Failure mode and eects analysis

Failure mode and eects analysis (FMEA)also

"failure modes", plural, in many publicationswas one
of the rst highly structured, systematic techniques for
failure analysis. It was developed by reliability engineers
in the late 1950s to study problems that might arise from
malfunctions of military systems. An FMEA is often the
rst step of a system reliability study. It involves reviewing as many components, assemblies, and subsystems as
possible to identify failure modes, and their causes and
eects. For each component, the failure modes and their
resulting eects on the rest of the system are recorded in
a specic FMEA worksheet. There are numerous variations of such worksheets. An FMEA can be a qualitative
analysis,[1] but may be put on a quantitative basis when
mathematical failure rate models [2] are combined with a
statistical failure mode ratio database.

or reduced by understanding the failure mechanism. Ideally this probability shall be lowered to impossible to occur by eliminating the (root) causes. It is therefore important to include in the FMEA an appropriate depth of
information on the causes of failure (deductive analysis).

1 Introduction
The FME(C)A is a design tool used to systematically analyze postulated component failures and identify the resultant eects on system operations. The analysis is sometimes characterized as consisting of two sub-analyses, the
rst being the failure modes and eects analysis (FMEA),
and the second, the criticality analysis (CA).[3] Successful development of an FMEA requires that the analyst
include all signicant failure modes for each contributing element or part in the system. FMEAs can be performed at the system, subsystem, assembly, subassembly
or part level. The FMECA should be a living document
during development of a hardware design. It should be
scheduled and completed concurrently with the design.
If completed in a timely manner, the FMECA can help
guide design decisions. The usefulness of the FMECA as
a design tool and in the decision-making process is dependent on the eectiveness and timeliness with which
design problems are identied. Timeliness is probably
the most important consideration. In the extreme case,
the FMECA would be of little value to the design decision process if the analysis is performed after the hardware is built. While the FMECA identies all part failure
modes, its primary benet is the early identication of
all critical and catastrophic subsystem or system failure
modes so they can be eliminated or minimized through
design modication at the earliest point in the development eort; therefore, the FMECA should be performed
at the system level as soon as preliminary design information is available and extended to the lower levels as the
detail design progresses.

A few dierent types of FMEA analyses exist, such as

Functional
Design
Process FMEA
Control plan
PFME
Sometimes FMEA is extended to FMECA (failure mode,
eects, and criticality analysis) to indicate that criticality
analysis is performed too.
FMEA is an inductive reasoning (forward logic) single
point of failure analysis and is a core task in reliability
engineering, safety engineering and quality engineering.

A successful FMEA activity helps identify potential failure modes based on experience with similar products and
processesor based on common physics of failure logic.
It is widely used in development and manufacturing industries in various phases of the product life cycle. Effects analysis refers to studying the consequences of those Remark: For more complete scenario modelling another
failures on dierent system levels.
type of Reliability analysis may be considered, for examFunctional analyses are needed as an input to deter- ple fault tree analysis (FTA); a deductive (backward logic)
mine correct failure modes, at all system levels, both for failure analysis that may handle multiple failures within
functional FMEA or Piece-Part (hardware) FMEA. An the item and/or external to the item including mainteFMEA is used to structure Mitigation for Risk reduction nance and logistics. It starts at higher functional / system
based on either failure (mode) eect severity reduction or level. An FTA may use the basic failure mode FMEA
based on lowering the probability of failure or both. The records or an eect summary as one of its inputs (the baFMEA is in principle a full inductive (forward logic) anal- sic events). Interface hazard analysis, Human error analysis, however the failure probability can only be estimated ysis and others may be added for completion in scenario
1

modelling.

1.1

Functional analysis

BASIC TERMS

1. It provides a documented method for selecting a design with a high probability of successful operation
and safety.
2. A documented uniform method of assessing potential failure mechanisms, failure modes and their impact on system operation, resulting in a list of failure
modes ranked according to the seriousness of their
system impact and likelihood of occurrence.

The analysis may be performed at the functional level until the design has matured suciently to identify specic
hardware that will perform the functions; then the analysis should be extended to the hardware level. When performing the hardware level FMECA, interfacing hard3. Early identication of single failure points (SFPS)
ware is considered to be operating within specication.
and system interface problems, which may be critiIn addition, each part failure postulated is considered to
cal to mission success and/or safety. They also probe the only failure in the system (i.e., it is a single failure
vide a method of verifying that switching between
analysis). In addition to the FMEAs done on systems to
redundant elements is not jeopardized by postulated
evaluate the impact lower level failures have on system
single failures.
operation, several other FMEAs are done. Special atten4. An eective method for evaluating the eect of protion is paid to interfaces between systems and in fact at all
posed changes to the design and/or operational profunctional interfaces. The purpose of these FMEAs is to
cedures on mission success and safety.
assure that irreversible physical and/or functional damage is not propagated across the interface as a result of
5. A basis for in-ight troubleshooting procedures
failures in one of the interfacing units. These analyses
and for locating performance monitoring and faultare done to the piece part level for the circuits that didetection devices.
rectly interface with the other units. The FMEA can be
accomplished without a CA, but a CA requires that the
6. Criteria for early planning of tests.
FMEA has previously identied system level critical failures. When both steps are done, the total process is called From the above list, early identications of SFPS, input
a FMECA.
to the troubleshooting procedure and locating of performance monitoring / fault detection devices are probably
the most important benets of the FMECA. In addition,
1.2 Ground rules
the FMECA procedures are straightforward and allow orderly evaluation of the design.
The ground rules of each FMEA include a set of project
selected procedures; the assumptions on which the analysis is based; the hardware that has been included and
2 Basic terms
excluded from the analysis and the rationale for the exclusions. The ground rules also describe the indenture level
[5]
of the analysis, the basic hardware status, and the criteria The following covers some basic FMEA terminology.
for system and mission success. Every eort should be
made to dene all ground rules before the FMEA begins; Failure The loss of a function under stated conditions.
however, the ground rules may be expanded and claried
as the analysis proceeds. A typical set of ground rules Failure mode The specic manner or way by which a
failure occurs in terms of failure of the item (being
(assumptions) follows:[4]
a part or (sub) system) function under investigation;
it may generally describe the way the failure occurs.
1. Only one failure mode exists at a time.
It shall at least clearly describe a (end) failure state of
the item (or function in case of a Functional FMEA)
2. All inputs (including software commands) to the
under consideration. It is the result of the failure
item being analyzed are present and at nominal valmechanism (cause of the failure mode). For examues.
ple; a fully fractured axle, a deformed axle or a fully
open or fully closed electrical contact are each a sep3. All consumables are present in sucient quantities.
arate failure mode.
4. Nominal power is available

Failure cause and/or mechanism Defects in requirements, design, process, quality control, handling or
part application, which are the underlying cause or
1.3 Benets
sequence of causes that initiate a process (mechanism) that leads to a failure mode over a certain time.
Major benets derived from a properly implemented
A failure mode may have more causes. For examFMECA eort are as follows:
ple; fatigue or corrosion of a structural beam or

3
fretting corrosion in an electrical contact is a failure
mechanism and in itself (likely) not a failure mode.
The related failure mode (end state) is a full fracture
of structural beam or an open electrical contact.
The initial cause might have been Improper application of corrosion protection layer (paint)" and /or
"(abnormal) vibration input from another (possibly
failed) system.

two revisions, ARP926 has been replaced by ARP4761,

which is now broadly used in civil aviation.

During the 1970s, use of FMEA and related techniques

spread to other industries. In 1971 NASA prepared
a report for the U.S. Geological Survey recommending
the use of FMEA in assessment of oshore petroleum
exploration.[14] A 1973 U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency report described the application of FMEA to
[15]
Failure eect Immediate consequences of a failure on wastewater treatment plants. FMEA as application for
operation, function or functionality, or status of HACCP on the Apollo Space Program moved into the
food industry in general.[16]
some item.
The automotive industry began to use FMEA by the mid
Indenture levels (bill of material or functional breakdown)
[17]
An identier for system level and thereby item com- 1970s. The Ford Motor Company introduced FMEA
plexity. Complexity increases as levels are closer to to the automotive industry for safety and regulatory consideration after the Pinto aair. Ford applied the same
one.
approach to processes (PFMEA) to consider potential
Local eect The failure eect as it applies to the item process induced failures prior to launching production.
under analysis.
In 1993 the Automotive Industry Action Group (AIAG)
rst published an FMEA standard for the automotive
Next higher level eect The failure eect as it applies at industry.[18] It is now in its fourth edition.[19] The SAE
the next higher indenture level.
rst published related standard J1739 in 1994.[20] This
[21]
End eect The failure eect at the highest indenture standard is also now in its fourth edition.
level or total system.
Although initially developed by the military, FMEA
Detection The means of detection of the failure mode methodology is now extensively used in a variety of indusfood service,
by maintainer, operator or built in detection system, tries including semiconductor processing,
[22][23]
plastics,
software,
and
healthcare.
Toyota
has taken
including estimated dormancy period (if applicable)
this one step further with its Design Review Based on
Probability The likelihood of the failure occurring.
Failure Mode (DRBFM) approach. The method is now
supported by the American Society for Quality which
Risk Priority Number (RPN) Severity (of the event) provides detailed guides on applying the method.[24] The
* Probability (of the event occurring) * Detection standard Failure Modes and Eects Analysis (FMEA)
(Probability that the event would not be detected be- and Failure Modes, Eects and Criticality Analysis
fore the user was aware of it)
(FMECA) procedures identify the product failure mechaSeverity The consequences of a failure mode. Severity nisms, but may not model them without specialized softconsiders the worst potential consequence of a fail- ware. This limits their applicability to provide a meanure, determined by the degree of injury, property ingful input to critical procedures such as virtual qualidamage, system damage and/or time lost to repair cation, root cause analysis, accelerated test programs,
and to remaining life assessment. To overcome the shortthe failure.
comings of FMEA and FMECA a Failure Modes, MechRemarks / mitigation / actions Additional info, in- anisms and Eect Analysis (FMMEA) has often been
cluding the proposed mitigation or actions used to used.
lower a risk or justify a risk level or scenario.

History

Procedures for conducting FMECA were described in US

Armed Forces Military Procedures document MIL-P1629[6] (1949); revised in 1980 as MIL-STD-1629A.[7]
By the early 1960s, contractors for the U.S. National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) were using variations of FMECA or FMEA under a variety of
names.[8][9] NASA programs using FMEA variants included Apollo, Viking, Voyager, Magellan, Galileo, and
Skylab.[10][11][12] The civil aviation industry was an early
adopter of FMEA, with the Society for Automotive Engineers (SAE) publishing ARP926 in 1967.[13] After

4 Example worksheet (ARP4761) Design (Hardware) FMEA

4.1 Probability (P)
It is necessary to look at the cause of a failure mode and
the likelihood of occurrence. This can be done by analysis, calculations / FEM, looking at similar items or processes and the failure modes that have been documented
for them in the past. A failure cause is looked upon as
a design weakness. All the potential causes for a failure
mode should be identied and documented. This should
be in technical terms. Examples of causes are: Human er-

4 EXAMPLE WORKSHEET (ARP4761) - DESIGN (HARDWARE) FMEA

rors in handling, Manufacturing induced faults, Fatigue,

Creep, Abrasive wear, erroneous algorithms, excessive
voltage or improper operating conditions or use (depending on the used ground rules). A failure mode is given a
Probability Ranking.

4.5 Indication

4.2

Indications to the operator should be described as follows:

Severity (S)

If the undetected failure allows the system to remain in a

safe / working state, a second failure situation should be
explored to determine whether or not an indication will
be evident to all operators and what corrective action they
may or should take.

Determine the Severity for the worst-case scenario ad Normal. An indication that is evident to an operator
verse end eect (state). It is convenient to write these
when the system or equipment is operating normally.
eects down in terms of what the user might see or ex Abnormal. An indication that is evident to an operperience in terms of functional failures. Examples of
ator when the system has malfunctioned or failed.
these end eects are: full loss of function x, degraded
performance, functions in reversed mode, too late func Incorrect. An erroneous indication to an operator
tioning, erratic functioning, etc. Each end eect is given
due to the malfunction or failure of an indicator (i.e.,
a Severity number (S) from, say, I (no eect) to VI (catasinstruments, sensing devices, visual or audible warntrophic), based on cost and/or loss of life or quality of life.
ing devices, etc.).
These numbers prioritize the failure modes (together with
probability and detectability). Below a typical classication is given. Other classications are possible. See also PERFORM DETECTION COVERAGE ANALYSIS
FOR TEST PROCESSES AND MONITORING (From
hazard analysis.
ARP4761 Standard):

4.3

Detection (D)

The means or method by which a failure is detected, isolated by operator and/or maintainer and the time it may
take. This is important for maintainability control (Availability of the system) and it is especially important for
multiple failure scenarios. This may involve dormant failure modes (e.g. No direct system eect, while a redundant system / item automatic takes over or when the failure only is problematic during specic mission or system states) or latent failures (e.g. deterioration failure
mechanisms, like a metal growing crack, but not a critical length). It should be made clear how the failure mode
or cause can be discovered by an operator under normal
system operation or if it can be discovered by the maintenance crew by some diagnostic action or automatic built
in system test. A dormancy and/or latency period may be
entered.

4.4

Dormancy or Latency Period

The average time that a failure mode may be undetected

may be entered if known. For example:
Seconds, auto detected by maintenance computer

This type of analysis is useful to determine how eective

various test processes are at the detection of latent and
dormant faults. The method used to accomplish this involves an examination of the applicable failure modes to
determine whether or not their eects are detected, and
to determine the percentage of failure rate applicable to
the failure modes which are detected. The possibility that
the detection means may itself fail latent should be accounted for in the coverage analysis as a limiting factor
(i.e., coverage cannot be more reliable than the detection
means availability). Inclusion of the detection coverage in
the FMEA can lead to each individual failure that would
have been one eect category now being a separate effect category due to the detection coverage possibilities.
Another way to include detection coverage is for the FTA
to conservatively assume that no holes in coverage due to
latent failure in the detection method aect detection of
all failures assigned to the failure eect category of concern. The FMEA can be revised if necessary for those
cases where this conservative assumption does not allow
the top event probability requirements to be met.
After these three basic steps the Risk level may be provided.

4.6 Risk level (P*S) and (D)

Risk is the combination of End Eect Probability

And Severity where probability and severity includes the
8 hours, detected by turn-around inspection
eect on non-detectability (dormancy time). This may
inuence the end eect probability of failure or the worst
2 months, detected by scheduled maintenance block case eect Severity. The exact calculation may not be
X
easy in all cases, such as those where multiple scenarios
(with multiple events) are possible and detectability / dor 2 years, detected by overhaul task x
mancy plays a crucial role (as for redundant systems). In

5
that case Fault Tree Analysis and/or Event Trees may be
needed to determine exact probability and risk levels.
Preliminary Risk levels can be selected based on a Risk
Matrix like shown below, based on Mil. Std. 882.[25] The
higher the Risk level, the more justication and mitigation
is needed to provide evidence and lower the risk to an
acceptable level. High risk should be indicated to higher
level management, who are responsible for nal decisionmaking.
After this step the FMEA has become like a
FMECA.

Timing

The FMEA should be updated whenever:

A new cycle begins (new product/process)
Changes are made to the operating conditions
A change is made in the design
New regulations are instituted
Customer feedback indicates a problem

Emphasize problem prevention

Minimize late changes and associated cost
Catalyst for teamwork and idea exchange between
functions
Reduce the possibility of same kind of failure in future
Reduce impact on company prot margin
Improve production yield
Maximizes prot

8 Limitations
While FMEA identies important hazards in a system, its
results may not be comprehensive and the approach has
limitations.[26][27][28] In the healthcare context, FMEA
and other risk assessment methods, including SWIFT
(Structured What If Technique) and retrospective approaches, have been found to have limited validity when
used in isolation. Challenges around scoping and organisational boundaries appear to be a major factor in this
lack of validity.[26]

If used as a top-down tool, FMEA may only identify major failure modes in a system. Fault tree analysis (FTA)
is better suited for top-down analysis. When used as
6 Uses
a bottom-up tool FMEA can augment or complement
FTA and identify many more causes and failure modes
Development of system requirements that minimize resulting in top-level symptoms. It is not able to discover
the likelihood of failures.
complex failure modes involving multiple failures within
Development of designs and test systems to ensure a subsystem, or to report expected failure intervals of parthat the failures have been eliminated or the risk is ticular failure modes up to the upper level subsystem or
system.
reduced to acceptable level.
Additionally, the multiplication of the severity, occurrence and detection rankings may result in rank reversals,
where a less serious failure mode receives a higher RPN
To help with design choices (trade-o analysis).
than a more serious failure mode.[29] The reason for this
is that the rankings are ordinal scale numbers, and multiplication
is not dened for ordinal numbers. The ordinal
Advantages
rankings only say that one ranking is better or worse than
another, but not by how much. For instance, a ranking
Improve the quality, reliability and safety of a prodof 2 may not be twice as severe as a ranking of 1,
uct/process
or an 8 may not be twice as severe as a 4, but multiplication treats them as though they are. See Level of
Improve company image and competitiveness
measurement for further discussion. Various solutions to
Increase user satisfaction
this problems have been proposed, e.g., the use of fuzzy
logic as an alternative to classic RPN model. [30] [31]
Reduce system development time and cost
Besides, two shortcomings are (1) complexity of the
Collect information to reduce future failures, cap- FMEA worksheet ; (2) intricacy of its use. Entries in
ture engineering knowledge
a FMEA worksheet are voluminous. The FMEA worksheet is hard to produce, hard to understand and read, as
Reduce the potential for warranty concerns
well as hard to maintain. The use of neural network techEarly identication and elimination of potential fail- niques to cluster and visualise failure modes were sugure modes
gested, recently.[32][33]

Development and evaluation of diagnostic systems

11

Types
Functional: before design solutions are provided
(or only on high level) functions can be evaluated on
potential functional failure eects. General Mitigations (design to requirements) can be proposed to
limit consequence of functional failures or limit the
probability of occurrence in this early development.
It is based on a functional breakdown of a system.
This type may also be used for Software evaluation.
Concept Design / Hardware: analysis of systems
or subsystems in the early design concept stages to
analyse the failure mechanisms and lower level functional failures, specially to dierent concept solutions in more detail. It may be used in trade-o
studies.
Detailed Design / Hardware: analysis of products
prior to production. These are the most detailed
(in mil 1629 called Piece-Part or Hardware FMEA)
FMEAs and used to identify any possible hardware
(or other) failure mode up to the lowest part level.
It should be based on hardware breakdown (e.g. the
BoM = Bill of Material). Any Failure eect Severity, failure Prevention (Mitigation), Failure Detection and Diagnostics may be fully analyzed in this
FMEA.
Process: analysis of manufacturing and assembly
processes. Both quality and reliability may be affected from process faults. The input for this FMEA
is amongst others a work process / task Breakdown.

10

See also

11

References

[1] System Reliability Theory: Models, Statistical Methods,

and Applications, Marvin Rausand & Arnljot Hoylan, Wiley Series in probability and statisticssecond edition
2004, page 88
[2] Tay K. M.; Lim C.P. n On the use of fuzzy inference
techniques in assessment models: part II: industrial applications. Fuzzy Optimization and Decision Making.
doi:10.1007/s10700-008-9037-y.

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[32] Tay, Kai Meng; Jong, Chian Haur; Lim, Chee Peng (July
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12

12
12.1

TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

Text and image sources, contributors, and licenses

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12.2

Images

File:Commons-logo.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/4/4a/Commons-logo.svg License: PD Contributors: ? Original artist: ?

File:Edit-clear.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/f/f2/Edit-clear.svg License: Public domain Contributors: The
Tango! Desktop Project. Original artist:
The people from the Tango! project. And according to the meta-data in the le, specically: Andreas Nilsson, and Jakub Steiner (although
minimally).
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12.3

Content license

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