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G.R. No.

127165

May 2, 2006

SALONGA HERNANDEZ & ALLADO, Petitioner,


vs.
OLIVIA
SENGCO
PASCUAL
and
THE
HONORABLE
COURT
OF
APPEALS, Respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Petitioner, a professional law partnership, brings
forth this Petition for Review assailing the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 22
December 1995. The appellate court had affirmed
two orders promulgated by the Malabon Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 72 (Probate Court), in
Sp. Proc. No. 136-MN, entitled "In the Matter of
Testate Estate of Doa Adela Pascual, Dr. Olivia S.
Pascual, Executrix."
The case actually centers on two estate
proceedings, that of Doa Adela Pascual (Doa
Adela) and the other, her husband Don Andres
Pascual's (Don Andres), who predeceased her.
Don Andres died intestate, while Doa Adela left
behind a last will and testament. The dispute over
the intestate estate of Don Andres has spawned
at least two cases already settled by this Court.2
On 1 December 1973, an intestate proceeding for
the settlement of the estate of Don Andres was
commenced by his widow Doa Adela before the
then Court of First Instance, now Regional Trial
Court of Pasig, Branch 23 (Intestate Court),
docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 7554. Apart from his
wife, who bore him no children, Don Andres was
survived by several nephews and nieces from his
full-blood
and
half-blood
brothers.3 This
proceeding proved to be the source of many
controversies, owing to the attempts of siblings
Olivia and Hermes Pascual, acknowledged natural
children of Don Andres's brother, Eligio, to be
recognized as heirs of Don Andres. Olivia and
Hermes Pascual procured the initial support of
Doa Adela to their claims. However, on 16
October 1985, the other heirs of Don Andres
entered into a Compromise Agreement over the
objections of Olivia and Hermes Pascual, whereby
three-fourths (3/4) of the estate would go to Doa
Adela and one-fourth (1/4) to the other heirs of
Don Andres, without prejudice to the final
determination
by
the
court
or
another
compromise agreement as regards the claims of
Olivia and Hermes Pascual.4 Subsequently, the
Intestate Court denied the claims of Olivia and
Hermes Pascual. Said denial was eventually
affirmed by this Court in 1992 in Pascual v.
Pascual-Bautista,5 applying Article 992 of the Civil
Code.

In the meantime, Doa Adela died on 18 August


1987, leaving behind a last will and testament
executed in 1978, designating Olivia Pascual as
the executrix, as well as the principal beneficiary
of her estate. The will also bequeathed several
legacies and devises to several individuals and
institutions.
Olivia Pascual then engaged the services of
petitioner in connection with the settlement of
the estate of Doa Adela. Their agreement as to
the professional fees due to petitioner is
contained in a letter dated 25 August 1987,
signed by Atty. Esteban Salonga in behalf of
petitioner and Olivia Pascual. It is stipulated
therein, among others, that the final professional
fee "shall be 3% of the total gross estate as well
as the fruits thereof based on the court approved
inventory of the estate. Fruits shall be reckoned
from the time of [Olivia Pascual's] appointment as
executrix of the estate. The 3% final fee shall be
payable upon approval by the court of the
agreement for the distribution of the properties to
the court designated heirs of the estate."6
On 26 August 1987, private respondent,
represented by petitioner, commenced a petition
for the probate of the last will and testament of
Doa Adela before the Probate Court, docketed as
Sp. Proc. No. 136-MN and raffled to Branch 72
presided by Judge Benjamin M. Aquino, Jr. The
petition was opposed by a certain Miguel Cornejo,
Jr. and his siblings, who in turn presented a
purported will executed in 1985 by Doa Adela in
their favor. 7
After due trial, on 1 July 1993, the Probate Court
rendered a Decision8 allowing probate of the 1978
Last Will and Testament of Doa Adela and
disallowing the purported 1985 Will. Letters
testamentary
were
issued
to
Olivia
9
Pascual. Cornejo attempted to appeal this
decision of the Probate Court, but his notice of
appeal was denied due course by the Probate
Court, said notice "not having been accompanied
by any record on appeal as required under the
Interim Rules and by Rule 109 of the Rules of
Court."10
On 27 July 1993, petitioner filed a Notice of
Attorney's Lien equivalent to three percent (3%)
of the total gross estate of the late Doa Adela S.
Pascual as well as the fruits thereof based on the
court approved inventory of the estate, pursuant
to the retainer agreement signed by and between
petitioner and Olivia S. Pascual, on 25 August
1987. In an Order dated 4 November 1993, the
Probate Court ruled that petitioner's "notice of
attorney's lien, being fully supported by a
retainer's contract not repudiated nor questioned
by his client Olivia S. Pascual, is hereby noted as

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Page 1

a lien that must be satisfied chargeable to the


share of Olivia S. Pascual."11 This was followed by
another Order, dated 11 November 1993, wherein
it was directed "that notice be x x x given,
requiring all persons having claims for money
against the decedent, Doa Adela S. Vda. de
Pascual, arising from contracts, express or
implied, whether the same be due, not due, or
contingent, for funeral expenses and expenses of
the last sickness of the said decedent, and
judgment for money against her, to file said
claims with the Clerk of Court at Malabon, Metro
Manila, within six (6) months from November 4,
1993."12
Accordingly, on 22 November 1993, petitioner
filed a Motion to Annotate Attorney's Lien on
Properties of the Estate of Doa Adela Vda. de
Pascual.13
It was at this stage, on 19 January 1994, that the
Intestate Court rendered a Decision in Sp. Proc.
No. 7554, finally giving judicial approval to the
aforementioned 1985 Compromise Agreement,
and partitioning the estate of Don Andres by
adjudicating one-fourth (1/4) thereof to the heirs
of Don Andres and three-fourths (3/4) thereof to
the estate of Doa Adela. The Intestate Court also
awarded attorney's fees to Atty. Jesus I. Santos,
equivalent to 15% of the three-fourths (3/4) share
of the estate of Doa Adela.14 Olivia Pascual filed
a petition for annulment of the award of
attorney's fees with the Court of Appeals, but the
same was denied, first by the appellate court,
then finally by this Court in its 1998 decision
in Pascual v. Court of Appeals.15
On 26 April 1994, petitioner filed a Motion for Writ
of Execution for the partial execution of
petitioner's
attorney's
lien
estimated
at P1,198,097.02. The figure, characterized as
"tentative," was arrived at based on a Motion to
Submit Project Partition dated 26 October 1993
filed by Olivia Pascual, which alleged the gross
appraised value of Doa Adela's estate
at P39,936,567.19. This sum was in turn derived
from the alleged value of the total estate of Don
Andres, three-fourths (3/4) of which had been
adjudicated to Doa Adela. At the same time,
petitioner noted that the stated values must be
considered as only provisional, considering that
they were based on a July 1988 appraisal report;
thus, the claim for execution was, according to
petitioner, without prejudice to an updated
appraisal of the properties comprising the gross
estate of Doa Adela.16
On 29 April 1994, Olivia Pascual, through Atty.
Antonio Ravelo, filed her comment and/or
opposition to the motion for the issuance of a writ
of execution on attorney's fees. She argued that a
lawyer of an administrator or executor should

charge the individual client, not the estate, for


professional fees. Olivia Pascual also claimed,
citing jurisprudence17, that the counsel claiming
attorney's fees should give sufficient notice to all
interested parties to the estate, and that such
was not accomplished by petitioner considering
that no notices were given to the several legatees
designated in Doa Adela's will.18 It was further
argued that the motion for execution was
premature, considering that the proceedings
before the Intestate Court had not yet been
terminated; that the computation of the figure
of P1,198,097.02 was erroneous; and that the
enforcement of the writ of execution on the
undivided estate of Don Andres would prejudice
his other heirs entitled to one-fourth (1/4) thereof.
On 2 June 1994, the Probate Court issued the first
assailed order denying the motion for writ of
execution in view of the fact that "the bulk of the
estate of the late Doa Adela S. Vda. De Pascual
is still tied-up with the estate of the late Don
Andres Pascual, the proceedings over which and
the final disposition thereof with respect to the
partition and segregation of what is to form part
of the estate of the late Doa Adela S. Vda. De
Pascual is pending with another court sitting in
Pasig, Metro Manila, and for having been
prematurely filed."19
On 14 November 1994, Olivia Pascual, filed with
the Probate Court a Motion to Declare General
Default
and
Distribution
of
Testamentary
Dispositions with Cancellation of Administrator's
Bond. It was noted therein that no creditor had
filed a claim against the estate of Doa Adela
despite due notice published pursuant to Section
1, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. The Probate
Court was also informed of the fact that the
proceedings before the Intestate Court had
already been terminated by reason of the 14
January 1994 Decision rendered by the latter
court. It was also stated "that the corresponding
estate taxes had been paid as evidenced by the
Estate Tax Return filed with the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, and of the Certificate of Authority
issued by the said agency."20Interestingly, it was
also manifested that two of the properties that
formed part of the estates of the spouses, "the
Ongpin Property" and "the Valenzuela Property,"
had in fact already been partitioned between the
estate of Doa Adela and the heirs of Don Andres
at the ratio of three-fourths (3/4) and one-fourth
(1/4), respectively.
In
response,
petitioner
filed
a
Comment/Manifestation praying that an order be
issued:
(1) ordering the annotation of the
attorney's
lien
on
the
properties

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Page 2

comprising the estate of Doa Adela


Pascual;
(2) a writ of partial execution be issued for
the satisfaction of the attorney's lien of
the
undersigned
counsel
[herein
petitioner] in relation to the Ongpin and
Valenzuela properties for the amount
of P635,368.14,without prejudice to the
issuance of a writ of execution after the reappraisal of the present market value of
the estate and the determination of the
amount due to [petitioner] as attorney's
fees;
(3) ordering the appointment of a
reputable appraisal company to reappraise the present market value of the
estate of Doa Adela Pascual including the
fruits thereof for the purpose of
determining the value of the attorney's
fees of [petitioner]; and
(4) after the re-appraisal of the estate of
Doa Adela Pascual a writ of execution be
issued for the full satisfaction and
settlement of the attorney's lien of
[petitioner].21
On 17 March 1995, the Probate Court issued an
order which denied petitioner's motion for a reappraisal of the property and the issuance of a
partial writ of execution "for being prematurely
filed as there is no exact estate yet to be
inventoried and re-appraised, assuming reappraisal would be proper, because the bulk of
the estate subject of this case, as far as this court
is concerned, has not yet been turned over to the
executrix or to the court itself."22
Through a petition for certiorari and mandamus,
petitioner assailed the two orders of the Probate
Court denying its motion for the immediate
execution, partial or otherwise, of its claim for
attorney's fees: the 2 June 1994 Order and the 17
March 1995 Order. Nonetheless, the twin orders
of the RTC were affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
effectively precluding petitioner's attempt to
execute on its attorney's lien. The appellate court
noted that the attorney's lien issued by the
Probate Court was chargeable only to the share of
Olivia Pascual, and not to the estate of Doa
Adela, since it was Olivia Pascual who entered
into the agreement with petitioner for the
payment of attorney's fees in connection with the
settlement of the estate of Doa Adela.
Citing Lacson v. Reyes,23 the Court of Appeals
asserted that as a rule an administrator or
executor may be allowed fees for the necessary
expenses he has incurred but he may not recover
attorney's fees from the estate.

The Court of Appeals likewise noted that in the


retainer agreement between petitioner and Olivia
Pascual, it is stipulated that "the 3% final fee shall
be payable upon approval by the court of the
agreement for the distribution of the properties to
the court designated heirs of the estate."24 On
this score, the Court of Appeals ruled that as the
petition before it did not show "that an
agreement on the distribution of properties of the
estate of Doa Adela S. Pascual has been
submitted and approved by the probate
court,"25 the filing of the motion for execution and
that of the motion for re-appraisal of the market
value of the estate were both premature.
Petitioner sought to reconsider the Decision of
the Court of Appeals, but in vain.26 Hence this
petition.
Petitioner argues that as held in Occea v.
Marquez,27 the counsel seeking to recover
attorney's fees for legal services to the executor
or administrator is authorized to file a petition in
the testate or intestate proceedings asking the
court, after notice to all the heirs and interested
parties, to direct the payment of his fees as
expenses of administration.28 Lacson, it is alleged,
was inappropriately cited, since that case
involved an executor who
concurrently was a lawyer who subsequently
claimed attorney's fees as part of the expenses of
administration. Petitioner also claims that the
decision of the probate court admitting Doa
Adela's will to probate sufficiently satisfies the
condition in the Retainer Agreement that the final
fee be payable "upon approval by the court of the
agreement for the distribution of the properties to
the court designated heirs of the estate," the
court-approved will comprising the agreement
referred to in the contract.
Petitioner also takes exception to the Probate
Court's finding that "the bulk of the estate subject
of this case, as far as this [c]ourt is concerned,
has not been turned over to the executrix or to
the [c]ourt itself," on which the appellate court
predicated its ruling that the motion for a writ of
execution was premature. Petitioner submits that
the Probate Court ineluctably has jurisdiction over
the estate of Doa Adela, and has necessarily
assumed control over the properties belonging to
the said estate. Thus, petitioner continues, there
is no longer need to await the turnover of the
properties involved in the intestate estate of Don
Andres which constitute part of the testate estate
of Doa Adela since the Probate Court and the
Intestate Court have concurrent jurisdiction over
these properties as they have not yet been
physically divided.

Rule 85: Accountability and Compensation of Executors and Administrators

Page 3

Petitioner refers to the averment made by Olivia


Pascual before the Probate Court that the
proceedings before the Intestate Court had
already been terminated, and that the proceeds
of the sale of the Ongpin Property and the
Valenzuela Property had in fact been already
divided based on the three-fourths (3/4) to onefourth (1/4) ratio between the estate of Doa
Adela and the heirs of Don Andres. Petitioner
further points out that the Probate Court had
authorized and approved the sale of the Ongpin
Property, yet refused to allow the partial
execution of its claim for attorney's fees.
Finally, petitioner asserts that the Probate Court
erred in refusing to grant the prayer seeking the
re-appraisal of the property of Doa Adela's
estate. Such re-appraisal, so it claims, is
necessary in order to determine the three percent
(3%) share in the total gross estate committed to
petitioner by reason of the Retainer Agreement.
It appears that the thrust of the assailed Decision
of the Court of Appeals is along these lines: that
petitioner may directly claim attorney's fees only
against Olivia Pascual and not against the estate
of Doa Adela; and that petitioner's claim is also
premature since contrary to the requisite
stipulated in the Retainer Agreement, there is no
court-approved agreement for the distribution of
the properties of the estate of Doa Adela as yet.
As an initial premise, we consider whether a
lawyer who renders legal services to the executor
or administrator of an estate can claim attorney's
fees against the estate instead of the executor or
administrator. Petitioner correctly cites Occea v.
Marquez29 as providing the governing rule on that
matter as previously settled in the 1905 case
of Escueta v. Sy-Juilliong,30 to wit:
The rule is that when a lawyer has rendered legal
services to the executor or administrator to assist
him in the execution of his trust, his attorney's
fees may be
allowed as expenses of
administration. The estate is, however, not
directly liable for his fees, the liability for
payment resting primarily on the executor or
administrator. If the administrator had paid the
fees, he would be entitled to reimbursement from
the estate. The procedure to be followed by
counsel in order to collect his fees is to request
the administrator to make payment, and should
the latter fail to pay, either to (a) file an action
against him in his personal capacity, and not as
administrator, or (b) file a petition in the testate
or intestate proceedings asking the court, after
notice to all the heirs and interested parties, to
direct the payment of his fees as expenses of
administration. Whichever course is adopted, the
heirs and other persons interested in the estate
will have the right to inquire into the value of the

services of the lawyer and on the necessity of his


employment.31
We reiterate that as a general rule, it is the
executor or administrator who is primarily liable
for attorney's fees due to the lawyer who
rendered legal services for the executor or
administrator in relation to the settlement of the
estate. The executor or administrator may seek
reimbursement from the estate for the sums paid
in attorney's fees if it can be shown that the
services of the lawyer redounded to the benefit of
the estate.32 However, if the executor or
administrator refuses to pay the attorney's fees,
the lawyer has two modes of recourse. First, the
lawyer may file an action against the executor or
administrator, but in his/her personal capacity
and not as administrator or executor. Second, the
lawyer may file a petition in the testate or
intestate proceedings, asking the court to direct
the payment of attorney's fees as an expense of
administration. If the second mode is resorted to,
it is essential that notice to all the heirs and
interested parties be made so as to enable these
persons to inquire into the value of the services
of the lawyer and on the necessity of his
employment.
Lacson v. Reyes,33 cited by the appellate court,
involved an executor who also happened to be
the lawyer for the heirs who had filed the petition
for probate. For that reason, that case is not
squarely in point to the case at bar. It was
pronounced therein that the administrator or
executor of the estate cannot charge professional
fees for legal services against the same estate, as
explicitly provided under Section 7, Rule 85 of the
Rules of Court of 1985.34No such rule exists
barring direct recovery of professional legal fees
from the estate by the lawyer who is not the
executor or administrator of the said estate. The
limitations on
such direct recovery are
nonetheless established by jurisprudence, as
evinced by the rulings in Escueta and Occea.
The character of such claim for attorney's fees
bears reiteration. As stated in Escueta, it partakes
the nature of an administration expense.
Administration expenses include attorney's fees
incurred in connection with the administration of
the estate.35 It is an expense attending the
accomplishment of the purpose of administration
growing out of the contract or obligation entered
into by the personal representative of the estate,
and thus the claim for reimbursement must be
superior to the rights of the beneficiaries.36
Notwithstanding, there may be instances wherein
the estate should not be charged with attorney's
fees. If the costs of counsel's fees arise out of
litigation among the beneficiaries thereof
themselves or in the protection of the interests of

Rule 85: Accountability and Compensation of Executors and Administrators

Page 4

particular persons, the estate generally cannot be


held liable for such costs, although when the
administrator employs competent counsel on
questions which affect his/her duties as the
administrator and on which he/she is in
reasonable doubt, reasonable expenses for such
services may be charged against the estate
subject to the approval of the court. 37 It has also
been held that an administrator who brings on
litigation for the deliberate purpose of defrauding
the legitimate heirs and for his own benefit is not
entitled to reimbursement for counsel's fees
incurred in such litigation.381avvphil.net
Clearly then, while the direct recovery of
attorney's fees from the estate may be
authorized if the executor refuses to pay such
fees, and claimed through the filing of the proper
petition with the probate court, such claim
remains
controvertible.
This
is
precisely
why Escueta and its progenies require that the
petition be made with notice to all the heirs
and interested parties.
It is these perspectives that we apply to the case
at bar. Notably, petitioner had filed both a Notice
of Attorney's Lien and a Motion for Writ of
Execution. These two pleadings have distinct
character and must be treated as such.
After Doa Adela's will had been admitted to
probate, petitioner had initially filed a Notice of
Attorney's Lien wherein it identified itself as "the
attorney for the executrix named in the said will,
Dra. Olivia S. Pascual", and sought to file its
"claim and/or lien for attorney's fees equivalent
to Three Percent (3%) of the total gross estate,"
pursuant to the 1987 Retainer Agreement. Copies
of this Notice of Attorney's Lien were furnished
Attys. Fortunato Viray, Jr. and Crisanto Cornejo,
who appear on record to have served as counsels
for the various oppositors to the probate of the
1978 will of Doa Adela. This Notice of Attorney's
Lien was noted by the Probate Court in its Order
of 4 November 1993, "as a lien that must be
satisfied chargeable to the share of Olivia S.
Pascual."
It may be so that petitioner, in filing this Notice of
Attorney's Lien, initially intended to hold Olivia
Pascual, and not Doa Adela's estate, liable for
the attorney's fees. It did identify itself as the
lawyer of Olivia Pascual, and the Probate Court
did note that the lien be satisfied chargeable to
the share of the executor. Yet it must also be
noted that such lien, as it is, is only contingent on
the final settlement of the estate of Doa Adela,
at such time, since the Retainer Agreement on
which the lien is hinged provides that the final fee
"be payable upon approval by the court of the
agreement for the distribution of the properties to
the court designated heirs of the estate." 39 This is

also made clear by the order noting the lien,


which qualified that said lien was chargeable only
to the share of Olivia Pascual, hence implying
that at the very least, it may be claimed only
after her share to Doa Adela's estate is already
determinate.
In rendering its assailed Decision, the Court of
Appeals relied on this qualification made by the
Probate Court that the lien for attorney's fees was
chargeable only to the share of Olivia
Pascual. Yet the Notice of Attorney's Lien
only seeks to serve notice of the pendency
of the claim for attorney's fees, and not the
payment of such fees itself. On its own, the
Notice of Attorney's Lien cannot serve as
the basis for the Probate Court to authorize
the payment to petitioner of attorney's
fees.
On the other hand, Escueta and its kindred
cases do explicitly recognize the recourse
for the lawyer to directly make the claim for
attorney's fees against the estate, not the
executor or administrator. The filing of the
Notice
of
Attorney's
Lien
and
the
qualificatory character of the rulings
thereon, do not preclude the resort to the
mode of recovery against the estate as
authorized by jurisprudence. Clearly then,
we disagree with the opinion of the Court of
Appeals that attorney's fees can be claimed
only against the share of Olivia Pascual.
The instant case is rooted in an incomplete
attempt to resort to the second mode of recovery
of attorney's fees as authorized in Escueta,
originating as it did from the denial of petitioner's
Motion for Writ of Execution, and not the Notice of
Attorney's Lien. The Motion did expressly seek
the
payment
of
attorney's
fees
to
petitioner. Escueta and Occea,
among
other
cases, did clearly lay down the manner under
which such fees may be paid out even prior to
the final settlement of the estate as an
administration expense directly chargeable to the
estate itself. The critical question in the present
petition is thus whether this Motion for Writ of
Execution
satisfies
the
requisites
set
in Escueta for a claim for attorney's fees directly
chargeable against the estate. It does not.
The fact that the prayer for attorney's fees was
cast in a motion and not a petition should not
impede such claim, considering that the motion
was nonetheless filed with the Probate
Court. However, the record bears that the
requisite notice to all heirs and interested
parties has not been satisfied. Doa Adela's
will designated 19 other individuals apart from
Olivia Pascual, and four (4) different institutions
as recipients of devises or legacies consisting of

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Page 5

real properties, jewelries, and cash amounts. Yet


only Olivia Pascual was served with a copy of the
Motion for Writ of Execution, the motion which
effectively sought the immediate payment of
petitioner's attorney's fees. As early as 29 April
1994, Olivia Pascual, in opposing the Motion for
Writ of Execution, already pointed out that
petitioner had failed to give sufficient notice to all
interested parties to the estate, particularly the
several devisees and legatees so named in Doa
Adela's will.
Such notice is material to the other heirs to Doa
Adela's estate. The payment of attorney's fees,
especially in the amount of 3% of the total gross
estate as sought for by petitioner, substantially
diminishes the estate of Doa Adela and may
consequently cause the diminution of their
devises and legacies. Since these persons were
so named in the very will itself and the action for
probate which was filed by petitioner itself, there
is no reason why petitioner could not have given
due notice to these persons on its claim for
attorney's fees.
The requisite notice to the heirs, devisees, and
legatees is anchored on the constitutional
principle that no person shall be deprived of
property without due process of law. 40 The fact
that these persons were designated in the will as
recipients of the testamentary dispositions from
the decedent establishes their rights to the
succession, which are transmitted to them from
the moment of the death of the decedent. 41 The
payment of such attorney's fees necessarily
diminishes the estate of the decedent, and may
effectively diminish the value of the testamentary
dispositions made by the decedent. These heirs,
devisees, and legatees acquire proprietary rights
by reason of the will upon the moment of the
death of the decedent, incipient or inchoate as
such rights may be. Hence, notice to these
interested persons of the claims for attorney's
fees is integral, so as to allow them to pose any
objections or oppositions to such claim which,
after all, could lead to the reduction of their
benefits from the estate.
The failure to notify the other heirs, devisees or
legatees, to the estate of Doa Adela likewise
deprives these interested persons of the right to
be heard in a hearing geared towards
determining whether petitioner was entitled to
the immediate payment of attorney's fees.
Notably, petitioner, in filing its Motion for Writ of
Execution, had initially set the hearing on the
motion on 29 April 1994, but one day prior to the
scheduled hearing, gave notice instead that the
motion was being submitted for the consideration
of
the
Probate
Court
without
further
42
argument. Evidently, petitioner did not intend a
full-blown hearing to ensue on whether it was

entitled to the payment of attorney's fees. Yet the


claim
for
attorney's
fees
is
hardly
incontrovertible.
That the Retainer Agreement set the attorney's
fees at three percent (3%) of the gross estate
does not imply that the basis for attorney's fees is
beyond controversy. Attorney's fees in this case
are in the nature of administration expenses, or
necessary expenses in the first place. Any party
interested in the estate may very well, in theory,
posit a myriad of objections to the attorney's fees
sought, such as for example, that these fees were
not
necessary
expenses
in
the
care,
management, and settlement of the estate.
Whether or not such basis for valid objections
exists in this case is not evident, but the fact
remains that all the parties interested in the
estate, namely the other devisees and legatees,
were deprived of the opportunity to raise such
objections as they were not served notice of the
Motion for Writ of Execution.
The instant claim for attorney's fees is thus
precluded by the absence of the requisite notices
by petitioner to all the interested persons such as
the designated heirs, devisees, legatees, as
required by the jurisprudential rule laid down
in Escueta. However, the Court of Appeals held
that it was the prematurity of the claim for
attorney's fees that served as the fatal
impediment. On this point, the Court does not
agree.
Again, the remaining
warrant clarification.

peripheral

questions

Escueta itself provides for two alternative


approaches through which counsel may proceed
with his claim for attorney's fees. The first
involves a separate suit against the executor or
administrator in the latter's personal capacity.
The second approach is a direct claim against the
estate itself, with due notice to all interested
persons, filed with the probate court.
In the same vein, the existence of the Retainer
Agreement between petitioner and Olivia Pascual
allows petitioner two possible causes of action on
which to claim attorney's fees in connection with
the administration of the estate of Doa Adela.
The first possible cause of action pivots on the
Retainer Agreement, which establishes an
obligation on the part of Olivia Pascual to pay the
final fee of 3% of the gross total estate of Doa
Adela, payable upon approval by the Probate
Court of the agreement for the distribution of the
properties to the court- designated heirs of the
estate. Necessarily, since the recovery of
attorney's fees is premised on the Retainer
Agreement any award thereupon has to await the
final ascertainment of value of the gross total

Rule 85: Accountability and Compensation of Executors and Administrators

Page 6

estate of Doa Adela, as well as the approval by


the Probate Court of the agreement for the
distribution of the properties. The Retainer
Agreement makes it clear that the final payment
of attorney's fees is contingent on these two
conditions,43 and the claim for attorney's fees
based on the Retainer Agreement cannot ripen
until these conditions are met.
Moreover, it cannot be escaped that the Retainer
Agreement was entered into between petitioner
and Olivia Pascual prior to the filing of the
probate petition, and that at such time, she had
no recognized right to represent the estate of
Doa Adela yet. This
circumstance further bolsters our opinion that if
petitioner insists on the judicial enforcement of
the Retainer Agreement, its proper remedy,
authorized by law and jurisprudence, would be a
personal action against Olivia Pascual, and not
against the estate of Doa Adela. If this were the
recourse pursued by petitioner, and Olivia
Pascual is ultimately held liable under the
Retainer Agreement for attorney's fees, she may
nonetheless seek reimbursement from the estate
of Doa Adela if she were able to establish that
the attorney's fees paid to petitioner were
necessary administration expenses.
The second or alternative recourse is the direct
claim for attorney's fees against the estate, as
authorized under Escueta. The character of
this claim is not contractual in nature, but
rather, as a reimbursement for a necessary
expense of administration, and it will be
allowed if it satisfies the criteria for
necessary expenses of administration. Its
entitlement can be established by the actual
services rendered by the lawyer necessary to the
accomplishment
of
the
purposes
of
administration, and not necessarily by the
contract of engagement of the attorney's
services.
By filing their claim directly against the estate of
Doa Adela, petitioner has clearly resorted to this
second cause of action. There are consequent
advantages and disadvantages to petitioner.
Since the claim arises irrespective of the
contingencies as stipulated in the Retainer
Agreement, the attorney's fees may be collected
against the estate even before the final
determination of its gross total value or the final
approval of the project of partition. As earlier
stated, such claim for reimbursement is superior
to the right of the beneficiaries to the estate, and
as such, there is need to finally determine the
respective shares of the beneficiaries before
attorney's fees in the nature of administration
expenses may be paid out.

The one distinct disadvantage, however, is that


the Retainer Agreement cannot be deemed
binding on the estate or the Probate Court since
the estate is not a party to such contract. This
would not preclude the Probate Court from
enforcing the provisions of the Retainer
Agreement if, in its sound discretion, the terms of
payment therein are commensurate to the value
of the actual services necessary to the
administration of the estate actually rendered by
petitioner. Yet if the Probate Court does choose to
adopt the Retainer Agreement as binding on the
estate of Doa Adela, petitioner may again be
precluded from immediate recovery of attorney's
fees in view of the necessity or precondition of
ascertaining the gross total value of the estate,
as well as the judicial approval of the final
agreement of partition.
In any event, whether the claim for attorney's
fees was pursued through a separate suit against
Olivia Pascual (in her personal capacity) for the
enforcement of the Retainer Agreement, or
against
the
estate
of
Doa
Adela
as
reimbursement for necessary administration
expenses, it remains essential that a hearing be
conducted on the claim. In either case too, the
hearing will focus on the value of the services of
the petitioner and the necessity of engaging
petitioner as counsel.
We reiterate that the direct claim against the
estate for attorney's fees must be made with due
notice to the heirs, devisees, and legatees. The
failure of petitioner to give such notice renders its
present claim inefficacious for now. Indeed, there
is sufficient cause to dismiss outright petitioner's
Motion for Writ of Immediate Execution filed with
the Probate Court, for its failure to notify therein
the other persons interested in the estate of Doa
Adela. Nonetheless, to authorize said outright
denial at this stage could unduly delay the
settlement of the estate of Doa Adela,
considering the likelihood that petitioner would
again pursue such claim for attorney's fees as the
right to which is affirmed by law and
jurisprudence.
Hence, in order not to unduly protract further the
settlement of the estate of Doa Adela, the Court
deems it proper instead to mandate the Probate
Court to treat the Motion for Writ of Immediate
Execution as a petition seeking a court order to
direct the payment of attorney's fees as expenses
of administration, but subject to the condition
that petitioner give due notice to the other
designated devisees and legatees so designated
in the will of the claim prior to the requisite
hearing thereon. Petitioner may as well seize
such opportunity to formally amend or
reconfigure its motion to a petition to direct
payment of attorney's fees. Once this step is

Rule 85: Accountability and Compensation of Executors and Administrators

Page 7

accomplished, there should be no impediment to


petitioner's claim for recovery of attorney's fees
as reimbursement for necessary administration
expenses, within the terms established by law,
jurisprudence, and this decision.
One final note. Petitioner's final prayer before this
court is that it be issued a partial writ of
execution, consistent with its position before the
Probate Court that it is already entitled to at least
a partial payment of its attorney's fees. This
prayer cannot obviously be granted at this stage
by the Court, considering the fatal absence of due
notice to the other designated beneficiaries to
the estate of Doa Adela. Still, we do not doubt
that the Probate Court, within its discretion, is
capacitated to render the award of attorney's
fees as administration expenses either partially or
provisionally, depending on the particular
circumstances and its ultimate basis for the
determination of the appropriate attorney's fees.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED IN PART.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 22
December 1995 and the Orders of the Regional
Trial Court of Malabon, Branch 72, dated 2 June
1994 and 17 March 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE
insofar as said orders denied petitioner's Motion
for Writ of Immediate Execution dated 26 April
1994. Petitioner is hereby directed to set for
hearing its claim for attorneys fees, giving due
notice thereof to all the heirs, devisees, and
legatees designated in the 1978 Last Will and
Testament executed by Doa Adela Pascual. The
Regional Trial Court is directed to treat
petitioner's aforesaid motion as a PETITION for
the payment of attorney's fees as expenses of
administration, and after due hearing resolve the
same with DISPATCH, conformably with this
decision. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-50277 February 14, 1980
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE DOMINADOR
TUMANG,
MAGDALENA
A.
TUMANG, administratrix-appellee,
vs.
GUIA
T.
LAGUIO
AND
HER
MINOR
CHILDREN, movants-appellants.

ANTONIO, J.:
This case was forwarded to this Court by the
Court of Appeals on the ground that it involves
purely legal issues. The factual background, as
found by the Court of Appeals, is as follows:
In Special Proceeding No. 1953 involving the
estate of the late Dominador Tumang and
pending before the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga, the widow of the deceased, namely

Magdalena A. Tumang, administratrix and


executrix of the will, filed a petition to declare the
testate proceedings definitely terminated and
closed with respect to herself and two of her
children Melba Tumang Ticzon and Nestor A.
Tumang. The petition was premised on the fact
that
the
aforesaid
heirs
had
already
acknowledged
receipt
of
the
properties
adjudicated to them, and in order for such
properties to be transferred in their names, there
was need for an order of the court declaring the
proceedings closed with respect to the aforesaid
heirs. The petition was opposed by appenee's
daughter, Guia T. Laguio and her children on the
ground that appellee, as administratrix and
executrix, had not yet delivered all properties
adjudicated to them. Moreover, the oppositors
contended that there could be no partial
termination of the proceedings. Thereafter, the
administratrix withdrew the aforementioned
petition.
During the hearing of the motion to withdraw
petition, Magdalena Tumang, as required by the
court, filed a pleading captioned "Compliance",
alleging that as shown by the attached receipts
issued by the BIR, the estate and inheritance
taxes had been fully paid; that as certified by the
Deputy Clerk of Court, no claim has been
presented that has not already delivered all the
properties and dividends of the shares of stock
adjudicated to her and her minor children since
the approval of the original and amendatory
projects of partition; and that with such
admission, the court no longer has jurisdiction to
entertain the motion under consideration.
Resolving the foregoing, the court a quo issued
the first questioned Order on February 5, 1971,
stating in part, the following:
Considering the opposition well founded, the
court hereby considers the motion to require
administratrix to render an accounting untenable,
as the final accounting of the administratrix was
already approved and therefore denies the
motion of oppositor and counter-petitioner dated
Jan. 25, 1971. 2
A motion for reconsideration of the foregoing
Order was filed by Guia T. Laguio and her minor
children. On August 16, 1971, the court a
quo issued the second questioned Order denying
the motion for reconsideration in the following
manner:
After a careful consideration of the grounds relied
upon by the movant counter-petitioner, this Court
resolves to deny the motion for reconsideration
for the reason that in view of said counterpetitioner's receipt of the cash dividends in
question without first requiring the administratrix
the accounting now being sought to be rendered
for purposes of determining the correctness of
the cash dividends constitutes already a waiver
on her part to question such correctness of the
aforesaid cash dividends. The counter-petitioner
is being assisted by counsel in the person of her
own husband, and who being well-versed in such
legal process, could have rejected receipt of the
said cash dividends on the shares of stock if the
correctness of the same was at that time being

Rule 85: Accountability and Compensation of Executors and Administrators

Page 8

doubted. To say the least, therefore, the grounds


for the motion for reconsideration are, in the
honest opinion of this Court, unmeritorious, and
all the motion, in effect, is hereby denied. 3
The sole issue is whether or not the court should
have required the executrix to render an
accounting of the cash and stock dividends
received after the approval of her final accounts.
A corollary issue is whether or not petitioners
have waived their right to demand such
accounting.
Section 8 of Rule 85 provides that the "executor
or administrator shall render an account of his
administration within one (1) year from the time
of
receiving
letters
testamentary
or
of
administration ..., and he shall render such
further accounts as the court may requite until
the estate is wholly settled."
In the instant case, further accounts by the
executrix appear to be in order, in view of the fact
that the dividends sought to be accounted for are
not included in the final accounts rendered by the
executrix. It appears that the interests of all the
parties will be better served and the conflict
between petitioners and respondent will be
resolved if such additional accounting is made.
Further, "it has been held that an executor or
administrator who receives assets of the estate
after he has filed an account should file a
supplementary account thereof, and may be
compelled to do so, but that it is only with respect
to matters occuring after the settlement of final
account that representatives will be compelled to
file supplementary account." 4 It is only in a case
where the petition to compel an executor to
account after he has accounted and has been
discharged fails to allege that any further sums
came into the hands of the executor, and the
executor specifically denies the receipt of any
further sums that the accounting should be
denied. 5

render such further accounts as the court may


require until the estate is wholly settled." 9
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the
Orders of the lower court dated February 5, 1971
and August 16, 1971 are set aside, and
respondent executrix is hereby ordered to render
a supplemental accounting of all cash and stock
dividends as well as other properties of the estate
which came into her possession after the
approval of her final accounts.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 86250 February 26, 1990
ALBERTO F. LACSON, EDITHA F. LACSON,
ROMEO
F.
LACSON
and
ZENA
F.
VELASCO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. LUIS R. REYES, in his capacity as
presiding judge of Branch 22 of the
Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 22,
and/or Multiple Sala, Imus, Cavite, and
EPHRAIM J. SERQUINA, respondents.
Victor H. Volfango for petitioners.
Ephraim J. Serquina for and his own behalf as
respondent.

SARMIENTO, J.:
On August 26, 1987, the private respondent,
Ephraim Serquina, petitioned the respondent
court for the probate of the last will and
testament of Carmelita Farlin. His petition was
docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 127-87 of the
respondent court, entitled "In Re Testate Estate of
Carmelita S. Farlin, Ephraim J. Serquina,
Petitioner." He also petitioned the court in his
capacity as counsel for the heirs, the herein
petitioners, and as executor under the will.

There is no question that in the instant case, the


fact that the executrix received funds of the
estate after the approval of her final accounts
and before the issuance of an order finally closing
the proceedings is admitted. She must, therefore,
account for the same, in consonance with her
duty to account for all the assets of the
decedent's estate which have come into her
possession by virtue of her office. 6 An executor
should account for all his receipts and
disbursements since his last accounting. 7

The petition was not opposed and hence, on


November 17, 1987, the respondent court issued
a "certificate of allowance," 1 the dispositive part
of which reads as follows:

We disagree with the lower court's finding that


petitioners, by receiving the dividends without
requiring an accounting, had waived their right to
do so. The duty of an executor or administrator to
render an account is not a mere incident of an
administration proceeding which can be waived
or disregarded. It is a duty that has to be
performed and duly acted upon by the court
before the administration is finally ordered closed
and terminated, 8to the end that no part of the
decedent's estate be left unaccounted for. The
fact that the final accounts had been approved
does not divest the court of jurisdiction to require
supplemental accounting for, aside from the
initial accounting, the Rules provide that "he shall

On March 14, 1988, Atty. Ephraim Serquina filed a


"motion for attorney's fees" 3 against the
petitioners, alleging that the heirs had agreed to
pay, as and for his legal services rendered, the
sum of P68,000.00.

WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing, the Court


hereby renders certification that subject will and
testament is accordingly allowed in accordance
with Sec. 13 of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court.
SO ORDERED.

Thereafter summonses were served upon the


heirs "as if it were a complaint against said
heirs" 4 directing them to answer the motion.
Thereafter, the heirs filed their answer and
denied the claim for P68,000.00 alleging that the
sum agreed upon was only P7,000.00, a sum they
had allegedly already paid.

Rule 85: Accountability and Compensation of Executors and Administrators

Page 9

After pre-trial, the respondent court rendered


judgment and disposed as follows:
In the light of the foregoing, considering the
extent of the legal services rendered to the
clients, the value of the properties gained by the
clients out of said services, the petition for
attorney's fees is granted. Judgment is hereby
rendered directing the respondent heirs to pay
their lawyer the sum of P65,000.00 as true and
reasonable attorney's fees which shall be a lien
on the subject properties. Cost against the
respondent.
SO ORDERED.

On October 21, 1988, eleven days after the heirs


received a copy of the decision, 6 the latter filed a
notice of appeal.
On November 7, 1988, the respondent court
issued an order directing the heirs to amend their
notice of appeal. 7
On October 27, 1988, the respondent court
issued an order "noting" the notice on appeal
"appellants [the heirs] having failed to correct or
complete the same within the reglementary
period to effect an appeal." 8
On November 24, 1988, the respondent court
issued yet another order denying the notice of
appeal for failure of the heirs to file a record on
appeal. 9
Thereafter, Atty. Serquina moved for execution.
On December 5, 1988, the respondent court
issued an order granting execution. 10
The petitioners submit that the decision, dated
October 26, 1988, and the orders, dated October
27, 1988, November 24, 1988, and December 5,
1988, respectively, are nun and void for the
following reasons: (1) the respondent court never
acquired jurisdiction over the "motion for
attorney's fees" for failure on the part of the
movant, Ephraim Serquina, to pay docket fees;
(2) the respondent court gravely abused its
discretion in denying the heirs' notice of appeal
for their failure to file a record on appeal; and (3)
the respondent court also gravely abused its
discretion in awarding attorney's fees contrary to
the provisions of Section 7, of Rule 85, of the
Rules of Court.
Atty. Serquina now defends the challenged acts of
the respondent court: (1) his motion was a mere
incident to the main proceedings; (2) the
respondent court rightly denied the notice of
appeal in question for failure of the heirs to
submit a record on appeal; and (3) in collecting
attorney's fees, he was not acting as executor of
Carmelita Farlin's last will and testament because
no letters testamentary had in fact been issued.
We take these up seriatim.
I.
Anent docket fees, it has been held 11 that the
court acquires jurisdiction over any case only
upon payment of the prescribed docket fee.

Although
the
rule
has
since
been
tempered, 12 that is, there must be a clear
showing that the party had intended to evade
payment and to cheat the courts, it does not
excuse him from paying docket fees as soon as it
becomes apparent that docket fees are indeed
payable.
In the case at bar, the "motion for attorney's
fees" was clearly in the nature of an action
commenced by a lawyer against his clients for
attorney's fees. The very decision of the court
states:
This case is an out-growth from Sp. Proc. No. 12787 of same Court which was long decided (sic). It
resulted from the filing of a petition for attorney's
fees by the lawyer of the petitioner's heirs in the
case against the latter.
Upon the filing of the petition for attorney's fees,
the heir- respondents (sic) were accordingly
summoned to answer the petition as if it were a
complaint against said heirs who retained the
petitioner as their lawyer in the said case. 13
In that event, the parties should have known, the
respondent court in particular, that docket fees
should have been priorly paid before the court
could lawfully act on the case, and decide it.
It may be true that the claim for attorney's fees
was but an incident in the main case, still, it is
not an escape valve from the payment of docket
fees because as in all actions, whether separate
or as an offshoot of a pending proceeding, the
payment of docket fees is mandatory.
Assuming, therefore, ex gratia argumenti, that
Atty. Serquina's demand for attorney's fees in the
sum of P68,000.00 is valid, he, Atty. Serquina,
should have paid the fees in question before the
respondent court could validly try his "motion".
II.
With respect to the second issue, it has been held
that in appeals arising from an incident in a
special proceeding, a record on appeal is
necessary, otherwise, the appeal faces a
dismissal. 14 It has likewise been held, however,
that in the interest of justice, an appeal, brought
without a record on appeal, may be reinstated
under exceptional circumstances. Thus:
xxx xxx xxx
It is noted, however, that the question presented
in this case is one of first impression; that the
petitioner acted in honest, if mistaken,
interpretation of the applicable law; that the
probate court itself believed that the record on
appeal was unnecessary; and that the private
respondent herself apparently thought so, too, for
she did not move to dismiss the appeal and
instead impliedly recognized its validity by filing
the appellee's brief.
In view of these circumstances, and in the
interest of justice, the Court feels that the
petitioner should be given an opportunity to
comply with the above-discussed rules by
submitting the required record on appeal as a

Rule 85: Accountability and Compensation of Executors and Administrators Page 10

condition for the revival of the appeal. The issue


raised in his appeal may then be fully discussed
and, in the light of the briefs already filed by the
parties, resolved on the merits by the respondent
court. 15
In the instant case, the Court notes the apparent
impression by the parties at the outset, that a
record on appeal was unnecessary, as evidenced
by: (1) the very holding of the respondent court
that "[i]t is now easy to appeal as there is no
more need for a record on appeal . . . [b]y merely
filing a notice of appeal, the appellant can
already institute his appeal . . . ;" 16 (2) in its
order to amend notice of appeal, it did not require
the appellants to submit a record on appeal; and
(3) Atty. Serquina interposed no objection to the
appeal on that ground.
In any event, since we are annulling the decision
appealed from, the matter is a dead issue.
III.
As
we
have
indicated,
we
are
granting certiorari and are annulling the decision
appealed from, but there seems to be no reason
why we can not dispose of the heirs' appeal in a
single proceeding.
It is pointed out that an attorney who is
concurrently an executor of a will is barred from
recovering attorney's fees from the estate. The
Rule is specifically as follows:
SEC. 7. What expenses and fees allowed executor
or administrator. Not to charge for services as
attorney. Compensation provided by will controls
unless
renounced.
An
executor
or
administrator shall be allowed the necessary
expenses in the care, management and
settlement of the estate, and for his services, four
pesos per day for the time actually and
necessarily employed, or a commission upon the
value of so much of the estate as comes into his
possession and is finally disposed of by him in the
payment of debts, expenses, legacies, or
distributive shares, or by delivery to heirs or
devisees, of two per centum of the first five
thousand pesos of such value, one per centum of
so much of such value as exceeds five thousand
pesos and does not exceed thirty thousand
pesos, one-half per centum of so much of such
value as exceeds thirty thousand pesos and does
not exceed one hundred thousand pesos, and
one-quarter per centum of so much of such value
as exceeds one hundred thousand pesos. But in
any special case, where the estate is large, and
the settlement has been attended with great
difficulty, and has required a high degree of
capacity on the part of the executor or
administrator, a greater sum may be allowed. If
objection to the fees allowed be taken, the
allowance may be reexamined on appeal.
If there are two or more executors or
administrators, the compensation shall be
apportioned among them by the court according
to the services actually rendered by them
respectively.

When the executor or administrator is an


attorney, he shall not charge against the estate
any professional fees for legal services rendered
by him.
When the deceased by will makes some other
provision for the compensation of his executor,
that provision shall be a full satisfaction for his
services unless by a written instrument filed in
the court he renounces all claim to the
compensation provided by the will. 17
The rule is therefore clear that an administrator
or executor may be allowed fees for the
necessary expenses he has incurred as such, but
he may not recover attorney's fees from the
estate. His compensation is fixed by the rule but
such a compensation is in the nature of
executor's or administrator's commissions, and
never as attorney's fees. In one case, 18 we held
that "a greater sum [other than that established
by the rule] may be allowed 'in any special case,
where the estate is large, and the settlement has
been attended with great difficulty, and has
required a high degree of capacity on the part of
the executor or administrator.'" 19 It is also left to
the sound discretion of the court. 20With respect
to attorney's fees, the rule, as we have seen,
disallows them. Accordingly, to the extent that
the trial court set aside the sum of P65,000.00 as
and for Mr. Serquina's attorney's fees, to operate
as a "lien on the subject properties," 21the trial
judge must be said to have gravely abused its
discretion (apart from the fact that it never
acquired jurisdiction, in the first place, to act on
said Mr. Serquina's "motion for attorney's fees").
The next question is quite obvious: Who
shoulders attorney's fees? We have held that a
lawyer of an administrator or executor may not
charge the estate for his fees, but rather, his
client. 22 Mutatis
mutandis, where
the
administrator is himself the counsel for the heirs,
it is the latter who must pay therefor.
In that connection, attorney's fees are in the
nature of actual damages, which must be duly
proved. 23 They are also subject to certain
standards, to wit: (1) they must be reasonable,
that is to say, they must have a bearing on the
importance of the subject matter in controversy;
(2) the extent of the services rendered; and (3)
the professional standing of the lawyer. 24 In all
cases, they must be addressed in a full-blown
trial and not on the bare word of the
parties. 25 And always, they are subject to the
moderating hand of the courts.
The records show that Atty. Ephraim Serquina, as
counsel for the heirs, performed the following:
xxx xxx xxx
5. That after the order of allowance for probate of
the will, the undersigned counsel assisted the
heirs to transfer immediately the abovementioned real estate in their respective names,
from (sic) the payment of estate taxes in the
Bureau of Internal Revenue to the issuance by the
Registry of Deeds of the titles, in order for the
heirs to sell the foregoing real estate of 10,683
sq. cm (which was also the subject of sale prior to

Rule 85: Accountability and Compensation of Executors and Administrators Page 11

the death of the testator) to settle testator's


obligations and day-to-day subsistence being (sic)
that the heirs, except Zena F. Velasco, are not
employed neither doing any business; 26
The Court is not persuaded from the facts above
that Atty. Serquina is entitled to the sum claimed
by him (P68,000.00) or that awarded by the lower
court (P65,000.00). The Court observes that
these are acts performed routinely since they
form part of what any lawyer worth his salt is
expected to do. The will was furthermore not
contested. They are not, so Justice Pedro Tuason
wrote, "a case [where] the administrator was able
to stop what appeared to be an improvident
disbursement of a substantial amount without
having to employ outside legal help at an
additional expense to the estate," 27 to entitle
him to a bigger compensation. He did not exactly
achieve anything out of the ordinary.

The records also reveal that Atty. Serquina has


already been paid the sum of P6,000.00. 28 It is
our considered opinion that he should be entitled
to P15,000.00 for his efforts on a quantum
meruit basis. Hence, we hold the heirs liable for
P9,000.00 more.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered: (1) GRANTING the petition and
making the temporary restraining order issued on
January 16, 1989 PERMANENT; and (2) ORDERING
the petitioners to PAY the private respondent,
Atty. Ephraim Serquina, attorney's fees in the sum
of P9,000.00. The said fees shall not be recovered
from the estate of Carmelita Farlin.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Rule 85: Accountability and Compensation of Executors and Administrators Page 12

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