Heirs of Olviga vs CA

FACTS: Angelita Glor and her children filed for reconveyance of a

parcel of land with the RTC of Caluag, Quezon against the heirs of
Jose Olviga. The RTC ruled in favor of the Glors which led to the
Olvigas to appeal with the CA arguing that the action for
reconveyance has already prescribed and that they were purchasers
in good faith. The CA affirmed the RTC decision. A summary of
events follows because it is much easier that way: 1950 - Lot in
question was still forestland when Eutiquio Pureza and his father
cultivated it by introducing fruit bearing trees such as coconuts,
jackfruits, mangoes, avocado and bananas. 1956 The Bureau of
Lands surveyed the land in the name of Pureza but Godofredo
Olviga, a son of Jose Olviga, protested and claims that theyre
entitled to of the lot. 1960 Pureza filed for homestead
application over the lot. 1961 Pureza transferred his rights to
Cornelio Glor, the husband of Angelita. Neither the homestead
application nor the transfer was acted upon by the Director of Lands
for unknown reasons. 1967 Jose Olviga obtained a registered title
for said lot in a cadastral proceeding, in fraud of the rights of Pureza
and his transferee, Cornelio Glor and family. The lot was split and
transferred to the Olilas. 1988 Glors learned of the Olvigas title
April 10, 1989 The Glors filed an action for reconveyance
ISSUE: W/N the action for reconveyance has already prescribed?
Held: NO. The SC has ruled in a number of cases that action for
reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied or constructive
trust prescribes in ten years, the point of reference being the date
of registration of the deed of the date of the issuance of the
certificate of title over the property. However such rule applies only
when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property. If a person
claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual possession of the
property, the right to seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to
quiet title to property doesnt prescribe. In the case at bar, the
Glors were in actual possession since 1950 hence their undisturbed
possession gave them the continuing right to seek the aid of a court
of equity to determine the nature of the claim of the Olvigas who,
upon their discovery in 1988 of the adverse title, disturbed their
possession. Added factual note: What mustve happened was that
the Glors were not notified of the registration proceedings with

Angelita testifying that theres been neither notice nor posting. Jose
Olvigas falsely ommitted the fact that other persons were in
possession of the land he sought to be registered.
Pingol vs CA
Facts: Petitioner Vicente Pingol is the owner of Lot No. 3223 of the
Cadastral Survey of Caloocan, with an area of 549 square meters,
located at Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City and more particularly
described in Transfer Certificate of Title of the Registry of Deeds of
Caloocan City. On 17 February 1969, he executed a "DEED OF
ABSOLUTE SALE OF ONE-HALF OF (1/2) [OF] AN UNDIVIDED PORTION
OF A PARCEL OF LAND" in favor of Francisco N. Donasco which was
acknowledged before a notary public. On 13 July 1984, Francisco
Donasco died. At the time of his demise, he had paid P8,369.00, plus
the P2,000.00 advance payment, leaving a balance of P10,161.00 on
the contract price. The heirs of Donasco remained in possession of
such lot and offered to settle the balance with Pingol. However,
Pingol refused to accept the offer and demanded a larger amount.
Thus, the heirs of Donasco filed an action for specific performance
(with Prayer for Writ of Prelim. Injunction, because Pingol were
encroaching upon Donascos lot. Pingol averred that the sale and
transfer of title was conditional upon the full payment of Donasco
(contract to sell, not contract of sale). With Donascos breach of the
contract in 1976 and death in 1984, the sale was deemed cancelled,
and the heirs continuous occupancy was only being tolerated by
Pingol.
Issue: Whether or not Donasco has the right to quiet title.
Held: Although the complaint filed by the Donascos was an action for
specific performance, it was actually an action to quiet title. A cloud
has been cast on the title, since despite the fact that the title had
been transferred to them by the execution of the deed of sale and
the delivery of the object of the contract, Pingol adamantly refused
to accept the payment by Donascos and insisted that they no longer
had the obligation to transfer the title. Donasco, who had made
partial payments and improvements upon the property, is entitled to
bring suit to clear his title against Pingol who refused to transfer
title to him. It is not necessary that Donasco should have an absolute

title, an equitable title being sufficient to clothe him with

personality to bring an action to quiet title.
Prescription cannot also be invoked against the Donascos because an
action to quiet title to property in ONEs POSSESSION is
imprescriptible.
A vendee in an oral contract to convey land who had made part
payment thereof, entered upon the land and had made valuable
improvements thereon is entitled to bring suit to clear his title
against the vendor who had refused to transfer the title to him. It is
not necessary that the vendee should have an absolute title, an
equitable title being sufficient to clothe him with personality to
bring an action to quiet title.
Titong vs CA
Facts: Petitioner alleges that he is the owner of an unregistered
parcel of land and declared for taxation purposes in his name. He
claims that on three separate occasions in September 1983, private
respondents, with their hired laborers, forcibly entered a portion of
the land containing an area of approximately two (2) hectares, and
began plowing the same under pretext of ownership. Private
respondents denied this allegation, and averred that the disputed
property formed part of the 5.5-hectare agricultural land which they
had purchased from their predecessor-in-interest, Pablo Espinosa on
August 10, 1981.
In his testimony, petitioner identified Espinosa as his adjoining
owner, 3 asserting that no controversy had sprouted between them
for twenty years until the latter sold Lot No. 3497 to private
respondent Victorico Laurio. This was corroborated by Ignacio
Villamor, who had worked on the land even before its sale to
Espinosa in 1962. The boundary between the land sold to Espinosa
and what remained of petitioner's property was the old Bugsayon
river. When petitioner employed Bienvenido Lerit as his tenant in
1962, he instructed Lerit to change the course of the old river and
direct the flow of water to the lowland at the southern portion of
petitioner's property, thus converting the old river into a riceland.

Private respondents, on the other hand, denied claim of Titongs,

saying that the area and boundaries of disputed land remained
unaltered during the series of conveyances prior to its coming into
his hands. According to him, Titong first declared land for taxation
purposes which showed that the land had an area of 5.5 hectares
and was bounded on the north by the B. River; on the east by
property under ownership by Zaragoza, and on the west by property
owned by De la Cruz. He also alleges that Titong sold property to
Verano. The latter reacquired the property pursuant to mutual
agreement to repurchase the same.
However, the property remained in Titongs hands only for 4 days
because he sold it to Espinosa. It then became a part of the estate
of Espinosas wife, late Segundina Espinosa. Later on, her heirs
executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Simultaneous
Sale whereby the 5.5 hectares was sold to Laurio for 5,000 pesos.
In all these conveyances, the area and boundaries of the property
remained exactly the same as those appearing in the name of
Titongs.
SSUE:
Whether or not Titong is the rightful owner of the subject property
RULING: NO
The remedy for quieting of title may be availed of under the
circumstances mentioned in Art 476 of the NCC wherein it says that
action to quiet title may be made as a remedial or preventive
measure. Under 476, a claimant must show that there is an
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which casts a
cloud, doubt, question or shadow upon owners title to or interest in
real property. The ground for filing a complaint for quieting title
must be instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding.
In the case at bar, Titong failed to allege that there was an
instrument, claim etc be clouded over his property. Through his
allegations, what Titong imagined as clouds cast on his title were
Laurios alleged acts of physical intrusion into his purported
property. The grounds mentioned are for action for forcible entry
and not quieting title.

In addition, the case was considered to be a boundary dispute. The

RTC and CA correctly held that when Titong sold the 5.5 hectare
land to Espinosa, his rights and possession ceased and were
transferred to Laurio upon its sale to the latter.
Thus, it is now a contract of sale wherein it is a contract
transferring dominion and other real rights in the thing sold. Titong
also cannot rely on the claim of prescription as ordinary acquisitive
prescription requires possession in good faith and with just title for
the time fixed by law.
Spouses Portic vs Cristobal
Facts: Spouses Clodualdo Alcantara and Candelaria Edrosalam were
the original registered owners of a parcel of land with three-door
apartment, located at No. 9, 1st Street BBB, Marulas, Valenzuela
City. On October 2, 1968, spouses sold the subject property in favor
of [petitioners] with the condition that the latter shall assume the
mortgage executed over the subject property by spouses Clodualdo
Alcantara and Candelaria Edrosalam in favor of the Social Security
System.[Petitioners] defaulted in the payment of the monthly
amortizations due on the mortgage. The Social Security System
foreclosed the mortgage and sold the subject property at public
auction with the Social Security System as the highest bidder.
ACSaHc On May 22, 1984, before the expiration of the redemption
period, [petitioners] sold the subject property in favor of
[respondent] in consideration of P200,025.89. Among others, the
parties agreed that [respondent] shall pay the sum of P45,025.89 as
down payment and the balance of P155,000.00 shall be paid on or
before May 22, 1985. The parties further agreed that in case
[respondent] should fail to comply with the conditions, the sale shall
be considered void and [petitioners] shall reimburse [respondent] of
whatever amount already paid.
On the same date, [petitioners] and [respondent] executed a 'Deed
of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage' whereby [petitioners] sold the

subject property in favor of [respondent] in consideration of

P80,000.00, P45,000.00 thereof shall be paid to the Social Security
System. On the same date, [respondent] executed a 'Deed of
Mortgage' whereby [respondent] constituted a mortgage over the
subject property to secure a P150,000.00 indebtedness in favor of
[petitioners]. [Respondent] paid the indebtedness due over the
subject property to the Social Security System. On May 20, 1996,
[petitioners] demanded from [respondent] the alleged unpaid
balance of P55,000.00. [Respondent] refused to pay.
[Respondent] on her part claimed that her title over the subject
property is already indefeasible; that the true agreement of the
parties is that embodied in the Deed of Absolute Sale with
Assumption of Mortgage; that [respondent] had fully paid the
purchase price; that [respondent] is the true owner of the subject
property; that [petitioners'] claim is already barred by laches.
Issue: whether the Portics are in possession of the premises, a fact
that would render the action for quieting of title imprescriptible.
Held: The issue of whether the Portics have been in actual,
continuous possession of the premises is necessarily a question of
fact. Well-entrenched is the rule that findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals, when supported by substantial evidence, are final and
conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal. This Court finds no
cogent reason to disturb the CA's findings sustaining those of the
trial court, which held that petitioners had been in continuous
possession of the premises. For this reason, the action to quiet title
has not pr escribed.
In their Motion for Partial Reconsideration, petitioners contended
that their action was not one for the enforcement of a written
contract, but one for the quieting of title an action that was
imprescriptible as long as they remained in possession of the
premises. The CA held, however, that the agreement between the
parties was valid, and that respondent's title to the property was
amply supported by the evidence. Therefore, their action for the
quieting of title would not prosper, because they failed to show the
invalidity of the cloud on their title.

Pardell vs Bartolome
Facts: Appeal by bill of exceptions.Spouses Miguel Ortiz and Calixta
Felin died in Vigan, Ilocos Sur, in 1875 and 1882, respectively. Prior
toher death, Calixta, executed, on August 17, 1876, a nuncupative
will in Vigan, whereby she made her four children,named Manuel,
Francisca, Vicenta, and Matilde, surnamed Ortiz y Felin, her sole
and universal heirs of all her property. Manuel and Francisca were
already deceased, leaving Vicenta and Matilda as heirs.In 1888, the
defendants (Matilde and Gaspar), without judicial authorization, nor
friendly or extrajudicial agreement, took upon themselves the
administration and enjoyment of the properties left by Calixta and
collected the rents, fruits, and products thereof, to the serious
detriment of Vicentas interest. Despit e repeated demands todivide
the properties and the fruits accruing therefrom, Sps Gaspar and
Matilde had been delaying the partition and delivery of the said
properties by means of unkempt promises and other excuses.Vicenta
filed a petition for partition with damages in the RTC.RTC decision:
absolved Matilde from payment of damages. It held that the
revenues and the expenses were compensated by the residence
enjoyed by the defendant party, that no losses or damages were
either caused or suffered, nor likewise any other expense besides
those aforementioned,Counsel for Matilde took an exception to the
judgment and moved for a new trial on the grounds that the
evidence presented did not warrant the judgment rendered and that
the latter was contrary to law. That motion was denied by the lower
court. Thus, this petition.
ISSUE: WON a co-owner is required to pay for rent in exclusively
using the co-owned property.
HELD: Article 394 of the Civil Code prescribes:"Each co-owner may
use the things owned in common, provided he uses them in
accordance with their object and in such manner as not to injure
the interests of the community nor prevent the co-owners from
utilizing them according to their rights."
Matilde Ortiz and her husband occupied the upper story, designed
for use as a dwelling, in the house of joint ownership; but the
record shows no proof that, by so doing, the said Matilde occasioned

any detriment to the interests of the community property, nor that

she prevented her sister Vicenta from utilizing the said upperstory
according to her rights. It is to be noted that the stores of the lower
floor were rented and an accountingof the rents was duly made to
the plaintiffs.Each co-owner of realty held pro indiviso exercises his
rights over the whole property and may use andenjoy the same with
no other limitation than that he shall not injure the interests of his
coowners, for the reason that, until a division be made, the
respective part of each holder can not be determined and every one
of the coowners exercises together with his other coparticipants,
joint ownership over the pro in diviso property, in addition to his use
and enjoyment of the same. the spouses are not liable to pay rent.
Their occupation of the said property was a mere exercise of their
right to use the same as a co-owner. One of the limitations on a coowners right of use is that he must use it in such a way so as not to
injure the interest of the other co-owners. In the case at bar, the
other party failed to provide proof that by the occupation of the
spouses Bartolome, they prevented Vicenta from utilizing the same.
Basa vs Aguilar
Facts: The seven (7) petitioners are owners co-pro-indiviso of an
undivided ONE-HALF (1/2) share of a parcel of land located in Barrio
San Mateo, Arayat, Pampanga, with an area of 32,383 square
meters, more or less. Private respondents Genaro Puyat and Brigida
Mesina were the owners of the other undivided half of the same
parcel of land. On March 6, 1964, Genaro Puyat, with the marital
consent of Brigida Mesina, sold his ONE-HALF (1/2) share of parcel of
the land in question for the price of ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00)
PESOS in favor of private respondents Primo Tiongson and Macaria
Puyat. Primo Tiongson is a son-in-law of Genaro Puyat who is
married to Macaria Puyat, a daughter of Genaro Puyat. Seven (7)
days later, on or March 13, 1964, the herein petitioners filed Civil
Case No. 2513, praying that they be allowed to exercise the right of
redemption under Article 1620 of the Civil Code, for which purpose
they deposited with the court the sum of ONE THOUSAND PESOS
(P1,000.00) as redemption money.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners are entitled to exercise the right

of redemption.
Held: Yes. Private respondent Primo Tiongson is definitely not a coowner of the land in question. He is not even an heir of private
respondents Genaro Puyat and Brigida Mesina, nor included in the
"family relations" of the said spouses as defined in Article 217 of the
Civil Code. The circumstance that he is married to Macaria Puyat, a
daughter of Genaro Puyat and Brigida Mesina, is of no moment. To
deny to the petitioners the right of redemption recognized in Article
1620 of the Civil Code is to defeat the purpose of minimizing coownership and to contravene the public policy in this regard.
Moreover, it would result in disallowing the petitioners a way out of
what, in the words of Manresa," might be a disagreeable or
inconvenient association into which they have been thrust.
Spouses del Campo vs Abesia
Facts: The case involves two friendly parties who are co-owners of a
corner lot at Flores and Cavan Streets in Cebu City. Plaintiff owns
2/3 of the lot and Defendant owns 1/3 of the same. The total size of
the lot is 45 square meters Later on, the two parties decided to
divide the co-owned property into two lots. 30 square meters went
to the plaintiffs and 15 square meters went to the defendants. From
the sketch plan, both parties discovered that the house of the
defendants occupied a portion of the plaintiffs adjacent lot, eating
5 sqm of it. The parties then requested the trial court to adjudicate
who should take possession of the encroached 5 sqm.
The trial court ruled that Art 448 does not apply. The owner of the
land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good
faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works,
sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in
Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to
pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent.
However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if
its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In
such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land
does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper
indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in

case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof. Since
art 448 does not apply, the Plaintiff cannot be obliged to pay for the
portion of defendants house that entered into the 30 sqm lot, AND
Defendant cannot be obliged to pay for the price of the 5 sqm their
house occupied. Why? The RTC believed the rules of co-ownership
should govern, and not that of accession.
RTC then assigned the full 30sqm to Plaintiff and ordered
Defendants to demolish the 5sqm part of their house encroaching
the 30sqm lot of the Plaintiffs. Defendants where aghast at having
to axe the family home, hence they appealed.
Issue: Whether or not the rule of accession of applies.
Held: YES. The court a quo correctly held that Article 448 of the
Civil Code cannot apply. The co-owner is not a third person under
the circumstances, and the situation is governed by the rules of coownership. However, when, as in this case, the co-ownership is
terminated by the partition and it appears that the house of
defendants overlaps or occupies a portion of 5 square meters of the
land pertaining to plaintiffs which the defendants obviously built in
good faith, then the provisions of Article 448 of the new Civil Code
should apply. Manresa and Navarro Amandi agree that the said
provision of the Civil Code may apply even when there was coownership if good faith has been established.
Applying the afore-said provision of the Civil Code, the plaintiffs
have the right to appropriate said portion of the house of
defendants upon payment of indemnity to defendants as provided
for in Article 546 of the Civil Code.
Bailon-Casilao vs CA
FActs: The petitioners herein filed a case for recovery of property
and damages with notice of lis pendens on March 13, 1981 against
the defendant and herein private respondent, Celestino Afable. The
parcel of land involved in this case issued on June 12, 1931, in the
names of Rosalia, Gaudencio, Sabina, Bernabe, Nenita and Delia, all
surnamed Bailon, as co-owners, each with a 1/6 share. Gaudencio
and Nenita are now dead, the latter being represented in this case
by her children, Luz, Emma and Nilda. Bernabe went to China in

1931 and had not been heard from since then. It appears that on
August 23, 1948, Rosalia Bailon and Gaudencio Bailon sold a portion
of the said land consisting of 16,283 square meters to Donato
Delgado. On May 13, 1949, Rosalia Bailon alone sold the remainder
of the land consisting of 32,566 square meters to Ponciana V.
Aresgado de Lanuza. On the same date, Lanuza acquired from
Delgado the 16,283 square meters of land which the latter had
earlier acquired from Rosalia and Gaudencio. On December 3, 1975,
John Lanuza, acting under a special power of attorney given by his
wife, Ponciana V. Aresgado de Lanuza, sold the two parcels of land
to Celestino Afable, Sr.
In all these transfers, it was stated in the deeds of sale that the land
was not registered under the provisions of Act No. 496 when the fact
is that it is. It appears that said land had been successively declared
for taxation first, in the name of Ciriaca Dellamas, mother of the
registered co-owners, then in the name of Rosalia Bailon in 1924,
then in that of Donato Delgado in 1936, then in Ponciana de Lanuza's
name in 1962 and finally in the name of Celestino Afable, Sr. in
1983. In his answer to the complaint filed by the herein petitioners,
Afable claimed that he had acquired the land in question through
prescription and contended that the petitioners were guilty of
laches. He later filed a third-party complaint against Rosalia Bailon
for damages allegedly suffered as a result of the sale to him of the
land.
Issue: Whether or not said petitioners are chargeable with such
laches as may effectively bar their present action.
Held: No. From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a coowner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire
property by one co-owner without the consent of the other coowners is not null and void. However, only the rights of the coowner-seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner
of the property.
The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the
sale or for the recovery of the thing owned in common from the
third person who substituted the co-owner or co-owners who

alienated their shares, but the DIVISION of the common property as

of it continued to remain in the possession of the co-owners who
possessed and administered it [Mainit v. Bandoy, supra.]
Thus, it is now settled that the appropriate recourse of co-owners in
cases where their consent were not secured in a sale of the entire
property as well as in a sale merely of undivided shares of some of
the co-owners is an action for PARTITION under Rule 69 of the
Revised Rules of Court. Neither recovery of possession nor
restitution can be granted since the defendant buyers are legitimate
proprietors and possessors in joint ownership of the common
property claimed [Ramirez v. Bautista, supra]. As to the action for
petition, neither prescription nor laches can be invoked.
Oliveras vs Lopez
Facts: Lorenzo Lopez owned Lot of the Cadastral survey of Villasis,
Pangasinan. In December, 1931, Lorenzo Lopez died, 2 leaving said
property to his wife, Tomasa Ramos and six (6) children. From that
time on, the heirs of Lorenzo Lopez did not initiate any moves to
legally partition the property.
More than twenty-one years later, or on February 11, 1953, Tomasa
Ramos and her eldest son, Candido Lopez, executed a deed of
absolute sale of the "eastern undivided four thousand two hundred
and fifty seven-square meters (4,257) more or less, of the undivided
portion of (their) interests, rights and participation" over Lot 4685,
in favor of the spouses Melecio Oliveras and Aniceta Minor, in
consideration of the amount of one thousand pesos (P1,000). On the
same day, executed another deed of absolute sale of the "undivided"
four thousand two hundred and fifty-seven (4,257) square meters of
the "eastern part" of Lot 4685 in favor of the spouses Pedro Oliveras
and Teodora Gaspar, also in consideration of P1,000.
Since the execution of the two deeds of absolute sale, the vendees,
brothers Melecio and Pedro, had been paying the real property taxes
for their respectively purchased properties. They also had been in
possession of their purchased properties which, being planted to
palay and peanuts, were segregated from the rest of Lot 4685 by
dikes. The counsel of the Oliveras brothers wrote the heirs of

Lorenzo Lopez reminding them of the Oliverases' demands to

partition the property so that they could acquire their respective
titles thereto without resorting to court action, and that, should
they fail to respond, he would be forced to file a case in court.
8Apparently, the Lopezes did not answer said letter.
In their answer, the defendants alleged that no sale ever transpired
as the alleged vendors could not have sold specific portions of the
property; that plaintiffs' possession and occupation of specific
portions of the properties being illegal, they could not ripen into
ownership; and that they were not under any obligation to lend their
copy of the certificate of title or to accede to plaintiffs' request for
the partition or settlement of the property. As special and
affirmative defenses, the defendants contended that the deeds of
sale were null and void and hence, unenforceable against them; that
the complaint did not state a cause of action and that the cause or
causes of action, if any, had prescribed.
Issue: Whether or not said deeds insofar as they pertain to sales of
designated portions of an undivided, co-owned property are valid.
Held: Yes. In a long line of decisions, this Court has held that before
the partition of a land or thing held in common, no individual coowner can claim title to any definite portion thereof. All that the
co-owner has is an ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in
the entire land or thing. In the instant case, the heirs of Lorenzo
Lopez maintained the co-ownership for more than twenty years. We
hold that when Candido and his mother (who died before the filing
of the complaint for partition) sold definite portions of Lot 4685,
they validly exercised dominion over them because, by operation of
law, the co-ownership had ceased. The filing of the complaint for
partition by the Oliverases who, as vendees, are legally considered
as subrogated to the rights of Candido over portions of Lot 4685 in
their possession, merely served to put a stamp of formality on
Candido's otherwise accomplished act of terminating the coownership.
Tagarao vs Garcia
Facts:

Rivera vs Peoples Bank and Trust

Facts: Ana Rivera was employed by Edgar Stephenson as
housekeeper from the year 1920 until his death on June 8, 1939. On
December 24, 1929, Stephenson opened an account in his name with
the defendant Peoples Bank by depositing therein the sum of
P1,000. On October 17, 1931, when there was a balance of P2,072 in
said account, the survivorship agreement in question was executed
and the said account was transferred to the name of "Edgar
Stephenson and/or Ana Rivera." At the time of Stephenson's death
Ana Rivera held the deposit book, and there was a balance in said
account of P701.43, which Ana Rivera claimed but which the bank
refused to pay to her upon advice of its attorneys, who gave the
opinion that the survivorship agreement was of doubtful validity.
Thereupon Ana Rivera instituted the present action against the
bank, and Minnie Stephenson, administratrix of the estate of the
deceased, intervened and claimed the amount for the estate,
alleging that the money deposited in said account was and is the
exclusive property of the deceased.
Issue: Whether or not validity of the survivorship agreement made
was valid.
Held: Yes. It is an aleatory contract supported by a lawful
consideration the mutual agreement of the joint depositors
permitting either of them to withdraw the whole deposit during
their lifetime, and transferring the balance to the survivor upon the
death of one of them. Furthermore, "it is well established that a
bank account may be so created that two persons shall be joint
owners thereof during their mutual lives, and the survivor take the
whole on the death of the other. The right to make such joint
deposits has generally been held not to be done away with by
statutes abolishing joint tenancy and survivorship generally as they
existed at common law.
Gatchalian vs Collector of Internal Revenue
Facts: Jose Gatchalian and 14 others, put up money totaling Php
2.00 in order to buy a sweepstakes ticket for the sameamount. They

won, and were assessed an income tax of Php1,499.94, equal to 3

percent of the Php 50,000 prize. They paid under protest. In
requesting for a refund, they admit that a partnership would be
liable for the income tax, but contend that what they formed was a
community of property, instead of a partnership.
A month after winning the ticket, they were questioned by the
Internal Revenue for the payment of their income tax in their
unregistered partnership. They replied that they are not in
Partnership but that of Co-ownership, as such, they will be exempt.
They submitted an evidence for their payment of individual tax
pertaining to their share in their winnings.
Issue: Whether or not formed co-ownership.
Held: There is no doubt that if the plaintiffs merely formed a
community of property the latter is exempt from the payment of
income tax under the law.
But according to the stipulated facts the plaintiffs organized a
partnership of a civil nature because each of them put up money to
buy a sweepstakes ticket for thesole purpose of dividing equally the
prize which they may win, as they did in fact in the amount of Php
50,000. The partnership was not only formed, but upon the
organization thereof and the winning of the prize, Jose Gatchalian
personally appeared in the office of the Philippine Charity.
Sweepstakes, in his capacity as co-partner, as such collected the
prize, the office issued the check for Php50,000 in favor of Jose
Gatchalian and company, and thesaid partner, in the same capacity,
collected the same check.
All these circumstances repel the idea that the plaintiffsorganized
and formed a community of property only.
Having organized and constituted a partnership of a civil nature, the
said entity is the one bound to pay the income tax which the
defendant collected. There is no
merit in plaintiffs contention that the tax should be
prorated among them and paid individually, resulting int heir
exemption from the tax.
Melencio vs Dy Tiao LAy
Facts:

Lavadia vs Cosme Mendoza (in Spanish?)

Facts: Object of litigation: a gold crown, choker, belt, bracelet,
necklace, all made of gold and encrusted with diamonds and
precious gems in the possession and custody of 6 religious ladies of
the municipality of Pagsanjan, Laguna all surnamed Lavadia. By
agreement, they decided to entrust the safekeeping of the jewelry
to Pia Lavadia (depositary). From Pia, to Paula, to her husband
Pedro, to their daughter Paz, and to her husband Baldomero.
Jewelry is kept at a BPI safety deposit box in the name of Rosario
Cosme de Mendoza (defendant). the 6 ladies used their own money
to have the jewelry made specifically to adorn the image of the
Lady of Guadalupe, the patron saint of the municipality. In effect,
they are the co- owners of the jewelry. Rosario, in her capacity as
administrator of the estate of Baldomero Cosme, announced that
she would be making a formal delivery of the jewelry to the Bishop
of Lipa, but the plaintiffs objected and filed a suit to retain
possession and custody of the same.
"There shall be no majority unless the resolution is approved by the
co- owners who represent the controlling interest in the object of
the co- ownership." In this case, the plaintiffs constituted the
majority, since they represent 4/6 of the original owners.
Defendants only represent 2/6. Thus CFI ruling that Rosario return
the jewelry as an obligation of a depositary holds.

Tuason vs Tuason
Facts: In 1941 the sisters Angela I. Tuason and Nieves Tuason de
Barreto and their brother Antonio Tuason Jr., held a parcel of land in
Sampaloc, Manila, in common, each owning an undivided 1/3
portion. Nieves wanted and asked for a partition of the common
property, but failing in this, she offered to sell her 1/3 portion. It
seems that the objection to dividing the property was that it would
lose in value by the proposed partition. The share of Nieves was sold
to Gregorio Araneta Inc., a domestic corporation, and a new

Certificate of Title No. 61721 was issued. The three co-owners

agreed to have the whole parcel subdivided into small lots and then
sold, the proceeds of the sale to be later divided among them.
Before, during and after the execution of this contract, Atty. J.
Antonio Araneta was acting as the attorney-in-fact and lawyer of the
two co-owners, Angela I. Tuason and her brother Antonio Tuason Jr.
At the same time he was a member of the Board of Directors of the
third co-owner, Araneta, Inc.
The pertinent terms of the contract (Exh. 6) may be briefly stated as
follows: The three co-owners agreed to improve the property by
filling it and constructing roads and curbs on the same and then
subdivide it into small lots for sale. Araneta Inc. was to finance the
whole development and subdivision; it was to prepare a schedule of
prices and conditions of sale, subject to the approval of the two
other co-owners; it was invested with authority to sell the lots into
which the property was to be subdivided, and execute the

corresponding contracts and deeds of sale; it was also to pay the

real estate taxes due on the property or of any portion thereof that
remained unsold, the expenses of surveying, improvements, etc., all
advertising expenses, salaries of personnel, commissions, office and
legal expenses, including expenses in instituting all actions to eject
all tenants or occupants on the property; and it undertook the duty
to furnish each of the two co-owners, Angela and Antonio Tuason,
copies of the subdivision plans and the monthly sales and rents and
collections made thereon. In return for all this undertaking and
obligation assumed by Araneta Inc., particularly the financial
burden, it was to receive 50 per cent of the gross selling price of the
lots, and any rents that may be collected from the property, while in
the process of sale, the remaining 50 per cent to be divided in equal
portions among the three co-owners so that each will receive 16.33
per cent of the gross receipts.