CASE

SECTION 22
Senate vs. Ermita

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING

Senate conduct inquiries or investigations in

aid of legislation w/c call for attendance of
officials and employees of the executive dept,
bureaus, offices including GOCC, AFP, PNP

Whether or not Congress can

compel appearance of executive
officials under Section 22 of the
Consti

NO

Sept. 2005: Senate called for attendance of

various Executive Officials
-as resource speakers in public hearing on
railway project of North Luzon Railways Corp
Group
-to help in investigating of alleged
OVERPRICING and other unlawful
provisions of the contract
Senate also invited (thru Senate Committee on
National Defense and Security): officials of AFP
to be resource speakers inquiring on
GLORIAGATE SCANDAL and alleged
WIRETAPPING of the Pres. (Garci tapes)
Gen. Senga postpone hearing for some
meetings need to attend; AND
Exec. Sec. Ermita: believes he needs time to
review issues
Sept. 28, 2005:
President issued EO 464: Ensuring Observance
of the Principles of Sep of Powers, Adherence to
the Rule on Exec Privilege & Respect for the
Rights of Public Officials Appearing in
Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Leg Under the
Consti
-it prohibit Dept heads, Senior officials of exec
depts. who in the judgment of dept heads
covered by executive privilege
-Generals and flag officers of AFP and other
officers in the judgment of Chief of Staff covered
by exec privilege

*the words were copy-pasted from the original case

BLOCK A

Section 21- relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid

of legislation.
-Its aim is to elicit information that may be used for
legislation.
Section 22- pertains to the power to conduct a question hour
-the objective of which is to obtain
information in pursuit of Congress' oversight function
Section 22 of Article VI is called the question hour
-(compared to Section 21) grants the Congress the power to
inquire in pursuit of its oversight functions
-as compared to those made in legislation (Section 21)
-the question here is how officials are implementing
certain statutes which makes them in the certain
investigation report to the legislative
-In cases of question hour, the executive officer may refuse
to go and this rationale is based on the separation of powers

given such inquiry is not in aid of

legislation and does not contravene the legislative
powers of Congress
THUS in Section 22, executive heads are exempt from the
question hour by validly claiming privilege but not because
of their position.
Congress can compel the appearance of executive
officials under Section 21, but NOT under Section 22.
-the only way for department heads to exempt themselves
therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege
In the letter given by Exec. Sec. Ermita, he does not
specify:
-whether the secret that is kept is for whether military,
diplomatic, etc. purposes
-Congress needs to know why such invocation is proper and

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-PPNP officers w/ rank superintendent or

higher and other who in the judgment of National
Security Adviser are covered by exec privilege
-OTHER OFFICERS determined by Pres from
reappearing in hearings conducted by Congress
w/o FIRST securing Pres APPROVAL
AFTER THE ISSUANCE OF EO:

deprives Congress of its processes to investigate

Gen. Senga refused to go to investigation

Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen Gudani pushed w/
event and reprimanded by Arroyo for defying EO
464
-they were removed from their position and made
to face court martial proceedings
North Rail Transport investigation: Exec Sec
Ermita and others did not push through w/
investigation
Section 23
SANLAKAS vs.
Exec Secretary

Oakwood Incident of Rebellion between 3 junior

officers of the AFP:
-demanded the resignation of the President and
other executive officials because of the worsening
corruption.

Whether or not the proclamation

calling state of rebellion is proper

President issued Proclamation 427 and General

Order 4:
-declared a state of rebellion and calling the AFP
to suppress such rebellion
Petitioners assert: Proclamation order 427 and
General order 4 is unconstitutional claimed:
1. Section 18 Article 7 of the constitution
in so far that it does not authorize a
declaration of a state of rebellion
2. presidential issuances cannot be
construed as an exercise of emergency
powers as the congress has not
delegated any power to the president.

*the words were copy-pasted from the original case

BLOCK A

the President is granted a sequence of graduated powers:

-power to suspend and the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus and power to declare martial law
Constitution requires the concurrence of two conditions:
1. an actual invasion or rebellion
2. public safety requires the exercise of such power.
Article not only vests to the president the commander-inchief power but also with executive powers
Thus, the Presidents authority to declare a state of rebellion
springs in the main from her powers as chief executive and
draws strength from the commander-in-chief powers
Sec. 4 chapter 2 Book III (Office of the President) of the
Revised Administrative Code of 1987:
-states that the presidents proclamation gives notice to the
nation that such state exists that the
-AFP may be called upon to prevent or suppress it.

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3.
4.

Ampatuan v. Hon.
DILG Secretary
Puno

it was an unwarranted and abuse of

power to
exercise martial law

Day after the infamous Ampatuan massacre

happened:
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued
Proclamation 1946
-placing the provinces of Maguindanao, Sultan
Kudarat, and Cotabato City under a state of
emergency
-she then directed the AFP and PNP allowed by
Consti and by law to prevent and suppress all
incidents of lawless violence in the said areas
3 days later:
PGMA issued Administrative order 273:
-transfers the supervision of the ARMM from
the Office of the President to the Department of
Interior and Local Government (DILG)
-transfer was then changed to
delegate/delegating because of some issues
raised over the terminology (it was amended)

Whether President Arroyo invalidly

exercised emergency powers when
she called out the AFP and the PNP
to prevent and suppress all incidents
of lawless violence in Maguindanao,
Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City

Mere declaration of a state of rebellion cannot diminish or

violate constitutionally protected rights:
-purely executive powers vested on the President by Sec. 1
and 18 Art. 7
-as opposed to the delegated legislative powers
contemplated by Section 23 (2) of Article 6.
NO
The President did not proclaim a national
emergency, only a state of emergency in the
three places mentioned
-And she did not act pursuant to any law enacted by
Congress that authorized her to exercise extraordinary
powers
-calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence: power that the Constitution directly vests
in the President a stated in Section 18 of Article 7
-she did not need a congressional authority to exercise the
same.

Petitioner contend:
President unlawfully exercised emergency powers
when she ordered the deployment of AFP and
PNP personnel in the places mentioned in the
proclamation.
-such deployment is NOT by itself an exercise of
emergency powers as understood under Section
23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution
Section 24
Tolentino vs.
Secretary of
Finance

BILLS OF LOCAL APPLICATION

These are motions seeking reconsideration of our
Whether or not RA 7716 violated
decision:
Section 24 Article VI of the
dismissing the petitions filed in these cases for the Constitution
declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No.

*the words were copy-pasted from the original case

BLOCK A

NO
NOT the LAW but the REVENUE BILL which is required
by the Constitution to "originate exclusively" in the House

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7716 - known as the Expanded Value-Added

Tax Law
Petitioners claimed: R.A. No. 7716 did not
"originate exclusively" in the House of
Representatives as required by Art. VI, 24 of the
Constitution.
(When it reached the Senate)
They contend that: Senate did not pass it on
second and third readings.
-Instead what the Senate did
was to pass its own version (S. No. 1630)
-which it approved on May 24, 1994
-Senate committee should have done was to
amend H. No. 11197 by striking out the text of the
bill and substituting it with the text of S. No. 1630
-IN THAT WAY: "the bill remains a House bill
and the Senate version just becomes the text
(only the text) of the House bill."
THUS they believe that Republic Act No. 7716
did not "originate exclusively" in the House of
Representatives as required by Art. VI, 24 of the
Constitution
-BECAUSE IT IS the result of the consolidation
of two distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No.
1630
to be considered as having originated in the
House: Republic Act No. 7716 must retain the
essence of H. No. 11197

of Representatives
-a bill originating in the House may undergo such extensive
changes in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of
the whole
-as a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be
produced.
To insist that a revenue statute NOT ONLY BILL initiated
for the enactment of law
-must substantially be the same as the House bill would be
to deny the Senate's power not only to "concur with
amendments" but also to "propose amendments."
-violate the coequality of legislative power of the two
houses of Congress
-make the HR more superior than the Senate
what the Constitution simply means:
-initiative for filing revenue, tariff, or tax bills, bills
authorizing an increase of the public debt, etc MUST
COME FROM THE HR becausethe members of the House
can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and
problems
-ON THE OTHER HAND: the senators, who are
elected at large, are expected to approach the same
problems from the national perspective
-BOTH VIEWS MADE TO BEAR ENACTMENT OF
SUCH LAWS
Constitution does not prohibit the filing in the Senate of a
SUBSTITUTE BILL in anticipation of its receipt of the bill
from the House, as long as it withheld pending receipt of
the House Bill
-because revenue bills are required to originate exclusively
in the House of Representatives:
-Senate cannot enact revenue measures of its own without
such bills
After a revenue bill is passed and sent over to it by the
House:
- Senate certainly can pass its own version on the same

*the words were copy-pasted from the original case

BLOCK A

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Pascual vs.
Secretary of Public
Works

subject matter
-Senate can practically re-write a bill
required to come from the House and leave only a
trace of the original bill
Article 6 Section 24 provides that:
but the Senate may
propose or concur with amendments.
APPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC REVENUE FOR PUBLIC PURPOSE
In 1953:
Whether or not the appropriation of
NO
RA 920 was passed
85K for the construction of the
-law appropriated P85,000.00 for the
feeder roads is valid
GENERAL RULE: legislature is without power to
construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and
appropriate public revenue for anything but a public
improvement of Pasig feeder road terminals
purpose
-essential character of the DIRECT OBJECT of the
Pascual (governor of Rizal) assailed: validity of
expenditure w/c must determine the validity as
the law
JUSTIFYING A TAX; and NOT the magnitude of the
-He claimed that the appropriation was actually
interest to be affected NOR degree to which the general
going to be used for private use for the terminals
advantage of the community, and thus the public welfare
sought to be improved were part of the Antonio
will be promoted
Subdivision
-said Subdivision is owned by Senator Zulueta
INCIDENTAL to the public or to the state: results from the
who was a member of the same Senate that passed
promotion of private interest and the prosperity of private
and approved the same RA
enterprises DOES NOT justify their aid by the use public
money
Pascual claimed: Zulueta misrepresented in
Congress the fact that he owns those terminals
the donation to the Government: over five (5) months after
-his property would be unlawfully enriched at the
the approval and effectivity of said Actfor the purpose of
expense of the taxpayers
giving a "semblance of legality", or legalizing, the
-prayed that the Sec of Public Works be restrained
appropriation in question:
from releasing funds for such purpose
DID NOT CURE ITS BASIC DEFECT
Zulueta (as an afterthought): donated the said
property to the City of Pasig

SC ruled that said donation violated the provision

of our fundamental law prohibiting members of
Congress from being directly or indirectly financially
interested in any contract with the
Government
For the construction of the projected feeder roads in
question with public funds would greatly enhance or
increase the value of the aforementioned subdivision of

*the words were copy-pasted from the original case

BLOCK A

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respondent Zulueta, "aside from relieving him from the

burden of constructing his subdivision streets or roads at his
own expense";
The donation of the property to the government to
make the property public does not cure the
constitutional defect:
-fact that the law was passed when the said property was
still a private property cannot be ignored.
Said appropriation sought a private purpose, and, hence,
was null and void.
SECTION 25 RULES ON APPROPRIATION

Garcia vs. Mata

PROHIBITION OF INCREASE
PROHIBITION ON RIDERS IN APPROPRIATION BILLS
July 1956: date when RA 1600 too effect:
Whether the subject provision
NO
Garcia has an accumulated active commissioned
contained in an act is embraced in
service of 10 yrs, 5 months, and 5 days in the AFP the subject and is properly
RA 1600 appropriated money for the
connected therewith, the subject to
operation of the Government for the fiscal year
EUSEBIO GARCIA- reserve officer in active
be considered is the one expressed
1956-1957
duty the Armed Forces of the Philippines until his
in the title of the act.
reversion to inactive status on Nov. 1960 pursuant
PAR. 11: refers to the fundamental government policy
to RA 2332
matters of the calling to active duty and the reversion to
inactive status of reserve officers in the AFP
1969: brought an action to compel the Sec of Natl
-it violated Art. VI, Sec. 21, par. 1 of the 1935 Constitution
Defense and Chief of Staff of the AFP to
provided that: "No bill which may
reinstate him in the active commissioned service
be enacted into law shall embrace more than
of the AFP, readjust his rank as of Captain, and
one subject which shall be expressed in the title of
to pay all the emoluments and allowances due to
the bill."
home from the tome of his reversion to inactive
-NULLIFIED AND RENDERED INOPERATIVE ANY
status
PROVISION contained in the body of an act not fairly
included in the subject expressed in the title OR was NOT
He claims: his reversion to inactive status in 15
germane to or properly connected with that subject.
Nov 1960 is in violation of the par. 11of the
special provision which prohibits the reversion to
Constitutional provision was intended to
inactive status of reserve officers on active duty
preclude the insertion of riders in legislation:
with at least 10 years of accumulated active
RIDER being a provision not germane to the subject-matter
commissioned service
of the bill
He contend that: said provision no relevance to

*the words were copy-pasted from the original case

BLOCK A

Par. 11 is unconstitutional, invalid and inoperative.

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Farinas vs.
Executive Sec

the budget in question or to any appropriation

item CONTAINED therein
-and is therefore proscribed by then Article 6,
Section 19 par.2 of 1935 consti
RA No. 9006: An Act to Enhance the holding of
Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible
Elections through fair election practices,
-consolidation of the following bills originating
from the House of Representatives and the Senate
(from the Omnibus Election Code; SB no.
1742 with the same title as RA 9006.)

Whether Section 14 of RA 9006 is

unconstitutional

Sec. 14 of the RA 9006 repeals Sec. 67 of the

Omnibus Election Code (OEC)
SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office.
Any
elective official, whether national or local,
running for any office other than the one which he
is holding in a permanent capacity, except for
President and Vice- President, shall be considered
ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing
of his certificate of candidacy.
With the repeal of Sec. 67: all elective officials
are now placed on equal footing as they are
allowed to finish their respective terms even if
they run for any office
-whether the presidency, vice-presidency or other
elective positions, other than the one they are
holding in a permanent capacity.

Belgica vs. Ochoa

Petitioners allege: Section 14 of RA 9006 as it

repeals Section 67 of the OEC, is unconstitutional
for being in violation of Sec. 26(1), Art. VI of the
Constitution
SPECIAL PURPOSE OF FUND
Petitioners: assailing the constitutionality of the
Whether or not Pork Barrel violates
Pork
Article 6 Section 25 (4) of the
Barrel System
Constitution

*the words were copy-pasted from the original case

BLOCK A

NO
The title is so broad that it encompasses all the
processes involved in an election exercise,
including the filing of certificates of candidacy by
elective officials
Section 67 is germane to the general subject of
Rep. Act No. 9006: eliminates the effect of prematurely
terminating the term of an elective official by his filing of a
certificate of candidacy for an office other than the one
which he is permanently holding
-legislature is not required to make the title of the act
a complete index of its contents
Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is Not a Rider
-title and the objectives of RA 9006 are comprehensive
enough to include the repeal of Sec. 67 of the OEC
-To require that the said repeal of Sec. 67 of the Code
be expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a
complete index of its content
Legislators considered Sec. 67 of the OEC as a
form of harassment or discrimination that had to be
done away with and repealed

YES
Section 25(4), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution requires that the "special
appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for

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Pork Barrel: refers to an appropriation of

government spending meant for localized projects
and secured solely or primarily to bring money to
a
representative's district
In the Philippines: pork barrel
-has been commonly referred to as lump-sum,
discretionary funds of Members of the
Legislature,
-although, its usage would evolve in reference to
certain funds of the President such as the
Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social
Fund.
Malampaya Funds- special fund created under
PD 910 issued by then President Marcos for the
development of indigenous energy resources vital
to
economic growth.

which it is intended, and shall be supported by

funds actually available as certified by the National
Treasurer, or to be raised by a corresponding
revenue proposal therein."
Under the 2013 PDAF Article:
- the amount of P24.79 Billion only appears as a collective
allocation limit since the said amount would be further
divided among individual legislators who would then
receive personal lump-sum allocations
-AFTER the GAA is passed
-intermediate appropriations are made by legislators
only after the GAA is passed and hence, outside of
the law
-actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have been
written into the General Appropriations Bill

Presidential Social Fund- sourced from the share

of the government in the aggregate gross earnings
of PAGCOR through which the President
provides direct assistance to priority programs
and projects not funded under the regular budget.
In 1996, Former Marikina City Romeo Candazo:
-huge sums of government money went into the
pockets of legislators as kickbacks
In 2004: several concerned citizens sought the
nullification of the PDAF for being
unconstitutional.
-it was dismissed for lack of evidentiary support
In 2013: NBI began its probe into allegations that
the government has been defrauded of some P10
Billion over the past 10 years
-a syndicate using funds from the pork barrel of

*the words were copy-pasted from the original case

BLOCK A

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lawmakers and various government agencies for

scores of ghost projects.
6 whistle-blowers: declared that JLN Corporation
(stands for Janet Lim Napoles) had facilitated the
swindling of billions of pesos from the public
coffers for ghost projects
-no fewer than 20 dummy nongovernment
organizations for an entire decade.
August 2013: Commission on Audit (CoA)
released report revealing substantial irregularities
in the disbursement and utilization of PDAF
during Arroyo administration
the 'Presidential Pork Barrel': "at least P900
Million from royalties in the operation of the
Malampaya gas project off Palawan province
intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries HAS
GONE INTO A DUMMY NGO.
Demetria vs. Alba

Clear conflict between par. 1 of Section 44

of PD 1177 ("Budget Reform Decree of 1977)
which states:
The President shall have the authority to transfer
any
fund, appropriated for the different departments,
bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive
Department, which are included in the General
Appropriations Act, to any program, project or
activity of any department, bureau, or office
included in the General Appropriations Act or
approved after its enactment.

TRANSFER OF FUNDS
Whether Section 44 (1) of PD 1177
is
unconstitutional

The purpose and conditions for which funds may

be
transferred were specified: like transfer may be
allowed for the purpose of augmenting an item
and
such transfer may be made only if there are

*the words were copy-pasted from the original case

BLOCK A

YES
Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177
unduly over extends the privilege granted under
said Section 16[5] (1973 constitution
Pres. Decree No. 1177: opens the floodgates for the
enactment of unfunded appropriations
-results in uncontrolled executive expenditures, diffuses
accountability for budgetary performance and entrenches
the pork barrel system as the ruling
party may well expand [sic] public money not on the
basis of development priorities but on political and
personal expediency.
It is only after Marcos regime: A provision which allows
even the slightest possibility of a repetition of this sad
experience cannot remain written in our statute books.

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savings
from another item in the appropriation of the
government branch or constitutional body.

Under 1973 Consti: The prohibition to transfer an

appropriation from one item to another was explicit and
categorical
-The leeway granted was thus Limited

It fails to specify the objectives and purposes for

which the proposed transfer of funds are to be
made
-allows the president to override the safeguards,
form and procedure prescribed by the
Constitution

Liga vs.
COMELEC

1994:
Congress itself had made an assessment that the
P137, 878,000.00 that were appropriated by
Congress for the holding of the 1994 barangay
elections in the General Appropriation Act of
1994 WOULD BE INSUFFICIENT TO DEFRAY
THE COST OF HOLDING THE SAID
ELECTIONS

Whether the COMELEC is indeed

officially initiating the alleged
transfer of funds for the barangay
elections

Petitioners allege:
the respondents have threatened and are about to
effect a transfer or reallocation of the following
amounts to be sourced from the executive and
legislative branches of Government to respondent
Commission on Elections (COMELEC)

Sec 44(1) of PD 1177:

-purpose and conditions for which funds
may be transferred were specified empowers the President
to indiscriminately transfer funds from one
department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive
Department to any program, project or activity of any
department, bureau or office included in the General
Appropriations Act or approved AFTER ITS
ENACTMENT
- These constitutional infirmities render the
provision in question null and void
NO
If the public respondents are attempting, or intending to
effect the transfer of funds would be in direct contravention
of Sec. 25(5), Art. VI, of the Constitution;
Undoubtedly, the threat to pursue the scheme, if ever there
was one, existed only in newspaper reports which could
have misled the general public,
- it would have been more prudent for them to have first
obtained an official statement or at least confirmation from
respondents as to the veracity of the reports contained in the
said news item

According to the news item entitled Barangay

Poll Funds Found:
(a) P180,000,000 from the appropriation of the
Department of Interior and Local Government
(DILG).
(b) P100,000,000 from the Countryside
Development
Fund; P70,000,000 from the Senate and

*the words were copy-pasted from the original case

BLOCK A

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P30,000,000)from the House of Representatives;

(c) P43,000,000 from the Internal Revenue
Allotments
(IRA) of Provinces, Cities and Municipalities

Sanchez vs. COA

Petitioners assailed that: transfer of funds would

be in direct contravention of Section 25(5),
Article 6 of the Constitution.
1991: Congress passed RA 7180 otherwise known
as the General Appropriations Act of 1992
-it provides an appropriation for the DILG under
Title XIII and set aside the amount of
P75,000,000.00 for the DILG's Capability
Building Program
Atty. Hiram C. Mendoza (Project Director of the
Ad Hoc Task Force for Inter-Agency
Coordination to Implement Local Autonomy)
- informed then Deputy Executive Secretary
Dionisio de la Serna of the proposal to constitute
and implement a "shamrock" type task force
- to implement local autonomy institutionalized
under the Local Government Code of 1991

Issue: Whether there is legal basis

for the transfer of funds of the
Capability Building Program Fund
appropriated in the 1992 General
Appropriation Act from the
Department of Interior and Local
Government to the
Office of the President;

Proposal was accepted by the Deputy Executive

Secretary and attested by then DILG Secretary
Cesar N. Sarino
- issued a memorandum for the transfer and
remittance to the Office of the President of the
sum of P300,000.00 for the operational expenses
of the task force
- An additional cash advance of P300,000.00 was
also requested
Upon post-audit conducted by Department
auditor Iluminada M.V. Fabroa, however, the
amounts were disallowed.

*the words were copy-pasted from the original case

BLOCK A

NO
Clearly, there are two essential requisites in order that a
transfer of appropriation with the corresponding funds may
legally be effected:
1. there must be savings in the programmed
appropriation of the transferring agency
2. there must be an existing item, project or activity
with an appropriation in the receiving agency to
which the savings will be transferred.
Actual savings- a valid transfer of funds from one
government agency to another
- word actual denotes that something is real or substantial,
or exists presently in fact as opposed to something which is
merely theoretical, possible, potential or hypothetical.
Senate President and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives shall approve the realignment (of savings).
"[B]efore giving their stamp of approval, these two officials
will have to see to it that:
1. The funds to be realigned or transferred are
actually savings in the items of expenditures from
which the same are to be taken
2. The transfer or realignment is for the purpose of
augmenting the items of expenditure to which
said transfer or realignment is to be made
Records show that there there were no savings at the time
of the questioned transfer

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As regards the requirement that there be an item to

be augmented: no item for augmentation in the
appropriation for the Office of the President at the time of
the transfers in question.
Augmentation- denotes that an appropriation was
determined to be deficient after the implementation of the
project
- To say that the existing items in the appropriation for the
Office of the President already needed augmentation as
early as 31 January 1992 is putting the cart before the horse.
Belgica vs. Ochoa

Petitioners: assailing the constitutionality of the

Pork
Barrel System

DISCRETIONARY FUND
Whether the Pork Barrel violates
Article VI Section 25
(6) of the Constitution

Pork Barrel: refers to an appropriation of

government spending meant for localized projects
and secured solely or primarily to bring money to
a
representative's district
In the Philippines: pork barrel
-has been commonly referred to as lump-sum,
discretionary funds of Members of the
Legislature,
-although, its usage would evolve in reference to
certain funds of the President such as the
Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social
Fund.
Malampaya Funds- special fund created under
PD 910 issued by then President Marcos for the
development of indigenous energy resources vital
to
economic growth.

YES
With respect to discretionary funds, Section 25(6), Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution requires that said funds "shall
be disbursed only for public purposes to be supported by
appropriate vouchers and subject to such guidelines as may
be prescribed by law."
Under the 2013 PDAF Article:
- the amount of P24.79 Billion only appears as a collective
allocation limit since the said amount would be further
divided among individual legislators who would then
receive personal lump-sum allocations
-AFTER the GAA is passed
-intermediate appropriations are made by legislators
only after the GAA is passed and hence, outside of
the law
-actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have been
written into the General Appropriations Bill
This setup connotes that the appropriation law leaves the
actual amounts and purposes of the appropriation for further
determination and, therefore, does not readily indicate a
discernible item

Presidential Social Fund- sourced from the share

of the government in the aggregate gross earnings
of PAGCOR through which the President

*the words were copy-pasted from the original case

BLOCK A

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provides direct assistance to priority programs

and projects not funded under the regular budget.
In 1996, Former Marikina City Romeo Candazo:
-huge sums of government money went into the
pockets of legislators as kickbacks
In 2004: several concerned citizens sought the
nullification of the PDAF for being
unconstitutional.
-it was dismissed for lack of evidentiary support
In 2013: NBI began its probe into allegations that
the government has been defrauded of some P10
Billion over the past 10 years
-a syndicate using funds from the pork barrel of
lawmakers and various government agencies for
scores of ghost projects.
6 whistle-blowers: declared that JLN Corporation
(stands for Janet Lim Napoles) had facilitated the
swindling of billions of pesos from the public
coffers for ghost projects
-no fewer than 20 dummy nongovernment
organizations for an entire decade.
August 2013: Commission on Audit (CoA)
released report revealing substantial irregularities
in the disbursement and utilization of PDAF
during Arroyo administration
the 'Presidential Pork Barrel': "at least P900
Million from royalties in the operation of the
Malampaya gas project off Palawan province
intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries HAS
GONE INTO A DUMMY NGO.

*the words were copy-pasted from the original case

BLOCK A

POLINAR
CONSTI 1 CASES