Kant's and Kierkegaard's Conception of Ethics

By ULRICH KNAPPE
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to show that Kierkegaard's conception of ethics in Fear and
Trembling is of Kantian origin. In the first part I refer to crucial features of what Kant
calls the principle of morality or the categorical imperative as it is conceived in the
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. In particular I show that, according to Kant,
morality must be based upon a principle that is universal, objective and reasonable. In
the second part I turn primarily to key passages of Fear and Trembling and demonstrate
that each of these characteristics plays a decisive role in Kierkegaard's understanding of
ethical existence.

It is a truism for most Kierkegaard researchers today that Kierkegaard's thinking was influenced and inspired by the philosophical systems of Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. It is also obvious that these representatives of German idealism themselves have their origin in the
philosophy of Immanuel Kant.1 Given this, it is a bit astonishing that
there has been little concern with Kierkegaard's relation to Kant
since it will be difficult, if not impossible, to understand Kierkegaard's standpoint with respect of German idealism without seriously
taking into account and grasping the kind of thinking from which it
stems.2 Furthermore, Kierkegaard's relation to Kant is also interesting in its own right. In this paper I focus on just one aspect of this relation. I investigate Kierkegaard's conception of ethics in Fear and
1

How deeply each of the German idealists starts from Kant's critical thinking is shown
by probably the best book on this issue, namely, Rolf-Peter Horstmann's Die Grenzen
der Vernunft, Frankfurt am Main, Beltz Athenum Verlag 1991.
An early work on this issue is published by Ronald M. Green The Hidden Debt, Albany 1992. Recently D.Z. Phillips and Timothy Tessin have edited an interesting investigation, Kant and Kierkegaard on Religion, New York, St. Martin's Press, Inc.
2000.

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Trembling3 (supplementing this with an analysis of a few passages

from Either/Or If) and show that this conception can be understood
as Kantian. In the first part of this paper I set out some of the basic
characteristics of the principle of morality, the categorical imperative,
as discussed by Kant in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. In the second part I turn explicitly to Kierkegaard and show that
his conception of ethics exhibits these very same characteristics. Of
course, it is Kierkegaard's claim in Fear and Trembling that the Kantian conception, being based on an abstract idea of ethics, is capable of
being transcended by the religious. However, it may be of interest to
understand the kind of ethics Kierkegaard finally dismisses and which
he nevertheless conceives of being a necessary transitional stage to
becoming a religious agent.
1. The Principle of Morality as the Categorical Imperative
When we assess whether someone is a moral agent or not, we then
evaluate her will. According to Kant, the will is a moral will if it is
good as such. We act morally if our will is an unconditionally good
will. Since we can always choose to act in a non-moral way, we have
to oblige ourselves so that our actions are based upon an unconditionally good will: the good is duty. Furthermore, it must arise from
duty because it can only be motivated by itself; otherwise the will
would not be unconditionally good. Now, if the good will cannot be
motivated and hence determined, so to speak, from outside itself, it
must be determined from within itself. In other words, its worth or its
essence must stem from its principle. According to Kant, the principle of the good will, that is, of morality is the categorical imperative.
The main characteristics of the categorical imperative are its strict
universality (and hence its refusal of any exception), its objectivity
and its rationality. All of these important features are inseparable
from each other and illuminate from different angles what kind of
principle it consists of.4
3

All references to Kant are from Practical Philosophy, tr. and ed. by Mary J Gregor,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, which includes Groundwork of the
Metaphysics of Morals, hereafter Groundwork.
Since all the main characteristics of the categorical imperative are indeed inseparable from each other or represent what Kant generally calls 'reciprocal concepts' it is
impossible to abstract completely from the other features when discussing one of
them.

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Let us first of all analyse the universality of the principle of the categorical imperative. Principles are rules and as such must be understood as being general. Principles of so-called hypothetical imperatives are not unconditionally valid or are not universal. Hypothetical
imperatives presuppose a certain end, and hence what they command
is dependent upon it. Therefore, the corresponding rule must be conditional upon this end: 'If you want y, then do x'. To do x' is based
upon a principle of the will which is not universally valid since it
should only be applied on condition of wanting y in the first place. By
contrast, the categorical imperative is not dependent upon any particular end. It is rather the source of determining an end and hence does
not lack an end. It rather means that the law itself is capable of specifying what end should be set.5 Insofar as the end is set by the categorical imperative in such a way, it is an end in itself according to Kant.
Accordingly, an end in itself cannot be limited, but is unlimited: 'Do x'
and have this kind of unconditional end irrespective of any particular
end and any particular situation by letting your will be determined by
a law which is universally valid without any limitation!
When I think of a hypothetical imperative in general I do not know
beforehand what it will contain; I do not know this until I am given
the condition. But when I think of a categorical imperative I know at
once what it contains. For, since the imperative contains, beyond the
law, only the necessity that the maxim be in conformity with this law,
while the law contains no condition to which it would be limited, nothing is left with which the maxim of action is to conform but the universality of a law as such; and this conformity alone is what the imperative properly represents as necessary.6
The law of the categorical imperative is a universal law and hence
applies to every human being as such independent of any circumstances in which she finds herself. Hence the generality of the categorical imperative is not imposed upon every human being by a presupposed end like happiness which we all have as a matter of fact according to Kant. Even in that case the end might still apply merely
accidently to every human being, and its generality would not be unconditional.
Let us have a look at how Kant describes how we should act upon
the categorical imperative as the universal law: 'act only in accordance
5
6

Allen W. Wood Kant's Ethical Thought, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press

1999, p. 70.
Groundwork, 4:421.

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with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law'.7 Accordingly Kant claims a few pages later:
1
We must be able to will that a maxim of our action become a universal
law: this is the canon of moral appraisal of action in general.'8 According to Kant a maxim is a subjective principle of volition. To act in accordance with such a principle, one which is capable of being universalised, is tantamount to acting in accordance with the categorical imperative. Thereby the volition, which leads our action, has to be 'in accordance with,' that is, agree with the categorical imperative. To will in
agreement with a universally valid principle can be understood as to
will truly or to will and act in truth.
One important consequence of the universality of the categorical
imperative is that it allows no exceptions whatsoever. It is characteristic of Kant's position that the source of any putative exception to
the moral law is to be found in our a posteriori incentives and our decision to incorporate them into our maxim: We 'take the liberty of
making an exception to it for ourselves (or just for this once) to the
advantage of our inclination'. But, 'if we weighted all cases from one
and the same point of view, namely that of reason, we would find a
contradiction in our own will, namely that a certain principle be objectively necessary as a universal law and yet subjectively not hold
universally, but allow exceptions'.9 Consequently, permitting such an
exception would be to break with morality. An exception simply contradicts the generality of the moral law, and according to Kant, cannot therefore have the quality of moral worth. As in his theory of
knowledge the particular must be in accordance with the universal. If
it is not, then it is not a possible object of our knowledge. This corresponds to his ethical theory. Any particular which is not in accordance with the moral law, any action which cannot be interpreted as
an instance of this generality, is not allowed, or, if it occurs, is without
moral worth.
Inseparable from the universality of the categorical imperative is its
objectivity. It is important to see that this kind of objectivity is indeed
7

8
9

Groundwork, 4:421. To deal with all the different formulae of the categorical imperative would be a separate discussion and need not be analysed in this paper, since
the main concern of it is to show the extent to which Kant's and Kierkegaard's thinking is internally connected. However, despite the different formulae it is clear that
Kant is convinced that there is only one categorical imperative that can be expressed
differently.
Groundwork, 4: 424.
Groundwork, 4: 424.

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different from the kind of objectivity which is possible in the realm of

knowledge of nature according to Kant. Kant is convinced that he has
shown in the Critique of Pure Reason that the understanding is capable of determining empirical data as being objective. By virtue of the
unifying functions of the categories, as well as the transcendental
unity of consciousness, the empirical manifold gains the status of being objectively valid. Hence objectivity in this sense refers to the
world as we perceive it in space and time, as an object of experience.
In the case of the categorical imperative, however, being objective
does not involve any object in space and time. On the contrary, the object of the categorical imperative remains completely in the noumenal
sphere, that is in a sphere which is solely concerned with reason alone.
Hence Kant identifies 'being objective' with 'being determined from
grounds that are valid for every rational being as such'.10
Let us look at the peculiar kind of rationality which is embodied in
the categorical imperative. Kant asserts:
Finally there is one imperative that, without being based upon and having as its condition any other purpose to be attained by certain conduct, commands this conduct immediately. This imperative is categorical. It has to do not with the matter of the action
and what is to result from it, but with the form and the principle from which the action
itself follows; and the essentially good in the action consists in the disposition, let the result be what it may. This imperative may be called the imperative of morality.11

According to Kant it is 'immediately' clear what the categorical imperative says and commands since we do not have to take into account any specific circumstances or conditions. The reasonableness of
the categorical imperative is not conditional or relative but, according
to Kant, the principle of rationality as such. Correspondingly, the law
of the categorical imperative (as well as the action which it commands) is unconditionally rational. Hypothetical imperatives can be
referred to as principles of a rational (and good) will as well. But in
this latter case the kind of rationality or necessity is not complete or
unconditional, but conditional upon 'wanting y', that is, upon attaining this aim. The principles of hypothetical imperatives can therefore
only gain the status of 'rules of skill' or 'counsels of prudence'.12 According to Kant, we can only speak of 'commands (laws)'13 if we deal
with an unconditional rational rule - the categorical imperative:
10
11
12
13

Groundwork, 4: 413.
Groundwork, 4: 416.
Groundwork, 4: 416.
Groundwork, 4: 416.

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For, only law brings with it the concept of an unconditional and objective and hence
universally valid necessity, and commands are laws that must be obeyed, that is, must be
followed even against inclination. Giving counsel does involve necessity, which however, can hold only under a subjective and contingent condition, whether this or that
man counts this or that in his happiness; the categorical imperative, on the contrary, is
limited by no condition and, as absolutely although practically necessary, can be called
quite strictly a command.14

It is evident for Kant that the categorical imperative has this quality of
being 'absolutely necessary'. It is not a rule which is reasonable under
the condition or presupposition that we want to attain a certain end,
but it is a rule that is reasonable in itself, not being conditional upon
anything. In the Preface of Groundwork of Metaphysics of Morals
Kant already expresses this claim: 'Everyone must grant that a law, if
it is to hold morally, that is, as a ground of obligation, must carry with
it absolute necessity.'15
We have seen above that insofar as the maxim and the corresponding action is in accordance with the universality of the categorical imperative we act morally. If the universality and the rationality of this
law are inseparably linked, then we must find an equivalent expression for moral conduct as exemplifying rationality. It must be possible
that our actions and their will can be derived from the categorical imperative. Such derivation is an act of reason since, according to Kant,
'reason is required for the derivation of actions from laws'.16 Only if
we can derive our subjective principle of volition from the universal
law of the categorical imperative, is it then possible to refer to this will
as a reasonable and moral will according to Kant. To derive singular
maxims from the categorical imperative and to act upon them exemplifies practical reason. Insofar as we can derive an action and its corresponding maxim from the universal understood thus, it is in accordance with it, which is tantamount to the fact that it must be possible
to universalise it. The rationality and the universality of the categorical imperative are inseparably connected with each other.
A practical derivation must be capable of being shown to be theoretically reasonable. In this respect it denotes the activity of inferring.
Accordingly, practical reason is in agreement with Kant's overall de14
15
16

Groundwork, 4: 416.
Groundwork, 4: 389.
Groundwork, 4: 412. Correspondingly, Kant says, after having discussed four applications of the categorical imperative: 'These are a few of the many actual duties ...
whose derivation from the one principle [sc. the categorical imperative] cited above
is clear'. Groundwork, 4:423-424.

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termination of theoretical reason as the faculty of drawing inferences.17 Such inference essentially belongs to the realm of judgments.
Insofar as we infer, our mind infers from one judgment (in respect of
the categorical imperative) to another judgment (in respect of a
maxim or subjective principle of volition). A maxim or a subjective
principle of volition must be capable of being reasonable in the sense
that we must be capable of inferring from the corresponding former
assertion to the corresponding latter. A practical derivation must thus
be capable of being represented in terms of a theoretical inference or
reason. With Kant's account of the categorical imperative as the principle of morality in view, we can now return to Kierkegaard's account
of ethics.
2. Kierkegaard's Kantian Conception of Ethics
I will show now that the main characteristics of what defines the ethical stage in Kierkegaard are genuinely Kantian. Let us first of all look
at some general remarks by the Dane concerning what he understands by ethics. In order to do so, I will quote from the introduction
to The Concept of Anxiety. 'Ethics points to ideality as a task18 and assumes that every man possesses the requisite conditions.'19 'The more
ideal ethics is, the better. It must not permit itself to be distracted by
the babble that it is useless to require the impossible'.20
'The more ethics remains in its ideality, and never becomes so inhuman as to lose sight of actuality, but corresponds to actuality by presenting itself as the task for every man in such a way that it will make
him the true and the whole man, the man ... [in an eminent sense] the
more it increases the tension of the difficulty'.21
17

18

19
20
21

In the Critique of Pure Reason he notes: 'Knowledge from principles is, therefore,
that knowledge alone in which I apprehend the particular in the universal through
concepts. Thus every syllogism is a mode of deducing knowledge from a principle.'
(B 357) Accordingly, a few pages later Kant says: 'In every process of reasoning
there is a fundamental proposition, and another, namely the conclusion, which is
drawn from it, and finally, the inference (logical sequence) by which the truth of the
latter is inseparably connected with the truth of the former'. (B 360)
Either/Or II expresses the same view: 'What he [sc. the individual at the ethical
stage] wants to actualise is certainly himself, but it is his ideal self, which he cannot
acquire anywhere but within himself. (EO2, p. 259 / SKS 3,247)
C4,p. 16/SKS4,324.
C4, p. 17/5^54,324.
C4,p. 18f./5^54,325.

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What Kierkegaard calls the ideality of ethics and of the corresponding task or demand can be understood as a conception of ethics that is
based on an abstract idea. Such a conception is genuinely Kantian.
According to Kant, the sole source of the moral worth of an action is
in its principle. This principle cannot itself be determined or influenced by any a posteriori or psychological factor, and it cannot be dependent upon the outcome or success of the corresponding action.
Hence it must be an 'self-contained' ideal principle. Since human beings are not necessarily determined by the ideal principle of the good
will, such ideality can only be realised insofar as we conceive of it as
our (self-imposed) duty. By acting from duty our actions become
solely determined by ideality.22 In order to see that Kierkegaard understands the ideal by analogy with the main features of the categorical imperative,23 we shall now have a closer look at some passages in
Fear and Trembling. This discussion will be broadened with the help
of a few passages from Either/Or II which will confirm that Judge William, the main representative of the ethical stage, is in accordance
with the characteristics of moral conduct as understood by Kant.24
22

23

24

These decisive features of what can count as a moral action sharply distinguish the
position shared by Kant and Kierkegaard from the Greek view of ethics. As Kierkegaard himself emphasises, Greek ethics 'was not ethics in the proper sense, but retained an aesthetic factor'. (C4, p. 16 / SKS 4, 324) The morally good for Plato/Socrates and Aristotle always at least partly implies a person's welfare and happiness.
Hence neither of these makes the principle of morality self-sufficient or fully independent of these factors. Despite the 'nobility' and subtlety of their conceptions, the
good and hence its principle does not escape the status of being 'good for me' in the
sense of being beneficial to me. In principle, this conception of the good has only relative status, is not independent of its outcome or its consequences and remains indistinguishable from the good as characteristic of hypothetical imperatives. Although
Kierkegaard borrows and refers to Greek concepts much more than he explicitly refers to Kantian ones, his conception of the ethical stage is on the side of Kant's and
not of Plato's or Aristotle's conception. I cannot expand this point here.
As we have seen above, the generality, ban of exceptions, objectivity, and rationality
of the categorical imperative are inseparable from each other and must be understood as having the status of what Kant generally calls 'reciprocal concepts'. Hence,
strictly speaking, if one could show that Kierkegaard's conception of the ethical is
determined by any of these concepts, it would follow that he agrees with the others in
principle. However, I will refer to each characteristic of the ethical individually.
Strictly speaking, Judge William's position is a non-position. The kind of ethical existence he exemplifies is ultimately too complicated to be capable of being traced
back to one single philosopher. He is, so to speak, a fully fledged human being with
characteristics which must be regarded as contradictory, at least from a theoretical
perspective. It is my conviction, however, that whenever he reflects about his lifeview, he shows a deep Kantian inheritance. To show this exhaustively would tran-

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The crucial problem in Fear and Trembling concerns the possibility

and legitimation of a suspension of the ethical stage. This is exemplified by the problem as to whether Abraham, by means of his peculiar
kind of religiousness, may sacrifice his son Isaac and, therefore,
whether he is allowed to transcend that which must be understood as
his moral duty, i.e. not to kill his son. Throughout the whole book this
conflict between ethics and religiousness reflects the conflict between the universality of what is reasonable and which is capable of
being mediated, the ban of any exception, on the one hand, and the
non-reasonable and the singularity/particularity of the exception on
the other hand.
Problema I of Fear and Trembling sets up the tension between an
ethical life and Abraham's faith specifically in respect of the teleological suspension of the ethical. The following passage from this first
section serves to show Kierkegaard's identification of the ethical with
the general or universal.25 At the same time the end-in-itself formula
of the categorical imperative comes to the fore as being a crucial dimension of what counts as morally good according to Kierkegaard.
'The ethical as such is the universal, and as the universal it applies to
everyone, which from another angle means that it applies at all times.
It rests immanent in itself, has nothing outside itself that is its telos but
is itself the telos26 for everything outside itself, and when the ethical
has absorbed this into itself, it goes not further'.27

25

26

27

scend the scope of the present investigation. Against this background I would like to
stress that the core of the following burden of proof of showing a genuinely Kantian
inheritance in Kierkegaard's thinking mainly relates to Fear and Trembling. Note,
however, that Either/Or is written before Fear and Trembling and hence the latter
can be seen as clarifying Kierkegaard's earlier attempt to give an account of the ethical stage of existence. Wilfried Greve's book Kierkegaards maieutische Ethik, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main 1990, contains a good summary of all the different
philosophical influences in Judge William's life view.
I cannot give all the passages where Kierkegaard expresses this identification. However, I want nevertheless to mention that each of the main chapters of this book
(Problema I, II, III) which will be interpreted in the following pages immediately begins with the straightforward claim that the ethical is the universal (FT, p. 54 / SKS 4,
148; FT, p. 68 / SKS 4,160; FT, p. 82 / SKS 4,172).
The same position comes to the fore in Either/Or II: Only within himself does the individual have the objective toward which he is to strive, and yet he has this objective
outside himself as he strives toward it'. (EO2, p. 259 / SKS 3,246f.)
FT, p. 54 / SKS 4,148. To what extent this and other passages are in agreement with
the Hegelian account of ethics or the Hegelian Sittlichkeit is an interesting question.
However, this investigation is concerned with Kierkegaard's relation to Kant, and
I will not therefore address this question. Nevertheless it may be worth mentioning

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The command of the categorical imperative to treat oneself and

others always as ends in themselves and not as a mere means to an
end is implicitly expressed here. To relate to someone as an end in itself implies to adopt an end which is set by the command of the categorical imperative itself and hence 'the ethical rests in itself. Any end
which is not set in such an priori way, but which is given with regards
to our posteriori incentives (whereby the corresponding command
becomes conditional) is Outside' the ethical. Any end which is not in
agreement with an ethical end must be understood as being on the
other side of the complete universality of the ethical command characteristic of the categorical imperative. It is the task of the ethical to
'absorb' any end which is not an ethical end. At the same time this
means that it is the task of the ethical to absorb any attitude and its
corresponding action which is not in agreement with the strict universality of the moral law. To fulfil the ethical demand clearly means to
let one's principles be determined by that which is universal.
With this background we can come to Problema II of Fear and
Trembling. In this section Kierkegaard contrasts the ethical life with
Abraham's faith by pulling apart doing one's duty to one's neighbour
from one's duty to God. In the first sentences one reads:
The ethical is the universal, and as such it is also the divine. Thus it is proper to say that every duty is essentially a duty to God, but if no more can be said than this, then it is also said
that I actually have no duty to God. The duty becomes duty by being traced back to God,
but in the duty itself I do not enter into relation to God. For example, it is a duty to love
one's neighbour. It is a duty by its being traced back to God, but in the duty I enter into relation not to God but to the neighbour I love. If in this connection I then say that it is my
duty to love God, I am actually pronouncing only a tautology, inasmuch as God in a totally
abstract sense is here understood as the divine - that is, the universal, that is the duty.28

It is the duty to fulfil the moral law that Kierkegaard identifies with
God or the ethical. Hence to 'trace back' the corresponding duty of
ethics or morality to God means to trace it back to this kind of uncondi-

28

that even if Kierkegaard as a matter of fact primarily has Hegelian ethics in mind, it
is - according to the issue itself - either a genuinely Kantian conception of morality
or it is the Kantian inheritance in Hegelian ethics which he describes and criticises.
This view is not only supported by the way in which Kierkegaard refers to ethics, but
also a consequence of his criticism of the Hegelian teleological conception of philosophy of history being primarily concerned with the 'result' (FT, p. 62 / SKS 4,156), as
well as by the fact that it is (as far as Kierkegaard knows) Kant, not Hegel (FT, p. 54/
55 / SKS 4,149), who claims that Abraham is a murderer (Conflict of the Faculties)
and who is, therefore, Kierkegaard's main opponent.
F7,p.68/SA:S4,160.

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tionality. Since this unconditionality gives expression to the necessity to

fulfil the command and hence to the duty to fulfil it, we must conclude
that duty is traced back to nothing else than to duty itself. This means:
do your duty, because it is your duty. Hence the ethical is conceived of
in a Kantian way as arising from duty.29 Understood in this way, the
'duty to God' expresses nothing more than the duty to the duty. It is, as
Kierkegaard rightly concludes, tautological. To trace the duty back to
the duty as the unconditional law of the ethical can only stand for an
abstract relation to God.30 This corresponds to saying that the ethical
has its telos in itself or is an end in itself as Kierkegaard asserted in the
passage at the beginning of Problema I as discussed above.
Like Kant, Kierkegaard is well aware that, being tantamount to the
universal, the ethical does not allow any exceptions. Consequently, he
repeatedly makes it clear that Abraham as the representative of the
stage of Religiousness A,31 must be conceived of as a murderer if the
ethical stage of existence cannot at all be transcended. Either Abraham is a murderer or the religious stage of existence, which would allow an exception is possible. From the viewpoint of ethics and its corresponding universality, however, any exception which is not in accordance with the moral law is not allowed.32
29

30

31

32

There is no reason to think that it is acting in accordance with duty or with a certain
custom that Kierkegaard conceives of as being characteristic of the ethical. If one asserts - and there is some evidence for this assertion - that Hegel's conception of ethics is not free from such a dimension of thinking, then one must confess once more
that Kierkegaard is closer to Kant than to Hegel in this respect.
One may object that Kierkegaard cannot really refer to the categorical imperative
since he talks about the love of neighbour and the love of God whereas the categorical imperative seems not to command love. Note, however, that Kierkegaard like
Kant (cf. Groundwork, 4:399) is convinced that the duty to love cannot mean to
oblige oneself to have the corresponding inclination. More importantly, Kierkegaard
does not elucidate what he means by the duty to love apart from the fact that it has
to arise from duty and that it is hence abstract. But to describe the duty to love in this
way is not alien to the Kantian position. Accordingly Kant understands the biblical
command 'to love our neighbour' in Groundwork as a 'beneficence from duty' which
he designates as 'practical... love' (Groundwork, 4:399).
Abraham is not a representative of the specifically Christian stage or what Kierkegaard in the Postscript calls Religiousness B since he does not believe or act with reference to Jesus of Nazareth as the god-man and is unaware of sin correspondingly. I
owe this insight to my supervisor at the S0ren Kierkegaard Research Centre, Niels
J0rgen Cappel0rn.
Accordingly, Kant stresses in the Conflict of the Faculties (as well as in Religion
within the Limits of Reason Alone) that Abraham would be a murderer if he were to
kill his son.

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That the ethical corresponds to ideality as an unconditional duty

and in doing so commands the universal thus understood is clearly expressed in Either/Or II as well. What it means to adopt the thus understood universal is independent of any kind of (possible) universal custom or habit which may exist as a matter of fact. A moral will has to
be good without limitation or has to be unconditionally good and
hence cannot take into account a universality with reference to (general) principles of the outward world. In this case the universal or ethical, to speak with Kierkegaard, 'lies outside the individual',33 or,
more precisely, it would not be the ethical or the moral any more. On
the contrary, the ethical or universal necessarily has to be inside the
human self if it is to have any moral worth at all. Kierkegaard's repeated assertion that it is '[n]ot until the individual herself is the universal ... can the ethical be actualised'34 emphasises this identity between universality and individuality. Only if our individuality is immediately and exclusively established by this (self-imposed) kind of universality being independent of any other concern or rule than its own,
only then is it possible to refer to it as a moral attitude: 'This is the secret that lies in the conscience; this is the secret the individual life has
with itself.35
It is by means of this kind of self-sufficient universality that the
human being becomes actual. Here, Kierkegaard implicitly takes on
board Kant's claim about the objectivity of the categorical imperative.36 Only insofar as we adopt this kind of generality is it possible
to get hold of what can count as being actual. Concreteness is not
gained by adopting attitudes and practices which we find in the
world outside us. On the contrary, the view that orients itself by reference to what it supposes to be concrete is in fact abstract according to Kierkegaard: 'That is, if the individual believes that the universal human being lies outside him, so that it will come to him from
the outside, then he is disoriented, then he has an abstract conception, and his method will always be an abstract annihilating of the
original self'.37
33
34
35
36

37

02, p. 255/5^53,243.
02, p. 255 / SKS 3,243, cf. O2, p. 259 / SKS 3,247.
02, p. 255/5^53,244.
Typically Kant focuses on the objective validity of the law, whereas Kierkegaard focuses on the objective validity or actuality of the self insofar it imposes this law on his
subjectivity. However, these two different accentuations belong to one and the same
conception of ethics.
02, p. 259/5^53,247.

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In Problema III Kierkegaard sets up the tension between the ethical and Abraham's faith as the problem of giving an open justification
for one's behaviour versus not being able to justify it in terms that others understand. Kierkegaard says at the beginning of this section: 'The
ethical as such is the universal; as the universal it is in turn the disclosed. The single individual, qualified as immediate, sensate, and psychical, is the hidden. Thus his ethical task is to work himself out of his
hiddenness, and to become disclosed in the universal'.38
Kierkegaard generally explains justified behaviour in terms of an
account of truth in respect of the self. Truth consists formally in an
agreement between ideality and reality according to him.39 With respect to ethics40 such an agreement becomes possible for the first
time. It consists in an agreement between the ideal self conceived of
as the universal task, with the real or immediate self. Insofar as the
latter is in agreement with the former in such a way that it is 'disclosed
in the universal', the immediate self is brought into line with the universal task and its corresponding law. If such agreement is realised,
the truth of the self becomes possible. The self as a (self-conscious)
synthesis of reality and ideality is a true self if the 'how' of the relation
is its truth - as Kierkegaard stresses in the Postscript. Indeed, we are
now in a position to understand the first crucial expression of this
'how' in a better way. It simply denotes the agreement between the
two dimensions of existence. Reality and ideality agree with each
other if and only if reality or our immediate self is disclosed in the universal. This is identical with Kierkegaard's repeated claim that the
ethical is the universal. Insofar as the human being can count as a
moral agent she is the universal in the sense that she is in complete
agreement with the thus understood universal. To act in accordance
with an ideal principle, which is capable of being universalised is tantamount to acting in accordance with the categorical imperative. As a
matter of fact this conception of ethics is genuinely Kantian.
To close I will briefly point out that Kierkegaard's conception of the
ethical life-view is in accordance with the other main characteristic of
38
39

40

FT, p. 82/5^54,172.
As far as I can see Kierkegaard generally determines truth as the agreement between the self we are (reality) with the self we should be (ideality). What we should
be, of course, must be understood differently at the ethical, religious and Christian
stage.
As the Postscript confirms, Kierkegaard is convinced that an agreement between reality and ideality that is more than a mere approximation is impossible with respect
to knowledge of nature.

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201

the categorical imperative, namely its rationality.41 As we have seen,

Kant's ethics obliges us to adopt attitudes and their corresponding actions that are capable of being universalised. Accordingly, the categorical imperative is a principle which urges us to act in such a way
that our underlying will can be conceived of as an instance of a purely
general order. Only if we can derive a particular will or maxim of an
action from the unconditional law of the categorical imperative (or
vice versa), is it then possible to refer to this will as a moral will. This
kind of derivation, which Kant identifies with practical reason, must,
as we have seen, be capable of being reflected theoretically. The practical derivation must correspond to a theoretical inference. In other
words, a practical derivation must be capable of being theoretically
reasonable. A maxim or a subjective principle of volition must be capable of being reasonable in the sense that we must be capable of inferring from the corresponding former assertion to the corresponding
latter. Now, it is the concept of mediation42 that reflects such a theoretical inference. Let us quote some sentences from Fear and Trembling in order to elucidate this point. '[A]ll mediation takes place only
by virtue of the universal.'43 'As soon as I speak, I express the universal, and if I do not do so, no one can understand me.'44 'You must acknowledge the universal, and you acknowledge it specifically by
speaking'.45 A moral maxim can indeed be arrived at by means of the
universal and correspondingly we can theoretically infer from a statement in respect of the categorical imperative to a statement in respect
of the maxim. Such an inference takes place within the medium of
speaking, that is, within the medium of judgments. What we should do
can be represented within the realm of what we know, that is, infer to
with reference to the knowledge of what the categorical imperative
41

42

43
44
45

I do not refer here to Either/Or II in order to show that the ethical can be identified
with the rational since this is not affirmed by Kierkegaard explicitly. However, it is
obvious, I think, that Judge William does not really have to emphasise this since he is
in some sense the incarnation of the rational and that which can be thought and
hence judged. He is a judge in the strictest sense of the word. He derives maxims and
their corresponding actions from the law. To 'render a verdict' (5L, p. 136 / SKS 6,
218) as expressed in Stages on Life's Way, reflects his innermost being.
Even though the term 'mediation' is a genuinely Hegelian concept, it can be, according to the issue itself, related to Kant's conception of practical reason as the capacity
of deriving actions and their corresponding will from laws (cf. Groundwork, 4:412)
and thereby to his conception of theoretical reason. I cannot expand this point here.
FT, p. 56/5^54,150.
FT, p. 60/SKS4,153.
FT, p. 110/5^54,199.

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Ulrich Knappe

consists in. In this sense a moral maxim can be acknowledged in respect of the universal by language or judgment. We can think a moral
maxim in the sense that we can infer from a statement with respect to
the universal to a statement with respect to this very maxim. We mediate it by authority of universality.
Whereas for Kant the impossibility of universalisation is tantamount to a failure altogether, this is not necessarily the case according
to Kierkegaard. Kant holds on to the categorical imperative whereas
Kierkegaard intends to transcend the ethical stage of existence and
that means transcending that which must be capable of being universalised. Since mediation corresponds to universalisation, religious existence as Kierkegaard conceives it cannot be mediated. This also corresponds to the fact that with respect to religious existence, Kierkegaard disapproves of Kant's presupposition of reason (as inferring) as
the conditio sine qua non of any kind of investigation. With this disapproval, Kierkegaard attacks a determination of universality as being
reasonable. However, this does not imply that every kind of universality disappears altogether in Kierkegaard's conception of religious life.
Rather, it shows itself in a different way, in a way that cannot be mediated, but it definitely remains a universal task, a universal command
to which every human being as a human being is obligated. Only if we
keep this in mind, can we make sense of Kierkegaard's attempt to try
to 'think' the exception or particular without, however, denouncing it
as exemplifying an existential failure.

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