Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Beronilla
11 Feb L 4445, February 28, 1955
Facts:
The defendant-appellants namely, Manuel Beronilla, Policarpio Paculdo,
Filipino Velasco and Jacinto Adriatico file an appeal from the judgment of the
Abra Court of First Instance (CFI), which convicted of murder for the
execution of Arsenio Borjal, the elected mayor of La, Paz, Abra (at the
outbreak of war), which was found to be aiding the enemy.
Borjal moved to Bangued because of death threats was succeeded by
Military Mayor Manuel Beronilla, who was appointed by regimental
commander of the 15th Infantry of the Phil. Army, operating as guerilla unit
in Abra. Simultaneously upon his appointment, Beronilla received a
memorandum which authorized him to appoint a jury of 12 bolo men to try
persons accused of treason, espionage and aiding or supporting the enemy.
Borjal upon return was placed under custody and tried and sentenced to
death by the jury based on various complaints made by the residents.
Two years thereafter, Beronilla, along with the executioner and jury, were
indicted for the murder of Borjal. Soon after, President Manuel Roxas issued
Executive Proclamation 8, which granted amnesty to persons who committed
acts in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy against persons aiding in
the war efforts of the enemy. The rest of defendants applied and were
granted amnesty, but Beronilla and others were convicted on the grounds
that the crime was made on purely personal motives and that the crime was
committed after the expiration of time limit for amnesty proclamation.
Issue:
Whether or not the defendant-appellants actions are covered by justifying
circumstances for obedience to lawful order of superior?
Held: Yes. The accused acted upon orders of their superior officers, which as
military subordinates, they could not question and obeyed in good faith
without the being aware of its illegality.
The evidence is sufficient to sustain the claim of the defense that arrest,
prosecution and trial of Borjal was done in pursuant to express orders of
superiors. The conduct of the accused also does not show malice on their
part because of the conduct of the trial, defense through counsel given to
People v. Cario
G.R 123325, 31 March 1998, 288 SCRA 404
Facts:
This is an appeal of finding the accused guilty of murder.
Accused, then being armed with an improvised shotgun or sumpak shot
one Rolando B. Sobreo, thereby inflicting upon the latter gunshot wounds
affecting his internal organs such as heart, lung, liver, stomach and part of
intestine, which ultimately caused his death.
Arlene Sobreo testified that she was on her way home when she heard a
shot. As she passed by the store she saw accused-appellant carrying a
sumpak, a homemade shotgun. When she got home, Bernadette Mata, a
neighbor, told Arlene that her husband was shot by accused-appellant.
Arlene rushed to the scene of the incident, which was a short distance from
Nognog store, only to find her husband wounded and lying on the ground
in front of Medy store. While there were people milling around at the crime
scene, she was unable to recognize them as she was thinking of her
husband. Roberto Maxwell testified that he was able to positively identify
accused-appellant as the one who shot the victim as Roberto had been
seeing accused-appellant at the public market.
Accused-appellant maintains that granting arguendo that Roberto Maxwells
testimony was credible, it could not support a conviction for murder since the
elements of treachery were not proven. In his defense, while accusedappellant expressly admits having killed Rolando Sobreo, he interposes a
combination of accident and what appears to be self-defense.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused-appellant acted in self-defense.
Held:
Where an accused admits killing the victim but invokes self-defense, it is
incumbent upon him to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he acted
in self-defense; and as the burden of the evidence is thus shifted to him, he
must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of
that of the prosecution for, even if the latter were weak, it could not be
disbelieved after the accuseds open admission of responsibility for the
killing.
concerned, homicide has already been established. The fact of death and its
cause were established by his admissions coupled with the other prosecution
evidence including the Certificate of Death, the Certificate of Post-Mortem
Examination and the Medico-Legal Findings. The intent to kill is likewise
presumed from the fact of death.
The only pieces of evidence in support of the plea of voluntary surrender
made by petitioner are statements made by two (2) prosecution witnesses
that they were allegedly told by other people that he had already gone to the
police station. There is no showing that he was not actually arrested; or that
when he went to the police station, he surrendered himself to a person in
authority. Neither is there any finding that he has evinced a desire to own to
any complicity in the killing.
Thus, he could not be deemed to have voluntarily surrendered. In the
absence of sufficient and convincing proof showing the existence of
indispensable circumstances, we cannot appreciate voluntary surrender to
mitigate petitioners penalty. Petition is DENIED.
Ulep v. People
G.R 132547, September 20, 2000
Facts:
On Dec 22 1995, Buenaventura Wapili appeared to have gone crazy and kept
on running without any particular direction.
SPO1 Ulep, together with Espadera and Pillo, arrived at the scene armed with
M-16 rifles and saw the naked Wapili approaching them. The police claimed
that Wapili was armed with a bolo and a rattan stool, while Wapilis relatives
and neighbours said he had no bolo, but only a rattan stool. SPO1 Ulep fired
a warning shot in the air and told Wapili to put down his weapons ar they
would shoot him.
When Wapili was only about 2-3 meters away from them, SPO1 Ulep shot the
victim with his M-16 rifle, hitting him in various parts of his body. As the
victim slumped to the ground, SPO1 Ulep came closer and pumped another
bullet into his head and literally blew his brains out.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused should be acquitted on the basis of his claim
that the killing of the victim was in the course of the performance of his
official duty as a police officer, and in self-defense
Held:
It cannot be said that the fatal wound in the head of the victim was a
necessary consequence of accused-appellants due performance of a duty or
the lawful exercise of a right or office. The evidence does not favor his claim
of self-defense. Accused-appellant is found guilty of Homicide, instead of
murder.
The accused must prove the presence of 2 requisites: (1) that he acted in the
performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or an office, and (2)
the injury caused or the offense committed is the necessary consequence of
the due performance of the duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office.
The aggression that was initially begun by the victim already ceased when
accused-appellant attacked him. From that moment, there was no longer any
danger to his life. No treachery, thus the offense is only murder. Victim was
given more than sufficient warning before he was shot.
Assuming arguendo that the victim, Aplacador, did try to stab appellant,
appellant went beyond reasonable necessity in trying to prevent or repel the
assault. The victim was not only disabled by multiple hack wounds; he was in
fact decapitated. The nature and number of wounds inflicted upon the victim
show that appellants intentions went beyond trying to protect his person but
sought to deliver serious harm, thus rendering self-defense unavailing in this
case. Appellants claim of self-defense is dubious. A plea of self-defense
cannot be appreciated where it is not only uncorroborated by independent
and competent evidence but is extremely doubtful by itself.
Prosecution failed to properly prove the qualifying circumstances of
treachery, abuse of superior strength, and evident premeditation. Appellant
could only be declared guilty of homicide.
US v. Laurel
G.R No 7037 22 Phil 252 15, March 1912
Facts:
On the night of December 26, 1909, while Concepcion Lat was walking with
his suitor Exequiel Castillo and several male friends, abruptly Jose Larel
approached and kissed her then ran towards his house. The male
companions tried to run after him but did not overtake him.
The following day December 28 when an entertainment was going on, Laurel
and Castillo gave contradicting stories as to who called who to clarify to
explain what happened two nights ago. Suffice to say, at the ground floor
where Laurel and Castillo spoke at the distance from the others, suddenly
Castillo struck Laurel with his cane twice prompting the other to stab him
with a penknife. Castillo contended that after asking him to explain for his
actions against Lat, Laurel stabbed him and he was forced to defend himself.
Castillo managed to go to a nearby drugstore to have his wounds tended as
he suffered serious injuries. Court of First Instance found Laurel and his
companions guilty of frustrated murder.
Issue:
Whether or not Laurel and his co-defendants are guilty of a crime against
Castillo
Held:
Judgment reversed. Laurel and his co-defendants are acquitted. The court is
forced to think that the person who would consider himself aggrieved at the
kiss given to Lat is her suitor Castillo and it would appear a reasonable
conclusion that it is Castillo who was offended for the boldness of Laurels
action and would demand an explanation of the offense. The invitation
coming from Castillo and by testimonies of the witnesses, it was Castillo who
provoked and commenced the assault. A person who uses a pocketknife to
seriously wound him on the head with a cane and continues to beat him
employs rational means of self-defense.