Pardell vBartolome; G.R. No. 4656, November 18, 1912.

Facts: Spouses Miguel Ortiz and Calixta Felin died in Vigan, Ilocos Sur, in 1875 and 1882,
respectively. Prior to her death, Calixta, executed, on August 17, 1876, a nuncupative will in
Vigan, whereby she made her four children, named Manuel, Francisca, Vicenta, and Matilde,
surnamed Ortiz y Felin, her sole and universal heirs of all her property. Manuel and Francisca
were already deceased, leaving Vicenta and Matilda as heirs.
In 1888, the defendants (Matilde and Gaspar), without judicial authorization, nor friendly or
extrajudicial agreement, took upon themselves the administration and enjoyment of the
properties left by Calixta and collected the rents, fruits, and products thereof, to the serious
detriment of Vicentas interest. Despite repeated demands to divide the properties and the fruits
accruing therefrom, Sps Gaspar and Matilde had been delaying the partition and delivery of the
said properties by means of unkempt promises and other excuses.
Vicenta filed a petition for partition with damages in the RTC.
RTC decision: absolved Matilde from payment of damages. It held that the revenues and the
expenses were compensated by the residence enjoyed by the defendant party, that no losses or
damages were either caused or suffered, nor likewise any other expense besides those
aforementioned,
Counsel for Matilde took an exception to the judgment and moved for a new trial on the grounds
that the evidence presented did not warrant the judgment rendered and that the latter was
contrary to law. That motion was denied by the lower court. Thus, this petition.
ISSUE: WON a co-owner is required to pay for rent in exclusively using the co-owned property.
RULING:
Article 394 of the Civil Code prescribes:
Each co-owner may use the things owned in common, provided he uses them in accordance
with their object and in such manner as not to injure the interests of the community nor prevent
the co-owners from utilizing them according to their rights.
Matilde Ortiz and her husband occupied the upper story, designed for use as a dwelling, in
the house of joint ownership; but the record shows no proof that, by so doing, the said
Matilde occasioned any detriment to the interests of the community property, nor that she
prevented her sister Vicenta from utilizing the said upper story according to her rights. It is
to be noted that the stores of the lower floor were rented and an accounting of the rents was
duly made to the plaintiffs.
Each co-owner of realty held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the whole property and
may use and enjoy the same with no other limitation than that he shall not injure the
interests of his coowners, for the reason that, until a division be made, the respective part of
each holder can not be determined and every one of the coowners exercises together with

his other coparticipants, joint ownership over the pro indiviso property, in addition to his
use and enjoyment of the same.
As the hereditary properties of the joint ownership of the two sisters, Vicenta Ortiz, plaintiff, and
Matilde Ortiz, defendant, were situated in the Province of Ilocos Sur, and were in the care of the
last named, assisted by her husband, while the plaintiff Vicenta with her husband was residing
outside of the said province the greater part of the time between 1885 and 1905, when she left
these Islands for Spain, it is not at all strange that delays and difficulties should have attended the
efforts made to collect the rents and proceeds from the property held in common and to obtain a
partition of the latter, especially during several years when, owing to the insurrection, the country
was in a turmoil; and for this reason, aside from that founded on the right of co-ownership of the
defendants, who took upon themselves the administration and care of the property of joint
tenancy for purposes of their preservation and improvement, these latter are not obliged to pay
to the plaintiff Vicenta one-half of the rents which might have been derived from the upper
story of the said house on Calle Escolta, and, much less, because one of the living rooms
and the storeroom thereof were used for the storage of some belongings and effects of
common ownership between the litigants. The defendant Matilde, therefore, in occupying
with her husband the upper floor of the said house, did not injure the interests of her
coowner, her sister Vicenta, nor did she prevent the latter from living therein, but merely
exercised a legitimate right pertaining to her as a coowner of the property.

Basa v. Aguilar, G.R. No. L-30994, September 30, 1982.

Facts: The seven (7) petitioners are owners co-pro-indiviso of an undivided ONEHALF (1/2) share of a parcel of land. Private respondents Genaro Puyat and Brigida
Mesina were the owners of the other undivided half of the same parcel of land.
Genaro Puyat, with the marital consent of Brigida Mesina, sold his ONE-HALF (1/2)
share of the parcel of land in question , in favor of private respondents Primo
Tiongson and Macaria Puyat. Primo Tiongson is a son-in-law of Genaro Puyat who is
married to Macaria Puyat, a daughter of Genaro Puyat. Seven (7) days later, on or
March 13, 1964, the herein petitioners filed Civil Case No. 2513, praying that they
be allowed to exercise the right of redemption under Article 1620 of the Civil Code.
Issue: WON the right of legal redemption can validly be exercised by the plaintiffs.
Held: yes ,
ART. 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the
shares of all the other co-owners or of any of them, are sold to a third person. If the
price of the alienation is grossly excessive, the redemptioner shall pay only a
reasonable one.
Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right of redemption, they may
only do so in proportion to the share they may respectively have in the thing owned
in common,

Legal redemption is in the nature of a privilege created by law partly for reasons of
public policy and partly for the benefit and convenience of the redemptioner, to
afford him a way out of what might be a disagreeable or inconvenient association
into which he has been thrust. It is intended to minimized co-ownership. The law
grants a co-owner the exercise of the said right of redemption when the shares of
the of her owners are sold to "a third person." A third person, within the
meaning of this Article, is anyone who is not a co-owner. Private
respondent Primo Tiongson is definitely not a co-owner of the land in
question. He is not even an heir of private respondents Genaro Puyat and
Brigida Mesina, nor included in the "family relations" of the said spouses
as defined in Article 217 of the Civil Code. The circumstance that he is
married to Macaria Puyat, a daughter of Genaro Puyat and Brigida Mesina,
is of no moment. The conveyance to the Tiongson spouses was by onerous
title, made during the lifetime of Genaro Puyat and Brigida Mesina. The
alleged inchoate right of succession from Genaro Puyat and Brigida
Mesina, which pertained only to Macaria Puyat. is thus out of the
question. To deny to the petitioners the right of redemption recognized in
Article 1620 of the Civil Code is to defeat the purpose of minimizing coownership and to contravene the public policy in this regard. Moreover, it
would result in disallowing the petitioners a way out of what, in the words
of Manresa, " might be a disagreeable or inconvenient association into
which they have been thrust."

Spouses Del Campo v. Abesia, G.R. No. L-49219, April 15, 1988.
Facts: This case involves a parcel of land, Lot No. 1161 of the Cadastral Survey of
Cebu, An action for partition was filed by plaintiffs in the CFI of Cebu. Plaintiffs and
defendants are co-owners pro indiviso of this lot in the proportion of and 1/3 share
each, respectively. The trial court appointed a commissioner in accordance with the
agreement of the parties. ,the Id commissioner conducted a survey, prepared a
sketch plan and submitted a report to the trial court on May 29, 1976,
recommending that the property be divided into two lots, The houses of plaintiffs
and defendants were surveyed and shown on the sketch plan. The house of
defendants occupied the portion with an area of 5 square meters of Lot 1161-A of
plaintiffs. The parties manifested their conformity to the report and asked the trial
court to finally settle and adjudicate who among the parties should take possession
of the 5 square meters of the land in question.
Issue:

WON

the

provision

on

BPS

shall

apply.

Held: yes , as an exception The court a quo correctly held that Article 448 of the
Civil Code cannot apply where a co-owner builds, plants or sows on the land owned
in common for then he did not build, plant or sow upon land that exclusively
belongs to another but of which he is a co-owner. The co-owner is not a third person
under the circumstances, and the situation is governed by the rules of coownership. 1

However, when, as in this case, the co-ownership is terminated by the

partition and it appears that the house of defendants overlaps or occupies
a portion of 5 square meters of the land pertaining to plaintiffs which the
defendants obviously built in good faith, then the provisions of Article 448
of the new Civil Code should apply. Manresa and Navarro Amandi agree
that the said provision of the Civil Code may apply even when there was
co-ownership if good faith has been established.
Applying the aforesaid provision of the Civil Code, the plaintiffs have the right to
appropriate said portion of the house of defendants upon payment of indemnity to
defendants as provided for in Article 546 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, the plaintiffs
may oblige the defendants to pay the price of the land occupied by their house.
However, if the price asked for is considerably much more than the value of the
portion of the house of defendants built thereon, then the latter cannot be obliged
to buy the land. The defendants shall then pay the reasonable rent to the plaintiff
upon such terms and conditions that they may agree. In case of disagreement, the
trial court shall fix the terms thereof. Of course, defendants may demolish or
remove the said portion of their house, at their own expense, if they so decide.
Delia Bailon-Casilao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 78178, April 15, 1988.
Facts: The petitioners herein filed a case for recovery of property and damages with
notice of lis pendens on March 13, 1981 against the defendant and herein private
respondent, Celestino Afable. The parcel of land involved in this case is covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 1771 issued on June 12, 1931, in the names of
Rosalia, Gaudencio, Sabina Bernabe, Nenita and Delia, all surnamed Bailon, as coowners, each with a 1/6 share. Gaudencio and Nenita are now dead, the latter being
represented in this case by her children. Luz, Emma and Nilda. Bernabe went to
China in 1931 and had not been heard from since then. It appears that on August
23, 1948, Rosalia Bailon and Gaudencio Bailon sold a portion of the said land to
Donato Delgado, Rosalia Bailon alone sold the remainder of the land to Ponciana V.
Aresgado de Lanuza. On the same date, Lanuza acquired from Delgado a land which
the latter had earlier acquired from Rosalia and Gaudencio. On December 3, 1975,
John Lanuza, acting under a special power of attorney given by his wife, Ponciana V.
Aresgado de Lanuza, sold the two parcels of land to Celestino Afable, Sr.
Issue: WON the sale made by a co owner is valid.
Held. Yes , Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of
the acts and benefits pertaining thereto,and he may therefore alienate assign or
mortgage it and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when
personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or mortgage, with
respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to
him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
As early as 1923, this Court has ruled that even if a co-owner sells the whole
property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-

owners who did not consent to the sale [Punsalan v. Boon Liat 44 Phil. 320 (1923)].
This is because under the aforementioned codal provision, the sale or other
disposition affects only his undivided share and the transferee gets only what would
correspond to his grantor in the partition of the thing owned in common.[Ramirez v.
Bautista, 14 Phil. 528 (1909)]. Consequently, by virtue of the sales made by Rosalia
and Gaudencio Bailon which are valid with respect to their proportionate shares,
and the subsequent transfers which culminated in the sale to private respondent
Celestino Afable, the said Afable thereby became a co-owner of the disputed parcel
of land as correctly held by the lower court since the sales produced the effect of
substituting the buyers in the enjoyment thereof [Mainit v. Bandoy, 14 Phil. 730
(1910)].
From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is entitled to sell his
undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner without the consent
of the other co-owners is not null and void. However, only the rights of the coowner-seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property.

Oliveras v. Lopez, G.R. No. L-29727, December 14, 1988

Facts: Lorenzo Lopez owned a specific property and at the time of his death, leaving
said property to his wife, Tomasa Ramos and six (6) children. From that time on, the heirs of
Lorenzo Lopez did not initiate any moves to legally partition the property. Tomasa Ramos

and her eldest son, Candido Lopez, executed a deed of absolute sale of the
undivided portion of (their) interests, rights and participation"in favor of the spouses
Melecio
Oliveras and Aniceta Minor, On the same day, Tomasa and Candido executed
another deed of absolute sale of the "undivided" eastern part in favor of the
spouses Pedro Oliveras and Teodora Gaspar, More than thirteen years later or on
November 21, 1966, the counsel of the Oliveras brothers wrote the heirs of Lorenzo
Lopez reminding them of the Oliverases' demands to partition the property so that
they could acquire their respective titles thereto without resorting to court action,
and that, should they fail to respond, he would be forced to file a case in court, The
Oliverases stated in their complaint that possession of the disputed properties was
delivered to them with the knowledge and consent of the defendants; that they had
been paying the real estate taxes thereon; that prior to the sale, said properties
were offered to the other co-owners for sale but they refused to buy them; the
transactions were duly annotated and entered in the Memorandum of
encumbrances of OCT No. 15262 as adverse claims; and that their desire to
segregate the portions of Lot 4685 sold to them was frustrated by defendants'
adamant refusal to lend them the owner's duplicate of OCT No. 15262 and to
execute a deed of partition of the whole lot. the defendants alleged that no sale
ever transpired as the alleged vendors could not have sold specific portions of the
property; that plaintiffs' possession and occupation of specific portions of the
properties being illegal, they could not ripen into ownership; that the complaint did
not state a cause of action and that the cause or causes of action if any, had
prescribed.

Issue: WON the disposition of the vendor of the parcel of land is valid.
Held: yes, this Court has held that before the partition of a land or thing held in
common, no individual co-owner can claim title to any definite portion thereof. All
that the co-owner has is an Ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in the
entire land or thing. 14
However, the duration of the juridical condition of co-ownership is not limitless.
Under Article 494 and 1083 of the Civil Code, co-ownership of an estate should not
exceed the period of twenty (20) years. And, under the former article, any
agreement to keep a thing or property undivided should be for a ten-year period
only. Where the parties stipulate a definite period of in division which exceeds the
maximum allowed by law, said stipulation shall be void only as to the period beyond
such maximum. 15
Although the Civil Code is silent as to the effect of the in division of a property for
more than twenty years, it would be contrary to public policy to sanction coownership beyond the period set by the law. Otherwise, the 20-year limitation
expressly mandated by the Civil Code would be rendered meaningless.
In the instant case, the heirs of Lorenzo Lopez maintained the co-ownership for
more than twenty years. We hold that when Candido and his mother (who died
before the filing of the complaint for partition) sold definite portions of Lot 4685,
they validly exercised dominion over them because, by operation of law, the coownership had ceased. The filing of the complaint for partition by the Oliverases
who, as vendees, are legally considered as subrogated to the rights of Candido over
portions of Lot 4685 in their possession, 16 merely served to put a stamp of
formality on Candido's otherwise accomplished act of terminating the co-ownership.

Rivera v. Peoples Bank and Trust Co., G.R. No. 47757, April 17, 1942
Facts: Ana Rivera was employed by Edgar Stephenson as housekeeper from the year

1920 until his death on June 8, 1939. On December 24, Stephenson opened an
account in his name with the defendant Peoples Bank by depositing therein the sum
of P1,000. On October 17, 1931, when there was a balance of P2,072 in said
account, the survivorship agreement in question was executed and the said account
was transferred to the name of "Edgar Stephenson and/or Ana Rivera." At the time
of Stephenson's death Ana Rivera held the deposit book, and there was a balance in
said account of P701. 43, which Ana Rivera claimed but which the bank refused to
pay to her upon advice of its attorneys who gave the opinion that the survivorship
agreement was of doubtful validity. Thereupon Ana Rivera instituted the present
action against the bank, and Minnie Stephenson, administratix of the estate of the
deceased, intervened and claimed the amount for the estate, alleging that the

money deposited in said account was and is the exclusive property of the deceased.
The defendant bank did not appear in this Court. Counsel for the intervenorappellee in his brief contends that the survivorship agreement was a donation
mortis causa from Stephenson to Ana Rivera of the bank account in question and
that, since it was not executed with the formalities of a will, it can have no legal
effect.
Issue: WON the survivorship agreement is void.
Held: No , that it is a gift mortis causa of the bank account in question from him to
her. Such conclusion is evidently predicated on the assumption that Stephenson
was the exclusive owner of the funds deposited in the bank, which assumption was
in turn based on the facts (1) that the account was originally opened in the name of
Stephenson alone and (2) that Ana Rivera "served only as housemaid of the
deceased." But it not infrequently happens that a person deposits money in the
bank in the name of another; and in the instant case it also appears that Ana Rivera
served her master for about nineteen years without actually receiving her salary
from him. The fact that subsequently Stephenson transferred the account to the
name of himself and/or Ana Rivera and executed with the latter the survivorship
agreement in question although there was no relation of kinship between them but
only that of master and servant, nullifies the assumption that Stephenson was the
exclusive owner of the bank account. In the absence, then, of clear proof of the
contrary, we must give full faith and credit to the certificate of deposit, which
recites in effect that the funds in question belonged to Edgar Stephenson and Ana
Rivera; that they were joint owners thereof; and that either of them could withdraw
any part or the whole of said account during the lifetime of both, and the balance, if
any, upon the death of either, belonged to the survivor.

Arcelona v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102900, October 02, 1997.

Petitioners Marcelino Arcelona, Tomasa Arcelona-Chiang and Ruth Arcelona are
natural-born Filipinos who are now naturalized Americans residing in California, U.
S.A. Petitioner Ruth Arcelona is the surviving spouse and legal heir of the deceased
Benedicto Arcelona, brother of Marcelino and Tomasa. Together with their three
sisters - Pacita Arcelona-Olanday, Maria Arcelona-Arellano and Natividad ArcelonaCruz, petitioners are co-owners pro-indiviso of a fishpond which they inherited from
their deceased parents.[4] The six Arcelonas (two brothers and four sisters) are
named as co-owners in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 34341 which evidences
ownership over the fishpond, a contract of lease over the fishpond was executed
between Cipriano Tandoc and Olanday, et al. The lease contract was for a period of
three (3) years but was renewed up to February 2, 1984, Private Respondent Moises
Farnacio was appointed in turn by Tandoc as caretaker-tenant of the same fishpond,
effective on the date the contract of lease was executed. After the termination of
the lease contract, the lessee (Tandoc) surrendered possession of the leased
premises to the lessors, Olanday, Private Respondent Farnacio instituted Civil Case
D-7240 for peaceful possession, maintenance of security of tenure plus damages,

with motion for the issuance of an interlocutory order against Olanday, et al., before
Respondent Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 40. The case was intended
to maintain private respondent as tenant of the fishpond

Issue: May a final judgment be annulled on the ground of lack of jurisdiction (over
the subject matter and/or over the person of indispensable parties) and denial of
due process, aside from extrinsic fraud?
Held: yes, True, the above dispositions refer to jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Basic considerations of due process, however, impel a similar holding in cases
involving jurisdiction over the persons of indispensable parties which a court must
acquire before it can validly pronounce judgments personal to said defendants.
Courts acquire jurisdiction over a party plaintiff upon the filing of the complaint. On
the other hand, jurisdiction over the person of a party defendant is assured upon
the service of summons in the manner required by law or otherwise by his voluntary
appearance. As a rule, if a defendant has not been summoned, the court acquires
no jurisdiction over his person, and a personal judgment rendered against such
defendant is null and void.[29] A decision that is null and void for want of
jurisdiction on the part of the trial court is not a decision in the contemplation of law
and, hence, it can never become final and executory.[30]
Rule 3, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, defines indispensable parties as parties-ininterest without whom there can be no final determination of an action. As such,
they must be joined either as plaintiffs or as defendants. The general rule with
reference to the making of parties in a civil action requires, of course, the joinder of
all necessary parties where possible, and the joinder of all indispensable parties
under any and all conditions, their presence being a sine qua non for the exercise of
judicial power.[31] It is precisely when an indispensable party is not before the court
(that) the action should be dismissed.[32] The absence of an indispensable party
renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act,
not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.[33]
Petitioners are co-owners of a fishpond. Private respondent does not deny this fact,
and the Court of Appeals did not make any contrary finding. The fishpond is
undivided; it is impossible to pinpoint which specific portion of the property is
owned by Olanday, et al. and which portion belongs to petitioners. Thus, it is not
possible to show over which portion the tenancy relation of private respondent has
been established and ruled upon in Civil Case D-7240. Indeed, petitioners should
have been properly impleaded as indispensable parties.
Article 487 of the old Civil Code provided that any one of the co-owners may bring
an action in ejectment. It was subsequently held that a co-owner could not maintain
an action in ejectment without joining all the other co-owners. Former Chief Justice
Moran, an eminent authority on remedial law, explains:[35]

x x x. As held by the Supreme Court, were the courts to permit an action in

ejectment to be maintained by a person having merely an undivided interest in any
given tract of land, a judgment in favor of the defendants would not be conclusive
as against the other co-owners not parties to the suit, and thus the defendant in
possession of the property might be harassed by as many succeeding actions of
ejectment, as there might be co-owners of the title asserted against him. The
purpose of this provision was to prevent multiplicity of suits by requiring the person
asserting a right against the defendant to include with him, either as co-plaintiffs or
as co-defendants, all persons standing in the same position, so that the whole
matter in dispute may be determined once and for all in one litigation.
Contrariwise, it is logical that a tenant, in an action to establish his status as such,
must implead all the pro-indiviso co-owners; in failing to do so, there can be no final
determination of the action. In other words, a tenant who fails to implead all the coowners cannot establish with finality his tenancy over the entire co-owned land.
Co-owners in an action for the security of tenure of a tenant are encompassed
within the definition of indispensable parties; thus, all of them must be impleaded.
As defined:[36]
An indispensable party is a party who has such an interest in the controversy or
subject matter that a final adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without
injuring or affecting that interest, a party who has not only an interest in the subject
matter of the controversy, but also has an interest of such nature that a final decree
cannot be made without affecting his interest or leaving the controversy in such a
condition that its final determination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and
good conscience. It has also been considered that an indispensable party is a
person in whose absence there cannot be a determination between the parties
already before the court which is effective, complete, or equitable. Further, an
indispensable party is one who must be included in an action before it may properly
go forward.
A person is not an indispensable party, however, if his interest in the controversy or
subject matter is separable from the interest of the other parties, so that it will not
necessarily be directly or injuriously affected by a decree which does complete
justice between them. Also, a person is not an indispensable party if his presence
would merely permit complete relief between him and those already parties to the
action, or if he has no interest in the subject matter of the action. It is not a
sufficient reason to declare a person to be an indispensable party that his presence
will avoid multiple litigation.
Clearly, the decision in Civil Case D-7240 cannot bind petitioners and cannot
adjudicate the entire co-owned property, not even that portion belonging to
Olanday et al., ownership of the property being still pro-indiviso. Obviously, the
failure to implead petitioners barred the lower court from making a final
adjudication. Without the presence of indispensable parties to a suit or proceeding,
a judgment therein cannot attain finality

Adlawan v. Adlawan, G.R. No. 161916, January 20, 2006

Facts: The instant ejectment suit stemmed from the parties dispute over Lot 7226
and the house built thereon, registered in the name of the late Dominador Adlawan
and located at Barrio Lipata, Municipality of Minglanilla, Cebu. In his complaint,
petitioner claimed that he is an acknowledged illegitimate child[6] of Dominador
who died on May 28, 1987 without any other issue. Claiming to be the sole heir of
Dominador, he executed an affidavit adjudicating to himself Lot 7226 and the house
built thereon.[7] Out of respect and generosity to respondents who are the siblings
of his father, he granted their plea to occupy the subject property provided they
would vacate the same should his need for the property arise. Sometime in January
1999, he verbally requested respondents to vacate the house and lot, but they
refused and filed instead an action for quieting of title[8] with the RTC. Finally, upon
respondents refusal to heed the last demand letter to vacate dated August 2, 2000,
petitioner filed the instant case on August 9, 2000. On the other hand, respondents
Narcisa and Emeterio, 70 and 59 years of age, respectively,[10] denied that they
begged petitioner to allow them to stay on the questioned property and stressed
that they have been occupying Lot 7226 and the house standing thereon since
birth. They alleged that Lot 7226 was originally registered in the name of their
deceased father, Ramon Adlawan[11] and the ancestral house standing thereon was
owned by Ramon and their mother, Oligia Maacap Adlawan. The spouses had
nine[12] children including the late Dominador and herein surviving respondents
Emeterio and Narcisa. During the lifetime of their parents and deceased siblings, all
of them lived on the said property. Dominador and his wife, Graciana Ramas
Adlawan, who died without issue, also occupied the same.[13] Petitioner, on the
other hand, is a stranger who never had possession of Lot 7226. pouses Ramon and
Oligia needed money to finance the renovation of their house. Since they were not
qualified to obtain a loan, they transferred ownership of Lot 7226 in the name of
their son Dominador who was the only one in the family who had a college
education. By virtue of a January 31, 1962 simulated deed of sale,[14] a title was
issued to Dominador which enabled him to secure a loan with Lot 7226 as collateral.
Notwithstanding the execution of the simulated deed, Dominador, then single,
never disputed his parents ownership of the lot. He and his wife, Graciana, did not
disturb respondents possession of the property until they diedRespondents also
contended that Dominadors signature at the back of petitioners birth certificate was
forged, hence, the latter is not an heir of Dominador and has no right to claim
ownership of Lot 7226.[15] They argued that even if petitioner is indeed
Dominadors acknowledged illegitimate son, his right to succeed is doubtful because
Dominador was survived by his wife, Graciana.
Issue: WON the case should be dismissed on the ground that it has been filed
solely on his benefit and not of the co owners.
Held: yes, In the instant case, it is not disputed that petitioner brought the suit for
unlawful detainer in his name alone and for his own benefit to the exclusion of the
heirs of Graciana as he even executed an affidavit of self- adjudication over the

disputed property. It is clear therefore that petitioner cannot validly maintain the
instant action considering that he does not recognize the co-ownership that
necessarily flows from his theory of succession to the property of his father,
Dominador.

In the same vein, there is no merit in petitioners claim that he has the legal
personality to file the present unlawful detainer suit because the ejectment of
respondents would benefit not only him but also his alleged co-owners. However,
petitioner forgets that he filed the instant case to acquire possession of the property
and to recover damages. If granted, he alone will gain possession of the lot and
benefit from the proceeds of the award of damages to the exclusion of the heirs of
Graciana. Hence, petitioner cannot successfully capitalize on the alleged benefit to
his co-owners. Incidentally, it should be pointed out that in default of the said heirs
of Graciana, whom petitioner labeled as fictitious heirs, the State will inherit her
share[31] and will thus be petitioners co-owner entitled to possession and
enjoyment of the property.
ART. 487. Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment.

This article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession. Article 487
includes forcible entry and unlawful detainer (accion interdictal), recovery of
possession (accion publiciana), and recovery of ownership (accion de
reivindicacion).[26] A co-owner may bring such an action without the necessity of
joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is presumed to have
been filed to benefit his co-owners. It should be stressed, however, that where the
suit is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner and
entitled to the possession of the litigated property, the action should be dismissed.

Punsalan vs boot liat

Facts:
On or about the 13th of July, 1920, a Moro by the name of Tamsi saw from the
Cawit-Cawit shores in the Province of Zamboanga, a big bulky object in the distance
which attracted his attention. Thereupon, together with another Moro named
Bayrula, he went in a small boat to investigation and found it to be a large fish.
They then returned to shore, where they met other Moros and requested their help
to catch the fish. They went in three small boats, there being then in one, seven in
the other, and five in the third, twenty-two men, in all, twenty-one of whom are
plaintiffs herein, and the remaining one named Ahamad is defendant. After having
arrived at the place where the fish was, which was found to be a whale, they
proceeded to pull it toward the shore up to the mouth of the river, where they
quartered it, having found in its abdomen a great quantity of ambergris, which was

placed in three sacks, two of which were full and the other half full, and taken to the
house of Maharaja Butu, where they left it to the care of Ahamad. Then the contents
of the two full sacks were placed in three trunks. All of these twenty-two persons
made an agreement that they were to be the sole owners of this ambergris and that
none of them could sell it without the consent of the rest. As to the half sack of
amber they agreed that some of them should take it to Zamboanga to sell for the
purpose of ascertaining the market price of the ambergris, in order that they might
dispose of the rest accordingly. Some of them, with Tamsi in charge, went to
Zamboanga to sell the half sack of amber where they did dispose of it to a
Chinaman, Cheong Tong, for the sum of P2,700, which amount was distributed
among all the parties in interest. It appears that there were other people in
Zamboanga who knew of the existence of this ambergris in the house of Maharaja
Butu. While the above related events were taking place, Mr. Henry E. Teck, who was
one of those having knowledge of the existence of this amber in Cawit-Cawit and of
the fact that the launch Ching-kang had left for Cawit-Cawit, proposed to the master
of the revenue cutter Mindoro to go to Cawit-Cawit to seize some supposedly
contraband opium. After transmitting this information to the Collector of Customs,
he, the master of the Mindoro, immediately proceeded to Cawit-Cawit. There were
on board the vessel Mr. Teck, some Chinamen, among whom were C. Boon Liat, Ong
Chua, and Go Tong, and some Moros who, according to Mr. Teck, were to assist in
the arrest of the smugglers. Upon the arrival of the Mindoro at Cawit-Cawit, the
master, accompanied by Mr. Teck and some Moros, went to the house of Maharaja
Butu. As is to be presumed, this information about the supposed contraband opium
was but a trick to have the Mindoro at their disposal. The master proceeded to
search the house, stating that he had information to the effect that there was
contraband opium and as a result of the search, he found three large trunks
containing a black substance which had a bad odor. He then asked the owner of the
house to whom those three trunks belonged, and the latter pointed to Ahamad who
was present and who stated that the contents came from the abdomen of a large
fish. The master, however, said that it was opium and told Ahamad that he would
take the three trunks on board the ship. Then Ahamad and other Moros asked
permission of the master to accompany him on the voyage to Zamboanga, to which
the master consented. When already on board and during the voyage the master
became convinced that the contents of the three trunks were not opium. During the
voyage, Mr. Teck offered to purchase the amber contained in the three trunks, but
Ahamad refused to sell it for the reason that he was not the sole owner thereof, but
owned it in common with other persons who were in Zamboanga however he sold it
thereafter.

Issue:

WON

the

ahamad

has

the

right

to

sell

the

ambergris.

Held: No , It appears from the foregoing that the amber in question was the
undivided common property of the plaintiffs (with the exception of Lim Chiat and
Cheong Tong) and the defendant Ahamad. This common ownership was acquired by
occupancy (arts. 609 and 610 of the Civil Code), so that neither Tamsi, Imam
Lumuyod, or Imam Asakil had any right to sell it, as they did, to Lim Chiat and

Cheong Tong, nor had the Moro Ahamad any right to sell this same amber, as he
did, to C. Boon Liat, Ong Chua, Go Tong, and Henry E. Teck. There was an
agreement between the coowners not to sell this amber without the consent of all.
Both sales having been made without the consent of all the owners, the same have
no effect, except as to the portion pertaining to those who made them (art. 399,
Civil Code).

Facts: June 30, 1988, petitioner Twin Towers Condominium Corporation (petitioner
for brevity) filed a complaint[7] with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC
for brevity) against respondents ALS Management & Development Corporation (ALS
for brevity) and Antonio Litonjua (Litonjua for brevity). The complaint prayed that
ALS and Litonjua be ordered to pay solidarily the unpaid condominium assessments
and dues with interests and penalties covering the four quarters of 1986 and 1987
and the first quarter of 1988. Petitioner collects from all its members quarterly
assessments and dues as authorized by its Master Deed and Declaration of
Restrictions (Master Deed for brevity) and its By-Laws. As of the filing of the
complaint with the SEC, petitioners records of account show that ALS failed to pay
assessments and dues starting 1986 up to the first quarter of 1988. Petitioner
claimed against both ALS and Litonjua P118,923.20 as unpaid assessments and
dues. In their joint Answer with Counterclaim, ALS and Litonjua asserted that
petitioner failed to state a cause of action against Litonjua. ALS and Litonjua argued
that petitioners admission that ALS and not Litonjua is the registered owner of the
Unit and member of petitioner exonerates Litonjua from any liability to petitioner.
While ALS is a juridical person that cannot by itself physically occupy the Unit, the
natural person who physically occupies the Unit does not assume the liability of ALS
to petitioner. Neither does the agent who acts for the corporation become
personally liable for the corporations obligation. As counterclaim, ALS claimed
damages against petitioner arising from petitioners act of repeatedly preventing
ALS, its agents and guests from using the parking space, swimming pool, gym, and
other facilities of the Condominium. In addition, Litonjua claimed damages against
petitioner for the latters act of including Litonjuas name in the list of delinquent unit
owners which was posted on petitioners bulletin board

Held: Petitioner was organized to hold title to the common areas of the
Condominium and to act as its management body. The Condominium Act, the law
governing condominiums, states that:
Title to the common areas, including the land, or the appurtenant interests in such
areas, may be held by a corporation specially formed for the purpose (hereinafter
known as the condominium corporation) in which the holders of separate interests
shall automatically be members or shareholders, to the exclusion of others, in
proportion to the appurtenant interest of their respective units in the common
areas. xxx[25]

The Condominium Act provides that the Master Deed may authorize the
condominium corporation to collect reasonable assessments to meet authorized
expenditures.[26] For this purpose, each unit owner may be assessed separately for
its share of such expenditures in proportion (unless otherwise provided) to its
owners fractional interest in the common areas.[27] Also, Section 20 of the
Condominium Act declares:
Section 20. An assessment upon any condominium made in accordance with a duly
registered declaration of restrictions shall be an obligation of the owner thereof at
the time the assessment is made. Thus, petitioners right to collect assessments and
dues from its members and the corollary obligation of its members to pay are
beyond dispute.
There is also no question that ALS is a member of petitioner considering that ALS is
the registered owner of the Unit. Under the automatic exclusive membership clause
in the Master Deed,[29] ALS became a regular member of petitioner upon its
acquisition of a unit in the Condominium.
As a member of petitioner, ALS assumed the compulsory obligation to share in the
common expenses of the Condominium. This compulsory obligation is further
emphasized in Section 8, paragraph c, Part I of the Master Deed, to wit:
Each member of the Condominium Corporation shall share in the common expenses
of the condominium project in the same sharing or percentage statedUndoubtedly,
as a member of petitioner, ALS is legally bound to pay petitioner assessments and
dues LO maintain the common areas and facilities of the Condominium. ALS
obligation arises from both the law and its contract with the Condominium
developer and other unit owners.
Petitioners Master Deed provides that a member of the Condominium corporation
shall share in the common expenses of the condominium project.[31] This obligation
does not depend on the use or non-use by the member of the common areas and
facilities of the Condominium. Whether or not a member uses the common areas or
facilities, these areas and facilities will have to be maintained. Expenditures must
be made to maintain the common areas and facilities whether a member uses them
frequently, infrequently or never at all.
ALS asserts that the denial by petitioner to ALS and Litonjua of the use of
the Condominium facilities deprived petitioner of any right to demand
from ALS payment of any condominium assessments and dues. ALS
contends that the right to demand payment of assessments and dues
carries with it the correlative obligation to allow the use of the
Condominium facilities. ALS is correct if it had not defaulted on its
assessment and dues before the denial of the use of the facilities.
However, the records clearly show that petitioner denied ALS and Litonjua
the use of the facilities only after ALS had defaulted on its obligation to

pay the assessments and dues. The denial of the use of the facilities was
the sanction for the prior default incurred by ALS.
In essence, what ALS wants is to use its own prior non-payment as a
justification for its future non-payment of its assessments and dues.
Stated another way, ALS advances the argument that a contracting party
who is guilty of first breaching his obligation is excused from such breach
if the other party retaliates by refusing to comply with his own obligation.
This obviously is not the law. In reciprocal obligations, when one party
fulfills his obligation, and the other does not, delay by the other begins.
Moreover, when one party does not comply with his obligation, the other
party does not incur delay if he does not perform his own reciprocal
obligation because of the first partys non-compliance. This is embodied in
Article 1169 of the Civil Code, the relevant provision of which reads:
In reciprocal obligations, neither party incurs in delay if the other does not
comply or is not ready to comply in a proper manner with what is
incumbent upon him. From the moment one of the parties fulfills his
obligation, delay by the other begins.
Thus, before ALS incurred its arrearages, petitioner allowed ALS to use
the facilities. However, ALS subsequently defaulted and thus incurred
delay. It was only then that petitioner disallowed ALS and Litonjua from
using the facilities. Clearly, petitioners denial to ALS of the Condominium
facilities, after ALS had defaulted, does not constitute a valid ground on
the part of ALS to refuse paying its assessments and dues.