions,
the principle of sociality is vital, but not the principle of domination. I believe this
argument is specious. For our present purposes, we can view the economy in the
same simplified fashion as Mead (1936: 1934) did, by dividing it into consumer
and labor markets. First, let us consider the consumer market. If the conditions
of supply and demand operated perfectly in the consumer marketplace, then his
argument might hold some weight. Unfortunately, such ideal market conditions
may exist in heaven but are seldom obtained here on earth. As long as a consumer
must pay for the necessities of life several times more than it costs to bring these
items to a stores shelves, domination also occurs in the consumer market place.
In this case, the retailer wields the upper hand in the economic transaction with
the consumer. Of course, to be fair, the reverse situation can also occur occasionally.
Retailers may be sometimes forced to slash their prices and sell their products to
consumers at a loss to reduce bloated inventories and replenish their dwindling
cash reserves. In this case, the consumer would wield the upper hand in the economic
transaction. Obviously, the latter situation can only be a temporary one because
the retailer would be soon driven out of business if it continued for very long.
Now, let us consider the labor market. On the one hand, if the number of workers
in general or even certain specialized labor markets is greater than what the employer
needs to operate his business effectively, then at least in labor-related matters, the
employer plays the super-ordinate role and his present employees or potential future
employees play the subordinate roles. He can decide not only who to hire and
under what conditions to hire them, especially with regard to their pay and the number
of hours that they must work to earn it, but also which of his present employees
to keep, which to fire, and under what conditions to keep them (that is, at what
salary and for what amount of work).
On the other hand, if fewer specialized workers are available than the employer
needs to operate his business effectively, then in labor-related matters, the potential
or present employees perform the super-ordinate role and the employer performs
the subordinate one. New employees can decide which employer to work for and
under what conditions to work for him, and present ones can decide whether to
continue working for the same employer under their present conditions or to seek
employment elsewhere. Admittedly, it is possible that the supply and demand for
workers can be such that neither the employer nor employee wields the upper hand.
In reality, however, this optimal condition seldom endures for too long. Each side
strives to get the upper hand, with more often than not the employer winning the
battle by introducing labor-saving technology or moving his production site to a
community where the labor costs are cheaper. Thus, in the cases of both the consumer
and labor markets, super-ordinate roles sooner or later become differentiated
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from subordinate ones, proving that domination has a major impact on economic
institutions.
The next institution in the institutional evolutionary ladder after economics is
religion. As in the case of economic exchanges, Mead (1915: 168; 1934: 2725)
believes that the principle of sociality, but not that of domination, is important to
the operation of religion. Unfortunately, he displays his naivet once again. According
to him, religion, to which he definitely gives a Christian twist, originally develops
from the attitudes of neighborliness and charitableness, the desire to help those
who live nearby but who are less fortunate than us. Nevertheless, super-ordinate
roles become differentiated from subordinate ones in all religious acts, including
those motivated by the most altruistic motives.
First, let us consider the informal and implicit religious act of coming to the
aid of another human being. As anyone who has ever received a helping hand
knows, the almsgiver performs the super-ordinate role, which is confirmed by the
recipients expected gratitude and subservience. In fact, it is precisely the tension
created over the recipients expected head bowing that often accounts for more
negative than positive feelings for all involved. On the one hand, if the needy are
made to feel that they must bow their heads too much, then they may later feel
more bitterness than gratitude toward their providers. On the other hand, if the
needy refuse to bow their heads at all, then an almsgiver may later see them as
ingrates rather than as truly deserving of assistance. Thus, when lending a helping
hand, extreme tact must be exercised. Otherwise, the act of generosity could generate
more ill than good will for all concerned (see Smith, 1932a).
Now, let us consider the more formal and explicit religious act in which the aid
giver is not a fellow human being, but instead is God, however he or she may
be defined. Formal religious acts take the form of special ceremonies during which
people ask for Gods help or blessing for some common endeavor in which they are
involved, for example in the act of a matrimonial ceremony. During these ceremonies,
three roles are can always be differentiated: God, the shaman or religious leader,
and the loyal flock of members. These three roles cannot only be differentiated, but
they can be placed in a definite hierarchical order: the shaman plays the superordinate role to the individual flock member and, of course, both of them take a
back seat to God. During religious ceremonies, the shaman also pays a special
homage to God, and individual flock members pay a special homage to both their
shaman and God, such as in bowing their heads or kneeling in their presumed
or actual presence.
It is not until the polity that Mead (1915; 1934: 284 6) displays any real concern
for the impact of domination. Even Mead would concede that the principle of
domination is of great importance to the polity. As I have shown, however, domination
is also of significant importance to language, the family, economics, and religion,
not only the polity. As I will show, it also is of great importance to science, the
institution that stands on the very top rung of the institutional evolutionary ladder.
According to Mead (1936: 2613, 270, 3602), the scientists job is to produce
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practical knowledge that can help human beings adapt to their ever-changing
physical and social environments. He (1923: 2646, 1936: 3604) believes that the
hope and salvation of human society does not rest on the family, economy, religion,
or politics, but on science because it can provide much needed improvements in
the operation of all these other institutions. Domination, however, impacts science
just as much as it impacts language, family, economics, religion, and politics. Although
scientists are often reluctant to admit it, domination ultimately determines what
scientific problems are examined, how they are solved, and by whom they are
investigated. It also decides where and when the results of scientific inquiries are
published and which rewards are given and withheld from those who produced
them (Athens, 2007b; Blumer, 1967; Denzin, 1989: 2830; Foucault, 1980: 1112,
1313; Hamilton, 1996: 209213; Joas 1997, 210).
Thus, in a sense, domination may be considered analogous to DNA: the former
is the basic building block of societies, whereas the latter is the basic building block
of life. It is ironic that Mead (1915: 15960; 1934: 229) limits the impact of domination
to the polity because he views the clan as not only the cradle from which the polity
was created, but also as a direct extension of the family. If the family is an early precursor
of the clan, and the clan is, in turn, an early precursor of the polity, then ipso facto
domination must be important to all the institutions that fall between and after them
on the evolutionary institutional ladder. Thus, in my opinion, Meads limiting the
impact of domination to the polity represents a serious lapse of judgment on his part
(Foucault, 1980: 102, 122). It is unfortunate that the aphorism that everything is
politics had not been bantered around in Meads day (Kanter, 1972: 90). If it had,
then it might have made him realize that domination is omnipresent in all institutions,
including his beloved science (Athens, 2007; see Smith, 1932b: 204, 213).
Domination not only operates within institutions, but also among them. If
Mead had recognized the enormous importance of domination in the functioning
of all institutions rather than only of the polity, then he may have also become
more cognizant that institutions vie among themselves for domination, and that
there emerges within societies an inter-institutional order (see: Gerth and Mills, 1954:
342404; Park, 1942: 323325). By not recognizing the existence of an interinstitutional order, however, Mead gives at least the distinct impression that he is
operating on the false presumption that the polity is always the most dominant
institution in society, performing the role of its CEO (Lee, 1973a: 74). However,
the polity may be only the handmaiden of other more powerful institutions in
society, such as religion in the case of a theocracy, a clan as in the case a monarchy,
the economy in the case of a corporate capitalism, or science as in the case of a
technocracy. Moreover, a given inter-institutional order may always change in the
wake of power struggles among its different constituent institutions. At one point
in time, a society may be a monarchy, only later to become a theocracy, as
apparently happened in the case of present-day Iran. Thus, whether the polity is
the predominant institution in a society depends not only on the particular society
in question, but also on the particular period of that societys existence.5
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Institutional Change and Domination

Meads explanations for how communal institutions and, in turn, community
members themselves change are specious. According to him (1934: 30710), the
opportunity for institutional and attendant self-change arises when an institutional
social act becomes blocked because the participants can no longer form a compatible plan of action for its completion. The obstacle that prevents them from
forming a compatible plan of action is presumably their disagreement over the
maxims that should guide the performance of their desired roles in some unfolding
institutional social action. For Mead (1913: 37980, 1927: 1705; 1932: 1935),
the solution to this problem lies within the creation of a new maxim on which all
the participants can agree for carrying out the blocked institutional act. Once
created, this new maxim can then become part and parcel of the new generalized
other of everyone in the community and, thereby, a common basis for all of them
to construct that same social act in the future (Athens, 2005a: 31819).
Meads explanation of institutional and self-change immediately raises two
fundamental questions. The first one is, how does the new maxim on which this
enlarged plan of action is based become created? With regard to the problem of
how new institutional maxims are created, Mead provides two different answers,
neither of which is very convincing to me, at least. One way that Mead (1913, 1934:
173222, 27381; 1982: 27105) answers this question is by claiming that an
individuals I can ignore or overrule his me. For him, the I and me represent
the two alternate phases of the human self, the I represents the action of an individual
community member, and the me represents the communitys attitude towards
that persons actions. Thus, when Mead (1934: 1979) argues that the I can disregard
the me, he means that the individual breaks the mold by acting in some unexpected
or novel manner, which of course would need to happen in the case of someone
inventing a new maxim for executing some blocked institutional social act.
As I (1995a: 246251) have argued at length elsewhere, the operation of the
I and me cannot be literally distinguished from one another in actual social acts
because their alleged conversation ultimately degenerates into a hopeless contradiction
of terms (see Athens, 1993: 186; Kolb, 1944). More importantly, even if Meads
notions of the I and me were perfectly consistent, the explanation that he
offers amounts to no more than his acknowledging that all the innovative ideas
that arise in a community are the brainwork of some unusually perceptive community
member. Because he (1934: 256) offers no explanation beyond this assertion for
either why this particular community member is more perceptive than the others
or where his special well of creativity springs from, Meads acknowledgement has
a hollow ring to it. Thus, Meads claim that the I can disregard the me
ultimately boils down to a mere article of faith on his part that human beings are
creative creatures, but it does not provide an explanation for their creativity.
Mead (1913: 37880; 1927: 1725; 1934: 90100, 11725) also tries to answer
the question of creating new maxims for blocked institutional acts in another way.
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His alternative answer is that novel ideas emerge from mulling over problems.
According to him (1934: 1546, 254, 2678), thinking takes place when we assume
the attitude of a generalized other or of the community at large. As I (1995a:
252257) have also argued elsewhere, Meads belief that an individual can cook
up new ideas through the assumption of a generalized others attitude generates
a problem every bit as serious as that generated by his notion of an I ignoring
or overruling the me. If, in fact, we can only think through assuming the attitude
of a generalized other, as Mead contends, then it would impossible for us ever to
have any original ideas because all our thoughts would for the most part mirror
those of every other member of our community. Thus, we would have no hope
of finding a new solution to a problem because we are all looking at it from a similar
viewpoint which, thereby, prevents us from thinking outside the box (see Cook,
1993: 1334; Faris, 1937b: 397; Lichtman, 1975: 80; Morris, 1965: 199200).
In short, mulling over a problem with our generalized other provides us with no
means for inventing new maxims for carrying out thwarted institutional social acts,
but instead only traps us in a similar mindset as everyone else participating in them.
Even Herbert Blumer (1928: 217; 1981: 1667) and David Miller, Meads former
brilliant students and tireless defenders, concede that Meads pivotal notion of the
generalized other suffers from vagueness and is in need of clarification and refinement
(Blumer and Miller, 2004: 10924). As I will soon explain, this concession on Blumers
and Millers part represents an understatement of the problems plaguing Meads
notion of the generalized other. Thus, both of the explanations that Mead offers
to account for how individuals create new maxims to unstop blocked institutional
social acts are equally specious.6
Meads explanation of institutional and self-change raises a second question
that is just as important as the first. Lets concede merely for sake of argument that
Mead can adequately explain how people create new maxims. If the participants
in some blocked social act create more than one new maxim of action, however,
then the question that arises is whose maxim will be used to guide their construction
of it (see Wirth, 1947: 1514)? After a lengthy review of Meads work, Dimitri
Shalin (2000: 342) concludes that the pragmatists challenge is to conceptualize
the obdurate realities of power that delimit our freedom to assume roles and
devise new perspectives. Meads only answer to this question is that the interested
parties reach some mutually acceptable agreement. Unfortunately, even in the
most democratic societies, there are many areas of social life, such the work place,
where conducting plebiscites are not an option.
I agree with Mead that the invention of new maxims for carrying out thwarted
social acts provides the impetus for the development of new institutions or modification
of old ones. Like him (1934: 199202, 2178, 256; 1936: 3734), I also believe that
it is always the individual community member who is the ultimate source of all
new community maxims. Unlike him, however, I (1994: 5259) believe that people
create new institutional maxims by soliloquizing with an extant or newly created
phantom community rather than from a mysterious conversation between an
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I and me, or from assuming the attitude of a generalized other. I also agree
with Mead that people must create new maxims to carry out institutional social acts
that can no longer be completed on the basis of old maxims. Unlike him, however,
I believe that the new maxims that are created to unclog blocked institutional
social action must always solve the problem of subordination and super ordination,
in which people or physical things pose the main obstacles to the completion of these
social acts (Mead, 1932: 119139, 1934: 1845, 1982: 1567; Miller, 1990: 510).
With the help of phantom communities, individual community members can
create new institutional maxims for executing thwarted institutional social acts in
either one of two ways. First, they can develop new maxims by soliloquizing with
a phantom community that is constituted in a fundamentally different way from
that of their present corporal community members. A phantom community refers
to the audience of real or imaginary people whose conception or what Louis Wirth
(1936: 138) called picture of communal life, especially our and other peoples place
in it, we always hold close to our hearts and usually take for granted. As Tamotsu
Shibutani (1962: 132) importantly adds, it is an audience before whom a person
tries to maintain or enhance his standing.
In contrast to either the generalized other or me, which both spring from the
attitudes of an individuals present corporal community, the phantom community
usually springs from the biographies of individual corporal community members
(see: Gillespie, 2005: 28). No two corporal community members biographies are
ever exactly alike because their biographies are etched from their own personal
histories of participation in social acts. Among other things, our participation in
past momentous social acts or experiences create maxims of, super ordination and
subordination, that with the passage of time, we come to take for granted (Hughes,
1945: 1447). As Park (1929: 204) reminds us, it is the things that people take
for granted which reveal at once the person and society in which he lives. Wirth
(1936: 1389; see also: 1956: 523) seconds Park: The most important thing that
one can know about a man is what he takes for granted and the most elemental
and important facts about a society are those that are seldom debated. In fact,
I (1994: 530) would argue that the more varied the lives that we have lived, then
the more novel our phantom communities and unquestioned maxims of action,
including those concerning, super-ordination and subordination, will be. Thus, our
phantom communities can be radically different from those of other members of
our present corporal community rather than the same, as anyone who has spent any
time in a foreign country can attest (Athens, 2005b: 1804; Hughes, 1962: 34854;
Park, 1925: 175; Shibutani, 1961: 256; Wirth, 1936: 1389; 1947: 14950).
The second way in which an individual community member can create a new
institutional maxim is with the help of a newly created rather than an extant
phantom community that is radically different from that of the other members of
their present corporal community. Here, the momentous social action that carves
out an individuals novel phantom community does not reside in her distant past,
but in her receding present. In fact, the occasion for the momentous social act in
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question may be the very blocked institutional social action for which a new maxim
is now desperately needed to make its completion possible. Thus, a presently blocked
institutional act can serve as a catalyst for the dramatic self-change process, at least
among some of the participants. This process can ultimately lead to the participants
development of a novel phantom community from which they can later create a
new institutional maxim for super-ordination and subordination that could potentially
change their society and them (Athens, 1995b: 57374).
Domination and the Operation of Institutions in Daily Life

In my opinion, Mead faultily explains how institutions actually operate to organize
the complex social actions that need to be created to ensure a communitys survival.
Recall that Mead (1909a, 2001: 38) defines an institution as any complex social
act that is organized on the basis of some common maxim for the purpose of satisfying
some recurrent human impulse. To his great credit, he realized that institutions
are rooted in ongoing social action, not frozen in reified social structures (see Blumer
1975; 1981: 1501) and dependent for their operation on some sort of composite
other (Mead, 1909a: 1034; 1934: 15264; 1938: 1523). Nevertheless, a major
defect exists in his explanation of how institutional action occurs primarily
because his particular notion of this composite other, the generalized other, is
severely limited in its application.7
On the one hand, Meads notion of the generalized other can admirably
explain how a composite other operates in the case of incipient institutions. For
him (1922: 1612; 1927: 3123; 1932: 87, 18593; 1934: 90, 15563), a generalized
other represents the present attitude of a community as a whole. Moreover, he uses
the adjective generalized in this dual term in the literal rather than only in the figurative
sense. According to Mead (1934: 158, 272), when people assume the attitude of
a generalized other during the construction of some prospective institutional social
act, they are not only generalizing from the attitudes of their collaborators in the
immediate social action, but also from the attitudes of everybody in their present
corporal community. In fact, it is while drawing this generalization from the
community at large that the maxims arise in their consciousness, which they later
use to guide the performance of their respective roles in a prospective institutional
social act. Thus, for Mead, the maxims that arise from assuming the attitude of
our generalized other are always extemporaneous abstractions that people make from
their present corporal communities (Athens, 2005b: 182).
Miller (1982: 21), who was arguably Meads most famous student in philosophy,
has apparently drawn the same conclusion as I have about the specific nature and
timing of generalized others operation:
The generalized other consists of an organization of roles of the individual participants in the
social act . . . Taking the role of the generalized other is a conceptual affair. It requires an
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abstraction from the particularity of the situation at hand . . . A generalization of the environment and of
the individual happen together and simultaneously with the emergence of the generalized other . . . This is done
by abstraction . . . from concrete situations and particular individuals (emphasis added).
Blumer (2004: 117), who was arguably Meads most famous student in sociology,
concurs with Miller and, in turn with me that the generalized other is ultimately
an extemporaneous abstraction that people make from their present corporal
communities:
The more that I think about Meads concept of the generalized other, the more that I am led to
believe that the concept stands for a mechanism of adjustment rather than for a given
organization of ones society . . . Put simply, human beings have to take the role of abstract
arrangements in order to adjust to one another . . . The basic mark of a generalized other is that it is an
abstraction of an organization of roles or relations between people (emphasis added).
If there is any remaining doubt that the generalized other is, in fact, an
extemporaneous abstraction, then Meads descriptions of how the generalized
other arises in our direct experience or immediate consciousness during institutional
social action should completely dispel it:
[A human being] must also, in the same way that he takes the attitudes of the other individuals
toward himself and toward one another, take their attitudes toward the various phases or aspects
of the common social activity or set of social undertakings in which as members of an organized
society or group, they are all engaged; and he must then, by generalizing these individual attitudes of
that organized society or group itself, as a whole, act toward different social projects which at any given
time it is carrying out (1934: 154 5, emphasis added).
These social or group attitudes are brought within the individuals field of direct experience . . . in
the same way that the attitudes of particular other individuals are; and the individual arrives at
them, or succeeds in taking them, by means of further organizing, and then generalizing the attitudes of
particular other individuals in terms of their organized social bearings and implications (1934:
158, emphasis added).
On the other hand, Meads notion of the generalized other cannot explain the
composite others operation in the case of existing institutions. If as Mead claims the
maxims that organize institutional acts are extemporaneous abstractions that come into
existence when we assume the attitude of our generalized other, then the temporal
locus of our generalized other must be always anchored in the present (Mead, 1932:
27). According to the pragmatist philosopher H.N. Lee (1973b: 132, emphasis added),
whose work was greatly influenced by Mead, the whole point of abstraction is to
escape from our past ways of thinking and projections about the future: It is only
by effort of analysis and abstraction that one can free oneself from reference to the past
and anticipation of the future.
However, extant institutional social acts represent long-established ways of doing
things in a community, so they have been invented long before their present application
(Park, 1936: 156; 1939: 2447; Sumner, 1906: 535). During extant institutional social
acts, participants operate on the taken-for-granted assumption that things will be more
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or less done now as they have always been done in the past (Shibutani, 1961: 254
9, 1962: 1301). More specifically, they take for granted the very maxims of action
on which institutional social acts are constructed. Unless the execution of the
extant institutional social act is a new experience for some of the participants or
becomes problematic for some unexpected reason, these maxims merely remain
an unquestioned assumption on which all the participants operate, so that there
is usually no need for them to spell out these maxims to each other or themselves.
Ironically, Mead (1917: 21928; 1934: 261; 1936: 361) repeatedly uses our body
of laws, which of course is based on precedent as the par excellent example of an
institution. Thus, if extant institutions operate on maxims of action that we usually
have taken for granted for so long that we no longer are even aware of them, then,
according to Mead (1934: 11316, 34142; 1982: 128130, 1589), our acting in
accordance with these maxims would spring from neural pathways or circuits
left open in our central nervous system from their repeated usage in the past.
Unfortunately, this contradicts Meads contention that the temporal loci of the
generalized other, through which he believes our maxims of action come into
existence, are always anchored in the immediate present (Athens, 2002: 234, 38).
Thus, in my opinion, if all institutional social acts are ever to be adequately
explained, then the part that a composite other plays in their construction must
be reconceived to take into account their different temporal loci. I believe that the
notion of the phantom community (Athens, 1994: 5256; 1995a: 25960; 1995b:
57382; 2005b) can be conceived in a manner that can explain how the composite
other operates in both incipient and extant institutions. Like Meads generalized
other, the phantom community operates on the basis of what he (1922: 1612; 1925:
288; 1936: 375) calls maxims or axioms. Like Meads notion of the generalized
other, a phantom community also enables the participants in social acts to form
social objects and plans of action for carrying them out. However, unlike the way
in which Meads envisions the generalized other as taking only one basic form, I envision
the phantom community as taking on two distinct forms: novel and customary.
Mead failed to recognize that with increased usage, a composite other undergoes
a dramatic transformation. When we first begin to assume the attitude of a novel
phantom community, it operates similarly to Meads generalized other. The phantom
communitys early or novel form is anchored in the present and operates through
our making contemporaneous abstractions just as Mead described the operation
of the generalized other. It is always this novel form of the phantom community
that we use during our construction of incipient institutional social acts. After we
have repeatedly assumed the same attitude of the same phantom community, however,
its mode of operation changes and it no longer operates as Meads generalized other
does. Whereas the maxims of Meads generalized other are always an immediate byproduct of our extemporaneous abstractions and, thereby, always remain at the tip of
our consciousness, the maxims of our customary phantom community over time
become distilled into maxims of action that we merely take for granted (see: Garfinkel,
1967: 3844; Park, 1929: 204; 1939: 248; Schutz 1973: 7478; 1970: 116132; Schutz
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and Luckmann, 1973: 815). The unspoken maxims that comprise our customary
phantom communities includes far more than we can ever recollect on the spot.8 Thus,
in contrast to Meads generalized other, the customary form of our phantom community is anchored in the past rather than the present. It is our customary phantom
community that usually operates during our construction of extant social institutions.9
In short, the customary phantom community that embodies the taken-for-granted
maxims of action that we usually use during the construction of extant institutional
social acts operate on repeatedly used neural circuits that, for better or worse, are
left open in our central nervous system and, thereby, are firmly anchored in our
distant past (see Lee, 1973b: 16970). Unfortunately, in explaining the operation
of the generalized other in extant institutionalized social actions, Mead confuses
the timing of their construction with the birth date of our composite others and, in
turn, the maxims of action that they embody. According to him, the composite other
and its attendant maxims of action are always created solely from our on-the-spot
abstractions and, thereby, are always produced in the present.10 His pivotal notion
of a generalized other, on which he (1934: 15264) believes that all mature
selves operate, simply does not provide us with a suitable vehicle for our unspoken
maxims of action to enter into extant institutionalized social actions. It operates
on the mistaken presumption that these maxims always emerge from our contemporaneous abstractions, which we must be, by necessity, aware of at the time, rather than
grounded on the taken-for-granted assumptions which we usually remain completely
unaware of while using (Giddens, 1984: xxiii, 45; Park, 1929: 204; 1939: 248; Wirth
1936: 138; see also Langer, 1972: 334345).11
As I have argued here, the very way that Mead designed the generalized other
to operate prevents it from embodying our countless number of taken-for-granted
maxims of action, including some on domination and subordination. However,
even if Mead had also conceived of the generalized other as operating on takenfor-granted rather than only on conscious maxims of action, then it is obvious
that he would not have placed maxims dealing with subordination and domination
at the top of his list because of his belief that society operates on the principle of
sociality, not domination. It needs to be underscored here that maxims of domination
and subordination, which are usually learned at our parents and older siblings knees
and later at our teachers and first bosses desks, are the earliest and most important
ones that become embodied in everyones phantom communities. Subordination
maxims identify who are our super-ordinates, and when and where we must
defer to their wishes, whereas domination maxims identify who are our subordinates,
and when and where they must defer to our wishes (Hughes, 1945: 1447).
DISCUSSION: DEFINING DOMINATION IN MEADIAN TERMS
According to Mead (1932: 182), human society is only the expression of the sociality
found throughout nature. For him (1938: 610), sociality refers to objects occupying
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simultaneously two or more systems, where their occupancy in one system affects
their occupancy in another one. The objects to which he refers can be anything
from stars to planets to continents to plants to ants to human beings. The systems
that these objects occupy may themselves comprise parts of a larger system and,
thereby, be subsystems. Moreover, he (1932: 6890; 1934: 118120; 1938: 60913)
contends that sociality operates in nature on two different levels, the conscious and
unconscious. On the conscious level, the objects in the system can consciously
anticipate each others movements, and their conscious anticipation of each others
movements can significantly affect not only their own prospective movements, but
the operation of the system as a whole. On the unconscious level, the objects in
the system cannot consciously anticipate each others movements, so at the very
least their conscious anticipation of each others movements cannot significantly
affect their prospective movements or the operation of the system as a whole.
In applying sociality to human communities, the subsystems would be human
beings separate attitudes and roles, and the larger system would be the social act
in which they participate. Thus, sociality would be achieved in human social acts
when the different attitudes that the individual participants display toward one
another not only affect the performance of their respective roles, but also the
construction of the larger social act in which they are jointly participating. In fact,
according to Mead, human social acts are precisely where sociality reaches its
penultimate expression in nature because through human beings use of language,
they can indicate to one another their planned courses of action and, thereby, they
can consciously anticipate what each other will do. It could be further argued that
for Mead (1932: 856), institutional social acts would be the social acts in which
sociality reaches its ultimate expression because through the medium of language,
human beings can tell each other not only their own planned courses of action but,
should the need arise, the maxims that everyone should follow in their construction
of the entire social act in which they are jointly participating.12
Like sociality, domination refers to objects occupying simultaneously two or more
different subsystems that affect their occupancy in some larger system. Unlike in the
case of sociality, however, in the case of domination, super-ordinate and subordinate
relationships always emerge among these objects, which significantly affects their
operation in the larger system. Like sociality, domination operates on two different
levels, the conscious and unconscious (Park, 1904: 53). On the conscious level, the
super-ordinate and subordinate objects in the system can consciously anticipate
the movements of each other, and their conscious anticipation of their subordinates
and super-ordinates movements can significantly affect not only their own prospective
movements, but also the operation of the system as a whole. Moreover, it is the
conscious anticipation of the movements of the super-ordinate objects in the system
that most significantly affects the movement of the subordinate objects and the
operation of the system as a whole. When domination operates on the unconscious
level, however, the super-ordinate and subordinate objects in the system cannot
consciously anticipate each others movements, so the conscious anticipation of
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their subordinates and super-ordinates movements cannot affect their prospective

movements or the operation of the system as a whole. Nevertheless, the movements
of super-ordinate objects still have the greatest effect on the movements of subordinate
objects and on the operation of the system as a whole.
As in the case of the application of sociality to human communities, when domination
is applied to them, the objects would be human beings, the subsystems would be
their respective attitudes and roles, and the larger system would be the social act
in which they are jointly participating. Thus, domination would be achieved in
human social acts when the superior and subservient attitudes that the separate
participants display toward one another not only affect the performance of their
respective subordinate and super-ordinate roles, but also the larger social act in
which they are jointly participating. As in the case of sociality, domination reaches
its penultimate expression in human social action and its ultimate expression in
institutional social action.
Unlike Mead, however, I am not willing to extend the expression of domination
throughout all of nature (see Doan, 1956). Due to my ignorance of our larger physical
universe, I must limit dominations operation to the plant and animal kingdoms (see
Park, 1934: 159164; 1936: 145158). Nevertheless, domination is not practiced
in the same manner throughout the organic world. Lower animals and all plants
can only practice the unconscious form of domination because they lack language,
whereas higher animals can practice the conscious form of it because they do have
language at their disposal (see Mead, 1909a: 917). Thus, from now on we should
reserve the term dominance for the former and the term domination for the latter.
Although all human societies are founded on institutions, the master principle on
which they operate is domination rather than sociality. Because domination operates
through the vehicle of language, it incorporates sociality into its very operation.
CONCLUSION
Now that the critique of Meads vision of how society operates has been completed,
I can now deliver on my promise to provide the foundation for an alternative to
his original form of interactionism, which for reasons that should now be clear, can
be dubbed radical interactionism. First, unlike in Meads symbolic interactionism, in
radical interactionism, the master principle behind societys operation is domination
rather than sociality. Although both domination and sociality are inherently social
in nature, the former provides a more much realistic account of both the origin
and daily operation of our major societal institutions. Unlike in the case of sociality,
domination does not naively restrict the impact of domination to a single institution,
the polity. Instead, it extends the impact of domination not only to every single institution
in society, language, family, economics, religion, and science as well as the polity,
but also to the relationship among these different institutions. Unlike in Meads
symbolic interactionism, in radical interactionism, the spotlight is always placed
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where it belongson the emergence, maintenance, and change of intra- and interinstitutional dominance orders. Thus, in contrast to Meads symbolic interactionism,
radical interactionism cannot be legitimately criticized for failing to focus sufficient
attention on the exercise of domination both within and across all major societal
institutions.
Second, unlike Meads symbolic interactionism, radical interactionism can provide
a satisfactory account, at least in principle, of the inception of new societal institutions.
On the one hand, Mead seeks to explain the creation of new maxims of action that
lie at the root of new institutions as taking place through people either assuming
the attitude of their generalized other or the interplay of the their I and me.
Although Meads notion of the interplay of the I and me is a provocative metaphor,
as far as a logical explanation of human creativity is concerned, it degenerates into
a hopeless contradiction of terms. Meads notion of the assumption of the generalized
others attitude provides no better explanation of creativity than his interplay of the
I and me. When people assume their generalized others attitude, they necessarily
abstract on the spot from their society as a whole a similar attitude as everyone else
participating with them in the same joint activity. Thus, his notion of the generalized
other provides no means whatsoever for any of the participants in a social act to
develop new maxims of action concerning subordination and domination or, for
that matter, anything else.13
On the other hand, in radical interactionism, the contradictory notion of the
interplay of the I and me is discarded altogether and the notion of the phantom
community is substituted for Meads notion of the generalized other, the term for
which it has been said that he is best known (Strauss, 1956: xiv). Unlike the
generalized other, the customary form of the phantom community is based on
maxims of actions that people usually take for granted and, thereby, are unaware
of, while using. Because not everyone has experienced the same momentous social
acts over their lives, their taken-for-granted maxims of actions may significantly
differ from each others. Some peoples varied social backgrounds may endow
them with a greater knack than others to come up with new maxims of action for
the execution of a blocked activity in which they are participating with others.
Thus, the notion of the phantom community can, at least in principle, explain
human creativity, while Meads notion of the generalized other cannot, even as a
matter principle, explain it.
In short, Meads original symbolic interactionism and radical interactionism
are at sharp odds with one another over the master principle on which a society
operates and, the way in which our new institutions are originally conceived. Despite
their crucial differences on these important matters, however, radical interactionism
generally conforms to the basic premises of pragmatism (see: Campbell, 1992: 2;
Denzin, 1996: 62; Morris, 1970: 318, Rucker, 1969: 56; Thayer, 1973: 47). Among
other things, radical interactionism presumes that reality is a process displaying
real duration or temporal spread; the social act is the basic unit of human existence;
institutions and, in turn, society are mutable; the individual is the original source
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of incipient social institutions; and democracy is the preferred form of governance.

To avoid any unnecessary confusion later, it should be underscored that the pragmatists
advocacy of democracy is not a denial of domination. On the contrary, it is only
an ardent plea for this one special form of it. Thus, there is nothing in principle
that prevents one from subscribing to radical interactionism, rather than to Meads
symbolic interactionism while still remaining a pragmatist. Whether radical interactionism merely adds a new twist to the old pragmatism or demands the development
of a new school of pragmatism, I must leave in the hands of experts in the history
of philosophy to decide.
Lonnie Athens
Department of Criminal Justice
Seton Hall University
South Orange, New Jersey 07079
USA
athenslo@shu.edu
Acknowledgment. I drew on a portion of this paper for my featured presentation

at the Symbolic Interaction and Ethnographic Research Conference held at Niagara Falls,
Canada on May 1618, 2006.
NOTES
1
The reader should consult the following works by Habermas (1987, vol. 2: 107111);
Lichtman (1970: 7583); by Meltzer, Petras, and Reynolds (1975: 83121); Roper (1973:
4756); by Shalin, (2000: 3412); Smith, (1931: 380 5) and Zeitlin (1973: 21956).
2
Although I do not use the term power in this paper, a legitimate question that arises is
its relationship to domination. As one recent commentator (Powell, 2007: 3597) has
correctly observed, however, the literature is marked by a deep disagreement over the
basic definition of power. Since there is no agreement on the definition of power, it is
beyond the scope of this paper to distinguish power precisely from domination. Despite the
great confusion over the meaning of power, however, I can make some admittedly
superficial observations about the relation of power to domination. Domination is always
lodged in social action and, thereby, always expresses itself during social interaction. If
power is defined in interactional and relational terms, then it is equitable to domination.
Unfortunately, power is not always defined strictly in interactional and relational terms.
Thus, it is a mistake to use power and domination as interchangeable terms.
3
To avoid the charge that I ignored the historical context in which Mead lived and
worked, I will describe and later criticize his analysis of language, family, economics, religion,
politics, and science in terms that were typical in his day rather than the present day.
4
It has been suggested that I may have distorted Meads ideas by viewing them through
the lens of a functionalist because I repeatedly contend that Mead believes that human
beings created institutions to satisfy their recurrent physiological impulses and liberally
use terms, such as impulse, axiom, maxim, and functional differentiation in
describing his ideas. Since these are Meads terms, rather than mine, however, I did not
2007 The Author

159
super impose my ideas on his thought. Unlike many sociologists, Mead never forgot that human
beings are animals. His enduring respect for this brute fact infused both his conception of
social action and, in turn, society (see: Ames, 1935; Dewey, 1931: 31112; Merton 1935;
Murphy, 1935). Unbeknownst to many sociologists, Mead started out as a functional
psychologist. Although he (1909c: 105 113) later became a social psychologist, he never
recanted his earlier functional principles of psychology, but only broadened them to include
the impact of the larger social context in which they operated (Cook, 1993: 701).
5
Of course, my present analysis of institutional orders represents an oversimplification
of a very complex problem. My remarks here, however, are only meant to be suggestive.
To provide a more penetrating analysis of institutional orders, a detailed study would need
to done of the rise and fall of different kinds of institutional orders over the histories of
different societies. Obviously, a project of this enormity would go well beyond the scope of
the present paper.
6
In the 12th of his famous Twenty Lectures, Alexander (1987: 195214) concludes
that Mead makes too much rather than too little room in society for individuality. In
drawing this hasty conclusion, Alexander ignores that Meads view of the self as a conversation
between an I and me degenerates into a hopeless contradiction of terms that ultimately
can neither explain individuality nor conformity in society (Athens, 1995a). Herbert Blumer
(Athens,1993: 186) and Ellsworth Faris (1937b: 397), both former students and later colleagues
of Meads at the University of Chicago, took the exact same position on this issue as I do.
7
After critically comparing the notion of the reference group with the notions of the
membership and comparison groups, Tamotsu Shibutani (1955, 1962) concludes that
reference group, which he equates with Meads generalized other, is superior to the other
two ideas. Although I completley agree with this conclusion, in my opinion, his (1955, 1962)
analysis suffers from two problems. First, by equating reference group with the generalized
other, he creates a needless terminological confusion. Second, he never casts the same
critical eye on the notion of the generalized other that he earlier cast on the notions of
comparison and membership groups, so the critical problems confronting the generalized
other that I will later point out here are completely overlooked by him. Thus, despite the
many invaluable insights that Shibutani (1955; 1961: 25060; 1962; 1986: 1124) offers
about the reference group, his anlaysis can be neither considered a definitive, nor critical
resource on the generalized other.
8
As a result, our customary phantom community reserves a room in the self for the
operation of our taken for granted assumptions about the social world, whereas the generalized
other does not. By making the assumption of the generalized others attitude the litmus test
for the development of a mature self, Mead has ultimately foisted upon us a conception of
the part that the human self plays in the social act that robs us of our taken for granted
assumptions and, thereby, a major source our biographical uniqueness (Athens, 1994: 5212,
530; 1995a: 257 60; 2005b: 180 4; Giddens, 1984: 60; Hughes, 1962: 34854; Park,
1925: 175; Shibutani, 1961: 256; Wirth, 1936: 1389; 1947: 14950).
9
In an apparent attempt to improve upon Meads view of the self s operation in social
action, Gillespie (2005) slightly redefines Meads notion of the generalized other. According
to Gillespie (28: emphasis original), the generalized other does not refer to the attitudes of
others becoming generalized into an abstract attitude, but instead refers to the generalization
of the self s own previous attitudes into the attitude of the other. Unfortunately, Gillespies redefinition
of Meads generalized other does not resolve the problem of how the generalized other
operates during our construction of social acts. Mead sees the generalized other as
emanating from other peoples attitudes, whereas Gillespie views it as emanating from their
own attitudes. Despite disagreeing over the exact source of the generalized other, Mead
and Gillespie agree that it is created from the process of generalization. Whenever people
generalize, no matter whether it is from their own past attitudes or other peoples present
2007 The Author
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Lonnie Athens
attitudes, they necessarily make extemporaneous abstractions. Thus, Gillespies redefinition

of the generalized other does not by any means salvage this idea. Although Gillespie obviously
recognizes that something is askew in Meads notion of the generalized other, he unfortunately
fails to realize that this idea needs to be replaced rather than merely redefined.
10
I am aware that Mead (1932) argues that people do not live in a knife-edged
present, but one with elastic borders that can expand backward into the past and forward
into the future. Unfortunately, Meads explanation of the duration or temporal spread of
the individual act that fits into the social act is completely out of sync with his conception of
how the generalized other operates. According to him, the mechanism behind the
generalized others operation is abstraction. When people abstract the attitudes of the other
participants in the social act to form a common plan of action, however, they become
frozen in a timeless present that neither slips back into the past, nor slides into the future
(see Lee, 1973: 16970; Miller, 1990: 42).
11
I would like to make clear that I am not arguing that Mead completely dismisses the
impact of peoples memory on their present conduct. On the contrary, he (1912: 1349;
1934: 332, 33746) acknowledges the part that fleeting memory images or recollections
can play in social action. Unfortunately, in Meads explanation of the generalized others
operation, he fails to take adequately into account the critical part played by the taken-forgranted maxims of action that are formed in the distant past. Thus, Mead shortchanges
the part that our taken for granted assumptions play in the operation of our composite other.
Although Langer (1972: 334 45) would strongly agree with Mead that the use of significant
symbols distinguishes human beings from all other animals, she would also disagree with
him about the degree of influence that our distant past exercises on our present conduct.
Thus, my notion of the customary phantom community is much more consistent than his notion
of the generalized other with Langers analysis of human conduct. Although Langer devotes
little attention to Mead, it is obvious that she (1972: 29899) was aware of his work.
12
As many scholars who have studied Meads thought have found (see Blumer, 2004: 14;
Cook, 1993: xiiixiv, 1993; Joas, 1993: 24; Murphy, 1936: 162; Rochberg-Halton 1983:
151; Shalin, 2000: 314 15; Strauss, 1977: xvi; Werkmeister, 1949: 527), he often fails to
distinguish his ideas clearly enough from each other. In the case of his pivotal notion of
sociality (see Stevens, 1967), he sometimes conflates it with his notion of emergence,
thereby making novelty, an integral component of emergence, also an integral component
of sociality. In my opinion, the making the element of novelty an integral element of
sociality, however, can be challenged on both empirical and logical grounds. First, people
routinely adjust their attitudes to each other and, thereby, alter the performance of their
respective roles in social acts without producing never before seen forms of social action.
In fact, sociality usually occurs during social acts without there also occurring genuine
novelty . Second, a definition of sociality that includes novelty as a necessary element
would contradict Meads view of human society. Mead argues that institutions are the
backbone of a society. He also argues that sociality is the master principle behind the
operation of a society (Athens, 2005a). If sociality is the master principle on which society
operates, however, then it must account for both the commonplace forms of social action,
which constitute its institutions, and the novel forms of social action that are responsible for
changing them, rather than for only one or the other of these two necessary forms of social
action (see Mead, 1936: 361 63; see also Dewey, 1936: 329).
13
Over the last half-century, interactionists have never refuted these criticisms of Meads
views of the self, although they have effectively ignored them. However, ignoring the
criticisms of venerated scholars, such as Herbert Blumer (Athens, 1993: 186), Gary Cook
(1993: 131134), Ellsworth Faris (1937b), and Charles Morris (1965: 199200), amounts
to burying your head in the sand. It needs to be underscored that with the lone exception
of Cook, all these venerated scholars were Meads former students.
2007 The Author
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Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 37:2

Radical Interactionism: Going Beyond Mead*

Radical Interactionism: Going Beyond Mead

A CRITIQUE OF MEADS THEORY OF SOCIETY

The Master Principle Behind the Operation of Human Societies

Radical Interactionism: Going Beyond Mead

Radical Interactionism: Going Beyond Mead

The Origin of Institutions and Domination

Radical Interactionism: Going Beyond Mead

Radical Interactionism: Going Beyond Mead

Institutional Change and Domination

Radical Interactionism: Going Beyond Mead

Radical Interactionism: Going Beyond Mead

Domination and the Operation of Institutions in Daily Life

Radical Interactionism: Going Beyond Mead

DISCUSSION: DEFINING DOMINATION IN MEADIAN TERMS

Radical Interactionism: Going Beyond Mead

their subordinates and super-ordinates movements cannot affect their prospective

Radical Interactionism: Going Beyond Mead

of incipient social institutions; and democracy is the preferred form of governance.

Acknowledgment. I drew on a portion of this paper for my featured presentation

2007 The Author

Radical Interactionism: Going Beyond Mead

attitudes, they necessarily make extemporaneous abstractions. Thus, Gillespies redefinition

Radical Interactionism: Going Beyond Mead

C, C 1990. Constructing Civilizations. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.

Radical Interactionism: Going Beyond Mead

L, H 1973b. Percepts, Concepts, & Theoretic Knowledge. Memphis: Memphis State

Radical Interactionism: Going Beyond Mead

R, B 1981. Introduction. Pp. ixxi in The Future of the Sociological Classics,

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