G.R. No.

146296

October 15, 2007 EDUARDO GULMATICO y BRIGATAY, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision 2 dated July 31, 2000 which affirmed the Decision3 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela City, dated April 16, 1999, convicting petitioner Eduardo Gulmatico (petitioner) of the crime of Robbery, with the modified conclusion that the felony proven was Theft instead.
The Facts

Petitioner was charged with the crime of Robbery in an Information dated January 2, 1997 which reads:

That on or about the 31st day of December, 1996, in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent of gain and by means of force, that is, by breaking the door, and without the knowledge and consent of the
owner thereof, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, rob and carry away one (1) AIWA VHS worth P8,000.00, one (1) BL Rayban, worth P3,000.00, one (1) gold necklace worth P1,200.00, one (1) camera Fuji worth P1,400.00 and one (1) leather wallet with
cash money of P100.00 belonging to one REBECCA HUERVA-LIPAYCO, to the damage and prejudice of the owner in the total amount of P12,800.00. CONTRARY TO LAW.4

Petitioner pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.5 Thus, trial on the merits ensued. In the course of the trial, two varying versions arose.

Version of the Prosecution

Spouses Gary Lipayco (Gary) and Rebecca Huerva-Lipayco (Rebecca) -- the Lipaycos -- are employees of CDO-Foodsphere, Inc. and reside at 2-D Bonifacio St. Canumay,
Valenzuela City. On December 31, 1996, the spouses went to work. When Rebecca returned home between 11:00 in the morning and 12:00 noon of the same day, she found
their door broken open, their place in shambles and some of their things missing. She went to report the incident first to the barangay but finding no official in the barangay hall,
she went to the nearest police outpost and had the incident blottered. An investigation was immediately conducted and the statements of witnesses were taken. Angelo "Cookie"
Alera (Angelo) and Michael Arnaldo (Michael), then both eight (8) years old, testified that at about noon of December 31, 1996, while they were playing nearby together with
other children,6 they saw petitioner push the door of the house of the Lipaycos, enter the same, ransack the cabinet and take a VHS player 7and a wallet
containing P100.00.8 Conchita Alera (Conchita) corroborated the statements of Angelo and Michael since she also saw the petitioner inside the house of the Lipaycos. 9 The
items missing and unrecovered were one (1) AIWA VHS player worth P8,000.00; one (1) Bausch & Lombe (BL) Rayban worth P3,000.00; one (1) gold necklace
worth P1,200.00; one (1) Fuji camera worth P1,400.00; and one (1) leather wallet containing P100.00, or a total of P12,800.00.10
Version of the Defense
Petitioner is a family friend of the Lipaycos and a godfather of the latter's child. He is also employed at CDO-Foodsphere, Inc. as a company driver. Due to the nature of his
work, petitioner was often away and entertained himself with a car stereo which he would always bring with him. Petitioner claimed that he would place the said car stereo on top
of the delivery vehicle's dashboard. After work, he would bring the car stereo with him. 11 Petitioner denied the accusations made against him. He testified that on December 30,
1996, he made deliveries in Malolos, Bulacan, where he stayed overnight. The next day, December 31, 1996, he returned to their office and left work at already about 11:30 in
the morning. He waited for a while so that he could get the second half of his 13th month pay. Then, he went to another company compound to get a suitable box for his holiday
ham which he entrusted to Conchita for safekeeping. After securing a box, he went to Conchita's house to get the ham. While Conchita was getting petitioner's ham, he passed
by the house of the Lipaycos to see if Gary was there, by calling out for him at the door 12 since Rebecca asked petitioner at their office if he saw Gary. Petitioner attested that the
door was slightly opened and he slightly pushed it to look for Gary. However, Gary was out. 13 Thereafter, Conchita gave the ham to petitioner and he placed it inside the box.
Carrying the same in a big plastic bag and his car stereo, petitioner on board a tricycle, went to his sleeping quarters. Ricky Acostosa, also an employee of CDO-Foodsphere,
Inc. testified that he and the petitioner boarded the same tricycle on the said date on the way to their sleeping quarters. He observed that petitioner was carrying a car stereo
and a box of ham at the time and that he did not notice that petitioner was carrying any VHS player. 14 Thereafter, petitioner left for Villamor Airbase in Pasay City where he
celebrated the New Years Eve with his relatives. He returned to his quarters on January 1, 1997 and in the afternoon of the same date, upon knowledge that Rebecca was
looking for him, petitioner went to the Lipaycos' house where he was apprehended by the police and was subsequently detained. 15 Upon posting the corresponding bail bond for
his provisional liberty in the amount of P24,000.00, the RTC ordered the petitioner's release.16

The RTC's Ruling

defenses of denial and alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of petitioner as the perpetrator of the crime by Michael and Angelo, who testified with sufficient
coherence and clarity. finding accused EDUARDO GULMATICO y BRIGATAY guilty beyond reasonable doubt and as principal of the crime of robberyxxxx
The CA's Ruling
On July 31, 2000, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC that the petitioner's defenses of denial and alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the petitioner by the
eyewitnesses which were categorical, consistent and without any showing of ill motive on the latter's part. However, the CA opined that while asportation was proven, the
element that petitioner entered the Lipaycos' house by breaking its door was not established since Michael and Angelo testified that petitioner merely pushed the door open in
order to gain entry. Moreover, based on the photographs of the said door, the CA found that the same was intact and unbroken. Thus:
Properly, then, the felony proven against Gulmatico is Theft defined in Art. 308 and penalized under Art. 309 of the Revised Penal Code, although the end penalties imposable
are just the same as those imposed by the trial court.
WHEREFORE, except for the felony which is instead Theft as defined and punished in Arts. 308 and 309 of the RPC, the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.19
On August 25, 2000, petitioner filed his Motion for Reconsideration20 of the assailed Decision which the CA denied in its Resolution21 dated December 8, 2000.
Hence, this Petition raising the sole issue of whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals decided correctly in finding herein petitioner still guilty of Theft notwithstanding the
fact that the evidence of the prosecution was preponderantly flawed and unmeritorious, short of the required proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Correlatively, the instant Petition is based on the following grounds:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING HEREIN ACCUSED-APPELLANT STILL GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF THEFT WHEN IT PREMISED ITS FINDING OF
THE AFFIRMATION ON THE FOLLOWING CONSIDERATIONS:
a) That there were two eyewitnesses (two 8-year-olds) who were familiar with the accused and had good opportunity to observe the felony and the felon;
b) That the veracity of the testimonies of these two eyewitnesses should not be doubted because the Trial Court has shown its appreciation of the testimonies of witnesses 'who were able to relay to
the (Trial) court with sufficient coherence and clarity what they saw;
c) That there was another witness who corroborated the testimonies of the two boys;
d) That the testimonies of these prosecution witnesses were aboveboard as 'none of the witnesses were discredited by the defense as having ill will towards or motive against the accused,'
concluding therefore that there was nothing which could have tainted the truthfulness of said testimonies;
e) That the defense put up by the accused using DENIAL, was no match to the prosecution where the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were positive, clear and unbiased;
f) That the defense of ALIBI cannot also save the day for the accused.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT, WHICH FOUND ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF A CRIME BASED ON
THE WEAKNESS OF DEFENSE

III.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED, JUST LIKE THE TRIAL COURT, IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT TO THE DEFENSE EVIDENCE. 22

Moreover, petitioner argues that the testimonies of Michael and Angelo are deficient as the two boys merely testified that petitioner took the VHS player and the wallet; that the
witnesses' testimonies are incoherent due to their numerous loopholes as regards the alleged taking; that it was physically impossible for the witnesses to view the commission
of the crime, considering the interior of the Lipaycos' residence; that the prosecution failed to rebut petitioner's testimony that he was in the premises for the purpose of getting
his ham from Conchita; that Michael and Angelo were pre-coached in giving their testimonies by their respective mothers; that Michael and Angelo mistakenly identified
petitioner's car stereo as the VHS player; that petitioner's non-flight speaks of his innocence; that Rebecca's testimony before the police and the photographs of the broken door
are pieces of evidence which are contrary to the witnesses' testimony that the petitioner merely pushed the door in order to gain entry, hence, the finding of the crime of Theft;
and that since the witnesses merely saw that petitioner take only the VHS player and the wallet, the value of the items lost amounts only to P8,100.00, hence, the petitioner,
without conceding the offense charged, is entitled to the imposition of a lesser penalty. Lastly, petitioner attests that he is innocent of the offense charged and prays for his
acquittal.23
On the other hand, respondent People of the Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) posits that the direct, positive and categorical testimonies of Michael
and Angelo pointing to the petitioner as the perpetrator of the crime of Theft are entitled to full faith and credit; that petitioner failed to prove any improper motive on the part of
the mothers of Michael and Angelo in allegedly coaching the minors to testify against him; that petitioner's defenses of denial and alibi are unavailing; that factual findings of the
RTC particularly in its assessment of credibility of witnesses are entitled to respect; and that non-flight is not proof of innocence. 24
The Petition lacks merit.
While it is true that the RTC and the CA had separate and different findings as to the crime committed, this Court holds that asportation was indeed established. Thus, we agree
with the ruling of the CA that the crime of Theft was committed based on the evidence presented.
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code defines theft as follows:
Art. 308. Who are liable for theft. Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without violence, against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property
of another without the latter's consent.
The elements of theft are: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the
consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things. 25 Therefore, in theft, corpus delicti has two elements,
namely: (1) that the property was lost by the owner, and (2) that it was lost by felonious taking. 26
At

this juncture, petitioner offers the defense of denial, postulating that when Michael and Angelo saw the petitioner, he was carrying at the time his car stereo which they have
mistaken to be the VHS player of the Lipaycos. Moreover, petitioner contends that he is not invoking the defense of alibi because he admittedly passed by the house of the
Lipaycos on December 31, 1996.27 However, a perusal of the petitioner's pleadings before this Court shows that the proffered defense is still alibi, since petitioner alleged that he
cannot be at two places at the same time.28
We reject petitioners arguments.
First. It could not be said that Michael and Angelo, young as they were, could have mistakenly identified petitioner's car stereo for the VHS player. On cross-examination, both
Michael and Angelo manifested that they know what a VHS player is and even described the size and color thereof before the RTC. 29 Moreover, Angelo also testified that the
petitioner, aside from taking the VHS player, ransacked the cabinet of the Lipaycos and took the wallet.30 In sum, the car stereo cannot fully and adequately fill in for the felonious
taking of the other lost and unrecovered items of the Lipaycos.

Second. Other than petitioner's own admission that he passed by the house of the Lipaycos on December 31, 1996, 31 Michael and Angelo, as corroborated by Conchita, testified
that petitioner was there before Rebecca arrived, who eventually found that their things were scattered all over the place and that certain items were missing. More importantly,
Michael and Angelo, throughout their respective testimonies before the RTC, positively and categorically identified the petitioner as the perpetrator of the crime.32
Time and time again, this Court has ruled that denial and alibi are the weakest of all defenses, because they are easy to concoct and difficult to disprove. Furthermore, they
cannot prevail over the positive and unequivocal identification of the accused by the principal witnesses. Absent any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitnesses
testifying on the matter, a categorical, consistent and positive identification of the accused prevails over denial and alibi. Unless substantiated by clear and convincing proof,
denial and alibi are negative, self-serving and undeserving of any weight in law.33
We cannot discern any improper motive on the part of, and no such motive was ever imputed to, the prosecution's witnesses, namely, Michael, Angelo, Conchita and even
Rebecca that they would falsely implicate the petitioner as the perpetrator of the crime. The absence of evidence as to improper motive actuating the principal witnesses for the
prosecution strongly sustains the conclusion that none existed, and consequently, their testimonies are worthy of full faith and credit.34
Stripped of the defenses of denial and alibi, the instant Petition now hinges on the assessment of the credibility of the witnesses presented.
The CA, citing the RTC Decision, aptly and judiciously held, to wit:
The principal eyewitnesses were Michael and Angelo then both 8 years old who were familiar with the accused and had good opportunity to observe the felony and the felon.
The testimonies of these eyewitnesses were appreciated by the trial court as follows:
Michael and Angelo, both 8 years of age, and who were able to relay to the court with sufficient coherence and clarity what they saw on the date and at the time in question
positively identified the accused as the one who entered the house of Rebecca and as the one who took away from that house the betamax. (Decision, p. 104, record)
Their testimonies were corroborated in part by Conchita Alera who also saw Gulmatico inside the house. None of these witnesses were discredited as having ill will towards or
motive against Gulmatico.
Petitioner claims that Michael and Angelo were pre-coached when they gave their respective testimonies before the police and before the RTC as their respective mothers and
Rebecca were there at the time.
We disagree.
This Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from the assessment made by the RTC, duly affirmed by the CA anent the credibility of the said prosecution witnesses who testified
during the trial of this case. Michael and Angelo clearly pointed out their exact location and the surrounding circumstances when they observed the petitioner and the felonious
taking. Upon the directive of the trial court judge, Angelo even described his location and the respective distances of the houses in the neighborhood by walking around the
courtroom.35 It bears stressing that full weight and respect to the determination by the trial court of the credibility of witnesses is usually accorded by the appellate courts, since
the trial court judge had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses. 36This Court is not a trier of facts and, as a rule, we do not weigh anew the evidence already
passed upon by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals.37 Thus, in the case of Siccuan v. People,38 we clearly held:
We have consistently adhered to the rule that where the culpability or innocence of an accused would hinge on the issue of credibility of witnesses and the veracity of their
testimonies, findings of the trial court are given the highest degree of respect. These findings will not be ordinarily disturbed by an appellate court absent any clear showing that

the trial court has overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts of circumstances of weight or substance which could very well affect the outcome of the case. It is the
trial court that had the opportunity to observe 'the witnesses' manner of testifying, their furtive glances, calmness, sighs or their scant or full realization of their oaths. It had the
better opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grueling examination.
Furthermore, Michael and Angelo are child witnesses. A child witness could not be expected to give a precise response to every question posed to him. His failure to give an
answer to the point of being free of any minor inconsistencies is understandable and does not make him a witness less worthy of belief. 39 Inconsistencies in the testimonies of
witnesses, when referring only to minor details and collateral matters, do not affect the substance of their declarations or the veracity or the weight of their testimonies. Although
there may be inconsistencies on minor details, the same do not impair the credibility of the witnesses where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and positive
identification of the accused.40 To this Court, Michael and Angelo's testimonies are sufficiently and consistently credible as to establish that: (1) the crime of Theft was committed
against the Lipaycos and (2) petitioner committed the said crime.
Lastly, we are not persuaded by petitioner's contention that the fact that he came back to the Lipaycos' house on January 1, 1997 shows that he is innocent of the offense
charged. It is established in this jurisdiction that while flight indicates guilt, non-flight does not mean innocence. 41 Much like the defenses of alibi and denial, non-flight cannot
prevail against the weight of positive identification of the accused. 42 Therefore, the Court finds no reason to overturn the judgment of conviction against the petitioner for the
crime of Theft as the prosecution sufficiently proved his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. C.R. No. 23230, finding petitioner Eduardo Brigatay Gulmatico guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime
of Theft, is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 194255

June 13, 2012

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
NURFRASIR HASHIM y SARABAN a.k.a "FRANZ/FRANS," MAKDUL JAMAD y BUKIN (AL) a.k.a. "MACKY," a certain "TAS," and a certain "JUN," Accused,
BERNADETTE PANSACALA a.k.a. "Neneng Awid," Accused-Appellant.
On appeal is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00644-MIN promulgated on 20 July 2010, which affirmed the conviction of herein accusedappellant Bernadette Pansacala a.k.a Neneng Awid, together with co-accused Nurfrasir Hashim y Saraban a.k.a "Franz/Frans," Makdul Jamad y Bukin a.k.a. "Macky," a certain
"Tas" and a certain "Jun" for the crime of illegal recruitment as defined under Section 6 in relation to Section 7(b) of Republic Act. No. (R.A.) 8042 or the Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995.
The Facts

On 10 March 2004, accused-appellant was charged as follows:2

That on or about June 11, 2003 and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together, mutually aiding and assisting with one another without having previously obtained from the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration, license or authority to engage in the recruitment and deployment of overseas workers, did then and there willfully [sic], unlawfully and feloniously,
illegally recruit for a promised employment abroad particularly in Brunei and Malaysia, thus causing and prompting the persons of BBB and AAA 3 to apply which employment
however did not materialize because in truth and in fact, the promised employment is non-existent, in flagrant violation of the above-mentioned law and causing damage and
prejudice to said complainants; further, the commission of the above stated offense tantamount to economic sabotage in that the same was committed by a syndicate.

Only accused-appellant and Nurfrasir Hashim y Saraban were arrested, and both entered a plea of "not guilty" when arraigned.
Private complainants AAA and BBB, Police Chief Inspector Ronald Aonuevo, and police officers Edmond Ranel Villareal and Renato Rabuya dela Pea were presented by the
prosecution to prove the following:
On 10 June 2003, accused-appellant approached AAA, who was then doing her job as a waitress at a stall in Paseo de Zamboanga, Buenavista, Zamboanga City, to encourage
AAA to work in Malaysia, as accused-appellant knew certain persons who would soon be leaving for that country.
On the next day, 11 June 2003, private complainant BBB was at her house in Talon-talon Loop, Zamboanga City, when accused-appellant paid her a visit and invited her to work
as a saleslady in Brunei. After being assured that the prospective employment was above board and that she would be well compensated, BBB accepted the invitation.
The day after, accused-appellant, together with co-accused Makdul Amad y Bukin a.k.a. "Macky" (Macky) and a certain "Jun," returned to the house of BBB. Accused-appellant
informed BBB that the latter would be escorted to Malaysia by the two men, and that they would meet the next day at 1:00 p.m. at Plaza Pershing, Zamboanga City.
On 13 June 2003, BBB, Macky and Jun met as planned. They proceeded to Shop-O-Rama, where they met with co-accused Nurfrasir Hashim, a.k.a. "Franz" (Franz), who
assured BBB that she would be easily hired because of her beauty and height. They then agreed to meet at 3:00 p.m. that same day at Paseo de Zamboanga.
At Paseo de Zamboanga, BBB, accused-appellant, Macky, and Jun met with AAA, a certain CCC (allegedly another recruit) and Arlene (allegedly AAAs employer). Then at 7:00
p.m. of that same day, they all proceeded to the wharf, where they met accused Franz and a certain Cristy, who was also allegedly invited by accused-appellant to work in
Malaysia.
Thereafter, AAA, BBB, CCC, Cristy, Macky and Jun boarded the M/V Grand Flora and were given pieces of paper containing a name. Franz, accused-appellant Bernadette and
a certain Titing did not board the boat. Accused-appellant informed private complainants and their companions that she and Franz would follow and bring their passports. We
quote the Decision of the CA to describe the journey of the group after boarding the M/V Flora bound for Bongao, Tawi-Tawi, at 10:00 p.m.:4
On June 14, 2003, they (BBB, AAA, CCC, Cristy, accused Macky) and Jun disembarked at Bongao, Tawi-Tawi, and then they proceeded to Sitangkai, Tawi-Tawi where they
stayed for two days. On June 16, 2003, they went to Pundohan, which is a terminal going to Lahad Datu, Sabah, Malaysia.
On June 17, 2003, at 6:00 oclock [sic] in the morning[,] they arrived at Lahad Datu and soon thenafter [sic] they boarded a van going to Samporna, Malaysia where they met
accused Mackys cousin named Pat. They waited at Samporna until 5:00 oclock [sic] in the afternoon when accused Franz and Tash[,] who was allegedly their financier[,]
arrived. Accused Franz then distributed to AAA, BBB, CCC and Cristy their respective passports.
Thereafter, they boarded a bus going to Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia, and they arrived thereat at 7:00 oclock [sic] in the morning of June 18, 2003. Later, they boarded again a bus
going to Minumpo, Malaysia and then a barge going to Labuan, Malaysia where they stayed at a hotel [the Classic Hotel] for three nights or from the night of June 18, 2003 until
June 20, 2003.
On June 21, 2003, accused Franz instructed BBB, AAA, CCC and Cristy to wear "sexy clothes" because they were going to meet their supposed boss named Bunso at Cape
Imperial located at Labuan, Malaysia.

When they arrived at Cape Imperial, accused Macky and Jun talked to Bunso but they failed to reach an agreement on the purported compensation of the four girls. So, accused
Macky and Jun brought the girls to Golden Lotus Barber Salon (Salon for brevity) where the latter were introduced to a certain person named Mommy Cindy, the alleged owner
of the salon, and their purported manager Hako who was called Mommy Susan.
The prosecution also alleged that while the group was staying at the Classic Hotel in Labuan, BBB was forced on numerous occasions to have sexual intercourse with Franz at
his bidding, even in the presence of other people. She followed his orders for fear that he would inflict physical harm on her.
At first, private complainants were not aware of the circumstances surrounding their employment at the Golden Lotus. It was only after they agreed to stay there for employment
that they were forced to become sex workers to earn money and pay off the debts they incurred from their travel from Zamboanga City to Labuan, Malaysia.
Thus, from 21 June 2003 to 13 July 2003, AAA and BBB worked as prostituted women. Each of the girls would be booked to a customer for the whole night for 300 Ringgit at a
certain hotel near the Golden Lotus. Meanwhile, during the day, they would be hired by customers for a "short time" for 150 Ringgit in one of the rooms of the Golden Lotus. The
girls were told that they would be made to pay a fine of 150 Ringgit if they refused to have sexual intercourse with the customers.
On 12 July 2003, BBB had a customer who was a law enforcer at Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia. She sought his help for her return to the Philippines, and he agreed.
The following day, on 13 July 2003, the Golden Lotus was raided by the Immigration Officers of Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia, and the prostituted Filipino women, including AAA and
BBB, were detained at the Balay Polis (Police Department) in Labuan until all the women were deported to the Philippines.
The defense, on the other hand, presented three witnesses: accused-appellant Bernadette, her common-law partner Majujie Jailya Misuari, and co-accused Franz.
According to accused-appellant, she and BBB were friends and neighbors in Talon-talon, Zamboanga City. Sometime in April 2003, when asked by BBB why accused-appellant
returned to the Philippines from Malaysia, the latter said that she had been made a prostituted woman in Malaysia.
Accused-appellant denied having offered BBB a job in Malaysia, a denial corroborated by Majujie Jailya Misuari. Accused-appellant also denied knowing AAA and Franz. She
claimed that she only met AAA when the latter, together with BBB, visited her in jail and offered to withdraw the case if accused-appellant would give them money.
Co-accused Franz merely denied knowing AAA, BBB or accused-appellant.
On 27 June 2008, after trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City rendered a Decision,5the dispositive portion of which states:6
WHEREFORE, the Court finds both accused NURFRASIR HASHIM y SARABAN a.k.a "FRANZ/FRAS" and BERNADETTE PANSACALA a.k.a "NENENG AWID" GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT defined under Section 6 and penalized under Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 8042 otherwise
known as the "Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995", as principals by direct participation, committed by a syndicate, against BBB and AAA, and SENTENCES
each of said accused to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine of P 1,000,000.00 each;7 to pay each of the above victims P 50,000.00 as moral
damages; P 300,000.00 as exemplary damages, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.

The trial court considered that, in the course of the trial, the prosecution and the defense had entered into a stipulation that neither accused-appellant Bernadette nor Franz had
a license or an authority to recruit or deploy workers for overseas employment.
Moreover, the trial court found that the crime was committed in conspiracy by the accused and other persons. It painstakingly enumerated the overt acts of the accusedappellant showing her direct participation in the commission of the crime. These acts included inducing AAA and BBB to work in Malaysia; introducing Macky, Jun and Franz to
the victims; and escorting them to the wharf, where the victims boarded the vessel that took them away from their families and their country and brought them to Malaysia,
where heretofore unbeknownst to them they were made to work as prostituted women.
It further held that the credible and positive testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution prevailed over those of the defense of mere denial, absent any showing that the
witnesses for the prosecution had any ill motive to falsely testify and implicate the accused in the commission of the crime charged.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the findings of fact of the trial court in the formers assailed Decision, but modified the award of damages, to wit: 8
In the present appeal, instead of filing a supplemental brief, both accused-appellant and the Office of the Solicitor General opted to adopt their respective Briefs filed with the CA.
The appeal is unmeritorious.
To be convicted of the crime of illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate, the following elements must occur: 9
1. The accused have no valid license or authority required by law to enable them to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers.
2. The accused engaged in this activity of recruitment and placement by actually recruiting, deploying and transporting.
3. Illegal recruitment was committed by three persons conspiring and confederating with one another.
As to the first element, accused-appellant admitted that she did not have a valid license to recruit persons for overseas employment, consistent with her defense that she did not
engage in the recruitment of persons for employment.
Anent the second element, both victims, AAA and BBB, narrated in great detail how they were induced by accused-appellant to accept an employment opportunity, and how they
were successfully transported from Zamboanga City to Malaysia where they eventually worked as prostituted women.
On the third element, accused-appellant posits that the prosecution failed to prove that there were more than two persons involved in the alleged crime of illegal recruitment,
since the trial court held only two of the accused liable for the crime. The prosecution, she alleges, failed to establish that the other accused Macky, Jun, and Tas also had no
license or authority to recruit workers for overseas employment.
In the recent case People v. Lalli,10 we affirmed the trial courts findings in which 2 of the 3 accused were convicted of illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate, even though
the third accused was at-large. In so ruling, we took note of the fact that the victim would not have been able to go to Malaysia were it not for the concerted efforts of the three
accused. We held thus:

Flight in criminal law is the evading of the course of justice by voluntarily withdrawing oneself in order to avoid arrest or detention or the institution or continuance of criminal
proceedings. The unexplained flight of an accused person may as a general rule be taken into consideration as evidence having a tendency to establish his guilt. Clearly, in this
case, the flight of accused Relampagos, who is still at-large, shows an indication of guilt in the crimes he has been charged.
It is clear that through the concerted efforts of Aringoy, Lalli and Relampagos, Lolita was recruited and deployed to Malaysia to work as a prostitute. Such conspiracy among
Aringoy, Lalli and Relampagos could be deduced from the manner in which the crime was perpetrated each of the accused played a pivotal role in perpetrating the crime of
illegal recruitment, and evinced a joint common purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest.
For these reasons, this Court affirms the CA Decision, affirming the RTC Decision, declaring accused Ronnie Aringoy y Masion and Hadja Jarma Lalli y Purih guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate in Criminal Case No. 21930, with a penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of P 500,000 imposed
on each of the accused. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the case at bar, the prosecution was similarly able to establish that accused-appellant Bernadette and Franz were not the only ones who had conspired to bring the victims to
Malaysia. It was also able to establish at the very least, through the credible testimonies of the witnesses, that (1) Jun and Macky were the escorts of the women to Malaysia; (2)
a certain Tash was their financier; (3) a certain Bunso negotiated with Macky for the price the former would pay for the expenses incurred in transporting the victims to Malaysia;
and (4) Mommy Cindy owned the prostitution house where the victims worked. The concerted efforts of all these persons resulted in the oppression of the victims.
Clearly, it was established beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant, together with at least two other persons, came to an agreement to commit the felony and decided to
commit it. It is not necessary to show that two or more persons met together and entered into an explicit agreement laying down the details of how an unlawful scheme or
objective is to be carried out. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated; or from the acts of the accused evincing a joint or
common purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest.11
Findings of fact of the CA, when they affirm those of the trial court, are binding on this Court, unless the findings of the trial and the appellate courts are palpably unsupported by
the evidence on record, or unless the judgment itself is based on a misapprehension of facts.12
Likewise, we have time and again ruled that mere denial cannot prevail over the positive testimony of a witness. A mere denial, just like an alibi, is a self-serving negative
evidence, which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declarations of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. As between a categorical testimony
that has the ring of truth on the one hand and a bare denial on the other, the former is generally held to prevail.13
We, however, find it proper to modify the amount of moral and exemplary damages awarded by the CA.
On 12 May 2003, Congress passed R.A. 9208 or the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act. This law was approved on 26 May 2003. Ironically, only a few days after, private
complainants found themselves in a situation that this law had sought to prevent.
In Lalli, we increased the amount of moral and exemplary damages from P 50,000 to P 500,000 and from P50,000 to P 100,000, respectively, having convicted the accused
therein of the crime of trafficking in persons. In so doing, we said:
The Civil Code describes moral damages in Article 2217:
Art. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary
computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act for omission.

Exemplary damages, on the other hand, are awarded in addition to the payment of moral damages, by way of example or correction for the public good, as stated in the Civil Code:
Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
Art. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances.1wphi1 Such damages are separate and
distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended party.
The payment of P 500,000 as moral damages and P 100,000 as exemplary damages for the crime of Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute finds basis in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, which states:
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;

(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;

(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;

(4) Adultery or concubinage;

(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;

(6) Illegal search;

(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;

(8) Malicious prosecution;

(9) Acts mentioned in Article 309;

10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.

The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in No. 3 of this article, may also recover moral damages.
The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may bring the action mentioned in No. 9 of this article, in the order named.
The criminal case of Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute is an analogous case to the crimes of seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts. In fact, it is worse. To be
trafficked as a prostitute without ones consent and to be sexually violated four to five times a day by different strangers is horrendous and atrocious. There is no doubt that Lolita
experienced physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation when she was trafficked as
a prostitute in Malaysia. Since the crime of Trafficking in Persons was aggravated, being committed by a syndicate, the award of exemplary damages is likewise justified.
(Emphasis supplied.)
We find no legal impediment to increasing the award of moral and exemplary damages in the case at bar.1wphi1 Neither is there any logical reason why we should differentiate
between the victims herein and those in that case, when the circumstances are frighteningly similar. To do so would be to say that we discriminate one from the other, when all of
these women have been the victims of unscrupulous people who capitalized on the poverty of others. While it is true that accused-appellant was not tried and convicted of the
crime of trafficking in persons, this Court based its award of damages on the Civil Code, and not on the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act, as clearly explained in Lalli.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00644-MIN dated 20 July 2010 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant Bernadette
Pansacala a.k.a. "Neneng Awid" is ORDERED to pay AAA and BBB the sum of P 500,000 each as moral damages and P 100,000 each as exemplary damages and to pay the costs. SO ORDERED.

[G.R. Nos. 135695-96. October 12, 2000] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. TOMAS TUNDAG, accused-appellant.
For automatic review is the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 28, in Criminal Cases Nos.DU-6186 and DU-6203, finding appellant Tomas
Tundag guilty of two counts of incestuous rape and sentencing him to death twice.

On November 18, 1997, private complainant Mary Ann Tundag filed with the Mandaue City Prosecutors Office two separate complaints for incestuous rape. The first
complaint, docketed as Criminal Case No. DU-6186, alleged:
That on or about the 5th day of September, 1997, in the City of Mandaue, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being the
father of complainant MARY ANN TUNDAG, who is a 13-year-old girl, with deliberate intent, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with
the said offended party against the latters will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]
The other, docketed as Criminal Case No. DU-6203, averred:
That on or about the 7th day of November, 1997, in the City of Mandaue, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being the
father of complainant MARY ANN TUNDAG, who is a 13-year-old girl, with deliberate intent, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with
the said offended party against the latters will. CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
Upon arraignment appellant, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded Not Guilty to the charges.
The two cases were consolidated and a joint trial ensued.
Appellants defense was bare denial. He claimed that private complainant had fabricated the rape charges against him since he and his daughter, had a quarrel when he
accordingly reprimanded her for going out whenever he was not at home.[3]
Appellant did not present any witness to reinforce his testimony.
On August 31, 1998, the trial court rendered its decision, thus:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, Joint Judgment is hereby rendered, to wit:
I. In Criminal Case No. DU-6186 a) Finding the herein accused TOMAS TUNDAG guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of rape, said accused is hereby sentenced to the penalty of death;
b) To indemnify the offended party Mary Ann Tundag the following amounts:
(1) P50,000.00 by reason of the commission of the offense of rape upon her; and
(2) Another P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages under Article 2219 in relation to Articles 2217 and 2230 of the New Civil Code for the pain and moral shock suffered by her and for the
commission of the crime of rape with one qualifying aggravating circumstance; and
c) To pay the costs.
II. In Criminal Case No. DU-6203 -

a) Finding the herein accused TOMAS TUNDAG guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of rape, said accused is hereby sentenced to the penalty of death;
b) To indemnify the offended party Mary Ann Tundag the following amounts:
(1) P50,000.00 by reason of the commission of the offense of rape upon her; and
(2) Another P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages under Article 2219 in relation to Articles 2217 and 2230 of the New Civil Code for the pain and moral shock suffered by her and for the
commission of the crime of rape with one qualifying aggravating circumstance; and
(3) To pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.[4]

In its judgment, the court below gave credence to complainants version of what accused did to her.

The evidence for the prosecution as adduced during the trial on the merits clearly shows that private complainant Mary Ann Tundag is a 13 year old girl who does not know how
to read and write and has an IQ of 76% which is a very low general mental ability and was living with her father, the herein accused, at Galaxy Compound, Mandaue City.
That on September 5, 1997 at about 10:00 oclock in the evening, she was in the house together with her father. But before she went to sleep, her father was already lying down
on the mat while herself (sic) just lied down at his head side which was not necessarily beside him. However, when she was already sleeping, she noticed that her father who
was already undressed was beside her and was embracing her. Then, he undressed her which she resisted but her father used a knife and told her that he would kill her if she
shouts and after that, he inserted his penis into her vagina and told her not to shout or tell anyone. In effect, his penis penetrated her genital, which made her vagina bleed and
was very painful.
That when the penis of her father was already inserted in her vagina, her father was all the time asking by saying (sic) : Does it feel good? And at the same time, he was
laughing and further, told her that a woman who does not marry can never enter heaven and he got angry with her when she contradicted his statement.
That while the penis of her father was inside her vagina and (he) was humping over her, she felt intense pain that she cried and told him to pull it out but did not accede and in
fact, said: Why will I pull it out when it feels so good(?)
That after removing his penis from her vagina and after telling her that she could not go to heaven if she did not get married, her father just stayed there and continued smoking
while she cried.
That in the evening of November 7, 1997, she was at home washing the dishes while her father was just smoking and squatting. That after she finished washing the dishes, she
lied (sic) down to sleep when her father embraced her and since she does not like what he did to her, she placed a stool between them but he just brushed it aside and laid
down with her and was able to take her womanhood again by using a very sharp knife which he was holding and was pointing it at the right side of her neck which made her
afraid.
That in the early morning of the following day, she left her fathers place and went to her neighbor by the name of Bebie Cabahug and told her what had happened to her, who, in
turn, advised her to report the matter to the police, which she did and accompanied by the policemen, she went to the Southern Islands Hospital where she was examined and
after her medical examination, she was brought back by the police and was investigated by them.[5]

Appellants claim that the complainants charges were manufactured did not impress the trial court, which found him twice guilty of rape. Now before us, appellant assails his
double conviction, simply contending that:[6]
THE TRIAL COURT HAS COMMITTED AN ERROR IN NOT ABSOLVING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIMES CHARGED IN THE INFORMATIONS DESPITE THE
PRESENCE OF REASONABLE DOUBT TO EXCULPATE HIM OF THE SAME.
Appellant flatly denies that the incidents complained of ever took place. He contends that on September 5, 1997, he was working as a watch repairman near Gals Bakery in
Mandaue City Market and went home tired and sleepy at around 11:00 oclock that evening. On November 7, 1997, he claims he was at work. In his brief, he argues that it was
impossible for him to have raped his daughter because when the incidents allegedly transpired, he went to work and naturally, being exhausted and tired, it is impossible for him
to do such wrongdoings.[7]
The Office of the Solicitor General disagrees with appellant and urges the Court to affirm the trial courts decision, with the recommendation that the award of damages and
indemnity ex delicto be modified to conform to prevailing jurisprudence.
Considering the gravity of the offense charged as a heinous crime and the irreversibility of the penalty of death imposed in each of these cases before us, the Court leaves
no stone unturned in its review of the records, including the evidence presented by both the prosecution and the defense. Conviction must rest on nothing less than a moral
certainty of guilt.[8] But here we find no room to disturb the trial courts judgment concerning appellants guilt, because his defense is utterly untenable.
Appellants defense of alibi and denial is negative and self-serving. It hardly counts as a worthy and weighty ground for exculpation in a trial involving his freedom and his
life. Against the testimony of private complainant who testified on affirmative matters, [9] such defense is not only trite but pathetic. Denial is an inherently weak defense, which
becomes even weaker in the face of the positive identification by the victim of the appellant as the violator of her honor. [10] Indeed, we find that private complainant was
unequivocal in charging appellant with ravishing her. The victims account of the rapes complained of was straightforward, detailed, and consistent. [11] Her testimony never
wavered even after it had been explained to her that her father could be meted out the death penalty if found guilty by the court.[12]
In a prosecution for rape, the complainants credibility is the single most important issue. [13] The determination of the credibility of witnesses is primarily the function of the
trial court. The rationale for this is that the trial court has the advantage of having observed at first hand the demeanor of the witnesses on the stand and, therefore, is in a better
position to form an accurate impression and conclusion. [14] Absent any showing that certain facts of value have clearly been overlooked, which if considered could affect the
result of the case, or that the trial courts finding are clearly arbitrary, the conclusions reached by the court of origin must be respected and the judgment rendered affirmed. [15]
Moreover, we note here that private complainants testimony is corroborated by medical findings that lacerations were present in her hymen. The examination conducted by
Dr. Bessie Acebes upon the private complainant yielded the following results:
Genitalia: grossly female

Pubic Hairs: scanty

Labia Majora: coaptated

Fourchette: U-shaped

Vestibule: pinkish

Hymen: + old healed laceration at 3 and 9 oclock position(s).

Orifice: admits 2 fingers with ease

Vagina: Walls: pinkish

Ruganities: prominent

Labia Minora: do

Uterus: small

Cervix: closed

Discharges: Mucoid, minimal

Smears:
Conclusions: sperm identification (-)

Gram staining of vaginal disc.[16]

Dr. Acebes testified that her findings of healed hymenal lacerations in the complainants private parts meant a history of sexual congress on her part. [17] According to her, the
lacerations may have been caused by the entry of an erect male organ into complainants genitals. The examining physician likewise pointed out that previous coitus may be
inferred from complainants U-shaped fourchette since the fourchette of a female who has not yet experienced sexual intercourse is V-shaped. [18] While Dr. Acebes conceded
under cross-examination, that the existence of the datum U-shape(d) fourchette does not conclusively and absolutely mean that there was sexual intercourse or contact because
it can be caused by masturbation of fingers or other things, [19] nonetheless, the presence of the hymenal lacerations tends to support private complainants claim that she was
raped by appellant.
Appellant next contends that his daughter pressed the rape charges against him because she had quarreled with him after he had castigated her for misbehavior. He
stresses that the prosecution did not rebut his testimony regarding his quarrel or misunderstanding with private complainant. He urges us to consider the charges filed against
him as the result of his frequent castigation of her delinquent behavior.[20]
Such allegation of a family feud, however, does not explain the charges away. Filing a case for incestuous rape is of such a nature that a daughters accusation must be
taken seriously. It goes against human experience that a girl would fabricate a story which would drag herself as well as her family to a lifetime of dishonor, unless that is the
truth, for it is her natural instinct to protect her honor.[21] More so, where her charges could mean the death of her own father, as in this case.
Appellant likewise points out that it was very unlikely for him to have committed the crimes imputed to him considering that he and his wife had ten children to attend to and
care for. This argument, however, is impertinent and immaterial. Appellant was estranged from his wife, and private complainant was the only child who lived with him. [22] As
pointed out by the Solicitor General, appellant was thus free to do as he wished to satisfy his bestial lust on his daughter.[23]
Nor does appellants assertion that private complainant has some psychological problems and a low IQ of 76 in any way favor his defense. These matters did not affect the
credibility of her testimony that appellant raped her twice. We note that the victim understood the consequences of prosecuting the rape charges against her own father, as
shown by the following testimony of the victim on cross-examination:
Q : Were you informed that if, and when your father will be found guilty, your father will be sentenced to death?

A : Yes.

Q : Until now you wanted that your father will be sentenced by death?

A (Witness nodding.)

Q : I will inform you, Miss Witness, that you have filed two cases against your father and in case your father would be found guilty, two death sentences will be imposed against him?
Q: With that information, do you still want this case would proceed?

A: I want this to proceed.[24]

Indeed, appellant is guilty. But is the penalty of death imposed on him correct?

A: Yes.

Section 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659, [25] penalizes rape of a minor daughter by her father as qualified rape [26] and a heinous crime. In
proving such felony, the prosecution must allege and prove the elements of rape: (1) sexual congress; (2) with woman; (3) by force or without her consent [27] and in order to warrant the imposition
of capital punishment, the additional elements that: (4) the victim is under 18 years of age at the time of the rape and (5) the offender is a parent of the victim. [28]

In this case, it was sufficiently alleged and proven that the offender was the victims father.[29] But the victims age was not properly and sufficiently proved beyond reasonable
doubt. She testified that she was thirteen years old at the time of the rapes. However, she admitted that she did not know exactly when she was born because her mother did not
tell her. She further said that her birth certificate was likewise with her mother. In her own words, the victim testified - [30]
COURT TO WITNESS
Q: When were you born?

A: I do not know.

Q: You do not know your birthday?

A: My mama did not tell me exactly when I asked her.

COURT: Proceed.
FISCAL PEREZ: For our failure to secure the Birth Certificate Your Honor, may we just request for judicial notice that the victim here is below 18 years old.

ATTY. SURALTA: Admitted.

Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts which judges may properly take and act on without proof because they already know them. [31] Under the Rules of Court,
judicial notice may either be mandatory or discretionary. Section 1 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides when court shall take mandatory judicial notice of facts SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. - A court shall take judicial notice without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law
of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the
measure of time, and the geographical divisions.
Section 2 of Rule 129 enumerates the instances when courts may take discretionary judicial notice of facts SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. - A court may take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions.

Thus, it can be considered of public knowledge and judicially noticed that the scene of the rape is not always nor necessarily isolated or secluded for lust is no respecter of
time or place. The offense of rape can and has been committed in places where people congregate, e.g. inside a house where there are occupants, a five (5) meter room with
five (5) people inside, or even in the same room which the victim is sharing with the accuseds sister.[32]
The Court has likewise taken judicial notice of the Filipinas inbred modesty and shyness and her antipathy in publicly airing acts which blemish her honor and virtue.[33]
On the other hand, matters which are capable of unquestionable demonstration pertain to fields of professional and scientific knowledge. For example, in People v. Alicante,
the trial court took judicial notice of the clinical records of the attending physicians concerning the birth of twin baby boys as premature since one of the alleged rapes had
occurred 6 to 7 months earlier.
[34]

As to matters which ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions, an example would be facts which are ascertainable from the record of court
proceedings, e.g. as to when court notices were received by a party.

With respect to other matters not falling within the mandatory or discretionary judicial notice, the court can take judicial notice of a fact pursuant to the procedure in Section 3
of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court which requires that SEC. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. - During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be
heard thereon.

After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative or on request of a party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be
heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case.
In this case, judicial notice of the age of the victim is improper, despite the defense counsels admission, thereof acceding to the prosecutions motion. As required by Section
3 of Rule 129, as to any other matters such as age, a hearing is required before courts can take judicial notice of such fact. Generally, the age of the victim may be proven by the
birth or baptismal certificate of the victim, or in the absence thereof, upon showing that said documents were lost or destroyed, by other documentary or oral evidence sufficient
for the purpose.
Thus, in People v. Rebancos, 172 SCRA 426 (1989), the victim was below 12 and we found that the rape committed was statutory rape. The mother testified that her
daughter was born on October 26, 1974, and so was only 9 years old at the time of the rape on February 12, 1984. Although no birth certificate was presented because the
victims birth had allegedly not been registered, her baptismal certificate was duly presented. Hence, we ruled that the mothers testimony coupled with the presentation of the
baptismal certificate was sufficient to establish that the victim was below 12 at the time of the rape.
However, in People v. Vargas, 257 SCRA 603 (1996), we ruled that appellant can only be convicted of simple rape, and not statutory rape, because of failure of the
prosecution to prove the minority of the victim, who was allegedly 10 years old at the time of the rape. The prosecution failed to present either the birth or baptismal certificate of
the victim. Also there was no showing that the said documents were lost or destroyed to justify their non-presentation. We held that testimony of the victim and her aunt were
hearsay, and that it was not correct for the trial court to judge the age of the victim by her appearance.
In several recent cases, we have emphasized the need for independent proof of the age of the victim, aside from testimonial evidence from the victim or her relatives. In People v. Javier,
we stressed that the prosecution must present independent proof of the age of the victim, even though it is not contested by the defense. The minority of the victim must be proved with equal
certainty and clearness as the crime itself. In People v. Cula,[36] we reiterated that it is the burden of the prosecution to prove with certainty the fact that the victim was below 18 when the rape was
committed in order to justify the imposition of the death penalty. Since the record of the case was bereft of any independent evidence thereon, such as the victims duly certified Certificate of Live
Birth, accurately showing private complainants age, appellant could not be convicted of rape in its qualified form. In People v. Veloso,[37] the victim was alleged to have been only 9 years of age at
the time of the rape. It held that the trial court was correct when it ruled that the prosecution failed to prove the victims age other than through the testimony of her father and herself.
[35]

Considering the statutory requirement in Section 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. No. 7659 and R.A. No. 8353, we reiterate here what the Court has held
in Javier without any dissent, that the failure to sufficiently establish victims age by independent proof is a bar to conviction for rape in its qualified form. For, in the words of Melo, J., independent
proof of the actual age of a rape victim becomes vital and essential so as to remove an iota of doubt that the case falls under the qualifying circumstances for the imposition of the death penalty
set by the law.
In this case, the first rape was committed on September 5, 1997 and is therefore governed by the death penalty law, R.A. 7659. The penalty for the crime of simple rape or rape in its
unqualified form under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 11 of R.A. 7659, is reclusion perpetua. The second rape was committed on November 7, 1997, after the
effectivity of R.A. 8353, also known as the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, which took effect on October 22, 1997. The penalty for rape in its unqualified form remains the same.

As to civil indemnity, the trial court correctly awarded P50,000.00 for each count of rape as civil indemnity. However, the award of another P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages
under Article 2219 in relation to Articles 2217 and 2230 of the Civil Code for each count is imprecise. In rape cases, the prevailing jurisprudence permits the award of moral damages without need
for pleading or proof as to the basis thereof.[38] Thus, pursuant to current jurisprudence, we award the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages for each count of rape.
The award of exemplary damages separately is also in order, but on a different basis and for a different amount. Appellant being the father of the victim, a fact duly proved during trial, we find
that the alternative circumstance of relationship should be appreciated here as an aggravating circumstance. Under Article 2230 of the New Civil Code, exemplary damages may be imposed
when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Hence, we find an award of exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 proper. Note that generally, in rape
cases imposing the death penalty, the rule is that relationship is no longer appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance in view of the amendments introduced by R.A. Nos. 7659 and
8353. The father-daughter relationship has been treated by Congress in the nature of a special circumstance which makes the imposition of the death penalty mandatory. [39] However, in this case,
the special qualifying circumstance of relationship was proved but not the minority of the victim, taking the case out of the ambit of mandatory death sentence. Hence, relationship can be
appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance in this instance so that exemplary damages are called for. In rapes committed by fathers on their own daughters, exemplary damages may be
imposed to deter other fathers with perverse tendency or aberrant sexual behavior from sexually abusing their own daughters. [40]
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, is hereby MODIFIED as follows: appellant Tomas Tundag is found guilty of two (2) counts of simple rape; and for each count,
sentenced to reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. No
pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

SPOUSES OMAR and MOSHIERA LATIP VS ROSALIE PALAA CHUA G.R. No. 177809, October 16, 2009
Challenged in this petition for review on certiorari is the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 89300: [1] (1) reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 274,Paraaque City in Civil Case No. 04-0052;[2] and (2) reinstating and affirming in toto the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 78, of the same city in
Civil Case No. 2001-315.[3]
First, we sift through the varying facts found by the different lower courts.
The facts parleyed by the MeTC show that respondent Rosalie Chua (Rosalie) is the owner of Roferxane Building, a commercial building, located at No. 158 Quirino
Avenue cornerRedemptorist Road, Barangay Baclaran, Paraaque City.
On July 6, 2001, Rosalie filed a complaint for unlawful detainer plus damages against petitioners, Spouses Omar and Moshiera Latip (Spouses Latip). Rosalie attached
to the complaint a contract of lease over two cubicles in Roferxane Bldg., signed by Rosalie, as lessor, and by Spouses Latip, as lessees thereof.
The contract of lease reads:
CONTRACT OF LEASE
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
This Contract of Lease is entered into by and between:
ROSALIE PALAA CHUA, Filipino, of legal age, married with office at 2/F JOFERXAN Building, F.B. Harrison St., Brgy. Baclaran, Paraaque City, and hereinafter referred to as the LESSOR,

- and OMAR LATIEF marriage to MOSHIERA LATIEF, also both Filipino, of legal age with address at 24 Anahan St. RGV Homes Paraaque City, and hereinafter referred to as the LESSEES.
WITNESSETH
1. That the LESSOR is the owner of the commercial building erected at the lot of the Toribio G. Reyes Realty, Inc. situated at 158 Quirino Ave. corner Redemptorist Road, Barangay Baclaran in Paraaque Ctiy;
2. That LESSOR hereby leases two (2) cubicles located at the 1st & 2nd Floor, of said building with an area of 56 square meters under the following terms and conditions, to wit:
a. That the monthly rental of the two (2) cubicles in PESOS, SIXTY THOUSAND (P60,000.00), Philippine Currency. However, due to unstable power of the peso LESSEES agrees to a yearly increase of ten (10%)
percent of the monthly rental;
b. That any rental in-arrears shall be paid before the expiration of the contract to the LESSOR;
c. That LESSEES agree to pay their own water and electric consumptions in the said premises;
d. That the LESSEES shall not sub-let or make any alteration in the cubicles without a written permission from the LESSOR. Provided, however, that at the termination of the Contract, the lessee shall return the
two cubicles in its original conditions at their expenses;
e. That the LESSEES agree to keep the cubicles in a safe and sanitary conditions, and shall not keep any kinds of flammable or combustible materials.
f. That in case the LESSEES fail to pay the monthly rental every time it falls due or violate any of the above conditions shall be enough ground to terminate this Contract of Lease. Provided, further, that, if the
LESSEES pre-terminate this Contract they shall pay the rentals for the unused month or period by way of liquidated damages in favor of the LESSOR.
3. That this Contract of Lease is for six (6) yrs. only starting from December _____, 1999 or up to December ______, 2005.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have hereunto affixed their hands this ___th day of December, 1999 at City of Manila, Philippines.
(sgd.) (sgd.)
ROSALIE PALAA-CHUA MOSHIERA LATIEF
LESSORLESSEE
(sgd.)
OMAR LATIEF
LESSEE
SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF:
(sgd.) (sgd.)
1. Daisy C. Ramos 2. Ferdinand C. Chua
Republic of the Philippines)
C i t y o f M a n i l a )s.s.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
BEFORE ME, a Notary Public for and in the City of Manila personally appeared the following persons:
Rosalie P. Chua with CTC No. 05769706 at Paraaque City on 2/1/99; Moshiera Latief with CTC No. 12885654 at Paraaque City on 11/11/99; Omar Latief with CTC No. 12885653 Paraaque City on Nov. 11, 1999.
known to me and to me known to be the same persons who executed this instrument consisting of two (2) pages duly signed by them and the two (2) instrumental witnesses and acknowledged to me that the same is their
free and voluntarily acts and deeds.
IN FAITH AND TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have hereunto affixed my hand and Notarial Seal this ____th day of December, 1999 at the City of Manila, Philippines.

Doc. No. _____ ATTY. CALIXTRO B. RAMOS

Page No. _____ NOTARY PUBLIC
Book No. LXV Until December 31, 2000
Series of 1999 PTR # 374145-1/11/99/-Mla.
IBP # 00262-Life Member[4]

A year after the commencement of the lease and with Spouses Latip already occupying the leased cubicles, Rosalie, through counsel, sent the spouses a letter demanding
payment of back rentals and should they fail to do so, to vacate the leased cubicles. When Spouses Latip did not heed Rosalies demand, she instituted the aforesaid complaint.
In their Answer, Spouses Latip refuted Rosalies claims. They averred that the lease of the two (2) cubicles had already been paid in full as evidenced by receipts showing
payment to Rosalie of the total amount of P2,570,000.00. The three (3) receipts, in Rosalies handwriting, read:
1. I received the amount of P2,000,000.00 (two million pesos) from [O]mar Latip & Moshi[e]ra Latip for the payment of 2 cubicles located at 158 Quirino Ave. corner Redemptorist Rd.[,] Baclaran P[ara]aque City.
ROFERLAND[5] Bldg. with the terms 6 yrs. Contract.
P2,000,000.00 ______(sgd.)______
CHECK # 3767924 Rosalie Chua
FAR EAST BANK
______(sgd.)______
Ferdinand Chua
2. Received cash
P500,000.00
From Moshiera Latip
(sgd.)
12/10/99 Rosalie Chua
Received by
3. Received cash
P70,000.00 from
Moshiera Latip
12-11-99

Spouses Latip asseverated that sometime in October 1999, Rosalie offered for sale lease rights over two (2) cubicles in Roferxane Bldg. Having in mind the brisk sale of
goods during the Christmas season, they readily accepted Rosalies offer to purchase lease rights in Roferxane Bldg., which was still under construction at the time. According to
Spouses Latip, the immediate payment of P2,570,000.00 would be used to finish construction of the building giving them first priority in the occupation of the finished cubicles.
Thereafter, in December 1999, as soon as two (2) cubicles were finished, Spouses Latip occupied them without waiting for the completion of five (5) other stalls. Spouses
Latip averred that the contract of lease they signed had been novated by their purchase of lease rights of the subject cubicles. Thus, they were surprised to receive a demand
letter from Rosalies counsel and the subsequent filing of a complaint against them.
The MeTC ruled in favor of Rosalie, viz.:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the [Spouses Latip] and all persons claiming rights under them are hereby ordered to VACATE the property subject of this case located at the 1 st and 2nd floors of a Roferxane
Building situated at No. 158 Quirino Avenue corner Redemptorist Road, Barangay Baclaran, Paraaque City. The [Spouses Latip] are also ordered to PAY [Rosalie] the amount of SEVEN HUNDRED TWENTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P720,000.00) as rent arrearages for the period of December 1999 to December 2000 and thereafter to PAY [Rosalie] the amount of SEVENTY TWO THOUSAND PESOS ( P72,000.00) per month from January
2001 to December 2002, plus ten percent (10%) increase for each and every succeeding years thereafter as stipulated in paragraph 2(a) of the Contract of Lease x x x, until the [Spouses Latip] have completely vacated the
leased premises subject of this lease. Finally[,] the [Spouses Latip] are hereby ordered to PAY [Rosalie] the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS ( P20,000.00) as attorneys fees and TWO THOUSAND PESOS
(P2,000.00) per [Rosalies] appearance in Court as appearance fee and to PAY the cost of this suit.
[Spouses Latips] counterclaim is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.[7]

In stark contrast, the RTC reversed the MeTC and ruled in favor of Spouses Latip. The RTC did not give credence to the contract of lease, ruling that it was not notarized and, in
all other substantial aspects, incomplete. Further on this point, the RTC noted that the contract of lease lacked: (1) the signature of Ferdinand Chua, Rosalies husband; (2) the
signatures of Spouses Latip on the first page thereof; (3) the specific dates for the term of the contract which only stated that the lease is for six (6) y[ea]rs only starting from
December 1999 or up to December 2005; (4) the exact date of execution of the document, albeit the month of December and year 1999 are indicated therein; and (5) the
provision for payment of deposit or advance rental which is supposedly uncommon in big commercial lease contracts.
The RTC believed the claim of Spouses Latip that the contract of lease was modified and supplemented; and the entire lease rentals for the two (2) cubicles for six (6) years had
already been paid by Spouses Latip in the amount of P2,570,000.00. As to Rosalies claim that her receipt of P2,570,000.00 was simply goodwill payment by prospective lessees
to their lessor, and not payment for the purchase of lease rights, the RTC shot this down and pointed out that, apart from her bare allegations, Rosalie did not adduce evidence
to substantiate this claim. On the whole, the RTC declared an existent lease between the parties for a period of six (6) years, and already fully paid for by Spouses Latip. Thus,
Spouses Latip could not be ejected from the leased premises until expiration of the lease period.
The RTC disposed of the appeal, viz.:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the appealed decision of the [MeTC] dated January 13, 2004 is reversed as judgment is hereby rendered for the [Spouses Latip] and against [Rosalie], ordering the latter to pay
the former
(1) the sum of PhP1,000,000.00 as moral damages;
(2) the sum of PhP500,000.00 as exemplary damages;
(3) the sum of PhP250,000.00 plus PhP3,000.00 per court appearance as and for attorneys fees; and
(4)

costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.[8]

In yet another turn of events, the CA, as previously mentioned, reversed the RTC and reinstated the decision of the MeTC. The CA ruled that the contract of lease, albeit lacking
the signature of Ferdinand and not notarized, remained a complete and valid contract. As the MeTC had, the CA likewise found that the alleged defects in the contract of lease
did not render the contract ineffective. On the issue of whether the amount of P2,570,000.00 merely constituted payment of goodwill money, the CA took judicial notice of this
common practice in the area of Baclaran, especially around the Redemptorist Church. According to the appellate court, this judicial notice was bolstered by the Joint Sworn

Declaration of the stallholders at Roferxane Bldg. that they all had paid goodwill money to Rosalie prior to occupying the stalls thereat. Thus, ruling on Rosalies appeal, the CA
disposed of the case:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision of RTC Paraaque City Branch 274 dated September 24, 2004 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the
January 13, 2004 decision of the MeTC is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED en toto.
SO ORDERED.[9]

Not surprisingly, Spouses Latip filed the present appeal.

The singular issue for our resolution is whether Spouses Latip should be ejected from the leased cubicles.
As previously adverted to, the CA, in ruling for Rosalie and upholding the ejectment of Spouses Latip, took judicial notice of the alleged practice of prospective lessees in the
Baclaran area to pay goodwill money to the lessor.
We disagree.
Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court declare when the taking of judicial notice is mandatory or discretionary on the courts, thus:
SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of
nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the
Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions.
SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. A court may take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial
functions.

On this point, State Prosecutors v. Muro[10] is instructive:

I. The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the courts. The power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with
caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt on the subject should be promptly resolved in the
negative.
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well
and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in
determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts
evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety.
To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way of saying that the usual form of evidence will be dispensed with if knowledge of the fact
can be otherwise acquired. This is because the court assumes that the matter is so notorious that it will not be disputed. But judicial notice is not judicial
knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and he is not authorized to make his individual

knowledge of a fact, not generally or professionally known, the basis of his action. Judicial cognizance is taken only of those matters which are commonly
known.
Things of common knowledge, of which courts take judicial notice, may be matters coming to the knowledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary
experiences of life, or they may be matters which are generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration. Thus,
facts which are universally known, and which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially noticed, provided they are of such
universal notoriety and so generally understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the common knowledge of every person.[11]
We reiterated the requisite of notoriety for the taking of judicial notice in the recent case of Expertravel & Tours, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[12] which cited State Prosecutors:
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well
and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in
determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public
records and facts of general notoriety. Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to a reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1) generally known
within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resorting to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be
questionable.
Things of common knowledge, of which courts take judicial notice, may be matters coming to the knowledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary
experiences of life, or they may be matters which are generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration. Thus,
facts which are universally known, and which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially noticed, provided, they are such of
universal notoriety and so generally understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the common knowledge of every person. As the common knowledge
of man ranges far and wide, a wide variety of particular facts have been judicially noticed as being matters of common knowledge. But a court cannot take judicial
notice of any fact which, in part, is dependent on the existence or non-existence of a fact of which the court has no constructive knowledge.
From the foregoing provisions of law and our holdings thereon, it is apparent that the matter which the appellate court took judicial notice of does not meet the requisite of
notoriety. To begin with, only the CA took judicial notice of this supposed practice to pay goodwill money to the lessor in the Baclaran area. Neither the MeTC nor the RTC, with
the former even ruling in favor of Rosalie, found that the practice was of common knowledge or notoriously known.
We note that the RTC specifically ruled that Rosalie, apart from her bare allegation, adduced no evidence to prove her claim that the amount of P2,570,000.00 simply constituted
the payment of goodwill money. Subsequently, Rosalie attached an annex to her petition for review before the CA, containing a joint declaration under oath by other stallholders
in Roferxane Bldg. that they had paid goodwill money to Rosalie as their lessor. On this score, we emphasize that the reason why our rules on evidence provide for matters that
need not be proved under Rule 129, specifically on judicial notice, is to dispense with the taking of the usual form of evidence on a certain matter so notoriously known, it will not
be disputed by the parties.
However, in this case, the requisite of notoriety is belied by the necessity of attaching documentary evidence, i.e., the Joint Affidavit of the stallholders, to Rosalies appeal before
the CA. In short, the alleged practice still had to be proven by Rosalie; contravening the title itself of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court What need not be proved.
Apparently, only that particular division of the CA had knowledge of the practice to pay goodwill money in the Baclaran area. As was held in State Prosecutors, justices
and judges alike ought to be reminded that the power to take judicial notice must be exercised with caution and every reasonable doubt on the subject should be ample reason
for the claim of judicial notice to be promptly resolved in the negative.
Ultimately, on the issue of whether Spouses Latip ought to be ejected from the leased cubicles, what remains in evidence is the documentary evidence signed by both
parties the contract of lease and the receipts evidencing payment of P2,570,000.00.
We need not be unduly detained by the issue of which documents were executed first or if there was a novation of the contract of lease. As had been found by the RTC,
the lease contract and the receipts for the amount of P2,570,000.00 can be reconciled or harmonized. The RTC declared:

Definitely, the parties entered into a lease agreement over two (2) cubicles of the 1 st and 2nd floors of Roferxane (Roferland) Building, a commercial building located at 158 Quirino Avenue, corner Redemptorist Road,
Baclaran, Paraaque City and belonging to [Rosalie]. The lease agreement is for a term of six (6) years commencing in December 1999 up to December 2005. This agreement was embodied in a Contract of Lease x x x. The
terms of this lease contract, however, are modified or supplemented by another agreement between the parties executed and or entered into in or about the time of execution of the lease contract, which exact date of
execution of the latter is unclear.[13]

We agree with the RTCs holding only up to that point. There exists a lease agreement between the parties as set forth in the contract of lease which is a complete document. It
need not be signed by Ferdinand Chua as he likewise did not sign the other two receipts for P500,000.00 and P70,000.00, respectively, which contained only the signature of
Rosalie. Besides, it is undisputed that Rosalie owns and leases the stalls in Roferxane Bldg.; thus, doing away with the need for her husbands consent. The findings of the three
lower courts concur on this fact.
The contract of lease has a period of six (6) years commencing in December 1999. This fact is again buttressed by Spouses Latips admission that they occupied the property
forthwith in December 1999, bearing in mind the brisk sales during the holiday season.
On the conflicting interpretations by the lower courts of the receipts amounting to P2,570,000.00, we hold that the practice of payment of goodwill money in the Baclaran area is
an inadequate subject of judicial notice. Neither was Rosalie able to provide sufficient evidence that, apart from the belatedly submitted Joint Affidavit of the stallholders of
Roferxane Bldg., the said amount was simply for the payment of goodwill money, and not payment for advance rentals by Spouses Latip.
In interpreting the evidence before us, we are guided by the Civil Code provisions on interpretation of contracts, to wit:
Art. 1371. In order to judge the intention of the contracting parties, their contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be principally considered.
Art. 1372. However general the terms of a contract may be, they shall not be understood to comprehend things that are distinct and cases that are different from those which the parties intended to agree.
Art. 1373. If some stipulation of any contract should admit of several meanings, it shall be understood as bearing that import which is most adequate to render it effectual.

The RTC was already on the right track when it declared that the receipts for P2,570,000.00 modified or supplemented the contract of lease. However, it made a quantum leap
when it ruled that the amount was payment for rentals of the two (2) cubicles for the entire six-year period. We cannot subscribe to this finding. To obviate confusion and for
clarity, the contents of the receipts, already set forth above, are again reproduced:
1. I received the amount of P2,000,000.00 (two million pesos) from [O]mar Latip & Moshi[e]ra Latip for the payment of 2 cubicles located at 158 Quirino Ave. corner Redemptorist Rd.[,] Baclaran P[ara]que City. ROFERLAND
Bldg. with the terms 6 yrs. Contract.
P2,000,000.00 ______(sgd.)______
CHECK # 3767924 Rosalie Chua
FAR EAST BANK
______(sgd.)______
Ferdinand Chua
2. Received cash
P500,000.00
From Moshiera Latip
(sgd.)
12/10/99 Rosalie Chua
Received by

3. Received cash
P70,000.00 from
Moshiera Latip
12-11-99

There is nothing on the receipts and on record that the payment and receipt of P2,570,000.00 referred to full payment of rentals for the whole period of the lease. All
three receipts state Rosalies receipt of cash in varying amounts. The first receipt for P2,000,000.00 did state payment for two (2) cubicles, but this cannot mean full payment of
rentals for the entire lease period when there are no words to that effect. Further, two receipts were subsequently executed pointing to the obvious fact that the P2,000,000.00 is
not for full payment of rentals. Thus, since the contract of lease remained operative, we find that Rosalies receipt of the monies should be considered as advanced rentals on the
leased cubicles. This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that Rosalie demanded payment of the lease rentals only in 2000, a full year after the commencement of the lease.
Finally, we note that the lease ended in 2005. Consequently, Spouses Latip can be ejected from the leased premises. They are liable to Rosalie for unpaid rentals on the lease
of the two (2) cubicles in accordance with the stipulations on rentals in the Contract of Lease. However, the amount of P2,570,000.00, covering advance rentals, must be
deducted from this liability of Spouses Latip to Rosalie.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 89300 is REVERSED. The petitioners,
spouses Omar and Moshiera Latip, are liable to respondent Rosalie Chua for unpaid rentals minus the amount of P2,570,000.00 already received by her as advance rentals. No
costs. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 159507 April 19, 2006

ANICETO G. SALUDO, JR.,vs.AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL, INC., and/or IAN T. FISH and DOMINIC MASCRINAS, Respondents.

Before the Court is the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision 1 dated May 22, 2003 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 69553. The assailed decision directed the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Maasin City, Southern Leyte, Branch 25 thereof, to vacate and set aside its Orders
dated September 10, 2001 and January 2, 2002 in Civil Case No. R-3172, and enjoined the presiding judge 2 thereof from conducting further proceedings in said case, except to
dismiss the complaint filed therewith on ground of improper venue. The petition also seeks to reverse and set aside the appellate court's Resolution dated August 14, 2003
denying the motion for reconsideration of the assailed decision.
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. filed a complaint for damages against the American Express International, Inc. (AMEX) and/or its officers Ian T. Fish, Vice-President and Country
Manager, and Dominic Mascrinas, Head of Operations, with the RTC of Maasin City, Southern Leyte. The case was raffled to Branch 25 of the said court.
The complaint alleged, inter alia, that plaintiff (herein petitioner Saludo) "is a Filipino citizen, of legal age, and a member of the House of Representatives and a resident of Ichon,
Macrohon, Southern Leyte, Philippines." On the other hand, defendant (herein respondent AMEX, Inc.) "is a corporation doing business in the Philippines and engaged in
providing credit and other credit facilities and allied services with office address at 4th floor, ACE Building, Rada Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City." The other defendants
(herein respondents Fish and Mascrinas) are officers of respondent AMEX, and may be served with summons and other court processes at their office address.
The complaint's cause of action stemmed from the alleged wrongful dishonor of petitioner Saludo's AMEX credit card and the supplementary card issued to his daughter. The
first dishonor happened when petitioner Saludo's daughter used her supplementary credit card to pay her purchases in the United States some time in April 2000. The second
dishonor occurred when petitioner Saludo used his principal credit card to pay his account at the Hotel Okawa in Tokyo, Japan while he was there with other delegates from the
Philippines to attend the Congressional Recognition in honor of Mr. Hiroshi Tanaka.

The dishonor of these AMEX credit cards were allegedly unjustified as they resulted from respondents' unilateral act of suspending petitioner Saludo's account for his failure to
pay its balance covering the period of March 2000. Petitioner Saludo denied having received the corresponding statement of account. Further, he was allegedly wrongfully
charged for late payment in June 2000. Subsequently, his credit card and its supplementary cards were canceled by respondents on July 20, 2000.
Petitioner Saludo claimed that he suffered great inconvenience, wounded feelings, mental anguish, embarrassment, humiliation and besmirched political and professional
standing as a result of respondents' acts which were committed in gross and evident bad faith, and in wanton, reckless and oppressive manner. He thus prayed that respondents
be adjudged to pay him, jointly and severally, actual, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.
In their answer, respondents specifically denied the allegations in the complaint. Further, they raised the affirmative defenses of lack of cause of action and improper venue. On
the latter, respondents averred that the complaint should be dismissed on the ground that venue was improperly laid because none of the parties was a resident of Leyte. They
alleged that respondents were not residents of Southern Leyte. Moreover, notwithstanding the claim in his complaint, petitioner Saludo was not allegedly a resident thereof as
evidenced by the fact that his community tax certificate, which was presented when he executed the complaint's verification and certification of non-forum shopping, was issued
at Pasay City. To buttress their contention, respondents pointed out that petitioner Saludo's complaint was prepared in Pasay City and signed by a lawyer of the said city.
Respondents prayed for the dismissal of the complaint a quo.
Thereafter, respondents filed an Opposition to Ex-Parte Motion (to Set Case for Pre-Trial) and Motion for Preliminary Hearing (on Affirmative Defense of Improper Venue) to
which petitioner Saludo filed his Comments and/or Objections to the Affirmative Defense of Improper Venue. He asserted that any allegation refuting his residency in Southern
Leyte was baseless and unfounded considering that he was the congressman of the lone district thereof at the time of the filing of his complaint. He urged the court a quo to take
judicial notice of this particular fact. As a member of Congress, he possessed all the qualifications prescribed by the Constitution including that of being a resident of his district.
He was also a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Southern Leyte Chapter, and has been such ever since his admission to the Bar. His community tax certificate
was issued at Pasay City only because he has an office thereat and the office messenger obtained the same in the said city. In any event, the community tax certificate is not
determinative of one's residence.
In the Order dated September 10, 2001, the court a quo denied the affirmative defenses interposed by respondents. It found the allegations of the complaint sufficient to
constitute a cause of action against respondents. The court a quo likewise denied respondents' affirmative defense that venue was improperly laid. It reasoned, thus:
x x x [T]he fact alone that the plaintiff at the time he filed the complaint was and still is, the incumbent Congressman of the Lone District of Southern Leyte with residence at
Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte, is enough to dispell any and all doubts about his actual residence. As a high-ranking government official of the province, his residence there
can be taken judicial notice of. As such his personal, actual and physical habitation or his actual residence or place of abode can never be in some other place but in Ichon,
Macrohon, Southern Leyte. It is correctly stated by the plaintiff, citing the case of Core v. Core, 100 Phil. 321 that, "residence, for purposes of fixing venue of an action, is
synonymous with domicile. This is defined as the permanent home, the place to which, whenever absent for business or pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on the
facts and circumstances, in the sense that they disclose intent. A person can have but one domicile at a time. A man can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at
any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. Venue could be at place of his residence. (Masa v. Mison, 200 SCRA 715 [1991])3
Respondents sought the reconsideration thereof but the court a quo denied the same in the Order dated January 2, 2002. They then filed with the appellate court a petition for
certiorari and prohibition alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the presiding judge of the court a quo in issuing the September 10, 2001 and January 2, 2002 Orders.
Upon respondents' posting of a bond, the appellate court issued on March 14, 2002 a temporary restraining order which enjoined the presiding judge of the court a quo from
conducting further proceedings in Civil Case No. R-3172.

On May 22, 2003, the appellate court rendered the assailed decision granting respondents' petition for certiorari as it found that venue was improperly laid. It directed the court a
quo to vacate and set aside its Orders dated September 10, 2001 and January 2, 2002, and enjoined the presiding judge thereof from further proceeding in the case, except to
dismiss the complaint.
The appellate court explained that the action filed by petitioner Saludo against respondents is governed by Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court. The said rule on venue of
personal actions basically provides that personal actions may be commenced and tried where plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where defendant or any of the
principal defendants resides, at the election of plaintiff.
Venue was improperly laid in the court a quo, according to the appellate court, because not one of the parties was a resident of Southern Leyte. Specifically, it declared that
petitioner Saludo was not a resident thereof. The appellate court pronounced that, for purposes of venue, the residence of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation,
or his actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.4
The appellate court quoted the following discussion in Koh v. Court of Appeals5 where the Court distinguished the terms "residence" and "domicile" in this wise:
x x x [T]he term domicile is not exactly synonymous in legal contemplation with the term residence, for it is [an] established principle in Conflict of Laws that domicile refers to the
relatively more permanent abode of a person while residence applies to a temporary stay of a person in a given place. In fact, this distinction is very well emphasized in those
cases where the Domiciliary Theory must necessarily supplant the Nationality Theory in cases involving stateless persons.
xxxx
"There is a difference between domicile and residence. Residence is used to indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; domicile denotes a fixed permanent
residence to which when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile
is residence coupled with intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous
places of residence. His place of residence generally is his place of domicile, but is not by any means, necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of remaining
will constitute domicile."6 (Italicized for emphasis)
In holding that petitioner Saludo is not a resident of Maasin City, Southern Leyte, the appellate court referred to his community tax certificate, as indicated in his complaint's
verification and certification of non-forum shopping, which was issued at Pasay City. Similarly, it referred to the same community tax certificate, as indicated in his complaint for
deportation filed against respondents Fish and Mascrinas. Under Republic Act No. 7160,7 the community tax certificate shall be paid in the place of residence of the individual, or
in the place where the principal office of the juridical entity is located. 8 It also pointed out that petitioner Saludo's law office, which was also representing him in the present case,
is in Pasay City. The foregoing circumstances were considered by the appellate court as judicial admissions of petitioner Saludo which are conclusive upon him and no longer
required proof.
The appellate court chided the court a quo for stating that as incumbent congressman of the lone district of Southern Leyte, judicial notice could be taken of the fact of petitioner
Saludo's residence thereat. No evidence had yet been adduced that petitioner Saludo was then the congressman of Southern Leyte and actual resident of Ichon, Macrohon of
the said province.
The appellate court held that, based on his complaint, petitioner Saludo was actually residing in Pasay City. It faulted him for filing his complaint with the court a quo when the
said venue is inconvenient to the parties to the case. It opined that under the rules, the possible choices of venue are Pasay City or Makati City, or any place in the National
Capital Judicial Region, at the option of petitioner Saludo.

It stressed that while the choice of venue is given to plaintiff, said choice is not left to his caprice and cannot deprive a defendant of the rights conferred upon him by the Rules of
Court.9 Further, fundamental in the law governing venue of actions that the situs for bringing real and personal civil actions is fixed by the rules to attain the greatest possible
convenience to the party litigants by taking into consideration the maximum accessibility to them - i.e., to both plaintiff and defendant, not only to one or the other - of the courts
of justice.10
The appellate court concluded that the court a quo should have given due course to respondents' affirmative defense of improper venue in order to avoid any suspicion that
petitioner Saludo's motive in filing his complaint with the court a quo was only to vex and unduly inconvenience respondents or even to wield influence in the outcome of the
case, petitioner Saludo being a powerful and influential figure in the said province. The latter circumstance could be regarded as a "specie of forum shopping" akin to that in
Investors Finance Corp. v. Ebarle11where the Court mentioned that the filing of the civil action before the court in Pagadian City "was a specie of forum shopping" considering
that plaintiff therein was an influential person in the locality.
The decretal portion of the assailed Decision dated May 22, 2003 of the appellate court reads:
UPON THE VIEW WE TAKE OF THIS CASE, THUS, the challenged orders must be, as they hereby are, VACATED and SET ASIDE and the respondent judge, or any one
acting in his place or stead, is instructed and enjoined to desist from further proceeding in the case, except to dismiss it. The temporary restraining order earlier issued is hereby
converted into a writ of preliminary injunction, upon the posting this time by petitioners [herein respondents], within five (5) days from receipt of this decision, of a bond in the
amount of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00), to answer for all damages that private respondent [herein petitioner] may sustain by reason of the issuance of such injunction
should the Court finally decide that petitioners are not entitled thereto. Private respondent, if he so minded, may refile his case for damages before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City or Pasay City, or any of the Regional Trial Courts of the National Capital Judicial Region. Without costs.
SO ORDERED.12
Petitioner Saludo sought the reconsideration of the said decision but the appellate court, in the Resolution dated August 14, 2003, denied his motion for reconsideration. Hence,
he filed the instant petition for review with the Court alleging that:
The Court of Appeals, (Special Fourth Division), in promulgating the afore-mentioned Decision and Resolution, has decided a question of substance in a way probably not in
accord with law or with applicable decisions of this Honorable Court.
(a) the Court of Appeals erred in not taking judicial notice of the undisputed fact that herein petitioner is the incumbent congressman of the lone district of Southern Leyte
and as such, he is a residence (sic) of said district;
(b) the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the complaint on the basis of improper venue due to the alleged judicial admission of herein petitioner;
(c) the Court of Appeals in dismissing the complaint ignored applicable decisions of this Honorable Court; and1avvphil.net
(d) the Court of Appeals erred in deciding that herein petitioner violated the rules on venue, and even speculated that herein petitioner's motive in filing the complaint in
Maasin City was only to vex the respondents.13
In gist, the sole substantive issue for the Court's resolution is whether the appellate court committed reversible error in holding that venue was improperly laid in the court a quo
in Civil Case No. R-3172 because not one of the parties, including petitioner Saludo, as plaintiff therein, was a resident of Southern Leyte at the time of filing of the complaint.
The petition is meritorious.

Petitioner Saludo's complaint for damages against respondents before the court a quo is a personal action. As such, it is governed by Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Courts
which reads:
SEC. 2. Venue of personal actions. - All other actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in
the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.

The choice of venue for personal actions cognizable by the RTC is given to plaintiff but not to plaintiff's caprice because the matter is regulated by the Rules of Court. 14 The rule
on venue, like other procedural rules, is designed to insure a just and orderly administration of justice, or the impartial and evenhanded determination of every action and
proceeding.15 The option of plaintiff in personal actions cognizable by the RTC is either the place where defendant resides or may be found, or the place where plaintiff resides. If
plaintiff opts for the latter, he is limited to that place.16
Following this rule, petitioner Saludo, as plaintiff, had opted to file his complaint with the court a quo which is in Maasin City, Southern Leyte. He alleged in his complaint that he
was a member of the House of Representatives and a resident of Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte to comply with the residency requirement of the rule.
However, the appellate court, adopting respondents' theory, made the finding that petitioner Saludo was not a resident of Southern Leyte at the time of the filing of his complaint.
It hinged the said finding mainly on the fact that petitioner Saludo's community tax certificate, indicated in his complaint's verification and certification of non-forum shopping, was
issued at Pasay City. That his law office is in Pasay City was also taken by the appellate court as negating petitioner Saludo's claim of residence in Southern Leyte.
The appellate court committed reversible error in finding that petitioner Saludo was not a resident of Southern Leyte at the time of the filing of his complaint, and consequently
holding that venue was improperly laid in the court a quo. In Dangwa Transportation Co., Inc. v. Sarmiento, 17 the Court had the occasion to explain at length the meaning of the
term "resides" for purposes of venue, thus:
In Koh v. Court of Appeals, we explained that the term "resides" as employed in the rule on venue on personal actions filed with the courts of first instance means the place of
abode, whether permanent or temporary, of the plaintiff or the defendant, as distinguished from "domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent,
one has the intention of returning.
"It is fundamental in the law governing venue of actions (Rule 4 of the Rules of Court) that the situs for bringing real and personal civil actions are fixed by the rules to attain the
greatest convenience possible to the parties-litigants by taking into consideration the maximum accessibility to them of the courts of justice. It is, likewise, undeniable that the
term domicile is not exactly synonymous in legal contemplation with the term residence, for it is an established principle in Conflict of Laws that domicile refers to the relatively
more permanent abode of a person while residence applies to a temporary stay of a person in a given place. In fact, this distinction is very well emphasized in those cases
where the Domiciliary Theory must necessarily supplant the Nationality Theory in cases involving stateless persons.
"This Court held in the case of Uytengsu v. Republic, 50 O.G. 4781, October, 1954, reversing its previous stand in Larena v. Ferrer, 61 Phil. 36, and Nuval v. Guray, 52 Phil. 645,
that 'There is a difference between domicile and residence. Residence is used to indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which
when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the
intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His place of residence
generally is his place of domicile, but is not by any means, necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile.' (Italicized for emphasis)
"We note that the law on venue in Courts of First Instance (Section 2, of Rule 4, Rules of Court) in referring to the parties utilizes the words 'resides or may be found,' and not 'is domiciled,' thus:

'Sec. 2(b) Personal actions - All other actions may be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs
resides, at the election of the plaintiff.' (Italicized for emphasis)
"Applying the foregoing observation to the present case, We are fully convinced that private respondent Coloma's protestations of domicile in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, based on his manifested
intention to return there after the retirement of his wife from government service to justify his bringing of an action for damages against petitioner in the C.F.I. of Ilocos Norte, is entirely of no
moment since what is of paramount importance is where he actually resided or where he may be found at the time he brought the action, to comply substantially with the requirements of Sec.
2(b) of Rule 4, Rules of Court, on venue of personal actions." (Koh v. Court of Appeals, supra, pp. 304-305.)
The same construction of the word "resides" as used in Section 1, Rule 73, of the Revised Rules of Court, was enunciated in Fule v. Court of Appeals, et al. (G.R. No. L-40502) and Fule v. Hon.
Ernani C. Pao, et al. (G.R. No. L-42670), decided on November 29, 1976. Thus, this Court, in the aforecited cases, stated:
"2. But, the far-ranging question is this: What does the term 'resides' mean? Does it refer to the actual residence or domicile of the decedent at the time of his death? We lay down the doctrinal
rule that the term 'resides' connotes ex vi termini 'actual residence' as distinguished from 'legal residence or domicile.' This term 'resides,' like the terms 'residing' and 'residence' is elastic and
should be interpreted in the light of the object or purposes of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules - Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of
Court is of such nature - residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word 'domicile' still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the
technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms 'residence' and 'domicile' but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same
meaning as the term 'inhabitant.' In other words, 'resides' should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence
or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or
domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile. No
particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary." 18

There is no dispute that petitioner Saludo was the congressman or the representative of the lone district of Southern Leyte at the time of filing of his complaint with the court a
quo. Even the appellate court admits this fact as it states that "it may be conceded that private respondent ever so often travels to Maasin City, Southern Leyte, because he is its
representative in the lower house."19
As a member of the House of Representatives, petitioner Saludo was correctly deemed by the court a quo as possessing the requirements for the said position, 20 including that
he was then a resident of the district which he was representing, i.e., Southern Leyte. Significantly, for purposes of election law, the term "residence" is synonymous with
"domicile," thus:
x x x [T]he Court held that "domicile" and "residence" are synonymous. The term "residence," as used in the election law, imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place
but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or
pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. x x x21
It can be readily gleaned that the definition of "residence" for purposes of election law is more stringent in that it is equated with the term "domicile." Hence, for the said purpose,
the term "residence" imports "not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention." 22 When
parsed, therefore, the term "residence" requires two elements: (1) intention to reside in the particular place; and (2) personal or physical presence in that place, coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention. As the Court elucidated, "the place where a party actually or constructively has a permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be
found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election
law."23
On the other hand, for purposes of venue, the less technical definition of "residence" is adopted. Thus, it is understood to mean as "the personal, actual or physical habitation of
a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is,

personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that
place and also an intention to make it one's domicile."24
Since petitioner Saludo, as congressman or the lone representative of the district of Southern Leyte, had his residence (or domicile) therein as the term is construed in relation to
election laws, necessarily, he is also deemed to have had his residence therein for purposes of venue for filing personal actions. Put in another manner, Southern Leyte, as the
domicile of petitioner Saludo, was also his residence, as the term is understood in its popular sense. This is because "residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence
coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time."
Reliance by the appellate court on Koh v. Court of Appeals 25 is misplaced. Contrary to its holding,26 the facts of the present case are not similar to the facts therein. In Koh, the
complaint was filed with the Court of First Instance in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte by plaintiff who admitted that he was a resident of Kamias, Quezon City. Save for the fact that he
grew up in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte and that he manifested the intent to return there after retirement, plaintiff therein had not established that he was actually a resident therein
at the time of the filing of his complaint. Neither did he establish that he had his domicile therein because although he manifested the intent to go back there after retirement, the
element of personal presence in that place was lacking. To reiterate, domicile or residence, as the terms are taken as synonyms, imports "not only an intention to reside in a
fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention."27
In contrast, petitioner Saludo was the congressman or representative of Southern Leyte at the time of filing of his complaint with the court a quo. Absent any evidence to the
contrary, he is deemed to possess the qualifications for the said position, including that he was a resident therein. And following the definition of the term "residence" for
purposes of election law, petitioner Saludo not only had the intention to reside in Southern Leyte, but he also had personal presence therein, coupled with conduct indicative of
such intention. The latter element, or his bodily presence as an inhabitant in Southern Leyte, was sufficient for petitioner Saludo to be considered a resident therein for purposes
of venue.
The following ratiocination of the court a quo is apt:
Residence in civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical presence of a person in a place. A person can have two or more residences, such as a country residence and a
city residence. (Quetulio v. Ruiz, S.C. Off. Gaz. 156, Commentaries and Jurisprudence in Civil Law, Vol. 1, page 211, Tolentino). Residence is acquired by living in a place; on
the other hand, domicile can exist without actually living in the place. The important thing for domicile is that, once residence has been established in one place, there be an
intention to stay there permanently, even if residence is also established in some other place.
Thus, if a person lives with his family habitually in Quezon City, he would have his domicile in Quezon City. If he also has a house for vacation purposes in the City of Baguio,
and another house in connection with his business in the City of Manila, he would have residence in all three places (Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on Civil Law,
Vol. 1, Page 212, 1990 Edition) so that one[']s legal residence or domicile can also be his actual, personal or physical residence or habitation or place of abode if he stays there
with intention to stay there permanently.
In the instant case, since plaintiff has a house in Makati City for the purpose of exercising his profession or doing business and also a house in Ichon, Macrohon, Southern
Leyte, for doing business and/or for election or political purposes where he also lives or stays physically, personally and actually then he can have residences in these two
places. Because it would then be preposterous to acknowledge and recognize plaintiff Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. as congressman of Southern Leyte without also recognizing him as
actually, personally and physically residing thereat, when such residence is required by law.28
The fact then that petitioner Saludo's community tax certificate was issued at Pasay City is of no moment because granting arguendo that he could be considered a resident
therein, the same does not preclude his having a residence in Southern Leyte for purposes of venue. A man can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any
time, but he may have numerous places of residence.29

That petitioner Saludo was the congressman or representative of the lone district of Southern Leyte at the time of the filing of his complaint was admitted as a fact by the court a
quo. In this connection, it consequently held that, as such, petitioner Saludo's residence in Southern Leyte, the district he was the representing, could be taken judicial notice of.
The court a quo cannot be faulted for doing so because courts are allowed "to take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable
demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions." 30 Courts are likewise bound to take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the
law in force in the Philippines, 31 including its Constitution.
The concept of "facts of common knowledge" in the context of judicial notice has been explained as those facts that are "so commonly known in the community as to make it
unprofitable to require proof, and so certainly known to as to make it indisputable among reasonable men." 32 Moreover, "though usually facts of 'common knowledge' will be
generally known throughout the country, it is sufficient as a basis for judicial notice that they be known in the local community where the trial court sits." 33 Certainly, the fact of
petitioner Saludo being the duly elected representative of Southern Leyte at the time could be properly taken judicial notice of by the court a quo, the same being a matter of
common knowledge in the community where it sits.
Further, petitioner Saludo's residence in Southern Leyte could likewise be properly taken judicial notice of by the court a quo. It is bound to know that, under the Constitution,
one of the qualifications of a congressman or representative to the House of Representatives is having a residence in the district in which he shall be elected.
In fine, petitioner Saludo's act of filing his complaint with the court a quo cannot be characterized as a "specie of forum-shopping" or capricious on his part because, under the
rules, as plaintiff, he is precisely given this option.
Finally, respondents' claim that the instant petition for review was not properly verified by petitioner Saludo deserves scant consideration.
Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court reads:
Sec. 4. Verification. - Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records.
A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on "information and belief," or upon "knowledge, information and belief," or lacks proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.

Petitioner Saludo's verification and certification of non-forum shopping states that he has "read the contents thereof [referring to the petition] and the same are true and correct
of my own personal knowledge and belief and on the basis of the records at hand." The same clearly constitutes substantial compliance with the above requirements of the
Rules of Court. GRANTED. The Decision of Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69553 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. RTC REINSTATED. SO ORDERED.