EN BANC

[G.R. No. 135882. June 27, 2001.]

LOURDES T. MARQUEZ, in her capacity as Branch Manager, Union Bank of the Philippines,
petitioner, vs. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, (in his capacity as OMBUDSMAN, Evaluation and
Preliminary Investigation Bureau, Office of the Ombudsman, ANGEL C. MAYOR-ALGO, JR., MARY
ANN CORPUZ-MANALAC and JOSE T. DE JESUS, JR., in their capacities as Chairman and
Members of the Panel, respectively, respondents.
Fortun Narvasa Law Office for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
SYNOPSIS
Sometime in May, 1998, petitioner Lourdes T. Marquez as Branch Manager of Union Bank of the
Philippines, Julia Vargas Branch, received an Order from Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto dated April
29, 1998, to produce several bank documents for purposes of inspection in camera. The accounts to be
inspected are involved in a case pending with the Ombudsman entitled, "Fact-Finding and Intelligence
Bureau (FFIB) vs. Amado Lagdameo, et al." for violation of R.A. No. 3019, Sec. 3 (e) and (g). In
relation thereto, petitioner, together with Union Bank of the Philippines, filed a petition for declaratory
relief, prohibition and injunction with the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, against the Ombudsman
wherein petitioner sought a declaration of her rights from the court due to the clear conflict between
R.A. No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989), Section 15 and R.A. No. 1405 (Secrecy of Bank
Deposits Law), Sections 2 and 3. On August 21, 1998, petitioner received a copy of the motion to cite
her for contempt. Petitioner then filed with the Ombudsman an opposition, on the ground that the filing
thereof was premature due to the petition pending in the lower court. But then, the Ombudsman panel
ordered her and her counsel to appear for a continuation of the hearing of the contempt charges against
her. Her motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the Ombudsman in the order dated October
14, 1998. Hence, this petition. CTHDcS
The Court ruled that before an in camera inspection may be allowed, there must be a pending case
before a court of competent jurisdiction. Further, the account must be clearly identified, the inspection
limited to the subject matter of the pending case before the court of competent jurisdiction. The bank
personnel and the account holder must be notified to be present during the inspection, and such
inspection may cover only the account identified in the pending case. In the case at bar, there is yet no
pending litigation before any court of competent authority. What is existing is an investigation by the
Office of the Ombudsman. In short, what the Office of the Ombudsman would wish to do is to fish for
additional evidence to formally charge Amado Lagdameo, et. al., with the Sandiganbayan. Clearly,
there was no pending case in court which would warrant the opening of the bank account for
inspection.
Petition was GRANTED.
SYLLABUS
1.
MERCANTILE LAW; BANKING LAW; REPUBLIC ACT NO. 1405 (LAW ON SECRECY
OF BANK DEPOSITS); EXCEPTIONS. An examination of the secrecy of the bank deposits law
(R.A. No. 1405) would reveal the following exceptions: 1. Where the depositor consents in writing; 2.
Impeachment case; 3. by court order in bribery or dereliction of duty cases against public officials; 4.
Deposit is subject of litigation; 5. Sec. 8. R.A. No. 3019, in cases of unexplained wealth as held in the
case of PNB vs. Gancayco.
2.
ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITES BEFORE AN IN CAMERA INSPECTION MAY BE ALLOWED.
We rule that before an in camera inspection may be allowed, there must be a pending case before a
court of competent jurisdiction. Further, the account must be clearly identified, the inspection limited to
the subject matter of the pending case before the court of competent. The bank personnel and the
account holder must be notified to be present during the inspection, and such inspection may cover
only the account identified in the pending case.

3.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. In the case at bar, there is yet no
pending litigation before any court of competent authority. What is existing is an investigation by the
Office of the Ombudsman. In short, what the Office of the Ombudsman would wish to do is to fish for
additional evidence to formally charge Amado Lagdameo, et al., with the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, there
was no pending case in court which would warrant the opening of the bank account for inspection.
THESAD
4.
ID.; ID.; ID.; UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. COURT OF APPEALS;
DECLARES BANK DEPOSITS TO BE ABSOLUTELY CONFIDENTIAL; EXCEPTIONS. In
Union Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, we held that "Section 2 of the Law on the Secrecy
of Bank Deposits, as amended, declares bank deposits to be "absolutely confidential" except: (1) In an
examination made in the course of a special or general examination of a bank that is specifically
authorized by the Monetary Board after being satisfied that there is reasonable ground to believe that a
bank fraud or serious irregularity has been or is being committed and that it is necessary to look into
the deposit to establish such fraud or irregularity, (2) In an examination made by an independent
auditor hired by the bank to conduct its regular audit provided that the examination is for audit
purposes only and the results thereof shall be for the exclusive use of the bank, (3) Upon written
permission of the depositor, (4) In cases of impeachment, (5) Upon order of a competent court in cases
of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or (6) In cases where the money deposited or
invested is the subject matter of the litigation.
5.
CIVIL LAW; PERSONS; ZONES OF PRIVACY ARE RECOGNIZED AND PROTECTED IN
OUR LAWS. Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil Code provides
that "[e]very person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors
and other persons" and punishes as actionable torts several acts for meddling and prying into the
privacy of another. It also holds a public officer or employee or any private individual liable for
damages for any violation of the rights and liberties of another person, and recognizes the privacy of
letters and other private communications. The Revised Penal Code makes a crime of the violation of
secrets by an officer, the revelation of trade and industrial secrets, and trespass to dwelling. Invasion of
privacy is an offense in special laws like the Anti-Wiretapping Law, the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act,
and the Intellectual Property Code.
DECISION
PARDO, J p:
In the petition at bar, petitioner seeks to
a.
Annul and set aside, for having been issued without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, respondents' order dated September 7, 1998 in
OMB-0-97-0411, In Re: Motion to Cite Lourdes T. Marquez for indirect contempt, received by counsel
of September 9, 1998, and their order dated October 14, 1998, denying Marquez's motion for
reconsideration dated September 10, 1998, received by counsel on October 20, 1998. Cdpr
b.
Prohibit respondents from implementing their order dated October 14, 1998, in proceeding with
the hearing of the motion to cite Marquez for indirect contempt, through the issuance by this Court of a
temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction. 1
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Sometime in May 1998, petitioner Marquez received an Order from the Ombudsman Aniano A.
Desierto dated April 29, 1998, to produce several bank documents for purposes of inspection in camera
relative to various accounts maintained at Union Bank of the Philippines, Julia Vargas Branch, where
petitioner is the branch manager. The accounts to be inspected are Account Nos. 011-37270, 240020718, 245-30317-3 and 245-30318-1, involved in a case pending with the Ombudsman entitled,
Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) v. Amado Lagdameo, et. al. The order further states:
"It is worth mentioning that the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and to require the production
and inspection of records and documents is sanctioned by the 1987 Philippine Constitution, Republic

Act No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989 and under existing jurisprudence on
the matter. It must be noted that R.A. 6770 especially Section 15 thereof provides, among others, the
following powers, functions and duties of the Ombudsman, to wit:
xxx
xxx
xxx
(8)
Administer oaths, issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum and take testimony in any
investigation or inquiry, including the power to examine and have access to bank accounts and records;
(9)
Punish for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court and under the same procedure and
with the same penalties provided therein.
Clearly, the specific provision of R.A. 6770, a later legislation, modifies the law on the Secrecy of
Bank Deposits (R.A. 1405) and places the Office of the Ombudsman in the same footing as the courts
of law in this regard." 2
The basis of the Ombudsman in ordering an in camera inspection of the accounts is a trail of managers
checks purchased by one George Trivinio, a respondent in OMB-0-97-0411, pending with the office of
the Ombudsman.
It would appear that Mr. George Trivinio, purchased fiftyone (51) Managers Checks (MCs) for a
total amount of P272.1 Million at Traders Royal Bank, United Nations Avenue branch, on May 2 and 3,
1995. Out of the 51 MCs, eleven (11) MCs in the amount of P70.6 million, were deposited and credited
to an account maintained at the Union Bank, Julia Vargas Branch. 3
On May 26, 1998, the FFIB panel met in conference with petitioner Lourdes T. Marquez and Atty. Fe
B. Macalino at the bank's main office, Ayala Avenue, Makati City. The meeting was for the purpose of
allowing petitioner and Atty. Macalino to view the checks furnished by Traders Royal Bank. After
convincing themselves of the veracity of the checks, Atty. Macalino advised Ms. Marquez to comply
with the order of the Ombudsman. Petitioner agreed to an in camera inspection set on June 3, 1998. 4
However, on June 4, 1998, petitioner wrote the Ombudsman explaining to him that the accounts in
question cannot readily be identified and asked for time to respond to the order. The reason forwarded
by petitioner was that "despite diligent efforts and from the account numbers presented, we can not
identify these accounts since the checks are issued in cash or bearer. We surmised that these accounts
have long been dormant, hence are not covered by the new account number generated by the Union
Bank system. We therefore have to verify from the Interbank records archives for the whereabouts of
these accounts." 5
The Ombudsman, responding to the request of the petitioner for time to comply with the order, stated:
"firstly, it must be emphasized that Union Bank, Julia Vargas Branch was the depositary bank of the
subject Traders Royal Bank Manager's Checks (MCs), as shown at its dorsal portion and as cleared by
the Philippine Clearing House, not the International Corporate Bank. CTHaSD
Notwithstanding the fact that the checks were payable to cash or bearer, nonetheless, the name of the
depositor(s) could easily be identified since the account numbers . . . where said checks were deposited
are identified in the order.
Even assuming that the accounts . . . were already classified as "dormant accounts," the bank is still
required to preserve the records pertaining to the accounts within a certain period of time as required by
existing banking rules and regulations.
And finally, the in camera inspection was already extended twice from May 13, 1998 to June 3, 1998,
thereby giving the bank enough time within which to sufficiently comply with the order." 6
Thus, on June 16, 1998, the Ombudsman issued an order directing petitioner to produce the bank
documents relative to the accounts in issue. The order states:
Viewed from the foregoing, your persistent refusal to comply with Ombudsman's order is unjustified,
and is merely intended to delay the investigation of the case. Your act constitutes disobedience of or
resistance to a lawful order issued by this office and is punishable as Indirect Contempt under Section
3(b) of R.A. 6770. The same may also constitute obstruction in the lawful exercise of the functions of
the Ombudsman which is punishable under Section 36 of R.A. 6770. 7

On July 10, 1998, petitioner together with Union Bank of the Philippines, filed a petition for
declaratory relief, prohibition and injunction 8 with the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, against the
Ombudsman.
The petition was intended to clear the rights and duties of petitioner. Thus, petitioner sought a
declaration of her rights from the court due to the clear conflict between R.A. No. 6770, Section 15 and
R.A. No. 1405, Sections 2 and 3.
Petitioner prayed for a temporary restraining order (TRO) because the Ombudsman and other persons
acting under his authority were continuously harassing her to produce the bank documents relative to
the accounts in question. Moreover, on June 16, 1998, the Ombudsman issued another order stating that
unless petitioner appeared before the FFIB with the documents requested, petitioner manager would be
charged with indirect contempt and obstruction of justice.
In the meantime, 9 on July 14, 1998, the lower court denied petitioner's prayer for a temporary
restraining order and stated thus:
"After hearing the arguments of the parties, the court finds the application for a Temporary Restraining
Order to be without merit.
"Since the application prays for the restraint of the respondent, in the exercise of his contempt powers
under Section 15 (9) in relation to paragraph (8) of R.A. 6770, known as "The Ombudsman Act of
1989," there is no great or irreparable injury from which petitioners may suffer, if respondent is not so
restrained. Respondent should he decide to exercise his contempt powers would still have to apply with
the court. . . . Anyone who, without lawful excuse . . . refuses to produce documents for inspection,
when thereunto lawfully required shall be subject to discipline as in case of contempt of Court and
upon application of the individual or body exercising the power in question shall be dealt with by the
Judge of the First Instance (now RTC) having jurisdiction of the case in a manner provided by law
(section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code). Under the present Constitution only judges may
issue warrants, hence, respondent should apply with the Court for the issuance of the warrant needed
for the enforcement of his contempt orders. It is in these proceedings where petitioners may question
the propriety of respondent's exercise of his contempt powers. Petitioners are not therefore left without
any adequate remedy.
"The questioned orders were issued with the investigation of the case of Fact-Finding and Intelligence
Bureau vs. Amado Lagdameo, et. al., OMB-0-97-0411, for violation of R.A. 3019. Since petitioner
failed to show prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the
jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman, no writ of injunction may be issued by this Court to delay
this investigation pursuant to Section 14 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989." 10
On July 20, 1998, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration based on the following grounds:
a.
Petitioners' application for Temporary Restraining Order is not only to restrain the Ombudsman
from exercising his contempt powers, but to stop him from implementing his Orders dated April 29,
1998 and June 16, 1998; and
b.
The subject matter of the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman at petitioners'
premises is outside his jurisdiction. 11
On July 23, 1998, the Ombudsman filed a motion to dismiss the petition for declaratory relief 12 on the
ground that the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction to hear a petition for relief from the findings
and orders of the Ombudsman, citing R.A. No. 6770, Sections 14 and 27. On August 7, 1998, the
Ombudsman filed an opposition to petitioner's motion for reconsideration dated July 20, 1998. 13
On August 19, 1998, the lower court denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration, 14 and also the
Ombudsman's motion to dismiss. 15
On August 21, 1998, petitioner received a copy of the motion to cite her for contempt, filed with the
Office of the Ombudsman by Agapito B. Rosales, Director, Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau
(FFIB).16
On August 31, 1998, petitioner filed with the Ombudsman an opposition to the motion to cite her in

contempt on the ground that the filing thereof was premature due to the petition pending in the lower
court. 17 Petitioner likewise reiterated that she had no intention to disobey the orders of the
Ombudsman. However, she wanted to be clarified as to how she would comply with the orders without
her breaking any law, particularly R. A. No. 1405. 18
Respondent Ombudsman panel set the incident for hearing on September 7, 1998. 19 After hearing, the
panel issued an order dated September 7, 1998, ordering petitioner and counsel to appear for a
continuation of the hearing of the contempt charges against her. 20
On September 10, 1998, petitioner filed with the Ombudsman a motion for reconsideration of the
above order. 21 Her motion was premised on the fact that there was a pending case with the Regional
Trial Court, Makati City, 22 which would determine whether obeying the orders of the Ombudsman to
produce bank documents would not violate any law.
The FFIB opposed the motion, 23 and on October 14, 1998, the Ombudsman denied the motion by
order the dispositive portion of which reads:
"Wherefore, respondent Lourdes T. Marquez's motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED, for lack
of merit. Let the hearing of the motion of the Fact Finding Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) to cite her for
indirect contempt be intransferably set to 29 October 1998 at 2:00 o'clock p.m. at which date and time
she should appear personally to submit her additional evidence. Failure to do so shall be deemed a
waiver thereof." 24
Hence, the present petition. 25
The issue is whether petitioner may be cited for indirect contempt for her failure to produce the
documents requested by the Ombudsman. And whether the order of the Ombudsman to have an in
camera inspection of the questioned account is allowed as an exception to the law on secrecy of bank
deposits (R. A. No. 1405).
An examination of the secrecy of bank deposits law (R.A. No. 1405) would reveal the following
exceptions: cEASTa
1.
Where the depositor consents in writing;
2.
Impeachment case;
3.
By court order in bribery or dereliction of duty cases against public officials;
4.
Deposit is subject of litigation;
5.
Sec. 8, R. A. No. 3019, in cases of unexplained wealth as held in the case of PNB vs. Gancayco.
26
The order of the Ombudsman to produce for in camera inspection the subject accounts with the Union
Bank of the Philippines, Julia Vargas Branch, is based on a pending investigation at the Office of the
Ombudsman against Amado Lagdameo, et al. for violation of R. A. No. 3019, Sec. 3 (e) and (g) relative
to the Joint Venture Agreement between the Public Estates Authority and AMARI. ETDHaC
We rule that before an in camera inspection may be allowed, there must be a pending case before a
court of competent jurisdiction. Further, the account must be clearly identified, the inspection limited to
the subject matter of the pending case before the court of competent jurisdiction. The bank personnel
and the account holder must be notified to be present during the inspection, and such inspection may
cover only the account identified in the pending case.
In Union Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, we held that "Section 2 of the Law on Secrecy of
Bank Deposits, as amended, declares bank deposits to be "absolutely confidential" except:
(1)
In an examination made in the course of a special or general examination of a bank that is
specifically authorized by the Monetary Board after being satisfied that there is reasonable ground to
believe that a bank fraud or serious irregularity has been or is being committed and that it is necessary
to look into the deposit to establish such fraud or irregularity,
(2)
In an examination made by an independent auditor hired by the bank to conduct its regular audit
provided that the examination is for audit purposes only and the results thereof shall be for the
exclusive use of the bank,

(3)
Upon written permission of the depositor,
(4)
In cases of impeachment,
(5)
Upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or
(6)
In cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation". 27
In the case at bar, there is yet no pending litigation before any court of competent authority. What is
existing is an investigation by the office of the Ombudsman. In short, what the Office of the
Ombudsman would wish to do is to fish for additional evidence to formally charge Amado Lagdameo,
et. al., with the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, there was no pending case in court which would warrant the
opening of the bank account for inspection. cSaATC
Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil Code provides that "[e]very
person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other
persons" and punishes as actionable torts several acts for meddling and prying into the privacy of
another. It also holds a public officer or employee or any private individual liable for damages for any
violation of the rights and liberties of another person, and recognizes the privacy of letters and other
private communications. The Revised Penal Code makes a crime of the violation of secrets by an
officer, the revelation of trade and industrial secrets, and trespass to dwelling. Invasion of privacy is an
offense in special laws like the Anti-Wiretapping Law, the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act, and the
Intellectual Property Code. 28
IN VIEW WHEREOF, we GRANT the petition. We order the Ombudsman to cease and desist from
requiring Union Bank Manager Lourdes T. Marquez, or anyone in her place to comply with the order
dated October 14, 1998, and similar orders. No costs. DCcAIS
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Buena,
Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr. and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1.
Petition, Rollo, pp. 8-29.
2.
Ibid., p. 10.
3.
Ibid.
4.
Motion to Cite LOURDES T. MARQUEZ, Union Bank Julia Vargas Branch Manager for
Indirect Contempt, Rollo, pp. 79-80, at p. 80.
5.
Petition, Annex "D", Letter of Ms. Lourdes Marquez, Rollo, pp. 39-40.
6.
Ibid., Annex "E", Order, pp. 41-42.
7.
Ibid., at p. 42.
8.
Docketed as Civil Case No. 98-1585, Union Bank of the Philippines and Lourdes T. Marquez
vs. Hon. Aniano A. Desierto, in his capacity as Ombudsman.
9.
Petition, Annex "G", Order dated July 14, 1998 in Civil Case No. 98-1585 Rollo, pp. 54-55.
10.
Ibid., p. 12.
11.
Petition, Annex "H", Rollo, pp. 56-65.
12.
Ibid., Annex "I", Rollo, pp. 66-70.
13.
Ibid., Annex "J" Rollo, pp. 71-76.
14.
Ibid., Annex "K", Rollo, p. 77.
15.
Ibid., Annex "L", Rollo, p. 78.
16.
Ibid., Rollo, p. 13.
17.
In Civil Case No. 98-1585.
18.
Ibid., Rollo, p. 13.
19.
Ibid., Rollo, p. 14.
20.
Petition, Annex "A", Rollo, pp. 30-32.
21.
Petition, Annex "O", Rollo, pp. 88-92.
22.
In Civil Case No. 98-1585.

23.
Petition, Annex "P", Rollo, pp. 93-97.
24.
Petition, Annex "B", Rollo, pp. 33-34.
25.
Filed on October 28, 1998, Petition, Rollo, pp. 8-26. On November 16, 1998, we required
respondents to comment on the petition (Rollo, p. 98). On March 26, 1999, respondents filed their
comment (Rollo, pp. 116-132). We now give due course to the petition.
26.
Philippine National Bank vs. Gancayco, 122 Phil. 503, 508 [1965].
27.
Union Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 563, 564-565 [1999].
28.
Ople vs. Torres, 354 Phil. 948, 973-974 [1998].
Copyright 2001

C D T e c h n o l o g i e s As i a I n c

G.R. No. 130661 June 27, 2001

People v. Torres
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 130661. June 27, 2001.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DANILO I. TORRES @ Pang-ae, JOHN DOE
and PETER DOE, accused.
DANILO I. TORRES @ Pang-ae, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
SYNOPSIS
Accused-appellant Danilo I. Torres was convicted of robbery with homicide by the Regional Trial
Court of Kalibo, Aklan. In his appeal before the Court, appellant contended that the trial court erred in
holding that he was positively identified as one of those who committed the crime. Appellant also
alleged that the robbery aspect of the alleged crime was not duly established. The Supreme Court
affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting appellant of robbery with homicide. The Court
upheld the credibility of the prosecution witnesses who positively and convincingly identified the
appellant as one of the perpetrators. The Court found nothing in the records of the case showing that
the witnesses were impelled by improper motive to impute the crime on appellant. The Court also ruled
that all the elements of the crime of robbery with homicide were sufficiently established in the case at
bar. The prosecution witnesses categorically stated that after their employer was shot, he saw the
culprits flee with the victim's bag. While the prosecution witnesses did not categorically state that they
saw the accused divest the victim of his property, the victim's purse, however, containing the money
and the pieces of jewelry, were missing from his body. From the said established circumstances, the
logical conclusion would be that the victim was killed to rob him of valuables. THDIaC
SYLLABUS
1.
REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; APPEAL; ERROR IN THE COURT TO
WHICH AN APPEAL IS MADE IS NOT FATAL TO THE APPEAL. Expectedly, Torres readily
filed his notice of appeal, albeit mistakenly directed to the Court of Appeals. The trial court,
nonetheless, elevated the records of this case to this court despite appellant's choice of court in the
notice of appeal. In the interest of justice, the error committed by the counsel of the appellant need not
deter us from deciding the appeal on the merits. The rule requiring a party to specify the court to which
the appeal is being made is merely directory. An error in the court to which an appeal is made is not
fatal to the appeal.
2.
ID.; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; COURT WILL NOT INTERFERE WITH
JUDGMENT OF TRIAL COURT IN PASSING ON THE CREDIBILITY OF OPPOSING
WITNESSES UNLESS THERE APPEAR IN THE RECORD SOME FACTS OR CIRCUMSTANCES
OF WEIGHT AND INFLUENCE THAT HAVE BEEN OVERLOOKED WHICH, IF CONSIDERED,
WILL AFFECT THE RESULT OF THE CASE. One of the highly revered dicta in our jurisdiction is

that this Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in passing on the credibility of
opposing witnesses unless there appear in the record some facts or circumstances of weight and
influence that have been overlooked which, if considered, will affect the result of the case. The reason
is founded on practical considerations. The trial judge is in a better position to decide questions of
credibility since he has personally heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of
testifying. Nevertheless, in view of the gravity of the charge and the penalty imposed, we spared no
effort to meticulously review the evidence and we are convinced that the trial court had not overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance that would have
materially affected the outcome of the case.
3.
ID.; ID.; ID.; WHERE CONDITIONS OF VISIBILITY ARE FAVORABLE AND
WITNESSES DO NOT APPEAR TO BE BIASED, THEIR ASSERTION AS TO IDENTITY OF
MALEFACTOR SHOULD BE ACCEPTED. Likewise, there is nothing in the record to show that
Macky and Vicente were moved by evil intent to impute the crime on appellant, thus there is the
presumption that they were not so actuated and their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit.
Further, we have ruled that where the conditions of visibility are favorable and the witnesses do not
appear to be biased, their assertion as to the identity of the malefactor should be accepted. SDHETI
4.
ID.; ID.; ALIBI; WHERE ALIBI IS ESTABLISHED ONLY BY ACCUSED, HIS RELATIVES
AND ASSOCIATES, SUCH DEFENSE DESERVES SCANT CONSIDERATION ESPECIALLY SO
IN THE FACE OF AFFIRMATIVE TESTIMONY OF CREDIBLE PROSECUTION WITNESSES AS
IN THIS CASE. Appellant's alibi must also fail. He insists that he was in Catigbian, Bohol working
in the farm during the incident. This was corroborated by Elizabeth Torres, his wife; Lolita Fuentes,
landlady of appellant's parents; and Porferio Cosmo, a neighbor of appellant. It is settled that where
alibi is established only by the accused, his relatives and associates, such defense deserves scant
consideration especially so in the face of affirmative testimony of credible prosecution witnesses as in
this case.
5.
CRIMINAL LAW; ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE; ELEMENTS; WHAT IS ESSENTIAL IN
ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE IS THAT THERE BE A DIRECT RELATION AND INTIMATE
CONNECTION BETWEEN ROBBERY AND KILLING, WHETHER BOTH CRIMES BE
COMMITTED AT THE SAME TIME. Robbery with homicide is a special complex crime against
property. Homicide is incidental to the robbery which is the main purpose of the criminal. In charging
robbery with homicide, the onus probandi is to establish: (a) the taking of personal property with the
use of violence or intimidation against a person; (b) the property belongs to another; (c) the taking is
characterized with animus lucrandi; and (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the
crime of homicide, which is used in the generic sense, was committed. The phrase "by reason" covers
homicide committed before or after the taking of personal property of another, as long as the motive of
the offender in killing a person before the robbery is to deprive the victim of his personal property
which is sought to be accomplished by eliminating an obstacle or opposition or in killing a person after
the robbery to do away with a witness or to defend the possession of the stolen property. Thus, it
matters not that the victim was killed prior to the taking of the personal properties of the victim. What
is essential in robbery with homicide is that there be a direct relation and intimate connection between
robbery and killing, whether both crimes be committed at the same time.
6.
ID.; ID.; PENALTY; RECLUSION PERPETUA IMPOSED IN CASE AT BAR. The penalty
for robbery with homicide is reclusion perpetua to death. There being no evidence of aggravating or
mitigating circumstances against or in favor of appellant, the lower of the two indivisible penalties shall
be imposed, without the benefit of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. aESTAI
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J p:
On appeal is the decision 1 rendered on June 20, 1997, by the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan,
Branch 3, in Criminal Case No. 4843 finding appellant Danilo Torres guilty of the crime of robbery

with homicide.
In an information dated January 7, 1997, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Mirazol Avila-Legaspi
charged appellant with robbery with homicide allegedly committed as follows: aSADIC
That on or about the 21st day of November, 1996, in the morning, in the highway of Barangay
Torralba, Municipality of Banga, Province of Aklan, Republic of the Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating together and
mutually helping one another while in camouflage fatigue uniform and while armed with guns, by
means of force and violence, and with intent of gain and without the consent of the owner thereof, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal, rob and carry away the following:
Cash money - P500,000.00, more or less;
One (1) gold ring worth
- P10,000.00;
One (1) gold necklace worth - P15,000.00;
One (1) gold plated wrist-watch worth
- P5,000.00
in the total amount of FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY THOUSAND (P530,000.00) PESOS, more or less,
belonging to LORENZO A. ISAGAN, JR. to the damage and prejudice of the owner in the aforesaid
amount; that by reason or on the occasion of said robbery, and for the purpose of enabling the accused
to take, steal and carry away the aforesaid items, the above-named accused with intent to kill, and
conspiring with one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with evident
premeditation and treachery stopped the truck being driven by the said LORENZO A. ISAGAN, JR.
and, thereafter, attack, assault and shot LORENZO A. ISAGAN, JR., thereby inflicting upon him
mortal wounds, to wit: SCcHIE
That as a result of the criminal acts of the accused the heirs of the victim suffered actual and
compensatory damages in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 2
Upon arraignment, Torres entered a plea of not guilty to the charge. Thereafter, trial on the merits
ensued.
The facts as presented by the prosecution to the trial court are as follows:
Witness MACKY GALANAO was employed as laborer of Lorenzo A. Isagan, Jr. [aka Boloy, victim
herein] since 1992. On November 21, 1996 he reported for work at 6:00 o'clock in the morning at the
house of Isagan. He worked in the trucking operation loading copras and abaca. The truck went
towards Libacao driven by Isagan. His other companions in the truck were Vicente Galanao, his father,
Julian Galanao, his younger brother and Jose Lumio. They did not reach Libacao because a person
stopped them in Torralba, Banga, Aklan. That person approached them near the left side of the truck,
went up the stepboard of the truck near the door and shot Boloy Isagan once. The truck moved
backward about fifteen (15) meters away from the spot where it originally stopped. Then it stopped
moving because its tire struck the canal. After the gun burst, two (2) other persons appeared on the
scene. One man ran towards them and said "Dapa" (face down) and they obeyed. The men opened the
door of the truck. The witness was inside the truck face down so he did not know what the men were
doing. After five minutes the men left the truck going towards the mountain. Then Jose Lumio shouted
"Nong Boloy, Nong Boloy". The witness also jumped out of the truck and seeing the lifeless body of
Boloy he ran towards Torralba with Julian Galanao in order to ask help from Emie Isagan, brother of
Boloy who lived there. When he told Emie that Boloy was dead, Emie rode in his truck and went to the
crime scene with them. Then they proceeded to the Banga Police Station where they reported that
Boloy Isagan was dead. After that, they returned to the crime scene. The witness stated that the man
who stopped the truck was dressed in fatigue and he was hiding something. But when he came nearer
the witness saw that he had a long firearm. The two (2) companions who later came out were also
dressed in fatigue, one armed with a short arm, and the other with a long arm. The witness was four (4)
meters away from the man who shot Boloy Isagan who was alone in the front of the truck while his
four (4) laborers were at the back of the truck. The following day, they were investigated by the police

concerning the incident in the police station of Banga. One week later, they were shown pictures (Exhs.
"F" to "F-4") of the suspects in this case by the investigators and from the pictures they recognized the
man shown in Exh. "F" as the one who waylaid and shot Boloy Isagan. That man was Danilo Torres,
the one who stopped the truck. On the way to Libacao, Boloy Isagan carried a blue bag. The witness
did not know the contents of the bag. When he and Emie returned to the truck, the bag was no longer
there. He saw the three (3) men carrying that bag when they left going towards the mountain. As he lay
flat, inside the truck marked "X" in Exh. "D-3," he tilted his head to the side trying to peep at the
direction of the persons going to the mountains. The truck was stopped before they reached the
barangay proper and the person who stopped the truck was about four (4) meters away from the edge of
the side of the road. He did not see the man carrying anything as he used his left hand in making a sign
to stop the truck while his other hand was at his side away from the witness. Boloy Isagan stopped the
truck. The witness saw the man as he was standing inside the truck, his head was over the roof. He was
at the left side of the truck going to Libacao while the man was at the right side of the road going to
Libacao. 3 AIDTSE
Further, the prosecution's version of the killing as summarized by the trial court shows that:
Witness VICENTE GALANAO is a laborer and has stayed in the house of Boloy Isagan in Linabuan
Norte for a month now. He started living there about three years ago. On November 21, 1996 he
reported for work at 6:00 o'clock in the morning and went to Libacao with Boloy Isagan, his sons
Julian and Macky and Jose riding in the back of the truck driven by Boloy. Their purpose was to buy
copra and abaca. They did not reach Libacao because in the middle of Barangay Torralba they were
stopped by a person who stood at the left side of the road. That man approached the left side of the
truck, went up the truck, and shot Boloy once. After shooting, two persons appeared from nowhere and
approached the back of the truck and told them to lie face downward. The two persons came from the
portion where bamboos grew by the side of the road. The one who shot Boloy had a firearm about 12
1/2 inches long. One companion was armed with a short gun and the other a long gun. They heard the
sound of the side door open and afterwards the men ran towards the mountainside. The witness and his
companions did not do anything. Macky and Julian went to seek help from Emie, while Jose went back
towards the direction of Banga. He remained at the scene, went down the truck and just stood by its
side. About five minutes after his companions left, some persons arrived. Later policemen came. They
were investigated by the policemen of Banga on November 22 the morning following the incident.
When the men stopped the truck the witness was at the left side of the truck. On the right side was
Julian. The witness noticed that the man was dressed in T-shirt and he recognized him to be the accused
Danilo Torres. 4
The body of the victim was later brought to Dr. Rafael Tumbokon Memorial Hospital in Kalibo, Aklan.
Dr. Edmundo Reloj, Provincial Health Officer, conducted a post mortem examination on the victim and
found the deceased had nine (9) gunshot wounds on the left side of the neck. He declared that the cause
of Isagan's death is hemorrhagic shock secondary to multiple gunshot wounds of the left neck. 5
The following day, PO3 Pedro Jerry Icay invited the four helpers of Isagan to the police station to shed
light on the incident. However, the four could not positively describe the culprits. On follow-up
investigation, the police gathered photo files and again summoned the four helpers to the station. At
first, they could not identify possible suspects from the pictures. But in the last picture, they identified a
suspect who was later known as Danilo I. Torres, appellant herein. The witnesses' sworn statement and
complaint were filed before the prosecutor's office. 6
Only Torres was apprehended while the two other accused remained at large. Torres claimed that he
was somewhere else during the incident. His defense's version of the incident at bar is as follows:
AIDcTE
DANILO TORRES denied committing the crime charged because he was a resident of Bohol with his
wife when the incident happened. They have a marriage contract but it was taken from him by a certain
policeman in Banga. He usually came home to Aklan every month of May to attend the fiesta. This

year he came home on May 3. Reaching his house, his mother told him that there was a warrant of
arrest issued against him and he was surprised why he was implicated in the crime when he was in
Bohol at the time. He asked her why she did not send him a letter when she knew of the case against
him but she said she did not send back the subpoena and just kept it because Danilo was not there at the
time. He wanted to proceed to Malinao and inquire about the case because it was a serious one but he
was not able to proceed because it was a Saturday. He was apprehended on Monday, May 5, at the
dance hall. He asked why he was apprehended when he was innocent but they informed him that there
was a warrant of arrest for the killing of Isagan and he told them that he had no knowledge of the
incident. The accused and Porferio Cosmo helped each other in tilling their farms. In November they
tilled their farms. On November 21 they weeded. This May he did not bring his wife here because it
was hard to travel. The accused denied the testimony of Florephiz Palmon who alleged that he saw the
accused with companions in Polocate because he was not here (sic) at that time. There are other
persons who had similar appearance like him and he insisted that he is innocent of this case, whatever
they will do to him. 7
Other witnesses were presented to bolster the version of the defense. Lolita Fuentes, Porferio Cosmo
and Elizabeth Torres corroborated the testimony of appellant.
The court found Torres guilty as charged.
Expectedly, Torres readily filed his notice of appeal, albeit mistakenly directed to the Court of Appeals.
The trial court, nonetheless, elevated the records of this case to this court despite appellant's choice of
court in the notice of appeal. In the interest of justice, the error committed by the counsel of the
appellant need not deter us from deciding the appeal on the merits. The rule requiring a party to specify
the court to which the appeal is being made is merely directory. An error in the court to which an
appeal is made is not fatal to the appeal. 8
In his brief, appellant assigns the following errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS
POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED AS ONE OF THOSE WHO COMMITTED THE CRIME CHARGED.
EASIHa
II
THE TRIAL COURT UTTERLY FAILED TO FIND THAT THE ROBBERY ASPECT OF THE
CRIME CHARGED WAS NOT DULY PROVEN BY THE PROSECUTION.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO
ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S DEFENSE AND IN NOT ACQUITTING HIM OF THE CRIME
CHARGED. 9
The primary issue for resolution concerns the credibility of the prosecution and defense witnesses.
Secondarily, we must also determine whether all the elements of robbery with homicide were proven
beyond reasonable doubt.
One of the highly revered dicta in our jurisdiction is that this Court will not interfere with the judgment
of the trial court in passing on the credibility of opposing witnesses unless there appear in the record
some facts or circumstances of weight and influence that have been overlooked which, if considered,
will affect the result of the case. The reason is founded on practical considerations. The trial judge is in
a better position to decide questions of credibility since he has personally heard the witnesses and
observed their deportment and manner of testifying. Nevertheless, in view of the gravity of the charge
and the penalty imposed, we spared no effort to meticulously review the evidence and we are
convinced that the trial court had not overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance that would have materially affected the outcome of the case.
In our view, appellant was positively and convincingly identified by Macky and Vicente Galanao. They
were standing at the left side of the truck, just behind the driver's seat where the victim was. The roof of

the truck was low and so their view of the road in front of the vehicle was unhampered. They were just
four meters away from the assailant and the crime was committed in broad daylight. During trial,
Macky and Vicente Galanao positively identified appellant as the same person who stopped the truck
and shot the victim. 10 Their failure to immediately describe the appearance of the culprits the day
following the shooting is understandable. After witnessing the killing of their employer right before
their eyes, they were still in shock during the initial investigation the next day. Nevertheless, a week
later, when they were shown several pictures of suspects, they recognized the appellant as the man in
one picture (Exh. "F4").
Likewise, there is nothing in the record to show that Macky and Vicente were moved by evil intent to
impute the crime on appellant, thus there is the presumption that they were not so actuated and their
testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit. 11 Further, we have ruled that where the conditions of
visibility are favorable and the witnesses do not appear to be biased, their assertion as to the identity of
the malefactor should be accepted. 12
Now, regarding the alleged inconsistency in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses. Admittedly,
Macky declared that appellant was in fatigue outfit while Vicente testified that he was in T-shirt. But
this discrepancy is understandable. The crime was executed swiftly for the startled witnesses to
remember accurately details in the clothing of the culprits.
Appellant also cites that the testimonies of Macky and Vicente that the victim was shot only once, did
not conform with the autopsy report that the victim sustained multiple gunshot wounds. They testified
they heard the first volley of gunfire from the assailant's firearm. In our view, their failure to accurately
recall the number of gunshots is understandable. Under such scary condition, ordinary men with their
own lives under threat, are not expected to count gunshots. Besides, it does not follow that the number
of shots would correspond to the number of gunshot wound. What is material is that they saw appellant
shot the victim. TCIDSa
Robbery with homicide is a special complex crime against property. Homicide is incidental to the
robbery which is the main purpose of the criminal. In charging robbery with homicide, the onus
probandi is to establish: (a) the taking of personal property with the use of violence or intimidation
against a person; (b) the property belongs to another; (c) the taking is characterized with animus
lucrandi; and (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of homicide, which is
used in the generic sense, was committed. 13 The phrase "by reason" covers homicide committed
before or after the taking of personal property of another, as long as the motive of the offender in
killing a person before the robbery is to deprive the victim of his personal property which is sought to
be accomplished by eliminating an obstacle or opposition or in killing a person after the robbery to do
away with a witness or to defend the possession of the stolen property. 14 Thus, it matters not that the
victim was killed prior to the taking of the personal properties of the victim. What is essential in
robbery with homicide is that there be a direct relation and intimate connection between robbery and
killing, whether both crimes be committed at the same time. 15
The foregoing elements are present in this case. Roselyn Isagan, the victim's wife, testified that before
her husband left their house for his routine business trip, he counted the money amounting to
P500,000.00 and then placed it in his bag. Her husband brought that amount because it was market day
and would use the money in buying copra and abaca. In addition, her husband wore a necklace, a ring
and a wristwatch when he left for the trip. 16
Galanao categorically stated that after their employer was shot, he saw the culprits flee with the
victim's bag. He and his co-workers were ordered to face down, apparently, in order not to witness the
incident. They were not harmed. On the other hand, after flagging down the truck, appellant
immediately shot the victim, facilitating the taking of valuables from the latter. While the prosecution
witnesses did not categorically state that they saw the accused divest the victim of his property, the
victim's purse containing the money and the pieces of jewelry were missing from his body. As the trial
court observed, there is no other known motive for the killing. From these circumstances, the logical

conclusion would be that the victim was killed to rob him of valuables. IESAac
Appellant's alibi must also fail. He insists that he was in Catigbian, Bohol working in the farm during
the incident. This was corroborated by Elizabeth Torres, his wife; Lolita Fuentes, landlady of
appellant's parents; and Porferio Cosmo, a neighbor of appellant. 17 It is settled that where alibi is
established only by the accused, his relatives and associates, such defense deserves scant consideration
especially so in the face of affirmative testimony of credible prosecution witnesses as in this case. 18
The penalty for robbery with homicide is reclusion perpetua to death. There being no evidence of
aggravating or mitigating circumstances against or in favor of appellant, the lower of the two
indivisible penalties shall be imposed, without the benefit of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
cTCaEA
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 3, in
Criminal Case No. 4843, dated June 20, 1997, finding appellant, DANILO TORRES Y IRADIEL,
guilty of ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE as charged; sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA; ordering him to restitute one (1) gold necklace, one (1) gold ring and one
(1) gold-plated wristwatch or their equivalent value of P30,000.00 if restoration can not be made, and
the cash amount of P500,000.00 taken from the victim, Lorenzo A. Isagan, Jr., is AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION that P50,000.00 is hereby awarded to the heirs of the victim not as actual or
compensatory damages but as indemnity for wrongful death, conformably with current jurisprudence.
Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1.
Rollo, pp. 16-29.
2.
Id. at 6-7.
3.
Id. at 62-63.
4.
Id. at 63-64.
5.
RTC Records, p. 4; TSN, May 21, 1997, pp. 4-8.
6.
TSN, May 26, 1997, pp. 2-9.
7.
Rollo, p. 68.
8.
Valerio vs. Tan, etc., et al., 97 Phil. 558, 560 (1955).
9.
Rollo, p. 41.
10.
TSN, May 26, 1997, pp. 18 and 31.
11.
People vs. Abdul, 310 SCRA 246, 265 (1999).
12.
People vs. Cogonon, 262 SCRA 693, 703 (1996).
13.
People vs. Salas, 327 SCRA 319, 333 (2000).
14.
People vs. Sanchez, 298 SCRA 48, 58 (1998).
15.
People vs. Cando,GR-128114, October 25, 2000, p. 14.
16.
TSN, May 27, 1997, pp. 13-14.
17.
TSN, June 10, 1997, p. 4; TSN, June 9, 1997, p. 12.
18.
People vs. Badon, 308 SCRA 175, 188 (1999).