GOOD MORAL CHARACTER

A.C. No. 6697

July 25, 2006

ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA, respondent.
x-------------------------x
Bar Matter No. 1227

July 25, 2006

RE: OATH-TAKING OF ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA, INCOMING PRESIDENT OF THE

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.
x-------------------------x
A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC

July 25, 2006

IN THE MATTER OF THE REMOVAL OF ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA FROM THE IBP
BOARD OF GOVERNORS AS EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT AND GOVERNOR.
IN THE MATTER OF THE LETTER-COMPLAINT OF ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA
DATED MAY 18, 2005 TO FORTHWITH DENY/DISAPPROVE THE IBP RESOLUTION
UNJUSTLY, ILLEGALLY, ARBITRARILY, AND ABRUPTLY REMOVING HIM FROM THE
BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE IBP FOR ABSOLUTE LACK OF BASIS AND FOR
FLAGRANT DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS.
DECISION
Per Curiam:
Before Us are three consolidated cases revolving around Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) Governor and Executive Vice-President (EVP) Atty. Leonard de Vera. The first
pertains to a disbarment case questioning Atty. de Vera's moral fitness to remain as a
member of the Philippine Bar, the second refers to Atty. de Vera's letter-request to schedule
his oath taking as IBP National President, and the third case concerns the validity of his
removal as Governor and EVP of the IBP by the IBP Board. The resolution of these cases
will determine the national presidency of the IBP for the term 2005-2007.
A.C. No. 6697

The Office of the Bar Confidant, which this Court tasked to make an investigation, report
and recommendation on subject case,1 summarized the antecedents thereof as follows:
In a Complaint dated 11 April 2005, complainant Zoilo Antonio Velez moved for the
suspension and/or disbarment of respondent Atty. Leonard de Vera based on the
following grounds:
1) respondent's alleged misrepresentation in concealing the suspension order
rendered against him by the State Bar of California; and
2) respondent's alleged violation of the so-called "rotation rule" enunciated in
Administrative Matter No. 491 dated 06 October 1989 (in the Matter: 1989
IBP Elections).
Complainant averred that the respondent, in appropriating for his own benefit funds
due his client, was found to have performed an act constituting moral turpitude by
the Hearing Referee Bill Dozier, Hearing Department San Francisco, State Bar of
California in Administrative Case No. 86-0-18429. Complainant alleged that the
respondent was then forced to resign or surrender his license to practice law in the
said state in order to evade the recommended three (3) year suspension.
Complainant asserted that the respondent lacks the moral competence necessary to
lead the country's most noble profession.
Complainant, likewise, contended that the respondent violated the so-called "rotation
rule" provided for in Administrative Matter No. 491 when he transferred to IBP
Agusan del Sur Chapter. He claimed that the respondent failed to meet the
requirements outlined in the IBP By-Laws pertaining to transfer of Chapter
Membership. He surmised that the respondent's transfer was intended only for the
purpose of becoming the next IBP National President. Complainant prayed that the
respondent be enjoined from assuming office as IBP National President.
Meanwhile, in his Comment dated 2 May 2005, respondent stated that the issues
raised in above-mentioned Complaint were the very issues raised in an earlier
administrative case filed by the same complainant against him. In fact, according to
him, the said issues were already extensively discussed and categorically ruled upon
by this Court in its Decision dated 11 December 2005 in Administrative Case No.
6052 (In Re: Petition to Disqualify Atty. Leonard De Vera). Respondent prayed that
the instant administrative complaint be dismissed following the principle of res
judicata.
On 15 June 2005, both parties appeared before the Office of the Bar Confidant for
presentation of evidence in support of their respective allegations.

Subsequently, in a Memorandum dated 20 June 2005, complainant maintained that

there is substantial evidence showing respondent's moral baseness, vileness and
depravity, which could be used as a basis for his disbarment. Complainant stressed
that the respondent never denied that he used his client's money. Complainant
argued that the respondent failed to present evidence that the Supreme Court of
California accepted the latter's resignation and even if such was accepted,
complainant posited that this should not absolve the respondent from liability.
Moreover, complainant added that the principle of res judicata would not apply in the
case at bar. He asserted that the first administrative case filed against the
respondent was one for his disqualification. x x x.
Bar Matter No. 1227
A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC
As earlier adverted to, Bar Matter No. 1227 refers to Atty. de Vera's letter-request to this
Court to schedule his oath taking as IBP National President. A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC, on the
other hand, is a letter-report dated 19 May 2005 of IBP National President Jose Anselmo I.
Cadiz (IBP President Cadiz) furnishing this Court with the IBP's Resolution, dated 13 May
2005, removing Atty. De Vera as member of the IBP Board and as IBP EVP, for committing
acts inimical to the IBP Board and the IBP in general. 2
The controversy in Bar Matter No. 1227 and A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC arose from the regular
meeting of the IBP Board of Governors held on 14 January 2005. In said meeting, by 2/3
vote (6 voting in favor and 2 against), the IBP Board approved the withdrawal of the Petition
filed before this Court docketed as "Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Jose Anselmo I.
Cadiz, et al. vs. Senate of the Philippines, et al. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with
Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order or Writ of Preliminary Injunction,
SC-R165108." The Petition was intended to question the legality and/or constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 9227, authorizing the increase in the salaries of judges and justices, and
to increase filing fees.3
The two IBP Governors who opposed the said Resolution approving the withdrawal of the
above-described Petition were herein respondent Governor and EVP de Vera and Governor
Carlos L. Valdez.4
On 19 January 2005, IBP President Cadiz informed this Court of the decision taken by the
IBP Board to withdraw the afore-mentioned Petition. Attached to his letter was a copy of the
IBP Board's 14 January 2005 Resolution.5
On 15 April 2005, Bar Matter No. 1227, pertaining to Atty. de Vera's request for oathtaking
as National President, was filed. The same was subsequently consolidated with A.C. No.
6697, the disbarment case filed against Atty. de Vera. 6

On 22 April 2005, a plenary session was held at the 10th National IBP Convention at the
CAP-Camp John Hay Convention Center, Baguio City. It was at this forum where Atty. de
Vera allegedly made some untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies in connection
with the IBP Board's Resolution to withdraw the Petition questioning the legality of Republic
Act No. 9227.7
On 10 May 2005, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining Atty. de
Vera from assuming office as IBP National President. 8
On 12 May 2005, IBP Gov. Romulo A. Rivera wrote IBP National President Cadiz a letter
wherein he prayed for the removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the IBP Board for having
committed acts which were inimical to the IBP Board and the IBP.9
On 13 May 2005, in the 20th Regular Meeting of the Board held at the Waterfront Hotel,
Cebu City, the IBP Board, by 2/3 vote, resolved to remove Atty. de Vera as member of the
IBP Board of Governors and as IBP Executive Vice President. 10 Quoted hereunder is the
dispositive portion of said Resolution:
NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, that
Governor Leonard S. de Vera is REMOVED as a member of the IBP Board of
Governors and Executive Vice President for committing acts inimical to the IBP
Board of Governors and the IBP, to wit:
1. For making untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies in public
about the Supreme Court and members of the IBP Board of Governors,
during the Plenary Session of the IBP 10th National Convention of Lawyers,
held at CAP-Camp John Hay Convention Center on 22 April 2005, making it
appear that the decision of the IBP Board of Governors to withdraw the
PETITION docketed as "Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Jose Anselmo I.
Cadiz, et al. vs. The Senate of the Philippines, et al., Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition With Prayer for the Issuance of A Temporary Restraining
Order or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, S.C.-R. 165108", was due to influence
and pressure from the Supreme Court of the Philippines;
2. For making said untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies that
brought the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP as a whole in public
contempt and disrepute;
3. For violating Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for
Lawyers which mandates that "A lawyer shall observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar
conduct by others", by making untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant

lies during the Plenary Session of the IBP 10th National Convention of
Lawyers in Baguio City;
4. For instigating and provoking some IBP chapters to embarrass and
humiliate the IBP Board of Governors in order to coerce and compel the latter
to pursue the aforesaid PETITION;
5. For falsely accusing the IBP National President, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz,
during the Plenary Session of the 10th National Convention in Baguio City of
withholding from him a copy of Supreme Court Resolution, dated 25 January
2005, granting the withdrawal of the PETITION, thereby creating the wrong
impression that the IBP National President deliberately prevented him from
taking the appropriate remedies with respect thereto, thus compromising the
reputation and integrity of the IBP National President and the IBP as a
whole.11
On 18 May 2005, Atty. de Vera aired his sentiments to this Court by writing the then Hon.
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. a letter captioned as "Urgent Plea to Correct a Glaring
Injustice of the IBP Board of Governors; Vehement Protest to the Board Resolution Abruptly
Removing Atty. Leonard de Vera from the Board of Governors in Patent Violation of Due
Process; Petition to Deny/Disapprove the Completely Unjustified and Highly Arbitrary
Resolution Precipitately Ousting Atty. de Vera from the Board of Governors in Less Than
Twenty Four (24) Hours from Notice and Judgment Without Formal Investigation." 12
In the said letter, Atty. de Vera strongly and categorically denied having committed acts
inimical to the IBP and its Board. He alleged that on the basis of an unverified lettercomplaint filed by IBP Governor Rivera, the IBP Board voted to expel him posthaste, without
just cause and in complete disregard of even the minimum standards of due process.
Pertinent portions of his letter read:
It is evident that the Board of Governors has committed a grave and serious injustice
against me especially when, as the incumbent Executive Vice President of the IBP, I
am scheduled to assume my position as National President of the IBP on July 1,
2005. x x x
I was denied the very basic rights of due process recognized by the Supreme Court
even in administrative cases:
1. The denial of the right to answer the charges formally or in writing. The
complaint against me was in writing.
2. The denial of the right to answer the charges within a reasonable period
of time after receipt of the complaint.

3. The denial of the right to a fair hearing.

4. The denial of the right to confront the accuser and the witnesses against
me. I challenged Gov. Rivera to testify under oath so I could question him. He
refused. I offered to testify under oath so I could be questioned. My request
was denied.
5. The denial of my right to present witnesses on my behalf.
6. The denial of my right to an impartial judge. Governor Rivera was my
accuser, prosecutor, and judge all at the same time.
7. Gov. Rivera's prejudgment of my case becomes even more evident
because when his motion to expel me was lost in a 5-3 votes (due to his
inhibition to vote), Gov. Rivera asked for another round of voting so he can
vote to support his own complaint and motion to expel me. 13 (Emphasis and
underscoring in original.)
On 27 May 2005, the IBP Board responded to the 18 May 2005 letter of Atty. de Vera. 14 In
their Reply, the IBP Board explained to this Court that their decision to remove Atty. de Vera
was based on valid grounds and was intended to protect itself from a recalcitrant member.
Among the grounds cited and elucidated by the IBP Board were the following:
(i) Atty. de Vera engaged himself in a negative media campaign and solicited
resolutions from IBP Chapters to condemn the IBP Board of Governors for its
decision to withdraw the Petition, all with the end in view of compelling or coercing
the IBP Board of Governors to reconsider the decision to withdraw the Petition.
(ii) Atty. de Vera embarrassed, humiliated and maligned the IBP Board of Governors
and the IBP National President in public or during the Plenary Session at the 10th
National Convention of Lawyers.
(iii) Rather than pacify the already agitated 'solicited' speakers (at the plenary
session), Atty. de Vera "fanned the fire", so to speak, and went to the extent of
making untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies about the Supreme Court
and some members of the IBP Board of Governors. He deliberately and intentionally
did so to provoke the members of the IBP Board of Governors to engage him in an
acrimonious public debate and expose the IBP Board of Governors to public ridicule.
(iv) Atty. de Vera uttered untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies, e.g., that
some of the members of the IBP Board of Governors voted in favor of the withdrawal
of the petition (without mentioning names) because "nakakahiya kasi sa Supreme
Court, nakakaawa kasi ang Supreme Court, kasi may mga kaibigan tayo sa Court."

He made it appear that the IBP Board of Governors approved the resolution,
withdrawing the petition, due to "influence" or "pressure" from the Supreme Court. 15
The IBP Board explained that Atty. de Vera's actuation during the Plenary Session was "the
last straw that broke the camel's back." He committed acts inimical to the interest of the IBP
Board and the IBP; hence, the IBP Board decided to remove him.
On 3 June 2005, Atty. de Vera furnished the Court with copies of resolutions and a position
paper coming from various IBP Chapters all condemning his expulsion from the IBP Board
and as IBP EVP.16
On 15 June 2005, IBP President Cadiz informed Chief Justice Davide that in a special
meeting of the IBP Board held at the EDSA Shangri-la Plaza on 13 June 2005, the IBP
Board took note of the vacancy in the position of the IBP EVP brought about by Atty. de
Vera's removal. In his stead, IBP Governor Pura Angelica Y. Santiago was formally elected
and declared as IBP EVP.17
On 17 June 2005, Atty. de Vera protested against the election of Atty. Santiago. 18 On 20
June 2005, Atty. Santiago voluntarily relinquished the EVP position through a letter
addressed to the IBP Board.19 Thus, on 25 June 2005, during its last regular meeting, the
IBP Board elected a new EVP in the person of IBP Governor Jose Vicente B. Salazar to
replace Atty. Santiago.
On 28 June 2005, IBP National President Cadiz, through a letter addressed to Chief Justice
Davide, reported to this Court Atty. Salazar's election. 20 IBP National President Cadiz also
requested, among other things, that Atty. Salazar's election be approved and that he be
allowed to assume as National President in the event that Atty. de Vera is disbarred or
suspended from the practice of law or should his removal from the 2003-2005 Board of
Governors and as EVP is approved by this Court.21 Also on 28 June 2005, Atty. de Vera
protested the election of Atty. Salazar.22
In his Extended Comment23 dated 25 July 2005, Atty. de Vera maintained that there was
absolutely no factual or legal basis to sustain the motion to remove him from the IBP Board
because he violated no law. He argued that if the basis for his removal as EVP was based
on the same grounds as his removal from the IBP Board, then his removal as EVP was
likewise executed without due notice and without the least compliance with the minimum
standards of due process of law.
Atty. de Vera strongly averred that, contrary to the utterly false and malicious charges filed
against him, the speakers at the Plenary Session of the Baguio Convention, although
undeniably impassioned and articulate, were respectful in their language and exhortations,
not once undermining the stature of the IBP in general and the IBP Board of Governors in
particular. He posited that speaking in disagreement with the Resolution of the Board during

the Convention's Plenary Session is not a valid cause to remove or expel a duly-elected
member of the IBP Board of Governors; and the decision to remove him only shows that the
right to freedom of speech or the right to dissent is not recognized by the incumbent IBP
Board.
Anent the charges that he accused the National President of withholding a copy of this
Court's Resolution granting the withdrawal of the Petition questioning the legality of
Republic Act No. 9227, Atty. de Vera avowed that he made no such remarks. As regards the
election of a new IBP EVP, Atty. de Vera contended that the said election was illegal as it
was contrary to the provisions of the IBP By-Laws concerning national officers, to wit:
Section. 49. Term of office. - The President and the Executive Vice President shall
hold office for a term of two years from July 1 following their election until 30 June of
their second year in office and until their successors shall have been duly chosen
and qualified.
In the event the President is absent or unable to act, his functions and duties shall be
performed by the Executive Vice President, and in the event of death, resignation, or
removal of the President, the Executive Vice President shall serve as Acting
President for the unexpired portion of the term. In the event of death, resignation,
removal or disability of both the President and the Executive Vice President, the
Board of Governors shall elect an Acting President to hold office for the unexpired
portion of the term or during the period of disability.
Unless otherwise provided in these By-Laws, all other officers and employees
appointed by the President with the consent of the Board shall hold office at the
pleasure of the Board or for such term as the Board may fix. 24
To bolster his position, Atty. de Vera stressed that when both the President and the EVP die,
resign, are removed, or are disabled, the IBP By-Laws only provides for the election of an
Acting President and that no mention for an election for EVP was made. Thus, when such
election for EVP occurs, such is contrary to the express provision of the IBP By-Laws.
Atty. de Vera also argued that even if he were validly removed as IBP EVP, his replacement
should come from Eastern Mindanao and not from any other region, due to the Rotation
Rule embodied in par. 2, Section 47, Article VII of the IBP By-Laws.
In response to Atty. de Vera's averments, the 2003-2005 IBP Board, through its counsel,
submitted a Reply dated 27 January 2006 and clarified as follows:
(i) The IBP Board of Governors is vested with sufficient power and authority to
protect itself from an intractable member by virtue of Article VI, Section 44 of the IBP
By-Laws;

(ii) Atty. de Vera was removed as a member of the IBP Board and as IBP EVP not
because of his disagreement with the IBP Board's position but because of the
various acts that he committed which the IBP Board determined to be inimical to the
IBP Board and the IBP as a whole;
(iii) Atty. de Vera cannot exculpate himself from liability by invoking his constitutional
right to Free Speech because, as a member of the Bar, it is his sworn duty to
observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and to
insist on similar conduct by others;
(iv) The IBP Board, in effecting the removal of Atty. de Vera, observed the
fundamental principles of due process. As the records would bear, Atty. de Vera was
duly notified of the Regular Meeting of the IBP Board held on 13 May 2004; was
furnished a copy of Governor Rivera's Letter-Complaint the day before the said
meeting; was furnished a copy of the said Meeting's Agenda; and was allowed to
personally defend himself and his accuser, Gov. Rivera;
(v) Atty. de Vera was validly removed because the required number of votes under
Section 44 of the IBP By-Laws to remove Atty. de Vera as a member of the IBP
Board and as IBP EVP was duly complied with;
(vi) Atty. de Vera's replacement as IBP EVP need not come from Eastern Mindanao
Region because: (a) the rotation rule under Article VII, Section 47, par. 2 of the IBP
By-Laws had already been complied with when Atty. de Vera, who hails from Eastern
Mindanao, was elected IBP EVP; and (b) the rotation rule need not be enforced if the
same will not be practicable, possible, feasible, doable or viable; and, finally, that
(vii) Atty. Salazar was validly elected as IBP EVP and, thus, should now be allowed
to take his oath as IBP National President. 25
The Court's Ruling
AC No. 6697
In his Memorandum26 dated 20 June 2005, complainant tendered the following issues for
the consideration of the Court:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT ATTORNEY LEONARD S. DEVERA (sic)
COMMITED MALPRACTICE WHICH AMOUNTED TO MORAL T[U]RPITUDE IN
THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA AND IN THE PHILIPPINES, IN THE COURSE
OF HIS PRACTICE OF LAW.

II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE OATH OF OFFICE AS LAWYER IS ATTACHED TO THE
PERSON OF ATTORNEY LEONARD S. DEVERA (sic) WHEREVER HE MAY GO
AND NOT NECESSARILY BOUND BY THE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF THE
PHILIPPINES.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO PROVE THE
MORAL T[U]RPITUDE, AS BASIS FOR DISBARMENT OF RESPONDENT IN AN
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING.
IV.
WHETHER OR NOT RES JUDICATA APPLIES IN THIS CASE, DUE TO ADMIN.
CASE NO. [6052]27
The disposition of the first three related issues hinges on the resolution of the fourth issue.
Consequently, we will start with the last issue.
A.C. No. 6052 is not a bar to the filing of the present administrative case.
In disposing of the question of res judicata, the Bar Confidant opined:
To reiterate, the instant case for suspension and/or disbarment against respondent
Leonard De Vera is grounded on the following:
1) respondent's alleged misrepresentation in concealing the suspension order
rendered against him by the State Bar in California; and
2) respondent's alleged violation of the so-called "rotation rule" enunciated in
Administrative Matter No. 491 dated 06 October 1989 (In the Matter: 1989
IBP Elections).
It appears that the complainant already raised the said issues in an earlier
administrative case against the respondent. Verily, these issues were already argued
upon by the parties in their respective pleadings, and discussed and ruled upon by
this Court in its Decision dated 11 December 2003 in Administrative Matter No. 6052
(In Re: Petition to Disqualify Atty. Leonard de Vera).
As such, with respect to the first issue, this Court held that:

"As for the administrative complaint filed against him by one of his clients
when he was practicing law in California, which in turn compelled him to
surrender his California license to practice law, he maintains that it cannot
serve as basis for determining his moral qualification (or lack of it) to run for
the position he is aspiring for. He explains that there is as yet no final
judgment finding him guilty of the administrative charge, as the records relied
upon by the petitioners are mere preliminary findings of a hearing referee
which are recommendatory findings of an IBP Commissioner on Bar
Discipline which are subject to the review of and the final decision of the
Supreme Court. He also stresses that the complainant in the California
administrative case has retracted the accusation that he misappropriated the
complainant's money, but unfortunately the retraction was not considered by
the investigating officer. xxx"
"On the administrative complaint that was filed against respondent De Vera
while he was still practicing law in California, he explained that no final
judgment was rendered by the California Supreme Court finding him guilty of
the charge. He surrendered his license to protest the discrimination he
suffered at the hands of the investigator and he found it impractical to pursue
the case to the end. We find these explanations satisfactory in the absence of
contrary proof. It is a basic rule on evidence that he who alleges a fact has
the burden to prove the same. In this case, the petitioners have not shown
how the administrative complaint affects respondent De Vera's moral fitness
to run for governor.
On the other hand, as regards the second issue:
"Petitioners contend that respondent de Vera is disqualified for the post
because he is not really from Eastern Mindanao. His place of residence is in
Paraaque and he was originally a member of the PPLM IBP Chapter. He
only changed his IBP Chapter membership to pave the way for his ultimate
goal of attaining the highest IBP post, which is the national presidency.
Petitioners aver that in changing his IBP membership, respondent De Vera
violated the domicile rule.
The contention has no merit. Under the last paragraph of Section 19, Article
II, a lawyer included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court can
register with the particular IBP Chapter of his preference or choice, thus:
xxx
It is clearly stated in the aforequoted section of the By-Laws that it is not
automatic that a lawyer will become a member of the chapter where his place

of residence or work is located. He has the discretion to choose the particular

chapter where he wishes to gain membership. Only when he does not
register his preference that he will become a member of the Chapter of the
place where he resides or maintains office. The only proscription in
registering one's preference is that a lawyer cannot be a member of more
than one chapter at the same time.
The same is provided in Section 29-2 of the IBP By-Laws. In fact, under this
Section, transfer of IBP membership is allowed as long as the lawyer
complies with the conditions set forth therein, thus:
xxx
The only condition required under the foregoing rule is that the transfer must
be made not less than three months prior to the election of officers in the
chapter to which the lawyer wishes to transfer.
In the case at bar, respondent De Vera requested the transfer of his IBP
membership to Agusan del Sur on 1 August 2001. One month thereafter, IBP
National Secretary Jaime M. Vibar wrote a letter addressed to Atty. Amador Z.
Tolentino, Jr., Secretary of IBP PPLM Chapter and Atty. Lyndon J. Romero,
Secretary of IBP Agusan del Sur Chapter, informing them of respondent de
Vera's transfer and advising them to make the necessary notation in their
respective records. This letter is a substantial compliance with the certification
mentioned in Section 29-2 as aforequoted. Note that de Vera's transfer was
made effective sometime between 1 August 2001 and 3 September 2001. On
27 February 2003, the elections of the IBP Chapter Officers were
simultaneously held all over the Philippines, as mandated by Section 29.a of
the IBP By-Laws which provides that elections of Chapter Officers and
Directors shall be held on the last Saturday of February of every other year.
Between 3 September 2001 and 27 February 2003, seventeen months had
elapsed. This makes respondent de Vera's transfer valid as it was done more
than three months ahead of the chapter elections held on 27 February 2003.
In the case of Romulo G. Dinsay vs. Atty. Leopoldo D. Cioco (Administrative Case
No. 2995, 27 November 1996), this Court declared that:
"The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial
proceedings and not to the exercise of the [Court's] administrative powers."
In the said case, respondent Clerk of Court Cioco was dismissed from service for
grave misconduct highly prejudicial to the service for surreptitiously substituting the
bid price in a Certificate of Sale from P3,263,182.67 to only P730,000.00. Thereafter

a complaint for disbarment was filed against the respondent on the basis of the same
incident. Respondent, interposing res judicata, argued that he may no longer be
charged on the basis of the same incident. This Court held that while the respondent
is in effect being indicted twice for the same misconduct, this does not amount to
double jeopardy as both proceedings are admittedly administrative in nature. This
Court qualified that, in the first case, the respondent was proceeded against as an
erring court personnel under the Court's supervisory power over courts while, in the
second case, he was disciplined as a lawyer under the Court's plenary authority over
membersof the legal profession.
In subsequent decisions of this Court, however, it appears that res judicata still
applies in administrative cases. Thus, in the case of Atty. Eduardo C. De Vera vs.
Judge William Layague (Administrastive Matter No. RTJ-93-986), this Court ruled
that:
"While double jeopardy does not lie in administrative cases, it would be
contrary to equity and substantial justice to penalize respondent judge a
second time for an act which he had already answered for.";
Likewise, in the recent case of Executive Judge Henry B. Basilia vs. Judge Amado L.
Becamon, Lolita Delos Reyes and Eddie Delos Reyes (Administrative Matter No.
MTJ-02-1404, 14 December 2004), this Court held that:
"Applying the principle of res judicata or bar by prior judgment, the present
administrative case becomes dismissible.
xxx
Under the said doctrine, a matter that has been adjudicated by a court of
competent jurisdiction must be deemed to have been finally and conclusively
settled if it arises in any subsequent litigation between the same parties and
for the same cause. It provides that
[a] final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction
is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies; and constitutes
an absolute bar to subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand, or
cause of action. Res judicata is based on the ground that the party to be
affected, or some other with whom he is in privity, has litigated the same
matter in the former action in a court of competent jurisdiction, and should not
be permitted to litigate it again.
This principle frees the parties from undergoing all over again the rigors of
unnecessary suits and repetitious trials. At the same time, it prevents the

clogging of court dockets. Equally important, res judicata stabilizes rights and
promotes the rule of law."
In the instant administrative case, it is clear that the issues raised by the complainant
had already been resolved by this Court in an earlier administrative case. The
complainant's contention that the principle of res judicata would not apply in the case
at bar as the first administrative case was one for disqualification while the instant
administrative complaint is one for suspension and/or disbarment should be given
least credence. It is worthy to note that while the instant administrative complaint is
denominated as one for suspension and/or disbarment, it prayed neither the
suspension nor the disbarment of the respondent but instead merely sought to enjoin
the respondent from assuming office as IBP National President. 28
Contrary to the findings of the Bar Confidant, Adm. Case No. 6052 entitled, "In Re: Petition
to Disqualify Atty. Leonard de Vera, on Legal and Moral Grounds, From Being Elected IBP
Governor for Eastern Mindanao in the May 31 IBP Election" and promulgated on 11
December 2003 does not constitute a bar to the filing of Adm. Case No. 6697. Although the
parties in the present administrative case and in Adm. Case No. 6052 are identical, their
capacities in these cases and the issues presented therein are not the same, thereby
barring the application of res judicata.
In order that the principle of res judicata may be made to apply, four essential conditions
must concur, namely: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) the
decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and
the parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment or order on the merits, and
(4) there must be between the first and second action identity of parties, identity of subject
matter, and identity of causes of action.29 In the absence of any one of these elements, Atty.
de Vera cannot argue res judicata in his favor.
It is noteworthy that the two administrative cases involve different subject matters and
causes of action. In Adm. Case No. 6052, the subject matter was the qualification of Atty. de
Vera to run as a candidate for the position of IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao. In the
present administrative complaint, the subject matter is his privilege to practice law. In the
first administrative case, complainants' cause of action was Atty. de Vera's alleged violation
or circumvention of the IBP By-laws. In the present administrative case, the primary cause
of action is Atty. de Vera's alleged violation of lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Finally, the two administrative cases do not seek the same relief. In the first case, the
complainants sought to prevent Atty. de Vera from assuming his post as IBP Governor for
Eastern Mindanao. In the present case, as clarified by complainant in his Memorandum,
what is being principally sought is Atty. de Vera's suspension or disbarment.

The distinctions between the two cases are far from trivial. The previous case was resolved
on the basis of the parties' rights and obligations under the IBP By-laws. We held therein
that Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified from running as Regional Governor as there is
nothing in the present IBP By-laws that sanctions the disqualification of candidates for IBP
governors. Consequently, we stressed that the petition had no firm ground to stand on.
Likewise, we held that the complainants therein were not the proper parties to bring the suit
as the IBP By-laws prescribes that only nominees - which the complainants were not - can
file with the IBP President a written protest against the candidate. The Court's statement,
therefore, that Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified on the ground that he was not morally fit
was mere obiter dictum. Precisely, the IBP By-laws do not allow for pre-election
disqualification proceedings; hence, Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified on the basis of the
administrative findings of a hearing officer of the State Bar of California suspending him
from the practice of law for three years. We held in that case that
There is nothing in the By-Laws which explicitly provides that one must be morally fit
before he can run for IBP governorship. For one, this is so because the
determination of moral fitness of a candidate lies in the individual judgment of the
members of the House of Delegates. Indeed, based on each member's standard of
morality, he is free to nominate and elect any member, so long as the latter
possesses the basic requirements under the law. For another, basically the
disqualification of a candidate involving lack of moral fitness should emanate from
his disbarment or suspension from the practice of law by this Court, or conviction by
final judgment of an offense which involves moral turpitude. 30
What this simply means is that absent a final judgment by the Supreme Court in a proper
case declaring otherwise, every lawyer aspiring to hold the position of IBP Regional Director
is presumed morally fit. Any person who begs to disagree will not be able to find a receptive
audience in the IBP through a petition for disqualification but must first file the necessary
disbarment or suspension proceeding against the lawyer concerned.
And this is precisely what complainant has chosen to do in the instant case. As his petition
is sufficient in form and substance, we have given it due course pursuant to Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court. And, considering that this case is not barred by the prior judgment in Adm.
Case No. 6052, the only issue left for consideration is whether or not Atty. de Vera can be
suspended or disbarred under the facts of the case and the evidence submitted by
complainant.
The recommendation of the hearing officer of the State Bar of California, standing
alone, is not proof of malpractice.
In the case of the Suspension From The Practice of Law In The Territory of Guam of Atty.
Leon G. Maquera,31 we were confronted with the question of whether or not a member of
the Philippine Bar, who is concomitantly an attorney in a foreign jurisdiction and who was

suspended from the practice of law in said foreign jurisdiction, can be sanctioned as
member of the Philippine Bar for the same infraction committed in the foreign jurisdiction.
We take the issue in Atty. Maquera one notch higher in the case of Atty. de Vera who was
admitted to the practice of law in a foreign jurisdiction (State Bar of California, U.S.A.) and
against whom charges were filed in connection with his practice in said jurisdiction.
However, unlike the case of Atty. Maquera, no final judgment for suspension or disbarment
was meted against Atty. de Vera despite a recommendation of suspension of three years as
he surrendered his license to practice law before his case could be taken up by the
Supreme Court of California.
In Maquera, we emphasized that the judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer in a
foreign jurisdiction does not automatically result in his suspension or disbarment in the
Philippines as the acts giving rise to his suspension are not grounds for disbarment and
suspension in this jurisdiction. Judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer may
transmute into a similar judgment of suspension in the Philippines only if the basis of the
foreign court's action includes any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension in this
jurisdiction. We likewise held that the judgment of the foreign court merely constitutes prima
facie evidence of unethical acts as lawyer.
The Maquera ruling is consistent with Rule 39, Section 48, of the Rules of Court which
provides:
Sec. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. - The effect of a judgment or final
order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or
final order is as follows:
xxxx
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order
is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in
interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact.
In Philippine Aluminum Wheels, Inc. v. Fasgi Enterprises, Inc.,32 we explained that "[a]
foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes,
until a contrary showing, on the basis of a presumption of regularity of proceedings and the
giving of due notice in the foreign forum."

In herein case, considering that there is technically no foreign judgment to speak of, the
recommendation by the hearing officer of the State Bar of California does not
constitute prima facie evidence of unethical behavior by Atty. de Vera. Complainant must
prove by substantial evidence the facts upon which the recommendation by the hearing
officer was based. If he is successful in this, he must then prove that these acts are likewise
unethical under Philippine law.
There is substantial evidence of malpractice on the part of Atty. de Vera independent
of the recommendation of suspension by the hearing officer of the State Bar of
California
Section 27 of Rule 138 of our Rules of Court states:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds
therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of
a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required
to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order
of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a
case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose
of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent
court or other disciplinary agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been
admitted as an attorney is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of
such action includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall
be prima facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension. 33
Disciplinary action against a lawyer is intended to protect the court and the public from the
misconduct of officers of the court and to protect the administration of justice by requiring
that those who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable and reliable
men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. 34 The statutory enunciation of the
grounds for disbarment on suspension is not to be taken as a limitation on the general
power of courts to suspend or disbar a lawyer. The inherent power of the court over its
officers cannot be restricted.35
Malpractice ordinarily refers to any malfeasance or dereliction of duty committed by a
lawyer. Section 27 gives a special and technical meaning to the term "Malpractice." 36 That
meaning is in consonance with the elementary notion that the practice of law is a
profession, not a business.37

Unprofessional conduct in an attorney is that which violates the rules on ethical code of his
profession or which is unbecoming a member of that profession. 38
Now, the undisputed facts:
1. An administrative case against Atty. de Vera was filed before the State Bar of California,
docketed then as Adm. Case No. 86-0-18429. It arose from an insurance case Atty. de Vera
handled involving Julius Willis, III who figured in an automobile accident in 1986. Atty. de
Vera was authorized by the elder Willis (father of Julius who was given authority by the son
to control the case because the latter was then studying in San Diego California) for the
release of the funds in settlement of the case. Atty. de Vera received a check in settlement
of the case which he then deposited to his personal account; 39
2. The Hearing referee in the said administrative case recommended that Atty. de Vera be
suspended from the practice of law for three years; 40 and
3. Atty. de Vera resigned from the California Bar which resignation was accepted by the
Supreme Court of California.41
Atty. de Vera vehemently insists that the foregoing facts do not prove that he
misappropriated his client's funds as the latter's father (the elder Willis) gave him authority
to use the same and that, unfortunately, the hearing officer did not consider this explanation
notwithstanding the fact that the elder Willis testified under oath that he "expected de Vera
might use the money for a few days."
By insisting that he was authorized by his client's father and attorney-in-fact to use the
funds, Atty. de Vera has impliedly admitted the use of the Willis funds for his own personal
use.
In fact, Atty. de Vera did not deny complainant's allegation in the latter's memorandum that
he (de Vera) received US$12,000.00 intended for his client and that he deposited said
amount in his personal account and not in a separate trust account and that, finally, he
spent the amount for personal purposes.42
At this point, it bears stressing that in cases filed before administrative and quasi-judicial
bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence or that
amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion.43 It means such evidence which affords a substantial basis from which the fact
in issue can be reasonably inferred.44
Beyond doubt, the unauthorized use by a lawyer of his client's funds is highly unethical.
Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is emphatic about this, thus:

CANON 16. A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES
OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME TO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for
or from the client.
Rule 16.02. A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his
own and those of others kept by him.
In Espiritu v. Ulep45 we held that
The relation between attorney and client is highly fiduciary in nature. Being such, it
requires utmost good faith, loyalty, fidelity and disinterestedness on the part of the
attorney. Its fiduciary nature is intended for the protection of the client.
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates every lawyer to hold in trust all
money and properties of his client that may come into his possession. Accordingly,
he shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.
Even more specific is the Canon of Professional Ethics:
The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or
gain he abuses or takes advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his
client.
Money of the client or collected for the client or other trust property coming
into the possession of the lawyer should be reported and accounted
for promptly and should not under any circumstances be commingled with
his own or be used by him.
Consequently, a lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds or property held by
him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the
same for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him
by, his client. It is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional
ethics; it impairs the public confidence in the legal profession and deserves
punishment.
Lawyers who misappropriate the funds entrusted to them are in gross violation of
professional ethics and are guilty of betrayal of public confidence in the legal
profession. Those who are guilty of such infraction may be disbarred or suspended
indefinitely from the practice of law. (Emphases supplied.)
In herein case, as it is admitted by Atty. de Vera himself that he used his client's money for
personal use, he has unwittingly sealed his own fate since this admission constitutes more

than substantial evidence of malpractice. Consequently, Atty. de Vera now has the burden of
rebutting the evidence which he himself supplied.
In his defense, Atty. de Vera claims that he was duly authorized by the elder Willis to use
the funds intended for the latter's son. Atty. de Vera also points out that he had restituted the
full amount of US$12,000.00 even before the filing of the administrative case against him in
the State Bar of California.46
Aside from these self-serving statements, however, we cannot find anywhere in the records
of this case proof that indeed Atty. de Vera was duly authorized to use the funds of his
client. In Radjaie v. Atty. Alovera47 we declared that
When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he
denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence
against him. He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and
integrity which at all times is expected of him.
Atty. de Vera cannot rely on the statement made by the hearing officer that the elder Willis
had indeed testified that he "expected de Vera might use the money for a few days." As Atty.
de Vera had vigorously objected to the admissibility of the document containing this
statement, he is now estopped from relying thereon. Besides, that the elder Willis "expected
de Vera might use the money for a few days" was not so much an acknowledgment of
consent to the use by Atty. de Vera of his client's funds as it was an acceptance of the
probability that Atty. de Vera might, indeed, use his client's funds, which by itself did not
speak well of the character of Atty. de Vera or the way such character was perceived.
In the instant case, the act of Atty. de Vera in holding on to his client's money without the
latter's acquiescence is conduct indicative of lack of integrity and propriety. It is clear that
Atty. de Vera, by depositing the check in his own account and using the same for his own
benefit is guilty of deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct and unethical behavior. He caused
dishonor, not only to himself but to the noble profession to which he belongs. For, it cannot
be denied that the respect of litigants to the profession is inexorably diminished whenever a
member of the profession betrays their trust and confidence. 48 Respondent violated his oath
to conduct himself with all good fidelity to his client.
Nevertheless, we do not agree with complainant's plea to disbar respondent from the
practice of law. The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution. 49 Where any
lesser penalty can accomplish the end desired, disbarment should not be decreed.
In Mortera v. Pagatpatan,50 we imposed upon Atty. Pagatpatan two years suspension from
his practice of law for depositing the funds meant for his client to his personal account
without the latter's knowledge. In Reyes v. Maglaya;51 Castillo v. Taguines;52 Espiritu v. Atty.
Cabredo IV,53 the respondents were meted one year suspension each for failing to remit to

their clients monies in the amounts of P1,500.00; P500.00, and P51,161.00, respectively,
received by them for their clients without the latter's permission. In Dumadag v. Atty.
Lumaya,54 we indefinitely suspended respondent for failure to remit to his client the amount
of the measly sum of P4,344.00 representing the amount received pursuant to a writ of
execution. Considering the amount involved here US$12,000.00, we believe that the
penalty of suspension for two (2) years is appropriate.
Transferring IBP membership to a chapter where the lawyer is not a resident of is not
a ground for his suspension or disbarment
Complainant insists that Atty. de Vera's transfer of membership from the Pasay, Paraaque,
Las Pias and Muntinlupa (PPLM) Chapter to the Agusan del Sur IBP Chapter is a
circumvention of the rotation rule as it was made for the sole purpose of becoming IBP
National President. Complainant stresses that Atty. de Vera is not a resident of Agusan del
Sur nor does he hold office therein.
In Adm. Case No. 6052, we held that Atty. de Vera's act of transferring to another IBP
Chapter is not a ground for his disqualification for the post of IBP Governor as the same is
allowed under Section 19 of the IBP By-Laws with the qualification only that the transfer be
made not less than three months immediately preceding any chapter election.
As it was perfectly within Atty. de Vera's right to transfer his membership, it cannot be said
that he is guilty of unethical conduct or behavior. And while one may incessantly argue that
a legal act may not necessarily be ethical, in herein case, we do not see anything wrong in
transferring to an IBP chapter that -- based on the rotation rule will produce the next IBP
EVP who will automatically succeed to the National Presidency for the next term. Our Code
of Professional Responsibility as well as the Lawyer's Oath do not prohibit nor punish
lawyers from aspiring to be IBP National President and from doing perfectly legal acts in
accomplishing such goal.
Bar Matter No. 1227
Administrative Matter No. 05-5-15-SC
To resolve Bar Matter No. 1227 and Administrative Matter No. 05-5- 15-SC, the following
issues must be addressed:
I. Whether the IBP Board of Governors acted with grave abuse of discretion in
removing Atty. de Vera as Governor and EVP of the IBP on 13 May 2005.
i. Whether the IBP Board of Governors complied with administrative due
process in removing Atty. de Vera.
ii. Whether the IBP removed Atty. De Vera for just and valid cause.

II. Whether Governor Salazar was validly elected as EVP of the IBP on 25 June
2005, and can consequently assume the Presidency of the IBP for the term 20052007.
The IBP Board observed due process in its removal of Atty. de Vera as IBP Governor
We start the discussion with the veritable fact that the IBP Board is vested with the power to
remove any of its members pursuant to Section 44, Article VI of the IBP By-Laws, which
states:
Sec. 44. Removal of members. If the Board of Governors should determine after
proper inquiry that any of its members, elective or otherwise, has for any reason
become unable to perform his duties, the Board, by resolution of the Majority of the
remaining members, may declare his position vacant, subject to the approval of the
Supreme Court.
Any member of the Board, elective or otherwise, may be removed for cause,
including three consecutive absences from Board meetings without justifiable
excuse, by resolution adopted by two-thirds of the remaining members of the
Board, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court.
In case of any vacancy in the office of Governor for whatever cause, the delegates
from the region shall by majority vote, elect a successor from among the members of
the Chapter to which the resigned governor is a member to serve as governor for the
unexpired portion of the term. (Emphasis supplied)
Under the aforementioned section, a member of the IBP Board may be removed for cause
by resolution adopted by two-thirds (2/3) of the remaining members of the Board, subject to
the approval of this Court.
In the main, Atty. de Vera questions his removal from the Board of Governors on procedural
and substantive grounds. He argues that he was denied "very basic rights of due process
recognized by the Honorable Court even in administrative cases" like the right to answer
formally or in writing and within reasonable time, the right to present witnesses in his behalf,
the right to a fair hearing. Atty. de Vera protests the fact that he was not able to crossexamine the complainant, IBP Gov. Romulo H. Rivera (Atty. Rivera) and that Atty. Rivera
voted as well for his expulsion which made him accuser, prosecutor and judge at the same
time. Atty. de Vera emphasized the fact that Atty. Rivera initially inhibited himself from voting
on his own motion. However, when his inhibition resulted in the defeat of his motion as the
necessary 2/3 votes could not be mustered, Atty. Rivera asked for another round of voting
so he could vote to support his own motion.

The IBP Board counters that since its members were present during the plenary session,
and personally witnessed and heard Atty. de Vera's actuations, an evidentiary or formal
hearing was no longer necessary. Since they all witnessed and heard Atty. de Vera, it was
enough that he was given an opportunity to refute and answer all the charges imputed
against him. They emphasized that Atty. de Vera was given a copy of the complaint and that
he was present at the Board Meeting on 13 May 2005 wherein the letter-complaint against
him was part of the agenda. Therein, he was given the opportunity to be heard and that, in
fact, Atty. de Vera did argue his case.
We are in agreement with the IBP Board.
First, it needs stressing that the constitutional provision on due process safeguards life,
liberty and property.55 It cannot be said that the position of EVP of the IBP is property within
the constitutional sense especially since there is no right to security of tenure over said
position as, in fact, all that is required to remove any member of the board of governors for
cause is a resolution adopted by 2/3 of the remaining members of the board.
Secondly, even if the right of due process could be rightfully invoked, still, in administrative
proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain one's side. 56 At
the outset, it is here emphasized that the term "due process of law" as used in the
Constitution has no fixed meaning for all purposes due "to the very nature of the doctrine
which, asserting a fundamental principle of justice rather than a specific rule of law, is not
susceptible of more than one general statement." 57 The phrase is so elusive of exact
apprehension,58 because it depends on circumstances and varies with the subject matter
and the necessities of the situation.59
Due process of law in administrative cases is not identical with "judicial process" for a trial in
court is not always essential to due process. While a day in court is a matter of right in
judicial proceedings, it is otherwise in administrative proceedings since they rest upon
different principles. The due process clause guarantees no particular form of procedure and
its requirements are not technical. Thus, in certain proceedings of administrative character,
the right to a notice or hearing are not essential to due process of law. The constitutional
requirement of due process is met by a fair hearing before a regularly established
administrative agency or tribunal. It is not essential that hearings be had before the making
of a determination if thereafter, there is available trial and tribunal before which all
objections and defenses to the making of such determination may be raised and
considered. One adequate hearing is all that due process requires. What is required for
"hearing" may differ as the functions of the administrative bodies differ.60
The right to cross-examine is not an indispensable aspect of due process. 61 Nor is an actual
hearing always essential62 especially under the factual milieu of this case where the
members of the IBP Board -- upon whose shoulders the determination of the cause for

removal of an IBP governor is placed subject to the approval of the Supreme Court all
witnessed Atty. de Vera's actuations in the IBP National Convention in question.
It is undisputed that Atty. de Vera received a copy of the complaint against him and that he
was present when the matter was taken up. From the transcript of the stenographic notes of
the 13 May 2005 meeting wherein Atty. de Vera was removed, it is patent that Atty. de Vera
was given fair opportunity to defend himself against the accusations made by Atty. Rivera.
Atty. de Vera, however, additionally questions the fact that Atty. Rivera, who authored the
complaint against him, also voted for his expulsion making him accuser, prosecutor and
judge at the same time. Atty. de Vera likewise laments the fact that Atty. Rivera initially
inhibited himself from voting but when this resulted in the defeat of his motion for lack of the
necessary 2/3 vote, he agreed to another round of voting and that, this time, he voted in
favor of his motion.
For the record, of the nine governors comprising the IBP Board, six voted for Atty. de Vera's
expulsion (including Atty. Rivera) while 3 voted against it (including Atty. de Vera).
Section 44 (second paragraph) of the IBP By-Laws provides:
Any member of the Board, elective or otherwise, may be removed for cause,
including three consecutive absences from Board meetings without justifiable
excuse, by resolution adopted by two-thirds of the remaining members of the Board,
subject to the approval of the Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied.)
Under the rules, a resolution for expulsion of an IBP Governor is done via a resolution
adopted by 2/3 of the remaining members. The phrase "remaining members" refers to the
members exclusive of the complainant member and the respondent member. The reason
therefore is that such members are interested parties and are thus presumed to be unable
to resolve said motion impartially. This being the case, the votes of Attys. Rivera and de
Vera should be stricken-off which means that only the votes of the seven remaining
members are to be counted. Of the seven remaining members, five voted for expulsion
while two voted against it which still adds up to the 2/3 vote requirement for expulsion.
The IBP Board removed Atty. de Vera as IBP Governor for just and valid cause
All the concerned parties to this case agree that what constitutes cause for the removal of
an IBP Governor has not been defined by Section 44 of the IBP By-Laws albeit it includes
three consecutive absences from Board meetings without justifiable excuse. Thus, the IBP
Board argues that it is vested with sufficient power and authority to protect itself from an
intractable member whose removal was caused not by his disagreement with the IBP Board
but due to various acts committed by him which the IBP Board considered as inimical to the
IBP Board in particular and the IBP in general.

Atty. de Vera, on the other hand, insists that speaking in disagreement with the Resolution
of the Board during the Convention's Plenary Session is not a valid cause to remove or
expel a duly-elected member of the IBP Board of Governors and the decision to remove him
only shows that the right to freedom of speech or the right to dissent is not recognized by
the IBP Board.
After weighing the arguments of the parties and in keeping with the fundamental objective of
the IBP to discharge its public responsibility more effectively, we hereby find that Atty. de
Vera's removal from the IBP Board was not capricious or arbitrary.
Indubitably, conflicts and disagreements of varying degrees of intensity, if not animosity, are
inherent in the internal life of an organization, but especially of the IBP since lawyers are
said to disagree before they agree.
However, the effectiveness of the IBP, like any other organization, is diluted if the conflicts
are brought outside its governing body for then there would be the impression that the IBP,
which speaks through the Board of Governors, does not and cannot speak for its members
in an authoritative fashion. It would accordingly diminish the IBP's prestige and repute with
the lawyers as well as with the general public.
As a means of self-preservation, internecine conflicts must thus be adjusted within the
governing board itself so as to free it from the stresses that invariably arise when internal
cleavages are made public.
The doctrine of majority rule is almost universally used as a mechanism for adjusting and
resolving conflicts and disagreements within the group after the members have been given
an opportunity to be heard. While it does not efface conflicts, nonetheless, once a decision
on a contentious matter is reached by a majority vote, the dissenting minority is bound
thereby so that the board can speak with one voice, for those elected to the governing
board are deemed to implicitly contract that the will of the majority shall govern in matters
within the authority of the board.63
The IBP Board, therefore, was well within its right in removing Atty. de Vera as the latter's
actuations during the 10th National IBP Convention were detrimental to the role of the IBP
Board as the governing body of the IBP. When the IBP Board is not seen by the bar and the
public as a cohesive unit, it cannot effectively perform its duty of helping the Supreme Court
enforce the code of legal ethics and the standards of legal practice as well as improve the
administration of justice.
In view of the importance of retaining group cohesiveness and unity, the expulsion of a
member of the board who insists on bringing to the public his disagreement with a
policy/resolution approved by the majority after due discussion, cannot be faulted. The

effectiveness of the board as a governing body will be negated if its pronouncements are
resisted in public by a board member.
Indeed, when a member of a governing body cannot accept the voice of the majority, he
should resign therefrom so that he could criticize in public the majority opinion/decision to
his heart's content; otherwise, he subjects himself to disciplinary action by the body.
The removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the Board of Governors ipso facto meant
his removal as EVP as well
The removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the Board of Governors ipso facto meant his
removal as EVP as well. Section 47, Article VII of the By-Laws of the IBP provides:
SEC. 47. National Officers. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall have a
President and Executive Vice President to be chosen by the Board of Governors
from among nine (9) regional governors, as much as practicable, on a rotation basis.
xxx
Thus, to be EVP of the IBP, one must necessarily be a member of IBP Board of Governors.
Atty. de Vera's removal from the Board of Governors, automatically disqualified him from
acting as IBP EVP. To insist otherwise would be contrary to Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws.
The Court will not interfere with the Resolution of the IBP Board to remove Atty. de
Vera since it was rendered without grave abuse of discretion
While it is true that the Supreme Court has been granted an extensive power of supervision
over the IBP,64 it is axiomatic that such power should be exercised prudently. The power of
supervision of the Supreme Court over the IBP should not preclude the IBP from exercising
its reasonable discretion especially in the administration of its internal affairs governed by
the provisions of its By-Laws. The IBP By-Laws were precisely drafted and promulgated so
as to define the powers and functions of the IBP and its officers, establish its organizational
structure, and govern relations and transactions among its officers and members. With
these By-Laws in place, the Supreme Court could be assured that the IBP shall be able to
carry on its day-to-day affairs, without the Court's interference.
It should be noted that the general charge of the affairs and activities of the IBP has been
vested in the Board of Governors. The members of the Board are elective and
representative of each of the nine regions of the IBP as delineated in its By-Laws. 65 The
Board acts as a collegiate body and decides in accordance with the will of the majority. The
foregoing rules serve to negate the possibility of the IBP Board acting on the basis of
personal interest or malice of its individual members. Hence, the actions and resolutions of
the IBP Board deserve to be accorded the disputable presumption 66 of validity, which shall
continue, until and unless it is overcome by substantial evidence and actually declared

invalid by the Supreme Court. In the absence of any allegation and substantial proof that
the IBP Board has acted without or in excess of its authority or with grave abuse of
discretion, we shall not be persuaded to overturn and set aside the Board's action or
resolution.
There is no question that the IBP Board has the authority to remove its members as
provided in Article VI, Section 4467 of the IBP By-Laws. Issue arises only as to whether the
IBP Board abused its authority and discretion in resolving to remove Atty. de Vera from his
post as an IBP Governor and EVP. As has been previously established herein, Atty. de
Vera's removal from the IBP Board was in accordance with due process and the IBP Board
acted well within the authority and discretion granted to it by its By-Laws. There being no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the IBP Board, we find no reason to interfere in the
Board's resolution to remove Atty. de Vera.
The election of Atty. Salazar by the IBP Board as IBP EVP in replacement of Atty. De
Vera was conducted in accordance with the authority granted to the Board by the IBP
By-Laws
In the same manner, we find no reason to disturb the action taken by the 2003-2005 IBP
Board of Governors in holding a special election to fill-in the vacant post resulting from the
removal of Atty. de Vera as EVP of the IBP since the same is a purely internal matter, done
without grave abuse of discretion, and implemented without violating the Rules and ByLaws of the IBP.
With the removal of Atty. de Vera from the Board, by virtue of the IBP Board Resolution
dated 13 May 2005, he was also removed from his post as EVP; thus, there was a resultant
vacancy in the position of IBP EVP.
Article VI, Section 41(g) of the IBP By-Laws expressly grants to the Board the authority to fill
vacancies, however arising, in the IBP positions, subject to the provisions of Section 8 of
the Integration Rule,68 and Section 11 (Vacancies),69 Section 44 (Removal of
members),70 Section 47 (National officers),71 Section 48 (other officers),72and Section 49
(Terms of Office)73 of the By-Laws. The IBP Board has specific and sufficient guidelines in
its Rules and By-Laws on how to fill-in the vacancies after the removal of Atty. de Vera. We
have faith and confidence in the intellectual, emotional and ethical competencies of the
remaining members of the 2005-2007 Board in dealing with the situation within the bounds
of the IBP Rules and By-Laws.
The election by the 2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors of a new EVP, who will assume the
Presidency for the term 2005-2007, was well within the authority and prerogative granted to
the Board by the IBP By-Laws, particularly Article VII, Section 47, which provides that "[t]he
EVP shall automatically become President for the next succeeding term." The phrase "for
the next succeeding term" necessarily implies that the EVP that should succeed Atty. Cadiz

as IBP President for the next succeeding term (i.e., 2005-2007) should come from the
members of the 2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors. Hence, in A.M. No. 05-7-19-SC, we
restrained now IBP EVP Feliciano Bautista from assuming the position of Acting President
because we have yet to resolve the question as to who shall succeed Atty. Cadiz from the
2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors.
Accordingly, the elections of Governor Santiago on 13 June 2005 as IBP EVP, and
thereafter, Governor Salazar on 25 June 2005, as the new IBP EVP, upon the
relinquishment of Gov. Santiago of the position, were valid.
Neither can this Court give credence to the argument of Atty. De Vera that, assuming his
removal as IBP Governor and EVP was valid, his replacement as IBP EVP should come
from Eastern Mindanao Region pursuant to the rotation rule set forth in Article VII, Section
47, of the IBP By-Laws.
According to Article VII, Section 47, of the IBP By-Laws, the EVP shall be chosen by the
Board of Governors from among the nine Regional Governors, as much as practicable, on a
rotation basis. This is based on our pronouncements in Bar Matter 491, wherein we ruled:
"ORDER
xxxx
3. The former system of having the IBP President and Executive Vice-President
elected by the Board of Governors (composed of the governors of the nine [9] IBP
regions) from among themselves (as provided in Sec. 47, Art. VII, Original IBP ByLaws) should be restored. The right of automatic succession by the Executive VicePresident to the presidency upon the expiration of their two-year term (which was
abolished by this Court's resolution dated July 9, 1985 in Bar Matter No. 287) should
be as it is hereby restored.
4. At the end of the President's two-year term, the Executive Vice-President shall
automatically succeed to the office of president. The incoming board of governors
shall then elect an Executive Vice-President from among themselves. The position
of Executive Vice-President shall be rotated among the nine (9) IBP
regions. One who has served as president may not run for election as Executive
Vice-President in a succeeding election until after the rotation of the presidency
among the nine (9) regions shall have been completed; whereupon, the rotation shall
begin anew.
xxxx
(Emphasis Supplied)"

In Bar Matter 491, it is clear that it is the position of IBP EVP which is actually rotated
among the nine Regional Governors. The rotation with respect to the Presidency is merely a
result of the automatic succession rule of the IBP EVP to the Presidency. Thus, the rotation
rule pertains in particular to the position of IBP EVP, while the automatic succession rule
pertains to the Presidency. The rotation with respect to the Presidency is but a consequence
of the automatic succession rule provided in Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws.
In the case at bar, the rotation rule was duly complied with since upon the election of Atty.
De Vera as IBP EVP, each of the nine IBP regions had already produced an EVP and, thus,
the rotation was completed. It is only unfortunate that the supervening event of Atty. de
Vera's removal as IBP Governor and EVP rendered it impossible for him to assume the IBP
Presidency. The fact remains, however, that the rotation rule had been completed despite
the non-assumption by Atty. de Vera to the IBP Presidency.
Moreover, the application of the rotation rule is not a license to disregard the spirit and
purpose of the automatic succession rule, but should be applied in harmony with the latter.
The automatic succession rule affords the IBP leadership transition seamless and enables
the new IBP National President to attend to pressing and urgent matters without having to
expend valuable time for the usual adjustment and leadership consolidation period. The
time that an IBP EVP spends assisting a sitting IBP President on matters national in scope
is in fact a valuable and indispensable preparation for the eventual succession. It should
also be pointed out that this wisdom is further underscored by the fact that an IBP EVP is
elected from among the members of the IBP Board of Governors, who are serving in a
national capacity, and not from the members at large. It is intrinsic in the IBP By-Laws that
one who is to assume the highest position in the IBP must have been exposed to the
demands and responsibilities of national leadership.
It would therefore be consistent with the purpose and spirit of the automatic succession rule
for Governor Salazar to assume the post of IBP President. By electing the replacement EVP
from among the members of the 2003-2005 Board of Governors, the IBP benefits from the
experience of the IBP EVP of 2003-2005 in this case, Governor Salazar who would
have served in a national capacity prior to his assumption of the highest position.
It will also be inconsistent with the purpose and spirit of the automatic succession rule if the
EVP for the term 2003-2005 will be elected exclusively by the members of the House of
Delegates of the Eastern Mindanao region. This Court notes that the removal of Atty. De
Vera in 13 May 2005 was about a month before the expiration of the term of office of the
2003-2005 Board of Governors. Hence, the replacement Governor would not have been
able to serve in a national capacity for two years prior to assuming the IBP Presidency.
In any case, Section 47 of the IBP Rules uses the phrase "as much as practicable" to
clearly indicate that the rotation rule is not a rigid and inflexible rule as to bar exceptions in
compelling and exceptional circumstances.

It is in view of the foregoing that the argument advanced by Atty. De Vera that the IBP
national presidency should be assumed by a nominee from Eastern Mindanao region from
where he comes, can not hold water. It would go against the intent of the IBP By-Laws for
such a nominee would be bereft of the wealth of experience and the perspective that only
one who is honed in service while serving in a national post in the IBP would have.
We therefore rule that the IBP Board of Governors acted in accordance with the IBP ByLaws, in electing Atty. Salazar as IBP EVP and in ensuring a succession in the leadership of
the IBP. Had the Board of Governors not done so, there would have been no one qualified
to assume the Presidency of the IBP on 1 July 2005, pursuant to Section 47 of the IBP ByLaws.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we rule as follows:
1) SUSPEND Atty. Leonard de Vera in A.C. No. 6697 from the practice of law for
TWO (2) YEARS, effective from the finality of this Resolution. Let a copy of this
Resolution be attached to the personal record of Atty. Leonard de Vera and copies
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator for dissemination to all courts;
2) DISMISS the letter-complaint of Atty. Leonard de Vera, dated 18 May 2005, in
A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC, praying for the disapproval of the Resolution, dated 13 May
2005, of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines removing
him from his posts as Governor and Executive Vice President of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, the said Resolution having been rendered without grave abuse of
discretion;
3) AFFIRM the election by the Board of Governors of Atty. Jose Vicente B. Salazar
as Executive Vice President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the remainder
of the term 2003-2005, such having been conducted in accordance with its By-Laws
and absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion; and
4) DIRECT Atty. Jose Vicente B. Salazar to immediately take his oath of office and
assume the Presidency of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the term 20052007 in accordance with the automatic succession rule in Article VII, Section 47 of
the IBP By-Laws, upon receipt of this Resolution.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Puno, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,
Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario,
Garcia, Velasco, Jr., J.J., concur.

LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE

G.R. No. 154207

April 27, 2007

FERDINAND A. CRUZ, Petitioner,

vs.
ALBERTO MINA, HON. ELEUTERIO F. GUERRERO and HON. ZENAIDA
LAGUILLES, Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, grounded
on pure questions of law, with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction assailing the Resolution
dated May 3, 2002 promulgated by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 116, Pasay City,
in Civil Case No. 02-0137, which denied the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
against the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 45, Pasay City, in Criminal Case No.
00-1705;1 and the RTCs Order dated June 5, 2002 denying the Motion for Reconsideration.
No writ of preliminary injunction was issued by this Court.
The antecedents:
On September 25, 2000, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) filed before the MeTC a formal
Entry of Appearance, as private prosecutor, in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 for Grave
Threats, where his father, Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness.
The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law student, justifies his appearance as
private prosecutor on the bases of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the
ruling of the Court En Banc in Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz, Jr.2 that a non-lawyer may
appear before the inferior courts as an agent or friend of a party litigant. The petitioner
furthermore avers that his appearance was with the prior conformity of the public prosecutor
and a written authority of Mariano Cruz appointing him to be his agent in the prosecution of
the said criminal case.
However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC denied permission for petitioner to
appear as private prosecutor on the ground that Circular No. 19 governing limited law
student practice in conjunction with Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court (Law Student Practice
Rule) should take precedence over the ruling of the Court laid down in Cantimbuhan; and
set the case for continuation of trial. 3

On February 13, 2002, petitioner filed before the MeTC a Motion for Reconsideration
seeking to reverse the February 1, 2002 Order alleging that Rule 138-A, or the Law Student
Practice Rule, does not have the effect of superseding Section 34 of Rule 138, for the
authority to interpret the rule is the source itself of the rule, which is the Supreme Court
alone.
In an Order dated March 4, 2002, the MeTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration.
On April 2, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus
with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order against the private
respondent and the public respondent MeTC.
After hearing the prayer for preliminary injunction to restrain public respondent MeTC Judge
from proceeding with Criminal Case No. 00-1705 pending the Certiorari proceedings, the
RTC, in a Resolution dated May 3, 2002, resolved to deny the issuance of an injunctive writ
on the ground that the crime of Grave Threats, the subject of Criminal Case No. 00-1705, is
one that can be prosecuted de oficio, there being no claim for civil indemnity, and that
therefore, the intervention of a private prosecutor is not legally tenable.
On May 9, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Reconsideration. The
petitioner argues that nowhere does the law provide that the crime of Grave Threats has no
civil aspect. And last, petitioner cites Bar Matter No. 730 dated June 10, 1997 which
expressly provides for the appearance of a non-lawyer before the inferior courts, as an
agent or friend of a party litigant, even without the supervision of a member of the bar.
Pending the resolution of the foregoing Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC, the
petitioner filed a Second Motion for Reconsideration dated June 7, 2002 with the MeTC
seeking the reversal of the March 4, 2002 Denial Order of the said court, on the strength of
Bar Matter No. 730, and a Motion to Hold In Abeyance the Trial dated June 10, 2002 of
Criminal Case No. 00-1705 pending the outcome of the certiorari proceedings before the
RTC.
On June 5, 2002, the RTC issued its Order denying the petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.
Likewise, in an Order dated June 13, 2002, the MeTC denied the petitioners Second
Motion for Reconsideration and his Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Trial on the ground that
the RTC had already denied the Entry of Appearance of petitioner before the MeTC.
On July 30, 2002, the petitioner directly filed with this Court, the instant Petition and assigns
the following errors:
I.

the respondent regional trial court abused its discretion when it resolved to deny the prayer
for the writ of injunction of the herein petitioner despite petitioner having established the
necessity of granting the writ;
II.
THE RESPONDENT TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION, TANTAMOUNT TO
IGNORANCE OF THE LAW, WHEN IT RESOLVED TO DENY THE PRAYER FOR THE
WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND THE SUBSEQUENT MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF THE HEREIN PETITIONER ON THE BASIS THAT [GRAVE]
THREATS HAS NO CIVIL ASPECT, FOR THE SAID BASIS OF DENIAL IS NOT IN
ACCORD WITH THE LAW;
III.
THE RESPONDENT METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN
IT DENIED THE MOTION TO HOLD IN ABEYANCE TRIAL, WHEN WHAT WAS DENIED
BY THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION and WHEN THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
IS YET TO DECIDE ON THE MERITS OF THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI;
IV.
THE RESPONDENT COURT[s] ARE CLEARLY IGNORING THE LAW WHEN THEY
PATENTLY REFUSED TO HEED TO [sic] THE CLEAR MANDATE OF THE LAPUT,
CANTIMBUHAN AND BULACAN CASES, AS WELL AS BAR MATTER NO. 730,
PROVIDING FOR THE APPEARANCE OF NON-LAWYERS BEFORE THE LOWER
COURTS (MTCS).4
This Court, in exceptional cases, and for compelling reasons, or if warranted by the nature
of the issues reviewed, may take cognizance of petitions filed directly before it. 5
Considering that this case involves the interpretation, clarification, and implementation of
Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, Bar Matter No. 730, Circular No. 19 governing
law student practice and Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, and the ruling of the Court
in Cantimbuhan, the Court takes cognizance of herein petition.
The basic question is whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior
court as an agent or friend of a party litigant.
The courts a quo held that the Law Student Practice Rule as encapsulated in Rule 138-A of
the Rules of Court, prohibits the petitioner, as a law student, from entering his appearance

in behalf of his father, the private complainant in the criminal case without the supervision of
an attorney duly accredited by the law school.
Rule 138-A or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides:
RULE 138-A
LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE
Section 1. Conditions for Student Practice. A law student who has successfully completed
his 3rd year of the regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a
recognized law school's clinical legal education program approved by the Supreme Court,
may appear without compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative case before any
trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic
of the law school.
Sec. 2. Appearance. The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be
under the direct supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
duly accredited by the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or
other papers to be filed, must be signed by the supervising attorney for and in behalf of the
legal clinic.
However, in Resolution6 dated June 10, 1997 in Bar Matter No. 730, the Court En Banc
clarified:
The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior court, where the
issues and procedure are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear in
his personal capacity without the supervision of a lawyer. Section 34, Rule 138 provides:
Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the court of a justice of the peace, a party
may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for
that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his
litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or
by a duly authorized member of the bar.
Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party
without the supervision of a member of the bar.7 (Emphasis supplied)
The phrase "In the court of a justice of the peace" in Bar Matter No. 730 is subsequently
changed to "In the court of a municipality" as it now appears in Section 34 of Rule 138,
thus:8
SEC. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. In the Court of a municipality a party may
conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that

purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation
personally or by aid of an attorney and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly
authorized member of the bar. (Emphasis supplied)
which is the prevailing rule at the time the petitioner filed his Entry of Appearance with the
MeTC on September 25, 2000. No real distinction exists for under Section 6, Rule 5 of the
Rules of Court, the term "Municipal Trial Courts" as used in these Rules shall include
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
There is really no problem as to the application of Section 34 of Rule 138 and Rule 138-A.
In the former, the appearance of a non-lawyer, as an agent or friend of a party litigant, is
expressly allowed, while the latter rule provides for conditions when a law student, not as an
agent or a friend of a party litigant, may appear before the courts.
Petitioner expressly anchored his appearance on Section 34 of Rule 138. The court a
quo must have been confused by the fact that petitioner referred to himself as a law student
in his entry of appearance. Rule 138-A should not have been used by the courts a quo in
denying permission to act as private prosecutor against petitioner for the simple reason that
Rule 138-A is not the basis for the petitioners appearance.
Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that appearance before the inferior courts by a non-lawyer is
allowed, irrespective of whether or not he is a law student. As succinctly clarified in Bar
Matter No. 730, by virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may appear, as an agent or
a friend of a party litigant, without the supervision of a lawyer before inferior courts.
Petitioner further argues that the RTC erroneously held that, by its very nature, no civil
liability may flow from the crime of Grave Threats, and, for this reason, the intervention of a
private prosecutor is not possible.
It is clear from the RTC Decision that no such conclusion had been intended by the RTC. In
denying the issuance of the injunctive court, the RTC stated in its Decision that there was
no claim for civil liability by the private complainant for damages, and that the records of the
case do not provide for a claim for indemnity; and that therefore, petitioners appearance as
private prosecutor appears to be legally untenable.
Under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, every person criminally liable for a felony is
also civilly liable except in instances when no actual damage results from an offense, such
as espionage, violation of neutrality, flight to an enemy country, and crime against popular
representation.9 The basic rule applies in the instant case, such that when a criminal action
is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged
shall be deemed instituted with criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil

action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action.10
The petitioner is correct in stating that there being no reservation, waiver, nor prior
institution of the civil aspect in Criminal Case No. 00-1705, it follows that the civil aspect
arising from Grave Threats is deemed instituted with the criminal action, and, hence, the
private prosecutor may rightfully intervene to prosecute the civil aspect.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution and Order of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 116, Pasay City are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 45, Pasay City is DIRECTED to ADMIT the Entry of
Appearance of petitioner in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 as a private prosecutor under the
direct control and supervision of the public prosecutor.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

THE LAWYERS OATH

B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATH-TAKING OF
SUCCESSFUL BAR APPLICANT AL C. ARGOSINO, petitioner.
RESOLUTION

FELICIANO, J.:
A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992 with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 101, charging Mr. A.C. Argosino along with thirteen (13) other individuals, with
the crime of homicide in connection with the death of one Raul Camaligan on 8 September
1991. The death of Raul Camaligan stemmed from the infliction of severe physical injuries
upon him in the course of "hazing" conducted as part of university fraternity initiation rites.
Mr. Argosino and his co-accused then entered into plea bargaining with the prosecution and
as a result of such bargaining, pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of homicide through
reckless imprudence. This plea was accepted by the trial court. In a judgment dated 11

February 1993, each of the fourteen (14) accused individuals was sentenced to suffer
imprisonment for a period ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to
four (4) years.
Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an application for probation
with the lower court. The application for probation was granted in an Order dated 18 June
1993 issued by Regional Trial Court Judge Pedro T. Santiago. The period of probation was
set at two (2) years, counted from the probationer's initial report to the probation officer
assigned to supervise him.
Less than a month later, on 13 July 1993, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition for Admission to Take
the 1993 Bar Examinations. In this Petition, he disclosed the fact of his criminal conviction
and his then probation status. He was allowed to take the 1993 Bar Examinations in this
Court's En Banc Resolution dated 14 August 1993. 1 He passed the Bar Examination. He
was not, however, allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office.
On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this Court to allow him to take the
attorney's oath of office and to admit him to the practice of law, averring that Judge Pedro T.
Santiago had terminated his probation period by virtue of an Order dated 11 April 1994. We
note that his probation period did not last for more than ten (10) months from the time of the
Order of Judge Santiago granting him probation dated 18 June 1993. Since then, Mr.
Argosino has filed three (3) Motions for Early Resolution of his Petition for Admission to the
Bar.
The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to
everyone who demands it. Rather, it is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of good
moral character, with special educational qualifications, duly ascertained and certified. 2 The
essentiality of good moral character in those who would be lawyers is stressed in the
following excerpts which we quote with approval and which we regard as having persuasive
effect:
In Re Farmer: 3
xxx xxx xxx
This "upright character" prescribed by the statute, as a condition precedent to
the applicant's right to receive a license to practice law in North Carolina, and
of which he must, in addition to other requisites, satisfy the court, includes all
the elements necessary to make up such a character. It is something more
than an absence of bad character. It is the good name which the applicant
has acquired, or should have acquired, through association with his fellows. It
means that he must have conducted himself as a man of upright character
ordinarily would, or should, or does. Such character expresses itself, not in

negatives nor in following the line of least resistance, but quite often, in the
will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right, and the resolve not to do the
pleasant thing if it is wrong. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
And we may pause to say that this requirement of the statute is eminently
proper. Consider for a moment the duties of a lawyer. He is sought as
counsellor, and his advice comes home, in its ultimate effect, to every man's
fireside. Vast interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient
of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals with is client's
property, reputation, his life, his all. An attorney at law is a sworn officer of the
Court, whose chief concern, as such, is to aid the administration of
justice. . . .
xxx xxx xxx 4
In Re Application of Kaufman, 5 citing Re Law Examination of 1926 (1926)
191 Wis 359, 210 NW 710:
It can also be truthfully said that there exists nowhere greater temptations to
deviate from the straight and narrow path than in the multiplicity of
circumstances that arise in the practice of profession. For these reasons the
wisdom of requiring an applicant for admission to the bar to possess a high
moral standard therefore becomes clearly apparent, and the board of bar
examiners as an arm of the court, is required to cause a minute examination
to be made of the moral standard of each candidate for admission to practice.
. . . It needs no further argument, therefore, to arrive at the conclusion
that the highest degree of scrutiny must be exercised as to the moral
character of a candidate who presents himself for admission to the bar. The
evil must, if possible, be successfully met at its very source, and prevented,
for, after a lawyer has once been admitted, and has pursued his profession,
and has established himself therein, a far more difficult situation is presented
to the court when proceedings are instituted for disbarment and for the
recalling and annulment of his license.
In Re Keenan: 6
The right to practice law is not one of the inherent rights of every citizen, as in
the right to carry on an ordinary trade or business. It is a peculiar privilege
granted and continued only to those who demonstrate special fitness in
intellectual attainment and in moral character. All may aspire to it on an
absolutely equal basis, but not all will attain it. Elaborate machinery has been

set up to test applicants by standards fair to all and to separate the fit from
the unfit. Only those who pass the test are allowed to enter the profession,
and only those who maintain the standards are allowed to remain in it.
Re Rouss: 7
Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, and a fair
private and professional character is one of them; to refuse admission to an
unworthy applicant is not to punish him for past offense: an examination into
character, like the examination into learning, is merely a test of fitness.
Cobb vs. Judge of Superior Court: 8
Attorney's are licensed because of their learning and ability, so that they may
not only protect the rights and interests of their clients, but be able to assist
court in the trial of the cause. Yet what protection to clients or assistance to
courts could such agents give? They are required to be of good moral
character, so that the agents and officers of the court, which they are, may
not bring discredit upon the due administration of the law, and it is of the
highest possible consequence that both those who have not such
qualifications in the first instance, or who, having had them, have fallen
therefrom, shall not be permitted to appear in courts to aid in the
administration of justice.
It has also been stressed that the requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of greater
importance so far as the general public and the proper administration of justice are
concerned, than the possession of legal learning:
. . . (In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E. 635, 143 N.C. 1, 10 L.R.A. [N.S.]
288, 10 Ann./Cas. 187):
The public policy of our state has always been to admit no
person to the practice of the law unless he covered an upright
moral character. The possession of this by the attorney is more
important, if anything, to the public and to the proper
administration of justice than legal learning. Legal learning may
be acquired in after years, but if the applicant passes the
threshold of the bar with a bad moral character the chances are
that his character will remain bad, and that he will become a
disgrace instead of an ornament to his great calling a curse
instead of a benefit to his community a Quirk, a Gammon or
a Snap, instead of a Davis, a Smith or a Ruffin. 9

All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those seeking
admission to the Bar. The scope of such inquiry is, indeed, said to be properly broader than
inquiry into the moral proceedings for disbarment:
Re Stepsay: 10
The inquiry as to the moral character of an attorney in a proceeding for his
admission to practice is broader in scope than in a disbarment proceeding.
Re Wells: 11
. . . that an applicant's contention that upon application for admission to the
California Bar the court cannot reject him for want of good moral character
unless it appears that he has been guilty of acts which would be cause for his
disbarment or suspension, could not be sustained; that the inquiry is broader
in its scope than that in a disbarment proceeding, and the court may
receive any evidence which tends to show the applicant's character as
respects honesty, integrity, and general morality, and may no doubt refuse
admission upon proofs that might not establish his guilt of any of the acts
declared to be causes for disbarment.
The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would seek
admission to the bar must of necessity be more stringent than the norm of conduct
expected from members of the general public. There is a very real need to prevent a
general perception that entry into the legal profession is open to individuals with inadequate
moral qualifications. The growth of such a perception would signal the progressive
destruction of our people's confidence in their courts of law and in our legal system as we
know it. 12
Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable "hazing" activities certainly fell far short of the
required standard of good moral character. The deliberate (rather than merely accidental or
inadvertent) infliction of severe physical injuries which proximately led to the death of the
unfortunate Raul Camaligan, certainly indicated serious character flaws on the part of those
who inflicted such injuries. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused had failed to discharge their
moral duty to protect the life and well-being of a "neophyte" who had, by seeking admission
to the fraternity involved, reposed trust and confidence in all of them that, at the very least,
he would not be beaten and kicked to death like a useless stray dog. Thus, participation in
the prolonged and mindless physical beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted
evident rejection of that moral duty and was totally irresponsible behavior, which makes
impossible a finding that the participant was then possessed of good moral character.
Now that the original period of probation granted by the trial court has expired, the Court is
prepared to consider de novo the question of whether applicant A.C. Argosino has purged

himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character referred to above. We stress that good
moral character is a requirement possession of which must be demonstrated not only at the
time of application for permission to take the bar examinations but also, and more
importantly, at the time of application for admission to the bar and to take the attorney's oath
of office.
Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for its examination and consideration,
evidence that he may be now regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral
character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar. His evidence may
consist, inter alia, of sworn certifications from responsible members of the community who
have a good reputation for truth and who have actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant
period of time, particularly since the judgment of conviction was rendered by Judge
Santiago. He should show to the Court how he has tried to make up for the senseless killing
of a helpless student to the family of the deceased student and to the community at large.
Mr. Argosino must, in other words, submit relevant evidence to show that he is a different
person now, that he has become morally fit for admission to the ancient and learned
profession of the law.
Finally, Mr. Argosino is hereby DIRECTED to inform this Court, by appropriate written
manifestation, of the names and addresses of the father and mother (in default thereof,
brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan), within ten (10) day from notice hereof. Let a
copy of this Resolution be furnished to the parents or brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul
Camaligan.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J. is on leave.

MEMBERSHIP IN THE IBP

A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978
In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION
(IBP Administrative Case No. MDD-1)
RESOLUTION

CASTRO, C.J.:

The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines.
On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of
Governors unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1
(In the Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon)
recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of
Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's
constitution notwithstanding due notice.
On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said
resolution to the Court for consideration and approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24,
Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP, which reads:
.... Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the
Board shall promptly inquire into the cause or causes of the continued
delinquency and take whatever action it shall deem appropriate, including a
recommendation to the Supreme Court for the removal of the delinquent
member's name from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action taken shall be
sent by registered mail to the member and to the Secretary of the Chapter
concerned.
On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution and
letter adverted to above; he submitted his comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his
refusal to pay the membership fees due from him.
On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to
reply to Edillon's comment: on March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply.
Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were
required to submit memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was
thenceforth submitted for resolution.
At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's pleadings would show that the
propriety and necessity of the integration of the Bar of the Philippines are in essence
conceded. The respondent, however, objects to particular features of Rule of Court 139-A
(hereinafter referred to as the Court Rule) 1 in accordance with which the Bar of the
Philippines was integrated and to the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the
IBP By-Laws (hereinabove cited).
The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court the
removal of a delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys is found in par. 2 Section
24, Article Ill of the IBP By-Laws (supra), whereas the authority of the Court to issue the
order applied for is found in Section 10 of the Court Rule, which reads:

SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. Subject to the provisions of

Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months
shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in
such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of
the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.
The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is stated in these words
of the Court Rule:
SECTION 1. Organization. There is hereby organized an official national
body to be known as the 'Integrated Bar of the Philippines,' composed of all
persons whose names now appear or may hereafter be included in the Roll of
Attorneys of the Supreme Court.
The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words of the Court Rule:
SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay
such annual dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the
approval of the Supreme Court. ...
The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion
of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to
maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay
the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of
the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived
of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the
respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are
void and of no legal force and effect.
The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the
Roll of Attorneys, contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable
by the Court but is rather of an "administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body."
The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court relating to constitutional
issues that inevitably and inextricably come up to the surface whenever attempts are made
to regulate the practice of law, define the conditions of such practice, or revoke the license
granted for the exercise of the legal profession.
The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised in a previous case before
the Court, entitled "Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for the
Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners." The Court
exhaustively considered all these matters in that case in its Resolution ordaining the

integration of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on January 9, 1973. The Court there
made the unanimous pronouncement that it was
... fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the
arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials
and the mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the
Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is
'perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable'. ...
Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court.
An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as
distinguished from bar associations organized by individual lawyers themselves,
membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which
every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in carrying out the
objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized
by or under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an official national body of which
all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules
prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a
reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence
to a code of professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of which constitutes
sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a
recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending member. 2
The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding considerations of
public interest and public welfare to such an extent as more than constitutionally and legally
justifies the restrictions that integration imposes upon the personal interests and personal
convenience of individual lawyers. 3
Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the integration of the
Bar have been uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power
over an important profession. The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a
privilege moreover clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not
only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation,
and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State the administration of
justice as an officer of the court. 4 The practice of law being clothed with public interest,
the holder of this privilege must submit to a degree of control for the common good, to the
extent of the interest he has created. As the U. S. Supreme Court through Mr. Justice
Roberts explained, the expression "affected with a public interest" is the equivalent of
"subject to the exercise of the police power" (Nebbia vs. New York, 291 U.S. 502).
When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397 5 authorizing the Supreme Court
to "adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions

as it shall see fit," it did so in the exercise of the paramount police power of the State. The
Act's avowal is to "raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of
justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively." Hence,
the Congress in enacting such Act, the Court in ordaining the integration of the Bar through
its Resolution promulgated on January 9, 1973, and the President of the Philippines in
decreeing the constitution of the IBP into a body corporate through Presidential Decree No.
181 dated May 4, 1973, were prompted by fundamental considerations of public welfare
and motivated by a desire to meet the demands of pressing public necessity.
The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and regulate personal
liberty, property and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to restraints and
burdens in order to secure the general prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez
Jesus, 31 Phil 218), for, as the Latin maxim goes, "Salus populi est supreme lex." The
public welfare is the supreme law. To this fundamental principle of government the rights of
individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty
should not be made to prevail over authority because then society win fall into anarchy
(Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an undoubted power of the State to restrain some
individuals from all freedom, and all individuals from some freedom.
But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and validity of Bar
integration in the Philippines is the explicit unequivocal grant of precise power to the
Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of Article X of the 1973 Constitution of the Philippines,
which reads:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and pro. procedure in all
courts, and the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the
Bar ...,
and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:
SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme
Court may adopt rules of Court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar
under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the
legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to
discharge its public responsibility more effectively.
Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the enabling Act (Republic Act
No. 6397), and looking solely to the language of the provision of the Constitution granting
the Supreme Court the power "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and

procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law," it at once becomes
indubitable that this constitutional declaration vests the Supreme Court with plenary power
in all cases regarding the admission to and supervision of the practice of law.
Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law
and his exercise of the said profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are)
subject to the power of the body politic to require him to conform to such regulations as
might be established by the proper authorities for the common good, even to the extent of
interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to submit himself to such reasonable
interference and regulation, he should not have clothed the public with an interest in his
concerns.
On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall.
The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now concisely deal with
them seriatim.
1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without power to compel
him to become a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the
Court Rule is unconstitutional for it impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to
associate (and not to associate). Our answer is: To compel a lawyer to be a member of the
Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate. 6
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a
member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. 7 All that
integration actually does is to provide an official national organization for the well-defined
but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is a ready a member. 8
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or
not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its
elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of
annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in
elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving
the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory
program the lawyers. 9
Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of
the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the
State. 10
2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the Court Rule
requiring payment of a membership fee is void. We see nothing in the Constitution that
prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning

the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X,
Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) which power the respondent acknowledges from
requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee
toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is
quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise
funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration. 11
3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty provisions would
amount to a deprivation of property without due process and hence infringes on one of his
constitutional rights. Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being
one that entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to
consider at length, as it clear that under the police power of the State, and under the
necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to
practise law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation
and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then
a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by
payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. 12
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere
privilege, 13 and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact
compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.
4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the
name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of
admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and
supervision have been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and
responsibilities, and the authorities holding such are legion. 14
In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the report of the Board of Bar
Commissioners in a disbarment proceeding was confirmed and disbarment ordered, the
court, sustaining the Bar Integration Act of Kentucky, said: "The power to regulate the
conduct and qualifications of its officers does not depend upon constitutional or statutory
grounds. It is a power which is inherent in this court as a court appropriate, indeed
necessary, to the proper administration of justice ... the argument that this is an arbitrary
power which the court is arrogating to itself or accepting from the legislative likewise
misconceives the nature of the duty. It has limitations no less real because they are
inherent. It is an unpleasant task to sit in judgment upon a brother member of the Bar,
particularly where, as here, the facts are disputed. It is a grave responsibility, to be assumed
only with a determination to uphold the Ideals and traditions of an honorable profession and
to protect the public from overreaching and fraud. The very burden of the duty is itself a
guaranty that the power will not be misused or prostituted. ..."

The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when it explicitly
granted to the Court the power to "Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice ... and
the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar ... (Article X, Sec. 5(5) the
power to pass upon the fitness of the respondent to remain a member of the legal
profession is indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court.
We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court that the
respondent Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby
ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.
Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Muoz Palma, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr.,
Santos, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.

Canon 1 Promote and Respect Law and Legal Process

Link for: Adegoke R. Plumptre vs. Atty. Socrates R. Rivera
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
file=/jurisprudence/2016/august2016/11350.pdf

Canon 1 Promote and Respect Law and Legal Process

G.R. Nos. 79690-707 October 7, 1988
ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and HONORABLE RAUL M. GONZALEZ, claiming
to be and acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution, respondents.
G.R. No. 80578 October 7, 1988
ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,
vs.

HON. RAUL M. GONZALEZ, claiming to be and acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman

ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution, respondent.

PER CURIAM:
The following are the subjects of this Resolution:
1) a Motion, dated 9 February 1988, to Cite in Contempt filed by petitioner Enrique A.
Zaldivar against public respondent Special Prosecutor (formerly Tanodbayan) Raul M.
Gonzalez, in connection with G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and G.R. No. 80578. and 2) a
Resolution of this Court dated 2 May 1988 requiring respondent Hon. Raul Gonzalez to
show cause why he should not be punished for contempt and/or subjected to administrative
sanctions for making certain public statements.
I
The pertinent facts are as follows:
Petitioner Zaldivar is one of several defendants in Criminal Cases Nos.
12159-12161 and 12163-12177 (for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act)
pending before the Sandiganbayan. The Office of the Tanodbayan conducted the
preliminary investigation and filed the criminal informations in those cases (originally TBP
Case No. 86-00778).
On 10 September 1987, petitioner filed with this Court a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition
and mandamus (G.R. Nos. 79690-707) naming as respondents both the Sandiganbayan
and Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez. Among other things, petitioner assailed: (1) the 5 February
1987 Resolution 1 of the "Tanodbayan" recommending the filing of criminal informations
against petitioner Zaldivar and his co-accused in TBP Case No. 86-00778; and (2) the 1
September 1987 Resolution 2 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases Nos. 12159-12161
and 1216312177 denying his Motion to Quash the criminal informations filed in those cases
by the "Tanodbayan." In this respect, petitioner alleged that respondent Gonzalez, as
Tanodbayan and under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, was no longer vested with
power and authority independently to investigate and to institute criminal cases for graft and
corruption against public officials and employees, and hence that the informations filed in
Criminal Cases Nos. 12159-12161 and 12163-12177 were all null and void.
On 11 September 1987, this Court issued a Resolution, which read:
G.R. Nos. 79690-707 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. The Honorable Sandiganbayan
and Honorable Raul M. Gonzalez, Claiming To Be and Acting as Tanodbayan-

Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution ).Acting on the special civil action
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
with urgent motion for preliminary elimination injunction, the Court Resolved,
without giving due course to the petition, to require the respondents to
COMMENT thereon, within ten (10) days from notice.
The Court further Resolved to ISSUE a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this
Court, ordering respondent Sandiganbayan to CEASE and DESIST from
hearing and trying Criminal Cases Nos. 12159 to 12161 and 12163 to 12177
insofar as petitioner Enrique Zaldivar is concerned and from hearing and
resolving the Special Prosecutor's motion to suspend dated September 3,
1987.
The parties later filed their respective pleadings.
Petitioner Zaldivar filed with this Court a second Petition for certiorari and Prohibition (G.R.
No. 80578) on 19 November 1987, initially naming only Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez as
respondent. That Petition assailed the 24 September 1987 Resolution 3 of the "Tanodbayan"
in TBP Case No. 87- 01304 recommending that additional criminal charges for graft and
corruption be filed against petitioner Zaldivar and five (5) other individuals. Once again,
petitioner raised the argument of the Tanodbayan's lack of authority under the 1987
Constitution to file such criminal cases and to investigate the same. Petitioner also moved
for the consolidation of that petition with G.R. No. 79690-707.
In a Resolution dated 24 November 1987, 4 this Court, without giving due course to the
second petition: (1) required respondent Gonzalez to submit a comment thereon: and (2)
issued a temporary restraining order "ordering respondent Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez to
CEASE and DESIST from further acting in TBP Case No. 87-01394 ... and particularly, from
filing the criminal information consequent thereof and from conducting preliminary
investigation therein." In a separate resolution of the same date, 5 G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and
G.R. No. 80578 were ordered consolidated by the Court.
In the meantime, however, on 20 November 1987 or four (4) days prior to issuance by this
Court of a temporary restraining order in G.R. No. 80578, the Office of the Tanodbayan
instituted Criminal Case No. 12570 6 with the Sandiganbayan which issued on 23 November
1987 an Order of Arrest 7 for petitioner Zaldivar and his co-accused in Criminal Case No.
12570. Upon Motion 8 of petitioner Zaldivar, this Court issued the following Resolution on 8
December 1987:
G.R. No. 80578 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez and
Sandiganbayan). The motion filed by the Solicitor General for respondents for
an extension of thirty (30) days from the expiration of the original period within

which to file comment on the petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer
for a writ of preliminary injunction or restraining order is GRANTED.
Acting on the manifestation with motion to treat the Sandiganbayan as partyrespondent, the Court Resolved to (a) Consider IMPLEADED the
Sandiganbayan as party respondent; and (b) In pursuance of and
supplementing the Temporary Restraining Order of November 24, 1987
"ordering respondent Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez to CEASE and DESIST from
further acting in TBP Case No. 87-01304 entitled, "Commission on Audit vs.
Gov. Enrique Zaldivar, et al." and particularly, from filing the criminal
information consequent thereof and from conducting preliminary investigation
therein" ISSUE a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER effective
immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, ordering
respondents Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez and Sandiganbayan to CEASE and
DESIST from further acting in Criminal Case No. 12570, entitled, "People of
the Philippines vs. Enrique M. Zaldivar, et al." and from enforcing the order of
arrest issued by the Sandiganbayan in said case.
The Solicitor General filed a Comment 9 on the petition in G.R. No. 80578, and we required
the petitioner to submit a Reply 10 thereto.
On 9 February 1988, petitioner Zaldivar filed with the Court a Motion to Cite in
Contempt 11 directed at respondent Gonzalez. The Motion cited as bases the acts of
respondent Gonzalez in: (1) having caused the filing of the information against petitioner in
Criminal Case No. 12570 before the Sandiganbayan; and (2) issuing certain allegedly
contemptuous statements to the media in relation to the proceedings in G.R. No. 80578. In
respect of the latter, petitioner annexed to his Motion a photocopy of a news article,
reproduced here in toto, which appeared in the 30 November 1987 issue of the "Philippine
Daily Globe:"
Tanod Scores SC for Quashing Graft Case
TANODBAYAN Justice Raul M. Gonzalez said yesterday the Supreme Court
order stopping him from investigating graft cases involving Antique Gov.
Enrique Zaldivar can aggravate the thought that affluent persons "an prevent
the progress of a trial."
What I am afraid of (with the issuance of the order) is that it appears that
while rich and influential persons get favorable actions from the Supreme
Court, it is difficult for an ordinary litigant to get his petition to be given due
course. Gonzalez told the Daily Globe in an exclusive interview.

Gonzalez said the high tribunal's order '"eightens the people's apprehension
over the justice system in this country, especially because the people have
been thinking that only the small fly can get it while big fishes go scot-free."
Gonzalez was reacting to an order issued by the tribunal last week after
Zaldivar petitioned the court to stop the Tanodbayan from investigating graft
cases filed against him.
Zaldivar had charged that Gonzalez was biased in his investigations because
the latter wanted to help promote the political fortunes of a friend from
Antique, lawyer Bonifacio Alentajan.
Acting on Zaldivar's petition, the high court stopped Gonzalez from
investigating a graft charge against the governor, and from instituting any
complaint with the Sandiganbayan.
While President Aquino had been prodding me to prosecute graft cases even
if they involve the high and mighty, the Supreme Court had been restraining
me. Gonzalez said.
In accordance with the President's order, Gonzalez said he had filed graft
cases against two "very powerful" officials of the Aquino governmentCommissioner Quintin Doromal of the Presidential Commission on Good
Government and Secretary Jiamil I.M. Dianlan of the Office of Muslim Affairs
and Cultural Communities.
While I don't wish to discuss the merits of the Zaldivar petition before the
Supreme Court, I am a little bit disturbed that (the order) can aggravate the
thinking of some people that affluent persons can prevent the progress of a
trial, he said.
He disclosed that he had a talk with the Chief Executive over the weekend
and that while she symphatizes with local officials who are charged in court
during election time, 'She said that it might be a disservice to the people and
the voters who are entitled to know their candidates.
Gonzalez said that while some cases filed against local officials during
election time could be mere harassment suits, the Constitution makes it a
right of every citizen to be informed of the character of tile candidate, who
should be subject to scrutiny. (Emphasis supplied)
Acting on petitioner's Motion to Cite in Contempt, the Court on 16 February 1988 required
respondent Gonzalez "to COMMENT on aforesaid Motion within ten (10) days from

notice." 12 On 27 April 1988, the Court rendered its Decision 13 (per curiam) in the
Consolidated Petitions. The dispositive portion thereof read:
WHEREFORE, We hereby:
(1) GRANT the consolidated petitions filed by petitioner Zaldivar and hereby
NULLIFY the criminal informations filed against him in the Sandiganbayan;
and
(2) ORDER respondent Raul Gonzalez to cease and desist from conducting
investigations and filing criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan or otherwise
exercising the powers and functions of the Ombudsman.
SO ORDERED.
A Motion for Reconsideration 14 was filed by respondent Gonzalez the next day, 28 April
1988. In his Motion, respondent Gonzalez, after having argued the legal merits of his
position, made the following statements totally unrelated to any legal issue raised either in
the Court's Decision or in his own Motion:
1. That he "ha(d) been approached twice by a leading member of the court ...
and he was asked to 'go slow on Zaldivar and 'not to be too hard on him;' "
2. That he "was approached and asked to refrain from investigating the COA
report on illegal disbursements in the Supreme Court because 'it will
embarass the Court;" and
3. That "(i)n several instances, the undersigned respondent was called over
the phone by a leading member of the Court and was asked to dismiss the
cases against (two Members of the Court)."
Respondent Gonzalez also attached three (3) handwritten notes 15 which he claimed were
sent by "some members of this Honorable Court, interceeding for cases pending before this
office (i.e., the Tanodbayan)." He either released his Motion for Reconsideration with
facsimiles of said notes to the press or repeated to the press the above extraneous
statements: the metropolitan papers for the next several days carried long reports on those
statements and variations and embellishments thereof On 2 May 1988, the Court issued the
following Resolution in the Consolidated Petitions:
G.R. No. 79690-707 (Enrique Zaldivar vs. The Hon. Sandiganbayan, et al.
G.R. No. 80578 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez, etc).

1. Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent Gonzalez

under date of April 28, 1988, the Court Resolved to REQUIRE the petitioner
to COMMENT thereon within ten (10) days from notice hereof.
2. It appearing that respondent Raul M. Gonzalez has made public
statements to the media which not only deal with matters subjudice but also
appear offensive to and disrespectful of the Court and its individual members
and calculated, directly or indirectly, to bring the Court into disrepute, discredit
and ridicule and to denigrate and degrade the administration of justice, the
Court Resolved to require respondent Gonzalez to explain in writing within
ten (10) days from notice hereof, why he should not be punished for contempt
of court and/or subjected to administrative sanctions for making such public
statements reported in the media, among others, in the issues of the "Daily
Inquirer," the "Journal," the "Manila Times," the "Philippine Star," the "Manila
Chronicle" the "Daily Globe" and the "Manila Standard" of April 29 and 30,
and May 1, 1988, to wit:
(a) That the Court resolution in question is merely "an offshoot of the position
he had taken that the SC Justices cannot claim immunity from suit or
investigation by government prosecutors or motivated by a desire to stop him
'from investigating cases against some of their proteges or friends;"
(b) That no less than six of the members of the Court "interceded for and on
behalf of persons with pending cases before the Tanodbayan," or sought "to
pressure him to render decisions favorable to their colleagues and friends;"
(c) That attempts were made to influence him to go slow on Zaldivar and not
to be too hard on him and to refrain from investigating the Commission on
Audit report on illegal disbursements in the Supreme Court because it will
embarass the Court;
(d) That there were also attempts to cause the dismissal of cases against two
Associate Justices; and
(e) That the Court had dismissed judges' without rhyme or reason' and
disbarred lawyers 'without due process.
3. It further appearing that three (3) affidavits relative to the purpose of and
circumstances attendant upon the notes written to said public respondent by
three (3) members of the Court have since been submitted to the Court and
now form part of its official records, the Court further Resolved to require the
Clerk of Court to ATTACH to this Resolution copies of said sworn statements

and the annexes thereto appended, and to DIRECT respondent Gonzalez

also to comment thereon within the same period of ten (10) days.
4. It finally appearing that notice of the Resolution of February 16, 1988
addressed to respondent Gonzalez was misdelivered and therefore not
served on him, the Court Resolved to require the Clerk of Court to CAUSE
SERVICE of said Resolution on the respondent and to REQUIRE the latter to
comply therewith.
Respondent Gonzalez subsequently filed with this Court on 9 May 1988 an Omnibus Motion
for Extension and Inhibition 16 alleging, among other things: that the above quoted 2 May
1988 Resolution of the Court "appears to have overturned that presumption [of innocence]
against him:" and that "he gravely doubts whether that 'cold neutrality [of an impartial judge]
is still available to him" there being allegedly "at least 4 members of this Tribunal who will
not be able to sit in judgment with substantial sobriety and neutrality." Respondent Gonzalez
closed out his pleading with a prayer that the four (4) Members of the Court Identified and
referred to there by him inhibit themselves in the deliberation and resolution of the Motion to
Cite in Contempt.
On 19 May 1988 17 after receipt of respondent's Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration. 18 this Court in an extended per curiam Resolution 19 denied the Motion
and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. That denial was made "final and immediately
executory.
Respondent Gonzalez has since then filed the following pleadings of record:
1. Manifestation with Supplemental Motion to Inhibition

20

dated 23 May 1988;

2. Motion to Transfer Administrative Proceedures to the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines 21dated 20 May 1988
3. Urgent Motion for Additional Extension of Time to File Explanation Ex
Abundante Cautelam, 22 dated 26 May 1988;
4. Urgent Ex-Parte Omnibus Motion
(a) For Extension of Time
(b) For Inhibition and
(c) For Transfer of Administrative Proceedings to the IBP, Under Rule 139B 23 dated 4 June 1988 (with Annex "A;" 24 an anonymous letter dated 27 May

1988 from the alleged Concerned Employees of the Supreme Court and
addressed to respondent):
5. Ex-Parte Manifestation 25 dated 7 June 1988;
6. Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Reconsideration 26 1988; and
7. Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation with Motion 27 member 1988.
In compliance with the 2 May 1988 Resolution of this Court quoted earlier, respondent
Gonzalez submitted on 17 June 1988 an Answer with Explanation and Comment 28 offering
respondent's legal arguments and defenses against the contempt and disciplinary charges
presently pending before this Court. Attached to that pleading as Annex "A" thereof was
respondent's own personal Explanation/Compliance 29 second explanation called
"Compliance," 30 with annexes, was also submitted by respondent on 22 July 1988.
II
We begin by referring to the authority of the Supreme Court to discipline officers of the court
and members of the Bar. The Supreme Court, as regulator and guardian of the legal
profession, has plenary disciplinary authority over attorneys. The authority to discipline
lawyers stems from the Court's constitutional mandate to regulate admission to the practice
of law, which includes as well authority to regulate the practice itself of
law. 31 Quite apart from this constitutional mandate, the disciplinary authority of the Supreme
Court over members of the Bar is an inherent power incidental to the proper administration
of justice and essential to an orderly discharge of judicial functions. 32 Moreover, the
Supreme Court has inherent power to punish for contempt, to control in the furtherance of
justice the conduct of ministerial officers of the Court including lawyers and all other persons
connected in any manner with a case before the Court. 33 The power to punish for contempt
is "necessary for its own protection against an improper interference with the due
administration of justice," "(it) is not dependent upon the complaint of any of the parties
litigant. 34
There are, in other words, two (2) related powers which come into play in cases like that
before us here; the Court's inherent power to discipline attorneys and the contempt power.
The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar is broader than the power to
punish for contempt. Contempt of court may be committee both by lawyers and nonlawyers, both in and out of court. Frequently, where the contemnor is a lawyer, the
contumacious conduct also constitutes professional misconduct which calls into play the
disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. 35 Where the respondent is a lawyer, however,
the Supreme Court's disciplinary authority over lawyers may come into play whether or not
the misconduct with which the respondent is charged also constitutes contempt of court.
The power to punish for contempt of court does not exhaust the scope of disciplinary

authority of the Court over lawyers. 36 The disciplinary authority of the Court over members
of the Bar is but corollary to the Court's exclusive power of admission to the Bar. A lawyer is
not merely a professional but also an officer of the court and as such, he is called upon to
share in the task and responsibility of dispensing justice and resolving disputes in society.
Any act on his part which visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, or impede and degrade the
administration of justice constitutes both professional misconduct calling for the exercise of
disciplinary action against him, and contumacious conduct warranting application of the
contempt power.
It is sometimes asserted that in the exercise of the power to punish for contempt or of the
disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar, the Court is acting as offended
party, prosecutor and arbiter at one and the same time. Thus, in the present case,
respondent Gonzalez first sought to get some members of the Court to inhibit themselves in
the resolution of this case for alleged bias and prejudice against him. A little later, he in
effect asked the whole Court to inhibit itself from passing upon the issues involved in this
proceeding and to pass on responsibility for this matter to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, upon the ground that respondent cannot expect due process from this Court,
that the Court has become incapable of judging him impartially and fairly. Respondent
Gonzalez misconceives the nature of the proceeding at bar as well as the function of the
members of the Court in such proceeding.
Respondent's contention is scarcely an original one. In In Re Almacen, 37 then Associate
(later Chief) Justice Fred Fruiz Castro had occasion to deal with this contention in the
following lucid manner:
xxx xxx xxx
It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of our authority in
the premises, that, as Atty. Almacen would have it appear, the members of
the Court are the 'complainants, prosecutors and judges' all rolled up into one
in this instance. This is an utter misapprehension, if not a total distortion, not
only of the nature of the proceeding at hand but also of our role therein.
Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the
present are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this
proceeding is notand does not involvea trial of an action or a suit, but is
rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers. Not being
intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution.
Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be
initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and
the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit
person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to

account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of
preserving the purity of the legal profession and the property and honest
administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their
misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with
the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such
posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a
prosecutor.
Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree, aggrieved
parties. Any tirade against the Court as a body is necessarily and inextricably
as much so against the individual members thereof But in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court acts as an entity separate and distinct from the
individual personalities of its members. Consistently with the intrinsic nature
of a collegiate court, the individual members act not as such individuals but
only as a duly constituted court. The distinct individualities are lost in the
majesty of their office. So that, in a very real sense, if there be any
complainant in the case at bar, it can only be the Court itself, not the
individual members thereofas well as the people themselves whose rights,
fortunes and properties, nay, even lives, would be placed at grave hazard
should the administration of justice be threatened by the retention in the Bar
of men unfit to discharge the solemn responsibilities of membership in the
legal fraternity.
Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a
necessary incident of the power to admit persons to said practice. By
constitutional precept, this power is vested exclusively in this Court. This duty
it cannot abdicate just as much as it cannot unilaterally renounce jurisdiction
legally invested upon it. So that even if it be conceded that the members
collectively are in a sense the aggrieved parties, that fact alone does not and
cannot disqualify them from the exercise of the power because public policy
demands that they, acting as a Court, exercise the power in all cases which
call for disciplinary action. The present is such a case. In the end, the
imagined anomaly of the merger in one entity of the personalities of
complainant, prosecutor and judge is absolutely inexistent.
xxx xxx xxx. 38
It should not be necessary for the members of this Court expressly to disclaim any bias or
prejudice against the respondent that would prevent them from acting in accordance with
the exacting requirements of their oaths of office. It also appears to the Court that for all the
members to inhibit themselves from sitting on this case is to abdicate the responsibility with
which the Constitution has burdened them. Reference of complaints against attorneys either
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or to the Solicitor General is not mandatory upon the

Supreme Court; such reference to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or to the Solicitor
General is certainly not an exclusive procedure under the terms of Rule 139-B of the
Revised Rules of Court, especially where the charge consists of acts done before the
Supreme Court. There is no need for further investigation of facts in the present case for it
is not substantially disputed by respondent Gonzalez that he uttered or wrote certain
statements attributed to him. In any case, respondent has had the amplest opportunity to
present his defense; his defense is not that he did not make the statements ascribed to him
but that those statements give rise to no liability on his part, having been made in the
exercise of his freedom of speech. The issues which thus need to be resolved here are
issues of law and of basic policy and the Court, not any other agency, is compelled to
resolve such issues.
III
It is necessary to become very explicit as to what respondent Gonzalez was saying in his
statements set out above. Respondent has not denied making the above statements;
indeed, he acknowledges that the newspaper reports of the statements attributed to him are
substantially correct. 39
Respondent Gonzalez was in effect saying, firstly, that the Supreme Court deliberately
rendered an erroneous or wrong decision when it rendered its per curiam Decision dated 27
April 1988 in G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and 80578. That decision according to respondent
Gonzalez, was issued as an act of retaliation by the Court against him for the position he
had taken "that the (Supreme Court) Justices cannot claim immunity from suit or
investigation by government prosecutors," and in order to stop respondent from
investigating against "some of (the) proteges or friends (of some Supreme Court Justices)."
The Court cannot, of course, and will not debate the correctness of its Decision of 27 April
1988 and of its Resolution dated 19 May 1988 (denying respondent Gonzalez Motion for
Reconsideration) in the consolidated Zaldivar cases. Respondent Gonzalez, and anyone
else for that matter, is free intellectually to accept or not to accept the reasoning of the Court
set out in its per curiam Decision and Resolution in the consolidated Zaldivar cases. This
should not, however, obscure the seriousness of the assault thus undertaken by respondent
against the Court and the appalling implications of such assault for the integrity of the
system of administration of justice in our country. Respondent has said that the Court
rendered its Decision and Resolution without regard to the legal merits of the Zaldivar cases
and had used the judicial process to impose private punishment upon respondent for
positions he had taken (unrelated to the Zaldivar cases) in carrying out his duties. It is very
difficult to imagine a more serious affront to, or a greater outrage upon, the honour and
dignity of this Court than this. Respondent's statement is also totally baseless.
Respondent's statements were made in complete disregard of the fact that his continuing
authority to act as Tanodbayanor Ombudsman after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution,
had been questioned before this Court as early as 10 September 1987 in the Petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus filed against him in these consolidated

Petitions 40 that is, more than seven (7) months before the Court rendered its Decision.
Respondent also ignores the fact that one day later, this Court issued a Temporary
Restraining Order effective immediately ordering the Sandiganbayan to cease and desist
from hearing the criminal cases filed against petitioner Zaldivar by respondent Gonzalez.
Respondent also disregards the fact that on 24 November 1987, upon the filing of a second
Petition for certiorari for Prohibition by Mr. Zaldivar, the Court issued a Temporary
Restraining Order this time requiring the respondent to cease and desist from further acting
in TBP Case No. 87-0934. Thus, the decision finally reached by this Court in April 1988 on
the constitutional law issue pending before the Court for the preceding eight (8) months,
could scarcely have been invented as a reprisal simply against respondent.
A second charge that respondent Gonzalez hurled against members of the Supreme Court
is that they have improperly Id pressured" him to render decisions favorable to their
"colleagues and friends," including dismissal of "cases" against two (2) members of the
Court. This particularly deplorable charge too is entirely baseless, as even a cursory
examination of the contents of the handwritten notes of three (3) members of this Court
addressed to respondent (which respondent attached to his Motion for Reconsideration of
the Decision of this Court of 27 April 1988 in the consolidated Petitions) win show. It is clear,
and respondent Gonzalez does not pretend otherwise, that the subject matters of the said
notes had no relation at all to the issues in G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and 80578. This charge
appears to have been made in order to try to impart some substance (at least in the mind of
respondent) to the first accusation made by respondent that the Court had deliberately
rendered a wrong decision to get even with respondent who had, with great fortitude,
resisted "pressure" from some members of the Court. Once again, in total effect, the
statements made by respondent appear designed to cast the Court into gross disrepute,
and to cause among the general public scorn for and distrust in the Supreme Court and,
more generally, the judicial institutions of the Republic.
Respondent Gonzalez has also asserted that the Court was preventing him from
prosecuting "rich and powerful persons," that the Court was in effect discrimination between
the rich and powerful on the one hand and the poor and defenseless upon the other, and
allowing "rich and powerful" accused persons to go "scot-free" while presumably allowing or
affirming the conviction of poor and small offenders. This accusation can only be regarded
as calculated to present the Court in an extremely bad light. It may be seen as intended to
foment hatred against the Supreme Court; it is also suggestive of the divisive tactics of
revolutionary class war.
Respondent, finally, assailed the Court for having allegedly "dismissed judges 'without
rhyme or reason' and disbarred lawyers 'without due process.'" The Court notes that this
last attack is not without relation to the other statements made by respondent against the
Court. The total picture that respondent clearly was trying to paint of the Court is that of an
"unjudicial" institution able and willing to render "clearly erroneous" decisions by way of
reprisal against its critics, as a body that acts arbitrarily and capriciously denying judges and

lawyers due process of law. Once again, the purport of respondent's attack against the
Court as an institution unworthy of the people's faith and trust, is unmistakable. Had
respondent undertaken to examine the records 'of the two (2) judges and the attorney he
later Identified in one of his Explanations, he would have discovered that the respondents in
those administrative cases had ample opportunity to explain their side and submit evidence
in support thereof. 41 He would have also found that there were both strong reasons for and
an insistent rhyme in the disciplinary measures there administered by the Court in the
continuing effort to strengthen the judiciary and upgrade the membership of the Bar. It is
appropriate to recall in this connection that due process as a constitutional precept does
not, always and in all situations, require the trial-type proceeding, 42 that the essence of due
process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any
evidence one may have in support of one's defense. 43 "To be heard" does not only mean
verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to
be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of
procedural due process. 44
As noted earlier, respondent Gonzalez was required by the Court to explain why he should
not be punished for contempt and/or subjected to administrative discipline for making the
statements adverted to above. In his subsequent pleadings where he asked the full Court to
inhibit itself and to transfer the administrative proceedings to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, respondent made, among others, the following allegations:
(a) That the Members of the Court "should inhibit [themselves] in the
contempt and administrative charges against the respondent, in the light of
the manifest prejudice and anger they hold against respondent as shown in
the language of the resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration;"
(b) That "the entire membership of the court has already lost that 'cold
neutrality of an impartial judge' [to] be able to allow fairness and due process
in the contempt citation as well as in the possible administrative charge;
(c) That "respondent honestly feels that this court as angry and prejudiced as
it is, respondent has no china man's chance to get fair hearing in the
contempt and possible administrative charges;"
(d) That one must consider "the milieu before this Tribunal with, perhaps
passion and obfuscation running riot;"
(e) That respondent, "after having been castigated with such venom by the
entire Court in its decision denying the Motion for Reconsideration, does not
have confidence in the impartiality of the entire Court" and that he "funds it
extremely difficult to believe that the members of this Tribunal can still act with
unbiased demeanor towards him;" and

(f) That "the Tribunal is determined to disbar [respondent] without due

process" and that a specified Member of the Court "has been tasked to be
the ponente, or at least prepare the decision." (Underscoring in the original)
Thus, instead of explaining or seeking to mitigate his statements earlier made, respondent
sought to heap still more opprobrium upon the Court, accusing it of being incapable of
judging his acts and statements justly and according to law. Once again, he paints this
Court as a body not only capable of acting without regard to due process but indeed
determined so to act. A grand design to hold up this Court to public scorn and disrespect as
an unworthy tribunal, one obfuscated by passion and anger at respondent, emerges once
more. It is very difficult for members of this Court to understand how respondent Gonzalez
could suppose that judges on the highest tribunal of the land would be ready and willing to
violate their most solemn oath of office merely to gratify any imagined private feelings
aroused by respondent. The universe of the Court revolves around the daily demands of
law and justice and duty, not around respondent nor any other person or group of persons.
Whether or not the statements made by respondent Gonzalez may reasonably be regarded
by this Court as contumacious or as warranting exercise of the disciplinary authority of this
Court over members of the Bar, may best be assayed by examining samples of the kinds of
statements which have been held in our jurisdiction as constituting contempt or otherwise
warranting the exercise of the Court's authority.
1. In Montecillo v. Gica, 45 Atty. Quirico del Mar as counsel for Montecillo, who was accused
in a slander case, moved to reconsider a decision of the Court of Appeals in favor of the
complainant with a veiled threat that he should interpose his next appeal to the President of
the Philippines. In his Motion for Reconsideration, he referred to the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code on "knowingly rendering an unjust judgment," and "judgment rendered
through negligence" and implied that the Court of Appeals had allowed itself to be deceived.
Atty. del Mar was held guilty of contempt of court by the Court of Appeals. He then sued the
three (3) justices of the Court of Appeals for damages before the Court of First Instance of
Cebu, seeking to hold them liable for their decision in the appealed slander case. This suit
was terminated, however, by compromise agreement after Atty. del Mar apologized to the
Court of Appeals and the justices concerned and agreed to pay moral damages to the
justices. Atty. del Mar some time later filed with this Court a Petition for Review on certiorari
of a decision of the Court of Appeals in a slander case. This Court denied the Petition for
Review. Atty. del Mar then filed a Motion for Reconsideration and addressed a letter to the
Clerk of the Supreme Court asking for the names of the justices of this Court who had voted
in favor of and those who had voted against his Motion for Reconsideration. After his Motion
for Reconsideration was denied for lack of merit, Atty. del Mar filed a Manifestation in this
Court saying:
I can at this time reveal to you that, had your Clerk of Court furnished me with
certified true copies of the last two Resolutions of the Supreme Court

confirming the decision of the Court of Appeals in the case entitled Francisco
M. Gica vs. Jorge Montecillo, I would have filed against the Justices
supporting the same, civil and criminal suits as I did to the Justices of the
Court of Appeals who, rewarding the abhorent falsification committed by Mr.
Gica, reversed for him the decisions of the City Court and the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, not with a view to obtaining a favorable judgment therein
but for the purpose of exposing to the people the corroding evils extant in our
Government, so that they may well know them and work for their
extermination.(60 SCRA at 240;emphasis supplied)
Counsel was asked to explain why he should not be administratively dealt with for making
the above statements. In his additional explanation, Atty. del Mar made the following
statements:
... Graft, corruption and injustice are rampant in and outside of the
Government. It is this state of things that convinced me that all human efforts
to correct and/or reform the said evils will be fruitless and, as stated in my
manifestation to you, I have already decided to retire from a life of militancy to
a life of seclusion, leaving to God the filling up deficiencies. (60 SCRA at 242)
The Court suspended Atty. del Mar, "until further orders," from the practice of law saying:
... Respondent is utilizing what exists in his mind as state of graft, corruption
and injustice allegedly rampant in and outside of the government as
justification for his contemptuous statements. In other words, he already
assumed by his own contemptuous utterances that because there is an
alleged existence of rampant corruption, graft and injustice in and out of the
government, We, by Our act in G.R. No. L-36800, are among the corrupt, the
grafters and those allegedly committing injustice. We are at a complete loss
to follow respondent del Mar's logic ...
xxx xxx xxx
To aged brethren of the bar it may appear belated to remind them that second
only to the duty of maintaining allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
and to support the Constitution and obey the laws of the Philippines, is the
duty of all attorneys to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of
justice and judicial officers (Sec. 20 (b) Rule 138, Rules of Court). But We do
remind them of said duty to emphasize to their younger brethren its
paramount importance. A lawyer must always remember that he is an officer
of the court exercising a high privilege and serving in the noble mission of
administering justice.

xxx xxx xxx.

As already stated, the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A G.R. No.
46504-R was based on its evaluation of the evidence on only one specific
issue. We in turn denied in G.R. No. L-36800 the petition for review on
certiorari of the decision because We found no reason for disturbing the
appellate court's finding and conclusion. In both instances, both the Court of
Appeals and this Court exercised judicial discretion in a case under their
respective jurisdiction. The intemperate and imprudent act of respondent del
Mar in resorting to veiled threats to make both Courts reconsider their
respective stand in the decision and the resolution that spelled disaster for his
client cannot be anything but pure contumely for aid tribunals.
It is manifest that respondent del Mar has scant respect for the two highest
Court of the land when on the flimsy ground of alleged error in deciding a
case, he proceeded to challenge the integrity of both Courts by claiming that
they knowingly rendered unjust judgment. In short, his allegation is that they
acted with intent and malice, if not with gross ignorance of the law, in
disposing of the case of his client.
xxx xxx xxx
... To those who are in the practice of law and those who in the future will
choose to enter this profession, We wish to point to this case as a reminder
for them to imprint in their hearts and minds that an attorney owes it to
himself to respect the courts of justice and its officers as a fealty for the
stability of our democratic institutions. (60 SCRA at 242-247: emphasis
supplied)
2. In Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel, 46 four (4) members of the bar, acting as
counsel for MacArthur International Minerals Company were required by this Court to
explain certain statements made in MacArthur's third Motion for Reconsideration:
d. ...; and I the Supreme Court I has overlooked the applicable law due to the
mis-representation and obfuscation of the petitioners' counsel. (Last
sentence, par. 1, Third Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968).
e. ... Never has any civilized democratic tribunal ruled that such a gimmick
(referring to the "right to reject any and all bids") can be used by vulturous
executives to cover up and excuse losses to the public, a government agency
or just plain fraud ... and it is thus difficult, in the light of our upbringing and
schooling, even under many of the incumbent justices, that the Honorable
Supreme Court intends to create a decision that in effect does precisely that

in a most absolute manner. (Second sentence, par. 7, Third Motion for

Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968). (31 SCRA at 6)
They were also asked to explain the statements made in their Motion to Inhibit filed on 21
September 1968 asking
Mr. Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro to
inhibit themselves from considering, judging and resolving the case or any
issue or aspect thereof retroactive to January 11, 1967. The motion charges
"It that the brother of the Honorable Associate Justice Castro is a vicepresident of the favored party who is the chief beneficiary of the false,
erroneous and illegal decision dated January 31, 1968" and the exparte preliminary injunction rendered in the above-entitled case, the latter in
effect prejudging and predetermining this case even before the joining of an
issue. As to the Chief Justice, the motion states [t]hat the son of the
Honorable Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion was given a significant
appointment in the Philippine Government by the President a short time
before the decision of July 31, 1968 was rendered in this case. The
appointment referred to was as secretary of the newly-created Board of
Investments. The motion presents a lengthy discourse on judicial ethics, and
makes a number of side comments projecting what is claimed to be the
patent wrongfulness of the July 31, 1968 decision. It enumerates "incidents"
which, according to the motion, brought about respondent MacArthur's belief
that unjudicial prejudice had been caused it and that there was 'unjudicial
favoritism' in favor of 'petitioners, their appointing authority and a favored
party directly benefited by the said decision
(31 SCRA at 6-7)
Another attorney entered his appearance as new counsel for MacArthur and filed a fourth
Motion for Reconsideration without leave of court, which Motion contained the following
paragraphs:
4. The said decision is illegal because it was penned by the Honorable Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion when in fact he was outside the borders of the
Republic of the Philippines at the time of the Oral Argument of the aboveentitled casewhich condition is prohibited by the New Rules of Court
Section 1, Rule 51, and we quote: "Justices; who may take part... . Only
those members present when any matter is submitted for oral argument will
take part in its consideration and adjudication ... ." This requirement is
especially significant in the present instance because the member who
penned the decision was the very member who was absent for approximately
four months or more. This provision also applies to the Honorable Justices
Claudio Teehankee and Antonio Barredo.

xxx xxx xxx

6. That if the respondent MacArthur International Minerals Company
abandons its quest for justice in the Judiciary of the Philippine Government, it
will inevitably either raise the graft and corruption of Philippine Government
officials in the bidding of May 12, 1965, required by the Nickel Law to
determine the operator of the Surigao nickel deposits, to the World Court on
grounds of deprivation of justice and confiscation of property and/or to the
United States Government, either its executive or judicial branches or both,
on the grounds of confiscation of respondent's proprietary vested rights by the
Philippine Government without either compensation or due process of law
and invoking the Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid
and benefits to the Philippine Government, including the sugar price
premium, amounting to more than fifty million dollars annually, until restitution
or compensation is made.
(31 SCRA at 10-11)
Finding their explanations unsatisfactory, the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Sanchez,
held three (3) attorneys guilty of contempt:
1. We start with the case of Atty. Vicente L. Santiago. In his third motion for
reconsideration, we, indeed, find language that is not to be expected of an
officer of the courts. He pictures petitioners as 'vulturous executives.' He
speaks of this Court as a 'civilized, democratic tribunal,' but by innuendo
would suggest that it is not.
In his motion to inhibit, his first paragraph categorizes our decision of July 31,
1968 as 'false, erroneous and illegal' in a presumptuous manner. He then
charges that the ex parte preliminary injunction we issued in this case
prejudiced and predetermined the case even before the joining of an
issue. He accuses in a reckless manner two justices of this Court for being
interested in the decision of this case: Associate Justice Fred Ruiz Castro,
because his brother is the vice president of the favored party who is the chief
beneficiary of the decision, and Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, whose
son was appointed secretary of the newly-created Board of Investments, 'a
significant appointment in the Philippine Government by the President, a
short time before the decision of July 31, 1968 was rendered.' In this
backdrop, he proceeds to state that 'it would seem that the principles thus
established [the moral and ethical guidelines for inhibition of any judicial
authority by the Honorable Supreme Court should first apply to itself.' He puts
forth the claim that lesser and further removed conditions have been known
to create favoritism, only to conclude that there is no reason for a belief that
the conditions obtaining in the case of the Chief Justice and Justice Castro

would be less likely to engender favoritism and prejudice for or against a

particular cause or party.' Implicit in this at least is that the Chief Justice and
Justice Castro are insensible to delicadeza, which could make their actuation
suspect. He makes it plain in the motion that the Chief Justice and Justice
Castro not only were not free from the appearance of impropriety but did
arouse suspicion that their relationship did affect their judgment. He points out
that courts must be above suspicion at all times like Ceasar's wife, warns that
loss of confidence for the Tribunal or a member thereof should not be allowed
to happen in our country, 'although the process has already begun.
xxx xxx xxx
What is disconcerting is that Atty. Santiago's accusations have no basis in
fact and in law. The slur made is not limited to the Chief Justice and Mr.
Justice Castro. It sweepingly casts aspersion on the whole court. For,
inhibition is also asked if, we repeated any other justices who have received
favors or benefits directly or indirectly from any of the petitioners or any
members of any board-petitioner or their agents or principals, including the
president.' The absurdity of this posture is at once apparent. For one thing,
the justices of this Court are appointed by the President and in that sense
may be considered to have each received a favor from the President. Should
these justices inhibit themselves every time a case involving the
Administration crops up? Such a thought may not certainly be entertained.
The consequence thereof would be to paralyze the machinery of this Court.
We would in fact, be wreaking havoc on the tripartite system of government
operating in this country. Counsel is presumed to know this. But why the
unfounded charge? There is the not too-well concealed effort on the part of a
losing litigant's attorney to downgrade this Court.
The mischief that stems from all of the foregoing gross disrespect is easy to
discern. Such disrespect detracts much from the dignity of a court of justice.
Decidedly not an expression of faith, counsel's words are intended to create
an atmosphere of distrust, of disbelief.
xxx xxx xxx
The precepts, the teachings, the injunctions just recited are not unfamiliar to
lawyers. and yet, this Court finds in the language of Atty. Santiago a style that
undermines and degrades the administration of justice. The stricture in
Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Rules against improper conduct tending to
degrade the administration of justice is thus transgressed. Atty. Santiago is
guilty of contempt of court.

xxx xxx xxx

Third. The motion contained an express threat to take the case to the World
Court and/or the United States government. It must be remembered that
respondent MacArthur at that time was still trying to overturn the decision of
this Court of July 31, 1968. In doing so, unnecessary statements were in
ejected. More specifically, the motion announced that McArthur 'will
inevitably ... raise the graft and corruption of the Philippine government
officials in the bidding of May 12, 1965 ... to the World Court' and would
invoke 'the Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid and
benefits to the Philippine Government, including the sugar price premium,
amount to more than fifty million dollars annually ...
This is a clear attempt to influence or bend the blind of this Court to decide
the case' in its favor. A notice of appeal to the World Court has even been
embodied in Meads return. There is a gross inconsistency between the
appeal and the move to reconsider the decision. An appeal from a decision
presupposes that a party has already abandoned any move to reconsider that
decision. And yet, it would appear that the appeal to the World Court is being
dangled as a threat to effect a change of the decision of this Court. Such act
has no aboveboard explanation.
xxx xxx xxx
The dignity of the Court, experience teaches, can never be protected where
infraction of ethics meets with complacency rather than punishment. The
people should not be given cause to break faith with the belief that a judge is
the epitome of honor amongst men. To preserve its dignity, a court of justice
should not yield to the assaults of disrespect. Punctilio of honor, we prefer to
think, is a standard of behavior so desirable in a lawyer pleading a cause
before a court of justice. (31 SCRA at 13-23; emphasis supplied)
3. In In re Almacen, supra, Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen, in protest against what he asserted
was "a great injustice committed against his client by the Supreme Court," filed a Petition to
Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title. He alleged that his client was deeply aggrieved by
this Court's "unjust judgment," and had become "one of the sacrificial victims before the
altar of hypocrisy," saying that "justice as administered by the present members of the
Supreme Court [was) not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." Atty. Almacen vowed to argue
the cause of his client "in the people's forum" so that "the people may know of this silent
injustice committed by this Court' and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that
were committed [may] never be repeated." Atty. Almacen released to the press the contents
of his Petition and on 26 September 1967, the "Manila Times" published statements
attributed to him as follows:

Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he did not expose

the tribunal's'unconstitutional and obnoxious' practice of arbitrarily denying
petitions or appeals without any reason.
Because of the tribunal's 'short-cut justice.' Almacen deplored, his client was
condemned to pay P120,000, without knowing why he lost the case.
xxx xxx xxx
There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in this
petition, 'where our Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to
our pleas of justice, who ignore without reason their own applicable decisions
and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity.'
xxx xxx xxx
He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by which he earns
his living, the present members of the Supreme Court 'will become
responsible to all cases brought to its attention without discrimination, and will
purge itself of those unconstitutional and obnoxious "lack of merit' or "denied
resolutions. (31 SCRA at 565566; emphasis supplied)
Atty. Almacen was required by this Court to show cause why disciplinary action should not
be taken against him. His explanation, which in part read:
xxx xxx xxx
The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolized in paintings that can be found in all
courts and government offices. We have added only two more symbols,
that it is also deaf and dumb. Deaf in the sense that no members of this Court
has ever heard our cries for charity, generosity, fairness, understanding,
sympathy and for justice; dumb in the sense, that inspire of our beggings,
supplications, and pleadings to give us reasons why our appeals has been
DENIED, not one word was spoken or given ... We refer to no human defect
or ailment in the above statement. We only described the impersonal state of
Things and nothing more.
xxx xxx xxx
As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence in the members of
this Court and for which reason we offered to surrender our lawyer's
certificate, IN TRUST ONLY. Because what has been lost today may be
regained tomorrow. As the offer was intended as our self-imposed sacrifice,

then we alone may decide as to when we must end our self- sacrifice. If we
have to choose between forcing ourselves to have faith and confidence in the
members of the Court but disregard our Constitution and to uphold the
Constitution and be condemned by the members of this Court, there is no
choice, we must uphold the latter. (31 SCRA at 572; emphasis supplied)
was found by the Court to be "undignified and cynical" and rejected. The Court indefinitely
suspended Almacen from the practice of law holding, through Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro,
that Almacen had exceeded the boundaries of "fair criticism."
4. In Paragas V. Cruz, 47 Counsel, whose Petition for Ceriorari ran was dismissed by this
Court, made the following statements in his Motion for Reconsideration:
The petitioner respectfully prays for a reconsideration of the resolution of this
Honorable Court dated April 20,1966 on the ground that it constitutes a
violation of Section 14 of Rule 11 2 of the Rules of Court promulgated by this
very Hon. Supreme Court, and on the further ground that it is likewise a
violation of the most important right in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of
the Philippines, a culpable violation which is a ground for impeachment.
... The rule of law in a democracy should always be upheld and protected by
all means, because the rule of law creates and preserves peace and order
and gives satisfaction and contentment to all concerned. But when the laws
and the rules are violated, the victims resort, sometimes, to armed force and
to the ways of the cavemen We do not want Verzosa and Reyes repeated
again and again, killed in the premises of the Supreme Court and in those of
the City Hall of Manila.Educated people should keep their temper under
control at all times! But justice should be done to all concerned to perpetuate
the very life of Democracy on the face of the earth. (14 SCRA at 810;
emphasis supplied)
The Court considered the above statements as derogatory to the dignity of the Court and
required counsel to show cause why administrative action should not be taken against him.
Counsel later explained that he had merely related factual events (i.e., the killing of Verzosa
and Reyes) and to express his desire to avoid repetition of such acts. The Court, through
Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, found these explanations unsatisfactory and the above statements
contumacious.
... The expressions contained in the motion for reconsideration ... are plainly
contemptuous and disrespectful, and reference to the recent killing of two
employees is but a covert threat upon the members of the Court. ... That such
threats and disrespectful language contained in a pleading filed in courts are
constitutive of direct contempt has been repeatedly decided(Salcedo vs.

Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724; People vs. Venturanza, 52 Off. Gaz. 769; Medina
vs. Rivera, 66 Phil. 151; De Joya vs. Court of First Instance of Rizal, 1, 9785,
September 19,1956; Sison vs. Sandejas L- 9270, April 29,1959; Lualhati vs.
Albert, 57 Phil. 86). What makes the present case more deplorable is that the
guilty party is a member of the bar; for, as remarked in People vs. Carillo, 77
Phil. 580Counsel should conduct himself towards the judges who try his cases with
that courtesy all have a right to expect. As an officer of the court, it is his
sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high
esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper
administration of justice.
It in light and plausible that an attorney in defending the cause and rights of
his client, should do so with all the fervor and energy of which he is capable,
but it is not, and never will be so, for him to exercise said right by resorting to
intimidation or proceeding without the propriety and respect which the dignity
of the courts require. (Salcedo vs. Hernandez, [In re Francisco], 61 Phil. 729)'
(1 4 SCRA at 811-812; emphasis supplied)
5. In In re Sotto, 48 a newspaper reporter, Mr. Angel Parazo, invoking the Press Freedom
Law, refused to divulge the source of the news item which carried his by-line and was sent
to jail for so refusing. Atty. Vicente Sotto, a senator and author of said law, caused the
publication of the following item in a number of daily newspapers in Manila:
As author of the Press Freedom Law (Republic Act No. 53), interpreted by the
Supreme Court in the case of Angel Parazo, reporter of a local daily, who now
has to suffer 30 days imprisonment, for his refusal to divulge the source of a
news published in his paper, I regret to say that our High Tribunal has not
only erroneously interpreted said law, but that it is once more putting in
evidence the incompetency or narrow mindedness of the majority of its
members. In the wake of so many blunders and injustices deliberately
committed during these last years, I believe that the only remedy to put an
end to so much evil, is to change the members of the Supreme Court.To this
effect, I announce that one of the first measures, which I will introduce in the
coming congressional sessions, will have as its object the complete
reorganization of the Supreme Court. As it is now constituted, the Supreme
Court of today constitutes a constant peril to liberty and democracy. It need
be said loudly, very loudly, so that even the deaf may hear: The Supreme
Court of today is a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of Justice of those
memorable times of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and
other learned jurists who were the honor and glory of the Philippine Judiciary.
(82 Phil. at 597-598; emphasis supplied)

In finding Atty. Sotto in contempt, despite his avowals of good faith and his
invocation of the constitutional guarantee of free speech and in requiring him
to show cause why he should not be disbarred, the Court, through Mr. Justice
Feria, saidTo hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing
deliberately so many blunders and injustices that is to say, that it has been
deciding in favor of one party knowing that the law and justice is on the part
of the adverse party and not on the one in whose favor the decision was
rendered, in many cases decided during the last years, would tend
necessarily to undermine the coincidence of the people in the honesty and
integrity of the members of this Court, and consequently to lower and
degrade the administration of justice by this Court. The Supreme Court of the
Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark to which the Filipino
people may repair to obtain relief for their grievances or protection of their
rights when these are trampled upon, and if the people lose their confidence
in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court and believe that they
cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their
hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result. As a member of
the bar and an officer of the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in
duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes
fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to
promote distrust in the administration of justice. Respect to the courts
guarantees the stability of other institutions, which without such guaranty
would be resting on a very shaky foundation. (82 Phil. at 601-602; emphasis
supplied)
6. In Salcedo v. Hernandez, 49 Atty. Vicente Francisco filed a Motion before the Supreme
Court which contained the following paragraph (in translation):
We should like frankly and respectfully to make it of record that the resolution
of this court, denying our motion for reconsideration, is absolutely erroneous
and constitutes an outrage to the rights of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a
mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls in the municipality of
Tiaong, Tayabas. We wish to exhaust all the means within our power in order
that this error may be corrected by the very court which has committed it,
because we should not want that some citizen, particularly some voter of the
municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas, resort to the press publicly to denounce, as
he has a right to do, the judicial outrage of which the herein petitioner has
been the victim, and because it is our utmost desire to safeguard the prestige
of this honorable court and of each and every member thereof in the eyes of
the public. But, at the same time we wish to state sincerely that erroneous
decisions like these, which the affected party and his thousands of voters will

necessarily consider unjust, increase the proselytes of sakdalism and make

the public lose confidence in the administration of justice. (61 Phil. at 726;
emphasis supplied)
When required by the Court to show cause why he should not be declared in contempt, Atty.
Francisco responded by saying that it was not contempt to tell the truth. Examining the
statements made above, the Court held:
... [they] disclose, in the opinion of this court, an inexcusable disrespect of the
authority of the court and an intentional contempt of its dignity, because the
court is thereby charged with no less than having proceeded in utter
disregard of the laws, the rights of the parties, and of the untoward
consequences, or with having abused its power and mocked and flouted the
rights of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's client, because the acts of outraging
and mocking from which the words 'outrage' and mockery' used therein are
derived, means exactly the same as all these, according to the Dictionary of
the Spanish Language published by the Spanish Academy (Dictionary of the
Spanish Language, 15th ed., pages 132-513).
The insertion of the phrases in question in said motion of Attorney Vicente J.
Francisco, for many years a member of the Philippine bar, was neither
justified nor in the least necessary, because in order to call the attention of the
court in a special way to the essential points relied upon in his argument and
to emphasize the force thereof, the many reasons stated in his said motion
were sufficient and the phrases in question were superfluous. In order to
appeal to reason and justice, it is highly improper and amiss to make trouble
and resort to threats, as Attorney Vicente J. Francisco has done, because
both means are annoying and good practice can ever sanction them by
reason of their natural tendency to disturb and hinder the free exercise of a
serene and impartial judgment, particularly in judicial matters, in the
consideration of questions submitted for resolution.
There is no question that said paragraph of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's
motion contains a more or less veiled threat to the court because it is
insinuated therein, after the author shows the course which the voters of
Tiaong should follow in case he fails in his attempt, that they will resort to the
press for the purpose of denouncing, what he claims to be a judicial outrage
of which his client has been the victim; and because he states in a
threatening manner with the intention of predisposing the mind of the reader
against the court, thus creating an atmosphere of prejudices against it in
order to make it odious in the public eye, that decisions of the nature of that
referred to in his motion to promote distrust in the administration of justice
and increase the proselytes of sakdalism a movement with seditious and

revolutionary tendencies the activities of which, as is of public knowledge,

occurred in this country a few days ago. This cannot mean otherwise than
contempt of the dignity of the court and disrespect of the authority thereof on
the part of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, because he presumes that the court
is so devoid of the sense of justice that, if he did not resort to intimidation, it
would maintain its error notwithstanding the fact that it may be proven, with
good reasons, that it has acted erroneously.
As a member of the bar and an officer of this court, Attorney Vicente J.
Francisco, as any attorney, is in duty bound to uphold its dignity and authority
and to defend its integrity, not only because it had conferred upon him the
high privilege, not a right (Malcolm, Legal Ethics, 158 and 160), of being what
he now is: a priest of justice (In re Thatcher, 80 Ohio St., Rep., 492, 669), but
also because in so doing, he neither creates nor promotes distrust in the
administration of justice, and prevents anybody from harboring and
encouraging discontent which, in many cases, is the source of disorder, thus
undermining the foundation upon which rests that bulwark called judicial
power to which those who are aggrieved turn for protection and relief (61 Phil.
at 727-728; emphasis supplied)
It should not be supposed that the six (6) cases above discussed exhaust our case law on
this matter. In the following cases, among others, the Supreme Court punished for contempt
or administratively disciplined lawyers who had made statements not very different from
those made in the cases discussed above:
1) In re Wenceslao Laureta, 148 SCRA 382 (1987);
2) Borromeo v. Court of appeals, 87 SCRA 67 (1978);
3) Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer, 20 SCRA 441 (1967);
4) Malolos v. Reyes, 1 SCRA 559 (1961);
5) De Joya, et al. v. Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch, 99
Phil. 907 (1956);
6) People v. Venturanza, et al., 98 Phil. 211 (1956);
7) In re Suzano A. Velasquez, per curiam Resolution (unreported),
Promulgated 29 April 1955;
8) Cornejo v. Tan, 85 Phil. 772 (1950);

9) People v. Carillon, 77 Phil. 572 (1946);

10) Intestate Estate of Rosario 0lba; Contempt Proceedings against Antonio
Franco, 67 Phil. 312 (1939); and
11) Lualhati v. Albert, 57 Phil. 86 (1932).
Considering the kinds of statements of lawyers discussed above which the Court has in the
past penalized as contemptuous or as warranting application of disciplinary sanctions, this
Court is compelled to hold that the statements here made by respondent Gonzalez clearly
constitute contempt and call for the exercise of the disciplinary authority of the Supreme
Court. Respondent's statements, especially the charge that the Court deliberately rendered
an erroneous and unjust decision in the Consolidated Petitions, necessarily implying that
the justices of this Court betrayed their oath of office, merely to wreak vengeance upon the
respondent here, constitute the grossest kind of disrespect for the Court. Such statements
very clearly debase and degrade the Supreme Court and, through the Court, the entire
system of administration of justice in the country. That respondent's baseless charges have
had some impact outside the internal world of subjective intent, is clearly demonstrated by
the filing of a complaint for impeachment of thirteen (13) out of the then fourteen (14)
incumbent members of this Court, a complaint the centerpiece of which is a repetition of the
appalling claim of respondent that this Court deliberately rendered a wrong decision as an
act of reprisal against the respondent.
IV
The principal defense of respondent Gonzalez is that he was merely exercising his
constitutional right of free speech. He also invokes the related doctrines of qualified
privileged communications and fair criticism in the public interest.
Respondent Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. No one
seeks to deny him that right, least of all this Court. What respondent seems unaware of is
that freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute
and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated
with the requirements of equally important public interests. One of these fundamental public
interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of
justice. There is no antinomy between free expression and the integrity of the system of
administering justice. For the protection and maintenance of freedom of expression itself
can be secured only within the context of a functioning and orderly system of dispensing
justice, within the context, in other words, of viable independent institutions for delivery of
justice which are accepted by the general community. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter put it:
... A free press is not to be preferred to an independent judiciary, nor an
independent judiciary to a free press. Neither has primacy over the other;

both are indispensable to a free society. The freedom of the press in itself
presupposes an independent judiciary through which that freedom may, if
necessary be vindicated. And one of the potent means for assuring judges
their independence is a free press. 50
Mr. Justice Malcolm of this Court expressed the same thought in the following terms:
The Organic Act wisely guarantees freedom of speech and press. This
constitutional right must be protected in its fullest extent. The Court has
heretofore given evidence of its tolerant regard for charges under the Libel
Law which come dangerously close to its violation. We shall continue in this
chosen path. The liberty of the citizens must be preserved in all of its
completeness. But license or abuse of liberty of the press and of the citizens
should not be confused with liberty ill its true sense. As important as is the
maintenance of an unmuzzled press and the free exercise of the rights of the
citizens is the maintenance of the independence of the Judiciary. Respect for
the Judiciary cannot be had if persons are privileged to scorn a resolution of
the court adopted for good purposes, and if such persons are to be permitted
by subterranean means to diffuse inaccurate accounts of confidential
proceedings to the embarassment of the parties and the courts. 51 (Emphasis
supplied)
Only slightly (if at all) less important is the public interest in the capacity of the Court
effectively to prevent and control professional misconduct on the part of lawyers who are,
first and foremost, indispensable participants in the task of rendering justice to every man.
Some courts have held, persuasively it appears to us, that a lawyer's right of free
expression may have to be more limited than that of a layman. 52
It is well to recall that respondent Gonzalez, apart from being a lawyer and an officer of the
court, is also a Special Prosecutor who owes duties of fidelity and respect to the Republic
and to this Court as the embodiment and the repository of the judicial power in the
government of the Republic. The responsibility of the respondent "to uphold the dignity and
authority of this Court' and "not to promote distrust in the administration of justice 53 is
heavier than that of a private practicing lawyer.
Respondent Gonzalez claims to be and he is, of course, entitled to criticize the rulings of
this Court, to point out where he feels the Court may have lapsed into error. Once more,
however, the right of criticism is not unlimited. Its limits were marked out by Mr. Justice
Castro in In re Almacen which are worth noting
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bonafide and
shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists
between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and

the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross
violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects
a lawyer to disciplinary action.
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential
to the orderly administration of justice. Hence, in the assertion of their clients'
rights, lawyers even those gifted with superior intellect are enjoined to rein up
their tempers.
xxx xxx xxx 54
(Emphasis supplied)
The instant proceeding is not addressed to the fact that respondent has criticized the Court;
it is addressed rather to the nature of that criticism or comment and the manner in which it
was carried out.
Respondent Gonzalez disclaims an intent to attack and denigrate the Court. The
subjectivities of the respondent are irrelevant so far as characterization of his conduct or
misconduct is concerned. He will not, however, be allowed to disclaim the natural and plain
import of his words and acts. 55 It is upon the other hand, not irrelevant to point out that
respondent offered no apology in his two (2) explanations and exhibited no repentance. 56
Respondent Gonzalez also defends himself contending that no injury to the judiciary has
been shown, and points to the fact that this Court denied his Motion for Reconsideration of
its per curiam Decision of 27 April 1988 and reiterated and amplified that Decision in its
Resolution of 19 May 1988. In the first place, proof of actual damage sustained by a court or
the judiciary in general is not essential for a finding of contempt or for the application of the
disciplinary authority of the Court. Insofar as the Consolidated Petitions are concerned, this
Court after careful review of the bases of its 27 April 1988 Decision, denied respondent's
Motion for Reconsideration thereof and rejected the public pressures brought to bear upon
this Court by the respondent through his much publicized acts and statements for which he
is here being required to account. Obstructing the free and undisturbed resolution of a
particular case is not the only species of injury that the Court has a right and a duty to
prevent and redress. What is at stake in cases of this kind is the integrity of the judicial
institutions of the country in general and of the Supreme Court in particular. Damage to
such institutions might not be quantifiable at a given moment in time but damage there will
surely be if acts like those of respondent Gonzalez are not effectively stopped and
countered. The level of trust and confidence of the general public in the courts, including the
court of last resort, is not easily measured; but few will dispute that a high level of such trust
and confidence is critical for the stability of democratic government.

Respondent Gonzalez lastly suggests that punishment for contempt is not the proper
remedy in this case and suggests that the members of this Court have recourse to libel suits
against him. While the remedy of libel suits by individual members of this Court may well be
available against respondent Gonzalez, such is by no means an exclusive remedy.
Moreover, where, as in the instant case, it is not only the individual members of the Court
but the Court itself as an institution that has been falsely attacked, libel suits cannot be an
adequate remedy. 57
The Court concludes that respondent Gonzalez is guilty both of contempt of court in facie
curiae and of gross misconduct as an officer of the court and member of the Bar.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND Atty. Raul M. Gonzalez from the practice
of law indefinitely and until further orders from this Court, the suspension to take effect
immediately.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Sandiganbayan, the Ombudsman, the
Secretary of Justice, the Solicitor General and the Court of Appeals for their information and
guidance.
Fernan C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco,
Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

2004 Rules on Notarial Practice

A.C. No. 5838

January 17, 2005

SPOUSES BENJAMIN SANTUYO AND EDITHA SANTUYO, complainants,

vs.
ATTY. EDWIN A. HIDALGO, respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
In a verified complaint-affidavit dated September 18, 2001, 1 spouses Benjamin Santuyo and
Editha Santuyo accused respondent Atty. Edwin A. Hidalgo of serious misconduct and
dishonesty for breach of his lawyers oath and the notarial law.
Complainants stated that sometime in December 1991, they purchased a parcel of land
covered by a deed of sale. The deed of sale was allegedly notarized by respondent lawyer
and was entered in his notarial register as Doc. No. 94 on Page No. 19 in Book No. III,
Series of 1991. Complainant spouses averred that about six years after the date of

notarization, they had a dispute with one Danilo German over the ownership of the land.
The case was estafathrough falsification of a public document.
During the trial of the case, German presented in court an affidavit executed by respondent
denying the authenticity of his signature on the deed of sale. The spouses allegedly forged
his notarial signature on said deed.2
According to complainants, respondent overlooked the fact that the disputed deed of sale
contained all the legal formalities of a duly notarized document, including an impression of
respondents notarial dry seal. Not being persons who were learned in the technicalities
surrounding a notarial act, spouses contended that they could not have forged the signature
of herein respondent. They added that they had no access to his notarial seal and notarial
register, and could not have made any imprint of respondents seal or signature on the
subject deed of sale or elsewhere. 3
In his answer4 to the complaint, respondent denied the allegations against him. He denied
having notarized any deed of sale covering the disputed property. According to respondent,
he once worked as a junior lawyer at Carpio General and Jacob Law Office where he was
asked to apply for a notarial commission. While he admitted that he notarized several
documents in that office, these, however, did not include the subject deed of sale. He
explained that, as a matter of office procedure, documents underwent scrutiny by the senior
lawyers and it was only when they gave their approval that notarization was done. He
claimed that, in some occasions, the secretaries in the law firm, by themselves, would affix
the dry seal of the junior associates on documents relating to cases handled by the law firm.
Respondent added that he normally required the parties to exhibit their community tax
certificates and made them personally acknowledge the documents before him as notary
public. He would have remembered complainants had they actually appeared before him.
While he admitted knowing complainant Editha Santuyo, he said he met the latters
husband and co-complainant only on November 5, 1997, or about six years from the time
that he purportedly notarized the deed of sale. Moreover, respondent stressed that an
examination of his alleged signature on the deed of sale revealed that it was forged; the
strokes were smooth and mild. He suspected that a lady was responsible for forging his
signature.
To further refute the accusations against him, respondent stated that, at the time the subject
deed of sale was supposedly notarized, on December 27, 1991, he was on vacation. He
surmised that complainants must have gone to the law office and enticed one of the
secretaries, with the concurrence of the senior lawyers, to notarize the document. He
claimed he was a victim of a criminal scheme motivated by greed.
The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation. In a report5 it submitted to the Court, the IBP noted that the
alleged forged signature of respondent on the deed of sale was different from his signatures

in other documents he submitted during the investigation of the present case. 6 However, it
ruled that respondent was also negligent because he allowed the office secretaries to
perform his notarial functions, including the safekeeping of his notarial dry seal and notarial
register.7 It thus recommended:
WHEREFORE[,] in view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that respondents
commission as notary public be revoked for two (2) years if he is commissioned as such; or
he should not be granted a commission as notary public for two (2) years upon receipt
hereof.8
After going over the evidence submitted by the parties, complainants did not categorically
state that they appeared before respondent to have the deed of sale notarized. Their
appearance before him could have bolstered this allegation that respondent signed the
document and that it was not a forgery as he claimed. The records show that complainants
themselves were not sure if respondent, indeed, signed the document; what they were sure
of was the fact that his signature appeared thereon. They had no personal knowledge as
well as to who actually affixed the signature of respondent on the deed.
Furthermore, complainants did not refute respondents contention that he only met
complainant Benjamin Santuyo six years after the alleged notarization of the deed of sale.
Respondents assertion was corroborated by one Mrs. Lyn Santy in an affidavit executed on
November 17, 20019 wherein she stated that complainant Editha Santuyo had to invite
respondent to her house on November 5, 1997 to meet her husband since the two had to
be introduced to each other. The meeting between complainant Benjamin Santuyo and
respondent was arranged after the latter insisted that Mr. Santuyo personally acknowledge
a deed of sale concerning another property that the spouses bought.
In finding respondent negligent in performing his notarial functions, the IBP reasoned out:
xxx xxx xxx.
Considering that the responsibility attached to a notary public is sensitive respondent should
have been more discreet and cautious in the execution of his duties as such and should not
have wholly entrusted everything to the secretaries; otherwise he should not have been
commissioned as notary public.
For having wholly entrusted the preparation and other mechanics of the document for
notarization to the secretary there can be a possibility that even the respondents signature
which is the only one left for him to do can be done by the secretary or anybody for that
matter as had been the case herein.
As it is respondent had been negligent not only in the supposed notarization but foremost in
having allowed the office secretaries to make the necessary entries in his notarial registry

which was supposed to be done and kept by him alone; and should not have relied on
somebody else.10
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Edwin A. Hidalgo is hereby found GUILTY of negligence in
the performance of his duties as notary public and is hereby SUSPENDED from his
commission as a notary public for a period of two years, if he is commissioned, or if he is
not, he is disqualified from an appointment as a notary public for a period of two years from
finality of this resolution, with a warning that a repetition of similar negligent acts would be
dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

2004 Rules on Notarial Practice

A.C. No. 5864

April 15, 2005

ARTURO L. SICAT, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. GREGORIO E. ARIOLA, JR., respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In an affidavit-complaint,1 complainant Arturo L. Sicat, a Board Member of the Sangguniang
Panglalawigan of Rizal, charged respondent Atty. Gregorio E. Ariola, the Municipal
Administrator of Cainta, Rizal, with violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility by
committing fraud, deceit and falsehood in his dealings, particularly the notarization of a
Special Power of Attorney (SPA) purportedly executed by a one Juanito C. Benitez.
According to complainant, respondent made it appear that Benitez executed the said
document on January 4, 2001 when in fact the latter had already died on October 25, 2000.
He alleged that prior to the notarization, the Municipality of Cainta had entered into a
contract with J.C. Benitez Architect and Technical Management, represented by Benitez, for
the construction of low-cost houses. The cost of the architectural and engineering designs
amounted to P11,000,000 and two consultants were engaged to supervise the project. For
the services of the consultants, the Municipality of Cainta issued a check dated January 10,
2001 in the amount of P3,700,000, payable to J.C. Benitez Architects and Technical
Management and/or Cesar Goco. The check was received and encashed by the latter by
virtue of the authority of the SPA notarized by respondent Ariola.

Complainant further charged respondent with the crime of falsification penalized under
Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code by making it appear that certain persons participated
in an act or proceeding when in fact they did not.
In his Comment,2 respondent explained that, as early as May 12, 2000, Benitez had already
signed the SPA. He claimed that due to inadvertence, it was only on January 4, 2001 that
he was able to notarize it. Nevertheless, the SPA notarized by him on January 4, 2001 was
not at all necessary because Benitez had signed a similar SPA in favor of Goco sometime
before his death, on May 12, 2000. Because it was no longer necessary, the SPA was
cancelled the same day he notarized it, hence, legally, there was no public document that
existed. Respondent prayed that the complaint be dismissed on the ground of forumshopping since similar charges had been filed with the Civil Service Commission and the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. According to him, the complaints were later
dismissed based on findings that the assailed act referred to violations of the implementing
rules and regulations of PD 1594,3 PD 1445,4 RA 71605 and other pertinent rules of the
Commission on Audit (COA). He stressed that no criminal and administrative charges were
recommended for filing against him.
In a Resolution dated March 12, 2003,6 the Court referred the complaint to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. On August 26,
2003, the IBP submitted its investigation report:
x x x it is evident that respondent notarized the Special Power of Attorney dated 4
January 2001 purportedly executed by Juanito C. Benitez long after Mr. Benitez was
dead. It is also evident that respondent cannot feign innocence and claim that he did
not know Mr. Benitez was already dead at the time because respondent, as member
of the Prequalification and Awards Committee of the Municipality of Cainta,
personally knew Mr. Benitez because the latter appeared before the Committee a
number of times. It is evident that the Special Power of Attorney dated 4 January
2001 was part of a scheme of individuals to defraud the Municipality of Cainta of
money which was allegedly due them, and that respondent by notarizing said
Special Power of Attorney helped said parties succeed in their plans. 7
The IBP recommended to the Court that respondent's notarial commission be revoked and
that he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year.8
After a careful review of the records, we find that respondent never disputed complainant's
accusation that he notarized the SPA purportedly executed by Benitez on January 4, 2001.
He likewise never took issue with the fact that on said date, Benitez was already dead. His
act was a serious breach of the sacred obligation imposed upon him by the Code of
Professional Responsibility, specifically Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, which prohibited him from
engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. As a lawyer and as an officer
of the court, it was his duty to serve the ends of justice, 9 not to corrupt it. Oath-bound, he

was expected to act at all times in accordance with law and ethics, and if he did not, he
would not only injure himself and the public but also bring reproach upon an honorable
profession.10
In the recent case of Zaballero v. Atty. Mario J. Montalvan,11 where the respondent notarized
certain documents and made it appear that the deceased father of complainant executed
them, the Court declared the respondent there guilty of violating Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.12 The Court was emphatic that lawyers
commissioned as notaries public should not authenticate documents unless the persons
who signed them are the very same persons who executed them and personally appeared
before them to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. The Court added
that notaries public must observe utmost fidelity, the basic requirement in the performance
of their duties, otherwise the confidence of the public in the integrity of notarized deeds and
documents will be undermined.
In the case at bar, the records show that Benitez died on October 25, 2000. However,
respondent notarized the SPA, purportedly bearing the signature of Benitez, on January 4,
2001 or more than two months after the latter's death. The notarial acknowledgement of
respondent declared that Benitez "appeared before him and acknowledged that the
instrument was his free and voluntary act." Clearly, respondent lied and intentionally
perpetuated an untruthful statement. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless and
routinary act.13 It converts a private document into a public instrument, making it admissible
in evidence without the necessity of preliminary proof of its authenticity and due execution. 14
Neither will respondent's defense that the SPA in question was superfluous and
unnecessary, and prejudiced no one, exonerate him of accountability. His assertion of
falsehood in a public document contravened one of the most cherished tenets of the legal
profession and potentially cast suspicion on the truthfulness of every notarial act. As the
Municipal Administrator of Cainta, he should have been aware of his great responsibility not
only as a notary public but as a public officer as well. A public office is a public trust.
Respondent should not have caused disservice to his constituents by consciously
performing an act that would deceive them and the Municipality of Cainta. Without the
fraudulent SPA, the erring parties in the construction project could not have encashed the
check amounting to P3,700,000 and could not have foisted on the public a spurious contract
all to the extreme prejudice of the very Municipality of which he was the Administrator.
According to the COA Special Task Force:
Almost all acts of falsification of public documents as enumerated in Article 171 in
relation to Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code were evident in the transactions of
the Municipality of Cainta with J.C. Benitez & Architects Technical Management for
the consultancy services in the conduct of Detailed Feasibility Study and Detailed
Engineering Design of the Proposed Construction of Cainta Municipal Medium Rise
Low Cost Housing, in the contract amount of P11,000,000. The agent resorted to

misrepresentation, manufacture or fabrication of fictitious document, untruthful

narration of facts, misrepresentation, and counterfeiting or imitating signature for the
purpose of creating a fraudulent contract. All these were tainted with deceit
perpetrated against the government resulting to undue injury. The first and partial
payment, in the amount of P3,700,000.00 was made in the absence of the required
outputs. x x x15
We need not say more except that we are constrained to change the penalty recommended
by the IBP which we find too light.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Gregorio E. Ariola, Jr., is found guilty of gross misconduct
and is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law. Let copies of this Resolution be
furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and entered in the records of respondent, and
brought to the immediate attention of the Ombudsman.
SO ORDERED.

2004 Rules on Notarial Practice

LINK FOR BAYSAC vs ATTY. ACERON-PAPA
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
file=/jurisprudence/2016/august2016/10231.pdf

No Unlawful, Dishonest, Immoral, Deceitful Conduct Rule 1.01

ADM. CASE No. 3319

June 8, 2000

LESLIE UI, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. IRIS BONIFACIO, respondent.
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Iris Bonifacio for
allegedly carrying on an immoral relationship with Carlos L. Ui, husband of complainant,
Leslie Ui.
The relevant facts are:

On January 24, 1971 complainant Leslie Ui married Carlos L. Ui at the Our Lady of Lourdes
Church in Quezon City1and as a result of their marital union, they had four (4) children,
namely, Leilani, Lianni, Lindsay and Carl Cavin, all surnamed Ui. Sometime in December
1987, however, complainant found out that her husband. Carlos Ui, was carrying on an illicit
relationship with respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio with whom he begot a daughter sometime in
1986, and that they had been living together at No. 527 San Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang
Village in Muntinlupa City. Respondent who is a graduate of the College of Law of the
University of the Philippines was admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1982.
Carlos Ui admitted to complainant his relationship with the respondent. Complainant then
visited respondent at her office in the later part of June 1988 and introduced herself as the
legal wife of Carlos Ui. Whereupon, respondent admitted to her that she has a child with
Carlos Ui and alleged, however; that everything was over between her and Carlos Ui.
Complainant believed the representations of respondent and thought things would turn out
well from then on and that the illicit relationship between her husband and respondent
would come to an end.
However, complainant again discovered that the illicit relationship between her husband and
respondent continued, and that sometime in December 1988, respondent and her husband,
Carlos Ui, had a second child. Complainant then met again with respondent sometime in
March 1989 and pleaded with respondent to discontinue her illicit relationship with Carlos Ui
but to no avail. The illicit relationship persisted and complainant even came to know later on
that respondent had been employed by her husband in his company.
A complaint for disbarment, docketed as Adm. Case No. 3319, was then filed on August 11,
1989 by the complainant against respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio before the Commission on
Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereinafter, Commission) on the
ground of immorality, more particularly, for carrying on an illicit relationship with the
complainant's husband, Carlos Ui. In her Answer,2 respondent averred that she met Carlos
Ui sometime in 1983 and had known him all along to be a bachelor, with the knowledge,
however, that Carlos Ui had children by a Chinese woman in Amoy, China, from whom he
had long been estranged. She stated that during one of their trips abroad, Carlos Ui
formalized his intention to marry her and they in fact got married in Hawaii, USA in 1985 3.
Upon their return to Manila, respondent did not live with Carlos Ui. The latter continued to
live with his children in their Greenhills residence because respondent and Carlos Ui
wanted to let the children gradually to know and accept the fact of his second marriage
before they would live together.4
In 1986, respondent left the country and stayed in Honolulu, Hawaii and she would only
return occasionally to the Philippines to update her law practice and renew legal ties. During
one of her trips to Manila sometime in June 1988, she was confronted by a woman who
insisted that she was the lawful wife of Carlos Ui. Hurt and desolate upon her discovery of
the true civil status of Carlos Ui, respondent then left for Honolulu, Hawaii sometime in July

1988 and returned only in March 1989 with her two (2) children. On March 20, 1989, a few
days after she reported to work with the law firm 5 she was connected with, the woman who
represented herself to be the wife of Carlos Ui again came to her office, demanding to know
if Carlos Ui has been communicating with her.
It is respondent's contention that her relationship with Carlos Ui is not illicit because they
were married abroad and that after June 1988, when respondent discovered Carlos Ui's
true civil status, she cut off all her ties with him. Respondent averred that Carlos Ui never
lived with her in Alabang, and that he resided at 26 Potsdam Street, Greenhills, San Juan,
Metro Manila. It was respondent who lived in Alabang in a house which belonged to her
mother, Rosalinda L. Bonifacio; and that the said house was built exclusively from her
parents' funds.6 By way of counterclaim, respondent sought moral damages in the amount
of Ten Million Pesos (Php10,000,000.00) against complainant for having filed the present
allegedly malicious and groundless disbarment case against respondent.
In her Reply7 dated April 6, 1990, complainant states, among others, that respondent knew
perfectly well that Carlos Ui was married to complainant and had children with her even at
the start of her relationship with Carlos Ui, and that the reason respondent went abroad was
to give birth to her two (2) children with Carlos Ui.
During the pendency of the proceedings before the Integrated Bar, complainant also
charged her husband, Carlos Ui, and respondent with the crime of Concubinage before the
Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, docketed as I.S. No. 89-5247, but the same was
dismissed for insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense charged.
The resolution dismissing the criminal complaint against respondent reads:
Complainant's evidence had prima facie established the existence of the "illicit
relationship" between the respondents allegedly discovered by the complainant in
December 1987. The same evidence however show that respondent Carlos Ui was
still living with complainant up to the latter part of 1988 and/or the early part of 1989.
It would therefore be logical and safe to state that the "relationship" of respondents
started and was discovered by complainant sometime in 1987 when she and
respondent Carlos were still living at No. 26 Potsdam Street, Northeast Greenhills,
San Juan, Metro Manila and they, admittedly, continued to live together at their
conjugal home up to early (sic) part of 1989 or later 1988, when respondent Carlos
left the same.
From the above, it would not be amiss to conclude that altho (sic) the relationship,
illicit as complainant puts it, had been prima facie established by complainant's
evidence, this same evidence had failed to even prima facie establish the "fact of
respondent's cohabitation in the concept of husband and wife at the 527 San Carlos
St., Ayala Alabang house, proof of which is necessary and indispensable to at least

create probable cause for the offense charged. The statement alone of complainant,
worse, a statement only of a conclusion respecting the fact of cohabitation does not
make the complainant's evidence thereto any better/stronger (U.S. vs. Casipong and
Mongoy, 20 Phil. 178).
It is worth stating that the evidence submitted by respondents in support of their
respective positions on the matter support and bolster the foregoing
conclusion/recommendation.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that the instant complaint be
dismissed for want of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense charged.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.8
Complainant appealed the said Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal to the Secretary
of Justice, but the same was dismissed9 on the ground of insufficiency of evidence to prove
her allegation that respondent and Carlos Ui lived together as husband and wife at 527 San
Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.
In the proceedings before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, complainant filed a Motion
to Cite Respondent in Contempt of the Commission 10 wherein she charged respondent with
making false allegations in her Answer and for submitting a supporting document which was
altered and intercalated. She alleged that in the Answer of respondent filed before the
Integrated Bar, respondent averred, among others, that she was married to Carlos Ui on
October 22, 1985 and attached a Certificate of Marriage to substantiate her averment.
However, the Certificate of Marriage 11 duly certified by the State Registrar as a true copy of
the record on file in the Hawaii State Department of Health, and duly authenticated by the
Philippine Consulate General in Honolulu, Hawaii, USA revealed that the date of marriage
between Carlos Ui and respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio was October 22, 1987, and not
October 22, 1985 as claimed by respondent in her Answer. According to complainant, the
reason for that false allegation was because respondent wanted to impress upon the said
IBP that the birth of her first child by Carlos Ui was within the wedlock. 12 It is the contention
of complainant that such act constitutes a violation of Articles 183 13 and 184 14 of the
Revised Penal Code, and also contempt of the Commission; and that the act of respondent
in making false allegations in her Answer and submitting an altered/intercalated document
are indicative of her moral perversity and lack of integrity which make her unworthy to be a
member of the Philippine Bar.
In her Opposition (To Motion To Cite Respondent in Contempt), 15 respondent averred that
she did not have the original copy of the marriage certificate because the same was in the
possession of Carlos Ui, and that she annexed such copy because she relied in good faith
on what appeared on the copy of the marriage certificate in her possession.

Respondent filed her Memorandum 16 on February 22, 1995 and raised the lone issue of
whether or not she has conducted herself in an immoral manner for which she deserves to
be barred from the practice of law. Respondent averred that the complaint should be
dismissed on two (2) grounds, namely:
(i) Respondent conducted herself in a manner consistent with the requirement of
good moral character for the practice of the legal profession; and
(ii) Complainant failed to prove her allegation that respondent conducted herself in
an immoral manner.
In her defense, respondent contends, among others, that it was she who was the victim in
this case and not Leslie Ui because she did not know that Carlos Ui was already married,
and that upon learning of this fact, respondent immediately cut-off all her ties with Carlos Ui.
She stated that there was no reason for her to doubt at that time that the civil status of
Carlos Ui was that of a bachelor because he spent so much time with her, and he was so
open in his courtship. 18
On the issue of the falsified marriage certificate, respondent alleged that it was highly
incredible for her to have knowingly attached such marriage certificate to her Answer had
she known that the same was altered. Respondent reiterated that there was no compelling
reason for her to make it appear that her marriage to Carlos Ui took place either in 1985 or
1987, because the fact remains that respondent and Carlos Ui got married before
complainant confronted respondent and informed the latter of her earlier marriage to Carlos
Ui in June 1988. Further, respondent stated that it was Carlos Ui who testified and admitted
that he was the person responsible for changing the date of the marriage certificate from
1987 to 1985, and complainant did not present evidence to rebut the testimony of Carlos Ui
on this matter.
Respondent posits that complainant's evidence, consisting of the pictures of respondent
with a child, pictures of respondent with Carlos Ui, a picture of a garage with cars, a picture
of a light colored car with Plate No. PNS 313, a picture of the same car, and portion of the
house and ground, and another picture of the same car bearing Plate No. PNS 313 and a
picture of the house and the garage, 19 does not prove that she acted in an immoral manner.
They have no evidentiary value according to her. The pictures were taken by a
photographer from a private security agency and who was not presented during the
hearings. Further, the respondent presented the Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of Pasig
in I.S. Case No. 89-5427 dismissing the complaint filed by Leslie Ui against respondent for
lack of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense charged 20 and the dismissal of
the appeal by the Department of Justice21 to bolster her argument that she was not guilty of
any immoral or illegal act because of her relationship with Carlos Ui. In fine, respondent
claims that she entered the relationship with Carlos Ui in good faith and that her conduct
cannot be considered as willful, flagrant, or shameless, nor can it suggest moral

indifference. She fell in love with Carlos Ui whom she believed to be single, and, that upon
her discovery of his true civil status, she parted ways with him.
In the Memorandum 22 filed on March 20, 1995 by complainant Leslie Ui, she prayed for the
disbarment of Atty. Iris Bonifacio and reiterated that respondent committed immorality by
having intimate relations with a married man which resulted in the birth of two (2) children.
Complainant testified that respondent's mother, Mrs. Linda Bonifacio, personally knew
complainant and her husband since the late 1970s because they were clients of the bank
where Mrs. Bonifacio was the Branch Manager. 23 It was thus highly improbable that
respondent, who was living with her parents as of 1986, would not have been informed by
her own mother that Carlos Ui was a married man. Complainant likewise averred that
respondent committed disrespect towards the Commission for submitting a photocopy of a
document containing an intercalated date.
In her Reply to Complainant's Memorandum 24, respondent stated that complainant
miserably failed to show sufficient proof to warrant her disbarment. Respondent insists that
contrary to the allegations of complainant, there is no showing that respondent had
knowledge of the fact of marriage of Carlos Ui to complainant. The allegation that her
mother knew Carlos Ui to be a married man does not prove that such information was made
known to respondent.
Hearing on the case ensued, after which the Commission on Bar Discipline submitted its
Report and Recommendation, finding that:
In the case at bar, it is alleged that at the time respondent was courted by Carlos Ui,
the latter represented himself to be single. The Commission does not find said claim
too difficult to believe in the light of contemporary human experience.
Almost always, when a married man courts a single woman, he represents himself to
be single, separated, or without any firm commitment to another woman. The reason
therefor is not hard to fathom. By their very nature, single women prefer single men.
The records will show that when respondent became aware the (sic) true civil status
of Carlos Ui, she left for the United States (in July of 1988). She broke off all contacts
with him. When she returned to the Philippines in March of 1989, she lived with her
brother, Atty. Teodoro Bonifacio, Jr. Carlos Ui and respondent only talked to each
other because of the children whom he was allowed to visit. At no time did they live
together.
Under the foregoing circumstances, the Commission fails to find any act on the part
of respondent that can be considered as unprincipled or disgraceful as to be
reprehensible to a high degree. To be sure, she was more of a victim that (sic)
anything else and should deserve compassion rather than condemnation. Without

cavil, this sad episode destroyed her chance of having a normal and happy family
life, a dream cherished by every single girl.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Thereafter, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued a Notice
of Resolution dated December 13, 1997, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED,
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the aboveentitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A", and, finding
the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable
laws and rules, the complaint for Gross Immorality against Respondent is
DISMISSED for lack of merit. Atty. Iris Bonifacio is REPRIMANDED for knowingly
and willfully attaching to her Answer a falsified Certificate of Marriage with a stern
warning that a repetition of the same will merit a more severe penalty.
We agree with the findings aforequoted.
The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does not have the right to enjoy the
practice of the legal profession simply by passing the bar examinations. It is a privilege that
can be revoked, subject to the mandate of due process, once a lawyer violates his oath and
the dictates of legal ethics. The requisites for admission to the practice of law are:
a. he must be a citizen of the Philippines;
b. a resident thereof;
c. at least twenty-one (21) years of age;
d. a person of good moral character;
e. he must show that no charges against him involving moral turpitude, are filed or
pending in court;
f. possess the required educational qualifications; and
g. pass the bar examinations.

25

(Emphasis supplied)

Clear from the foregoing is that one of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an
applicant must possess good moral character. More importantly, possession of good moral
character must be continuous as a requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law

practice, otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege. It has
been held
If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar, then the continued
possession of good moral character is also a requisite for retaining membership in
the legal profession. Membership in the bar may be terminated when a lawyer
ceases to have good moral character. (Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).
A lawyer may be disbarred for "grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude". A member of the bar should have
moral integrity in addition to professional probity.
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is
"grossly immoral conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which
render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that
what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the
immoral conduct that warrants disbarment.
Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or
shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and
respectable members of the community." (7 C.J.S. 959). 26
In the case at bar, it is the claim of respondent Atty. Bonifacio that when she met Carlos Ui,
she knew and believed him to be single. Respondent fell in love with him and they got
married and as a result of such marriage, she gave birth to two (2) children. Upon her
knowledge of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, she left him.
Simple as the facts of the case may sound, the effects of the actuations of respondent are
not only far from simple, they will have a rippling effect on how the standard norms of our
legal practitioners should be defined. Perhaps morality in our liberal society today is a far
cry from what it used to be before. This permissiveness notwithstanding, lawyers, as
keepers of public faith, are burdened with a higher degree of social responsibility and thus
must handle their personal affairs with greater caution. The facts of this case lead us to
believe that perhaps respondent would not have found herself in such a compromising
situation had she exercised prudence and been more vigilant in finding out more about
Carlos Ui's personal background prior to her intimate involvement with him.
Surely, circumstances existed which should have at least aroused respondent's suspicion
that something was amiss in her relationship with Carlos Ui, and moved her to ask probing
questions. For instance, respondent admitted that she knew that Carlos Ui had children with
a woman from Amoy, China, yet it appeared that she never exerted the slightest effort to
find out if Carlos Ui and this woman were indeed unmarried. Also, despite their marriage in
1987, Carlos Ui never lived with respondent and their first child, a circumstance that is

simply incomprehensible considering respondent's allegation that Carlos Ui was very open
in courting her.
All these taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that respondent was imprudent
in managing her personal affairs. However, the fact remains that her relationship with Carlos
Ui, clothed as it was with what respondent believed was a valid marriage, cannot be
considered immoral. For immorality connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral
norms of society and the opinion of good and respectable members of the
community. 27 Moreover, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must be
"grossly immoral," that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree. 28
We have held that "a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to
refrain from adulterous relationships . . . but must also so behave himself as to avoid
scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral
standards." 29 Respondent's act of immediately distancing herself from Carlos Ui upon
discovering his true civil status belies just that alleged moral indifference and proves that
she had no intention of flaunting the law and the high moral standard of the legal profession.
Complainant's bare assertions to the contrary deserve no credit. After all, the burden of
proof rests upon the complainant, and the Court will exercise its disciplinary powers only if
she establishes her case by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence. 30 This, herein
complainant miserably failed to do.
On the matter of the falsified Certificate of Marriage attached by respondent to her Answer,
we find improbable to believe the averment of respondent that she merely relied on the
photocopy of the Marriage Certificate which was provided her by Carlos Ui. For an event as
significant as a marriage ceremony, any normal bride would verily recall the date and year
of her marriage. It is difficult to fathom how a bride, especially a lawyer as in the case at bar,
can forget the year when she got married. Simply stated, it is contrary to human experience
and highly improbable.
Furthermore, any prudent lawyer would verify the information contained in an attachment to
her pleading, especially so when she has personal knowledge of the facts and
circumstances contained therein. In attaching such Marriage Certificate with an intercalated
date, the defense of good faith of respondent on that point cannot stand.
It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of
morality. The legal profession exacts from its members nothing less. Lawyers are called
upon to safeguard the integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts constitutive of
malpractice. Their exalted positions as officers of the court demand no less than the highest
degree of morality.

WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Iris L. Bonifacio, for
alleged immorality, is hereby DISMISSED.
However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED for attaching to her Answer a photocopy of
her Marriage Certificate, with an altered or intercalated date thereof, with a STERN
WARNING that a more severe sanction will be imposed on her for any repetition of the
same or similar offense in the future.
SO ORDERED.

No Unlawful, Dishonest, Immoral, Deceitful Conduct Rule 1.01

SBC Case No. 519 July 31, 1997
PATRICIA FIGUEROA, complainant,
vs.
SIMEON BARRANCO, JR., respondent.
RESOLUTION

ROMERO, J.:
In a complaint made way back in 1971, Patricia Figueroa petitioned that respondent Simeon
Barranco, Jr. be denied admission to the legal profession. Respondent had passed the
1970 bar examinations on the fourth attempt, after unsuccessful attempts in 1966, 1967 and
1968. Before be could take his oath, however, complainant filed the instant petition averring
that respondent and she had been sweethearts, that a child out of wedlock was born to
them and that respondent did not fulfill his repeated promises to many her.
The facts were manifested in hearings held before Investigator Victor F. Sevilla in June and
July 1971. Respondent and complainant were townmates in Janiuay, Iloilo. Since 1953,
when they were both in their teens, they were steadies. Respondent even acted as escort to
complainant when she reigned as Queen at the 1953 town fiesta. Complainant first acceded
to sexual congress with respondent sometime in 1960. Their intimacy yielded a son, Rafael
Barranco, born on December 11, 1964. 1 It was after the child was born, complainant
alleged, that respondent first promised he would marry her after he passes the bar

examinations. Their relationship continued and respondent allegedly made more than
twenty or thirty promises of marriage. He gave only P10.00 for the child on the latter's
birthdays. Her trust in him and their relationship ended in 1971, when she learned that
respondent married another woman. Hence, this petition.
Upon complainant's motion, the Court authorized the taking of testimonies of witnesses by
deposition in 1972. On February 18, 1974, respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion to
Dismiss the case citing complainant's failure to comment on the motion of Judge Cuello
seeking to be relieved from the duty to take aforesaid testimonies by deposition.
Complainant filed her comment required and that she remains interested in the resolution of
the present case. On June 18, 1974, the Court denied respondent's motion to dismiss.
On October 2, 1980, the Court once again denied a motion to dismiss on the ground of
abandonment filed by respondent on September 17, 1979. 2 Respondent's third motion to
dismiss was noted in the Court's Resolution dated September 15, 1982. 3 In 1988,
respondent repeated his request, citing his election as a member of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Janiuay, Iloilo from 1980-1986, his active participation in civic organizations and
good standing in the community as well as the length of time this case has been pending as
reasons to allow him to take his oath as a lawyer. 4
On September 29, 1988, the Court resolved to dismiss the complaint for failure of
complainant to prosecute the case for an unreasonable period of time and to allow Simeon
Barranco, Jr. to take the lawyer's oath upon payment of the required fees. 5
Respondent's hopes were again dashed on November 17, 1988 when the Court, in
response to complainant's opposition, resolved to cancel his scheduled oath-taking. On
June 1, 1993, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.
The IBP's report dated May 17, 1997 recommended the dismissal of the case and that
respondent be allowed to take the lawyer's oath.
We agree.
Respondent was prevented from taking the lawyer's oath in 1971 because of the charge of
gross immorality made by complainant. To recapitulate, respondent bore an illegitimate child
with his sweetheart, Patricia Figueroa, who also claims that he did not fulfill his promise to
marry her after he passes the bar examinations.
We find that these facts do not constitute gross immorality warranting the permanent
exclusion of respondent from the legal profession. His engaging in premarital sexual
relations with complainant and promises to marry suggests a doubtful moral character on
his part but the same does not constitute grossly immoral conduct. The Court has held that

to justify suspension or disbarment the act complained of must not only be immoral, but
grossly immoral. "A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a
criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree." 6 It is
a willful, flagrant, or shameless act which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of
respectable members of the community. 7
We find the ruling in Arciga v. Maniwang 8 quite relevant because mere intimacy between a
man and a woman, both of whom possess no impediment to marry, voluntarily carried on
and devoid of any deceit on the part of respondent, is neither so corrupt nor so unprincipled
as to warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction against him, even if as a result of such
relationship a child was born out of wedlock. 9
Respondent and complainant were sweethearts whose sexual relations were evidently
consensual. We do not find complainant's assertions that she had been forced into sexual
intercourse, credible. She continued to see and be respondent's girlfriend even after she
had given birth to a son in 1964 and until 1971. All those years of amicable and intimate
relations refute her allegations that she was forced to have sexual congress with him.
Complainant was then an adult who voluntarily and actively pursued their relationship and
was not an innocent young girl who could be easily led astray. Unfortunately, respondent
chose to marry and settle permanently with another woman. We cannot castigate a man for
seeking out the partner of his dreams, for marriage is a sacred and perpetual bond which
should be entered into because of love, not for any other reason.
We cannot help viewing the instant complaint as an act of revenge of a woman scorned,
bitter and unforgiving to the end. It is also intended to make respondent suffer severely and
it seems, perpetually, sacrificing the profession he worked very hard to be admitted into.
Even assuming that his past indiscretions are ignoble, the twenty-six years that respondent
has been prevented from being a lawyer constitute sufficient punishment therefor. During
this time there appears to be no other indiscretion attributed to him. 10 Respondent, who is
now sixty-two years of age, should thus be allowed, albeit belatedly, to take the lawyer's
oath.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Respondent Simeon Barranco,
Jr. is ALLOWED to take his oath as a lawyer upon payment of the proper fees.
SO ORDERED.

No Unlawful, Dishonest, Immoral, Deceitful Conduct Rule 1.01

A.C. No. 4585

November 12, 2004

MICHAEL P. BARRIOS, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. FRANCISCO P. MARTINEZ, respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:
This is a verified petition1 for disbarment filed against Atty. Francisco Martinez for having
been convicted by final judgment in Criminal Case No. 6608 of a crime involving moral
turpitude by Branch 8 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tacloban City.2
The dispositive portion of the same states:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused Francisco Martinez guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime for (sic) violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 charged
in the Information. He is imposed a penalty of one (1) year imprisonment and fine
double the amount of the check which is EIGHT THOUSAND (8,000.00) PESOS,
plus payment of the tax pursuant to Section 205 of the Internal Revenue Code and
costs against the accused.3
Complainant further submitted our Resolution dated 13 March 1996 and the Entry of
Judgment from this Court dated 20 March 1996.
On 03 July 1996, we required4 respondent to comment on said petition within ten (10) days
from notice. On 17 February 1997, we issued a second resolution 5 requiring him to show
cause why no disciplinary action should be imposed on him for failure to comply with our
earlier Resolution, and to submit said Comment. On 07 July 1997, we imposed a fine of
P1,000 for respondent's failure to file said Comment and required him to comply with our
previous resolution within ten days.6 On 27 April 1998, we fined respondent an additional
P2,000 and required him to comply with the resolution requiring his comment within ten
days under pain of imprisonment and arrest for a period of five (5) days or until his
compliance.7 Finally, on 03 February 1999, or almost three years later, we declared
respondent Martinez guilty of Contempt under Rule 71, Sec. 3[b] of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure and ordered his imprisonment until he complied with the aforesaid resolutions. 8
On 05 April 1999, the National Bureau of Investigation reported 9 that respondent was
arrested in Tacloban City on 26 March 1999, but was subsequently released after having
shown proof of compliance with the resolutions of 17 February 1997 and 27 April 1998 by
remitting the amount of P2,000 and submitting his long overdue Comment.
In the said Comment10 dated 16 March 1999, respondent stated that:

1. He failed to respond to our Resolution dated 17 February 1997 as he was at that

time undergoing medical treatment at Camp Ruperto Kangleon in Palo, Leyte;
2. Complainant Michael Barrios passed away sometime in June 1997; and
3. Said administrative complaint is an offshoot of a civil case which was decided in
respondent's favor (as plaintiff in the said case). Respondent avers that as a result of
his moving for the execution of judgment in his favor and the eviction of the family of
herein complainant Michael Barrios, the latter filed the present administrative case.
In the meantime, on 11 September 1997, a certain Robert Visbal of the Provincial
Prosecution Office of Tacloban City submitted a letter 11 to the First Division Clerk of Court
alleging that respondent Martinez also stood charged in another estafa case before the
Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City, Branch 9, as well as a civil case involving the victims
of the Doa Paz tragedy in 1987, for which the Regional Trial Court of Basey, Samar,
Branch 30 rendered a decision against him, his appeal thereto having been dismissed by
the Court of Appeals.
In the said Decision of Branch 30 of the Regional Trial Court of Basey, Samar,12 it appears
that herein respondent Atty. Martinez offered his legal services to the victims of the Doa
Paz tragedy for free. However, when the plaintiff in the said civil case was issued a check
for P90,000 by Sulpicio Lines representing compensation for the deaths of his wife and two
daughters, Atty. Martinez asked plaintiff to endorse said check, which was then deposited in
the account of Dr. Martinez, Atty. Martinez's wife. When plaintiff asked for his money, he was
only able to recover a total of P30,000. Atty. Martinez claimed the remaining P60,000 as his
attorney's fees. Holding that it was "absurd and totally ridiculous that for a simple legal
service he would collect 2/3 of the money claim," the trial court ordered Atty. Martinez to
pay the plaintiff therein the amount of P60,000 with interest, P5,000 for moral and
exemplary damages, and the costs of the suit.
Said trial court also made particular mention of Martinez's dilatory tactics during the trial,
citing fourteen (14) specific instances thereof. Martinez's appeal from the above judgment
was dismissed by the Court of Appeals for his failure to file his brief, despite having been
granted three thirty (30)-day extensions to do so. 13
On 16 June 1999, we referred14 the present case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.
The report15 of IBP Investigating Commissioner Winston D. Abuyuan stated in part that:
Several dates for the hearing of the case were scheduled but none of the parties
appeared before the Commission, until finally it was considered submitted for
resolution last 27 June 2002. On the same date respondent filed a motion for the
dismissal of the case on the ground that the complainant died sometime in June
1997 and that dismissal is warranted because "the case filed by him does not
survive due to his demise; as a matter of fact, it is extinguished upon his death."
We disagree with respondent's contention.

Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court, the Honorable
Supreme Court or the IBP may motu proprio initiate the proceedings when they
perceive acts of lawyers which deserve sanctions or when their attention is called by
any one and a probable cause exists that an act has been perpetrated by a lawyer
which requires disciplinary sanctions.
As earlier cited, respondent lawyer's propensity to disregard or ignore orders of the
Honorable Supreme Court for which he was fined twice, arrested and imprisoned
reflects an utter lack of good moral character.
Respondent's conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude (estafa and/or violation
of BP Blg. 22) clearly shows his unfitness to protect the administration of justice and
therefore justifies the imposition of sanctions against him (see In re: Abesamis, 102
Phil. 1182; In re: Jaramillo, 101 Phil. 323; In re: Vinzon, 19 SCRA 815; Medina vs.
Bautista, 12 SCRA 1, People vs. Tuanda, Adm. Case No. 3360, 30 Jan. 1990).
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that respondent
Atty. Francisco P. Martinez be disbarred and his name stricken out from the Roll of
Attorneys immediately.
On 27 September 2003, the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution 16 adopting and
approving the report and recommendation of its Investigating Commissioner.
On 03 December 2003, respondent Martinez filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or
Reinvestigation,17 in the instant case alleging that:
1. The Report and Recommendation of the IBP Investigating Commissioner is
tantamount to a deprivation of property without due process of law, although
admittedly the practice of law is a privilege;
2. If respondent is given another chance to have his day in court and allowed to
adduce evidence, the result/outcome would be entirely different from that arrived at
by the Investigating Commissioner; and
3. Respondent is now 71 years of age, and has served the judiciary in various
capacities (from acting city judge to Municipal Judges League Leyte Chapter
President) for almost 17 years prior to resuming his law practice.
On 14 January 2004, we required18 complainant to file a comment within ten days. On 16
February 2004, we received a Manifestation and Motion 19 from complainant's daughter,
Diane Francis Barrios Latoja, alleging that they had not been furnished with a copy of
respondent's Motion, notwithstanding the fact that respondent ostensibly lives next door to
complainant's family. Required to Comment on 17 May 2004, respondent has until now
failed to do so.
The records show that respondent, indeed, failed to furnish a copy of said Motion to herein
complainant. The records also show that respondent was given several opportunities to
present evidence by this Court20 as well as by the IBP.21 Indeed, he only has himself to

blame, for he has failed to present his case despite several occasions to do so. It is now too
late in the day for respondent to ask this court to receive his evidence.
This court, moreover, is unwilling to exercise the same patience that it did when it waited for
his comment on the original petition. At any rate, after a careful consideration of the records
of the instant case, we find the evidence on record sufficient to support the IBP's findings.
Under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or
other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a
case without authority to do so.
In the present case, respondent has been found guilty and convicted by final judgment for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 for issuing a worthless check in the amount of P8,000. The issue
with which we are now concerned is whether or not the said crime is one involving moral
turpitude. 22
Moral turpitude "includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or
good morals."23 It involves "an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties
which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and
customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals."24
In People of the Philippines v. Atty. Fe Tuanda,25 where the erring lawyer was indefinitely
suspended for having been convicted of three counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22, we held
that conviction by final judgment of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude and
stated:
We should add that the crimes of which respondent was convicted also import deceit
and violation of her attorney's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility
under both of which she was bound to "obey the laws of the land." Conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude might not (as in the instant case, violation of B.P. Blg.
22 does not) relate to the exercise of the profession of a lawyer; however, it certainly
relates to and affects the good moral character of a person convicted of such
offense26 (emphasis supplied)
Over ten years later, we reiterated the above ruling in Villaber v. Commission on
Elections27 and disqualified a congressional candidate for having been sentenced by final
judgment for three counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in accordance with Sec. 12 of the
Omnibus Election Code, which states:
SEC. 12. Disqualifications. Any person who has been declared by competent
authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for
subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for which he has been
sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months, or for a crime involving moral

turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he

has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty. (emphasis supplied)
Enumerating the elements of that crime, we held that the act of a person in issuing a check
knowing at the time of the issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or
credit with, the drawee bank for the check in full upon its presentment, is a manifestation of
moral turpitude. Notwithstanding therein petitioner's averment that he was not a lawyer, we
nevertheless applied our ruling in People v. Tuanda, to the effect that
(A) conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, "imports deceit" and "certainly relates to
and affects the good moral character of a person." [Indeed] the effects of the
issuance of a worthless check, as we held in the landmark case of Lozano v.
Martinez, through Justice Pedro L. Yap, "transcends the private interests of the
parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the
community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or
holder, but also an injury to the public" since the circulation of valueless commercial
papers "can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the
banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest."
Thus, paraphrasing Black's definition, a drawer who issues an unfunded check
deliberately reneges on his private duties he owes his fellow men or society in a
manner contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty
or good morals.28(emphasis supplied)
In the recent case of Barrientos v. Libiran-Meteoro,29 we stated that:
(T)he issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having been drawn against
a closed account indicates a lawyer's unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed
on her. It shows a lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render
her unworthy of public confidence. [Cuizon v. Macalino, A.C. No. 4334, 07 July 2004]
The issuance of a series of worthless checks also shows the remorseless attitude of
respondent, unmindful to the deleterious effects of such act to the public interest and
public order. [Lao v. Medel, 405 SCRA 227] It also manifests a lawyer's low regard
for her commitment to the oath she has taken when she joined her peers, seriously
and irreparably tarnishing the image of the profession she should hold in high
esteem. [Sanchez v. Somoso, A.C. No. 6061, 03 October 2003]
Clearly, therefore, the act of a lawyer in issuing a check without sufficient funds to cover the
same constitutes such willful dishonesty and immoral conduct as to undermine the public
confidence in law and lawyers. And while "the general rule is that a lawyer may not be
suspended or disbarred, and the court may not ordinarily assume jurisdiction to discipline
him for misconduct in his non-professional or private capacity, where, however, the
misconduct outside of the lawyer's professional dealings is so gross a character as to show
him morally unfit for the office and unworthy of the privilege which his licenses and the law
confer on him, the court may be justified in suspending or removing him from the office of
attorney."30
The argument of respondent that to disbar him now is tantamount to a deprivation of
property without due process of law is also untenable. As respondent himself admits, the

practice of law is a privilege. The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is "to protect the
administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be
competent, honorable and reliable; men in whom courts and clients may repose
confidence."31 "A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action
where the complainant is plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary
proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are
undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare, and for the purpose of preserving
courts of justice from the official ministrations of persons unfit to practice them." 32 "Verily,
lawyers must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, to the courts
and to their clients. Their conduct must always reflect the values and norms of the legal
profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. On these
considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend lawyers for any professional or private
misconduct showing them to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good
demeanor or to be unworthy to continue as officers of the Court." 33
Nor are we inclined to look with favor upon respondent's plea that if "given another chance
to have his day in court and to adduce evidence, the result/outcome would be entirely
different from that arrived at." We note with displeasure the inordinate length of time
respondent took in responding to our requirement to submit his Comment on the original
petition to disbar him. These acts constitute a willful disobedience of the lawful orders of this
Court, which under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is in itself a cause sufficient for
suspension or disbarment. Thus, from the time we issued our first Resolution on 03 July
1996 requiring him to submit his Comment, until 16 March 1999, when he submitted said
Comment to secure his release from arrest, almost three years had elapsed.
It is revealing that despite the unwarranted length of time it took respondent to comply, his
Comment consists of all of two pages, a copy of which, it appears, he neglected to furnish
complainant.34 And while he claims to have been confined while undergoing medical
treatment at the time our Resolution of 17 February 1997 was issued, he merely reserved
the submission of a certification to that effect. Nor, indeed, was he able to offer any
explanation for his failure to submit his Comment from the time we issued our first
Resolution of 03 July 1996 until 16 March 1999. In fact, said Comment alleged, merely, that
the complainant, Michael Barrios, passed away sometime in June 1997, and imputed upon
the latter unsupported ill-motives for instituting the said Petition against him, which
argument has already been resolved squarely in the abovementioned IBP report.
Moreover, the IBP report cited the failure of both parties to appear before the Commission
as the main reason for the long delay, until the same was finally submitted for Resolution on
27 June 2002. Respondent, therefore, squandered away seven years to "have his day in
court and adduce evidence" in his behalf, which inaction also unduly delayed the court's
prompt disposition of this petition.
In Pajares v. Abad Santos,35 we reminded attorneys that "there must be more faithful
adherence to Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court [now Rule 7, Section 3] which provides
that the signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the
pleading and that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is good ground
to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay, and expressly admonishes that for a
willful violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to disciplinary action. 36 It is

noteworthy that in the past, the Court has disciplined lawyers and judges for willful disregard
of its orders to file comments or appellant's briefs, as a penalty for disobedience thereof. 37
For the same reasons, we are disinclined to take respondent's old age and the fact that he
served in the judiciary in various capacities in his favor. If at all, we hold respondent to a
higher standard for it, for a judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and
independence,38 and his conduct should be above reproach.39 The fact that respondent has
chosen to engage in private practice does not mean he is now free to conduct himself in
less honorable or indeed in a less than honorable manner.
We stress that membership in the legal profession is a privilege, 40 demanding a high degree
of good moral character, not only as a condition precedent to admission, but also as a
continuing requirement for the practice of law.41 Sadly, herein respondent falls short of the
exacting standards expected of him as a vanguard of the legal profession.
The IBP Board of Governors recommended that respondent be disbarred from the practice
of law. We agree.
We come now to the matter of the penalty imposable in this case. In Co v.
Bernardino and Lao v. Medel, we upheld the imposition of one year's suspension for nonpayment of debt and issuance of worthless checks, or a suspension of six months upon
partial payment of the obligation.42 However, in these cases, for various reasons, none of
the issuances resulted in a conviction by the erring lawyers for either estafa or B.P. Blg. 22.
Thus, we held therein that the issuance of worthless checks constitutes gross misconduct,
for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law.
In the instant case, however, herein respondent has been found guilty and stands
convicted by final judgment of a crime involving moral turpitude. In People v. Tuanda, which
is similar to this case in that both respondents were convicted for violation of B.P. Blg. 22
which we have held to be such a crime, we affirmed the order of suspension from the
practice of law imposed by the Court of Appeals, until further orders.
However, in a long line of cases, some of which were decided after Tuanda, we have held
disbarment to be the appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment for a crime
involving moral turpitude. Thus:
1. In In The Matter of Disbarment Proceedings v. Narciso N. Jaramillo,43 we
disbarred a lawyer convicted of estafa without discussing the circumstances behind
his conviction. We held that:
There is no question that the crime of estafa involves moral turpitude. The
review of respondent's conviction no longer rests upon us. The judgment not
only has become final but has been executed. No elaborate argument is
necessary to hold the respondent unworthy of the privilege bestowed on him
as a member of the bar. Suffice it to say that, by his conviction, the
respondent has proved himself unfit to protect the administration of justice. 44

2. In In Re: Dalmacio De Los Angeles,45 a lawyer was convicted of the crime of

attempted bribery in a final decision rendered by the Court of Appeals. "And since
bribery is admittedly a felony involving moral turpitude (7 C.J.S., p. 736; 5 Am. Jur. p.
428), this Court, much as it sympathizes with the plight of respondent, is constrained
to decree his disbarment as ordained by Section 25 of Rule 127." 46
3. In Ledesma De Jesus-Paras v. Quinciano Vailoces,47 the erring lawyer
acknowledged the execution of a document purporting to be a last will and
testament, which later turned out to be a forgery. He was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification of public document, which the Court
held to be a crime involving moral turpitude, said act being contrary to justice,
honesty and good morals, and was subsequently disbarred.
4. In In Re: Disbarment Proceedings Against Atty. Diosdado Q. Gutierrez,48 Atty.
Gutierrez was convicted for murder. After serving a portion of the sentence, he was
granted a conditional pardon by the President. Holding that the pardon was not
absolute and thus did not reach the offense itself but merely remitted the unexecuted
portion of his term, the court nevertheless disbarred him.
5. In In Re: Atty. Isidro P. Vinzon,49 Atty. Vinzon was convicted of the crime of estafa
for misappropriating the amount of P7,000.00, and was subsequently disbarred. We
held thus:
Upon the other hand, and dealing now with the merits of the case, there can
be no question that the term "moral turpitude" includes everything which is
done contrary to justice, honesty, or good morals. In essence and in all
respects, estafa, no doubt, is a crime involving moral turpitude because the
act is unquestionably against justice, honesty and good morals (In re
Gutierrez, Adm. Case No. 263, July 31, 1962; Bouvier's Law Dictionary; In re
Basa, 41 Phil. 275-76). As respondent's guilt cannot now be questioned, his
disbarment is inevitable. (emphasis supplied)50
6. In In Re: Attorney Jose Avancea,51 the conditional pardon extended to the erring
lawyer by the Chief Executive also failed to relieve him of the penalty of disbarment
imposed by this court.
7. In In Re Disbarment of Rodolfo Pajo,52 a lawyer was charged and found guilty of
the crime of falsification of public document for having prepared and notarized a
deed of sale of a parcel of land knowing that the supposed affiant was an impostor
and that the vendor had been dead for almost eight years. We ruled that disbarment
follows as a consequence of a lawyer's conviction by final judgment of a crime
involving moral turpitude, and since the crime of falsification of public document
involves moral turpitude, we ordered respondent's name stricken off the roll of
attorneys.
8. In Adelina T. Villanueva v. Atty. Teresita Sta. Ana,53 we upheld the
recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors to disbar a lawyer who had been

convicted of estafa through falsification of public documents, because she was

"totally unfit to be a member of the legal profession." 54
9. In Victoriano P. Resurreccion v. Atty. Ciriaco C. Sayson,55 a lawyer was disbarred
for having been convicted of estafa by final judgment for misappropriating the funds
of his client.
In this case as well, we find disbarment to be the appropriate penalty. "Of all classes and
professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn
servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and override the laws, to trample
them underfoot and to ignore the very bands of society, argues recreancy to his position
and office and sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate and dangerous elements of
the body politic."56
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco P. Martinez is hereby dISBARRED and his name
is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered
in the respondent's record as a member of the Bar, and notice of the same be served on the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation
to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.

No Unlawful, Dishonest, Immoral, Deceitful Conduct Rule 1.01

A.C. No. 9115

September 17, 2014

REBECCA MARIE UY YUPANGCO-NAKPIL, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ROBERTO L. UY, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This is an administrative case against respondent Atty. Roberto L. Uy (respondent) for
unprofessional and unethical conduct, stemming from a complaint filed by private
complainant Rebecca Marie Uy Yupangco-Nakpil (Rebecca), represented by her attorneyin-fact, Bella Asuncion Pollo (Bella).
The Facts

Rebecca is the natural niece and adopted daughter of the late Dra. Pacita Uy y Lim
(Pacita).1 She was adjudged as the sole and exclusive legal heir of Paci ta by virtue of an
Order2 dated August 10, 1999 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 34 in
SPEC. PROC. No. 95-7520 l (SP 95-75201). At the time of her death, Pacita was a
stockholder in several corporations primarily engaged in acquiring, developing, and leasing
real properties, namely, Uy Realty Company, Inc. (URCI), Jespajo Realty Corporation,
Roberto L. Uy Realty and Development Corporation, Jesus Uy Realty Corporation,
Distelleria La Jarolina, Inc., and Pacita Lim Uy Realty, Inc. 3
In her Complaint4 filed on May 9, 2005,5 Rebecca, through her attorney-in fact, Bella,
averred that respondent, her alleged illegitimate halfcousin, 6 continuously failed and refused
to comply with the court order in SP 95-75201 declaring her as the successor-in-interest to
all of Pacitas properties, as well as her requests for the accounting and delivery of the
dividends and other proceeds or benefits coming from Pacitas stockholdings in the
aforementioned corporations.7 She added that respondent mortgaged a commercial
property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-133606 (subject property) in favor of
Philippine Savings Bank in the total amount of 54,000,000.00, 8 despite an existing Trust
Agreement9 executed on October 15, 1993 (subject Trust Agreement) wherein respondent,
in his capacity as President of URCI, already recognized her to be the true and beneficial
owner of the same.10Accordingly, she demanded that respondent return the said property by
executing the corresponding deed of conveyance in her favor together with an inventory
and accounting of all the proceeds therefrom, but to no avail. 11 In this relation, Rebecca
claimed that it was only on September 2, 2005 or after she had already instituted various
legal actions and remedies that respondent and URCIagreed to transfer the subject
property to her pursuant to a compromise agreement. 12
In his Answer With Compulsory Counterclaim,13 respondent denied Rebeccas allegations
and raised the affirmative defenses of forum shopping and prescription. He pointed out that
Rebecca had filed several cases raising the single issue on the correct interpretation of the
subject trust agreement. He also contended that the parties transactions in this case were
made way back in 1993 and 1995 without a complaint having been filed until Bella came
into the picture and instituted various suits covering the same issue. 14 As such, he sought
the dismissal of the complaint, and further prayed for the payment of moral damages and
attorneys fees by way of counterclaim.15
On September 8, 2005, Rebecca filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint 16 in CBD Case No.
05-1484 for the reason that "the facts surrounding the same arose out of a
misunderstanding and misapprehension of the real facts surrounding their dispute." 17
However, on October 6, 2005, Bella filed a Manifestation with Leave of Court to File Motion
for Intervention,18praying that the investigation of the charges against respondent continue
in order to weed out erring members of the legal profession. 19

The Report and Recommendation of the IBP

On October 8, 2007, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Investigating Commissioner
issuedhis Report and Recommendation,20 finding respondent guilty of serious misconduct in
violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code), and,
thus, recommended the penalty of suspension for a period of six (6) months. 21
On matters of procedure, the Investigating Commissioner opined that Rebeccas motion to
withdraw did notserve as a bar for the further consideration and investigation ofthe
administrative case against respondent. As basis, he cites Section 5, Rule 139-B of the
Rules of Court which provides that "[n]o investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by
reason of the desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges, or
failure of the complainant to prosecute the same." Separately, the Investigating
Commissioner denied the claim of forum shopping, noting that disciplinary cases are sui
generis and may, therefore, proceed independently.22
On the merits of the charge, the Investigating Commissioner observed that respondent
lacked the good moral character required from members of the Bar when the latter failed to
comply with the demands of Rebecca under the subject trust agreement, not to mention his
unworthy and deceitful acts of mortgaging the subject property without the formers consent.
In fine, respondent was found guilty of serious misconduct in violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1
of the Code, for which the above-stated penalty was recommended. 23
In a Resolution24 dated November 10, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the Investigating Commissioners Report and Recommendation.
The Issue Before the Court
The basic issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively
liable.
The Courts Ruling
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code, as itis applied to the members of the legal profession,
engraves an overriding prohibition against any form of misconduct, viz.:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF
THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
The gravity of the misconduct determinative as it is of the errant lawyers penalty
depends on the factual circumstances of each case.

Here, the Court observes that the squabble which gave rise to the present administrative
case largely constitutes an internal affair, which had already been laid to rest by the parties.
This is clearly exhibited by Rebeccas motion to withdraw filed in this case as well as the
compromise agreement forged in Civil Case No. 04-108887 which involves the subject
propertys alleged disposition in violation of the subject trust agreement. As the Court sees
it, his failure to complywith the demands of Rebecca which she takes as an invocation of
her rights under the subject trust agreement as well as respondents acts of mortgaging
the subject property without the formers consent, sprung from his own assertion of the
rights he believed he had over the subject property. The propriety of said courses of action
eludes the Courts determination,for that matter had never been resolved on its merits in
view of the aforementioned settlement. Rebecca even states in her motion to withdraw that
the allegations she had previously made arose out of a "misapprehension of the real facts
surrounding their dispute" and even adds that respondent "had fully explained to [her] the
real nature and extent of her inheritance x x x toher entire satisfaction," leading her to state
that she is "now fully convinced that [her] complaint has no basis in fact and in
law."25 Accordingly, with the admitted misstatement of facts, the observations of the
Investigating Commissioner, as adopted by the IBP, hardly hold water so as to support the
finding of "serious misconduct" which would warrant its recommended penalty.
Be that as it may, the Court, nonetheless, finds that respondent committed some form of
misconduct by, as admitted, mortgaging the subject property, notwithstanding the apparent
dispute over the same. Regardless of the merits of his own claim, respondent should have
exhibited prudent restraint becoming of a legal exemplar. He should not have exposed
himself even to the slightest risk of committing a property violation nor any action which
would endanger the Bar's reputation. Verily, members of the Bar are expected at all times to
uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission
which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty,
and integrity of the legal profession.26 By no insignificant measure, respondent blemished
not only his integrity as a member of the Bar, but also that of the legal profession. In other
words, his conduct fell short of the exacting standards expected of him as a guardian of law
and justice. Although to a lesser extent as compared to what has been ascribed by the IBP,
the Court still holds respondent guilty of violating Rule 1. 01, Canon 1 of the Code.
Considering that this is his first offense as well as the peculiar circumstances of this case,
the Court believes that a fine of P15,000.00 would suffice.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Roberto L. Uy is found GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is ordered to pay a
FINE of P15,000.00 within ten (10) days from receipt of this Resolution. Further, he is
STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to respondent's record in this Court as attorney.
Further, let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and

the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the courts in
the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

No Counseling to Defy Law Rule 1.02

A.C. No. 6057

June 27, 2006

PETER T. DONTON, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. EMMANUEL O. TANSINGCO, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a disbarment complaint against respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco
("respondent") for serious misconduct and deliberate violation of Canon 1, 1 Rules 1.012 and
1.023 of the Code of Professional Responsibility ("Code").
The Facts
In his Complaint dated 20 May 2003, Peter T. Donton ("complainant") stated that he filed a
criminal complaint for estafa thru falsification of a public document 4 against Duane O. Stier
("Stier"), Emelyn A. Maggay ("Maggay") and respondent, as the notary public who notarized
the Occupancy Agreement.
The disbarment complaint arose when respondent filed a counter-charge for
perjury5 against complainant. Respondent, in his affidavit-complaint, stated that:
5. The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT dated September 11, 1995 was prepared and
notarized by me under the following circumstances:
A. Mr. Duane O. Stier is the owner and long-time resident of a real property located
at No. 33 Don Jose Street, Bgy. San Roque, Murphy, Cubao, Quezon City.
B. Sometime in September 1995, Mr. Stier a U.S. citizen and thereby
disqualified to own real property in his name agreed that the property be
transferred in the name of Mr. Donton, a Filipino.

C. Mr. Stier, in the presence of Mr. Donton, requested me to prepare several

documents that would guarantee recognition of him being the actual owner of the
property despite the transfer of title in the name of Mr. Donton.
D. For this purpose, I prepared, among others, the OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT,
recognizing Mr. Stiers free and undisturbed use of the property for his residence and
business operations. The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT was tied up with a loan which
Mr. Stier had extended to Mr. Donton.6
Complainant averred that respondents act of preparing the Occupancy Agreement, despite
knowledge that Stier, being a foreign national, is disqualified to own real property in his
name, constitutes serious misconduct and is a deliberate violation of the Code. Complainant
prayed that respondent be disbarred for advising Stier to do something in violation of law
and assisting Stier in carrying out a dishonest scheme.
In his Comment dated 19 August 2003, respondent claimed that complainant filed the
disbarment case against him upon the instigation of complainants counsel, Atty. Bonifacio
A. Alentajan,7 because respondent refused to act as complainants witness in the criminal
case against Stier and Maggay. Respondent admitted that he "prepared and notarized" the
Occupancy Agreement and asserted its genuineness and due execution.
In a Resolution dated 1 October 2003, the Court referred the matter to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
The IBPs Report and Recommendation
In her Report dated 26 February 2004 ("Report"), Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan
("Commissioner San Juan") of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found respondent
liable for taking part in a "scheme to circumvent the constitutional prohibition against foreign
ownership of land in the Philippines." Commissioner San Juan recommended respondents
suspension from the practice of law for two years and the cancellation of his commission as
Notary Public.
In Resolution No. XVI-2004-222 dated 16 April 2004, the IBP Board of Governors adopted,
with modification, the Report and recommended respondents suspension from the practice
of law for six months.
On 28 June 2004, the IBP Board of Governors forwarded the Report to the Court as
provided under Section 12(b), Rule 139-B8 of the Rules of Court.
On 28 July 2004, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration before the IBP. Respondent
stated that he was already 76 years old and would already retire by 2005 after the

termination of his pending cases. He also said that his practice of law is his only means of
support for his family and his six minor children.
In a Resolution dated 7 October 2004, the IBP denied the motion for reconsideration
because the IBP had no more jurisdiction on the case as the matter had already been
referred to the Court.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court finds respondent liable for violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code.
A lawyer should not render any service or give advice to any client which will involve
defiance of the laws which he is bound to uphold and obey.9 A lawyer who assists a client in
a dishonest scheme or who connives in violating the law commits an act which justifies
disciplinary action against the lawyer.10
By his own admission, respondent admitted that Stier, a U.S. citizen, was disqualified from
owning real property.11Yet, in his motion for reconsideration,12 respondent admitted that he
caused the transfer of ownership to the parcel of land to Stier. Respondent, however, aware
of the prohibition, quickly rectified his act and transferred the title in complainants name.
But respondent provided "some safeguards" by preparing several documents, 13 including
the Occupancy Agreement, that would guarantee Stiers recognition as the actual owner of
the property despite its transfer in complainants name. In effect, respondent advised and
aided Stier in circumventing the constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership of
lands14 by preparing said documents.
Respondent had sworn to uphold the Constitution. Thus, he violated his oath and the Code
when he prepared and notarized the Occupancy Agreement to evade the law against
foreign ownership of lands. Respondent used his knowledge of the law to achieve an
unlawful end. Such an act amounts to malpractice in his office, for which he may be
suspended.15
In Balinon v. De Leon,16 respondent Atty. De Leon was suspended from the practice of law
for three years for preparing an affidavit that virtually permitted him to commit concubinage.
In In re: Santiago,17 respondent Atty. Santiago was suspended from the practice of law for
one year for preparing a contract which declared the spouses to be single again after nine
years of separation and allowed them to contract separately subsequent marriages.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco GUILTY of violation of
Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly,
we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco from the practice of law for SIX
MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to
respondents personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the
Department of Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

No Counseling to Defy Law Rule 1.02

G.R. No. 1203

May 15, 1903

In the matter of the suspension of HOWARD D. TERRELL from the practice of law.
Solicitor-General Araneta for Government.
W. A. Kincaid for defendant.
PER CURIAM:
Howard D. Terrell, an attorney-at-law, was ordered to show cause in the Court of First
Instance, in the city of Manila, on the 5th day of February, 1903, why he should not be
suspended as a member of the bar of the city of Manila for the reasons:
First, that he had assisted in the organization of the "Centro Bellas Artes" Club, after he had
been notified that the said organization was made for the purpose of evading the law then in
force in said city; and,
Secondly, for acting as attorney for said "Centro Bellas Artes" during the time of and after its
organization, which organization was known to him to be created for the purpose of evading
the law.
The accused appeared on the return day, and by his counsel, W. A. Kincaid, made answer
to these charges, denying the same, and filed affidavits in answer thereto. After reading
testimony given by said Howard D. Terrell, in the case of the United States vs. H. D.
Terrell,1 wherein he was charged with estafa, and after reading the said affidavits in his
behalf, and hearing his counsel, the court below found, and decided as a fact, that the
charges aforesaid made against Howard D. Terrell were true, and thereupon made an order
suspending him from his office as a lawyer in the Philippine Islands, and directed the clerk
of the court to transmit to this court a certified copy of the order of suspension, as well as a
full statement of the facts upon which the same was based.
We have carefully considered these facts, and have reached the conclusion that they were
such as to justify the court below in arriving at the conclusion that the knowledge and acts of

the accused in connection with the organization of the "Centro Bellas Artes" Club were of
such a nature and character as to warrant his suspension from practice.
The promoting of organizations, with knowledge of their objects, for the purpose of violating
or evading the laws against crime constitutes such misconduct on the part of an attorney, an
officer of the court, as amounts to malpractice or gross misconduct in his office, and for
which he may be removed or suspended. (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 21.) The assisting
of a client in a scheme which the attorney knows to be dishonest, or the conniving at a
violation of law, are acts which justify disbarment.
In this case, however, inasmuch as the defendant in the case of the United
States, vs. Terrell was acquitted on the charge of estafa, and has not, therefore, been
convicted of crime, and as the acts with which he is charged in this proceeding, while
unprofessional and hence to be condemned, are not criminal in their nature, we are of
opinion that the ends of justice will be served by the suspension of said Howard D. Terrell
from the practice of law in the Philippine Islands for the term of one year from the 7th day of
February, 1903.
It is therefore directed that the said Howard D. Terrell be suspended from the practice of law
for a term of one year from February 7, 1903. It is so ordered.

No Counseling to Defy Law Rule 1.02

G.R. No. 148560

November 19, 2001

JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
JOHN STUART MILL, in his essay On Liberty, unleashes the full fury of his pen in defense
of the rights of the individual from the vast powers of the State and the inroads of societal
pressure. But even as he draws a sacrosanct line demarcating the limits on individuality
beyond which the State cannot tread - asserting that "individual spontaneity" must be
allowed to flourish with very little regard to social interference - he veritably acknowledges
that the exercise of rights and liberties is imbued with a civic obligation, which society is
justified in enforcing at all cost, against those who would endeavor to withhold fulfillment.
Thus he says -

The sole end for which mankind is warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with
the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. The only purpose for which
power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his
will, is to prevent harm to others.
Parallel to individual liberty is the natural and illimitable right of the State to selfpreservation. With the end of maintaining the integrity and cohesiveness of the body politic,
it behooves the State to formulate a system of laws that would compel obeisance to its
collective wisdom and inflict punishment for non-observance.
The movement from Mill's individual liberalism to unsystematic collectivism wrought
changes in the social order, carrying with it a new formulation of fundamental rights and
duties more attuned to the imperatives of contemporary socio-political ideologies. In the
process, the web of rights and State impositions became tangled and obscured, enmeshed
in threads of multiple shades and colors, the skein irregular and broken. Antagonism, often
outright collision, between the law as the expression of the will of the State, and the zealous
attempts by its members to preserve their individuality and dignity, inevitably followed. It is
when individual rights are pitted against State authority that judicial conscience is put to its
severest test.
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA
7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder),1 as amended by RA
7659,2 wishes to impress upon us that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it
crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. He
therefore makes a stringent call for this Court to subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of
constitutionality mainly because, according to him, (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness;
(b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it
abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal
Code, all of which are purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of the accused
to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Specifically, the provisions of the Plunder Law claimed by petitioner to have transgressed
constitutional boundaries are Secs. 1, par. (d), 2 and 4 which are reproduced hereunder:
Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business, enterprise or
material possession of any person within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by
him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business
associates by any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:
(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or
raids on the public treasury;

(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage,

kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in
connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or
position of the public office concerned;
(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the
National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, or
government owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock,
equity or any other form of interest or participation including the promise of future
employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;
(5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other
combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit
particular persons or special interests; or
(6) By taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or
influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage
and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties. - Any public officer who, by himself
or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business
associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten
wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section
1 (d) hereof, in the aggregate amount or total value of at least fifty million pesos
(P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the said public officer in the
commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for
such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance
of mitigating and extenuating circumstances as provided by the Revised Penal Code shall
be considered by the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their
interests and other incomes and assets including the properties and shares of stocks
derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State (underscoring
supplied).
Section 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not
be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance
of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it
being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal
acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy (underscoring supplied).

On 4 April 2001 the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan eight (8)
separate Informations, docketed as: (a) Crim. Case No. 26558, for violation of RA 7080, as
amended by RA 7659; (b) Crim. Cases Nos. 26559 to 26562, inclusive, for violation of Secs.
3, par. (a), 3, par. (a), 3, par. (e) and 3, par. (e), of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act), respectively; (c) Crim. Case No. 26563, for violation of Sec. 7, par. (d), of RA
6713 (The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees); (d)
Crim. Case No. 26564, for Perjury (Art. 183 of The Revised Penal Code); and, (e) Crim.
Case No. 26565, for Illegal Use Of An Alias (CA No. 142, as amended by RA 6085).
On 11 April 2001 petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for the remand of the case to the
Ombudsman for preliminary investigation with respect to specification "d" of the charges in
the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558; and, for reconsideration/reinvestigation of the
offenses under specifications "a," "b," and "c" to give the accused an opportunity to file
counter-affidavits and other documents necessary to prove lack of probable cause.
Noticeably, the grounds raised were only lack of preliminary investigation,
reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses, and opportunity to prove lack of probable cause.
The purported ambiguity of the charges and the vagueness of the law under which they are
charged were never raised in that Omnibus Motion thus indicating the explicitness and
comprehensibility of the Plunder Law.
On 25 April 2001 the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No.
26558 finding that "a probable cause for the offense of PLUNDER exists to justify the
issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused." On 25 June 2001 petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan.
On 14 June 2001 petitioner moved to quash the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558 on the
ground that the facts alleged therein did not constitute an indictable offense since the law on
which it was based was unconstitutional for vagueness, and that the Amended Information
for Plunder charged more than one (1) offense. On 21 June 2001 the Government filed
its Opposition to the Motion to Quash, and five (5) days later or on 26 June 2001 petitioner
submitted his Reply to the Opposition. On 9 July 2001 the Sandiganbayan denied
petitioner's Motion to Quash.
As concisely delineated by this Court during the oral arguments on 18 September 2001, the
issues for resolution in the instant petition for certiorari are: (a) The Plunder Law is
unconstitutional for being vague; (b) The Plunder Law requires less evidence for proving the
predicate crimes of plunder and therefore violates the rights of the accused to due process;
and, (c) Whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it
is within the power of Congress to so classify it.
Preliminarily, the whole gamut of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of legislation is
predicated on the basic principle that a legislative measure is presumed to be in harmony
with the Constitution.3 Courts invariably train their sights on this fundamental rule whenever

a legislative act is under a constitutional attack, for it is the postulate of constitutional

adjudication. This strong predilection for constitutionality takes its bearings on the idea that
it is forbidden for one branch of the government to encroach upon the duties and powers of
another. Thus it has been said that the presumption is based on the deference the judicial
branch accords to its coordinate branch - the legislature.
If there is any reasonable basis upon which the legislation may firmly rest, the courts must
assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary
powers, and has passed the law with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of
promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority. Hence in determining
whether the acts of the legislature are in tune with the fundamental law, courts should
proceed with judicial restraint and act with caution and forbearance. Every intendment of the
law must be adjudged by the courts in favor of its constitutionality, invalidity being a
measure of last resort. In construing therefore the provisions of a statute, courts must first
ascertain whether an interpretation is fairly possible to sidestep the question of
constitutionality.
In La Union Credit Cooperative, Inc. v. Yaranon4 we held that as long as there is some basis
for the decision of the court, the constitutionality of the challenged law will not be touched
and the case will be decided on other available grounds. Yet the force of the presumption is
not sufficient to catapult a fundamentally deficient law into the safe environs of
constitutionality. Of course, where the law clearly and palpably transgresses the hallowed
domain of the organic law, it must be struck down on sight lest the positive commands of
the fundamental law be unduly eroded.
Verily, the onerous task of rebutting the presumption weighs heavily on the party
challenging the validity of the statute. He must demonstrate beyond any tinge of doubt that
there is indeed an infringement of the constitution, for absent such a showing, there can be
no finding of unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if well-founded, will hardly suffice. As tersely
put by Justice Malcolm, "To doubt is to sustain."5 And petitioner has miserably failed in the
instant case to discharge his burden and overcome the presumption of constitutionality of
the Plunder Law.
As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined
parameters which would enable the accused to determine the nature of his violation.
Section 2 is sufficiently explicit in its description of the acts, conduct and conditions required
or forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the crime with reasonable certainty and
particularity. Thus 1. That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance with
members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates or other persons;

2. That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth through a

combination or series of the following overt or criminal acts: (a) through
misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the
public treasury; (b) by receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share,
percentage, kickback or any other form of pecuniary benefits from any person and/or
entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the
office or position of the public officer; (c) by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or
disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any of its
subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities of Government owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries; (d) by obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or
indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation
including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or
undertaking; (e) by establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or
other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit
particular persons or special interests; or (f) by taking advantage of official position,
authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or
themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people
and the Republic of the Philippines; and,
3. That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed,
accumulated or acquired is at least P50,000,000.00.
As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who
are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be
sustained. It must sufficiently guide the judge in its application; the counsel, in defending
one charged with its violation; and more importantly, the accused, in identifying the realm of
the proscribed conduct. Indeed, it can be understood with little difficulty that what the
assailed statute punishes is the act of a public officer in amassing or accumulating ill-gotten
wealth of at least P50,000,000.00 through a series or combination of acts enumerated in
Sec. 1, par. (d), of the Plunder Law.
In fact, the amended Information itself closely tracks the language of the law, indicating with
reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense which petitioner is alleged to have
committed:
"The undersigned Ombudsman, Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB, Office of the
Ombudsman, hereby accuses former PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Joseph Ejercito Estrada, a.k.a. 'ASIONG SALONGA' and a.k.a. 'JOSE
VELARDE,' together with Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Edward Serapio,
Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan
or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and John DOES & Jane Does, of the crime of
Plunder, defined and penalized under R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. No.
7659, committed as follows:

That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A PRESIDENT
OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by
himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused, WHO ARE
MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY,
BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING
UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP,
CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally
amass, accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten
wealth in the aggregate amount or TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN
MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE
PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (P4,097,804,173.17), more or less, THEREBY
UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE
DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
through ANY OR A combination OR Aseries of overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR
SCHEMES OR MEANS, described as follows:
(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES,
MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE
MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00), MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL
GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR
ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connection with
co-accused CHARLIE 'ATONG' ANG, Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte,
Edward Serapio, AND JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in consideration OF
TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING;
(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating,
converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR
PERSONAL gain and benefit, public funds in the amount of ONE HUNDRED
THIRTY MILLION PESOS (P130,000,000.00), more or less, representing a portion
of the TWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS (P200,000,000.00) tobacco excise tax
share allocated for the province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, by himself
and/or in connivance with co-accused Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE
a.k.a.Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND OTHER
JOHN DOES & JANE DOES; (italic supplied).
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND
BENEFIT, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE
351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCKS, MORE OR LESS, and the Social Security
System (SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK, MORE OR LESS, OF THE
BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION
ONE HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX
HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (P1,102,965,607.50) AND

MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR MILLION SIX HUNDRED

TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (P744,612,450.00),
RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT
HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT
THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (P1,847,578,057.50);
AND BY COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY
HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES,
COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID PURCHASES OF
SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE
MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P189,700,000.00) MORE OR
LESS, FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE
DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE
VELARDE;'
(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES,
PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN
CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in the amount of MORE OR
LESS THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE
HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND
SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (P3,233,104,173.17) AND DEPOSITING THE SAME
UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE' AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI
BANK."
We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous - as there is obviously none
- that will confuse petitioner in his defense. Although subject to proof, these factual
assertions clearly show that the elements of the crime are easily understood and provide
adequate contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts. Upon such unequivocal
assertions, petitioner is completely informed of the accusations against him as to enable
him to prepare for an intelligent defense.
Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the
terms "combination" and "series" in the key phrase "a combination or series of overt or
criminal acts" found in Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word "pattern" in Sec. 4. These
omissions, according to petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being
impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him, hence, violative of his fundamental right to due
process.
The rationalization seems to us to be pure sophistry. A statute is not rendered uncertain and
void merely because general terms are used therein, or because of the employment of
terms without defining them;6 much less do we have to define every word we use. Besides,
there is no positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the legislature to define
each and every word in an enactment. Congress is not restricted in the form of expression

of its will, and its inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily
result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at
least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law.
Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be
interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification, 7 unless it is
evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those
words.8 The intention of the lawmakers - who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and
lexicographers - to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed. Thus,
Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary contains the following commonly accepted definition of
the words "combination" and "series:"
Combination - the result or product of combining; the act or process of combining.
To combine is to bring into such close relationship as to obscure individual characters.
Series - a number of things or events of the same class coming one after another in spatial
and temporal succession.
That Congress intended the words "combination" and "series" to be understood in their
popular meanings is pristinely evident from the legislative deliberations on the bill which
eventually became RA 7080 or the Plunder Law:
DELIBERATIONS OF THE BICAMERAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, 7 May 1991
REP. ISIDRO: I am just intrigued again by our definition of plunder. We say THROUGH A
COMBINATION OR SERIES OF OVERT OR CRIMINAL ACTS AS MENTIONED IN
SECTION ONE HEREOF. Now when we say combination, we actually mean to say, if there
are two or more means, we mean to say that number one and two or number one and
something else are included, how about a series of the same act? For example, through
misappropriation, conversion, misuse, will these be included also?
REP. GARCIA: Yeah, because we say a series.
REP. ISIDRO: Series.
REP. GARCIA: Yeah, we include series.
REP. ISIDRO: But we say we begin with a combination.
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
REP. ISIDRO: When we say combination, it seems that -

REP. GARCIA: Two.

REP. ISIDRO: Not only two but we seem to mean that two of the enumerated means not
twice of one enumeration.
REP. GARCIA: No, no, not twice.
REP. ISIDRO: Not twice?
REP. GARCIA: Yes. Combination is not twice - but combination, two acts.
REP. ISIDRO: So in other words, thats it. When we say combination, we mean, two
different acts. It cannot be a repetition of the same act.
REP. GARCIA: That be referred to series, yeah.
REP. ISIDRO: No, no. Supposing one act is repeated, so there are two.
REP. GARCIA: A series.
REP. ISIDRO: Thats not series. Its a combination. Because when we say combination or
series, we seem to say that two or more, di ba?
REP. GARCIA: Yes, this distinguishes it really from ordinary crimes. That is why, I said, that
is a very good suggestion because if it is only one act, it may fall under ordinary crime but
we have here a combination or series of overt or criminal acts. So x x x x
REP. GARCIA: Series. One after the other eh di....
SEN. TANADA: So that would fall under the term "series?"
REP. GARCIA: Series, oo.
REP. ISIDRO: Now, if it is a combination, ano, two misappropriations....
REP. GARCIA: Its not... Two misappropriations will not be combination. Series.
REP. ISIDRO: So, it is not a combination?
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
REP. ISIDRO: When you say combination, two different?
REP. GARCIA: Yes.

SEN. TANADA: Two different.

REP. ISIDRO: Two different acts.
REP. GARCIA: For example, ha...
REP. ISIDRO: Now a series, meaning, repetition...
DELIBERATIONS ON SENATE BILL NO. 733, 6 June 1989
SENATOR MACEDA: In line with our interpellations that sometimes "one" or maybe even
"two" acts may already result in such a big amount, on line 25, would the Sponsor consider
deleting the words "a series of overt or," to read, therefore: "or conspiracy COMMITTED by
criminal acts such as." Remove the idea of necessitating "a series." Anyway, the criminal
acts are in the plural.
SENATOR TANADA: That would mean a combination of two or more of the acts mentioned
in this.
THE PRESIDENT: Probably two or more would be....
SENATOR MACEDA: Yes, because "a series" implies several or many; two or more.
SENATOR TANADA: Accepted, Mr. President x x x x
THE PRESIDENT: If there is only one, then he has to be prosecuted under the particular
crime. But when we say "acts of plunder" there should be, at least, two or more.
SENATOR ROMULO: In other words, that is already covered by existing laws, Mr.
President.
Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it is referring to at least two (2) acts
falling under different categories of enumeration provided in Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g., raids on
the public treasury in Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1), and fraudulent conveyance of assets
belonging to the National Government under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (3).
On the other hand, to constitute a series" there must be two (2) or more overt or criminal
acts falling under the same category of enumeration found in Sec. 1, par. (d), say,
misappropriation, malversation and raids on the public treasury, all of which fall under Sec.
1, par. (d), subpar. (1). Verily, had the legislature intended a technical or distinctive meaning
for "combination" and "series," it would have taken greater pains in specifically providing for
it in the law.

As for "pattern," we agree with the observations of the Sandiganbayan 9 that this term is
sufficiently defined in Sec. 4, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2 x x x x under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a 'pattern' consists of at least a combination or series of
overt or criminal acts enumerated in subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d). Secondly, pursuant
to Sec. 2 of the law, the pattern of overt or criminal acts is directed towards a common
purpose or goal which is to enable the public officer to amass, accumulate or acquire illgotten wealth. And thirdly, there must either be an 'overall unlawful scheme' or 'conspiracy'
to achieve said common goal. As commonly understood, the term 'overall unlawful scheme'
indicates a 'general plan of action or method' which the principal accused and public officer
and others conniving with him follow to achieve the aforesaid common goal. In the
alternative, if there is no such overall scheme or where the schemes or methods used by
multiple accused vary, the overt or criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy to attain a
common goal.
Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not give a fair warning and
sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Under the circumstances, petitioner's reliance
on the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The doctrine has been
formulated in various ways, but is most commonly stated to the effect that a statute
establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient definiteness that
persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It
can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e.,
that which cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by construction.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men
of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In
such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects - it violates
due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of
what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its
provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. 10 But the doctrine
does not apply as against legislations that are merely couched in imprecise language but
which nonetheless specify a standard though defectively phrased; or to those that are
apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types of activities. The first may be
"saved" by proper construction, while no challenge may be mounted as against the second
whenever directed against such activities. 11 With more reason, the doctrine cannot be
invoked where the assailed statute is clear and free from ambiguity, as in this case.
The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the
language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when
measured by common understanding and practice.12It must be stressed, however, that the
"vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be
upheld - not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest.
Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds

of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it might
have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions, especially where,
because of the nature of the act, it would be impossible to provide all the details in advance
as in all other statutes.
Moreover, we agree with, hence we adopt, the observations of Mr. Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza during the deliberations of the Court that the allegations that the Plunder Law is
vague and overbroad do not justify a facial review of its validity The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a statute which either forbids or requires the
doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess
at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of
law."13 The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that "a governmental purpose
may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the
area of protected freedoms."14
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad
because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen
statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself
as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to
all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on
overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate
that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow
specificity."15 The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go
unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be
deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of
overly broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in
terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this
reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful
conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free
speech.
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech
cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court
put it, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have not recognized an 'overbreadth'
doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment." 16 In Broadrick v.
Oklahoma,17 the Court ruled that "claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in
cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words" and,
again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked
against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct." For this
reason, it has been held that "a facial challenge to a legislative act is the most difficult

challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of
circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid." 18 As for the vagueness doctrine, it
is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible
applications. "A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot
complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others." 19
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools
developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in
American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is
involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the established rule is that "one
to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on
the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other
situations in which its application might be unconstitutional." 20 As has been pointed out,
"vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges
typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due process
typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular defendant." 21 Consequently, there
is no basis for petitioner's claim that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and
in its entirety.
Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them down entirely on the
ground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities are
constitutionally protected.22 It constitutes a departure from the case and controversy
requirement of the Constitution and permits decisions to be made without concrete factual
settings and in sterile abstract contexts. 23 But, as the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out
in Younger v. Harris24
[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring
correction of these deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an
appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness of the
controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the
speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes, .
. . ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional
questions, whichever way they might be decided.
For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as "manifestly
strong medicine," to be employed "sparingly and only as a last resort," 25 and is generally
disfavored.26 In determining the constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its provisions which
are alleged to have been violated in a case must be examined in the light of the conduct
with which the defendant is charged.27
In light of the foregoing disquisition, it is evident that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder
Law, so tenaciously claimed and argued at length by petitioner, is more imagined than real.
Ambiguity, where none exists, cannot be created by dissecting parts and words in the

statute to furnish support to critics who cavil at the want of scientific precision in the law.
Every provision of the law should be construed in relation and with reference to every other
part. To be sure, it will take more than nitpicking to overturn the well-entrenched
presumption of constitutionality and validity of the Plunder Law. A fortiori, petitioner cannot
feign ignorance of what the Plunder Law is all about. Being one of the Senators who voted
for its passage, petitioner must be aware that the law was extensively deliberated upon by
the Senate and its appropriate committees by reason of which he even registered his
affirmative vote with full knowledge of its legal implications and sound constitutional
anchorage.
The parallel case of Gallego v. Sandiganbayan28 must be mentioned if only to illustrate and
emphasize the point that courts are loathed to declare a statute void for uncertainty unless
the law itself is so imperfect and deficient in its details, and is susceptible of no reasonable
construction that will support and give it effect. In that case,
petitioners Gallego and Agoncillo challenged the constitutionality of Sec. 3, par. (e),
of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Actfor being vague. Petitioners posited, among
others, that the term "unwarranted" is highly imprecise and elastic with no common law
meaning or settled definition by prior judicial or administrative precedents; that, for its
vagueness, Sec. 3, par. (e), violates due process in that it does not give fair warning or
sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Petitioners further argued that the Information
charged them with three (3) distinct offenses, to wit: (a) giving of "unwarranted" benefits
through manifest partiality; (b) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through evident bad faith;
and, (c) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through gross inexcusable negligence while in the
discharge of their official function and that their right to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against them was violated because they were left to guess which of the
three (3) offenses, if not all, they were being charged and prosecuted.
In dismissing the petition, this Court held that Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act does not suffer from the constitutional defect of vagueness. The phrases
"manifest partiality," "evident bad faith," and "gross and inexcusable negligence" merely
describe the different modes by which the offense penalized in Sec. 3, par. (e), of the
statute may be committed, and the use of all these phrases in the same Information does
not mean that the indictment charges three (3) distinct offenses.
The word 'unwarranted' is not uncertain. It seems lacking adequate or official support;
unjustified; unauthorized (Webster, Third International Dictionary, p. 2514); or without
justification or adequate reason (Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. US Dept. of Justice, C.D.
Pa., 405 F. Supp. 8, 12, cited in Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, Vol. 43-A 1978,
Cumulative Annual Pocket Part, p. 19).
The assailed provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act consider a corrupt
practice and make unlawful the act of the public officer in:

x x x or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, x x x (Section 3 [e], Rep. Act 3019, as
amended).
It is not at all difficult to comprehend that what the aforequoted penal provisions penalize is
the act of a public officer, in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions,
in giving any private party benefits, advantage or preference which is unjustified,
unauthorized or without justification or adequate reason, through manifest partiality, evident
bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
In other words, this Court found that there was nothing vague or ambiguous in the use of
the term "unwarranted" in Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
which was understood in its primary and general acceptation. Consequently, in that case,
petitioners' objection thereto was held inadequate to declare the section unconstitutional.
On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly stretched theory that Sec. 4 of the
Plunder Law circumvents the immutable obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the predicate acts constituting the crime of plunder when it requires only
proof of a pattern of overt or criminal acts showing unlawful scheme or conspiracy SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be
necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the
scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient
to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the
overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.
The running fault in this reasoning is obvious even to the simplistic mind. In a criminal
prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the
presumption of innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State
succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the
accused is entitled to an acquittal.29 The use of the "reasonable doubt" standard is
indispensable to command the respect and confidence of the community in the application
of criminal law. It is critical that the moral force of criminal law be not diluted by a standard
of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned. It is also
important in our free society that every individual going about his ordinary affairs has
confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense without
convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty. This "reasonable doubt"
standard has acquired such exalted stature in the realm of constitutional law as it gives life
to the Due Process Clause which protects the accused against conviction except upon
proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which
he is charged.30 The following exchanges between Rep. Rodolfo Albano and Rep. Pablo

Garcia on this score during the deliberations in the floor of the House of Representatives
are elucidating DELIBERATIONS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON RA 7080, 9 October 1990
MR. ALBANO: Now, Mr. Speaker, it is also elementary in our criminal law that what is
alleged in the information must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. If we will prove only
one act and find him guilty of the other acts enumerated in the information, does that not
work against the right of the accused especially so if the amount committed, say, by
falsification is less than P100 million, but the totality of the crime committed is P100 million
since there is malversation, bribery, falsification of public document, coercion, theft?
MR. GARCIA: Mr. Speaker, not everything alleged in the information needs to be proved
beyond reasonable doubt. What is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is every
element of the crime charged. For example, Mr. Speaker, there is an enumeration of the
things taken by the robber in the information three pairs of pants, pieces of jewelry. These
need not be proved beyond reasonable doubt, but these will not prevent the conviction of a
crime for which he was charged just because, say, instead of 3 pairs of diamond earrings
the prosecution proved two. Now, what is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is
the element of the offense.
MR. ALBANO: I am aware of that, Mr. Speaker, but considering that in the crime of plunder
the totality of the amount is very important, I feel that such a series of overt criminal acts
has to be taken singly. For instance, in the act of bribery, he was able to accumulate
only P50,000 and in the crime of extortion, he was only able to accumulate P1 million. Now,
when we add the totality of the other acts as required under this bill through the
interpretation on the rule of evidence, it is just one single act, so how can we now convict
him?
MR. GARCIA: With due respect, Mr. Speaker, for purposes of proving an essential element
of the crime, there is a need to prove that element beyond reasonable doubt. For example,
one essential element of the crime is that the amount involved is P100 million. Now, in a
series of defalcations and other acts of corruption in the enumeration the total amount
would be P110 or P120 million, but there are certain acts that could not be proved, so, we
will sum up the amounts involved in those transactions which were proved. Now, if the
amount involved in these transactions, proved beyond reasonable doubt, is P100 million,
then there is a crime of plunder (underscoring supplied).
It is thus plain from the foregoing that the legislature did not in any manner refashion the
standard quantum of proof in the crime of plunder. The burden still remains with the
prosecution to prove beyond any iota of doubt every fact or element necessary to constitute
the crime.

The thesis that Sec. 4 does away with proof of each and every component of the crime
suffers from a dismal misconception of the import of that provision. What the prosecution
needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient to form a
combination or series which would constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at
least P50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove each and every other act alleged in the
Information to have been committed by the accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. To illustrate,
supposing that the accused is charged in an Information for plunder with having committed
fifty (50) raids on the public treasury. The prosecution need not prove all these fifty (50)
raids, it being sufficient to prove by pattern at least two (2) of the raids beyond reasonable
doubt provided only that they amounted to at least P50,000,000.00.31
A reading of Sec. 2 in conjunction with Sec. 4, brings us to the logical conclusion that
"pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy"
inheres in the very acts of accumulating, acquiring or amassing hidden wealth. Stated
otherwise, such pattern arises where the prosecution is able to prove beyond reasonable
doubt the predicate acts as defined in Sec. 1, par. (d). Pattern is merely a by-product of the
proof of the predicate acts. This conclusion is consistent with reason and common sense.
There would be no other explanation for a combination or series of
overt or criminal acts to stash P50,000,000.00 or more, than "a scheme or conspiracy to
amass, accumulate or acquire ill gotten wealth." The prosecution is therefore not required to
make a deliberate and conscious effort to prove pattern as it necessarily follows with the
establishment of a series or combination of the predicate acts.
Relative to petitioner's contentions on the purported defect of Sec. 4 is his submission that
"pattern" is "a very important element of the crime of plunder;" and that Sec. 4 is "two
pronged, (as) it contains a rule of evidence and a substantive element of the crime," such
that without it the accused cannot be convicted of plunder JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, cannot an accused be convicted under the Plunder
Law without applying Section 4 on the Rule of Evidence if there is proof beyond reasonable
doubt of the commission of the acts complained of?
ATTY. AGABIN: In that case he can be convicted of individual crimes enumerated in the
Revised Penal Code, but not plunder.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, if all the elements of the crime are proved beyond
reasonable doubt without applying Section 4, can you not have a conviction under the
Plunder Law?
ATTY. AGABIN: Not a conviction for plunder, your Honor.

JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: Can you not disregard the application of Sec. 4 in convicting an
accused charged for violation of the Plunder Law?
ATTY. AGABIN: Well, your Honor, in the first place Section 4 lays down a substantive
element of the law x x x x
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: What I said is - do we have to avail of Section 4 when there is
proof beyond reasonable doubt on the acts charged constituting plunder?
ATTY. AGABIN: Yes, your Honor, because Section 4 is two pronged, it contains a rule of
evidence and it contains a substantive element of the crime of plunder. So, there is no way
by which we can avoid Section 4.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: But there is proof beyond reasonable doubt insofar as the
predicate crimes charged are concerned that you do not have to go that far by applying
Section 4?
ATTY. AGABIN: Your Honor, our thinking is that Section 4 contains a very important
element of the crime of plunder and that cannot be avoided by the prosecution. 32
We do not subscribe to petitioner's stand. Primarily, all the essential elements of plunder
can be culled and understood from its definition in Sec. 2, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and
"pattern" is not one of them. Moreover, the epigraph and opening clause of Sec. 4 is clear
and unequivocal:
SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder x x x x
It purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of procedure for the prosecution of a criminal
case for plunder. Being a purely procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not define or establish
any substantive right in favor of the accused but only operates in furtherance of a remedy. It
is only a means to an end, an aid to substantive law. Indubitably, even without invoking Sec.
4, a conviction for plunder may be had, for what is crucial for the prosecution is to present
sufficient evidence to engender that moral certitude exacted by the fundamental law to
prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, even granting for the sake of
argument that Sec. 4 is flawed and vitiated for the reasons advanced by petitioner, it may
simply be severed from the rest of the provisions without necessarily resulting in the demise
of the law; after all, the existing rules on evidence can supplant Sec. 4 more than enough.
Besides, Sec. 7 of RA 7080 provides for a separability clause Sec. 7. Separability of Provisions. - If any provisions of this Act or the application thereof to
any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remaining provisions of this Act and the
application of such provisions to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected
thereby.

Implicit in the foregoing section is that to avoid the whole act from being declared invalid as
a result of the nullity of some of its provisions, assuming that to be the case although it is
not really so, all the provisions thereof should accordingly be treated independently of each
other, especially if by doing so, the objectives of the statute can best be achieved.
As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza that plunder is a malum in
se which requires proof of criminal intent. Thus, he says, in his Concurring Opinion x x x Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must
be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended information
alleges that the crime of plunder was committed "willfully, unlawfully and criminally." It thus
alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner.
In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the requirement of mens rea and that
is the reason he claims the statute is void, petitioner cites the following remarks of Senator
Taada made during the deliberation on S.B. No. 733:
SENATOR TAADA . . . And the evidence that will be required to convict him would not be
evidence for each and every individual criminal act but only evidence sufficient to establish
the conspiracy or scheme to commit this crime of plunder.33
However, Senator Taada was discussing 4 as shown by the succeeding portion of the
transcript quoted by petitioner:
SENATOR ROMULO: And, Mr. President, the Gentleman feels that it is contained in Section
4, Rule of Evidence, which, in the Gentleman's view, would provide for a speedier and faster
process of attending to this kind of cases?
SENATOR TAADA: Yes, Mr. President . . .34
Senator Taada was only saying that where the charge is conspiracy to commit plunder, the
prosecution need not prove each and every criminal act done to further the scheme or
conspiracy, it being enough if it proves beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or
ciminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. As far as the acts
constituting the pattern are concerned, however, the elements of the crime must be proved
and the requisite mens rea must be shown.
Indeed, 2 provides that Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense
contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the
imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and

extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by

the court.
The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to
prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element
of plunder since the degree of responsibility of the offender is determined by his criminal
intent. It is true that 2 refers to "any person who participates with the said public officer in
the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder." There is no reason to
believe, however, that it does not apply as well to the public officer as principal in the crime.
As Justice Holmes said: "We agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws
with what they omit, but there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws
as saying what they obviously mean."35
Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be deemed to
have been resolved in the affirmative by the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it
among the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Other heinous crimes
are punished with death as a straight penalty in R.A. No. 7659. Referring to these groups of
heinous crimes, this Court held in People v. Echegaray:36
The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their very nature,
despicable, either because life was callously taken or the victim is treated like an animal
and utterly dehumanized as to completely disrupt the normal course of his or her growth as
a human being . . . . Seen in this light, the capital crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention for ransom resulting in the death of the victim or the victim is raped, tortured, or
subjected to dehumanizing acts; destructive arson resulting in death; and drug offenses
involving minors or resulting in the death of the victim in the case of other crimes; as well as
murder, rape, parricide, infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal detention, where the
victim is detained for more than three days or serious physical injuries were inflicted on the
victim or threats to kill him were made or the victim is a minor, robbery with homicide, rape
or intentional mutilation, destructive arson, and carnapping where the owner, driver or
occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed or raped, which are penalized by reclusion
perpetua to death, are clearly heinous by their very nature.
There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in the significance and
implications of the subject criminal acts in the scheme of the larger socio-political and
economic context in which the state finds itself to be struggling to develop and provide for
its poor and underprivileged masses. Reeling from decades of corrupt tyrannical rule that
bankrupted the government and impoverished the population, the Philippine Government
must muster the political will to dismantle the culture of corruption, dishonesty, greed and
syndicated criminality that so deeply entrenched itself in the structures of society and the
psyche of the populace. [With the government] terribly lacking the money to provide even
the most basic services to its people, any form of misappropriation or misapplication of
government funds translates to an actual threat to the very existence of government, and in

turn, the very survival of the people it governs over. Viewed in this context, no less heinous
are the effects and repercussions of crimes like qualified bribery, destructive arson resulting
in death, and drug offenses involving government officials, employees or officers, that their
perpetrators must not be allowed to cause further destruction and damage to society.
The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it
is a malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong,
they are mala in se37 and it does not matter that such acts are punished in a special law,
especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se. Indeed, it
would be absurd to treat prosecutions for plunder as though they are mere prosecutions for
violations of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an ordinance against jaywalking,
without regard to the inherent wrongness of the acts.
To clinch, petitioner likewise assails the validity of RA 7659, the amendatory law of RA 7080,
on constitutional grounds. Suffice it to say however that it is now too late in the day for him
to resurrect this long dead issue, the same having been eternally consigned by People v.
Echegaray38 to the archives of jurisprudential history. The declaration of this Court therein
that RA 7659 is constitutionally valid stands as a declaration of the State, and becomes, by
necessary effect, assimilated in the Constitution now as an integral part of it.
Our nation has been racked by scandals of corruption and obscene profligacy of officials in
high places which have shaken its very foundation. The anatomy of graft and corruption has
become more elaborate in the corridors of time as unscrupulous people relentlessly contrive
more and more ingenious ways to bilk the coffers of the government. Drastic and radical
measures are imperative to fight the increasingly sophisticated, extraordinarily methodical
and economically catastrophic looting of the national treasury. Such is the Plunder Law,
especially designed to disentangle those ghastly tissues of grand-scale corruption which, if
left unchecked, will spread like a malignant tumor and ultimately consume the moral and
institutional fiber of our nation. The Plunder Law, indeed, is a living testament to the will of
the legislature to ultimately eradicate this scourge and thus secure society against the
avarice and other venalities in public office.
These are times that try men's souls. In the checkered history of this nation, few issues of
national importance can equal the amount of interest and passion generated by petitioner's
ignominious fall from the highest office, and his eventual prosecution and trial under a
virginal statute. This continuing saga has driven a wedge of dissension among our people
that may linger for a long time. Only by responding to the clarion call for patriotism, to rise
above factionalism and prejudices, shall we emerge triumphant in the midst of ferment.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder
Law, as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare
the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Not to Encourage Lawsuit or Proceedings Rule 1.03

A.C. No. 4497

September 26, 2001

MR. and MRS. VENUSTIANO G. SABURNIDO, complainants,

vs.
ATTY. FLORANTE E. MADROO,1 respondent.
QUISUMBING, J.:
For our resolution is the administrative complaint 2 for disbarment of respondent, Atty.
Florante E. Madroo filed by spouses Venustiano and Rosalia Saburdino. Complainants
allege that respondent has been harassing them by filing numerous complaints against
them, in addition to committing acts of dishonesty.
Complainant Venustiano Saburnido is a member of the Philippine National Police stationed
at Balingasag, Misamis Oriental, while his wife Rosalia is a public school teacher.
Respondent is a former judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Balingasag-Lagonglong,
Misamis Oriental.
Previous to this administrative case, complainants also filed three separate administrative
cases against respondent.
In A. M. No. MTJ-90-383,3 complainant Venustiano Saburnido filed charges of grave threats
and acts unbecoming a member of the judiciary against respondent. Respondent was
therein found guilty of pointing a high-powered firearm at complainant, who was unarmed at
the time, during a heated altercation. Respondent was accordingly dismissed from the
service with prejudice to reemployment in government but without forfeiture of retirement
benefits.
Respondent was again administratively charged in the consolidated cases of Sealana-Abbu
v. Judge Madroo, A.M. No. 92-1-084-RTC and Sps. Saburnido v. Judge Madroo, A.M. No.
MTJ-90-486.4 In the first case, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Florencia Sealana-Abbu
charged that respondent granted and reduced bail in a criminal case without prior notice to
the prosecution. In the second case, the spouses Saburnido charged that respondent, in
whose court certain confiscated smuggled goods were deposited, allowed other persons to
take the goods but did not issue the corresponding memorandum receipts. Some of the
goods were lost while others were substituted with damaged goods. Respondent was found
guilty of both charges and his retirement benefits were forfeited.

In the present case, the spouses Saburnido allege that respondent has been harassing
them by filing numerous complaints against them, namely:
1. Adm. Case No. 90-0755,5 for serious irregularity, filed by respondent against Venustiano
Saburnido. Respondent claimed that Venustiano lent his service firearm to an acquaintance
who thereafter extorted money from public jeepney drivers while posing as a member of the
then Constabulary Highway Patrol Group.
2. Adm. Case No. 90-0758,6 for falsification, filed by respondent against Venustiano
Saburnido and two others. Respondent averred that Venustiano, with the help of his corespondents in the case, inserted an entry in the police blotter regarding the loss of
Venustiano's firearm.
3. Crim. Case No. 93-67,7 for evasion through negligence under Article 224 of the Revised
Penal Code, filed by respondent against Venustiano Saburnido. Respondent alleged that
Venustiano Saburnido, without permission from his superior, took into custody a prisoner by
final Judgment who thereafter escaped.
4. Adm. Case No. 95 33,8 filed by respondent against Rosalia Saburnido for violation of the
Omnibus Election Code. Respondent alleged that Rosalia Saburnido served as chairperson
of the Board of Election Inspectors during the 1995 elections despite being related to a
candidate for barangay councilor.
At the time the present complaint was filed, the three actions filed against Venustiano
Saburnido had been dismissed while the case against Rosalia Saburnido was still pending.
Complainants allege that respondent filed those cases against them in retaliation, since
they had earlier filed administrative cases against him that resulted in his dismissal from the
judiciary. Complainants assert that due to the complaints filed against them, they suffered
much moral, mental, physical, and financial damage. They claim that their children had to
stop going to school since the family funds were used up in attending to their cases.
For his part, respondent contends that the grounds mentioned in the administrative cases in
which he was dismissed and his benefits forfeited did not constitute moral turpitude. Hence,
he could not be disbarred therefor. He then argues that none of the complaints he filed
against complainants was manufactured. He adds that he "was so unlucky that Saburnido
was not convicted."9 He claims that the complaint for serious irregularity against Venustiano
Saburnido was dismissed only because the latter was able to antedate an entry in the police
blotter stating that his service firearm was lost. He also points out that Venustiano was
suspended when a prisoner escaped during his watch. As for his complaint against Rosalia
Saburnido, respondent contends that by mentioning this case in the present complaint,
Rosalia wants to deprive him of his right to call the attention of the proper authorities to a
violation of the Election Code.

In their reply, complainants reiterate their charge that the cases against them were meant
only to harass them. In addition, Rosalia Saburnido stressed that she served in the BEI in
1995 only because the supposed chairperson was indisposed. She stated that she told the
other BEI members and the pollwatchers that she was related to one candidate and that
she would desist from serving if anyone objected. Since nobody objected, she proceeded to
dispense her duties as BEI chairperson. She added that her relative lost in that election
while respondent's son won.
In a resolution dated May 22, 1996,10 we referred this matter to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.
In its report submitted to this Court on October 16, 2000, the IBP noted that respondent and
his counsel failed to appear and present evidence in the hearing of the case set for January
26, 2000, despite notice. Thus, respondent was considered to have waived his right to
present evidence in his behalf during said hearing. Neither did respondent submit his
memorandum as directed by the IBP.
After evaluating the evidence before it, the IBP concluded that complainants submitted
convincing proof that respondent indeed committed acts constituting gross misconduct that
warrant the imposition of administrative sanction. The IBP recommends that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for one year.
We have examined the records of this case and find no reason to disagree with the findings
and recommendation of the IBP.
A lawyer may be disciplined for any conduct, in his professional or private capacity, that
renders him unfit to continue to be an officer of the court. 11 Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility commands all lawyers to at all times uphold the dignity and
integrity of the legal profession. Specifically, in Rule 7.03, the Code provides:
RULE 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor shall be whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Clearly, respondent's act of filing multiple complaints against herein complainants reflects
on his fitness to be a member of the legal profession. His act evinces vindictiveness, a
decidedly undesirable trait whether in a lawyer or another individual, as complainants were
instrumental in respondent's dismissal from the judiciary. We see in respondent's tenacity in
pursuing several cases against complainants not the persistence of one who has been
grievously wronged but the obstinacy of one who is trying to exact revenge.

Respondent's action erodes rather than enhances public perception of the legal profession.
It constitutes gross misconduct for which he may be suspended, following Section 27, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
SECTION 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds
therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of
a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required
to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do.x x x
Complainants ask that respondent be disbarred. However, we find that suspension from the
practice of law is sufficient to discipline respondent.
The supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that
seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court. 12 While
we will not hesitate to remove an erring attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers,
where the evidence calls for it, we will also not disbar him where a lesser penalty will suffice
to accomplish the desired end.13 In this case, we find suspension to be a sufficient sanction
against respondent. Suspension, we may add, is not primarily intended as a punishment,
but as a means to protect the public and the legal profession. 14
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Florante E. Madroo is found GUILTY of gross misconduct
and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one year with a WARNING that a repetition
the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. Respondent's suspension is
effective upon his receipt of notice of this decision. Let notice of this decision be spread in
respondent's record as an attorney in this Court, and notice of the same served on the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation
to all the courts concerned.
SO ORDERED.

Not to Encourage Lawsuit or Proceedings Rule 1.03

A.C. No. 6672

September 4, 2009

PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO, Respondent.

RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This is a complaint for disbarment1 filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan Linsangan &
Linsangan Law Office against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients and
encroachment of professional services.
Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano,
convinced his clients2 to transfer legal representation. Respondent promised them financial
assistance3 and expeditious collection on their claims.4To induce them to hire his services,
he persistently called them and sent them text messages.
To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit 5 of James Gregorio
attesting that Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations with
complainant and utilize respondents services instead, in exchange for a loan of P50,000.
Complainant also attached "respondents" calling card: 6
Front

NICOMEDES TOLENTINO
LAW OFFFICE
CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES
W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
Fe Marie L. Labiano
Paralegal
1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. Rm.
M-01
6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar
Grace Park, Caloocan City

Tel: 362-7820
Fax: (632) 3627821
Cel.: (0926)
2701719

Back

SERVICES OFFERED:

CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE

TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN
REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,
INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH
AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS
ABROAD.
1

(emphasis supplied)
Hence, this complaint.
Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and
circulation of the said calling card.7
The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. 8
Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in its report and
recommendation,9 found that respondent had encroached on the professional practice of
complainant, violating Rule 8.0210 and other canons11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR). Moreover, he contravened the rule against soliciting cases for gain,
personally or through paid agents or brokers as stated in Section 27, Rule 138 12 of the
Rules of Court. Hence, the CBD recommended that respondent be reprimanded with a
stern warning that any repetition would merit a heavier penalty.
We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of respondent but we modify the
recommended penalty.
The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged intrusion by respondent into complainants
professional practice in violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR. And the means employed by
respondent in furtherance of the said misconduct themselves constituted distinct violations
of ethical rules.
Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere to, including the manner
by which a lawyers services are to be made known. Thus, Canon 3 of the CPR provides:
CANON 3 - A lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair,
dignified and objective information or statement of facts.
Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession and not a
business; lawyers should not advertise their talents as merchants advertise their wares. 13 To
allow a lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize the practice of law, degrade

the profession in the publics estimation and impair its ability to efficiently render that high
character of service to which every member of the bar is called. 14
Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:
RULE 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit
legal business.
Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally
or through paid agents or brokers.15 Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for
disbarment.16
Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides:
RULE 1.03. A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or
proceeding or delay any mans cause.
This rule proscribes "ambulance chasing" (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal
business by an attorney, personally or through an agent in order to gain employment) 17 as a
measure to protect the community from barratry and champerty.18
Complainant presented substantial evidence19 (consisting of the sworn statements of the
very same persons coaxed by Labiano and referred to respondents office) to prove that
respondent indeed solicited legal business as well as profited from referrals suits.
Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano in his answer, he later admitted it
during the mandatory hearing.
Through Labianos actions, respondents law practice was benefited. Hapless seamen were
enticed to transfer representation on the strength of Labianos word that respondent could
produce a more favorable result.
Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment violating Rule 2.03, and
Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 of the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
With regard to respondents violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the rule that a
lawyer should not steal another lawyers client nor induce the latter to retain him by a
promise of better service, good result or reduced fees for his services. 20 Again the Court
notes that respondent never denied having these seafarers in his client list nor receiving
benefits from Labianos "referrals." Furthermore, he never denied Labianos connection to
his office.21Respondent committed an unethical, predatory overstep into anothers legal
practice. He cannot escape liability under Rule 8.02 of the CPR.
Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers,
respondent violated Rule 16.04:
Rule 16.04 A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the clients interests are
fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer

lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary
expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.
The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is, when in
the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses (such as filing fees,
stenographers fees for transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or premium for surety
bond, etc.) for a matter that he is handling for the client.
The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyers independence of mind so that the free
exercise of his judgment may not be adversely affected. 22 It seeks to ensure his undivided
attention to the case he is handling as well as his entire devotion and fidelity to the clients
cause. If the lawyer lends money to the client in connection with the clients case, the lawyer
in effect acquires an interest in the subject matter of the case or an additional stake in its
outcome.23Either of these circumstances may lead the lawyer to consider his own recovery
rather than that of his client, or to accept a settlement which may take care of his interest in
the verdict to the prejudice of the client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to the
clients cause.24
As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation constitutes malpractice 25 which calls for the
exercise of the Courts disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statutes warrants
serious sanctions for initiating contact with a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining
employment.26 Thus, in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the rule to protect the public from the
Machiavellian machinations of unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the nobility of the legal
profession.
Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including violation of the prohibition on
lending money to clients), the sanction recommended by the IBP, a mere reprimand, is a
wimpy slap on the wrist. The proposed penalty is grossly incommensurate to its findings.
A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by petitioner. A lawyers best
advertisement is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust
based on his character and conduct.27 For this reason, lawyers are only allowed to
announce their services by publication in reputable law lists or use of simple professional
cards.
Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:
(a) lawyers name;
(b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;
(c) address;
(d) telephone number and
(e) special branch of law practiced.28

Labianos calling card contained the phrase "with financial assistance." The phrase was
clearly used to entice clients (who already had representation) to change counsels with a
promise of loans to finance their legal actions. Money was dangled to lure clients away from
their original lawyers, thereby taking advantage of their financial distress and emotional
vulnerability. This crass commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar and deserved no
place in the legal profession. However, in the absence of substantial evidence to prove his
culpability, the Court is not prepared to rule that respondent was personally and directly
responsible for the printing and distribution of Labianos calling cards.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02
and 16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court is hereby SUSPENDEDfrom the practice of law for a period of
one year effective immediately from receipt of this resolution. He is STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of his records in the Office of the Bar Confidant,
Supreme Court of the Philippines, and be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and the Office of the Court Administrator to be circulated to all courts.
SO ORDERED.

Encourage Client to Avoid Controversy Rule 1.04

G.R. No. 104599 March 11, 1994
JON DE YSASI III, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FOURTH DIVISION), CEBU CITY, and
JON DE YSASI,respondents.
F.B. Santiago, Nalus & Associates for petitioner.
Ismael A. Serfino for private respondent.

REGALADO, J.:
The adage that blood is thicker than water obviously stood for naught in this case,
notwithstanding the vinculum of paternity and filiation between the parties. It would indeed
have been the better part of reason if herein petitioner and private respondent had

reconciled their differences in an extrajudicial atmosphere of familial amity and with the
grace of reciprocal concessions. Father and son opted instead for judicial intervention
despite the inevitable acrimony and negative publicity. Albeit with distaste, the Court cannot
proceed elsewise but to resolve their dispute with the same reasoned detachment accorded
any judicial proceeding before it.
The records of this case reveal that petitioner was employed by his father, herein private
respondent, as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao in Hinigaran, Negros Occidental
sometime in April, 1980. Prior thereto, he was successively employed as sales manager of
Triumph International (Phil.), Inc. and later as operations manager of Top Form
Manufacturing (Phil.), Inc. His employment as farm administrator was on a fixed salary, with
other allowances covering housing, food, light, power, telephone, gasoline, medical and
dental expenses.
As farm administrator, petitioner was responsible for the supervision of daily activities and
operations of the sugarcane farm such as land preparation, planting, weeding, fertilizing,
harvesting, dealing with third persons in all matters relating to the hacienda and attending to
such other tasks as may be assigned to him by private respondent. For this purpose, he
lived on the farm, occupying the upper floor of the house there.
Following his marriage on June 6, 1982, petitioner moved to Bacolod City with his wife and
commuted to work daily. He suffered various ailments and was hospitalized on two separate
occasions in June and August, 1982. In November, 1982, he underwent fistulectomy, or the
surgical removal of the fistula, a deep sinuous ulcer. During his recuperation which lasted
over four months, he was under the care of Dr. Patricio Tan. In June, 1983, he was confined
for acute gastroenteritis and, thereafter, for infectious hepatitis from December, 1983 to
January, 1984.
During the entire periods of petitioner's illnesses, private respondent took care of his
medical expenses and petitioner continued to receive compensation. However, in April,
1984, without due notice, private respondent ceased to pay the latter's salary. Petitioner
made oral and written demands for an explanation for the sudden withholding of his salary
from Atty. Apolonio Sumbingco, private respondent's auditor and legal adviser, as well as for
the remittance of his salary. Both demands, however, were not acted upon.
Petitioner then filed an action with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC, for
brevity), Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI, Bacolod City, on October 17, 1984, docketed
therein as RAB Case No. 0452-84, against private respondent for illegal dismissal with
prayer for reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and payment of full back wages,
thirteenth month pay for 1983, consequential, moral and exemplary damages, as well as
attorney's fees.

On July 31, 1991, said complaint for illegal dismissal was dismissed by the NLRC, 1 holding
that petitioner abandoned his work and that the termination of his employment was for a
valid cause, but ordering private respondent to pay petitioner the amount of P5,000.00 as
penalty for his failure to serve notice of said termination of employment to the Department of
Labor and Employment as required by Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 and consonant with this
Court's ruling in Wenphil Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al. 2 On
appeal to the Fourth Division of the NLRC, Cebu City, said decision was affirmed in toto. 3
His motion for reconsideration 4 of said decision having been denied for lack of
merit, 5 petitioner filed this petition presenting the following issues for resolution: (1) whether
or not the petitioner was illegally dismissed; (2) whether or not he is entitled to
reinstatement, payment of back wages, thirteenth month pay and other benefits; and (3)
whether or not he is entitled to payment of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's
fees because of illegal dismissal. The discussion of these issues will necessarily subsume
the corollary questions presented by private respondent, such as the exact date when
petitioner ceased to function as farm administrator, the character of the pecuniary amounts
received by petitioner from private respondent, that is, whether the same are in the nature
of salaries or pensions, and whether or not there was abandonment by petitioner of his
functions as farm administrator.
In his manifestation dated September 14, 1992, the Solicitor General recommended a
modification of the decision of herein public respondent sustaining the findings and
conclusions of the Executive Labor Arbiter in RAB Case No. 0452-84, 6 for which reason the
NLRC was required to submit its own comment on the petition. In compliance with the
Court's resolution of November 16, 1992, 7 NLRC filed its comment on February 12, 1992
largely reiterating its earlier position in support of the findings of the Executive Labor
Arbiter. 8
Before proceeding with a discussion of the issues, the observation of the labor arbiter is
worth noting:
This case is truly unique. What makes this case unique is the fact that
because of the special relationship of the parties and the nature of the action
involved, this case could very well go down (in) the annals of the Commission
as perhaps the first of its kind. For this case is an action filed by an only son,
his father's namesake, the only child and therefore the only heir against his
own father. 9
Additionally, the Solicitor General remarked:
. . . After an exhaustive reading of the records, two (2) observations were
noted that may justify why this labor case deserves special considerations.
First, most of the complaints that petitioner and private respondent had with

each other, were personal matters affecting father and son relationship. And
secondly, if any of the complaints pertain to their work, they allow their
personal relationship to come in the way. 10
I. Petitioner maintains that his dismissal from employment was illegal because of want of
just cause therefor and non-observance of the requirements of due process. He also
charges the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion in relying upon the findings of the
executive labor arbiter who decided the case but did not conduct the hearings thereof.
Private respondent, in refutation, avers that there was abandonment by petitioner of his
functions as farm administrator, thereby arming private respondent with a ground to
terminate his employment at Hacienda Manucao. It is also contended that it is wrong for
petitioner to question the factual findings of the executive labor arbiter and the NLRC as
only questions of law may be appealed for resolution by this Court. Furthermore, in seeking
the dismissal of the instant petition, private respondent faults herein petitioner for failure to
refer to the corresponding pages of the transcripts of stenographic notes, erroneously citing
Sections 15(d) and 16(d), Rule 44 (should be Section 16[c] and [d],
Rule 46 and Section 1[g], Rule 50) of the Rules of Court, which provide that want of page
references to the records is a ground for dismissal of an appeal.
Prefatorily, we take advertence of the provisions of Article 221 of the Labor Code that
technical rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling, and
that every and all reasonable means to speedily and objectively ascertain the facts in each
case shall be availed of, without regard to technicalities of law or procedure in the interest of
due process.
It is settled that it is not procedurally objectionable for the decision in a case to be rendered
by a judge, or a labor arbiter for that matter, other than the one who conducted the hearing.
The fact that the judge who heard the case was not the judge who penned the decision
does not impair the validity of the judgment, 11 provided that he draws up his decision and
resolution with due care and makes certain that they truly and accurately reflect conclusions
and final dispositions on the bases of the facts of and evidence submitted in the case. 12
Thus, the mere fact that the case was initially assigned to Labor Arbiter Ricardo T. Octavio,
who conducted the hearings therein from December 5, 1984 to July 11, 1985, and was later
transferred to Executive Labor Arbiter Oscar S. Uy, who eventually decided the case,
presents no procedural infirmity, especially considering that there is a presumption of
regularity in the performance of a public officer's functions, 13 which petitioner has not
successfully rebutted.
We are constrained to heed the underlying policy in the Labor Code relaxing the application
of technical rules of procedure in labor cases in the interest of due process, ever mindful of
the long-standing legal precept that rules of procedure must be interpreted to help secure,

not defeat, justice. For this reason, we cannot indulge private respondent in his tendency to
nitpick on trivial technicalities to boost his arguments. The strength of one's position cannot
be hinged on mere procedural niceties but on solid bases in law and jurisprudence.
The fundamental guarantees of security of tenure and due process dictate that no worker
shall be dismissed except for just and authorized cause provided by law and after due
process. 14 Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the causes for which an employer
may validly terminate an employment, to wit:
(a) serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his
employer or representative in connection with his work; (b) gross and habitual neglect by
the employee of his duties; (c) fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in
him by his employer or duly authorized representative; (d) commission of a crime or offense
by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family
or his duly authorized representative; and (e) other causes analogous to the foregoing.
The employer may also terminate the services of any employee due to the installation of
labor saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or
cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking, unless the closing is for the
purpose of circumventing the pertinent provisions of the Labor Code, by serving a written
notice on the workers and the Department of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month
before the intended date thereof, with due entitlement to the corresponding separation pay
rates provided by law. 15Suffering from a disease by reason whereof the continued
employment of the employee is prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his and his coemployee's health, is also a ground for termination of his services provided he receives the
prescribed separation pay. 16 On the other hand, it is well-settled that abandonment by an
employee of his work authorizes the employer to effect the former's dismissal from
employment. 17
After a careful review of the records of this case, we find that public respondent gravely
erred in affirming the decision of the executive labor arbiter holding that petitioner
abandoned his employment and was not illegally dismissed from such employment. For
want of substantial bases, in fact or
in law, we cannot give the stamp of finality and conclusiveness normally accorded to the
factual findings of an administrative agency, such as herein public respondent NLRC, 18 as
even decisions of administrative agencies which are declared "final" by law are not exempt
from judicial review when so warranted. 19
The following perceptive disquisitions of the Solicitor General on this point deserve
acceptance:
It is submitted that the absences of petitioner in his work from October 1982
to December 1982, cannot be construed as abandonment of work because
he has a justifiable excuse. Petitioner was suffering from perennial abscess in

the peri-anal around the anus and fistula under the medical attention of Dr.
Patricio Tan of Riverside Medical Center, Inc., Bacolod City (Tsn, Vol. III, Dr.
Tan, February 19, 1986 at 20-44).
This fact (was) duly communicated to private respondent by medical bills sent
to Hacienda Manucao (Tsn, Vol. III, Dr. Tan, January 22, 1987 at 49-50).
During the period of his illness and recovery, petitioner stayed in Bacolod City
upon the instruction(s) of private respondent to recuperate thereat and to
handle only administrative matters of the hacienda in that city. As a manager,
petitioner is not really obliged to live and stay 24 hours a day inside Hacienda
Manucao.
xxx xxx xxx
After evaluating the evidence within the context of the special circumstances
involved and basic human experience, petitioner's illness and strained family
relation with respondent Jon de Ysasi II may be considered as justifiable
reason for petitioner Jon de Ysasi III's absence from work during the period of
October 1982 to December 1982. In any event, such absence does not
warrant outright dismissal without notice and hearing.
xxx xxx xxx
The elements of abandonment as a ground for dismissal of an employee are
as follows:
(1) failure to report for work or absence without valid or
justifiable reason; and (2) clear intention to sever the employeremployee tie (Samson Alcantara, Reviewer in Labor and Social
Legislation, 1989 edition, p. 133).
This Honorable Court, in several cases, illustrates what constitute
abandonment. In Dagupan Bus Company v. NLRC (191 SCRA 328), the
Court rules that for abandonment to arise, there must be a concurrence of the
intention to abandon and some overt act from which it may be inferred that
the employee has no more interest to work. Similarly, in Nueva Ecija I Electric
Cooperative, Inc. v. NLRC(184 SCRA 25), for abandonment to constitute a
valid cause for termination of employment, there must be a deliberate,
unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment. . . Mere
absence is not sufficient; it must be accompanied by overt acts unerringly
pointing to the fact that the employee simply does not want to work anymore.

There are significant indications in this case, that there is no abandonment.

First, petitioner's absence and his decision to leave his residence inside
Hacienda Manucao, is justified by his illness and strained family relations.
Second he has some medical certificates to show his frail health. Third, once
able to work, petitioner wrote a letter (Annex "J") informing private respondent
of his intention to assume again his employment. Last, but not the least, he at
once instituted a complaint for illegal dismissal when he realized he was
unjustly dismissed. All these are indications that petitioner had no intention to
abandon his employment. 20
The records show that the parties herein do not dispute the fact of petitioner's confinement
in the hospital for his various afflictions which required medical treatment. Neither can it be
denied that private respondent was well aware of petitioner's state of health as the former
admittedly shouldered part of the medical and hospital bills and even advised the latter to
stay in Bacolod City until he was fit to work again. The disagreement as to whether or not
petitioner's ailments were so serious as to necessitate hospitalization and corresponding
periods for recuperation is beside the point. The fact remains that on account of said
illnesses, the details of which were amply substantiated by the attending physician, 21 and
as the records are bereft of any suggestion of malingering on the part of petitioner, there
was justifiable cause for petitioner's absence from work. We repeat, it is clear, deliberate
and unjustified refusal to resume employment and not mere absence that is required to
constitute abandonment as a valid ground for termination of employment. 22
With his position as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao, petitioner unmistakably may
be classified as a managerial employee 23 to whom the law grants an amount of discretion in
the discharge of his duties. This is why when petitioner stated that "I assigned myself where
I want to go," 24 he was simply being candid about what he could do within the sphere of his
authority. His duties as farm administrator did not strictly require him to keep regular hours
or to be at the office premises at all times, or to be subjected to specific control from his
employer in every aspect of his work. What is essential only is that he runs the farm as
efficiently and effectively as possible and, while petitioner may definitely not qualify as a
model employee, in this regard he proved to be quite successful, as there was at least a
showing of increased production during the time that petitioner was in charge of farm
operations.
If, as private respondent contends, he had no control over petitioner during the years 1983
to 1984, this is because that was the period when petitioner was recuperating from illness
and on account of which his attendance and direct involvement in farm operations were
irregular and minimal, hence the supervision and control exercisable by private respondent
as employer was necessarily limited. It goes without saying that the control contemplated
refers only to matters relating to his functions as farm administrator and could not extend to
petitioner's personal affairs and activities.

While it was taken for granted that for purposes of discharging his duties as farm
administrator, petitioner would be staying at the house in the farm, there really was no
explicit contractual stipulation (as there was no formal employment contract to begin with)
requiring him to stay therein for the duration of his employment or that any transfer of
residence would justify the termination of his employment. That petitioner changed his
residence should not be taken against him, as this is undeniably among his basic rights, nor
can such fact of transfer of residence per se be a valid ground to terminate an employeremployee relationship.
Private respondent, in his pleadings, asserted that as he was yet uncertain of his son's
intention of returning to work after his confinement in the hospital, he kept petitioner on the
payroll, reported him as an employee of the haciendafor social security purposes, and paid
his salaries and benefits with the mandated deductions therefrom until the end of
December, 1982. It was only in January, 1983 when he became convinced that petitioner
would no longer return to work that he considered the latter to have abandoned his work
and, for this reason, no longer listed him as an employee. According to private respondent,
whatever amount of money was given to petitioner from that time until
April, 1984 was in the nature of a pension or an allowance or mere gratuitous doles from a
father to a son, and not salaries as, in fact, none of the usual deductions were made
therefrom. It was only in April, 1984 that private respondent completely stopped giving said
pension or allowance when he was angered by what he heard petitioner had been saying
about sending him to jail.
Private respondent capitalizes on the testimony of one Manolo Gomez taken on oral
deposition regarding petitioner's alleged statement to him, "(h)e quemado los (p)ue(n)tes de
Manucao" ("I have burned my bridges with Manucao") as expressive of petitioner's intention
to abandon his job. In addition to insinuations of sinister motives on the part of petitioner in
working at the farm and thereafter abandoning the job upon accomplishment of his
objectives, private respondent takes the novel position that the agreement to support his
son after the latter abandoned the administration of the farm legally converts the initial
abandonment to implied voluntary resignation.25
As earlier mentioned, petitioner ripostes that private respondent undoubtedly knew about
petitioner's illness and even paid for his hospital and other medical bills. The assertion
regarding abandonment of work, petitioner argues, is further belied by his continued
performance of various services related to the operations of the farm from May to the last
quarter of 1983, his persistent inquiries from his father's accountant and legal adviser about
the reason why his pension or allowance was discontinued since April, 1984, and his
indication of having recovered and his willingness and capability to resume his work at the
farm as expressed in a letter dated September 14, 1984. 26 With these, petitioner contends
that it is immaterial how the monthly pecuniary amounts are designated, whether as salary,
pension or allowance, with or without deductions, as he was entitled thereto in view of his
continued service as farm administrator. 27

To stress what was earlier mentioned, in order that a finding of abandonment may justly be
made there must be a concurrence of two elements, viz.: (1) the failure to report for work or
absence without valid or justifiable reason, and (2) a clear intention to sever the employeremployee relationship, with the second element as the more determinative factor and being
manifested by some overt acts. Such intent we find dismally wanting in this case.
It will be recalled that private respondent himself admitted being unsure of his son's plans of
returning to work. The absence of petitioner from work since mid-1982, prolonged though it
may have been, was not without valid causes of which private respondent had full
knowledge. As to what convinced or led him to believe that petitioner was no longer
returning to work, private respondent neither explains nor substantiates by any reasonable
basis how he arrived at such a conclusion.
Moreover, private respondent's claim of abandonment cannot be given credence as even
after January, 1983, when private respondent supposedly "became convinced" that
petitioner would no longer work at the farm, the latter continued to perform services directly
required by his position as farm administrator. These are duly and correspondingly
evidenced by such acts as picking up some farm machinery/equipment from G.A.
Machineries, Inc.,28 claiming and paying for additional farm equipment and machinery
shipped by said firm from Manila to Bacolod through Zip Forwarders, 29 getting the payment
of the additional cash advances for molasses for crop year 1983-1984 from Agrotex
Commodities, Inc., 30 and remitting to private respondent through
Atty. Sumbingco the sums collected along with receipts for medicine and oil. 31
It will be observed that all of these chores, which petitioner took care of, relate to the normal
activities and operations of the farm. True, it is a father's prerogative to request or even
command his child to run errands for him. In the present case, however, considering the
nature of these transactions, as well as the property values and monetary sums involved, it
is unlikely that private respondent would leave the matter to just anyone. Prudence dictates
that these matters be handled by someone who can be trusted or at least be held
accountable therefor, and who is familiar with the terms, specifications and other details
relative thereto, such as an employee. If indeed petitioner had abandoned his job or was
considered to have done so by private respondent, it would be awkward, or even out of
place, to expect or to oblige petitioner to concern himself with matters relating to or
expected of him with respect to what would then be his past and terminated employment. It
is hard to imagine what further authority an employer can have over a dismissed employee
so as to compel him to continue to perform work-related tasks:
It is also significant that the special power of attorney 32 executed
by private respondent on June 26, 1980 in favor of petitioner, specifically stating
xxx xxx xxx

That I, JON de YSASI, Filipino, of legal age, married, and a resident of Hda.
Manucao, hereinafter called and referred to as PRINCIPAL, am a sugarcane
planter, BISCOM Mill District, and a duly accredited planter-member of the
BINALBAGAN-ISABELA PLANTERS' ASSOCIATION, INC.;
That as such planter-member of BIPA, I have check/checks with BIPA
representing payment for all checks and papers to which I am entitled to (sic)
as such planter-member;
That I have named, appointed and constituted as by these presents
I HEREBY NAME, APPOINT AND CONSTITUTE as my true and lawful
ATTORNEY-IN-FACT
JON de YSASI III
whose specimen signature is hereunder affixed, TO GET FOR ME and in my
name, place and stead, my check/checks aforementioned, said ATTORNEYIN-FACT being herein given the power and authority to sign for me and in my
name, place and stead, the receipt or receipts or payroll for the said
check/checks. PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that my said ATTORNEY-IN-FACT
cannot cash the said check/checks, but to turn the same over to me for my
proper disposition.
That I HEREBY RATIFY AND CONFIRM the acts of my
Attorney-in-Fact in getting the said check/checks and signing the receipts
therefor.
That I further request that my said check/checks be made a "CROSSED
CHECK".
xxx xxx xxx
remained in force even after petitioner's employment was supposed to have been
terminated by reason of abandonment. Furthermore, petitioner's numerous requests for an
explanation regarding the stoppage of his salaries and benefits, 33 the issuance of
withholding tax reports, 34 as well as correspondence reporting his full recovery and
readiness to go back to work, 35 and, specifically, his filing of the complaint for illegal
dismissal are hardly the acts of one who has abandoned his work.
We are likewise not impressed by the deposition of Manolo Gomez, as witness for private
respondent, ascribing statements to petitioner supposedly indicative of the latter's intention
to abandon his work. We perceive the irregularity in the taking of such deposition without
the presence of petitioner's counsel, and the failure of private respondent to serve

reasonably advance notice of its taking to said counsel, thereby foreclosing his opportunity
to
cross-examine the deponent. Private respondent also failed to serve notice thereof on the
Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI of the NLRC, as certified to by Administrative Assistant
Celestina G. Ovejera of said office. 36 Fair play dictates that at such an important stage of
the proceedings, which involves the taking of testimony, both parties must be afforded equal
opportunity to examine and cross-examine a witness.
As to the monthly monetary amounts given to petitioner, whether denominated as salary,
pension, allowance or ex gratia handout, there is no question as to petitioner's entitlement
thereto inasmuch as he continued to perform services in his capacity as farm administrator.
The change in description of said amounts contained in the pay slips or in the receipts
prepared by private respondent cannot be deemed to be determinative of petitioner's
employment status in view of the peculiar circumstances above set out. Besides, if such
amounts were truly in the nature of allowances given by a parent out of concern for his
child's welfare, it is rather unusual that receipts therefor 37 should be necessary and required
as if they were ordinary business expenditures.
Neither can we subscribe to private respondent's theory that petitioner's alleged
abandonment was converted into an implied voluntary resignation on account of the father's
agreement to support his son after the latter abandoned his work. As we have determined
that no abandonment took place in this case, the monthly sums received by petitioner,
regardless of designation, were in consideration for services rendered emanating from an
employer-employee relationship and were not of a character that can qualify them as mere
civil support given out of parental duty and solicitude. We are also hard put to imagine how
abandonment can be impliedly converted into a voluntary resignation without any positive
act on the part of the employee conveying a desire to terminate his employment. The very
concept of resignation as a ground for termination by the employee of his
employment 38 does not square with the elements constitutive of abandonment.
On procedural considerations, petitioner posits that there was a violation by private
respondent of the due process requirements under the Labor Code for want of notice and
hearing. 39 Private respondent, in opposition, argues that Section 2, Rule XIV, Book V of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code applies only to cases where the employer
seeks to terminate the services of an employee on any of the grounds enumerated under
Article 282 of the Labor Code, but not to the situation obtaining in this case where private
respondent did not dismiss petitioner on any ground since it was petitioner who allegedly
abandoned his employment. 40
The due process requirements of notice and hearing applicable to labor cases are set out in
Rule XIV, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code in this wise:

Sec. 2. Notice of Dismissal. Any employer who seeks to dismiss a worker

shall furnish him a written notice stating the particular acts or omission(s)
constituting the grounds for his dismissal. In cases of abandonment of work,
notice shall be served at the worker's last known address.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 5. Answer and hearing. The worker may answer the allegations as
stated against him in the notice of dismissal within a reasonable period from
receipt of such notice. The employer shall afford the worker ample opportunity
to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his representative, if
he so desires.
Sec. 6. Decision to dismiss. The employer shall immediately notify a
worker in writing of a decision to dismiss him stating clearly the reasons
therefor.
Sec. 7. Right to contest dismissal. Any decision taken by the employer
shall be without prejudice to the right of the worker to contest the validity or
legality of his dismissal by filing a complaint with the Regional Branch of the
Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 11. Report of dismissal. The employer shall submit a monthly report
to the Regional Office having jurisdiction over the place of work at all
dismissals effected by him during the month, specifying therein the names of
the dismissed workers, the reasons for their dismissal, the dates of
commencement and termination of employment, the positions last held by
them and such other information as may be required by the Ministry for policy
guidance and statistical purposes.
Private respondent's argument is without merit as there can be no question that petitioner
was denied his right to due process since he was never given any notice about his
impending dismissal and the grounds therefor, much less a chance to be heard. Even as
private respondent controverts the applicability of the mandatory twin requirements of
procedural due process in this particular case, he in effect admits that no notice was served
by him on petitioner. This fact is corroborated by the certification issued on September 5,
1984 by the Regional Director for Region VI of the Department of Labor that no notice of
termination of the employment of petitioner was submitted thereto. 41
Granting arguendo that there was abandonment in this case, it nonetheless cannot be
denied that notice still had to be served upon the employee sought to be dismissed, as the

second sentence of Section 2 of the pertinent implementing rules explicitly requires service
thereof at the employee's last known address, by way of substantial compliance. While it is
conceded that it is the employer's prerogative to terminate an employee, especially when
there is just cause therefor, the requirements of due process cannot be lightly taken. The
law does not countenance the arbitrary exercise of such a power or prerogative when it has
the effect of undermining the fundamental guarantee of security of tenure in favor of the
employee. 42
On the executive labor arbiter's misplaced reliance on the Wenphil case, the Solicitor
General rejoins as follows:
The Labor Arbiter held thus:
While we are in full agreement with the respondent as to his
defense of implied resignation and/or abandonment, records
somehow showed that he failed to notify the Department of
Labor and Employment for his sons' (sic)/complainants' (sic)
aba(n)donment as required by BP 130. And for this failure, the
other requisite for a valid termination by an employer was not
complied with. This however, would not work to invalidate the
otherwise (sic) existence of a valid cause for dismissal. The
validity of the cause of dismissal must be upheld at all times
provided however that sanctions must be imposed on the
respondent for his failure to observe the notice on due process
requirement. (Wenphil Corp. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 80587).
(Decision Labor Arbiter, at 11-12, Annex "C" Petition), . . .
This is thus a very different case from Wenphil Corporation v. NLRC, 170
SCRA 69. In Wenphil, the rule applied to the facts is: once an employee is
dismissed for just cause, he must not be rewarded
re-employment and backwages for failure of his employer to observe
procedural due process. The public policy behind this is that, it may
encourage the employee to do even worse and render a mockery of the rules
of discipline required to be observed. However, the employer must be
penalized for his infraction of due process. In the present case, however, not
only was petitioner dismissed without due process, but his dismissal is
without just cause. Petitioner did not abandon his employment because he
has a justifiable excuse. 43
II. Petitioner avers that the executive labor arbiter erred in disregarding the mandatory
provisions of Article 279 of the Labor Code which entitles an illegally dismissed employee to
reinstatement and back wages and, instead, affirmed the imposition of the penalty of
P5,000.00 on private respondent for violation of the due process requirements. Private

respondent, for his part, maintains that there was error in imposing the fine because that
penalty contemplates the failure to submit the employer's report on dismissed employees to
the DOLE regional office, as required under Section 5 (now, Section 11), Rule XIV of the
implementing rules, and not the failure to serve notice upon the employee sought to be
dismissed by the employer.
Both the Constitution and the Labor Code enunciate in no uncertain terms the right of every
worker to security of tenure. 44 To give teeth to this constitutional and statutory mandates,
the Labor Code spells out the relief available to an employee in case of its denial:
Art. 279. Security of Tenure. In cases of regular employment, the employer
shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or
when authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from
work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and
other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his
other benefits of their monetary equivalent computed from the time his
compensation was withheld from him up to the time of actual reinstatement.
Clearly, therefore, an employee is entitled to reinstatement with full back wages in the
absence of just cause for dismissal. 45 The Court, however, on numerous occasions has
tempered the rigid application of said provision of the Labor Code, recognizing that in some
cases certain events may have transpired as would militate against the practicability of
granting the relief thereunder provided, and declares that where there are strained relations
between the employer and the employee, payment of back wages and severance pay may
be awarded instead of reinstatement, 46 and more particularly when managerial employees
are concerned. 47 Thus, where reinstatement is no longer possible, it is therefore appropriate
that the dismissed employee be given his fair and just share of what the law accords him. 48
We note with favor and give our imprimatur to the Solicitor General's ratiocination, to wit:
As a general rule, an employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be
entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and to his backwages
computed from the time his compensation was withheld up to the time of his
reinstatement. (Morales vs. NLRC, 188 SCRA 295). But in Pacific Cement
Company, Inc. vs. NLRC, 173 SCRA 192, this Honorable Court held that
when it comes to reinstatement, differences should be made between
managers and the ordinary workingmen. The Court concluded that a
company which no longer trusts its managers cannot operate freely in a
competitive and profitable manner. The NLRC should know the difference
between managers and ordinary workingmen. It cannot imprudently order the
reinstatement of managers with the same ease and liberality as that of rank
and file workers who had been terminated. Similarly, a reinstatement may not

be appropriate or feasible in case of antipathy or antagonism between the

parties (Morales, vs. NLRC, 188 SCRA 295).
In the present case, it is submitted that petitioner should not be reinstated as
farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao. The present relationship of
petitioner and private respondent (is) so strained that a harmonious and
peaceful employee-employer relationship is hardly possible. 49
III. Finally, petitioner insists on an award of moral damages, arguing that his dismissal from
employment was attended by bad faith or fraud, or constituted oppression, or was contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy. He further prays for exemplary damages to serve
as a deterrent against similar acts of unjust dismissal by other employers.
Moral damages, under Article 2217 of the Civil Code, may be awarded to compensate one
for diverse injuries such as mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, and
social humiliation, provided that such injuries spring from a wrongful act or omission of the
defendant which was the proximate cause thereof. 50 Exemplary damages, under Article
2229, are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. They are not recoverable as a matter of
right, it being left to the court to decide whether or not they should be adjudicated. 51
We are well aware of the Court's rulings in a number of cases in the past allowing recovery
of moral damages where the dismissal of the employee was attended by bad faith or fraud,
or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy, 52 and of exemplary damages if the dismissal was effected in a
wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner. 53 We do not feel, however, that an award of the
damages prayed for in this petition would be proper even if, seemingly, the facts of the case
justify their allowance. In the aforestated cases of illegal dismissal where moral and
exemplary damages were awarded, the dismissed employees were genuinely without fault
and were undoubtedly victims of the erring employers' capricious exercise of power.
In the present case, we find that both petitioner and private respondent can equally be
faulted for fanning the flames which gave rise to and ultimately aggravated this controversy,
instead of sincerely negotiating a peaceful settlement of their disparate claims. The records
reveal how their actuations seethed with mutual antagonism and the undeniable enmity
between them negates the likelihood that either of them acted in good faith. It is apparent
that each one has a cause for damages against the other. For this reason, we hold that no
moral or exemplary damages can rightfully be awarded to petitioner.
On this score, we are once again persuaded by the validity of the following recommendation
of the Solicitor General:

The Labor Arbiter's decision in RAB Case No. 0452-84 should be modified.
There was no voluntary abandonment in this case because petitioner has a
justifiable excuse for his absence, or such absence does not warrant outright
dismissal without notice and hearing. Private respondent, therefore, is guilty
of illegal dismissal. He should be ordered to pay backwages for a period not
exceeding three years from date of dismissal. And in lieu of reinstatement,
petitioner may be paid separation pay equivalent to one (1) month('s) salary
for every year of service, a fraction of six months being considered as one (1)
year in accordance with recent jurisprudence (Tan, Jr. vs. NLRC, 183 SCRA
651). But all claims for damages should be dismissed, for both parties are
equally at fault. 54
The conduct of the respective counsel of the parties, as revealed by the records, sorely
disappoints the Court and invites reproof. Both counsel may well be reminded that their
ethical duty as lawyers to represent their clients with
zeal 55 goes beyond merely presenting their clients' respective causes in court. It is just as
much their responsibility, if not more importantly, to exert all reasonable efforts to smooth
over legal conflicts, preferably out of court and especially in consideration of the direct and
immediate consanguineous ties between their clients. Once again, we reiterate that the
useful function of a lawyer is not only to conduct litigation but to avoid it whenever possible
by advising settlement or withholding suit. He is often called upon less for dramatic forensic
exploits than for wise counsel in every phase of life. He should be a mediator for concord
and a conciliator for compromise, rather than a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of
litigation. 56
Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides that "(a) lawyer shall
encourage his client to avoid, end or settle the controversy if it will admit of a fair
settlement." On this point, we find that both counsel herein fell short of what was expected
of them, despite their avowed duties as officers of the court. The records do not show that
they took pains to initiate steps geared toward effecting a rapprochement between their
clients. On the contrary, their acerbic and protracted exchanges could not but have
exacerbated the situation even as they may have found favor in the equally hostile eyes of
their respective clients.
In the same manner, we find that the labor arbiter who handled this regrettable case has
been less than faithful to the letter and spirit of the Labor Code mandating that a labor
arbiter "shall exert all efforts towards the amicable settlement of a labor dispute within his
jurisdiction." 57 If he ever did so, or at least entertained the thought, the copious records of
the proceedings in this controversy are barren of any reflection of the same.
One final word. This is one decision we do not particularly relish having been obliged to
make. The task of resolving cases involving disputes among members of a family leaves a
bad taste in the mouth and an aversion in the mind, for no truly meaningful and enduring

resolution is really achieved in such situations. While we are convinced that we have
adjudicated the legal issues herein squarely on the bases of law and
jurisprudence, sans sentimentality, we are saddened by the thought that we may have failed
to bring about the reconciliation of the father and son who figured as parties to this dispute,
and that our adherence here to law and duty may unwittingly contribute to the breaking,
instead of the strengthening, of familial bonds. In fine, neither of the parties herein actually
emerges victorious. It is the Court's earnest hope, therefore, that with the impartial
exposition and extended explanation of their respective rights in this decision, the parties
may eventually see their way clear to an ultimate resolution of their differences on more
convivial terms.
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission is hereby
SET ASIDE. Private respondent is ORDERED to pay petitioner back wages for a period not
exceeding three (3) years, without qualification or deduction, 58 and, in lieu of reinstatement,
separation pay equivalent to one (1) month for every year of service, a fraction of six (6)
months being considered as one (1) whole year.
SO ORDERED.

Encourage Client to Avoid Controversy Rule 1.04

G.R. No. L-28546 July 30, 1975
VENANCIO CASTANEDA and NICETAS HENSON, petitioners,
vs.
PASTOR D. AGO, LOURDES YU AGO and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Quijano and Arroyo for petitioners.
Jose M. Luison for respondents.

CASTRO, J.:

The parties in this case, except Lourdes Yu Ago, have been commuting to this Court for
more than a decade.
In 1955 the petitioners Venancio Castaeda and Nicetas Henson filed a replevin suit
against Pastor Ago in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover certain machineries
(civil case 27251). In 1957 judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, ordering Ago to
return the machineries or pay definite sums of money. Ago appealed, and on June 30, 1961
this Court, in Ago vs. Castaeda, L-14066, affirmed the judgment. After remand, the trial
court issued on August 25, 1961 a writ of execution for the sum of P172,923.87. Ago moved
for a stay of execution but his motion was denied, and levy was made on Ago's house and
lots located in Quezon City. The sheriff then advertised them for auction sale on October 25,
1961. Ago moved to stop the auction sale, failing in which he filed a petition for certiorari
with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court dismissed the petition and Ago appealed. On
January 31,1966 this Court, in Ago vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-19718, affirmed the
dismissal. Ago thrice attempted to obtain a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the
sheriff from enforcing the writ of execution "to save his family house and lot;" his motions
were denied, and the sheriff sold the house and lots on March 9, 1963 to the highest
bidders, the petitioners Castaeda and Henson. Ago failed to redeem, and on April 17, 1964
the sheriff executed the final deed of sale in favor of the vendees Castaeda and Henson.
Upon their petition, the Court of First Instance of Manila issued a writ of possession to the
properties.
However, on May 2, 1964 Pastor Ago, now joined by his wife, Lourdes Yu Ago, as his coplaintiff, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City (civil case Q-7986) to
annul the sheriff's sale on the ground that the obligation of Pastor Ago upon which judgment
was rendered against him in the replevin suit was his personal obligation, and that Lourdes
Yu Ago's one-half share in their conjugal residential house and lots which were levied upon
and sold by the sheriff could not legally be reached for the satisfaction of the judgment.
They alleged in their complaint that wife Lourdes was not a party in the replevin suit, that
the judgment was rendered and the writ of execution was issued only against husband
Pastor, and that wife Lourdes was not a party to her husband's venture in the logging
business which failed and resulted in the replevin suit and which did not benefit the conjugal
partnership.
The Court of First Instance of Quezon City issued an ex parte writ of preliminary injunction
restraining the petitioners, the Register of Deeds and the sheriff of Quezon City, from
registering the latter's final deed of sale, from cancelling the respondents' certificates of title
and issuing new ones to the petitioners and from carrying out any writ of possession. A
situation thus arose where what the Manila court had ordered to be done, the Quezon
City court countermanded. On November 1, 1965, however, the latter court lifted the
preliminary injunction it had previously issued, and the Register of deeds of Quezon City
cancelled the respondents' certificates of title and issued new ones in favor of the
petitioners. But enforcement of the writ of possession was again thwarted as the Quezon

City court again issued a temporary restraining order which it later lifted but then rerestored. On May 3, 1967 the court finally, and for the third time, lifted the restraining order.
While the battle on the matter of the lifting and restoring of the restraining order was being
fought in the Quezon City court, the Agos filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
this Court under date of May 26, 1966, docketed as L-26116, praying for a writ of
preliminary injunction to enjoin the sheriff from enforcing the writ of possession. This Court
found no merit in the petition and dismissed it in a minute resolution on June 3, 1966;
reconsideration was denied on July 18, 1966. The respondents then filed on August 2, 1966
a similar petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. 37830-R),
praying for the same preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals also dismissed the
petition. The respondents then appealed to this Court (L-27140). We dismissed the petition
in a minute resolution on February 8, 1967.
The Ago spouses repaired once more to the Court of Appeals where they filed another
petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction (CA-G.R. 39438-R). The said
court gave due course to the petition and granted preliminary injunction. After hearing, it
rendered decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, writ of preliminary injunction from enforcement of the writ of
possession on and ejectment from the one-half share in the properties
involved belonging to Lourdes Yu Ago dated June 15, 1967 is made
permanent pending decision on the merits in Civil Case No. Q-7986 and
ordering respondent Court to proceed with the trial of Civil Case No. Q-7986
on the merits without unnecessary delay. No pronouncement as to costs.
Failing to obtain reconsideration, the petitioners Castaeda and Henson filed the present
petition for review of the aforesaid decision.
1. We do not see how the doctrine that a court may not interfere with the orders of a coequal court can apply in the case at bar. The Court of First Instance of Manila, which issued
the writ of possession, ultimately was not interfered with by its co-equal court, the Court of
First Instance of Quezon City as the latter lifted the restraining order it had previously issued
against the enforcement of the Manila court's writ of possession; it is the Court of Appeals
that enjoined, in part, the enforcement of the writ.
2. Invoking Comilang vs. Buendia, et al., 1 where the wife was a party in one case and the
husband was a party in another case and a levy on their conjugal properties was upheld,
the petitioners would have Lourdes Yu Ago similarly bound by the replevin judgment against
her husband for which their conjugal properties would be answerable. The case invoked is
not at par with the present case. In Comilang the actions were admittedly instituted for the
protection of the common interest of the spouses; in the present case, the Agos deny that
their conjugal partnership benefited from the husband's business venture.

3. Relying upon Omnas vs. Rivera, 67 Phil. 419, the Court of Appeals held that a writ of
possession may not issue until the claim of a third person to half-interest in the property is
adversely determined, the said appellate court assuming that Lourdes Yu Ago was a
"stranger" or a "third-party" to her husband. The assumption is of course obviously wrong,
for, besides living with her husband Pastor, she does not claim ignorance of his business
that failed, of the relevant cases in which he got embroiled, and of the auction sale made by
the sheriff of their conjugal properties. Even then, the ruling in Omnas is not that a writ of
possession may not issue until the claim of a third person is adversely determined, but that
the writ of possession being a complement of the writ of execution, a judge with jurisdiction
to issue the latter also has jurisdiction to issue the former, unless in the interval between the
judicial sale and the issuance of the writ of possession, the rights of third parties to the
property sold have supervened. The ruling in Omnas is clearly inapplicable in the present
case, for, here, there has been no change in the ownership of the properties or of any
interest therein from the time the writ of execution was issued up to the time writ of
possession was issued, and even up to the present.
4. We agree with the trial court (then presided by Judge Lourdes P. San Diego) that it is
much too late in the day for the respondents Agos to raise the question that part of the
property is unleviable because it belongs to Lourdes Yu Ago, considering that (1) a wife is
normally privy to her husband's activities; (2) the levy was made and the properties
advertised for auction sale in 1961; (3) she lives in the very properties in question; (4) her
husband had moved to stop the auction sale; (5) the properties were sold at auction in
1963; (6) her husband had thrice attempted to obtain a preliminary injunction to restrain the
sheriff from enforcing the writ of execution; (7) the sheriff executed the deed of final sale on
April 17, 1964 when Pastor failed to redeem; (8) Pastor had impliedly admitted that the
conjugal properties could be levied upon by his pleas "to save his family house and lot" in
his efforts to prevent execution; and (9) it was only on May 2, 1964 when he and his wife
filed the complaint for annulment of the sheriff's sale upon the issue that the wife's share in
the properties cannot be levied upon on the ground that she was not a party to the logging
business and not a party to the replevin suit. The spouses Ago had every opportunity to
raise the issue in the various proceedings hereinbefore discussed but did not; laches now
effectively bars them from raising it.
Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence,
could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert
a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. 2
5. The decision of the appellate court under review suffers from two fatal infirmities.
(a) It enjoined the enforcement of the writ of possession to and ejectment from the one-half
share in the properties involved belonging to Lourdes Yu Ago. This half-share is not in esse,

but is merely an inchoate interest, a mere expectancy, constituting neither legal nor
equitable estate, and will ripen into title when only upon liquidation and settlement there
appears to be assets of the community. 3 The decision sets at naught the well-settled rule
that injunction does not issue to protect a right not in esse and which may never arise. 4
(b) The decision did not foresee the absurdity, or even the impossibility, of its enforcement.
The Ago spouses admittedly live together in the same house 5 which is conjugal property. By
the Manila court's writ of possession Pastor could be ousted from the house, but the
decision under review would prevent the ejectment of Lourdes. Now, which part of the
house would be vacated by Pastor and which part would Lourdes continue to stay in? The
absurdity does not stop here; the decision would actually separate husband and wife,
prevent them from living together, and in effect divide their conjugal properties during
coverture and before the dissolution of the conjugal union.
6. Despite the pendency in the trial court of the complaint for the annulment of the sheriff's
sale (civil case Q-7986), elementary justice demands that the petitioners, long denied the
fruits of their victory in the replevin suit, must now enjoy them, for, the respondents Agos,
abetted by their lawyer Jose M. Luison, have misused legal remedies and prostituted the
judicial process to thwart the satisfaction of the judgment, to the extended prejudice of the
petitioners. The respondents, with the assistance of counsel, maneuvered for fourteen (14)
years to doggedly resist execution of the judgment thru manifold tactics in and from one
court to another (5 times in the Supreme Court).
We condemn the attitude of the respondents and their counsel who,
far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who seek justice, have tried
to use them to subvert the very ends of justice. 6
Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his exalted position as an
officer of the court, Atty. Luison has allowed himself to become an instigator of controversy
and a predator of conflict instead of a mediator for concord and a conciliator for
compromise, a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation instead of a true exponent
of the primacy of truth and moral justice.
A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour and honesty his client's
cause must be encouraged and is to be commended; what we do not and
cannot countenance is a lawyer's insistence despite the patent futility of his
client's position, as in the case at bar.
It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the
intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack of merit of his case. If
he finds that his client's cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to
advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the

incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client, and
temper his clients propensity to litigate. A lawyer's oath to uphold the cause of
justice is superior to his duty to his client; its primacy is indisputable. 7
7. In view of the private respondents' propensity to use the courts for purposes other than to
seek justice, and in order to obviate further delay in the disposition of the case below which
might again come up to the appellate courts but only to fail in the end, we have motu
proprio examined the record of civil case Q-7986 (the mother case of the present case). We
find that
(a) the complaint was filed on May 2, 1964 (more than 11 years ago) but trial on the merits
has not even started;
(b) after the defendants Castaedas had filed their answer with a counterclaim, the plaintiffs
Agos filed a supplemental complaint where they impleaded new parties-defendants;
(c) after the admission of the supplemental complaint, the Agos filed a motion to admit an
amended supplemental complaint, which impleads an additional new party-defendant (no
action has yet been taken on this motion);
(d) the defendants have not filed an answer to the admitted supplemental complaint; and
(e) the last order of the Court of First Instance, dated April 20, 1974, grants an extension to
the suspension of time to file answer. (Expediente, p. 815)
We also find that the alleged causes of action in the complaint, supplemental complaint and
amended supplemental complaint are all untenable, for the reasons hereunder stated. The
Complaint
Upon the first cause of action, it is alleged that the sheriff levied upon conjugal properties of
the spouses Ago despite the fact that the judgment to be satisfied was personal only to
Pastor Ago, and the business venture that he entered into, which resulted in the replevin
suit, did not redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The issue here, which is
whether or not the wife's inchoate share in the conjugal property is leviable, is the same
issue that we have already resolved, as barred by laches, in striking down the decision of
the Court of Appeals granting preliminary injunction, the dispositive portion of which was
herein-before quoted. This ruling applies as well to the first cause of action of the complaint.
Upon the second cause of action, the Agos allege that on January 5, 1959 the Castaedas
and the sheriff, pursuant to an alias writ of seizure, seized and took possession of certain
machineries, depriving the Agos of the use thereof, to their damage in the sum of P256,000
up to May 5, 1964. This second cause of action fails to state a valid cause of action for it
fails to allege that the order of seizure is invalid or illegal.

It is averred as a third cause of action that the sheriff's sale of the conjugal properties was
irregular, illegal and unlawful because the sheriff did not require the Castaeda spouses to
pay or liquidate the sum of P141,750 (the amount for which they bought the properties at
the auction sale) despite the fact that there was annotated at the back of the certificates of
title a mortgage of P75,000 in favor of the Philippine National Bank; moreover, the sheriff
sold the properties for P141,750 despite the pendency of L-19718 where Pastor Ago
contested the amount of P99,877.08 out of the judgment value of P172,923.37 in civil case
27251; and because of said acts, the Agos suffered P174,877.08 in damages.
Anent this third cause of action, the sheriff was under no obligation to require payment of
the purchase price in the auction sale because "when the purchaser is the judgment
creditor, and no third-party claim has been filed, he need not pay the amount of the bid if it
does not exceed the amount of his judgment." (Sec. 23, Rule 39, Rules of Court)
The annotated mortgage in favor of the PNB is the concern of the vendees Castaedas but
did not affect the sheriff's sale; the cancellation of the annotation is of no moment to the
Agoo.
Case L-19718 where Pastor Ago contested the sum of P99,877.08 out of the amount of the
judgment was dismissed by this Court on January 31, 1966.
This third cause of action, therefore, actually states no valid cause of action and is
moreover barred by prior judgment.
The fourth cause of action pertains to moral damages allegedly suffered by the Agos on
account of the acts complained of in the preceding causes of action. As the fourth cause of
action derives its life from the preceding causes of action, which, as shown, are baseless,
the said fourth cause of action must necessarily fail.
The Counterclaim
As a counterclaim against the Agos, the Castaedas aver that the action was unfounded
and as a consequence of its filing they were compelled to retain the services of counsel for
not less than P7,500; that because the Agos obtained a preliminary injunction enjoining the
transfer of titles and possession of the properties to the Castaedas, they were unlawfully
deprived of the use of the properties from April 17, 1964, the value of such deprived use
being 20% annually of their actual value; and that the filing of the unfounded action
besmirched their feelings, the pecuniary worth of which is for the court to assess.
The Supplemental Complaint
Upon the first cause of action, it is alleged that after the filing of the complaint, the
defendants, taking advantage of the dissolution of the preliminary injunction, in conspiracy

and with gross bad faith and evident intent to cause damage to the plaintiffs, caused the
registration of the sheriff's final deed of sale; that, to cause more damage, the defendants
sold to their lawyer and his wife two of the parcels of land in question; that the purchasers
acquired the properties in bad faith; that the defendants mortgaged the two other parcels to
the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation while the defendants' lawyer and his wife also
mortgaged the parcels bought by them to the Rizal Commercial Bank; and that the bank
also acted in bad faith.
The second cause of action consists of an allegation of additional damages caused by the
defendants' bad faith in entering into the aforesaid agreements and transactions.
The Amended Supplemental Complaint
The amendment made pertains to the first cause of action of the supplemental complaint,
which is, the inclusion of a paragraph averring that, still to cause damage and prejudice to
the plaintiffs, Atty. & Mrs. Juan Quijano, in bad faith sold the two parcels of land they had
previously bought to Eloy Ocampo who acquired them also in bad faith, while Venancio
Castaeda and Nicetas Henson in bad faith sold the two other parcels to Juan Quijano
(60%) and Eloy Ocampo (40%) who acquired them in bad faith and with knowledge that the
properties are the subject of a pending litigation.
Discussion on The Causes of Action
of The Supplemental Complaint And
The Amended Supplemental Complaint
Assuming hypothetically as true the allegations in the first cause of action of the
supplemental complaint and the amended supplemental complaint, the validity of the cause
of action would depend upon the validity of the first cause of action of the original complaint,
for, the Agos would suffer no transgression upon their rights of ownership and possession of
the properties by reason of the agreements subsequently entered into by the Castaedas
and their lawyer if the sheriff's levy and sale are valid. The reverse is also true: if the
sheriff's levy and sale are invalid on the ground that the conjugal properties could not be
levied upon, then the transactions would perhaps prejudice the Agos, but, we have already
indicated that the issue in the first cause of action of the original complaint is barred by
laches, and it must therefore follow that the first cause of action of the supplemental
complaint and the amended supplemental complaint is also barred.
For the same reason, the same holding applies to the remaining cause of action in the
supplemental complaint and the amended supplemental complaint.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Appeals under review is set aside. Civil case
Q-7986 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal is ordered dismissed, without prejudice to the
re-filing of the petitioners' counterclaim in a new and independent action. Treble costs are

assessed against the spouses Pastor Ago and Lourdes Yu Ago, which shall be paid by their
lawyer, Atty. Jose M. Luison. Let a copy of this decision be made a part of the personal file
of Atty. Luison in the custody of the Clerk of Court.
Makasiar, Esguerra, Muoz Palma and Martin, JJ., concur.