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International Journal of Psychology

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Personality and cognitive processes in life and death

decision making: An exploration into the source of
judgment errors by police special squads
Michel Girodo a
a
University of Ottawa, Canada

First Published on: 09 October 2007

To cite this Article: Girodo, Michel (2007) 'Personality and cognitive processes in life
and death decision making: An exploration into the source of judgment errors by
police special squads ', International Journal of Psychology, 42:6, 418 - 426
To link to this article: DOI: 10.1080/00207590701436728
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00207590701436728

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INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY, 2007, 42 (6), 418426

Personality and cognitive processes in life and death

decision making: An exploration into the source of
judgment errors by police special squads
Michel Girodo
University of Ottawa, Canada

his study sought to understand judgment errors by special police units such as those documented after the
assault by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms on the Branch Davidians near Waco, Texas. The
study examined the relation between personality traits, the cognitive organization of safety and survival skills,
and past deadly force encounters in 131 tactical and command officers of Violent Crimes and Fugitives Task
Forces, and as they executed live high-risk arrest warrants in an all-inclusive decision-making simulation
environment. Logistic regressions showed that getting shot on the job was related to very low neuroticism and
low sensation (experience) seeking among officers. Getting shot in a deadly force encounter during a simulated
team entry was also related to low neuroticism and low experience seeking. Making safety and survival errors in a
simulated entry was positively related to toughmindedness in Task Force tactical officers but negatively related to
toughmindedness in Task Force leaders. Principle components factor analysis of 27 self-reported safety and
survival competencies showed that, generally, TF leaders reasoned with higher cognitive processes of analysis and
deliberation while tactical personnel reasoned more in terms of reactive and procedural knowledge. Getting shot
during a simulated dangerous encounter was more likely to occur when there was a mismatch between task
demands and an officers preference of one knowledge system over another. It was speculated that the poor
judgment by command staff at Waco might have been related to their use of a procedural knowledge system
when higher cognitive processes were needed. Greater experience with executing arrest warrants would have
triggered the recognition of a serious anomaly, which would have primed the use of higher cognitive processes.

ette etude visait a` mieux comprendre les erreurs de jugement des unites de police speciales telles que celles
rapportees apre`s lassaut par le Bureau des alcools, du tabac et des armes a` feu sur la secte Davidienne pre`s
de Waco, au Texas. Cette etude examinait la relation entre les traits de personnalite, lorganisation cognitive des
habiletes de securite et de survie et les interventions avec usage de force letale qui ont eu lieu dans le passe, aupre`s
de 131 officiers tactiques et commandants des groupes de travail sur les crimes violents et les fugitifs. Les officiers
ont delivre en personne des mandats darrestation a` haut risque dans un milieu simule de prise de decision
incluant tous les facteurs en cause. Les regressions logistiques ont montre quetre atteint par balle en service etait
tre
relie a` une tre`s faible tendance nevrotique et a` une faible recherche dexperience a` sensation chez les officiers. E
atteint par balle lors dune intervention simulee dequipe avec usage de force letale etait aussi relie a` une faible
tendance nevrotique et a` une faible recherche dexperience a` sensation. Faire des erreurs de securite et de survie
lors dune intervention simulee etait positivement associe a` une durete desprit chez les officiers tactiques des
groupes de travail, mais negativement relie a` la durete desprit chez les leaders des groupes de travail. Lanalyse de
facteurs par composantes principales des 27 competences de securite et de survie auto-rapportees a montre que,
generalement, les leaders resonnaient avec des processus superieurs danalyse et de deliberation tandis que le
tre atteint par balle
personnel tactique resonnait plus en termes de connaissances procedurales et reactives. E
durant une intervention simulee dangereuse etait plus susceptible de se produire quand il y avait un mauvais
jumelage entre les demandes de la tache et la preference de lofficier relativement a` un syste`me de connaissance au
detriment dun autre. Il etait attendu que le pauvre jugement du groupe de commandement a` Waco pouvait etre
Correspondence should be addressed to Michel Girodo, School of Psychology, University of Ottawa, 145 Jean-Jacques Lussier
Street, Ottawa, Ontario K1N 6N5, Canada. (E-mail: girodo@uottawa.ca).
This study was conducted while the author was a Visiting Professor at the FBI Academy in Quantico, Va. The sponsorship by S/
Special Agent Edward Tully of the National Executive Institute Associates, the financial assistance of the ALSAM Foundation of Salt
Lake City, the close collaboration of Special Agent Phillip Hayden in conducting this research, the statistical assistance of Dwayne
Schindler, and the critical comments of two anonymous reviewers are gratefully acknowledged.
# 2007 International Union of Psychological Science

http://www.psypress.com/ijp

DOI: 10.1080/00207590701436728

PERSONALITY AND COGNITIVE PROCESSES

419

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relie a` leur utilisation du syste`me de connaissance procedural lorsque les processus cognitifs superieurs etaient
requis. Une plus grande experience a` delivrer des mandats darrestation aurait pu declencher la reconnaissance
dune anomalie serieuse laquelle aurait amorce lutilisation des processus cognitifs superieurs.

traves de este estudio se busco una mejor comprension de los errores de juicio en unidades especiales de
polica, tales como aquellos documentados despues del asalto en la Oficina de Alcohol, Tabaco y Armas de
Fuego en la Sede Davidiana cerca de Waco, Texas. En 131 oficiales de tactica y de comando pertenecientes a las
Fuerzas Especiales de Crmenes Violentos y de Fugitivos se examino la relacion entre rasgos de personalidad,
organizacion cognitiva de seguridad y de recursos de supervivencia e intervenciones policiales pasadas con riesgo
de vida y su influencia sobre la ejecucion de ordenes de arresto en situaciones de alto riesgo de vida en un
ambiente simulado de toma de decisiones. Regresiones logsticas mostraron que entre los oficiales el resultar
herido durante el desempeno de sus funciones estaba relacionado con muy bajo neuroticismo y con baja
busqueda de experiencias. Recibir una herida de bala en una operacion policial con riesgo de muerte durante una
intervencion simulada de equipo estuvo tambien relacionado con bajo neuroticismo y con baja busqueda de
experiencias. Mientras que en oficiales de tactica de las Fuerzas Especiales cometer errores de seguridad y
supervivencia en una intervencion simulada estuvo relacionado positivamente con rigidez, en los lderes de las
Fuerzas Especiales (FF EE) se observo una asociacion negativa entre estas variables. El analisis factorial de los 27
componentes principales de las habilidades de seguridad y de supervivencia reportados por los participantes
senalaron que generalmente los lderes de las FF EE utilizaron un proceso cognitivo de analisis y de deliberacion
mas elevado, mientras que el personal tactico reacciono mas en terminos del conocimiento reactivo y de los
procedimientos. Ser herido de bala durante un encuentro simulado peligroso tuvo mayores probabilidades de
ocurrir cuando hubo un desacuerdo entre las demandas de la tarea y la preferencia de un oficial respecto de un
sistema de conocimiento sobre otro. Se especulo que la pobreza de juicio del personal de comando en Waco
podra haber estado relacionada con la utilizacion de un sistema de conocimiento circunscrito a los
procedimientos, cuando de hecho hubieran sido necesarios procesos cognitivos mas elevados. El tener mayor
experiencia en la ejecucion de ordenes de arresto hubiera facilitado el reconocimiento de una anomala grave la
cual hubiera exigido la utilizacion de procesos cognitivos mas elevados.
Keywords: Deadly force; cognition; personality; police; Waco

Strategic and tactical mistakes by police special

squads tend to be attributed to an unexplained
lapse in good judgment. Nowhere has this claim
been more strongly made than in the United States
Treasury Departments report of the investigation
into the events surrounding the raid by the Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) of the
Branch Davidians compound near Waco, Texas,
on February 28, 1993 (United States Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, 1993). Special
Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) units understand
that surprise, speed, and diversion are necessary to
achieve success in a raid. An hour before the raid
was launched, command staff learned they had
lost the element of surprise. The raid should have
been called off, but the command staff went
ahead with their plans. The tactical teams were
ambushed by armed Branch Davidians waiting for
the agents to make their entry. After a detailed
investigation, it was judged that command staff
lacked the training and experience in the tasks they
were called upon to perform, and that this led to
faulty decision making, contributing to the death
of federal agents and civilians. Psychologically,
what is it about experience and training that
underlies better decision making?

Only three empirical studies have reported on

information processing around deadly force encounters by police. From interviews, Fridell and Binder
(1992) found that events that precede the use of
deadly force are characterized by lack of information, uncertainty, ambiguity, and surprise compared
with those where deadly force was averted. Hayden
(1981) studied the decision making of 300 officers
presented with case scenarios involving varying
amounts of information. Officers who chose to use
deadly force used the same 6 to 7 of the 50 to 60
pieces of information available as those who did not
use deadly force. Once officers made their initial
decision, adding more information was useless in
getting them to alter it. Helsen and Starkes (1999)
reported on information processing in potentially
dangerous situations using a life-size video projection methodology. Officers who were judged to be
inexperienced in handling dangerous situations were
more disorganized in their visual searches and often
attended to areas of their environment that provided
irrelevant information, in contrast to experts, who
consistently attended to a limited set of environmental stimuli.
Dual-process theories of reasoning are popular
among cognitive psychologists. Common features

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420

GIRODO

of many of these theories are that they involve

either System 1 or System 2 cognitive processes
(Stanovich & West, 2000). System 1 involves
processes that are implicit, associative, fast, automatic, based on experience, and context dependent. Similar to procedural knowledge (Anderson,
1982), System 1 is less conscious and involves lowlevel cognitive skill and actions that are largely
reactive and sequential (Sun, Peterson, & Merrill,
1996). System 1 coincides with the perceptualmotor activities of tactical personnel as they
execute dynamic entries. System 2 processes, in
contrast, are rule-based, analytic, and explicit.
System 2 places demands on slower, conscious,
controlled processing and is context free. Like
declarative knowledge (Anderson, 1982), it resembles the strategic type of reasoning required of
command personnel and team leaders.
A naturalistic decision-making approach typically examines behaviour in a dynamic, real-time,
stressful environment that often involves a series
of events engaged in by multiple players (e.g.,
Klein, Orasnu, Calderwood, & Zsambok, 1993).
The decision process here is characterized by a
situational assessment to grasp the essentials of the
problem, an evaluation of one option at a time
through mental simulations, and a decision to
accept an option if the outcome is satisfactory. A
basic claim of the naturalistic decision-making
approach is that decisions are influenced by: (1)
features of the task, and (2) a persons knowledge
and experience in relation to that task (Orasanu &
Connolly, 1993).
Individual differences play a role in decision
making. Stanovich and West (2000) argue that
a need-for-cognition (e.g., Cacioppo, Petty,
Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996) motivates some people
to search out and engage their environment in
ways that involve cognitive challenges in problem
solving. The need-for-cognition has been linked
to a greater inclination to deal with abstraction
and more generally to engage System 2 processes.
Commanders of special police units start off as
tactical members of a team but, based on interest,
motivation, and possibly a different cognitive
style, only some team members advance to a
leadership role. One goal of the present study
was to examine personality and cognitive differences between tactical and self-selected command
staff.
A new philosophy for the safe execution of highrisk arrest warrants has evolved in the United States
(Stephens, 2000). Members of Violent Crime and
Fugitives Task Forces (VCFTF) differ in three
important ways from SWAT teams: (1) they are
minimally equipped with assault and defence

capabilities; (2) they use a knock and announce

approach, followed by deliberate and methodical
advances in approaching dangerous subjects; and
(3) unlike SWAT, which relegates particular tasks
and functions to specific persons on the team, the
new philosophy emphasizes broad situational
awareness by all members by engaging everyone in
prior planning, preparation, decision making, and
in executing the tactical plan. Today, these Task
Forces (TF) are composed of police with prior
SWAT experience who receive transitional training
to this new model. The training requires every one of
the team to strengthen 27 strategic and tactical
safety and survival skills, determined by experts to
be essential in potentially deadly force encounters by
members of these TFs.
This study examined three questions. (1) Are there
personality differences between experts who specialize in the tactical execution of a plan compared with
the persons who have become team leaders and
commanders? (2) How are safety and survival skills
cognitively organized by tactical and command
experts? (3) What relation is there between cognitive
organization of skills and safety and survival errors
while executing a high-risk warrant?
METHOD
Participants
A total of 162 officers (11 females and 149 males)
attending 5 consecutive safety and survival courses
were invited to participate in the research. Each
course was attended by 32 to 35 police officers.
About half of the members (61 males, 6 females)
occupied a tactical role (Regular Member). Their
age varied from 25 to 55 years (Md 5 33), had 6 to
18 years (Md 5 13) of service, and had previously
executed 5 to 70 (Md 5 44) prior entries/arrest
warrants. Another half (61 males, 1 female)
occupied a command role (TF Leader) in their
home TF. They were aged 31 to 48 years (Md 5
39), had 9 to 24 (Md 5 16) years of service, and all
had executed more than 100 prior entries/arrest
warrants.
Self-ratings on the 27 skills, reports of a prior
involvement in a deadly force incident, and behavioural data from observations during entry exercises
were obtained from 131 officers (5 courses). Three
participants (males) were excluded because their lie
scores on the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire
(Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975) suggested they were
excessively concerned with presenting themselves in
a good light (lie score.14). Three participants
(males) chose not to participate in the research.

PERSONALITY AND COGNITIVE PROCESSES

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Training and simulation environment

Participants took part in 22 practical exercises
over 5 days. These were carried out in a fully
furnished mock city, with the involvement of 18
trained civilian role players and 12 instructors, and
with the use of live, blank, and paint simunitions
rounds fired from pistols and shotguns. All
officers and some role players were equipped with
a 9mm or .38 cal simunitions firearm capable of
delivering rounds that stung sharply, bruised the
skin, and left a paint mark. The role players task
was to comply with a TF members commands and
efforts at ensuring a safe arrest, but to shoot at any
TF member failing to use a threat detection skill
adequately, use acceptable cover and concealment,
or properly clear a space. On the morning of the
first day, following signed informed consent,
participants completed a series of questionnaires
and scales.
Measures
Work experiences
Participants indicated (1) if they had ever been
shot during a law enforcement confrontation on
the job (Yes 5 0, No 5 1); (2) if they had ever shot
and wounded, or killed, another person in a law
enforcement confrontation (Yes 5 0, No 5 1); (3)
the number of mandated rounds they fired each
year to maintain proficiency; (4) the number of
days of firearms training they received each year;
(5) years of law enforcement experience; and (6)
the role they had been assigned in their TF (i.e.,
Regular Member or TF Leader).
Psychometric tests
Data were obtained from two instruments that
had have been found to distinguish job performance and stress among undercover officers
(Girodo, 1997).
The Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (EPQ;
Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975). The neuroticism scale
(23 items) measures levels of worry, anxiety, and
emotionality (Cronbachs Alpha of .84 was observed
in this study). Scores of 11 or higher weigh negatively
for undercover work. The introversion/extraversion
scale (21 items) measures degrees of outgoingness
and sociability (Cronbachs Alpha 5 .85 observed in
this study). Low scores are limited to specific
undercover roles, while the desirability of high
scores depends on other impulse control measures.
On the toughmindedness scale (antisocial tendencies,
25 items, Cronbachs Alpha 5 .62 observed in this

421

study), high scorers are often insensitive, can act

dangerously, and weigh negatively for undercover
work. A lie scale (21 items; Cronbachs Alpha 5 .80
observed in this study) assesses if respondents
were being frank in the responses or sought to
present themselves in a good light.
Sensation Seeking Scales (Zuckerman, 1979).
Three predispositions related to seeking excitement
were obtained from each of 10 items: (1) thrill and
adventure seeking (Cronbachs Alpha 5 .89 in this
study), where scores above 5 weigh positively among
applicants for undercover work because they are
associated with managed risk taking, motivation,
higher fear thresholds, and self-mastery in such highrisk activities as parachuting, racing, and scuba
diving; (2) experience seeking (Cronbachs Alpha 5
.83 in this study), where scores of 7 and higher weigh
negatively because they are associated with unusual
curiosity and experimenting with illicit substances,
engaging in unconventional practices, or alternative
lifestyles; and (3) disinhibition (Cronbachs Alpha 5
.91 in this study), where scores of 7 and higher are
negatively weighted because they have been associated with lesser impulse control and a tendency to
act without adequate restraint (see Girodo, 1991).
Behavioural data
All behavioural recordings were made by one of
two observers who recorded any failure by a team
member to adequately use 15 (see below) of the 27
skills. The two observers were instructors in these
skills and had obtained 100% concordance in
independently identifying individual errors in
entry teams.
Safety and survival errors. (1) Single person
entry: A single person entry with live rounds
allowed members to demonstrate a full range of
tactical skills unencumbered by other team members. Skills 1019 were the object of these observations. (2) Team entries: Observations were made as
team members executed separate warrants into one
of four residences. The following criterion behaviours were recorded: (a) tactical mistakes (Mistake
5 1; No mistake 5 0)the number of distinct
violations in tactical skills and arrest of subject(s)
safety and survival tactical practices (items 1024);
(b) getting shot by a role playersix simulation entry
exercises were chosen for recording of this measure
(Got shot 5 1; Did not get shot 5 0). The scenarios
ensured that getting shot by a role player was to be
directly attributable to a TF members failure to
locate or identify a threat accurately, maintain
weapon discipline, remain vigilant, not respond to

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422

GIRODO

distractions, or search a subject thoroughly.

Participants were also equipped with a small round
mirror capable of rotating at the end of an
extendable metal arm, to be used for looking
around corners, inside spaces, or behind objects.
At least one scenario required the use of a mirror to
locate an armed suspect accurately in a dimly lit
alcove. When the first shot was fired it was often
accompanied by a series of weapon discharges.
Attempts at recording accurately which TF member
shot first or preemptively proved to be so unreliable
that this measure was abandoned.
Self-reported competencies. After 5 days, participants indicated the extent to which they were
strong or weak in the use of each particular skill.
They were asked to recollect their performances in
their exercises and to assign a number from 17 to
each of the 27 skills based on the following scale
anchors: Could use more attention on my part, at
the lower end, to Definitely one of the strengths I
displayed at the higher end.

RESULTS
Cognitive organization of safety and
survival skills
The scores on the 27 skills for all participants (N 5
131) were subjected to a principle components
factor analysis with varimax rotation. Eigenvalues
of 8.9 and 2.6 for the first two factors accounted
for 40% of the variance. The results for the whole
sample are not reported here due to space
limitations, but they are available from the author.
In addition, separate principle components factor
analyses with varimax rotation were conducted on
the Regular Members (n 5 67) and on the TF
Leaders (n 5 62). Table 1 describes the 27 skills
and summarizes the factor analyses. The factor
solutions revealed very similar results, but because
of the smaller samples these findings should be
treated with caution. For Regular Members, the
first factor accounted for 27% and the second
factor 21% of the variance. For TF Leaders, the

TABLE 1
Safety and survival skills factor loadings for Regular Members and Task Force Leaders
Regular Members

Planning and Preparation

1. Conducting a specific site survey
2. Taking photos, interviewing witnesses, surveillance)
3. Briefing (mission, execution, administrative, communication)
4. Conducting brief backs (report on duties and tasks)
5. Conducting interviews on location
6. Securing arrest site prior to arrest
7. Preparing for unknown persons, cross fire, and medical aid
Executing Arrest Plan
8. Making proper decision to wait, induce, or enter premises
9. Completing slow and methodical clears
10. Using mirrors to locate subjects and other persons
11. Using quick peeks around corners, over obstacles
12. Slicing the pie by repeated increase in angle field of vision
13. Moving quickly through openings
14. Maximizing the use of cover and concealment
15. Weapon close to body, pointing away; finger off trigger
16. Covering danger areas and unknown persons on site
17. Giving clear, forceful, succinct commands
Use of Handgun
18. Proficiency in shooting skills
19. Mastery of weapon
20. Proficiency in reloading skills
Arrest of Subject(s)
21. Ensuring subject kept hands in view
22. Controlling subject physically
23. Using safe handcuffing procedures
24. Searching all subjects thoroughly
Debriefing
25. Taking an active part in critiquing the operation
26. Examining if changes are needed in Operating Procedures
27. Examining any problems anyone had with the assignment
Note: Values in bold determined factor assignment.

Task Force Leaders

Reactive

Deliberative

Reactive

Deliberative

.66
.67
.34
.17
.56
.74
.39

.43
.11
.43
.75
.24
.12
.56

.09
.04
.01
.24
.29
.18
.21

.67
.58
.67
.51
.47
.55
.53

.59
.62
.39
.45
.44
.72
.71
.56
.72
.53

.39
.22
.22
.31
.38
.10
.11
.34
.41
.45

2 .05
.31
.24
.73
.63
.60
.53
.63
.56
.48

.50
.46
.58
.28
.32
.06
.34
.00
.06
.08

.35
.32
.08

.67
.66
.75

.49
.76
.25

.11
.14
.48

.62
.60
.69
.73

.29
.40
.14
.16

.53
.52
.66
.53

.11
.33
.19
.08

.15
.15
.27

.81
.83
.76

.14
.05
.10

.74
.70
.62

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first factor accounted for 19% and the second

factor 20% of the variance. The labelling of factors
into reactive or deliberative tasks/skills reflects the
lower level versus the higher level cognitive
processing inherent in the two factors.
Regular Members and TF Leaders
Two of the six personality traits distinguished
the two groups. Regular Members had higher
scores than TF Leaders on the Thrill and
Adventure Seeking scale (M 5 7.06, SD 5 2.01
vs M 5 5.54, SD 5 3.21), t(61) 5 2.30, p,.02. TF
Leaders obtained higher scores than Regular
Members on the Neuroticism scale (M 5 7.68,
SD 5 5.69 vs M 5 5.06, SD 5 3.85), t(61) 5 2.17,
p,.03.
Involvement in a deadly force incident on the
job was reported by 22 officers. Seven TF Leaders
and two Regular Members reported having
been shot on the job. Ten TF Leaders and three
Regular Members reported having shot someone on the job. None of the officers who were
shot were among those who had shot someone. In
the simulation entry exercises, 26 Regular
Members and 22 TF Leaders were shot by a role
player. At least one safety and survival error was
observed in 41 Regular Members and in 42 TF
Leaders.
Officers who were shot and who shot
someone on the job
A stepwise backward (likelihood ratio) logistic
regression analysis, considering all officers
together to predict who had had shot someone
on the job with the personality dimensions (thrill
and adventure seeking, experience seeking, disinhibition, extraversion, neuroticism, and toughmindedness), failed to produce any significant
predictions. With regard to predicting which
officers had been shot, a stepwise backward
(likelihood ratio) logistic regression on all officers
showed that, following the sequential removal of
the weakest predictors, at the fifth and final step
both neuroticism and experience seeking were
retained within the final model, x2(2) 5 15.10,
p,.001; Nagelkerke R2 5 .50; B (neuroticism) 5
.98, p,.05; B (experience seeking) 5 .81, p,.09.
Thus, while personality factors shared some
common predictive capacity, the final model was
represented by unique aspects of both neuroticism
and experience seeking. Officers who had been
shot had lower neuroticism (M 5 1.40, SD 5 1.14
vs M 5 6.64, SD 5 4.87) and lower experience
seeking scores (M 5 2.40, SD 5 .89 vs M 5 3.83,

423

SD 5 1.48) than officers who had not been

shot.
Getting shot in a simulated entry
Among the 102 officers observed making entries
into premises, 48 were shot on at least one
occasion by a role player. Of these 48 incidents,
15 were triggered by the following: 5 officers had a
failure to use available cover and concealment, 3
officers showed a lack of discipline or vigilance, 2
officers failed to identify a threat in sufficient time,
2 officers neglected to search a subject thoroughly,
2 officers failed to conduct quick peeks or slice the
pie, and 1 officer failed to clear a danger area
adequately. In the 33 other instances of officers
shot by a role player, a failure to detect a threat
with the use of a mirror triggered the assault on
the officer. Twenty-two Regular Members and 11
TF Leaders got shot by a role player in the same
scenario requiring the use of a mirror to detect a
threat. The Regular Members who got shot
reported poorer mirror skills (M 5 2.13; SD 5
1.71) compared with those who were not shot (M
5 3.83; SD 5 1.69), t 5 3.10, p,.01. In contrast,
mirror skills in TF Leaders who got shot (M 5
3.01, SD 5 1.88 did not differ from mirror skills in
TF Leaders who did not get shot (M 5 3.07, SD 5
1.83; t 5 1.28, p 5 ns).
Stepwise (likelihood ratio) logistic regression
analyses to predict who was shot in a simulated
entry with the six personality traits were conducted. Given the differences between Regular
Members and TF Leaders observed above, these
analyses were run for Regular Members and TF
Leaders separately. They showed that while
toughmindedness was a significant predictor for
both Regular Members, x2(1) 5 7.12, p,.02;
Nagelkerke R2 5 .33; B 5 .72, p,.03, and TF
Leaders, x2(1) 5 6.68, p,.01; Nagelkerke R2 5
.43; B 5 2 1.87, p,.10, the direction of the
relationship differed between the two groups. For
Regular Members the higher the toughmindedness
score (M 5 4.00, SD 5 1.87 vs M 5 2.10,
SD 5 1.91), the greater the likelihood of getting
shot, while for TF Leaders the lower the toughmindedness score (M 5 .67, SD 5 .57 vs M 5
2.80, SD 5 1.65), the greater the likelihood of
getting shot.
A stepwise backward (likelihood ratio) logistic
regression analysis to predict who was shot by a
role player based on years in law enforcement,
rounds fired per year, firearms training days per
year, and number of arrest warrants and prior
entries did not produce a significant predictor.

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Safety and survival mistakes

A stepwise backward (likelihood ratio) logistic
regression analysis on all officers using the six
personality traits to predict which officers made 0
2 errors from those who made 34 errors showed
that neuroticism was a significant predictor of
errors, x2(1) 5 5.04, p,02; R2 5 .22; B 5 .98,
p,.04.

DISCUSSION
The link between personality and getting shot on
the job, getting shot by a role player, and errors
committed in an entry argues for the ecological
validity of a complete simulation environment for
studying this class of behaviour. For TF officers,
getting shot on the job was linked to a generalized
absence of concern, worry, or apprehension (low
neuroticism) and a lower need for arousal (experience seeking) or pleasure taken from a mastery of
high-risk environments. A modicum of apprehension may be necessary to catalyze a general
preparedness for handling danger and low scores
on these personality traits may dampen attentional
mechanisms and vigilance for danger. Since
sensation seeking may be one reason for joining
an elite group, it raises a question about what
motivates low sensation seeking people to become
members of an elite unit.
In terms of theory, the findings in the study
illustrate the complexity of how features of the
task and knowledge and experience in relation to
that task interact. Two kinds of individual
differences were observed: personality traits and
cognitive organization of competencies. First,
officers who specialize in the tactical execution of
high-risk warrants are more emotionally secure
and more motivated by the thrill of the work than
officers who specialize in strategic planning and
command. Officers occupying these roles can get
shot in a simulated entry but for different reasons.
Greater toughmindedness in a tactical expert may
facilitate getting shot in a simulated entry because
recklessness and impulsiveness invites such consequences. However, when an expert in strategic
decision making gets shot in a simulated entry,
lower toughmindedness, perhaps linked to sensitivity and timidity, may be behind some of their
errors. Cognitive needs (e.g., Cacioppo et al.,
1996), or a preference for analysis and problem
solving such as that represented by System 2, may
be what distinguishes the two roles, and this could
be in part what drives the eventual self-selection of
tactical personnel to a command position. If this is

the case, self-selection may come at the price of a

greater risk of getting shot when occupying a
tactical position (see below).
The second individual difference concerns how
skills are cognitively organized by officers in the
two roles. The two factor competencies resemble
procedural (reactive) vs declarative (methodical)
knowledge systems (Anderson, 1982), and these
parallel System 1 and System 2 processes respectively. Where the TF Leaders and Regular
Members diverge on a skill factor suggests a key
difference in how that same task is perceived and
undertaken by officers in different roles. Thus, as
is seen in Table 1, survey, photo, interview and
secure, under planning and preparation, are
paradoxically relegated to the reactive factor by
Regular Members. This might be understandable
if we see their role as one of gathering information
to present to TF Leaders for analysis. TF Leaders
relegate decision, methodical, and mirror skills to
a deliberative mode of information processing
since these tasks involve higher cognitive processes
and decision making. Conscious decision making
around a task may be, in part, what bears on
factor assignment. Note, for example, that while
shooting and weapons proficiency skills involve
procedural memory and are intuitively reactive by
nature, because it is Regular Members in a tactical
encounter who are responsible for deciding
whether to pull the trigger when their life is
threatened, it is they who relegate shooting and
weapons-handling skills to the deliberative cognitive factor, where thoughtful decisional processes
take place.
Properties of a task may cue one knowledge
system over another. Some people may be predisposed to construe the task before them in a way
that invites the engagement of error-producing
cognitive systems (Stanovich & West, 2000). Why
did half as many TF Leaders as Regular Members
get shot in an entry when the proper use of a
mirror might have saved their life? The effective
use of a mirror to detect a threat clearly involves
System 2 processes. Visually, in a mirror, left
becomes right, and object size, orientation, and
distances are not what they appear. Information
from a mirror can be ambiguous, and focused
attention, careful analysis, deliberation, and reasoned inference making should characterize cognitive processes. The relegation of mirror skills to
a deliberative (System 2) process by TF Leaders
and their lower probability of getting shot by the
role player suggest a better fit between cognitive
processes and task requirements.
In the light of these findings, what can be
speculated about what the authors of the Waco

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PERSONALITY AND COGNITIVE PROCESSES

report meant when they concluded that the

commanders lack of experience led to poor
judgment? In terms of Kleins recognition-primed
decision theory, the commanders inexperience
with raids may have meant an absence of a cadre
of previously experienced prototypical situations
against which the current situation could be
compared. The Waco investigators painstakingly
reconstituted the commanders activities 1 hour
before he gave the go signal. The commanders
frame of mind could be characterized as one
dominated by a sense of haste, physical activity,
and involvement with equipment on the tarmac. It
was there that he received the critical piece of
information that people in the compound knew
that ATF was coming. The commander gave the
go signal in the next moments. He was then seen
running into the command post to call the
National Command Center about his decision,
and then scurrying out of the building into the
helicopters.
Recognition-primed decision theory postulates
that, had there been a prototypical raid schema
wrought from sufficient prior experience, then the
news of the loss of surprise would more likely have
been seen as anomalous or unfamiliar and this
would have triggered conscious, deliberate, and
effortful work (System 2) for searching out a
solution. The commander testified at the Waco
enquiry that as he sat in the helicopter on his way
to the compound, after giving the go signal, he
recalled wondering, Weve got time, why are we
hurrying? (United States Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms, 1993; Part II, Section 4,
Note 56). Not unlike the Regular Members
difficulty in adequately processing new information from a mirror when a tactical environment is
ever-present, the commanders actions on the
tarmac and this remark may be telling about
which reasoning processes prevailed when he
heard the news that people in the Branch
Davidians compound knew ATF was coming.
Kleins decision model postulates that greater
experience with executing arrest warrants would
have triggered the recognition of this as an
anomaly with past experience. The model predicts
that this recognition would have primed the use of
higher cognitive processes and the reasoning that
the only rational decision was to call off the raid.
Two comments are in order with regard to
selection and screening for tactical police squads.
First, notwithstanding the consistent finding that
very low neuroticism is associated with being shot
on the job and with making errors in simulated
entries, personality traits linked to safety and
survival may be mediated by attentional processes

425

that could be modified with training. Being

repeatedly and painfully hit by simunitions rounds
when not attending to the right environmental
cues may sharpen situational awareness. Second, a
limitation of the present study concerns the
confounding of experience in executing high-risk
warrants with individual differences in cognition.
While TF Leaders were much more likely to have
been shot on the job, it is unknown if this was
due to their greater exposure to such opportunities
or to a predisposition for cognition and a
preference for declarative knowledge. System 2
processes or a need for cognition may better
enable a mitigation of risk at the planning and
preparation phase of an encounter, but System 1
processes afford a better fit for avoiding getting
shot if tactical skills are needed. The recruitment
of officers into special squads would benefit from
research into personenvironment fit using preferences for System 1 or System 2 cognitive
processes as predictors.
Manuscript received 1 March 2006
Revised manuscript accepted 17 March 2007
First published online 9 October 2007

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