4,1 Makati Stock Exchange vs Miguel Campos

Facts:This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking the reversal of the Decision
dated 11 February 1997 and Resolution dated 18 May 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
38455. Petitioners want this Court to affirm the dismissal by the SEC en banc of respondents Petition
in SEC Case No. 02-94-4678 for failure to state a cause of action.On the other hand, respondent insists
on the sufficiency of his Petition and seeks the continuation of the proceedings before the SICD.
Issue:Whether the petitioner failed to state the cause of action
Ruling:A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. A complaint
states a cause of action where it contains three essential elements of a cause of action, namely: (1) the
legal right of the plaintiff, (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant, and (3) the act or omission of
the defendant in violation of said legal right.If these elements are absent, the complaint becomes
vulnerable to dismissal on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. There is no question that the
Petition in SEC Case No. 02-94-4678 asserts a right in favor of respondent, particularly, respondents
alleged right to subscribe to the IPOs of corporations listed in the stock market at their offering prices;
and stipulates the correlative obligation of petitioners to respect respondents right, specifically, by
continuing to allow respondent to subscribe to the IPOs of corporations listed in the stock market at
their offering prices. However, the terms right and obligation in respondents Petition are not magic
words that would automatically lead to the conclusion that such Petition sufficiently states a cause of
action. Right and obligation are legal terms with specific legal meaning. A right is a claim or title to an
interest in anything whatsoever that is enforceable by law.An obligation is defined in the Civil Code as
a juridical necessity to give, to do or not to do.For every right enjoyed by any person, there is a
corresponding obligation on the part of another person to respect such right. Thus, Justice J.B.L. Reyes
offers the definition given by Arias Ramos as a more complete definition:An obligation is a juridical
relation whereby a person (called the creditor) may demand from another (called the debtor) the
observance of a determinative conduct (the giving, doing or not doing), and in case of breach, may
demand satisfaction from the assets of the latter.
The Civil Code enumerates the sources of obligations:
Art. 1157. Obligations arise from:
(1) Law;
(2) Contracts;
(3) Quasi-contracts;
(4) Acts or omissions punished by law; and
(5) Quasi-delicts.
Therefore, an obligation imposed on a person, and the corresponding right granted to another, must be
rooted in at least one of these five sources. The mere assertion of a right and claim of an obligation in
an initiatory pleading, whether a Complaint or Petition, without identifying the basis or source thereof,
is merely a conclusion of fact and law.A pleading should state the ultimate facts essential to the rights
of action or defense asserted, as distinguished from mere conclusions of fact or conclusions of law.

4.2 Cuyugan Vs. Santos

Facts:On April 3, 1895, Guillerma Cuyugan received from Isidoro Santos the sum of P3,500. She
executed in favor of Santos a document which on its face appears to be a venta con pacto de retro [sale
with right of repurchase] of four parcels of land. The yearly rental was fixed at P420. In the year 1897,
two years after the date of the execution of the instrument purporting to be a deed of sale, the nominal
vendor paid the nominal purchaser P1,000, whereupon the nominal rent of the land was reduced from
P120 to P300 per annum, the real purpose and object of this arrangement being to reduce the amount of
the annual interest on the original loan made to the nominal vendor of the land, proportionately to the
reduction of the amount of the loan itself by the payment of P1,000.
Issue:Whether the petitioner can claim venta con pacto de retro [sale with right of repurchase] in the
case at bar?
Ruling:"The acceptance by the defendant of this large sum of money, under the circumstances as they
appear from the complaint, can only be accounted for on one or two hypotheses. Either the original
transaction was in truth and in fact an arrangement or agreement by virtue of which a loan of money
was made and secured by a formal deed of sale of land with a reserved right of repurchase; or, if the
original transaction was in truth and in fact one of purchase and sale of real estate, with a reserved right
of repurchase in the vendor, then the purchaser, by the acceptance from the vendor of the sum of
P1,000, waived and surrendered his rights under the original contract, and entered into a new contract
with the vendor, under which he obligated himself to cancel the deed, or resell the land to the original
vendor on the payment of the balance of the original purchase price, and bound himself not to exercise
his right, under the original deed of sale, to refuse to allow the original vendor to repurchase after the
expiration of the period stipulated in the original contract for that purpose."Upon either hypothesis,
plaintiff would clearly be entitled to the relief prayed for in his complaint. Of course the defendant is
not entitled to keep both the land and the payment of a thousand pesos. The acceptance and retention of
such a payment is wholly inconsistent with a claim of a right of absolute ownership in the land, without
any obligation to resell it to the original vendor. Defendant can not eat his cake and have it too

4.3 ARTURO PELAYO,plaintiff-appellant vs. MARCELO LAURON, ET AL.,defendants-appellees

Facts:Arturo Pelayo, a physician residing in Cebu, filed a complaint against Marcelo Lauron and Juana
Abella the plaintiff was called to the house of the defendants, situated in San Nicolas, and that upon
arrival he was requested by them to render medical assistance to their daughter-in-law who was about
to give birth to a child; that therefore, and after consultation with the attending physician, Dr. Escao, it
was found necessary, on account of the difficult birth, to remove the fetus by means of forceps which
operation was performed by the plaintiff, who also had to remove the afterbirth, in which services he
was occupied until the following morning, and that afterwards, on the same day, he visited the patient
several times; that the just and equitable value of the services rendered by him was P500, which the
defendants refuse to pay without alleging any good reason therefor.
Issue:Whether the respondent is bound to pay the service fee of the petitioner
Ruling:Assuming that it is a real fact of knowledge by the defendants that the plaintiff, by virtue of
having been sent for by the former, attended a physician and rendered professional services to a
daughter-in-law of the said defendants during a difficult and laborious childbirth, in order to decide the
claim of the said physician regarding the recovery of his fees, it becomes necessary to decide who is
bound to pay the bill, whether the father and mother-in-law of the patient, or the husband of the latter.
According to article 1089 of the Civil Code, obligations are created by law, by contracts, by quasicontracts, and by illicit acts and omissions or by those in which any kind of fault or negligence occurs.
Obligations arising from law are not presumed. Those expressly determined in the code or in special
laws, etc., are the only demandable ones. Obligations arising from contracts have legal force between
the contracting parties and must be fulfilled in accordance with their stipulations. (Arts. 1090 and
1091.)
The rendering of medical assistance in case of illness is comprised among the mutual obligations to
which the spouses are bound by way of mutual support. (Arts. 142 and 143.)
If every obligation consists in giving, doing or not doing something (art. 1088), and spouses are
mutually bound to support each other, there can be no question but that, when either of them by reason
of illness should be in need of medical assistance, the other is under the unavoidable obligation to
furnish the necessary services of a physician in order that health may be restored, and he or she may be
freed from the sickness by which life is jeopardized; the party bound to furnish such support is
therefore liable for all expenses, including the fees of the medical expert for his professional services.
This liability originates from the above-cited mutual obligation which the law has expressly established
between the married couple.

4.4 LORENZO M. TAADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS

FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI],petitioners,
vs. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN
VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA
CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacaang Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his
capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.
Facts:Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in
Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution,as well as the principle that laws to be valid
and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated,
petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the
publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.
Issue:Whether the publication in Official Gazette is a demandable right
Ruling:Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no
less than the fundamental law of the land .The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public
nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide
for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or the people, such as
tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to
particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published
on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned.It is needless to add that the
publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement
of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially
and specifically informed of its contents.