Utilitarianism in its true form requires an almost God-like sense of all

consequences of every action we undertakean omniscience entirely

unrealistic in human society. In actuality, it is almost impossible to consider
every impact of a decision throughout the future, or to know for sure what is
best for everyone (mostly strangers to us) who are impacted. We, as fellow
humans, are unaware of all their needs and beliefs. And utility is dependent
upon the situation: for example, if you killed one person for no particular
reason (except that he made you angry, perhaps), it would hurt many more
people than it harmed. But, if you killed one person, say to appease some
force that threatened to decimate the entirety of New York City, perhaps,
then you would be saving millions of lives while sacrificing the one (and
probably negatively impacting their family and friends), and there is greater
societal utility. But this is not an easy system to live undersince rules are
entirely subjective to context, there cannot be rules. Too many different
situations, both feasible and completely silly, would have to be considered in
the making of each rule, for example: murder is wrong, except under cases
x, y, z, etc. In which case, why even follow the rules if there are so many
caveats to each one?
Instead, philosophers like John Stuart Mill and Richard Hare promote an
alternative: quality-of-character utilitarianism. This takes into account the
emotional aspect involved in decision-making that rule-utilitarianism does
not. Rather than prohibiting and allowing options, quality-of-characterutilitarianism dictates that it is really better to not even think of an option
which is harmful or has little utility. In the heat of a decision-making moment
(often clouded by emotions like passion or hatred), no ideal utilitarian
thought is occurringones mind is not on societal impact as all, but what
the actor wants to do. But the strict utilitarian view of actions is distinctly
black-and-white: there is duty, and there is wrongdoingnothing between
the two (with net neutrality). For people do not, as a general rule, devote
every hour of their time to pursuing actions beneficial to the largest part of
societythey also have free time, in which they engage in completely
neutral activities, like reading a book or watching television. Seeking only the
most satisfactory option would require that there is no rest or free timeas
long as there is something an individual can do to benefit society, they
should do itbut a better option, Carruthers offers, is that we just seek a
satisfactory consequence. When faced with helping clean up a river or
resting after a long days work, the most net community benefit comes from
river clean-upbut there is also community benefit from resting, because it
restores ones energy in order to continue being a productive member of
society.
The main alternative Carruthers presents to utilitarianism is contractualism.
This philosophy is ruled by the concept that morality is not innate to an
individual, but rather part of a theoretical contract between rational
individuals in which rules are agreed on to benefit the most members of
societytaking the onus of decision-making off the shoulders of the
individual. This contract is completely imaginary, but the idea is that, in a

theoretical world in which a group of people of reason might gather in a

Congress, without any individual interests according to such differences as
race or sex, and create rules that would benefit society on the whole and
encourage success and happiness. This Congress would, in theory, decide
upon the moral rules to be followed by individuals. It need not necessarily
abandon all individual beliefs, however: as in Thomas Scanlons model, as
long as this theoretical Congress could come to a consensus, it should not
matter that some members care more deeply about the environment than
the economy and vice versa. They should be able to find a common ground
and formulate a rule that is beneficial to both groups.
Some arguments against contractualism remain: for example, that
contractualist rules are too minimal and only allow members of society to
follow a bare minimum, not to go above and beyond and strive for the best
outcome, rather than just a good one. It does not punish callousness
outright. Another argument is that while rational individuals may make the
laws, there are still more rational individuals who must follow them. Though
the theoretical Congress is unaware of any bias, making their laws inherently
fair to all, why should all other rational individuals (who may be aware of
bias) accept fairness as the best option? For surely in a society that is
majority Christian, laws should be made to best facilitate Christian worship
although there is still a segment of the population that may be hurt by
curtailing business hours or mandating Biblical law contrary to their own
deeply-held beliefs. Contractualism is perhaps best compared to a liberal
democracythe rules are made in a plural setting, and thus the majority
rules. But in the process, minority beliefs integral to societal diversity are
overruled, removing cultural variation.
But an important problem with contractualism is its focus on the rational
individual. What is rationality? Are all humans inherently rational? What
about other animals? A Common Raven exhibits far more problem-solving
proficiency than a two-month-old human infant, so why is the infant
considered a rational individual and the raven is not? Is it because the infant
will one day become a rational individual? In that case, but we also respect
the rights of individual gametes, which all have a chance at becoming a
rational individual? Should male masturbation be outlawed because it results
in the fruitless spilling of seed which should have combined with an oocyte to
create a future productive member of society? There are many questions
raised by the concept, some of which are, quite honestly, absurd.
Non-rational agents are not entitled, under Rawlsian contractualism, to moral
rights. This includes animals. But still, it is a general belief of society that
cruelty to animals is wrong, even though they are non-rational by nature. So
how can we ensure that non-rational creatures safety is protected while not
giving them rights of their own? Perhaps a member of the Contractualist
Congress should be appointed to speak on behalf of the animalsbut could
this not lead to a slippery slope in which a member is added to speak for
everything else, like the historic cathedrals, or the birch trees, or
interestingly shaped outcroppings of granite? Or does safety inherently

require any kind of moral protection? Rawls states that morality is inherently
humancreated by humans to dictate the general rules of interaction
between humans, to protect the interests of all humans. Scanlon, however,
simply says that a moral law is a law that no one can reasonably reject. So
wouldnt a law protecting all animals from harm (including slaughter) directly
conflict with and be rejected by those with a distinct interest in consuming
the meat of animals or using their hides as durable textiles (thus not being a
moral law)?
Animals are not necessarily entitled to rights, but they may be entitled to
rights-like protection. This is perhaps most easily seen in the concepts of
keeping animals as pets or legally protecting endangered species.
Endangered species become the property of a government just as pets are
the property of the individual that owns them. These animals become
protected as propertyharming a persons property harms that person, and
therefore is it beneficial to all property owners to have laws against the
harming of any propertybut they do not gain rights of their own. If you are
to kill your neighbours cat, you have not disrespected that cats autonomous
right to life, but you have disrespected the cats owners right to hold
property, just as you would if you took a sledgehammer to the birdbath in
their front garden. More abstractly (and therefore covering animals who do
not fall into either category of pet or legally protected animal), animals may
gain rights-like privilege through their protection under laws created in the
public interest. If the majority of the public agrees that animals are valuable
to themthey are aesthetically pleasing, or comforting, or just so darn cute
they may agree to pass laws protecting these animals, because more
people would be benefitted by animals being alive and not suffering than
would be benefitted by animals being killed or abused without regard.
Similarly, if you torture and kill a feral pigeon in the street, you have not
denied that pigeon the right to live, but have denied all the people on that
street the right to not see animals tortured and killed in front of them.
However, this raises a difficult question: does it then matter if animals are
tortured and killed and no one knows about it except the actor? Not under
the latter rule, because non-public torture is not subject to public interest. So
how can we be sure to protect the lives and safety of animals if not to raise
them to the status of rational individuals?
I have mentioned prior that certain animals exhibit intelligence and reason to
a greater degree than do human infants, or humans in a vegetative state, or
humans in the end stages of dementia, for example. So could we not
promote the interests of rational animals in lieu of those of non-rational
humans? Rawls says no, for the simple reason that we cannot demote the
interests of non-rational humans because these humans are important to
the interests of rational humansthe non-rational infant will one day become
a rational and productive adult, and it is in its parents best interests to
protect it in order to ensure the survival of their own genomes. Every senile
human who can no longer take care of themselves is someones mother,
grandfather, or other beloved family member, and thus it is in those rational

humans interest to protect the non-rational humans lives and rights.

Carruthers also says nofor the simple reason that society cannot be
trusted. The boundaries are blurred between baby and adultdoes a child
become rational at six? When they learn how to use language effectively?
When they understand basic economic concepts?and between rational and
senile (Grandpa still acts like himself, but sometimes he forgets where he is
and must be watched so he doesnt get on the bus and go to his
hometown!). And when a rational human begins the descent into nonrationality (for example, as dementia sets in, or following an accident
causing neurological damage taking away ones faculties of speech), it
becomes easy for rational humans close to them to claim to have the ability
to make decisions for themits what they would have wanted. Perhaps
those humans could further still impose their wills upon other humans who
may be rational, but are unable to be heard in the same way as the imposers
are (they are poor, not well-liked, less famous, etc). We enter a Holocaustlike situation in which it becomes easy for an imposer to say that perhaps the
Jews are not acting like themselves and should be locked up for their own
good, or that they have become harmful to society and should be
exterminated.
However, the line between humans and all other species is much more
clearly definedbiologically, there are humans and there are non-humans.
Therefore, it is easier to deny them direct rights. I, for one, see no real
problems with simply giving animals rights-like protections as a matter of
public interest or property protection. No matter how rational an animal may
be, we will never be able to know, as we cannot communicate with them.
The raven may be able to solve any number of puzzles to receive a reward,
but it can never tell us what it needs to thrivewe can only assume by
observation that we should protect its habitat, so that it may nest and hunt
and survive. Until inter-species communication becomes feasible, we really
cannot allow animals to make their own ethical decisionsto allow them into
the Contractualist Congress, if you will. And if we are to afford all animals the
same moral rights as humans, would we not be opening the door to our own
extermination? There are many more animals in the world than people, and
people are arguably the main (if not only, in certain respects) cause of
animal suffering and extinctionwere the animals to form their own
Congress, would it not benefit them to make a law allowing them to hunt and
kill humans to extinction in order to protect their habitats and welfare? And
would it not be right for them to do so, as the majority?