Contempt of Court

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ContemptofCourt
byContributedPapers|October13,20107:30pm
Like Bethefirstofyourfriendstolikethis.
INTRODUCTION
Saidthebookwormtothesilverfish
Ioncetriedalawbook
Atfirst,itrefusedtobudge,
Thensuddenlyitshook
AndIfellontojudge.
TotellyouwhatIfeltthere.
Iwontevenattempt.
NotbecauseIdontdare
Butthereissomethingcalledcontempt.[1]
Contempt of court is an offence, which by the common law of England was punishable by the High Court, in a summary manner, by fine or
imprisonmentorboth.ThepowertopunishforcontemptofcourtwasappliedoriginallyinEnglandtocontemptcommittedinthepresenceofthe
court.In1747,ThomasMartin,MayorofGreatYamouth,sentabanknotefundamentalrightsPound20tolordHardwicke,LordChancellor,witha
letter referring to a proposed chancery proceeding. The Lord Chancellor ordered Martin to show cause why he should not be committed for
contempt.HesoughtpardonandtheLordChancellorinconsiderationofthis,hispublicoffice,thepaymentofcosts,andhiswillingnesstothe
suggestionthatthebanknotebesenttothewardenoftheFleetStreetprisonfordebtorsfortheirrelief,didnottakeanyaction.[2]
In1631,whenaprisonerthrewabrickbatattheJudgeandnarrowlymissedhim,theprisonersrighthandwasorderedtobecutoffandhungon
the gallows. In 1938, when the disgruntled litigant threw tomatoes at the Court of Appeal, consisting of Clauson and Goddard JJ.[3] He was
immediatelycommittedtoprison,butreleasedafterafewdaysofincarceration,because,hedidnotscoreadirecthitandsecondlyChristmaswas
soonapproaching.ThereareseveralinstancesofcontemptinthefaceoftheCourtinEnglishTraditionandtheywouldnotendevenifwewritea
bookonit.ThedevelopmentofcontemptlawinEnglanddidcontributegreatprinciplestothelawofcontempt,whicharepresentlyfollowedby
severalcommonlawjurisdictions.
TheIndianCourtsasguidedbyCommonLawprinciplesoughttohavefollowedsimilarprinciplesaslaiddownbythecommonlawcourts.Thelaw
ofcontemptiswelldevelopedundertheEnglishprecedentsystem.WithregardtootherlawstheIndianCourtshaveblindlyfollowedthembutthe
lawofcontempthasbeenexercisedinanarbitraryanduncontrolledmanner,astherewasnolimittotheperiodofimprisonmentthatmaybe
inflicted,orthefinethatmaybeimposed.Article129oftheConstitutionprovidesthattheSupremeCourtshallbeacourtofrecordwithallthe
powersofsuchacourtincludingthepowertopunishforcontemptofitself.Similarly,Article215providesthateveryHighCourtshallbeaCourt
ofRecordwithallthepowersofsuchaCourtincludingthepowertopunishforcontemptofitself.UnderArticle129theSupremeCourthaspower
todealwithcontemptcommittedvisvistheHighCourts.[4]UnderEntry77ofListIoftheSeventhScheduletotheConstitution,Parliamenthas
thepowertomakelawsrelatingtothejurisdictionsandpowersoftheSupremeCourt,includingcontemptofsuchcourt.UnderEntry14ListIII,
ParliamentandaStateLegislaturehavepowertomakelawsrelatingtocontemptofcourt,butnotcontemptoftheSupremeCourt.Sarthiinhis
bookoutlinethreebasicprinciplesofcontemptjurisdiction:
1.ThepowertopunishforcontemptofcourtisunderArticles129and215oftheConstitutionandnotsolelyundertheContemptofCourts
Act.TherealjurisdictiontotrycontemptisconferreduponthecourtsbytheConstitution,thebasicdocumentofallthelaws.
2.Butthereshouldbewiseeconomyintheuseofthispower,asinthecaseofanyotherpower.Judgesshouldneverusethisjurisdictionas
ameanstoupholdtheirdignity,whichmustrestonbetterandstrongerfoundations.Itshouldneverbeusedtosuppressthosewhospeak
againstthem,because,goodjudgesdonotfearcriticismnordotheyresentit.Thefreedomofspeechisaveryimportantrightanditis
onlywhenitisabusedtotheextentofinterferingwiththeadministrationofjusticethatthecontemptjurisdictionshouldbeinvoked.
3.ThedichotomybetweenthepersonalprotectionofalibeledJudgeandpreventionofobstructionofpublicJusticeshouldbeclearlykeptin
mind. It is only when the court considers the attack on the Judge or Judges scurrilous, offensive, intimidating or malicious beyond
condonablelimits,thatthestrongarmofthelawmuststrikeablowonhimwhochallengesthesupremacyoftheruleoflawbyfoulingits
sourceandstream.
Theissueinquestionhasbeenifthestatementmadebythecontemnoristhetruth,thencanitstillbeconsideredcontempt.Itissubmittedthat
inallcasesthesocalledcontemnorshouldbeallowedtoprovethetruthofhisstatement.Ifheisabletoshowsomeprimafaciejustification,the
Judgeshouldbelefttohispersonalremedyofinvokingthecriminallawofdefamation.Butifthecontemnorfailstoshowanyjustification,he
mustbeseverelypunished.
InlightofthesepowersandprincipleslaiddownunderourConstitutionandcommonlaw,theauthorsattempttoanalysethelawoncontemptof
courtinIndia.Thepositionofthisprincipleseemstobearbitraryasfarastherecentdebatesinmediaportrayedittobe.Thisisanimportanttool
inthehandsofthecourtandsometimestheyneedtobeusedasaswordandsometimesasashieldtoprotectitself.
RESEARCHMETHODOLOGY
Aim
Theaimofthispaperistofindouttheconceptofcontemptofcourt.Thispaperseekstoidentifythedevelopmentofcontemptunderdifferent
jurisdictions
Scope
Theprojectlimitsitselfinunderstandingtheconceptofcontemptofcourt.Thispapertracesthehistoricaljurisprudenceoftheconceptandthe
latestdevelopmentsandthecontemptasunderstoodunderbothUKsystemsandUS.
ResearchQuestions
1.Whatiscontemptofcourt?
2.Whyisthereanecessityofthisconcept?
http://legalsutra.com/246/contemptofcourt/print/
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2.Whyisthereanecessityofthisconcept?
3.Whatiscontemptunderstoodinotherjurisdictions?
4.IstheContemptofCourtsAct,1971acomprehensivelegislation?
5.WhatistheresponseofIndianJudiciarytothisconcept?
6.Whatoughttobecontemptofcourt?
Methodology
Theapproachhasbeenprimarilydescriptiveandanalytical.
Hypothesis
Thelawofcontempt,whichdevelopedunderthecommonlawsystem,hasbeenclearlydefinedbytheEnglishcourts.EventhoughtheIndian
courtshavedeliberatedanumberoftimesoncontemptlaw,theyhavegivendifferentinterpretationsandstillthelawofcontemptisambiguous
undertheIndiansystem.
Modeofcitation
Auniformmodeofcitationhasbeenadoptedthroughouttheproject.Itisasfollows:
Nameofauthor,Titleofbook,PlaceofPublication,NameofthePublishers,YearofPublication,pagenumber.
NameoftheAuthor,NameoftheArticle,NameoftheJournal,Volume,Year,PageNumber.
Sources
Bothprimaryandsecondarysourcesareusedfortheproject.
ChapterI
HISTORY AND BACKGROUND TO THE CONTEMPT OF COURTS
ACT
OurJudgesaresohonestasothermen,
andnotmoreso.Theyhavewithothers
Thesamepassionsforparty,farpower
Andprivilegeoftheircorps[5]
Itisagreatquestiontoeveryjudicialsystemastowhatcontemptofcourtis.JamesFrancisOswalddefinescontemptofcourtastospeak
generallycontemptofcourtmaybesaidtobeconstitutedofthelawintodisrespectordisregard,ortointerferewithorprejudicepartieslitigant
ortheirwitnessduringthelitigation.[6]LordHadwickin1742[7]madeathreefoldclassificationofcontempt:
1.Scandalizingthecourt.
2.Abusingpartieswhoareconcernedinthecauses,inthepresenceofcourt.
3.Prejudicingthepublicagainstpersonsbeforethecauseisheard.
Thelawofcontemptisasoldastheconceptofjusticeandjudicialsystem.FromthetimesofRomans,thisconceptwasusedbythejudicial
officersofthestatetopreservethedignityofthejusticesystemasawhole.Butduringthosedaystheseconceptswereusedliberallybythe
sovereign.Oswaldinhisbookprovidesanillustration.T.ofFwentarmedinthepalace,whichwasshowntothecounciloftheKing,bywhichhe
wastakenanddisarmedbeforeChiefJusticeShard,andcommittedtotheprisonoftheMarshalseaandcouldnotbebailedtillthekingsenthis
will.[8]Withthechangeintime,theconceptsofcontemptalsoevolved.Astheartofgovernancebegantogrow,theKingyieldedhispowerstothe
threeorgans[9]ofthegovernment,theExecutive,theParliament/LegislatureandtheJudiciary.Thejudgesweredeemedtohaveactedinthe
nameoftheking.ItwasKingsjusticeandassuchdemandedallrespectandobedience.Anydisrespecttotheseatofjusticewasaffronttothe
dignityandmajestyoflaw.ItisapttoquotewhatJusticeWilmotstatesinRexv.Wilmot:[10]Andwhenevermensallegiancetothelawisso
fundamentallyshaken,itisthemostfatalandmostdangerousobstructionofjusticeandinmyopinioncallsforrapidandimmediateactionthan
anyotherobstructionwhatsoevernotforthesakeofthejudgesasprivateindividualsbutastheyarethechannelsbywhichtheKingsjusticeis
conveyedtopeople.
ThustheprovisionofcontemptofcourtwasfirstputforwardandgivenafirmfootingbytheEnglishjudges.Latertheprocessofcontemptofcourt
wasintroducedintoIndiabytheBritishfollowingtheestablishmentofthecourtsofrecordinthe19thCentury.Thiswasputonafirmbasisin
IndiabyContemptofCourtsAct,1926.TheneedforcontemptofCourtsAct,1926wasfeltonaccountofthedifferenceofopinionbetweenthe
madrasandBombayHighCourtsontheonehandandCalcuttaHighCourtontheotherregardingtheprotectionofsubordinatecourts.[11]The
attemptatacomprehensivelegislationrelatingtocontemptofcourtsinIndiawasthecontemptofCourtsAct,1926.TheActdidnotcontainany
provision with regard to contempt of courts subordinate to courts other than High Courts, that is, the courts subordinate to Chief courts and
judicialcommissioners.TheActalsodidnotdealwiththeextraterritorialjurisdictionofHighcourtsinmattersofcontempt.
TheActof1926wasashortActcontainingonlythreesections.Thepreamblementionsthatitwasanacttodefineandlimitthepowersofcertain
courtsinpunishingforcontemptofcourtsandsincedoubtsaroseastothepowersoftheHighCourtofJudicaturetopunishforcontempt,itwas
consideredexpedienttoresolvethesedoubtsandlimitsthepowersoftheHighCourtinpunishingforcontemptofcourts.Section3oftheActlaid
downthatacontemnormaybepunishedforsimpleimprisonmentforatermwhichmayextendto6monthsorfinewhichmayextendto2000
Rupeesorwithboth.[12]TheContemptofCourtsAct,1926wasnotfoundadequateandassuchtheContemptofCourtsAct,1952wasenacted.
FromthestatementofobjectsandreasonswhichledtotheenactmentsofthecontemptofCourtsAct,1952,itisobviousthatthislawwasmade
as there was no specific provision of law which enabled a High Court to exercise this power in respect of Contempt Committed beyond its
territorialjurisdiction.[13]
TheprovisionsforpunishmentcontainedintheContemptofCourtsAct,1926andtheActof1952thoughvalidandconstitutionalfellshortofthe
expectationsofthepeopleandinterferedwiththeirfundamentalrightsoffreedomofspeechandexpression.ItwasfeltthattheActof1952did
notcontainsufficientsafeguardsforthefreedomofpressparticularly.ThusacommitteewassetupunderthethenAdditionalSolicitorGeneralof
India,SriH.N.Sanyal.TheSanyalCommitteesubmittedaverydetailedandcomprehensivereportsuggestingdrasticchangesinthecontemptlaw.
ThedraftbillwasreferredtoaselectcommitteeandtheBillwasfinallyintroducedIntheRajyaSabhaon19thFebruary1968andtheContemptof
CourtsAct,1952wasreplacedbythe1971Act.
Itisgenerallyfeltthattheexistinglawrelatingtocontemptofcourtsissomewhatuncertain,undefinedandunsatisfactory.Thejurisdictionto
punishforcontempttouchesupontwoimportantfundamentalrightsofcitizen,namely,therighttopersonallibertyandtherighttofreedomof
expression.Itwastherefore,consideredadvisabletohavetheentirelawonthesubjectscrutinizedbyaspecialcommittee.TheSanyalCommittee
wassetuptolookintothisaspect,whichmaderecommendationsandmostofitwereacceptedbytheGovernment.Contemptproceedingsdonot
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wassetuptolookintothisaspect,whichmaderecommendationsandmostofitwereacceptedbytheGovernment.Contemptproceedingsdonot
partake the character of a traditional lis. In the legalistic sense a contempt proceeding is not a dispute between two parties but is primarily
betweenthecourtandthepersonwhoallegedtohavecommittedthecontemptofcourt.[14]
Theindividualwhobringstothenoticeofthecourtthatcontempthasbeencommittedisnotaprosecutorbutmerelyanassistantofthecourtor
friendofthecourt.InSupremeCourtBarAssociationv.UnionofIndia[15]aConstitutionBenchdescribedthespecialjurisdictiontopunishfor
contemptasanunusualtypecombiningtheJury,theJudgeandtheHangmanandexplainedthisapparentanomalyonthegroundthattheCourt
wasnotadjudicationuponanyclaimbetweenlitigatingparties.Thepowertocommitforcontemptisapunitivepower.Thisistohonorthedignity
andintegrityofthecourtandtheorderspassedbythem.
DEFININGCONTEMPTOFCOURT
Severaljuristsandjudgeshavedefinedcontemptofcourtbutthereisnoonesinglestandarddefinitionofthephrasecontemptofcourt.Pointing
outthedifficultiesindefiningcontempttheSanyalCommitteeobserved:
Inthelawofcontempt,difficultyandvaguenessstartatthedefinitionstageitself.Contemptinitsrootsensesignifiesdisrespecttothatwhichis
entitled to respect or regard and the expression contempt of court has been a recognized phrase in English law from the 12th century. If
administrationofjusticehastobeeffective,respectforitsadministrationhastobefosteredandmaintainedanditisoutofrulesframedby
courtsinthisbehalfthatthelawofcontempthasgrown.Fromrudimentaryrulesdevisedforthelimitedpurposeofsecuringobediencetothe
ordersofcourts,thereevolvedinthecourseoftimeelaborateandfarreachingdoctrinesandextraordinaryprocedures.Righttillthepresent
century,thesedoctrinesandprocedureswereneversubjectedtolegislativescrutinywiththeresultthatthelawofcontempthad,asitwere,awild
growth. Each new precedent was not declaratory but creative of the law. Each new type of attack on the administration of justice received a
correspondingelaborationorextensionofthecontemptlaw.AsCrarieshassaidtheingenuityoftheJudgesandsomeofthosewhoareconcerned
todefeatordefyjusticehasrenderedcontemptalmostproteaninthischaracter.Andevennow,itmaywellbesaidthecategoriesofcontemptare
notclosed.Theresultisthattherearecontempt,contemptsrangingfrommeredisobediencetoordersofthecourtandinvolvingonlyawrongofa
privatenatureasbetweenthepartiestoasuitatoneendandcontemptinvolvingphysicalviolenceorlargescaleblackmailormudslingingby
meansofpublicationonthejudgeattheotherend.Inviewofthehaphazarddevelopmentinherentintheprocessofdevelopmentoflawby
judicialprecedent,itisnotpossibletoattemptneatandclearcutclassificationsofvariousbranchesofthelawofcontemptand,inviewofthe
possibilityofnewtypesofcontemptarisinginfuture,itisnotpossibletodemarcatetheareaofoperationofthelawofcontemptarisinginfuture,
itisnotpossibletodemarcatetheareaofoperationofthelawofcontempt.Itisforthesereasonsthatjudgesandjuristshavenotsucceededin
formulatingacomprehensiveandcompletedefinitionoftheconceptofcontemptofcourts.TheShawcrossCommitteeobserved:Nottheleastof
thedifficultiesinthisfield(definition)isthatcontempt,beinggrowthofthecommonlaw,hasnoauthoritativedefinitionorlimitationItcanbe
definedinthemostgeneralterms.Inthewordsofoneofourownjudges,Itisindeeddifficultandalmostimpossibletoframeacomprehensive
andcompletedefinitionofcontemptofcourt.Thelawofcontemptcoversthewholefieldoflitigationitself.Therealendofajudicialproceeding,
civilorcriminal,istoascertainthetruefactsanddispensejusticeAnythingthattendstocurtailorimpairthefreedomofthelimbsofthejudicial
proceedingmustsofnecessityresultinhamperingthedueadministrationoflawandininterferingwiththecourseofjustice.[16]
ThereasonsgivenbytheSanyalcommitteedoesnotrequireanyclarificationorexplanationtotheproblemofdefiningtheconceptofcontemptof
court.Itisthediscretionthatislefttothejudgetodecidewhetherthecontemnorhaspassedthetestslaiddownbypriordecisionorhasinany
manneraffectedthedignityorintegrityofthecourt.Ifweprovidewithaconcretedefinitionthatwouldlimitthescopeofcontempt,henceit
should be left to the courts to decide whether any contempt has been done. But the fear that crops up with this vagueness is the danger of
misusingthispowerbythecourtandthejudges.Thediscretionofdefiningcontemptisgiventothejudgeswithanassumptionthattheyare
honestandwouldalwaysbefairandjust.
ChapterII
COMPARATIVESTUDY
ContemptUnderCommonLawPositionInUnitedKingdom
LordJusticeOttongaveanoverviewoftheconceptofcontemptofcourt.InEngland,contempthasinheredinthejudicialpowertorunthecourts
andtopreventinterferencewithjusticesincetimeimmemorial.ContemptprotectsthedignityoftheCourt,nottheindividualjudge.
Contemptcanbecriminalorcivil.Criminalcontemptinvolvesanintentionalinterferencewiththeadministrationofjustice,while
civilcontemptisdisobediencetoordersorjudgmentsofacourt,withonlyknowledgeoftheorderorjudgment,notintentto
interfere,beingneeded.Civilcontemptrequiresonlyapreponderanceoftheevidencewhilecriminalcontemptrequiresproof
beyondreasonabledoubt.Anothersignificantdistinctionarisesfromwhetherthecontemptoccursinthefactofthecourtor
outsideitcontemptbeyondthecourtroomismuchhardertoprove.
Englishcontemnorsarenotentitledtoatrialbyjury.ParliamentenactedtheContemptofCourtActof1981,whichforthefirsttimeimposeda
twoyearmaximumjailsentenceforcivilandcriminalcontemptaswellasmaximumfines.Thecourtcanuseallitscontemptpowersbutstill
suspendsentenceifthecontemnorpromisesnottorepeatthecontumaciousactandapologizes.
LordJusticeOttondescribedafineof40,000againstTheEveningStandardnewspaper,whichhadbeensustainedbytheCourtofAppealaweek
earlierforpublishingthecriminalrecordsofdefendantsontrialforexplosivesoffenseswithIRAlinks.Englandimposeslimitswithrespectto
reportsofproceedingsandpublicationofmateriallikelytointerferewiththeadministrationofjustice.TheresultinTheEveningStandardcase
wasveryprejudicial,includingahalttothecriminaltrial.Healsonotedareluctancetousethecontemptpowerforfearofcreatingacausethat
spurspublicsympathyas,forexample,invariousEnglishcoalstrikeorders.
Themainaimofcontemptofcourtrulesistopreventpotentialjurorsfrombeingprejudicedfororagainstadefendantbecauseofwhathasbeen
publishedinthemediabeforeorduringatrial.
Ajuryissupposedtoreachtheirdecisiononlyontheevidenceproducedincourt.Thejurymustalsopresumethattheaccusedisnotonlyinnocent
butalsothathehasnopreviousconvictions.
ContemptofCourtisgovernedbytwosetsofrules.
1.1.TheContemptofCourtAct1981appliestoindividualcases.
2.2.CommonLawcontemptcanapplytoindividualcasesandtotheadministrationofthelawgenerally.
One of the tests to determine contempt is whether the story creates a substantial risk that the course of justice will be
seriouslyimpededorprejudiced.
Theimportantwordsaresubstantialandserious.Thesearethetestsbywhichthecourtdecideswhetherthestorywould
createasubstantialriskofseriousprejudicethemindofanyonewhoreaditandwhowasthenwasselectedtoserveonthe
juryhearingthecase.
Time:Thelongerthetimebetweenthestorybeingpublishedandthejuryretiringtoreachitsverdictthelesschancethereisofthestorybeingin
contempt. News desks should know the average time it takes in their Crown Court area for a case to go from arrest to trial. If the story is
published,say,onthenightbeforethetrialopensthentheriskofcontemptishigherthanifitwerepublishedmonthspreviously.
Proximity:Thecourtwillweighupthechancesofajurorhavingactuallyreadtheoffendingstory.IfthestoryispublishedintheNorthernEchoin
DarlingtonandthetrialisheldinCornwallthenthereisplainlylittlechanceofasubstantialriskofseriousprejudicebecauseapotentialjuror
couldneverbeexpectedtohavereadit.
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couldneverbeexpectedtohavereadit.
InitialImpact:Presuming,though,thatthestoryislikelytohavebeenreadbyapotentialjurorthenthecourtwilltrytoassesstheimpactthe
storywouldhavehadonhim.
Itdoessobydetermininghownovelwasthewayitwaspresented.AscreamingPageOneleadinthelocalpaperwouldplainlyhavemoreimpact
thanadownpagethreeparstoryonpage18ofanational.Thenthecourtwouldtrytoevaluatethe:
ResidualImpact:Thetheoryisthatifajurorlistensincourttoalltheevidence,andhearsallthewitnessescrossexamined,andthenisguidedby
the trial judge on what is, and is not, important then any initial prejudicial impact the story might have had will fade away as the juror
concentratesontheactualevidence.
ThetrendistowardsliberalizationwhenitcomestoapplyingtheContemptofCourtAct1981.Judgesseemtohaveacceptedthatmostpretrial
coverage,whilemaybeprejudicial,fallsshortofcreatingasubstantialriskofbeingseriouslyprejudicial.Nationaltabloidshaveusedluridaccounts
ofGeoffKnightsbeatingupataxidriverandhavebeenclearedofcontempt.
Buteachcaseisdifferent.Byusingtheabovetestsaneditorcanatleastmakehisownassessmentofwhethertheparticularstorycreatesa
substantialriskofseriousprejudice.
There is a particular danger in revealing that the defendant has a previous conviction. A jury (which must presume that a defendant has an
unblemishedpast)wouldfindthathardtoforget.
TheContemptofCourtAct1981ceasestobeactivewhen:Thearrestedpersonisreleasedwithoutbeingchargedexceptwhenreleasedon
policebail.Noarrestismadewithin12monthsoftheissueofthewarrantthecaseisdiscontinuedthedefendantisacquittedorsentencedthe
defendantisfoundunfittobetried,orunfittopleadorthecourtordersthechargetolieonthefile.
NewspapersaresafewhentheyusepoliceappealsforhelpintracingawantedmanforwhomawarranthasbeenissuedeventhoughtheDanger
ManorFindthisMonstertypeofheadlinewouldplainlycreateasubstantialriskofseriousprejudiceespeciallyasmostsuchstoriesrevealhis
pastconvictions.ThisisclassiccontemptofcourtterritorybuttheAttorneyGeneralhaspromisednottoprosecutebecausethepublicsafety
outweighsthefugitivesrighttoafairtrial.AssoonasDangerManisarrested,however,theimmunityceases.
Section3oftheContemptofCourtActgivesaneditoradefenceif,atthetimeofpublication,havingtakenallreasonablecare,hedidnotknow
andhadnoreasontosuspectthatproceedingsintheparticularcasewereactive.
Section5oftheContemptofCourtActgivesprotectiontostories,whichareadiscussionofpublicaffairsaslongastheriskofprejudicetoa
particularcaseismerelyincidentaltothewiderdiscussion.
Civilproceedings:TheActstatesthatcivilproceedingsbecomeactiveasfarascontemptriskisinvolvedwhenthecaseissetdownfortrial(puton
thewaitinglist)orwhenanactualdateisfixedforthecasetobeheard.
Pictures:Apicturecanbeincontemptinthesamewayasastoryif,forinstance,thecasehingedonwitnessesidentifyingthemanincourtorat
anidentityparade.Andifyouusedapictureofthedefendanthandcuffedandguardedbyarmedpoliceitmightalsoprejudiceajuror.
Theriskofcontemptunderthe1981ActonlystartswhentheInitialStepistakenapersonisarrested,charged,orhasawarrantorsummons
issuedagainsthim.CommonLawcontemptcoversthetimebeforethatinitialstepistakenbutwhenatrialcouldplainlybeseentobeimminent
orpending.Ifaknowncriminal,forinstance,takesagroupofpeoplehostageandanewspaperidentifieshimandhispreviousconvictionsbefore
heisarrestedorchargedorawarrantisissuedthenthereisplainlygoingtobeariskofcontempttoproceedingswhichwillalmostcertainlytake
place.
IfthenewspaperisprosecutedunderCommonLawcontempttheprosecutionhastoprovethattheeditorintendedtocreateprejudice.Thecourt
caninferintentbytakingaccountofallofthecircumstancesleadingtopublication.CommonLawcontemptcanalsobeusedagainstarticles
prejudicialtothecourseofjusticegenerally,asdistinctfromtheparticularcasegovernedbythe81Act.
PositionUndertheAmericanLegalSystem
Contempt of court is an act of disobedience or disrespect towards the judicial branch of the government, or an interference with its orderly
process.Itisanoffenseagainstacourtofjusticeorapersontowhomthejudicialfunctionsofthesovereigntyhavebeendelegated.
TheAmericanJurisprudencedefinescontemptofcourtinVol17.Itcanbeclassifiedasfollows:
1.DespisingtheauthorityoftheJudgeordignityofthecourt
2.Anyconductwhichtendstobringtheauthorityandadministrationoflawintodisrespectordisregard
3.Anyconductwhichinterferesorprejudicesthepartiestoalitigationortheirwitnessesduringalitigation
4.Anyconductwhichotherwisetenstoimpede,embarrass,orobstructacourtorajudgeinthedischargeofitsorhisduties
5.Astatutemaydefinecontemptbutitcanneverbeexhaustive.
IntheUnitedStatesofAmericafreedomofspeechwasoriginallyprotectedbythedoctrineclearandpresentdangerpropoundedinSchenk v.
UnitedStates[17]InthatcasetheSupremeCourtofUSApassedobservationsuponthemilitarycensorshipprovisionsoftheEspionageActof
1917,whichimposedcertainlimitationsuponpressandspeech.RejectingthecontentionJusticeHolmeswroteanopinionunanimouslyconcurred
bythecourt,upholdingtheConstitutionalityoftheEspionageAct.Therightofspeechhesaidhadneverbeenanabsoluteoneatanytime,in
peaceorinwar.Freespeechwouldnotprotectamaninfalselyshoutingfireinatheatre,andcausingapanic.Whenanationisatwarheadded
manythingsthatmightbesaidintimeofpeacearesuchahindrancetoitseffortthattheirutterancewillnotbeenduredsolongasmenfightand
nocourtcouldregardthemasprotectedbyanyConstitutionalRight.
AccordingtothisviewfreedomofspeechcouldbeabridgedonlyiftheGovernmentcouldshowthattherewasaclearandpresentdangertothe
statearisingfromtheabusesofthatfreedom.Thisdoctrine,however,wasjettisonedinDennisv.UnitedStates.[18]Inthatcasethevalidityof
theAlienRegistrationAct,1940wasinquestion.VinsonC.J.observedasfollowsInthiscasewearesquarelypresentedwiththeapplicationof
theclearandpresentdangertestandmustdecidewhatthephraseimports.Thetestofclearandpresentdangerwasdiscardedandthetestof
clearandprobabledangerhasbeensubstituted.Thetimefactorhasbeenthuseliminatedfromthetest.Judgedbythenewtestitwasheldthat
the impugned statute was constitutional, though it penalized even conspiring to advocate the future overthrow of the state and no imminent
dangeristobeapprehendedthereby.Thearmofthelawhasbeenlengthenedthereby.NodoubtDouglasJ.,inhisdissentingopinionbewailsthat
freespeech,thegloryofoursystemofgovernment,hadbeeneclipsedbythemajorityrulinginDenniscase.
InYatesv.UnitedStates[19]whileappearingtoadheretothemodificationoftheclearandpresentdangertest,theSupremeCourthasina
measure really overruled the DennisCase.In Yates case the Supreme Court set aside the conviction of fourteen communists who had been
convictedunderSmithAct.ItwasheldthattheadvocacyoftheoverthrowoftheGovernmentasanabstractprincipledidnotconstituteanoffence
undertheSmithAct.Itisonlywhenactiontothatend,thoughitmaynotbeimmediateaction,hasbeenadvocated,thattheoffencewouldbe
committed.ThedecisioninYatescaserestoredtosomeextenttheprotectiontofreedomofspeechwhichhadbeenwithdrawninDenniscase.But
histestisnotapplicableinIndiaasthisprinciplewasrejectedbyJusticeMadhokarin1961.[20]
Under the US law of contempt, the courts have recognized both direct and indirect contempt. Contempt is indirect when it occurs out of the
presenceofthecourt,therebyrequiringthecourttorelyonthetestimonyofthirdpartiesforproofoftheoffense.Itisdirectwhenitoccursunder
thecourtsowneyeandwithinitsownhearing.SeeMatterofHeathcock,696F.2d1362,1365(11thCir.1983)UnitedStatesv.Peterson,456F.2d
1135,1139(10thCir.1972).Therequirementthatdirectcontemptbecommittedinthepresenceofthecourtdoesnotlimitdirectcontemptsto
thosewhichtakeplaceinthecourtroom,butsomedegreeofformalityusuallyfoundinthecourtroomsettingmustaccompanyanexerciseofthe
judicialfunctionfortheproceedingstobeintheactualpresenceofthecourt.MatterofJaffree,741F.2d133(7thCir.1984).Directcontemptfor
conductinthecourtspresencemaybepunishedsummarily.McGuirev.SigmaCoatings,Inc.,48F.3d902(5thCir.1995).
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Thelawofcontemptcannothaveabroadgeneralprincipleapplicabletotheconcept
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Thelawofcontemptcannothaveabroadgeneralprincipleapplicabletotheconcept
ofcontemptintotality.Thecourtshavemadeadistinctionbetweencivilandcriminal
contempt. Because different substantive and procedural rules apply to civil and
criminal contempt, distinctions between the two forms of contempt are important.
Criminal contempt is a crime in the ordinary sense, Bloom v. Illinois,[21], and
criminal penalties may not be imposed on someone who has not been afforded the
protections that the Constitution requires of such criminal proceedings. Hicks v.
Feiock.[22]Theseconstitutionalprotectionsincludetheright(1)nottobesubjectto
double jeopardy, see United States v. Dixon[23] In re Bradley,[24] (2) to receive
notice of the charges, (3) to receive assistance of counsel (4) to receive summary
process (5) to present a defense, Cooke v. United States[25] (6) not to self
incriminate oneself, and (7) to proof beyond a reasonable doubt, Gompers v. Bucks
Stove&RangeCo.[26].Forseriouscriminalcontemptinvolvingimprisonmentofmore
thansixmonths,theseprotectionsincludetherighttoajurytrial.
By contrast, civil contempt sanctionswhich are designed to compel future compliance with a court orderare coercive and avoidable through
obedience,andthusmaybeimposedinanordinarycivilproceedinguponnoticeandanopportunitytobeheard.Neitherajurytrialnorproof
beyondareasonabledoubtisrequired.InternationalUnion,UMWAv.Bagwell[27].
ChapterIII
CONTEMPTOFCOURTANDTHEINDIANJUDICIARY
TheMediaandtheJudiciaryshareaneedthatneithercanlivewithout:youmusthavejournalisticindependenceandjudgesmusthavejudicial
independence.HefurtherelaboratedHitlersGermanyisstillfreshinmemory,sowecanrecalltwoofhismajorstepstoconsolidatehispower
whenhebecametheChancellor.Onewastodestroythefreepresstheotherwastocontrolthecourtsandeliminateanindependentjudiciary.
Knewandweknowthatnodictationcansurvivewithanindependentpressandindependentjudiciary.[28]
ThepoweroftheSupremeCourtofIndiaindealingwiththedaytodayaffairsofthecitizenshasincreasedmanyafoldduringthepastfew
decades.LookingatthepagesofLawReportspriortoliftingofemergencywillrevealtheirrelevanceofthecourtstoalargepartoftheIndian
population.Itisaftertheliftingofemergencyfromthe1980sthattheSupremeCourtfullyrealizeditspotential.ThefailureoftheLegislature
andtheBureaucracytoliveuptotheexpectationsintheeyesofthepeopleputtheJudiciaryinahigherpedestal.Itwasseenasthelastresortfor
justicetotheotherwisejusticestarvedcitizensofIndia.TheSupremeCourtofIndiaaswellasothercourtsarosetotheoccasioninhelpingthe
pooranddowntroddensectionofthesociety.
ButitwaspreciselythismagnanimousviewtakenupbytheSupremeCourttolookintoalmostalltheaspectsoftheothertwowingsthatgaverise
tocriticisms.Thecriticismswerefromthepublic,fromthepressandthemedia.TheviewoftheSupremeCourttowardsthesecriticismswerenot
always static. It kept on changing from the stating that the judiciarys shoulders are broad and going to the other extreme by punishing an
individualwhohadmadeacontemptofcourt.ItispreciselythoseexerciseofthecontemptpowersoftheSupremeCourtandtheIndianJudiciary
ingeneraloverthepastfewdecades,thatwillbedealtwithinthesechapters.Thereisnobetterwaytolookattheseexerciseofpowerbutto
examinethejudgmentspassedbytheSupremeCourtandtheHighCourtsregardingthismatter.
Oneofthefirstandinterestingcasesregardinglawofcontemptarosein1954.[29]InthiscasethemembersoftheExecutiveCommitteeofthe
DistrictBarAssociationatMuzaffarnagarwithinthestateofU.PmadecertainallegationsagainstajudicialofficerMr.KanhayaLalMehraanda
RevenueOfficerMr.LattaPrasad.AresolutionwaspassedinthemeetingoftheBarAssociationsthatcomplaintsshouldbefiledtothesuperior
authoritiesagainstthemisconductofthesejudges.Theallegationswereinall
1.Thejudicialofficerdoesnotrecordevidenceincasestriedbeforehimproperly,thatinalltheCriminalmattersthataretransferredtothe
court,wheretheaccusedarealreadyinbail,hedoesnotgivethemtimetofurnishfreshsuretieswiththeresultheissenttojail.Heisnot
accommodatingtolawyeraswhole
2.Therevenueofficerfollowsthehighlyillegalprocedureofleaving2casesatatime,whereinherecordstheevidenceofonecaseandask
thecourtclerktodosowiththeother.Alsoheishighlytemperamentalandconstantlythreatensthelawyerswithcontemptofcourt.
3.Itisnowourconsideredopinionthatthetwoofficersarethoroughlyincompetentinlaw,donotinspireconfidenceintheirjudicialwork.
Theystatewrongfactswhenpassingjudgmentsandareoverbearinganddiscourteoustothelitigantpublicandthelawyersalike.
TheHighCourtfoundthelawyerstobeprimafacieincontemptofcourtandfinedthemRs.300/.TheSupremeCourtconsideredalltherelevant
factsincludingthefactthatthemeetingwasheldinclosedquarters.Onlymemberswerepresent,theresolutionsweretypedbythepresidentof
theBaritselfandeventheminutesbookdidnthavetherecord.AfterconsideringalltherelevantfactsandcircumstancestheSupremeCourt
speakingthroughJusticeMukherjeeheld:
We are unable to agree with the learned counsel for the respondents that whether or not the representation made by the appellants in the
presentcaseiscalculatedtoproducetheseresults.Itistobekeptinmind,whenattacksorcommentsaremadeonajudgeorjudges,disparaging
incharacterandderogatorytotheirdignitycareshouldbetakentodistinguishbetweenwhatislibelonthejudgeandwhatamountstocontempt
ofcourt.Thefactthatastatementisdefamatorysofarasthejudgeisconcerneddoesnotreallymakeitacontempt.
Moreoverthejudgesaidthattheobjectofrepresentationsmadebytheappellantinthepresentcasewerenotforthepurposeofexposingthe
publicallegedshortcomingsoftheofficersconcerned,thewholeobjectwastohavethegrievanceofthelawyersandthelitigatingpublicreally
felt.TheSupremeCourtreversedthedecisionandallowedtheappeal.
OneoftheexcellentexamplesforthesocalledhypersensitivityoftheSupremeCourtisthecaseofE.M.S.Namboodriv.T.N.Nambiar.[30]The
casearoseoutofapressconferencethatthethenChiefMinisterE.M.SNamboodripadheld.[31]Duringthepressconferencehemadecertain
remarks:
MarxandEngelconsideredthejudiciaryasaninstrumentofoppressionJudgesareguidedanddominatedbyclasshatred,classinterestsand
classprejudicesandwheretheevidenceisbalancedbetweenawelldressed,potbelliedrichmanandapoor,illdressedandilliterateperson,the
judgeinstinctivelyfavorstheformer..Judiciaryispartoftheclassruleoftherulingclass.Andtherearelimitstothesanctityofthejudiciary.The
judiciaryisweighedagainstworkers,peasantsandothersectionsoftheworkingclassandthelawandthesystemofjudiciaryessentiallyservethe
exploitingclasses.
NamboodripadwasconvictedbytheKeralaHighCourtforcontemptofcourtandsentencedtoafineofRs1000/.Thiswasamajoritydecision
made by Justice Raman Nair, Justice Krishnamoorthy Iyer and with Justice Mathew dissenting. Namboodripad appealed to the Supreme Court
pleading:
1.HisobservationsdidnomorethangiveexpressionstotheMarxistphilosophyandwhatwascontainedintheprogrammeofhisparty.
2.Theycontainedafaircriticismofthejudicialadministration.
3.Theydidnotcontaincriticismofanyparticularjudgeorhisjudgmentorconduct.
4.ThelawofcontemptoughttobeinterpretedsoastocausenoencroachmentuponthefreedomofspeechguaranteedbyArticle19(1)(a)
oftheConstitutionofIndia.
ThejudgesHidayatullahCJ,G.K.MitterandA.N.RayafterlookingdeeplyintotheteachingsofLeninandMarxcametotheconclusionthatno
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ThejudgesHidayatullahCJ,G.K.MitterandA.N.RayafterlookingdeeplyintotheteachingsofLeninandMarxcametotheconclusionthatno
whereintheirwritingshavetheyshownanydirectattackonthejudiciary.Thecourtarrivedattheconclusionthatinalltheirwritingsthereisno
mentionofjudges,whichtheappellanthadmade.Thecourtfurtherstatesthateitherhedoesnotknoworhasdeliberatelydistortedthewritings
ofMarx.TheSupremeCourthenceconvictedNamboodripadforcontemptofcourtbutreducedthefinefromRs1000/toRs.50/.
Another case which relates to Freedom of Press and contempt of court, and also which gave rise to vehement criticism from both inside and
outsidelegalcirclesisP.NDudav.P.Shivshanker.[32]ThecasearoseoutofacomplaintfiledbyP.NDudaagainstP.Shivshankerwhowasthe
Unionlawminister.AccordingtothepetitionertheUnionLawMinisterhadcommittedcontemptofcourtduringspeechmadebyPShivshankeron
theoccasionofthesilverjubileeoftheBarCouncilofAndhraPradesh.EventhoughthespeechwasaddressedtoJudgesandlawyers,alarge
numberofpresspersonnelwerepresent.P.N.Dudacomplainedabout5passagesinhisspeech.Thetwomainpointwere:
1.TheSupremeCourtcomposedoftheelementfromtheeliteclasshadtheirsympathyforthehavesi.e.theZamindars.Asaresultthey
interpretedthewordcompensationinArticle31contrarytothespiritandamendmentoftheConstitutionandrulesthecompensation
mustrepresentthepricewhichawillingsellerispreparedtobuyfromabuyer.TheentireprogrammeofZamindariabolitionsuffereda
setback.TheConstitutionasamendedbythe1st14thand17thAmendmentstoremovethisoligarchicapproachoftheSupremeCourtwith
littleornohelp.Ultimatelythisrigidreactionaryandtraditionaloutlookofproperty,ledtotheabolitionofpropertyasafundamental
right.
2.Antisocialelements,i.e.FERAviolators,brideburnersandwholehordeofreactionarieshavefoundtheirhavenintheSupremeCourt.
ThecasewasheardbyabenchcomprisingofJusticeSabyasachiMukherjeeandSRanganathan.TothebiggestsurpriseofeveryonetheSupreme
Court took a liberal view. Speaking through Justice Mukherjee, the SC held that: there was no imminent danger of interference with the
administrationofjustice,norofbringingaadministrationintodisrepute.Inthatviewtheministerwasnotguiltyofcontemptofthecourt.The
speechoftheMinisterreadinitsproperperspective,didnotbringtheadministrationofjusticeintodisreputeorimpairadministrationofjustice,
thoughinsomeportionsofthespeechlanguageusedcouldhavebeenavoidedbytheministerhavingbackgroundofbeingformerjudgeofthe
HighCourt.Theministerperhapscouldhaveachievedhispurposebymakinghislanguagebuthisfactsdeadly.Thepetitionwasdismissed.
TheSupremeCourthasnotbeentheonlycourt,whichhasissuedcontemptofcourtproceedings.ManyoftheHighCourtshavealsodonethe
same.RecentlytheDelhiHighcameintothelimelightfollowingwhathasbeencalledastheWahIndiacase[33].Thecasearoseoutofthe
publicationbythepublishersofamagazinebythenameofWahIndia!ontheirwebsite,theresultsofapurportedsurveygradingthejudgesof
DelhiHighCourt.Eachofthejudgeswhosephotoswerealsopublishedweregradedinafivecolumntableratingtheinteralia,ontheirpersonal
integrity,depthinlawandqualityofjudgmentsdelivered.Thepublishersclaimedthatthegradeswerebasedonasurveywherefiftyofthesenior
membersoftheDelhiBarwereconsulted.ThepublicationwastitledJudgedoutanditalsoclaimedthatthesurveyisbynomeansanattemptto
cast any aspersion on the competence of the judiciary, but is a small and humble attempt to hold a mirror to it. It might make some Judges
uncomfortable,butthetruthsometimesdoes.
TheDelhiHighCourtpassedanordersummarilydirectingtheconfiscationoftheunsoldcopiesoftheissueofthenewsmagazinebarredits
circulationandorderedthemedianottopublishanythingthatwouldlowertheauthority,dignityandprestigeofthemembersofthejudiciary.The
nextdaythecourtliftedthebanonreportingofthecontemptproceedingsanddirectedthatthereportingmustbefairandaccurate.[34]Butthe
courtletthepublishersoffaftertheacceptanceofanapologybythepublisherRahulMishra,editorMadhuTrehanandthreejournalists.
AnothercasethatcameupbeforetheSupremeCourtrecentlywasRe:SKSundaram.[35]ThecasearoseoutofasuomotuactionintheSupreme
Court.AChennaibasedadvocatehadsenttelegramstothethenCJofIndiaDr.A.SAnand,demandinghisresignationonthegroundthatthe
latterhadexceededtheageofsuperannuation.Withinthreedaysofsendingthetelegram,hefiledacriminalcomplaintagainsttheCJunderthe
IPC,1860allegingcheating,criminalbreachoftrustandfalsificationofrecords,thatDr.AnandhadusurpedtheofficeofChiefJusticeofIndia
andcausedlosstotheexchequertothetuneofRs.3Crores.ThepetitionerwhohadpreviouslyfiledamandamusseekingthepresidentofIndia
to verify the age of Dr. Anand, alleged that he was spurred into action by an article that appeared in The Hindu on 3112000, publishing a
statementbyRamJethmalaniandanannexurepublishedinthebookBigEgosSmallMen.
TheSupremeCourtinthiscaseheldthatwellifheisdeterminedtosignthathewouldnotlookatanyoneofthosematerialaswellasthefinal
decisionrenderedbythepresidentofIndiaregardingtheageofDr.Anand,andthendecidedtopersistentlyjumpintotheforaywiththetirade,
puttinghimselfintotheoutfitandchasubleofhisproofinsignia,itisonlyreminiscentoftheSpanishheirDonQuiescentofLaMancha.Onthepart
ofthiscourt,wemayobservethatifthecontemnorhadstoppedwithhistelegramwewouldhavepersuadedourselvestoignoreitsasacaseof
rantinggibberish.ButwhenhefolloweditupwithlodgingofacriminalcomplaintbeforeacriminalcourtinwhichtheChiefJusticeofIndiawas
arrayedasanaccusedhavingcommittedtheoffenceofcheating,criminalbreachoftrustandfalsificationofrecordswerealizedthatheseriously
meanttomalignandunderminethedignityandauthorityofthiscourt.[36]Sundaramwassentto6monthsimprisonment.
ThemostrecentaswellasthemostcontroversialonewasArundhatiRoy,InRe.[37]ThefactsofthiscasearosefromaformercaseNarmada
BachaoAndolanv.UnionofIndia.[38]WhilethecasewaspendingbeforetheSupremeCourtMrs.ArundhatiRoywroteanarticleTheGreater
CommonGoodwhichwaspublishedinoutlookandFrontlinemagazines.TwoofthejudgesoftheSupremeCourtfoundthatthecommentsmade
byherwere,primafacie,amisrepresentationoftheproceedingsoftheCourt.TheCourtshoweditsdiscontentweareunhappyattheway
leadersofNBAandMrs.ArundhatiRoyhaveattemptedtounderminethedignityofthecourt.Weexpectedbetterbehaviourfromthem.[39]But
thecourtletthematterlieinthelargerinterestoftheissuespendingbeforethem.Buton30122000Mrs.ArundhatiandMrs.MedhaPatkarleda
hugeprotestrallyinfrontoftheSupremeCourtandshoutedabusiveslogansatthecourt.TheyalsoattackedthepetitionerstojudgesRParashar
advocateandothers.HencetheyfiledapetitionstatingthatMrs.ArundhatiRoyisguiltyofcontemptofcourt.[40]Moreovertherespondentalso
statedinheraffidavitonthegroundsthatjudgesoftheSupremeCourtaretoobusy,theCJofIndiarefusedtoallowasittingJudgetoheadthe
judicialenquiryintotheTehelkaScandal
Yetwhenitcomestoanabsurd,despicableentirelyunsubstantiatedpetitioninwhichallthethreerespondentshappentobepeople,whohave
publiclythoughinmarkedlydifferentwaysquestionedthepoliciesoftheGovernmentandseverelycriticizedarecentjudgmentoftheSupreme
Court,thecourtdisplaysadisturbingwillingnesstoissuenotice.Itindicatesadisquietinginclinationonthepartofthecourttosilencecriticism
andmuzzledissent,toharassandintimidatethosewhodisagreewithit.ByentertainingapetitionbasedonanFIRthatevenalocalpolicestation
doesnotseefittoactupon,theSupremeCourtisdoingitsownreputationandcredibilityconsiderableharm.[41]TheBenchcomprisingofJustice
G.B.PatnaikandR.P.Sethiallowedhertoretractheraverments.Butshestoodherground.
ThecourtheldthatAfaircriticismoftheconductofajudgetheinstitutionofthejudiciaryanditsfunctioningmaynotamounttocontemptif
made in good faith and in public interest. To ascertain the good faith and the public interest, the courts have to see all the surrounding
circumstancesincludingtheperson,hisknowledgeinthefieldandtheintendedconsequence.Allcitizenscannotbepermittedtocommentupon
theconductofthecourtsinthenameoffaircriticismwhichifnotcheckedwoulddestroytheinstitutionitself.
MoreovertheSupremeCourtstatedthesecannotcomeundertheexceptionofP.N.Dudav.ShivShanker[42], the court held that it may be
noticedthatthecriticismofthejudicialsystemwasmadebyapersonwhohimselfhadbeenthejudgeoftheHighCourtandwastheMinisterat
the relevant time. He had made studies about the system and expressed his opinions which, under the circumstances was held to be not
defamatorydespitethefactthatthecourtfoundthaninsomeportionofthespeechthelanguageusedcouldhavebeenavoidedbytheMinister
havingthebackgroundofbeingaformerjudge.[43]ThecourtherefoundthatMrs.Roywasdevoidofanyspecialknowledgeoflawandhencewas
finedRs.2000/.
ChapterIV
CIVILANDCRIMINALCONTEMPT
Theconceptofcontemptisabroadone,whichhasthecapacitytoencompassanyactdoneindetrimentofthecourt.Contemptmayrangefrom
disobediencetoordersofthecourttothrowingoftomatoesattheJudges.Broadlywecancategorizecontemptintotwotypes:CivilContemptand
CriminalContempt.
CIVILCONTEMPT
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CIVILCONTEMPT
IthasbeendefinedunderSection2(b)oftheContemptofCourtsAct,1971.[44]Theessentialingredientiswillfuldisobedienceandnotanyand
every disobedience due to various reasons such as delay due to unavoidable circumstances, or inadvertence. It has to be proved that the
disobediencewaswillful.Itconnotesaclearintentiontoflout.AcivilcontemptinvolvesdisobediencetoaCourtsorderaffectingtherightsof
otherpartiestothatorderbasicallydenyingtherightfulfruitsofthesuittotheotherparty.ButMensReahasbeenmadeanessentialingredient
inthe1971Act,whichisadeparturefromthepreexistinglawwiththeintroductionofthewordwillful.SoCivilcontemptdoesnotattractstrict
liabilityanymore.Itissometimessupposedthatthewillbeingapartytothedisobedienceisnotenoughandthatthereshouldfurtherbean
elementofobstinacy,rebellionordefiance.InWorthingtonv.AdlibClubLtd.[45],thecourtheldthatthewordcontumaciouslyasmeaningwas
notdifferentfromwillfully.InIndiaalso,thecourtsusethewordcontumaciouslyindescribingcontemptandinvariablyuseitdisjunctivelywith
willfulordeliberate.InDebaBrataBandopadhyayav.StateofWestBengal.[46],The Supreme Court observed that if orders of stay, bail,
injunction,receivedfromhighercourtsmustbeattendedtopromptly,andifthereisadelayindispatchingthemordealingwiththemthecourt
maydrawaninferenceofindifferenceandevencontumaciousness.InMd.IkramHussainv.StateofU.P.[47],thecourtaskedtheappellantto
producehisdaughterinamatterforhabeascorpus.Hemadefalseexcusesanddidnotproduceher.Hewasfoundguiltyofcontempt.InAlligarh
Municipalityv.E.T.MazdoorUnion[48],duringthependencyofthesuitthetrialcourtpassedanorderprohibitingtheappellantmunicipalityfrom
realizinganyfeesfromthetongawallasfortheuseofastand,whichtheydidnotfollowanditwasheldaswillfuldisobedienceandamountedto
contemptofcourt.InUnionofIndiav.OswalWollenMills[49],thecourtheldthatWhenasaresultofanorderoftheHighCourtinawrit
petition,anapplicationforlicensewastobedisposedofbythestatutoryauthority,nocontemptcanbesaidtobecommittedmerelybecause
thereisafailuretodisposeofthepetition.Anyorderofthecourtshouldgivesufficienttimeforcompliancebeforecontemptproceedingscanbe
initiated.RegardingviolationofanundertakinggiventoacourtitwasheldinMvHomeOffice[50],thatifapartyorhisadvocateactssoasto
coveytothecourtthefirmconvictionthatundertakingisbeinggiventhepartywouldbeboundanditwillbenoanswerthathedidnotthinkthat
he was giving it or that he was misunderstood and he would be held for contempt. But an undertaking, which runs counter to the statutory
provisionsorlawisanunauthorizedundertakingandcannotbethebasisofcontemptproceedingsforitsbreach.[51]
InMd.Idrisv.RustamJehangir[52],wheretherewasaclearbreachoftheundertakingthecourt,heldthatitwasentitledtogivedirectionsfor
closingthebreachinadditiontoimposingpunishment.
CRIMINALCONTEMPT
It has been defined under Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.[53]It is thus seen that scandalizing or prejudicing a Judge or
interferingwiththeadministrationofjusticeisContempt.Eventendingtoscandalizeortendingtoprejudiceortendingtointerfereorobstructis
enoughtoinvokeactionincriminalcontempt.InNaraindassv.StateofUP,[54]theSupremeCourtheldthat,itisnecessarytoexaminewhether
anyoftheimpugnedstatementsdointerfereorhaveatendencytointerferewithduecourseoftheproceedingsbycreatingprejudiceagainst
appellantorthewritpetition.InN.RajagopalaRaov.MurtazaMujtabbi,[55]theAP high court held that the publication of an article casting
aspersionsontheintegrityoftheHighCourtJudgeswhileselectingandrecommendingcandidatesforappointmentofDistrictjudgeswasheldto
becriminalcontempt.
Allacts,whichbringthecourtintodisrespectordisreputeorwhichoffendsitsdignity,orchallengeitsauthority,certainlyamounttocontempt.In
DelhiJudicialServiceAssociationv.StateofGujarat[56],theSupremeCourtobservedthatthedefinitionofcriminalcontemptiswideenoughto
includeanyactbyapersonwhichwouldtendtointerferewiththeadministrationofjusticeorwhichwouldlowertheauthorityofthecourt.The
publics have a vital stake in effective and orderly administration of justice. The court has the duty of protecting the community in the due
administrationofjusticeand,so,itisentrustedwiththepowertocommitforcontemptofcourt,nottoprotectthedignityofthecourtagainst
insultorinjury,but,toprotectandtovindicatetherightofthepublicsothattheadministrationofjusticeisnotperverted,prejudiced,obstructed
orinterferedwith.InPratapSinghv.GurbakshSingh,[57]thecourtheldthatanykindofthreatoranyactionwhichmayamounttoathreatheld
outtoapersonwhohasapproachedthecivilcourtforredressalofhisgrievancewithaviewtoforgotheassistanceofthecivilcourtamountsto
criminalcontempt.Athreatheldouttoajudgewithaviewtoobtainfavourableorderwouldamounttocriminalcontemptasinterferencewiththe
administrationofjusticeinStateofA.P.v.V.PrakashRao.[58]Thethreatneednotbeathreattothejudgehimselfpersonally.
A false or misleading or a wrong statement deliberately and willfully made by the party to a proceeding to obtain a favourable order would
prejudiceorinterferewiththeduecourseofjudicialproceedingwasheldtobecriminalcontemptinAfzalv.StateofHaryana[59]
DistinctionbetweenCivilandCriminalContempt
Civilcontemptisbasicallywrongtothepersonwhoisentitledtothebenefitofacourtorderwhilecriminalcontemptinvolvesdefianceofthe
courtrevealedinconduct,whichamountstoobstructionorinterferencewiththeadministrationofjustice.Ahelpfulillustrationisacasewherethe
person restrained commits a breach, he is guilty of civil contempt but a third party aiding and abetting a breach commits criminal contempt
becauseheinterfereswiththeadministrationofjustice.InAGv.TimesNewspapersLtd.[60],theHouseofLords,ontherationalebehindthe
distinction held that A distinction is sometimes drawn between what is described as civil contempt, that is to say contempt by party to the
proceedinginmatterofprocedure,andcriminalcontempt.Oneparticularformofcontemptbypartytoproceedingsisthatconstitutedbyan
intentionalact,whichisinbreachoftheorderofacompetentcourt.Wherethisoccursasaresultoftheactofapartywhoisboundbytheorder
orofothersactingathisdirectionoronhisinstigation,itconstitutesacivilcontemptbyhimwhichispunishablebythecourtattheinstanceof
thepartyforwhosebenefittheorderwasmadeandcanwaivedbyhim.Theintentionwithwhichtheactwasdonewill,ofcourse,beofthe
highestrelevanceinthedeterminationofthepenalty(ifany)tobeimposebythecourt,buttheliabilityhereisastrictoneinthesensethatall
requires to be proved its service of the order and the subsequent doing by the party bound of that which is prohibited. When, however, the
prohibitedactisdonenotbythepartyboundhimselfbutbythirdparty,astrangertothelitigation,thatpersonmayalsobeliableforcontempt.
Thereis,however,thisessentialdistinctionthathisliabilityisforcriminalcontemptandarisesnotbecausethecontemnorishimselfaffectedby
theprohibitioncontainedintheorderbutbecausehisactconstitutesawillfulinterferencewiththeadministrationofjusticebythecourtinthe
proceedingsinwhichtheorderwasmade.Heretheliabilityisnotstrictinthesensereferredto,fortheirhastobeshownnotonlyknowledgeof
the order but an intention to interfere with or impede the administration of justice an intention which can of course be inferred from
circumstances.
ButadecisionoftheAndhraPradeshHighCourt[61]failedtoappreciatethisdistinctionwheretheconductofthecontemnorininstitutingasuit
and obtain in interim order of status quo and thereafter writing letters to the Advocate Commissioner to stall a decree passed earlier were
characterized as civil contempt in spite of the express finding that the offending acts were deliberately intended to thwart the earlier orders
passedbytheHighCourt.
ChapterV
CONTEMPTOFCOURTANDFREEDOMOFSPEECHCONSTITUTIONALASPECT
Were it left to me to decide whether we should have a government without newspapers or newspapers without a government. I should not
hesitateamomenttopreferthelatter.[62]
Thoughtheconceptoffreedomofpressisnotanewone,itisveryhardtofindasuitabledefinition.AbrahamLincolnhasaptlyputitwhenhe
said,theworldhasneverhadagooddefinitionofit.[63]ButpeoplehavedefinedtheconceptofFreedomofPressandcontinuetodoso.The
conceptwasexplainedbyWilliamBlackstonewaybackin1769Thelibertyofthepressisindeedessentialtothenatureofafreestatebutthis
consistsinlayingnopreviousrestraintsuponpublicationsandnotinthefreedomfromcensureforcriminalmatterwhenpublished.Everyfreeman
hasanundoubtedrighttolaywhatsentimenthepleasesbeforethepublictoforbidthisistodestroythefreedomofthepressbutifhepublishes
whatisimproper,mischievous,illegalhemusttaketheconsequenceofhisownterritory.[64]
In1977theroyalCommissiononPresshasemphasizedtheimportanceof,anddefinedthefreedomofthepressasthatdegreeoffreedomfrom
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In1977theroyalCommissiononPresshasemphasizedtheimportanceof,anddefinedthefreedomofthepressasthatdegreeoffreedomfrom
restraintwhichisessentialtoenableproprietors,editorsadjournalisttoadvancethepublicinterestbypublishingthefactsandopinionswithout
whichademocraticelectoratecannotmakeresponsiblejudgments.
ProfChafeesaidthetruthis,Ithink,thattheframershadnoveryclearideaastowhattheymeantbythefreedomofspeechorofthepress,but
wecansaywithreasonableassurancethatthefreedomwhichcongresswasforbiddentoabridgewasnot,forthem,someabsoluteconceptwhich
hadneverexistedontheearth.[65]ProfessorBaxisaysthatfreedomofpressmeanstwoorthreethings.Firstitimpliesthefreedomtohavethe
infrastructurerequiredtosetupanewspaperandtorunitefficiently.Secondly,itmeansfreedomtogatherandreportinformation.Thirdly,it
meansfreedomtoexpressopinion.[66]
ButquiteadverseviewhasalsobeenputinbyK.K.Mathew[67]whenhesaidthequestionofthefreedomofpresshastobeunderstoodinthe
contextoffreedomforwhomthepublisherwhohasputinthemoneytheworkerwhoproducesthepaper,theadvertiserwhosustainsit,the
politicianwhorunstheadministrationorthereaderwhoreadsit?Freedomofthepressisthefreedomofthecommunity,ofsocietyasawhole.It
isnottheexclusiveprivilegeofanyofthefourcategorieswhoareassociatedwiththenewspaperpublication.Thereaderwhorepresentssociety,
shouldhavetheultimatefreedom.
TheeminentJuristandwriterMr.KrishnaIyerhassummedupwhatisFreedomofPress.Accordingtohimthemajorcontentsofthefreedomof
pressare:[68]
1.Freedomtogatherinformationfromdiverseandantagonisticsources,onacompetitivebasis,freefromanymonopolisticcontrolfromthe
government.
2.Freedomtoinformthepublictruefactswithoutfearorfavor.
3.Righttohavefreeaccesstosourcesofinformation.
Thecontemptoffreedomofpresshascomequitealongway.TherewasatimeinU.K.WhenthefreedomofPresswasntencouraged.SitWilliam
ScroggwhobecameLordChiefJusticein1678,pronouncedajudgmentthattopublishanewspaperwasillegalas,accordingtohim,manifested
anintentiontocommitbreachofthepeace.[69]On24thFebruary1703DanielDefoewasfined200Marksandcondemnedtobepillaredthriceto
beimprisonedindefinitelyandtofindsuretiesforhisgoodbehaviorsduringsevenyearsforwritingananonymouspamphletcalledshortestway
with dissenters. Thus even though the church and state resorted to all methods to suppress, corruption of youth or sedition. Such restraints
throughlicensingandcensorshipcametobeaccentuatedaftertheinventionofprintingandtheappearanceofnewspapersin17thcentury,which
demonstratedhowpowerfulthepressasamediumofexpressionis.Itisinprotesttosuchgovernmentalinterferencethatthefreedomofthe
presswasbuiltupinEngland.
AclassicexampleforthissituationwouldbeJohnMiltons[70]AeropagticawhichwasaprotestaddressedtothelongParliamentwhichhad
takenuplicensing,aftertheabolitionofstarchamber.MiltonSaid:Truthandunderstandingarenotsuchwarsastobemonopolizedandtraded
byticketsgivemethelibertytoknowtoutterandtoarguefreelyaccordingtoconscience,aboveallliberties.Whoeverknewtruthputtoworsein
afreeandopenencounter?Whoknowsnotthattruthisstrongnexttoalmightysheneedsnopolicies,nostrategies,nolicensingtomakeher
victoriousthesearetheshiftsanddefinesthaterrormakesagainstherpower.
ItwasresultofsuchagitationthattheLicensingActof1662waseventuallyrefusedtoberenewedbytheHouseofCommonsin1694though
reasonsgivenweretechnical.ThuseventhoughtheconceptofPressFreedomdevelopedinUnitedKingdom,Swedenwasthefirstcountryinthe
worldtorecognizelawfullythefreedomofpress.TheSwedishpressLawof1756guaranteedaclearprotectionorthepress.Thelawoffreedomof
presswasfirstpromulgatedin1810inSweden.Itwasreplacedin1949byanewAct,whichenjoyedofbeingpartoftheConstitutionitself.
CertainamendmentsweremadetotheFreedomofPressActin1976.[71]WecanseefromArticle1ofSwedishConstitutionthatSwedishlaw
expresslyprovidesforfreedomofpress.SoisthecaseofUnitedStates.InAmericathestruggleforfreedomofPresshaditsgreatesttriumph
whenitcametobeguaranteedbyawrittenConstitutions,asafundamentalright.TheFirstAmendmentdeclared:Congressshallmakenolaw
abridgingthefreedomofpress.InBridgesv.California[72],theAmericanSupremeCourtheldthatfreedomofpresswillincludethefreedomto
possessthosemeansandequipmentwhicharenecessaryfortheachievementoftheobjectorgoalforwhichfreedomofthepressisrequired.
TheIndianConstitutionthoughhasnotrecognizedthisrightspecificallyunderanyofthefreedomstheIndiancourtshavereadthisfreedomunder
freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a).[73] Supreme Court in ManekaGandhiv.UnionofIndia[74] observed that to be a
fundamentalrightitisnotnecessarythatarightmustbespecificallymentionedinaparticulararticlespecifically,itmaybeafundamentalrightif
itisanintegralpartofanamedfundamentalrightorpartiesofthesamebasicnatureandcharacterasthatfundamentalright.Everyactivity,
whichfacilitatestheexerciseofthenamedfundamentalright,maybeconsideredintegralpartofthatrightandhencebeafundamentalright
freedomofpressinArticle19.
ButthefreedomofpressimpliedlyprovidedunderArticle19(1)(a)isnotabsolute.Itisliabletoreasonablerestrictionsasimposedbyanexisting
laworalawtobemadebyastateonvariousgroundslikea)sovereigntyandintegrityofIndiab)thesecurityofthestatec)friendlyrelationswith
foreignstatesd)publicordere)decencyormoralityf)orinrelationwithcontemptofcourtandg)defamationorincitementtoanoffence.[75]
ItisthisnexusbetweenfreedomofpressasimpliedlyprovidedinArticle19(1)(a)anditsrestrictionbaseduponcontemptofcourtthatwillbe
dealtindetailinthecomingchapters.
ContemptbyLawyersandContemptagainstJudges
InthecaseofBrahmaP.Sharmav.StateofUP[76]theSupremeCourtdiscussedinverydetailtheconceptofcontemptandlibel.Thecourtheld
thatinaninstancewherethecourtiscalledupontheexercisethesummarypowersincasesofcontemptcommittedbyscandalisingthecourt,
therearetwoprimaryconsiderations.
1.The reflection on the conduct or character of a judge in reference to the discharge is made in the exercise of the right of fair and
reasonablecriticism.
2.Whenattacks/commentsaremadeagainstjudge/judgescareshouldbetakentodistinguishbetweenwhatisalibelonthejudgeand
whatamountstocontempt.Ifthestatementisdefamatorysofarasthejudgeisconcerned,thenhecanproceedagainstthelibelorfor
libel.
Theimportanceofthiscaseliesinthefactthatthecircumstancesasawholeshouldbelookedinto.Itisoneofthevery1stcases,whichstatesthe
principle. The fact that the meeting was held in a closed room, with only four members present, the President himself typing the letter, and
forwardingittosuperiorsinlettermarkedconfidentialallmadethecourtthinkthatwhatevertheydidwastoseekananswerforthegrievances
facedbytheBarandthepublicandnottoinformthepublicaboutthesocalledmisdeedsofthejudiciaryandtoscandalizeandlowerthevalueof
thecourt.
The Namboodripad Case was one in which we believe that a more severe punishment ought to have been imposed. The Supreme Court to a
surprisepenalizedmerelywithasymbolicfine.HMSeervaipointsoutitissubmittedthatthejudgmentiscorrectintheresultbutunsatisfactory
whenittendstosummarize.[77]ButifwelookintoitcloselywecanseethatNamboodripadsobservationshavetobeseeninthecontextofthe
circumstancestheyweremadein.theyweregeneralinnature.Theypertainedneithertoapendingcasenorweretheyindisobedienceofcourt
orderorindefamationforanyjudge.Theycontainedacriticismofthejudicialsystemingeneralandwereexpressedatapressconferencebefore
presscorrespondentssothattheywerenotlikelytocauseevendistantly,anyinterferencewiththeadministrationofjustice.Theywereasyoucan
seeofpurelyacademicinnature,sofarastheireffectonthelistenersareconcerned.Thegravityofspeechandtheconvictiondidnotseemtoget
alongtogether.
Butwhatevertheresultswerethemethodsbywhichthecourtarrivedattheconclusionisnothingbutpitiable.Inordertorefutetheargumentsof
Mr.MenonwhoappearedonbehalfoftheChiefMinister,theCourtwentandexaminedthewholeMarxianideology.Vehementcriticismswere
raised against this approach of the Court. After the court decided, S. P. Sathe wrote, it is not clear. However, that there was any need to
undertakeanexaminationofthewritings.TheCourtscouldhavetoldMr.MenonthattheywereinterpretingtheIndianConstitutionandnotMarx,
Engel or Lenin. Whether they had learnt about communism only by reading MiclellitanMurray was irrelevant. If Namboodripads statement
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Engel or Lenin. Whether they had learnt about communism only by reading MiclellitanMurray was irrelevant. If Namboodripads statement
amountedtocontemptofcourt,hehadtobepunishednomatterwhoseviewshewasvoicing.TheSupremeCourtcouldhaveresortedtowhat
justiceHolmesstatedinhisclassicdissentingjudgmentinLochnerv.NewYork[78]thecaseisdependeduponaneconomictheorywhichalarge
partofthecountrydoesnotentertain.IfitwereaquestionwhetherIagreedwiththattheory,Ishoulddesiretostudyitfurtherandlongbefore
makingupmymind.ButIdonotconceivethattobemyduty,becauseIstronglybelievethatmyagreementordisagreementhasnothingtodo
withtherightofthemajoritytoembodytheiropinionsinlawthe14thamendmentdoesntenactMr.HerbertSpencerssocialstatistics.Thisis
whatcourtoughttopreciselyhavedone.ApartfromthefactthattheirdwellingintohistoryofMarxistideologysidetracksthemainissues.Italso
unnecessarilyinvolvesthecourtinapoliticalcontroversy.
ItcomestoasasurprisetomanythattheSupremeCourtwhoconvictedNamboodripadwhowasachiefministerandwidelyacclaimedscholar,
acquittedShivShanker.[79]ThespeechbyShivShankerishighlyinflammatoryandwithcompletedisregardtohisposition.Ifitwastobeargued
thatthedecisioninNamboodripadscasewascorrect,becauseapersoninsuchahighpositionshouldhavetakenmorecarewhilemakingsuch
statementsbeforethepress,thatargumentcollapseswhenonereadstheShivShankerjudgment.JusticeMukherjeenotonlydidntconvicthimbut
evenstatedthatthestatementwasacomplimenttothejudiciary.
JusticeMukherjeeappliedthetestofimminentdangersaslaiddownbyJusticeHolmesinSchnenckv.U.S.[80]JusticeMukherjeesaidwith
these observations, it must be held that there was no imminent danger of interference with the administration of justice, nor of bringing
administrationintodisrepute.Inthatviewitmustbeheldthattheministerwasguiltyofcontemptofcourt.
MoreoverthejudgesshouldhavelookedintotheconsequencewhentheUnionLawMinisterhimselfspeakstothegatheringwherethepressis
present,thatSupremeCourtiscomprisedoftheeliteclasswhatwillbetheimpressiononthenormalmanwillhehavefaithinthejudicial
system?H.M.SeervairemarksaboutthatheintendednodisrespecttotheSupremeCourtandthathehadhighregardfortheHonblecourtcan
onlybecomparedtoamanwhoslapsanotherpersonveryhardandthensaysthathehadhighregardforthatpersonandwasmerelytryingto
rousehimtoasenseofhisownshortcomings.[81]
The case of Wah India where they were hauled up for contempt was a correct decision by the Apex court. As put forward by Lord Simons in
AttorneyGeneralv.TimesNewspaper[82]therearealways2conflictinginterestsbeforethecourt.Oneinthepublicsrighttoinformationand
thusthefreedomofpressandtheotherinuninterruptedadministrationofjustice.HereIcannotseehowthepublicsrighttoinformationis
infringed.Theywereputtingupnewsitem,whichhadnorealandsubstantialbasisatall.Thepublishersclaimedthatthegradeswerebasedona
surveywherefiftyoftheseniormembersofDelhiBarwereconsulted.Buthowfaristhiscredible?Wouldntithappenthatalawyerwholostan
importantcasewillhavesomegrudgeagainstthatparticularjudge?Sotheelementoftruthcannotbefoundout.TheWahIndiacasedoesno
credit to the case for journalistic freedoms. If the media demands greater freedom to criticize the administration of justice, there is also a
correspondingdutyonthemediatoreportwithamuchgreaterdegreeofresponsibility.[83]Alsoweshouldlookatthefactsthatjudgesbythe
natureoftheirofficecannotrespondtocriticismorgetembroiledincontroversyinthepublicarena.[84]AlsoinDeHaesandGijselsv.Belgium,[85]
theEuropeanCourtwhilereiteratingthatthepressplaysanessentialroleinademocraticsocietyremarkedthatthecourtsmustbeprotected
fromdestructiveattacksthatareunfettered,speciallyinviewofthefactthatjudgesaresubjecttoadutyofdiscretionthatprecludesthemfrom
replyingtocriticism.
InthecaseofRe.SKSundaram[86]the distinction between libel and contempt is almost completely blurred. The court while discussing the
chargescontainedinthetelegramheldthatanyoneofthosepostulateswouldcertainlyscandalizeandatanyratewouldtendtoscandalizeand
lowertheauthorityofthecourtsasawhole,andparticularlytheSupremeCourtofIndia.TheChiefJusticeofIndiabyvirtueofhisConstitutional
rankingistheheadoftheIndianJudiciary.Whenthreatsoftheabovenaturehavebeenhurledathim,theywouldunmistakablytentoundermine
thepositions,majestyanddignityofthecourtsandthelaw.
AnotherimportantaspectaboutthiscasewasputforwardbyMadhaviDivaninanarticle.[87]Divanstatedwheretheallegationsceasedtobe
libelandwhentheyamountedtocontemptisnotexplained.Also,althoughthecourtreferredtoJethmalanisBookBigEgoSmallmen,itappears
thatthecontextofthisbook,theapparentsourceofrenewedattackbySundaramwerenotexamined.Thisbookinadditiontocontainingmaterial
insupportoftheclaimthatthethenchiefjusticehadpassedtheageofsuperannuation,alsoalludestoacontroversiallandacquisitioncase
involving members of Dr. Anands family. Yet those writings of the former law minister of India and far more damaging than any ranting
gibberishbyanunknownentityprovokednojudicialresponse.
InReArundhatiRoy[88]theverdictoftheSupremeCourt,whichdistinguishesthiscasefromP.N.Dudav.Shivshankerisutterlyillogical.The
courtheldthatsinceMr.ShivshankerwasaretiredHighCourtJudgeandUnionLawMinister,hehadmadestudiesaboutthesystemandexpressed
hisopinionwhich,underthecircumstanceswasheldnottobedefamatory.Butthecourtsalsoheldthatintheinstantcasetherespondenthasnot
claimed to possess any special knowledge of law and the working of the institution of judiciary. She has not made any studies regarding the
workingofjudiciaryinthiscountryandinthesecase,thebenefittowhichMrShivshankerunderthecircumstanceswasheldentitledistherefore
notavailabletotherespndentinthepresentproceedings.
ThishoweverIcannotgrapplewith.Tosayexplicitlythatonlyapersonwhohasknowledgeoflawandworkingofthejudiciarycancriticizethe
judiciary,istosayingthatonlylawyers,juristsandacademicianscancriticizethejudiciary.Thenwhatabouttheaverageandsocalledlaymanto
do?
InR.v.Nicholls,[89]which is regarded as an Australian authority, Griffith CJ held that the defence of fair comment is available to persons
charged with scandalizing the court. The same case has been cited with approval in many of the leading Indian decisions. If we follow this
principle,ArundhatiRoysopinionshouldhavebeenconsideredasafaircomment.
IthasbeenrightlyheldinM.R.Parasharv.FarooqAbdullah[90]byChandrachudCJthattherightoffreespeechisanimportantrightofthe
citizen, in the exercise of which he is entitled to bring to the notice of the public at large the infirmities from which any institution suffers,
including institutions which administer justice. Thus it is clear from this statement that every citizen has a right to healthy and constructive
criticism.Hereonecannotdifferentiatethecitizensbybarriersofspecialistknowledgeoflawandtheworkingofjudiciary.AGNooraniwritesa
disturbingjudgmenthaslookedintotheseaspectsandcommentedallmenareequalbeforethelaw,onecannotbutwonderhowtheSupreme
Courtatlastdistinguishcitizensintotwocategories.[91]
OnecannothelpbutwonderattheirregularpatterninwhichtheSupremeCourtgivesitsverdictforcontemptcases.InNamboodripadsCase,the
SupremeCourtconvictedhimandwenttogreatlengthstocheckuptheworksofMarxandEngeltoprovehimwrong.InP.N.Dudav.Shivshanker
itwenttotheotherextremeandevensaidwhathehadsaidwasacomplimentandexoneratedhim.Thiswasnottheonlyinstance.Eventhe
KeralaHighCourthauledupJusticeKrishnaIyerforcontemptofCourttwicebutexoneratedhimbystatinghewasaneminentjuristauthorand
judge,andhasbetterandmorethoroughknowledgeinthefieldoflaw.InJ.SubramaniumPottiswards.[92]Thereisanoceanofdifference
between wellinformed and illinformed criticism. Those who have spent years and perhaps life time as part of the institution or to study an
institutionmayhaveoccasiontomakeathroughobjectiveassessmentofthatinstitution.Whattheysayinregardtoamatterconcerningthat
institutionshouldbevieweddifferentlyfromasimilarstatementbyanuninformedperson.
Oneoftheimportantquestionsthatariseinthespecterofcontemptpowerofthecourtsistherightofthecontemnortogoaheadandprovethe
truthofhisallegations.Orotherwisewilltruthbeadefenceincontemptincontemptproceedings?
AfewyearsbackthehonorableSupremeCourthadtheoccasiontoconsiderthisquestioninD.C.Saxenav.HonbletheChiefJusticeofIndia.[93]
InthatcaseacontemnorfiledawritpetitionagainstthethenChiefJusticeofIndiawasunfittoholdthatofficeandhenceheshouldbestripped
ofhiscitizenship.HealsosoughtforadirectiontoregisteranFIRagainstthethenCJIunderdifferentprovisionsofIPCandalsotoprosecutehim
underthePreventionofCorruptionAct.
Lookingintotherelevantfactsthe3judgesbenchheldthatittendstolowerthedignityandauthorityofthecourtandalsosowseedstopersons
withsimilarpropensitytounderminetheauthorityofthecourtorthejudiciaryaswhole,hecrossedallboundariesofrecklessandindulgesinwild
accusations.
SpeakingabouttruthasadefencejudgesKRamaswamysaiditwouldnotbeopentothecontemnortobringforwardevidenceorcircumstances
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SpeakingabouttruthasadefencejudgesKRamaswamysaiditwouldnotbeopentothecontemnortobringforwardevidenceorcircumstances
tojustifyontoshowwhetherandhowfairlyimputatiouswerejustifiedbecausethejudgeisnotbeforethecount.
ItishumblysubmittedthattheviewtakenbytheSupremeCourtisnotrightinthismatter.Ithascompletelyignoredtheprecedentsofthesame
courtinwhichTruthasadefencewasstressed.InBathinaRamakrishnaReddyv.Madras,[94]judges,Mukherjeesaid,thearticleinquestionsis
ascurrilousattackontheintegrityandhonestyofajudicialofficer.Specificinstanceshavebeengivenwheretheofficerisallegedtohavetaken
bribesorbehavedwithimproprietytolitigantswhodidsatisfyhisdishonestdemands.Iftheallegationsweretrue,obviouslyitwouldbetothe
benefit of the public to bring these matters into light. But if they were false, they cannot undermine the confidence of the public in the
administrationofjusticeandbringthejudiciaryintodisrepute.
AlsoinR.v.Nicholls[95]GriffithCJobserved:Iamnotpreparedtoaccedetothepropositionthananimputationofwantofimpartialitytoa
judgeisnecessarilycontemptofcourt.Onthecontrary,Ithinkthatifanyjudgeofthiscourtonifanyothercourtweretomakeapublicutterance
ofsuchcharacterastobelikelytoimpairtheconfidencesofthepublic,orofsuitorsoranyclassofsuitorsintheimpartialityofthecourtinany
matterlikelytobebroughtbeforeit,anypubliccommentwouldsofarfromanutterance,ifitwereafaircomment,wouldsofarfrombeinga
contemptofcourt,beentitledtosimilarprotectiontothatwhichcommentuponmattersofpublicinterestisentitledunderthelawoflibel.[96]
Thusitisaddedthatifacontemnorispreparedtogoforwardandprovethechargestotheextremewithalltherequiredevidencethenhemustbe
permittedtodoso.ItwouldbedesirabletowrapuptheargumentwiththereasonsgivenbythenotedConstitutionalLawexpertH.M.SeervaiA
judgeisapublicservantandifhetakesbribesheisnotactingorpurportingtoactasajudgeheiscommittingacrime,andisliabletobe
punishedforthatcrime.Sincepublicconfidenceinafearlessandjudiciaryisavitalpublicinterest,itwouldbedesirableifapublicspiritedlawyer
orlawyersAssociationconveyedingoodfaithandinsoberlanguage,theallegationsofcorruptions,withsupportingevidence,totheappropriate
authoritieswithaviewtoactionbeingtakenagainstthejudge.Howeverpracticinglawyersmaybeunwillingtotakesuchastep,orpersonsin
authoritymayturnablindageordonothing.Theprocessofremovalofajudgebyimpeachmentiscumbrous,andwithoutapublicoutcrymight
notberesortedto.Itthenfallstothepresstoexpose,ingoodfaithacorruptjudgeinsoberanddignifiedlanguage,andplacerelevantevidence,
whichcanbeproved,beforethepublic.Iftrue,thewritingcannotbeacanbeproved,beforethepublic.Iftrue,thewritingcannotbeacontempt
ofcourt,becausenothingbringstheadministrationofjusticeintodisreputesomuchascorruptioninthejudiciary.[97]
WHAT OUGHT TO BE CONTEMPT OF COURT CONCLUDING

REMARKS
Inanadversarialsystemoflitigationlikeourstherearealwaystwoparties,onemustlose,theothermustwin.Andwhenitgoesthroughthree
tiersoflitigationagainanunfortunatecharacteristicofourlawthepartywhoultimatelywinssometimesharborsinbuiltgrievancesagainstone
ofmoreJudgesdownthelinewhomayhavedecidedagainsthim.
Peoplewhopropagatethesegrudgesareoftenlawyersthemselves.Toplawyershavebigegos.Andegotisticallawyersneverliketolose,and
whentheydo,someofthemarenotaversetoblamingtheJudgeorsuggestingtotheirclientsthattherewassomeulteriormotive.
Now,judgingcasesisadifficultbusinessandtheoccupationalhazardsofjudgingaremanythememoryofawrongdecision(orwhatisultimately
foundtobeawrongdecision)sometimesfestersitalsogivesrisetoirresponsiblesometimesscurrilouscommentfirstaboutthecaseitself,and
theninevitablyaboutthejudgeorcourtwhichrenderedjudgment.
Thelawreportsarestrewnwithcasesofdisgruntledlitigantsgoingtogreatlengthsinmakingcharges,oftenunfounded,againsttheJudiciary.
The law of contempt that part of which is so colourfully described as scandalizing the court is intended as a wall of protection against the
vicissitudesofjudging.Oursisaverylitigioussocietyandthereareanumberofunreasonablepeopleinthesystem,personswhowillmakeany
typeofallegationagainstanyoneatthedropofahat.
ThisiswhyIbelievethatthispartoftheCriminalContemptJurisdictionthoughnowobsoleteinEngland,shouldremaininIndia.
Butthereareproblemsinthisbranchofthelawthelinesarethinlydrawnandarenotveryclear:andtheydependverymuchontheperceptionof
theJudgeadministeringtheContemptJurisdictioninthenameofthecourt.Thepublic,themenandwomenofthemedia,andthelawyersare
contenttoacceptconstraintsimposedbytheRuleofLaw,butarenotpreparedtoacceptadhocrulesimposedaccordingtothewhims,vagaries
andidiosyncrasiesofindividualjudges.
ThisadhocismistypifiedintheV.C.Mishracase[98]
NoonelikedwhatV.C.MishrasaidanddidinAllahabad,butthethreeJudgeBenchthatdecidedhiscaseintheirenthusiasmtoteachhimalesson
deviatedfromthelaw:ultimately,sobrietyprevailedtheConstitutionBenchoftheSupremeCourt[99]alsodidnotlikewhatMishrasaidordid
andyettheyoverruledthepunishmentmetedouttohimandsetoutthetruecontoursofthepenaltiesthatcanbeimposedincontemptcases.
Thiscasehassetanexampleandpromptsawordofadvicetoall:lawyersandjudges.NeverneverbehaveasMishradid.Andnever,neverlose
yourtemperasthethreeJudgeBenchdidinMishrascase:alwayskeepyourcoolasthefiveJudgeBenchdid,andsoearnedtheadmirationofall.
Mishrascasehasestablishedthatthecontemptjurisdictionmustnotandcannotbeusedtodisciplinethelawyerinconductofacase:thismust
belefttotheBarCouncilsentrustedwithdisciplinarypowersundertheAdvocatesAct.
ItwasJeremyBenthamwhocharacterizedtheCommonLawasDogLaw.Whenyourdogdoesanythingyouwanttobreakhimoff,(hewrotein
1823),youwaittillhedoesit,andthenbeathimforit.Thisisthewayyoumakelawsforyourdog,andthisisthewayjudgesmakelawsforyou
andme.
ThelawofcontemptofcourtinAngloSaxonjurisprudencebothinEnglandinthepast,andinIndiainthepastandpresenthasbeennomore,no
lessDogLaw.Therearenorules,noconstraintsnoprecisecircumstanceswhentheadministrationofjusticeisbroughtintocontempt.The
judgmentsarestrewnwithpiousplatitudesthatgivelittleguidancetotheeditor,tothecommentators,tolawyers,andtomembersofthepublic:
thispartofthelawofcontemptthoughnecessary,isastandingthreattofreeexpression.Itleavestoomuchtothediscretionoftheparticular
judge.AndattimesdecisionsdogiverisetoastrangefeelingthatthestatusofthestatusofthepersonwhoscandalizestheCourtperhapsdid
affecttheultimateresult.
In1988asittingCabinetMinistermadewideandimproperremarksagainstJudgesoftheSupremeCourthesaid:
ZamindarslikeGolakhnath(hewasspeakingofGolakhnathsCase)evokedasympatheticcordnowhereinthewholecountryexcepttheSupreme
CourtofIndia.Andthebankmagnates,therepresentativesoftheelitistcultureofthiscountryablysupportedbyindustrialists,thebeneficiaries
ofindependence,gothighercompensationbytheinterventionoftheSupremeCourtinCooperscase(1970),Antisocialelements,FERAviolators,
brideburnersandawholehoardofreactionarieshavefoundtheirheavenintheSupremeCourt.[100]
TheministerthenwentontosaythatbecausetheJudgesofthehighestCourthadtheirunconcealedsympathyforthehaves(asopposedtothe
havenots)theyhadinterpretedtheexpressioncompensationinthemannertheydid:clearlyattributingmotives.AndyetaBenchoftwoJudges
(inDudascase)exoneratedhim.LetmereadtoyouwhattheBenchsaid:
Bearinginmindthetrendinthelawofcontempt(theywerespeakingoftheliberaltrend)establishedbytheJudgmentofJusticeKrishnaIyerin
Mulgaokarscase[101]thespeechoftheMinisterhastobereadinitsproperperspective,andwhensoreaditdidnotbringtheadministrationof
justiceintodisreputeorimpairadministrationofjustice.Theministerisnotguiltyofcontemptofthecourt
AgainwhenanimportantpersonageMr.Mohd.Yunus,ChairmanoftheTradeFairAuthorityofIndiaknownatthetimetobeveryclosetothe
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AgainwhenanimportantpersonageMr.Mohd.Yunus,ChairmanoftheTradeFairAuthorityofIndiaknownatthetimetobeveryclosetothe
Prime Minister had criticized a judgment delivered by a Supreme Court Judge in the JehovahWitnesscase holding that the singing of the
NationalAnthemforaparticularsectofChristianswasnotcompulsoryMr.Mohd.YunussaidthattheJudgehasnorighttobecalledeitheran
IndianoraJudge.AnAssociationofindividualscalledtheConscientiousGroupv.Mohd.Yunus&Ors[102]filedapetitionseekingadirection
thatMr.Yunusshouldbehauledupforcontempt.
Theseexamplesaregivennottoderideourjudgesorcriticizepreviousdecisions.Itisonlytoillustrateverygraphicallythatthetruenatureof
this aspect of contempt jurisdiction: is mercurial, unpredictable capable of being exercised (and therefore in fact exercised) differently in
differentcasesbydifferentJudgesinthesameCourt.
Theoriginofthebranchoflawknownasscandalizingthecourtisshroudedinantiquityithasbeendescribedintextbooksasbothdubiousand
controversial[103].ItoriginatesfromacelebrateddictumofJusticeWilmotinhisjudgmentinWilkesCasewaybackin1765,ajudgmentwhich
wasneveractuallydelivered,butmeanttobedelivered,andlaterpublishedbyJusticeWilmotssonwhenhisfatherspaperwereedited.Itwasa
judgmentreservedafterargument,andwhenreadytobedelivereditwasdiscoveredthatthewritagainstWilkeswasincorrectlytitledandsince
anamendmentoftheWritwasnotconsentedto,thecasehadtobeabandoned.Thisistherealancestryofthatpartofthelawofcontempt
knowntodayasscandalizingtheCourt:itisbasedonajudgmentneverdeliveredinacase,acasewhichhadalreadyabated!
The Law of Contempt is an exception to the fundamental right of free speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the
Constitution, the law must then be justified on the ground that it is a reasonable restriction under Article 19(2): otherwise it would be
unconstitutional.ThereisajudgmentoftheDivisionBenchoftheCalcuttaHighCourt[104]deliveredsomeyearsago,whichcorrectlyappreciated
thisconstitutionalprinciple.Itwasnotwidelyreportedanddeservesgraterpublicitythanithassofarreceived.ItisajudgmentofaBenchoftwo
judgesS.C.SenJ.&U.C.BanerjeeJ.Thefactthatthelawofcontemptisanexceptiontothefundamentalrightofthefreespeechhasbeen
nowheremorefelicitouslydescribedthaninthisjudgment(deliveredfortheBenchbyJusticeBanerjee).InthatcasetheCourtwascalleduponto
decidewhetheranarticleinaCalcuttadaily,whichhadcondemnedapriorjudgmentoftheCalcuttaHighCourt,unreadandbydistortingfacts,
wascontemptuous.
ThearticlehadthedisquietingheadingLettheHighCourtsaveitselffromIgnominy.AsuomotorulewasissuedbytheHighCourt.Whenit
cameupforhearingnoapologywascalledforortendered.Butthenewspaperwasexonerated:thecontemptnoticedischarged.Thejudgessaid:
None of the articles can be defended as fair comment made in temperate language about a court case. In fact the distorted version of the
judgmentgivenandthelanguageemployedinthearticlesmayhavetheeffectofshakingtheconfidenceofthepeopleinthejudiciaryandthereby
loweringthedignityandmajestyofthelaw.
Andyet,upholdingtheimportanceoffreedomofspeechtheCalcuttaHighCourtheldthatthepublicationwasnotcontemptthoughtheJudges
didsaythatthelanguageusedcouldhavebeenbetter,politeandmoresober.Freedomtocriticize(evenwronglyandobtusely)ajudgmentofthe
courtwasupheldaspartofthecherishedfreedomofspeech.ThejudgmentoftheCalcuttaHighCourtmakeusrecallwhatwassaidbyLord
Denninginafamouscontemptcase:QuintonHogg,sonofaLordChancellorandafutureLordChancellorofEnglandhimselfhadwrittenanarticle
inverycriticalandcaustictoneaboutadecisionofDenninginagamecase.ThelitigantBlackburnmovedforcontemptandthatiswhatLord
Denningsaid.[105]
Thisisthefirstcase,sofarIknow,wherethiscourthasbeencalledontoconsideranallegationofcontemptagainstitself.Itisajurisdiction
whichundoubtedlybelongstous,butwhichwewillmostsparinglyexercise:moreparticularlyasweourselveshaveaninterestinthematter.Let
mesayatoncethatwewillneverusethisjurisdictionasameanstoupholdourowndignity.Thatmustrestonsurerfoundations.Norwillweuseit
tosuppressthosewhospeakagainstus.Wedonotfearcriticism,nordoweresentit.Forthereissomethingfarmoreimportantatstake.Itisno
less than freedom of speech itself. It is the right of every man, in parliament or out of it, in the Press or over the broadcast, to make a fair
comment,evenoutspokencomment,onmattersofpublicinterest.Thosewhocommentcandealfaithfullywithallthatisdoneinacourtofjustice.
Theycansaythatwearemistaken,andourdecisionserroneous,whethertheyaresubjecttoappealornot.Allwewouldaskisthatthosewho
criticizeuswillrememberthat,fromthenatureofouroffice,wecannotreplytotheircriticisms.Wecannotenterintopubliccontroversy.Stillno
lessinpoliticalcontroversy.Wemustrelyonourconductitselftobeitsownvindication.
Exposedaswearetothewindsofcriticism,nothingwhichissaidbythispersonorthat,nothingwhichiswrittenbythispersonorthat,willdeter
usfromdoingwhatwebelieveisrightnor,Iwouldadd,fromsayingwhattheoccasionrequires,providedthatitispertinenttothematterin
hand. Silence is not an option when things are ill done. So it comes to this. Mr. Quinton Hogg has criticized the court, but in so doing he is
exercisinghisundoubtedright.Thearticlecontainsanerror,nodoubt,buterrorsdonotmakeitacontemptofcourt.Wemustupholdhisrightto
the uppermost. I hold this not to be a contempt of court, and would dismiss the application. Lord Denning in England, like Justices Sen and
BanerjeeinIndiaputfreespeechfirstinaconflictbetweenthisfreedomandthecontemptjurisdiction.
ShortlyafterthecontroversialdecisionintheSpycatcherCase[106]whichattractedworldwideattention.LordTemplemanbelievedthatPeter
Wright who wrote to Spycatcher, and had it published in the U.K., should be held fast to the undertaking by him, which was not to publish
confidentialinformationobtainedbyhiminhiscapacityasamemberoftheBritishSecretService,notwithstandingthattheinformationhad,with
lapseoftime,percolatedintothepublicdomain.Twoofhiscolleagues(intheHouseofLords)agreedwithhim,whichputLordTemplemaninthe
majority.ThePressheldthemuptoridiculetheDailyMirrorpublishedphotographsofallthreeJudgesandbelowthephotographswaswrittenin
capitallettersOLDFOOLS.
Itwasaskedofhimwhynocontemptproceedingswereinitiatedagainsttheparticularnewspaper.Heapparentlysmiled,andwithoutatraceof
bitterness,saidtheJudgesinEnglanddidnottakenoticeofpersonalinsults,utteredwithoutmalice.Afterall,hesaid,hewasold,andthoughhe
believedhewasntafool,someoneelsewhosincerelythoughthewas,wasentitledtohisopinion.HealsoaddedButifthey(theEditorand
Publisher)hadsaidweweredishonestornottruetoourconscience,Iwouldhavepromptlyhauledthemup.
Hereisajudgewhowassoconsciousofhisenormouspowerthatheknewwhennottouseit:aselfrestrainingqualitywhichgreatlyenhancesthe
prestigeofalljudicialpower.
Thereisanotherdisturbingaspectofthisbranchofthelaw.Unlikedefamationtruth,isnotconsideredtobeadefence.Doesthelawofcontempt
thenimposereasonablerestrictionsonfreedomofspeechifyouarenotpermittedtospeakandestablishthetruth?Indiasnoteconstitutional
historianH.M.Seervaihadnodoubtonthepoint.ThisiswhathehadtosayintheFourthEditionofhisfamousbookontheConstitutionofIndia:
alawrelatingtodefamation,whichprovidedthattruth,spokenorwritten,forthepublicgoodshallnotbedefenceinalibelactionwouldimpose
restrictionswhichwouldbeunreasonable..thepositionwouldbenodifferentifalawweretoenactthattruthshouldnotbeadefencetoa
chargeofcontemptofcourt,ifitconsistsinscandalizingajudge.
Inacriminalprosecutionforlibel,theprosecutionwouldfailifitwereshownthatspecificchargesweretrueanditwasforthepublicgoodthat
theyshouldbemade.ButisthereonelawforacorruptMinisterandanotherforacorruptJudge?Theauthorthenboldlysaysthatnocourtin
IndiawouldsaythattherewasonelawforacorruptMinisterandanotherforacorruptJudge,andsaysquiteconfidentlythatnocourtwouldby
any process of reasoning punish for contempt the writer of an article who, in sober language sets out specific acts of bribery and is able to
successfullyprovethem.
For this view the author relies on a judgment of a Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court itself in B. Ramakrishna Reddy v. State of
Madras[107]1952SCR425whereJusticeB.K.Mukherjeasaid:
Thearticleinquestionisascurrilousattackontheintegrityandhonestyofajudicialoffice.Specificinstanceshavebeengivenwheretheofficer
isallegedtohavetakenbribesorbehavedwithimproprietytolitigantswhodidnotsatisfyhisdishonestdemands.Iftheallegationsweretrue,
obviouslyitwouldbetothebenefitofthepublictobringthesemattersintolight.Butiftheywerefalse,theycannotbutunderminetheconfidence
ofthepublicintheadministrationofjusticeandbringthejudiciaryintodisrepute.
UnfortunatelytheseobservationswerereadinalatercaseinPerspectivePublicationsPvt.Ltd.,&anr.V.StateofMaharashtra[108]asnotlaying
11/15
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UnfortunatelytheseobservationswerereadinalatercaseinPerspectivePublicationsPvt.Ltd.,&anr.V.StateofMaharashtra[108]asnotlaying
downaffirmativelythattruthandgoodfaithcouldbesetupasadefenceincontemptproceedingsandeversincethenthelawinPerspective
PublicationsCaseisthelawthatisfollowed.Wrongly,Iwouldsubmit.ParticularlysinceyearsafterthePerspectivePublicationsCase another
BenchofthreeHonbleJusticesoftheSupremeCourt(inAugust1976)setasideaFullBenchdecisionoftheHighCourtofPunjab,whichheldthat
aprimafaciecaseforcontemptwasmadeout.Inthatcase15membersofaBarAssociationmadeacomplaintaboutobservationsofaHighCourt
judgemadeduringaninspectionattheDistrictCourtBarthejudgehadsaidnastythingsaboutpoliticiansandthelawyersfeltthatthejudgewas
wrongtotalkpoliticsandtheysaidsointheletter.TheletterwasaddressedtotheChiefJusticebutitwasplacedforconsiderationofaBenchof
theCourtandonperusalofthecontentstheBenchthataprimafacieofcriminalcontemptwasmadeout.Noneoftheallegationsinthematter
againstthejudgeweredisputedorchallenged.
YettheHighCourtproceededonthebasisthateventhoughtheletterswrittencorrectlyrecordedwhathadhappenedandcommentedadversely
onthejudgesconduct,theauthorswereguiltyofcontempt.TheSupremeCourtoverruledandbysooverrulingemphasizedthatallegationswhen
truewerenotcapableofsustainingachargeofcontempt.
ThemostrecentendorsementofthisviewisthedecisionofthePrivyCouncil(March1999)inwhichLordSlynn(inanappealfromtheRepublicof
Mauritius),whilstupholdingtheconstitutionalityoftheoffenceofscandalizingthecourt,undertheConstitutionofMauritius,emphasizedtwo
things:first,thatthecopeofoffencewasanarrowoneandsecond,thatexposureandcriticismofjudicialmisconductplainlyinthepublicinterest
wouldnotnecessarilyconstitutecontempt:thatistosaytruthandgoodfaithwouldtrumptheContemptlaw,whichisasitshouldbe.
OurConstitutionmakesfreedomofspeechandexpressionafundamentalright,andtheexceptiontoitisthelawofcontemptnotanylawof
contemptbutreasonablerestrictionsinthelaw.TheContemptofCourtsActdoesnotsaythattruthcannotbeadefenceanditisfortheCourts
tointerpretthemeaningofthewordscandalize.
IfitispartofthelawasunderstoodthatapersoncommitscontemptifhetruthfullypublishesasafactthataparticularJudgehasaccepteda
bribeforgivingajudgmentinapartysfavourthensuchalawwouldbevoidasimposingunreasonablerestrictionsonthefreedomofspeechand
expression:thejudgewhotookthebribewouldbefalsetohisoath,todojusticewithoutfearorfavouranditwouldbeabsurdtosaythat
althoughArticle124(4)providesfortheremovalofajudgeforprovedmisbehaviour,noonecanofferproofforsuchmisbehaviourexceptonpain
ofbeingsenttojailforcontemptofcourt.
This is a glaring defect in our judgemade law that needs to be remedied hopefully by the Judges themselves if not, reluctantly then by
Parliament.ItisinterestingtonoticethatwhentheOntarioCourtofAppealsomeyearsagoconsideredtheoffenceofscandalizingtheCourtin
thelightoftheCanadianCharterofHumanRights.ThemajorityintheCourtconcludedthatscandalizingthecourtwasnolongercompatiblewith
thefundamentalfreedomofspeechandexpression.[109]Thedictionarymeaningofthewordscandalizeistoutterfalseormaliciousreportofa
personsconduct.Thereforetruthcanneverscandalize.
ThedecisionofSupremeCourtinRavichandraIyerv.Bhattacharji[110]isaregrettableonebecausetheBenchinthatcasesaidthatevenBar
Associationscannottakeupmattersandpanresolutionswithregardtoallegationsofcorruptionagainstsittingjudges.Theymusttakeupthe
matterfirstwiththeChiefJusticeandawaithisresponseforareasonableperiod.AndwhatiftheChiefJusticedoesnotrespondwhatafter
that?TheirLordshipsgavenoanswer.ItisBahttacharjiscase,whichquotesHarryEdwards,ChiefJusticeoftheUSCourtofAppealsoftheDistrict
ofColumbiawhowasatonetimeChairmanofwhatisknownastheJudicialCouncilintheUnitedStates(aCouncilfordiscipliningfederaljudges
intheUSjudgeswhoareappointedforlife).
InBhattacharjiscaseourcourtsquotedfromanarticlebyHarryEdwardsinwhichhehadsaid:
Idealofjudicialindependenceisnotcompromisedwhenjudgesaremonitoredandregulatedbytheirownpeers.Thislimitedsystemofjudicial
selfregulationpresentnoconstitutionaldilemmaaslongastheremovalpowerremainswithCongress.Iarguethatthejudiciaryaloneshould
monitorthisbadbehaviourthroughasystemofselfregulation.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
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1.G.Noorani,ADisturbingJudgment,Frontline,March292002at34.
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3.K.K.Mathew,ChiefEditor,MalayalamManorama,ATalkonAllIndiaRadioonTheFreedomofPress,Vidura,Vol.15,No.5,October
1978at280.
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1974at4.
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891(898).
Books
1.E.S.Venkataramaih,FreedomofPressSomerecentTrends,1stEdn.,B.R.PublishingCorp,NewDelhi,1987.
2.HMSeervai,ConstitutionalLawofIndia,Vol.I,4thEdn.,UniversalBookPublishers,NewDelhi,1999.
3.J.Milton,Aeropagiticia,1stEdn.,1644at23asCitedinD.S.Bogen,FirstAmendmentAncillaryDoctrines,MarylandLawReview,Vol.
37,No.4,1978.
4.JamesFrancisOswald,ContemptofCourt,3rdEdn.,HindustanLawBooks,Calcutta,1993.
5.JusticeA.N.Grover,PressandtheLaw,1stEdn.,VikasPublishingHouseLtd.,NewDelhi,1990.
6.JusticeVrKrishnaIyeradVSethi,EssaysonPressFreedom,1stEdn.,CapitalFoundationSociety,1996,NewDelhi.
7.K.K.Mathew,OnDemocracy,EqualityandFreedom,1stEdn.,Universalbooks,1978.
8.K.N.Goyal,JudicialMiscellany,1stEdn.,InstituteofJudicialTrainingandResearch,UttarPradesh,1993.
9.KrishnaIyerandV.Sethi,EssaysonPressFreedom,1stEdn.,CapitalFoundationSociety,NewDelhi,1996.
10.OxfordDictionaryofQuatotations,3rdEdition,OxfordUniversityPress,1999.
11.PKrishnaswamy,JusticeV.K.KrishnaIyerALivingLegend,1sted.,UniversalPublication,NewDelhi,NewDelhi,2000.
12.S.K.Padover,ThomasJeffersononDemocracy,2ndEdn.,McMillanPublishers,NewYork,1956.
13.S.Pal,LawofContempt,LawResearchInstitute,Calcutta,2001.
14.V.GRamachandran,ContemptofCourt,5thEdn.,EasternBookCompany,1976.
15.VepaP.Sarthi,G.C.V.SubbaRaosCommentaryonContemptofCourtsAct,1971,ALTPublications,Hyderabad,1999.
[1]RajuZMoray,ConversationinaCourtRoom,TheLawyersCollective,JulyAugust1994at53.
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[1]RajuZMoray,ConversationinaCourtRoom,TheLawyersCollective,JulyAugust1994at53.
[2]VepaP.Sarthi,G.C.V.SubbaRaosCommentaryonContemptofCourtsAct,1971,ALTPublications,Hyderabad,1999at1.
[3]Id.
[4]AsexplainedbySawantJ.inV.C.MishraAIR1995SC2348.Todischargeitsobligationsasthecustodianoftheadministrationofjusticeinthe
countryandasthehighestcourtimbuedwithsupervisoryandappellatejurisdictionoverallthelowercourtsandtribunals,itisinherentlydeemed
tohavebeenentrustedwiththepowertoseethatthestreamofjusticeinthetribunalsareprotectedwhilefearorfavourandforthatpurposeall
thecourtsandtribunalsareprotectedwhiledischargingtheirlegitimateduties.Todischargethisobligation,thiscourthastotakecognizanceof
thedeviationfromthepathofjusticeinthetribunalsoftheland,andalsoofattemptstocausesuchdeviationandobstructthecourseofjustice.
ToholdotherwisewouldmeanthatalthoughthiscourtischargedwiththedutiesandresponsibilitiesenumeratedintheConstitution,itisnot
equippedwiththepowertodischargethem.
[5]ThomasJefferson,ascitedinOxfordDictionaryofQuatotations,3rdEdition,OxfordUniversityPress,1999.
[6]JamesFrancisOswald,ContemptofCourt,3rdEdn.,HindustanLawBooks,Calcutta,1993at6.
[7]St.JamesEveningPostCase(1742)2A&K469.CitedFrom,V.GRamachandran,ContemptofCourt,5thEdn.,EasternBookCompany,1976
at2.
[8]Supra.n.6at1.
[9] Mosntesques idea of separation of power divided the state governing bodies into three organs. This model is followed by almost all the
jurisdictionsintheworld.
[10](1975)Wilm243.
[11]JusticeV.C.Srivastava,ContemptofCourtasCitedinK.N.Goyal,JudicialMiscellany,1stEdn.,InstituteofJudicialTrainingandResearch
UttarPradesh,1993at33.
[12]Thisamountoffinewasimposedin1926andeventodayunderthe1971Actwehavecontinuationofthesameprovisionwithouttakinginto
considerationofthetimeelapsedandthevalueofmoneyreduced.
[13]K.N.Goyal,JudicialMiscellany,1stEdn.,InstituteofJudicialTrainingandResearchUttarPradesh,1993at34.
[14]StateofMaharashtrav.MahboobS.Allibhoy,AIR1996SC2131.
[15]1998(4)SCC409.
[16]S.Pal,LawofContempt,LawResearchInstitute,Calcutta,2001at26.
[17](1919)249U.S.47.ThecaseinvolvedanappealfromaconvictioninthelowerFederalCourtonachargeofcirculatingantidraftleaflets
amongmembersoftheUSarmedforces.TheEspionageActmadeitafelonytoattempttoobstructtheenlistmentinandrecruitingtoservicesof
theUnitedStatesortoconveyfalsestatementswithintenttointerferewithmilitaryoperations.AppellantscounselcontendedthattheEspionage
ActviolatedtheFirstAmendmentguaranteeingfreedomofspeechandofthepressandwasunconstitutional.
[18] (1951) 34 U.S. 494. The Statute made it unlawful for any person to advocate, advice or teach duty, necessity desirability or propriety of
overthrowingordestroyingtheGovernmentintheUnitedStates,byforceorviolenceandpenalizedevenaconspiracytocommitsuchforbidden
acts.Thepetitioners,leadingmembersoftheCommunistParty,werechargedwithaconspiracytoformapartyforteachingandadvocatingthe
overthrowofgovernmentbyforce.TheycontendedthatthestatutecouldnotstandtheConstitutionaltestofclearandpresentdangerandthat
theirconvictionbythecourtbelowwasthereforeliabletobesetaside.
[19](1957)U.S.298.
[20]BabuLalParatev.StateofMaharashtra,AIR1961SC884.
[21]391U.S.194,201(1968)
[22]485U.S.624,632(1988).
[23]509U.S.688,695(1993).
[24]318U.S.50(1943).
[25]267U.S.515,537(1925).
[26]221U.S.418,444(1911).
[27]512U.S.821,114S.Ct.2552,2557(1994)
[28] CHIEF JUSTICE Warren Berger as cited in Floyd Abrams, Fair Trial Free Press: A Legal overview, Address before Connecticut Bar
Association,1979ascitedinJusticeVrKrishnaIyeradVSethi,EssaysonPressFreedom,1stEdn.,CapitalFoundationSociety,1996,New
Delhiat13.
[29]BrahmaP.Sharmav.StateofU.P.AIR1954SupremeCourt10.
[30]AIR1970SC2015.
[31]ThispressconferencewasheldatTrivandrumonNovember9th1967andthepaperwhichreportedwastheIndianExpress.
[32]AIT1988SC1208.
[33]CitedinMadhaviDivan,TheLawofcriminalContempt:timetomoveon,TheLawyersCollective,March2002at8.
[34]TheIndianExpress,2ndMay2001.
[35](2001)2SCC171.
[36](2001)2SCC171at176.
[37](2002)3SCC343.
[38]AIR1999SC3345.
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[38]AIR1999SC3345.
[39]NBAv.UnionofIndia(1999)8SCC308at313.
[40]JudgesRParasherv.PrashantBhusan,(2001)6SCC735.
[41]InreArundhatiRoy,(2002)3SCC346at354.
[42]AIR1988SC1208.
[43](2002)3SCC343at372.
[44]Civilcontemptmeans
(i)wilfuldisobediencetoanyjudgement,decree,direction,order,writorotherprocessofacourt
(ii)wilfulbreachofanundertakinggiventoacourt.
[45](1964)3All.ER674
[46]AIR1969SC189
[47]AIR1964SC1625
[48]AIR1970SC1767
[49]AIR1985SC1264
[50](1992)4All.ER97
[51]BabuRamGuptav.SudhirBhasin,AIR1979SC1528
[52]AIR1984SC1826
[53]Criminalcontemptmeans
Thepublication(a)bywordsspokenorwrittenor(b)bysignsor(c)byvisiblerepresentationsorotherwiseofanymatteror(d)anyotheract
whatsoeverwhich
(i)scandalizesortendstoscandalize,orlowersortendstolowertheauthorityof,anycourtor
(ii)prejudices,orinterferesortendstointerferewith,theduecourseofanyjudicialproceedingor
(iii)interferesortendstointerferewith,orobstructsortendstoobstruct,theadministrationofjusticeinanyothermanner.
[54]AIR1974SC1252
[55](1974)1ALT170
[56]AIR1991SC2176.
[57]AIR1962SC1172.
[58]1997(5)ALT724.
[59]1995Supp.(2)SCC388.
[60](1991)2AllER398
[61]KamalabaiNayakv.DhananjoyNayak,1996(3)ALT404.
[62]SpeechbyThomasJefferson,S.K.Padover,ThomasJeffersononDemocracy,2ndEdn.,McMillanPublishers,NewYork,1956at93.
[63]K.K.Mathew,OnDemocracy,EqualityandFreedom,1stEdn.,Universalbooks,1978at98.
[64]Blackstone Commentaries, Vol. IV at 151152 (Wendell ed.1854) as Cited in Justice E.S. Venkataramaiah, Freedom of Press Some
RecentTrends,2ndEd.,B.R.publishingCorp,Delhi,1987at14.
[65]Z.Chafee,BookReview,FreeSpeech:AnditsRelationtoSelfGovernmentbyAlexanderMeiklojohn,62HarvardLawReview,1949at891
(898).
[66]UpendraBaxi,InaninterviewontheFreedomofPress,Vidura,JournalofthePressInstituteofIndia,Vol.12,No.6,December1974at
4.
[67]K.K.Mathew,ChiefEditor,MalayalamManorama,ATalkonAllIndiaRadioonTheFreedomofPress,Vidura,Vol.15,No.5,October1978
at280.
[68]JusticeKrishnaIyerandV.Sethi,EssaysonPressFreedom,1stEdn.,CapitalFoundationSociety,1996,NewDelhiat13.
[69]JusticeE.S.Venkataramaih,FreedomofPressSomerecentTrends,1stEdn.,B.R.PublishingCorp,NewDelhi,1987at13.
[70]J.Milton,Aeropagiticia,1stEdn.,1644at23asCitedinD.S.Bogen,FirstAmendmentAncillaryDoctrines,MarylandLawReview,Vol.
37,No.4,1978at682.
[71]JusticeA.N.Grover,PressandtheLaw,1stEdn.,VikasPublishingHouseLtd.,NewDelhi,1990at8.
[72](1941)314U.S.252.
[73]InRomeshThapparv.StateofMadras,AIR1950SC124,thecourtrecognizedthefactthatfreedomofspeechandexpressionasgivenin
Article19(1)(a)impliedlygaverisetofreedomofpress.
[74]AIR1978SC597.
[75]Article19(2)
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[75]Article19(2)
[76]AIR1954SC10.
[77]HMSeervai,ConstitutionalLawofIndia,Vol.I,4thEdn.,UniversalBookPublishers,NewDelhi,1999at749.
[78](1904)198U.S.45,49Led.937.
[79]P.N.Dudav.P.ShivShankerAIR1988SC1212.
[80](1918)249U.S.47.
[81]Supra.n77at759.
[82][1973]1ALLE.R.710.
[83]ReHarijaiSinghandAnotherandReVijayKumar,(1996)6SCC466.
[84]LordDenninginR.v.MetropolitanpublicCommissionerExparte,(1968)2ALLE.R.319.
[85]Application19998/92,(1998)25EHRRI
[86](2001)2SCC171.
[87]MadhaviDivan,TheLawofcriminalContempt:timetomoveon,TheLawyersCollective,March2002at8.
[88](2002)3SCC346.
[89](1911)12CLR280.
[90]AIR1984SC615.
[91]A.G.Noorani,ADisturbingJudgment,Frontline,March292002at34.
[92]PKrishnaswamy,JusticeV.K.KrishnaIyerALivingLegend,1sted.,UniversalPublication,NewDelhi,NewDelhi,2000at350.
[93](1996)5SCC216.
[94]AIR1952SC76.
[95](1911)12CLR280.
[96]ThisfamousAustraliancasehasbeencitedwithapprovalinvariousIndianandsubsequentAustraliancases.Foreg.FletcherExpKirch(1935)
52CLR248Brett(1950)VLR226FosterExpGillies(1937)St.Rqd368AGNSWv.Mundey,(1972)2NSWLR887etc.
[97]Supra.n.77at754.
[98]1995(2)SCC584.
[99]SupremeCourtBarAssociationv.UOI,1998(4)SCC409.
[100]P.N.Dudav.P.Shivshanker,AIR1988SC1208.
[101]AIR1978SC727.
[102]AIR1987SC1451.
[103]BorricandLowe,LawofContempt,3rdEdn.at331.
[104]ArchanaGuhav.RajneetGuha,1989Cal.HCNotes252
[105]R.vMetropolitanPoliceCommissioner,1968(2)AER319.
[106]AttorneyGeneralv.GuardianNewpaper,1987(3)AER316.
[107]1952SCR425.
[108](1969)2SCR779
[109]R.v.Kopyto,1987(47)DLR4thSeries.
[110]1995(5)SSC478
Norelatedposts.
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WHAT OUGHT TO BE CONTEMPT OF COURT CONCLUDING

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