ATTY. EDITA NOE-LACSAMANA vs. ATTY. YOLANDO F.

ATTY. YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE BUSMENTE

A.C. No. 7269. November 23, 2011
Facts:

Noe-Lacsamana was the counsel for Irene Bides, the

plaintiff in a Civil Case before the RTC of Pasig City,
while Busmente was the counsel for the defendant
Imelda B. Ulaso (Ulaso).

Noe-Lacsamana alleged that Ulaso's deed of sale

over the property was annulled, which resulted in
the filing of an ejectment case, Civil Case 9284, where
Busmente appeared as counsel.

Another case for falsification was led against Ulaso

where Busmente also appeared as counsel. NoeLacsamana alleged that Atty. Elizabeth Dela Rosa or
Atty. Liza Dela Rosa (Dela Rosa) would accompany
Ulaso in court, projecting herself as Busmente's
collaborating counsel.

Dela Rosa signed the minutes of the court

proceedings in the civil case nine times from 25
November 2003 to 8 February 2005.

Upon verification with this Court and the Integrated

Bar of the Philippines, Noe-Lacsamana discovered that
Dela Rosa was not a lawyer.

Busmentes contention:

Dela Rosa, a law graduate, was his paralegal

assistant for a few years

Dela Rosa's employment with him ended in 2000

but Dela Rosa was able to continue
misrepresenting herself as a lawyer with the help
of Regine Macasieb (Macasieb), Busmente's former
secretary.

Busmente did not represent Ulaso in Civil Case

No. 9284 and that his signature in the Answer
presented as proof by Noe-Lacsamana was forged.
Issue:
Whether Busmente is guilty of directly or indirectly
assisting Dela Rosa in her illegal practice of law that
warrants his suspension from the practice of law.
Ruling:
Canon 9. A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist
in the unauthorized practice of law.

The term "practice of law" implies customarily or

habitually holding oneself out to the public as a
lawyer for compensation as a source of livelihood or
in consideration of his services (identifying oneself as
attorney, appearing in court in representation of a
client, or associating oneself as a partner of a law
office for the general practice of law)

Public policy requires that the practice of law be

limited to those individuals found duly qualified in
education and character. The purpose is to protect
the public, the court, the client, and the bar from
the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed
to practice law

The law makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject

to disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the
unauthorized practice of law

Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa's employment in

ended in 2000 and that Dela Rosa was able to
continue with her illegal practice of law through
connivance with Macasieb. Busmente claimed that
Macasieb resigned from his office in 2003. Yet, Dela
Rosa continued to represent Ulaso until 2005.
Pleadings and court notices were still sent to
Busmente's office until 2005. The IBP-CBD noted that
Dela Rosa's practice should have ended in 2003
when Macasieb left. We agree. It would have been
impossible for Dela Rosa to continue representing
Ulaso in the case, considering Busmente's claim that
Macasieb already resigned, if Dela Rosa had no
access to the files in Busmente's office.

Busmente, in his motion for reconsideration, submitted

a copy of the NBI report stating that the signature
on the Answer submitted in Civil Case No. 9284 and
the specimen signatures submitted by Busmente
were not written by one and the same person. The
IBP-CBD report, however, showed that there were
other documents signed by Busmente, including the
Pre-Trial Brief and Motion to Lift Order of Default.
Noe-Lacsamana also submitted a letters all signed by
Busmente. Busmente failed to impugn his signatures
in these other documents.

Busmente claimed that he was totally unaware of

Civil Case No. 9284. His allegation contradicted the
Joint Counter-Affidavit submitted by Ulaso and Eddie
B. Bides:

a.

That our legal counsel is Atty. YOLANDO F.

BUSMENTE XXX
g. XXX; we just presumed that she has legal
qualifications to represent us in our cases
because Atty. YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE represent us
in our cases because Atty. YOLANDO F.
BUSMENTE allowed her to accompany us and
attend our hearings in short, she gave allowed
her to accompany us and attend our hearings in
short, she gave us paralegal assistance
we SUSPEND SUSPEND Atty. Yolando F. Busmente from
the practice of law for SIX MONTHS
NATASHA HUEYSUWAN-FLORIDO vs. ATTY. JAMES
BENEDICT C. FLORIDO BENEDICT C. FLORIDO
A.C. No. 5624. January 20, 2004

Facts:

INatasha V. Hueysuwan-Florido averred that she is

the legitimate spouse of respondent Atty. James
Benedict C. Florido, but that they are estranged and
living separately from each other

They have two children namely, Kamille Nicole H.

Florido, five years old, and James Benedict H.
Florido, Jr., three years old both of whom are in
complainant's custody.

Complainant filed a case for the annulment of her

marriage with respondent

Sometime in the middle of December 2001,

respondent went to complainant's residence and
demanded the surrender of the custody of their two
minor children. He showed complainant a photocopy
of an alleged Resolution issued by the Court of
Appeals which supposedly granted his motion for
temporary child custody.

Complainant called up her lawyer but the latter

informed her that he had not received any motion
for temporary child custody filed by respondent.

Complainant asked respondent for the original copy

of the alleged resolution of the Court of Appeals, but
respondent failed to give it to her. Complainant then
examined the resolution closely and noted that it
bore two dates: November 12, 2001 and November
29, 2001. Sensing something amiss, she refused to
give custody of their children to respondent.

In January 15, 2002, while complainant was with her

children in the ABC Learning Center respondent,
accompanied by armed men, suddenly arrived and
demanded that she surrender to him the custody of
their children. He threatened to forcefully take them
away with the help of his companions, whom he
claimed to be agents of the National Bureau of
Investigation.

Alarmed, complainant immediately sought the

assistance of the Tanjay City Police. The responding
policemen subsequently escorted her to the police
station where the matter could be clarified and
settled peacefully.

At the police station, respondent caused to be

entered in the Police Blotter a statement that he,
assisted by agents of the NBI, formally served on
complainant the appellate court's resolution/order.

In order to diffuse the tension, complainant agreed to

allow the children to sleep with respondent for one
night on condition that he would not take them away
from Tanjay City.

The next day, complainant received information that a

van arrived at the hotel where respondent and the
children were staying to take them to Bacolod City.
Complainant rushed to the hotel and took the
children to another room, where they stayed.

On the same day, respondent filed with the Regional

Trial Court of Dumaguete City, Branch 31, a verified
petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus
asserting his right to custody of the children on the
basis of the alleged Court of Appeals' Resolution.

In the meantime, complainant verified the authenticity

of the Resolution and obtained a certification from
the Court of Appeals stating that no such resolution
ordering complainant to surrender custody of their
children to respondent had been issued.

At the hearing of the petition for habeas corpus on

January 23, 2002, respondent did not appear.
Consequently, the petition was dismissed.

complainant filed the instant complaint alleging that

respondent violated his attorney's oath by
manufacturing, flaunting and using a spurious Court
of Appeals' Resolution in and outside a court of law.
Furthermore, respondent abused and misused the
privilege granted to him by the Supreme Court to
practice law in the country. After respondent

answered the complaint, the matter was referred to

the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline for investigation,
report and recommendation
Issue:
whether or not the respondent can be held
administratively liable for his reliance on and attempt to
enforce a spurious Resolution of the Court of Appeals
Ruling:

Respondent claims that he acted in good faith in

invoking the Court of Appeals Resolution which he
honestly believed to be authentic. This, however, is
belied by the fact that he used and presented the
spurious Resolution two times:
first, in his Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas
Corpus docketed as Special Proc. Case No. 3898, 7
which he filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Dumaguete City;
Second, when he sought the assistance of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) of Tanjay City to
recover custody of his minor children from
complainant. Since it was respondent who used the
spurious Resolution, he is presumed to have
participated in its fabrication.

Candor and fairness are demanded of every lawyer.

(CANON 10 of the CPR)

Moreover, the records show that respondent used

offensive language in his pleadings in describing
complainant and her relative. A lawyer's language
should be forceful but dignified, emphatic but
respectful as befitting an advocate and in keeping
with the dignity of the legal profession

Respondent's actions erode the public perception of

the legal profession. They constitute gross misconduct
and the sanctions for such malfeasance is prescribed
by Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
(Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme
Court, grounds therefor)

Atty. James Benedict C. Florido is SUSPENDED from

the practice of law for a period of two (2) years.
RODRIGO E. TAPAY & ANTHONY J. RUSTIA vs . ATTY.
CHARLIE L. BANCOLO & ATTY. JANUS T. JARDER
A.C. No. 9604. March 20, 2013
Facts:

Sometime in 2004, Tapay and Rustia received an

Order from the Ombudsman (Visayas) requiring them
to file a counter-affidavit to a complaint for
usurpation of authority, falsification of public
document, and graft and corrupt practices filed by
Nehimias Divinagracia, Jr. (Divinagracia), a
coemployee in the Sugar Regulatory Administration.

The Complaint was allegedly signed on behalf of

Divinagracia by Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo of the Jarder
Bancolo Law Office

When Atty. Bancolo and Rustia accidentally met, the

latter informed Atty. Bancolo of the case against
them. Atty. Bancolo denied that he represented
Divinagracia since he had yet to meet Divinagracia
in person.

When Rustia showed him the Complaint, Atty.

Bancolo declared that the signature appearing above
his name as counsel for Divinagracia was not his.

Atty. Bancolo signed an affidavit denying his supposed

signature appearing on the Complaint and submitted
six specimen signatures for comparison.

Using Atty. Bancolo's affidavit and other documentary

evidence, Tapay and Rustia filed a counter-affidavit
accusing Divinagracia of falsifying the signature of
his alleged counsel, Atty. Bancolo.

In a Resolution, the Ombudsman provisionally

dismissed the complaint since the falsification of the
counsel's signature posed a prejudicial question to the
Complaint's validity.

The Ombudsman ordered that separate cases for

Falsification of Public Document and Dishonesty 3 be
filed against Divinagracia, with Rustia and Atty.
Bancolo as complainants.

Thereafter, Divinagracia filed his Counter-Affidavit

denying that he falsified the signature of Atty.
Bancolo. Divinagracia presented as evidence an
affidavit by Richard A. Cordero, the legal assistant of
Atty. Bancolo, that the Jarder Bancolo Law Office
accepted Divinagracia's case and that the Complaint
filed with the Ombudsman was signed by the office
secretary per Atty. Bancolo's instructions.

Divinagracia asked that the Ombudsman dismiss the

cases for falsification of public document and

dishonesty filed against him by Rustia and Atty.

Bancolo and to revive the original Complaint for
various offenses that he filed against Tapay and
Rustia.
In a Resolution, the Ombudsman dismissed the
criminal case for falsification of public document and
the administrative case for dishonesty for insufficiency
of evidence
Tapay and Rustia filed with the IBP a complaint to
disbar Atty. Bancolo and Atty. Jarder, Atty. Bancolo's
law partner for being subjected to a harassment
Complaint filed before the Ombudsman with the
forged signature of Atty. Bancolo
Complainants stated further that the signature of Atty.
Bancolo in the Complaint was not the only one that
was forged. Complainants attached a Report by the
Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory which
examined three other letter-complaints signed by Atty.
Bancolo for other clients. They further alleged that
Mary Jane Gentugao, the secretary of the Jarder
Bancolo Law Office, forged the signature of Atty.
Bancolo
Respondents contentions:
o
Respondents admitted that the criminal and
administrative cases led by Divinagracia
against complainants before the Ombudsman
were accepted by the Jarder Bancolo Law
Office.
o
Atty. Bancolo alleged that after being
informed of the assignment of the cases, he
ordered his staff to prepare and draft all the
necessary pleadings and documents.
However, due to some minor lapses, Atty.
Bancolo permitted that the pleadings and
communications be signed in his name by
the secretary of the law office

Issue:
Whether or not the respondents violated the CPR
Ruling:

Atty. Bancolo admitted that the Complaint he filed

for a former client before the Office of the
Ombudsman was signed in his name by a secretary
of his law office. Clearly, this is a violation of Rule
9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility

Rule 9.01 A lawyer shall not delegate to any

unqualied person the performance of any task which
by law may only be performed by a member of the
Bar in good standing.

The preparation and signing of a pleading constitute

legal work involving the practice of law which is
reserved exclusively for members of the legal
profession. Atty. Bancolo's authority and duty to sign
a pleading are personal to him. Although he may
delegate the signing of a pleading to another lawyer,
he may not delegate it to a non-lawyer.

Further, under the Rules of Court, counsel's signature

serves as a certification that (1) he has read the
pleading; (2) to the best of his knowledge,
information and belief there is good ground to
support it; and (3) it is not interposed for delay.

In the Answer, Atty. Bancolo categorically stated that

because of some minor lapses, the communications
and pleadings filed against Tapay and Rustia were
signed by his secretary. Undoubtedly, Atty. Bancolo
violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by
allowing a non-lawyer to affix his signature to a
pleading.

Atty. Bancolo wants us to believe that he was a

victim of circumstances or of manipulated events
because of his unconditional trust and confidence in
his former law partner, Atty. Jarder.

Atty. Bancolo had an opportunity to maintain his

innocence when he led with the IBP his Joint Answer
(with Atty. Jarder). Atty. Bancolo, however, admitted
that prior to the preparation of the Joint Answer,
Atty. Jarder threatened to file a disbarment case
against him if he did not cooperate. Thus, he was
constrained to allow Atty. Jarder to prepare the Joint
Answer. Atty. Bancolo simply signed the verification
without seeing the contents of the Joint Answer.

The complainants did not present any evidence that

Atty. Jarder was directly involved, had knowledge of,
or even participated in the wrongful practice of Atty.
Bancolo in allowing or tolerating his secretary to sign
pleadings for him. Thus, we agree with the nding of
the IBP Board that Atty. Jarder is not administratively
liable.

We DISMISS the complaint against Atty. Janus T. Jarder

for lack of merit. We SUSPEND Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo
from the practice of law for 1 year

respondents' title is being questioned in another

case.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and
denied its motion for reconsideration
Petitioner once again seeks this Court's intervention
reiterating in essence the same line of arguments
espoused in their petition before the respondent Court
of Appeals

ETERNAL GARDENS MEMORIAL PARK CORPORATION,

vs COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. LILIA SEVILLA and
JOSE SEELIN
G.R. No. 123698. August 5, 1998

Facts

on May 18, 1981 private respondent-spouses Jose

Seelin and Lilia Sevilla Seelin filed a complaint against
Central Dyeing & Finishing Corporation (Central
Dyeing for brevity) for quieting of title and for
declaration of nullity of Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT No. 205942) issued in the name of said
corporation

The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the

spouses which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals

Subsequently, private respondents filed an Urgent

Manifestation and Motion for an Immediate Writ of
Possession/Break Open Order. The motion was opposed
by herein petitioner Eternal Gardens Memorial Park
Corporation contending that it is not submitting to
the jurisdiction of the trial court; that it is
completely unaware of the suit between private
respondents and Central Dyeing; that it is the true
and registered owner of the lot having bought the
same from Central Dyeing; and that it was a buyer
in good faith.

The trial court granted private respondents' motion.

Another Order was issued by the trial court holding
that the judgment was binding on petitioner (Eternal
Gardens), being the successor-in-interest of defendant
Central Dyeing

Petitioner went to the Court of Appeals in a petition

for certiorari. The Court of Appeals rendered judgment
dismissing the petition and further denied its motion for
reconsideration

On further appeal to this Court, petitioner's petition

for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 109076,
was denied in a resolution. Upon finality of said
resolution, this Court issued Entry of Judgment dated
October 21, 1993

Thereafter, private respondents filed another motion

for the issuance of a second writ of execution before
the trial court which was granted in the Order of
July 20, 1994. Not willing to give up, petitioner
sought a reconsideration

Petitioner's motion was initially granted by the trial

court. However, upon motion of private respondents,
the said order was reconsidered and ultimately the
court granted the writ of execution

Desperately needing a favorable judgment, petitioner,

for the second time, filed a petition for certiorari
with the Court of Appeals arguing inter alia: that the
judgment cannot be executed against it because it
was not a party to Civil Case No. C-9297; that the
decision of the trial court in said case never
mandated Central Dyeing to deliver possession of the
property to the private respondents; that certain facts
and circumstances which occurred after the finality of
the judgment will render the execution highly unjust,
illegal and inequitable; that the issuance of the
assailed writ of execution violates the lot buyers'
freedom of religion and worship; and that private

Issue:
Whether or not the contention of the petitioner are correct
and that it should be given favorable judgment?
Ruling:

Once a court renders a final judgment, all the issues

between or among the parties are deemed resolved
and its judicial functions with respect to any matter
related to the controversy litigated come to an end

Placing private respondents in possession of the land

in question is the necessary and logical effect or
consequence of the decision declaring them as the
rightful owners of the property. As correctly argued
by the private respondents, they do not have to
institute another action for the purpose of taking
possession of the subject realty.

The pendency of Civil Case No. C-11337 for

annulment of titles filed by the Republic against
private respondents will not justify the suspension of
the execution of the judgment in Civil Case No. C9297. This is so because the petitioner's title which
originated from Central Dyeing (TCT No. 205942) was
already annulled in the judgment sought to be
executed, and which judgment had long been
affirmed by the Court of Appeals and by this Court.
Thus, even if the trial court will nullify the said
private respondents' title in Civil Case No. C-11337,
as argued by petitioner, the supposed adverse
decision cannot validate TCT No. 205942 and make
petitioner the rightful owner of the subject land.
Clearly, the present petition was instituted merely to
delay the execution of the judgment.

Be that as it may, the petition has been rendered

moot and academic in view of the fact that the
questioned Alias Writ of Possession and Alias Writ of
Execution have already been implemented by the
Sheriff as shown by the "Sheriff's Return," dated March
31, 1995, with the attached "Turn Over Premises"
indicating therein that private respondents took
possession of the subject property

A note of caution. This case has again delayed the

execution of a final judgment for seventeen (17)
years to the prejudice of the private respondent

We note that while lawyers owe entire devotion

to the interest of their clients and zeal in the
defense of their client's right, they should not
forget that they are officers of the court,
bound to exert every effort to assist in the
speedy and efficient administration of justice.
They should not, therefore, misuse the rules of
procedure to defeat the ends of justice or
unduly delay a case, impede the execution of
a judgment or misuse court processes

the petition is hereby DENIED