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Nicolas Malebranche, The Search After Truth, Book III, Part II, Chapter 3.
2: DIVINE PERFECTION
2.1 GODS PERFECTION
At the foundation of Leibnizs system is the idea that God is an absolutely perfect being. Of course,
this itself is not novel conception of God. God is the being that possesses all possible perfections to
the highest possible degree. You will recall that this is the basis of the Ontological Argument that we
saw in Meditation Five.
Descartes Ontological Argument
P1 Whenever I clearly and distinctly that some properties must belong to some idea,
we can be certain that those properties belong to the idea (i.e. we can be certain that
3 sidedness belongs to our idea of a triangle).
P2 I clearly and distinctly perceive that, because God is a being with all perfections,
existence is part of Gods essence.
C I can be certain that God exists.
Some have criticized P2 of this argument. How can we know for sure that we actually have a clear
and distinct idea of God? Is it actually coherent to think of a being with all perfections? Leibniz
notes that some things are not capable of a highest perfection.
We must also know what a perfection is. A fairly sure test for being a perfection is
that forms or natures that are not capable of a highest degree are not perfections, as
for example, the nature of number or figure. For the greatest of all numbers (or even
the number of all numbers, as well as the greatest of all figures, imply a contradiction
(1).
Things like numbers and figures cannot be perfections because we can always imagine a greater
number or a larger figure. However, there does not seem to be any contradiction in thinking about
perfections like omnipotence or omniscience.
but the greatest knowledge and omnipotence do not involve any impossibility.
Consequently, power and knowledge are perfections, and, insofar as they belong to
God, they do not have limits (1).
Importantly this also means that God is all omnibenevolent or all-good and that everything God
makes is excellent.
Whence it follows that God, possessing supreme and infinite wisdom, acts in the
most perfect manner, not only metaphysically, but also morally speaking, and that,
with respect to ourselves, we can say that the more enlightened and informed we are
about Gods works, the more we will be disposed to find them excellent and in
complete conformity with what we might have desired (1).
If this world was not the best, then that means God would not be perfect, because God could have
acted in a better fashion. Thus, this is the best possible world. We can outline Leibnizs argument
formally in the following manner.
Argument from Gods Perfection
P1 God is perfect in every way (God is omnibenevolent, omnipotent, and
omniscient) and created the world.
P2 If this world is not the best of all possible worlds, then God is imperfect.
C This world is the best of all possible worlds.
Some have rejected P1, but we will focus on P2 for the moment. Both Descartes and Leibniz
conceived of God as absolutely perfect. The support for this premise is based upon the idea that
God would have to lack some perfection for imperfection to exist in the world. If the world was not
perfect, and thus a better world is possible, then one of the following must be true.
(i) God must not be powerful enough to bring about a better world, or
(ii) God did not know that this world would not be the best, or
(iii) God did not want to make a better world, or
(iv) God did not create the world.
Thus, the world cannot be imperfect without God being imperfect in some way as well.
2.4 VOLTAIRES OBJECTION AND THEODICY
Leibnizs contention seems immediately absurd and has been the target of a great deal of criticism.
Famously, Voltaire mocked Leibnizs optimism in his novel Candide which pointed to all the seeming
imperfections of our world. This requires what is known as a theodicy, or an attempt to defend God
from the charge that God is responsible for the evil and imperfections in the world. Leibniz
responds to the criticism in the following way.
[S]carcely any will be found favoring the opinion of these moderns, an opinion
which is, in my judgment, unknown to all antiquity and which is based only on the
universe and of the hidden reasons for Gods conduct. This enables us to judge
audaciously that many things could have been better (3).
From our limited perspective it seems like things are imperfect, but if we could take a Gods-eye
point of view we would see this is a rash judgment. He gives further explanation to this point in On
the Ultimate Origination of Things.
We know but a small part of the eternity which extends without measure, for how
short is the memory of several thousand years which history gives us. But yet, from
such meager experience we rashly make judgments about the immense and the
eternal, like people born and raised in prison or, if you prefer, in the subterranean
saltmines of the Sarmatians, people who think that there is no light in the world but
the dim light of their torches, light scarcely sufficient to guide their steps. Look at the
very beautiful picture, and cover it up except for some small part. What will it look
like, but some confused combination of colors, without delight, without art; indeed
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the more closely we examine it the more it will look that way. But as soon as the
covering is removed, and you see the whole surface from an appropriate place, you
will understand that what looked like accidental splotches on the canvas were made
with consummate skill by the creator of the work (46).
Just as we cannot see the beauty of a work of art if we only consider one part of it, we also cannot
recognize the perfection of Gods creation from our limited perspective. Leibniz even goes on to
offer a positive reason why God would want to include evil in the world.
What the eyes discover in the painting, the ears discover in music. Indeed, the most
distinguished masters of composition quite often mix dissonances with consonances
in order to arouse the listener, and pierce him, as it were, so that, anxious about what
is to happen, the listener might feel all the more pleasure when order is soon
restored, just as we delight in small dangers or in the experience of misfortune for
the very feeling or manifestation they provide of our power or happiness, or just as
we delight in the spectacle of ropewalkers or sword dancing for their ability to incite
fear, or just as we ourselves laughingly half toss children, as if we are about to throw
them off (46-47).
There are cases where having painful or scary experiences actually increase our enjoyment overall.
Ultimately, the bad things in the universe make the good things better by contrast.
On that same principle it is insipid to always eat sweet things; sharp, acidic, and even
bitter tastes should be mixed in to stimulate the palate. He who hasnt tasted bitter
things hasnt earned sweet things, nor, indeed, will he appreciate them. Pleasure does
not derive from uniformity, for uniformity brings forth disgust and makes us dull,
not happy: this very principle is a law of delight (47).
2.5 DIVINE FREEDOM
Leibniz also addresses those who would argue that God cannot be free if God is not capable of
choosing to create a world other than this one (the best possible world).
They also believe that in this way they are able to safeguard Gods freedom, as
though it were not freedom of the highest sort to act in perfection following
sovereign reason (3).
Leibniz responds much how Descartes, in Meditation Four, to the idea that we are no longer free if
we only assent to clear and distinct ideas. The highest sort of freedom for God is not to act without
any reason (the freedom of indifference), but to be motivated to choose what is best.
For to believe that God does something without having any reason for his will
overlooking the fact this seems impossible is an opinion that conforms little to his
glory. Let us assume, for example, that God chooses between A and B and that he
takes A without having any reason to prefer it to B. I say that this action of God is at
the very least not praiseworthy; for all praise must be based on some reason, and by
hypothesis there is none here. Instead I hold that God does nothing for which he
does not deserve to be glorified (3).
God is the most free because God always does what is best and this is the basis upon which God
deserves our praise.
2.6 QUIETISM
We might think that if God always ensures that the best possible world will come about, then our
actions do not have any importance. Something like this was held by the quietists, followers of
Miguel Molinos (1640-1697), who held that we ought to sit in quiet contemplation of God totally
resigned to Gods will. Leibniz thought this doctrine was ridiculous.
As for the future, we must not be quietists and stand ridiculously with arms folded,
awaiting that which God will do, according to the sophism of the ancients called
logon aergon, the lazy reason. But we must act in accordance with what we presume to
be the will of God, insofar as we can judge it, trying with all our might to contribute
to the general good and especially to the embellishment and perfection of that which
affects us or that which is near us, that which is, so to speak, in our grasp (4).
in the universe, whether past, present , or future this has some resemblance to an
infinite perception or knowledge. And since all other substances in turn express this
substance and accommodate themselves to it, one can say that it extends its power
over all the others, in imitation of the creators omnipotence (9).
Because every individual substance is related to all other substances, each one of them contains
some mark of every other substance in the world. Leibniz describes each substance as representing
the universe from a different point of view and multiplies the glory of God.
circle all the properties that can be deduced from it. But it seems that this would
eliminate the difference between contingent and necessary truths, that there would
be no place for human freedom, and that an absolute fatalism would rule all our
actions as well as the other events of the world (12).
If the fact that Caesar will cross the Rubicon is already included in his complete concept, then it
does not seem that Caesar is free to choose not to cross the Rubicon.
5.3 NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY
Leibniz responds by pointing out that there are two different senses in which something can be
necessary: absolute necessity and hypothetical necessity (13).
Absolute Necessity Something is absolutely necessary when its contrary implies
a contradiction. It is contradictory for a triangle to have four sides, thus it is
absolutely necessary that triangles have three sides.
Hypothetical Necessity Something is hypothetically necessary if, although it
had to be a certain way, its contrary does not imply a contradiction. It is the case that
Barack Obama was reelected president in 2012 (and if Leibniz is correct, then it
could not have happened otherwise). However, there is no contradiction in thinking
Mitt Romney was elected president instead.
According to Leibniz, hypothetical necessities are certain to occur, but also contingent since their
contrary implies no contradiction. It is only hypothetically necessary that Caesar crossed the
Rubicon. This is important because it secures one of the three conditions that Leibniz says are
necessary for someone to be free.
1. Intelligence Someone does some action, A, intelligently if s/he does A for a reason and
with an understanding of what s/he is doing.
2. Spontaneity Someone does some action, A, spontaneously if s/he is the cause of A.
3. Contingency Some action, A, is contingent, if the contrary of that action does not imply
a contradiction.2
Under these conditions, then, we can say that Caesar was free when he crossed the Rubicon. He did
so intelligently (i.e. had a reason and understood the action), he was the source of the action (his
own body was the cause of the action), and the action was contingent.
5.4 IS THIS FREEDOM?
One problem here is that it does not actually seem like this captures what is essential about human
freedom. It is true that it is only hypothetically necessary that Caesar cross the Rubicon. However, if
Caesar exists, then Caesar must cross the Rubicon. Otherwise it would not be Caesar, it would be
2
Leibniz: Theodicy, trans. E.M. Huggard (Chicago and La Salle: Open Court 1990), 303.
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someone else. That means that the existence of every human necessitates that they must act in a
certain way.
5.5 FREEDOM AND THE BEST OF ALL POSSIBLE WORLDS
An additional problem stems from the fact that Leibniz believes that this is the best possible world
and, therefore, that God had to choose this world. This creates that same type of issue at another
level. It is true that it was only hypothetically necessary that God create this world, It is reasonable
and certain in almost the same way that God will always do the best, even though what is less
perfect does not imply a contradiction (14). However, it also seems that God could not have done
otherwise. Consequently, Alexander had to exist and, if he had to exist, then he had to cross the
Rubicon.
6: INTERSUBSTANTIAL INTERACTION
If each substance simply acts according to its own nature, or essence, then we might wonder how
Leibniz accounts for the interaction of different substances in his system. When someone says
hello to me I respond by saying hello back. Usually, we think that my response was (to some
extent) caused by the original statement. Or when we all see a rainbow and say beautiful! we see
that our actions correspond together nicely. However, if Leibniz is right, then every action I perform
is simply the product of my own essence. It should not really matter what other people do. Leibniz
first reminds us that God is still in control of this entire system.
Now, first of all, it is very evident that created substances depend upon God, who
preserves them and who even produces them continually by a kind of emanation,
just as we produce our thoughts (15).
Leibniz explains that God coordinates everything so that substances interact with one another in a
way that makes sense despite the fact that each substance is like a world apart (15).
Nevertheless, it is very true that the perceptions or expressions of all substances
mutually correspond in such a way that each one, carefully following certain reasons
or laws it has observed, coincides with others doing the same in the same way that
several people who have agreed to meet in some place at some specified time can
really do this if they so desire [] In just the same way, several spectators believe
that they are seeing the same thing and agree among themselves about it, even
though each sees and speaks in accordance with his view (15).
Leibniz is quite clear that the substances are not responsible for the interactions that occur between
them. Rather, God simply ensures that substances will correspond in a regular way.
[I]f I were capable of considering distinctly everything that happens or appears to me
at this time, I could see in it everything that will ever happen or appear to me. This
would never fail, and it would happen to me regardless, even if everything outside of
me were destroyed, provided there remained only God and me (16).
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In section 15 Leibniz explains the action of one substance upon another as the increase and
diminution of expression of the various substances.
Therefore, when a change takes place by which several substances are affected (in
fact every change affects all of them), I believe one may say that the substance which
immediately passes to a greater degree of perfection or to a more perfect expression
excercises its power and acts, and the substance which passes to a lesser degree
shows its weakness and is acted upon (16-17).
We will see when we read Leibnizs Monadology that he uses a similar sort of strategy to account for
the interaction between mind and body.
Briefly returning to the issue of miracles in section 16, Leibniz points out that we can still call certain
things miraculous even though every action in the universe is already included in our complete
concept.
Thus, in order that my words may be as irreproachable as my meaning, it would be
good to connect certain ways of speaking with certain thoughts. We could call that
which includes everything we express our essence or idea; since this expresses our
union with God himself, it has no limits and nothing surpasses it. But that which is
limited in us could be called our nature or our power; and in that sense, that which
surpasses the natures of all created substances is supernatural (18).
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