Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Economic Modelling
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ecmod
International Centre for Research in Events, Tourism and Hospitality (ICRETH), Leeds Metropolitan University, UK
School of Tourism, Bournemouth University, UK
a r t i c l e
i n f o
Article history:
Accepted 9 September 2012
JEL classication:
L83
C68
Keywords:
Economic impacts
Tourism impacts
The Beijing Olympics
Computable general equilibrium modelling
imperfect competition
a b s t r a c t
Major sports events are used increasingly by policy-makers to stimulate economic development. This has
resulted in a growth of academic interest in ways of analysing their contribution. Following a review of the
literature on the contrasting approaches that have been used, this paper assesses the economic impact of
the Beijing Olympics, in particular the tourism impact, using computable general equilibrium (CGE) modelling. To add novelty, it analyses the data under conditions of imperfect competition, an approach that has
been used to good effect in other contexts, notably international trade. The ndings suggest that staging
the Beijing Olympics brought economic benets to the host economy but that the scale of the impact was
not signicant compared to the total size of the economy. The welfare impacts of the Beijing Olympics
under imperfect competition are shown to be higher than when perfect competition is assumed. This is
explained by the pro-competitive effect.
2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Sports governing bodies, such as the International Olympic Committee
(IOC) and the Fdration Internationale de Football Association (FIFA),
have started to allocate their championships, in part, on the basis of
their potential for promoting economic development in particular contexts (Clark, 2008). In recent years, this has resulted in several major
sports events being held in developing countries; the 2008 Olympic
games in Beijing, the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa, the 2014
FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Olympic games to be held in Brazil are all
contemporary examples. Governments eager to host these events justify
their actions on the basis that gross domestic product (GDP) will increase
and, as a consequence, their populations will eventually be better off
(Dwyer et al., 2004). The efcacy of such claims is unclear and can only
be judged following rigorous empirical assessment, probably on a caseby-case basis.
Various methods have been applied to assessing the economic effects of large sports events. These include inputoutput (IO) modelling
(see Humphreys and Plummer, 1995; Jang et al., 1999), computable
general equilibrium (CGE) modelling (see Blake, 2005; Bohlmann and
Van Heerden, 2005; Giesecke and Madden, 2007; Li and Blake, 2008;
Corresponding author at: 226 Bront Building, Headingley Campus, Leeds Metropolitan University, Leeds LS6 3QW, UK. Tel.: +44 1138123483; fax: +44 1138121111.
E-mail addresses: S.Li@leedsmet.ac.uk (S. Li), ablake@bournemouth.ac.uk (A. Blake),
r.thomas@leedsmet.ac.uk (R. Thomas).
1
Mailing address: Fern Barrow, Talbot Campus, Bournemouth University, Poole,
Dorset, BH12 5BB, UK.
2
Mailing address: 214 Bront Building, Headingley Campus, Leeds Metropolitan
University, Leeds LS6 3QW, UK.
0264-9993/$ see front matter 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2012.09.013
Li et al., 2011; Madden, 2002, 2006; New South Wales Treasury, 1997)
and econometric modelling (see Baade et al., 2008; Hotchkiss, et al.,
2003; Kasimati and Dawson, 2009). Although IO modelling was the
most commonly used method in event impact analysis, it has fallen
out of favour because of the limitations of the assumptions used
(Dwyer et al., 2000). CGE modelling makes more realistic assumptions,
which helps explain why it is now considered a more appropriate approach than the IO modelling to assessing the economic impact of
events (Dwyer et al., 2004). Macro-econometric modelling is less complex and requires fewer data than CGE modelling but fails to capture the
interrelationships of different industries in an economy (Russo, 2009).
Perhaps not surprisingly, CGE modelling is gaining currency as a powerful means of assessing the economic effects of hosting major events but
its application to date remains very limited.
Previous studies of the economic impact of sports events using CGE
modelling have all applied the assumption of the perfectly competitive
markets. As this is an idealised market structure, it may be useful analytically but is ultimately unrealistic. The economic impacts of events estimated using perfectly competitive market assumptions can, therefore,
only be valid in the context of an ideal economy and may differ signicantly from the real economy. Most markets are imperfectly competitive,
in particular service industries which have a variety of products, high
markup and restrictions to entry (Blake et al., 2006). Most industries affected by the staging of large sports events are services related to tourism
such as restaurants, hotels, media, communication and entertainment. It
seems appropriate, therefore, to assume imperfect competition when
evaluating the economic effects of sports events. CGE modelling with imperfect competition has been widely used in the eld of international
trade, such as trade policy analysis, trade integration and liberalisation,
236
3
The estimation of the economic impacts of large sporting events normally covers a
long run period, including pre-, during and post-event stages and so one approach
might be to employ a dynamic model. However, the purpose of this paper was to explore the inuence of imperfect competition on the estimation, and there was a danger
of diverting the focus to a discussion of dynamics. Therefore, in this paper we incorporate imperfect competition to a static model and leave the dynamic issue to further
research.
4
See Lofgren et al. (2002) for detailed discussion of the structure of this standard
model.
It is assumed that rms compete in a DixitStiglitz type of imperfectly competitive setting (as in Harris, 1984; Harrison et al., 1997). In
the DixitStiglitz setting of perfect competition model, all rms in the
same industry produce exactly the same products. To model the feature of heterogeneous goods in an imperfectly competitive market, it
is assumed that each rm produces one variety of one type of good,
which is different from other varieties supplied by other rms in
the same industry. For example, tour operators supply tour packages
and each package can be seen as one variety, which is not exactly the
same as another tour package (or another variety) in terms of different destinations, or hotels or transport and so on. In this case, each
tour package can be seen as a variety of the product. In the model, it
is assumed that each rm only produces one variety. Internal economic scale at the rm level is formed due to the product diversity,
but constant returns to scale is assumed at the industry level.
Mark-up can be obtained from both domestic and exported goods. A
dummy sector named entrepreneur is specied in the model. This
new sector collects mark-ups and pays for xed costs. It is assumed
that free entry and exit are allowed which means that the number
of rms in each industry is endogenous.
A key challenge in introducing imperfect competition into CGE
models is the way to model mark-up, which is the difference between
the market price and the marginal cost. There are different ways to introduce mark-up into the standard model with perfect competition.
In the model built for this paper, the mark-up is regarded as endowment of the representative entrepreneur, who demands xed costs. In
other words, the mark-up is used to pay xed costs. Two types of
mark-ups are identied: the mark-up of domestic goods and the
markup of exported goods. The number of rms in the market determines the level of the mark-up the more rms competing in the
market, the less the total mark-up, and vice versa. The share of production of each rm is assumed to be the same.
The general mark-up rate formula is 5:
1 1
1
Mark uprate 1
N
For details of how this formula is induced, please see Blake et al. (1999).
For details of introducing tourism to CGE models, please see Wattanakuljarus and
Coxhead (2008) and Li et al. (2011).
6
237
er
ptour
TourElas1
where
er
ptour
238
20
Nj p :
R
To foreign countries
239
Total exports
Total supply
Domestic goods
Intermediate inputs
Input(1)
Input(2)
Imported goods
From
foreign
countries
Value-added
Input(n)
Factor(1)
Input(2)
From
rest of
China
Input(n)
Organising Committee for the Olympic Games and the Olympic Coordination Committee to estimate the new money brought by the
Sydney Olympics. Blake (2005) used the data provided by the London
Olympic Committee when estimating the new money brought by
the London Olympics. Increased tourism expenditure precipitated
by the Beijing Olympics is injected into the economy of the host city
before, during and after the Olympic Games. It is considered a tourism
demand shock to the Beijing model. As estimating Beijing Olympicrelated investment and expenditure is not the focus of this paper,
the data for new money injected into the economy is adapted
from the estimates predicted by Li and Blake (2009). Li and Blake
(2009) has built a framework in evaluating the Olympic expenditure
and investment, which consist of operation expenditure by the Olympic Committee, Olympic-related national and international tourism
expenditure, investment in Olympic-related infrastructure, investment in Olympic venues and related facilities, and exports and foreign
investment legacies. This framework has been applied to estimating
the new money injected into China and Beijing due to holding the
2008 Beijing Olympics. The estimation is based on the data published
by the Beijing Olympic Committee, Beijing and China Bureau of Statistics, Beijing and China Tourism Administration, and Research Ofce of
Beijing Municipal Government.
In previous studies, the impact of holding a mega event is
conceptualised in three stages: pre-event (from the year of being
told that the bid has been successful to the year the event is held),
the year the event is held and the post-event stage. These three stages
normally last between ten and twelve years (Li and Blake, 2009;
Madden, 2006). Tourism expenditure brought to Beijing due to the
Olympics is divided into four categories: Olympic international visitors and tourism legacies, national visitors and tourism legacies. The
estimation was for each year during three stages: pre-Games
(20042007), Games' year (2008) and post-Games (20092013). Li
and Blake (2009) have explained the difference between Olympic visitors and Olympic tourism legacies. Visitors include tourists whose
purpose of visiting the host city is to watch the Olympics or to participate in the Olympics, such as athletes, media visitors, sponsors and
Olympic family. Visitors arrive at a host city during the event. Tourism
legacies include tourists arriving at the host city before or after the
Olympics and their visits are indirectly related to holding the Olympics. For example, extensive media coverage during the Olympics
may build a good image of tourism destination for the host city,
which may generate tourism legacies. Olympic visitors visited Beijing
during the Games' year and tourism legacies generated in pre- and
post-Games stages. The total tourism expenditure generated by holding the Beijing Olympics was estimated as $4948 million in the central scenario by Li and Blake (2009). Different predictions of tourism
spending can affect the economic impact and thus low and high scenarios are designed to show the differences. The low scenario is
one-tenth of the central scenario and the high scenario is ten times
that of the central scenario. 15
To introduce a tourism demand shock to the models, Eq. (2)
discussed earlier will be used. The two key parameters in Eq. (2) are
price elasticity of foreign tourism demand (TourElas) and shift parameter for foreign tourism demand (TourShift). The value of TourElas is
taken as 1.37 according to recent research conducted by Song and
Fei (2006). TourShift can be obtained by calculating the percentage
of the increased tourism receipts brought by holding the Beijing
Olympics over total tourism exports. The increased tourism demand
brought by holding the Beijing Olympics shocks the models through
multiplying each industry in tourism exports by TourShift. 16
Sensitivity analysis was used to test the reliability and condence
of the CGE models. The main assumptions and parameters in the
model, such as elasticities, may introduce uncertainties into the
model. Previously, sensitivity tests 1 and 2 had been introduced
when (in Formula 3) was assigned 15 and 20 respectively. Another
ve sensitivity tests are conducted. In the analysis of the tourism impacts, a key elasticity in the model is the price elasticity of international tourism demand. In order to test the degree of effects that
this elasticity might bring to the results, the base elasticity (1.37)
was halved to be 0.685 and doubled to be 2.74 in sensitivity
tests 3 and 4. Sensitivity analyses 5 to 7 were applied to three groups
of main elasticities: Armington elasticities, output transformation
elasticities, and factor substitution elasticities, used in the model by
doubling one elasticity and maintaining the other two unchanged.
For example, Armington elasticities were doubled while output transformation elasticities and factor substitution elasticities were kept the
same as the base case. Each group of elasticities included 130 elasticities for the 130 industries in the Beijing 2002 IO table.
15
A large scale (ten times) is used in the high scenario in order to clearly show the
inuence of different predictions of model inputs to the model results.
16
For example, to calculate the TourShift for international visitors, the total tourism exports are foreign exchange earnings of international tourism, which are
$3620 million. This is the base case the base scenario without the Beijing Olympics occurring. The increased international visitor expenditure brought by holding
the Beijing Olympics was estimated as $713 million in 2008, which is tourism demand shock. The ratio of the demand shock to the base scenario would be 713/
3620 = 0.2. In order to shock the model, TourShift in the above function is assigned
the value of 1 + 0.2 = 1.2. The TourShift 1.2 multiplies tourism exports to foreign
countries in each industry, which would generate increased tourism demand (demand shock) for the corresponding industry.
240
Table 1
The impact of international and national visitors and tourism legacies in Beijing (the central scenario, imperfect competition IC model).
Central scenario
Calculation
International visitors
National visitors
A
B
C
D
E
A/B
A/C
A/E
119
713
693
0.337
708
0.167
0.172
0.169
284
1694
1636
0.804
1678
0.168
0.174
0.169
59
449
449
0.0003
449
0.132
0.132
0.132
276
2092
2090
0.003
2090
0.132
0.132
0.132
4. Findings
4.1. The economic effects at the macro-economic level
The equivalent variation (EV) is dened as the income that must
be given to an agent, at some xed set of prices, to make them as
well-off as they would be under some policy change (Hanslow,
2001: 23) or in this paper under demand shocks to an economy by
holding a large-scale event. EV normally employs the money metric
utility function and is the most used indicator when measuring welfare in CGE modelling in the literature (see Ahmed, 2008; Fane and
Ahammad, 2003; Margaret and Mabugu, 2008). In this paper, EV is
employed to measure the economic welfare impact of holding a
large-scale event. As the model assumes that real government consumption is unchangeable, the calculation of EV only captures
changes in private utility (household welfare).
Following other economic impact evaluations, two scenarios are
assumed in this paper: the base scenario, which assumes that the
event would not happen, and the event scenario. The latter causes a
demand shock with extra investment and expenditure brought by
the event. EV in this paper captures the amount of income that
would have to be given to (or taken away from) the host economy
in the base scenario in order to leave the economy as well off as the
economy would be in the event scenario.
Table 1 shows the main results of the impact of the additional
spending of visitors and tourism legacies generated due to holding
the Beijing Olympics under the model with imperfect competition.
The second column shows the calculation for each row. For example,
row A/B is obtained by dividing values in row A by row B. It can be
seen that international ($284 million) and national ($276 million)
tourism legacies contribute much more than international ($119 million) and national ($59 million) visitors' expenditure respectively to
the change in EV which measures the household welfare gains (row
A) in 2008 prices. In general, results from row A to row E for the columns of both international and national tourism legacies are larger
than those of visitors respectively. It might be because Table 1 reports
on the total tourism legacies for ten years (20042013), while it reports on visitors for only one year (2008). The ndings reveal the importance of encouraging tourism legacies and prolonging the period
of legacies when holding sports events.
In each column, the changes in real tourism consumption (row C)
are less than the changes in international tourism demand (row B),
which is the demand shock brought by holding the Beijing Olympics.
This occurs because there is an increase in price of foreign tourism consumption (row D), which offsets international tourism demand. The
change in tourism expenditure (row E) is the combination of the
changes in real tourism consumption (row C) and the price of tourism
consumption. Every unit change in tourism demand (row A/B) leads
to a change in welfare by 0.17 and 0.13 generated by international
and national tourism. Each unit of tourism expenditure generates
around 0.17 and 0.13 of the welfare value for international and national
tourism (row A/D). It implies that international tourism contributes
more to the economic welfare than national tourism. This might be because the composition of tourism expenditure by international and national tourists is different (please see Appendix A) international
tourists spend on more expensive tourism products, such as air transports and three to ve star hotels while national tourists may spend
on shopping, food and beverage, which are relatively cheaper tourism
products.
When the results generated from the model with imperfect competition (Table 1) are compared with perfect competition (Table 2)
for both international and national tourism effects, larger changes in
welfare (row A) and in real tourism consumption (row C) can be observed in the imperfect competition model. The ndings can be
explained by pro-competitive and anti-competitive effects, which
have a signicant inuence on the economic impacts generated in
the imperfect competition model.
Pro-competitive effects probably play a dominant role in the Beijing
model with imperfect competition. As discussed in the previous paragraph, pro-competitive effects happen when demand increases in industries which are highly concentrated. The Beijing Olympics would
increase demand for tourism services and products provided by
tourism-related industries and these industries are highly concentrated.
When tourism spending ows into tourism related industries and more
rms enter the market, the level of competition increases, which generates pro-competitive effects. However, demand would decrease in
other industries, such as primary and manufacturing and these industries are highly competitive. This process can generate larger welfare
gains. The concentration ratios R (%) for most of the tourism-related industries such as communication, travel and leisure, transport, accommodation, catering and recreation are above 50%, which indicates that
these industries are highly concentrated. On the other hand, the ratios
for most of the other non-tourism industries are below 50%, which indicates that these industries are highly competitive.
In three scenarios (low, central and high), when the tourism expenditure brought by holding the Olympics varies, it leads to a large
change in economic welfare (see Appendix C). Higher tourism demand can bring higher real tourism consumption, which leads to
larger welfare gains. It implies that it is important to formulate policies to encourage tourism demand during the Olympics. The prediction of increased tourism expenditure in the ex-ante estimation
studies can greatly affect the quality of the ndings. If the expenditure
is over-estimated, changes in welfare brought by holding an event are
likely to be over-estimated.
Seven sensitivity analyses have been designed to evaluate the robustness and reliability of the model results. In the rst two sensitivity
tests, when the parameter in Formula 3 is assigned 15 and 20, changes
in EV and EV per expenditure in the two tests are very close to the base
case ( = 10). In another two tests, when halving and doubling price
elasticity of tourism demand, change in EV per change in tourism expenditure remains almost the same. The nal tests are to double
Armington, output transformation, and factor substitution elasticities
respectively while the other two remain unchanged, and the model
does not change output qualitatively.
241
Table 2
The impact of international and national visitors and tourism legacies (the central scenario, perfect competition PC model).
Central scenario
Calculation
International
visitors
International tourism
legacies
National visitors
National tourism
legacies
A
B
C
D
E
A/B
A/C
A/E
109
713
682
0.526
705
0.153
0.16
0.154
261
1694
1604
1.254
1670
0.154
0.163
0.156
42
449
445
0.014
448
0.095
0.095
0.095
199
2092
2073
0.065
2085
0.095
0.095
0.095
Table 3
The industry impact of Olympic tourism (the central scenario, IC model).
Central scenario
Percentage change
of price index (%)
Percentage change
of output (%)
Primary industry
Secondary industry
Railway transport
Road transport
Water transport
Air transport
Communication
Accommodation
Catering
Tourism
Residential services
Recreation
Other tertiary industries
15.0
429.7
26.2
104.8
0.4
735.7
84.0
412.0
219.025
148.0
5.1
109.5
91.7
16.0
733.8
93.0
246.1
0.3
167.4
31.3
470.9
542.1
177.5
4.7
156.5
98.2
1.206
1.020
1.194
1.227
1.118
1.302
1.292
1.256
1.195
1.085
1.223
1.040
1.247
0.093
0.168
1.45
0.859
0.364
5.085
0.089
3.003
2.289
10.092
0.041
3.441
0.012
242
Table 4
Comparison of the industry impact of the Olympic tourism.
Central scenario
Primary industry
Secondary industry
Railway transport
Road transport
Water transport
Air transport
Communication
Accommodation
Catering
Tourism
Residential services
Recreation
Other tertiary
IC model
0.230
0.237
1.553
0.831
0.303
4.801
0.176
2.855
2.197
9.602
0.003
3.359
0.015
0.093
0.168
1.45
0.859
0.364
5.085
0.089
3.003
2.289
10.092
0.041
3.441
0.012
5. Conclusion
This paper has applied CGE modelling with imperfect competition to assess the economic impact of the 2008 Beijing Olympics.
The ndings demonstrate that holding the Beijing Olympics brought
benets to the local people but that the scale of the impact was
not signicant compared to the total size of the economy. The
Beijing Olympics were estimated in this paper to have brought
$119 million and $59 million of welfare gains from Olympic international and national visitors in 2008 respectively. The real gross
domestic product (GDP) in Beijing was $178 billion for 2008
(Beijing Municipal Bureau of Statistics, 2009); the Olympic impact
only accounts for 0.1% of the total GDP in Beijing. Understandably,
the larger the economy of the host city (and country), the smaller
the economic impact from holding a large event as a percentage of
the economy as a whole.
This research has implications for other city authorities who intend to host major sports events for the purposes of economic development. As the ndings suggest, an increase in economic welfare
could be generated in the period after the event if careful planning
is undertaken prior to and during its staging to building an image of
the city as a tourist destination. Indeed, tourism legacy impacts are
considered to be one of the most important reasons why countries
and/or cities take an interest in hosting major events, especially developing countries (Cornelissen, 2004). Those planning the 2012
London Olympics, the 2014 Football World Cup and the 2016 Olympics in Brazil, would, therefore, do well to consider tourism legacies
well in advance of these events. In addition, seeking to obtain direct
economic benets should not be the only reason for developing countries to hold a mega event. There are potentially other socio-cultural
justications that may be equally powerful ranging from promoting
participation in sport to changing the image of particular places.
The paper has revealed that the welfare impacts of the Beijing Olympics under imperfect competition structure are higher than when perfect
competition is assumed. This can be explained by the pro-competitive
effect. Holding the Beijing Olympics attracted additional tourism expenditure on products and services supplied by tourism-related industries.
This increased the number of rms entering these industries which
led to a decrease in mark-up. This pro-competitive process happened
in Beijing because tourism-related industries were highly concentrated.
The ndings imply, therefore, that the economic impact of a sports
Tourism foreign
exchange earnings
Earnings created by
tourists from the rest of
China
Item
Value
($ million)
Percentage
(%)
Value
($ million)
Percentage
(%)
Total
Long-distance
transportation expenses
Air
Railway
Highway
Local transportation
expenses
Accommodation
Food and beverage
Shopping
Post and
telecommunications
Tickets of tourism spots
Culture and
entertainment
Other
3620.0
1277.9
100.0
35.3
15,869.7
2031.3
100.0
12.8
1118.6
39.8
119.5
39.8
30.9
1.1
3.3
1.1
904.6
5.7
626.3
333.0
720.4
123.1
17.3
9.2
19.9
3.4
2729.6
3142.2
3824.6
174.6
17.2
19.8
24.1
1.1
170.1
166.5
4.7
4.6
1444.1
492.0
9.1
3.1
162.9
4.5
1126.7
7.1
The above table displays values and percentage of tourism expenditure on different tourism products and services. It can be observed
that foreign tourists spend most of their money on long-distance
transportation while domestic tourists from the rest of China spend
most of their money on shopping. Tourism foreign exchange earnings
account for a part of total exports to foreign countries and earnings
created by tourists from the rest of China are a part of total exports
to the rest of China. For the purpose of the research, tourism exports
to foreign countries and the rest of China are separated from the total
exports respectively based on the above table.
:
MARKUPNX j 1 omegaj
j subddj
Nj
subddj
The equations of the mark-up of non-tourism exported goods and
domestic goods are generated based on existing literature. It is assumed that each sector only produces one variety of goods. See
Blake et al. (1999) for the details of the underlying theory regarding
these equations.
The equation of the mark-up rate of domestic goods is calibrated
to be:
1
MARKUPDj 1 omegaj
Nj
"
ExpendSj
1
1
subdxj
1
1
subdxj subddj
1
subddj
where
MARKUPNXj is mark-up of non-tourism exported goods in sector j
MARKUPDj is mark-up of domestic goods in sector j
omegaj is a conjectural variation term (a prediction of supplier for
other suppliers' actions after it changes the quantity of production); this parameter is assumed to be zero
is the number of rms in sector j
Nj
is the elasticity of demand for exports in sector j
j
ExpendSj is the share of expenditure for domestic produced good in
total production in sector j
is the elasticity of substitution between demand for domessubdxj
tic and for exported good in sector j
is the elasticity of substitution between domestic goods in
subddj
sector j.
Tourism exports cannot use the mark-up rate of non-tourism
exported goods. Non-tourism goods sell to foreign customers abroad
while tourism exports, such as accommodation and catering sell domestically to foreign visitors arriving at Beijing. Therefore, tourism
exports use the mark-up rate for domestic goods.
Appendix C. Comparisons of the international tourism impact
between the Beijing models with perfect and imperfect competition
in three scenarios
EV ($, million)
Low scenario
Central scenario
High scenario
National tourism
International tourism
(PC)
(IC)
(PC)
(IC)
48
242
1254
67
335
1676
73
373
2019
81
405
2085
243
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Dr. ShiNa Li is Senior Lecturer in Events Management at Leeds Metropolitan University. Before she joined Leeds Met, ShiNa worked as a university teacher in Tourism at the
University of Nottingham, where she obtained her PhD. Her thesis topic is The economic impact of mega-events: a CGE approach to the Beijing Olympic Games. Her research interest includes economic and social impact evaluation, tourism economics,
computable general equilibrium modelling, mega-events and developing countries.
Adam Blake is Professor of Economics and Deputy Director of International Centre for
Tourism & Hospitality Research. His expertise includes CGE modelling, tourism economics, poverty and climate change mitigation. One of his most recent projects included a detailed study on the economic impact of London 2012, which formed part of the
UK Government's Olympic Games Impact Study. He has carried out research and consultancy work for key UK government departments, including Culture, Media & Sport,
Revenue & Customs, regional development agencies and the Treasury. He has worked
with the European Commission, as well as a number of overseas governments.
Rhodri Thomas is Professor of Tourism and Events Policy and Head of the International Centre for Research in Events, Tourism and Hospitality (ICRETH) at Leeds Metropolitan University. His research interests include the use of events and festivals to achieve
public policy goals. He is currently working on or has recently completed projects
funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and various government agencies.