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UNIT 1: RATIONALISM

HANDOUT 11: LEIBNIZS DISCOURSE ON METAPHYSICS, SECTIONS 1-16


1: OCCASIONALISM
Another answer to the mind-body problem, which influenced Leibnizs work in important ways, is
given by Nicolas Malebranche in The Search After Truth (1674-1675). Malebranche held that our
common sense view of causation is misleading.
This is why everyone concludes that a moving ball meeting another is the true and
principal cause of the motion it communicates to the other, and that the souls will is
the true and principal cause of motion of the arm, and other such similar prejudices,
because it always happens that a ball moves when it is struck by another, that our
arms move every time we want them to, and that we do no sensibly see what could
be the cause of these motions.1
We commonly think that we have an immediate knowledge of causal powers. However,
Malebranche points out that all we really have is an awareness that certain aspects of our experience
always occur together (i.e. my desire to move my arm and the movement of my arm). In fact we
have the same evidence for causal powers between our will and bodily movements that we do for
the following examples.
For example: a comet appears and afterwards a prince dies; stones are exposed to the
moon and they are eaten by worms; the sun is in conjunction with Mars at the birth
of a child and something extraordinary happens to the child.
However, we do not say that in these cases there is causal power occurring between, for instance,
the situation of the planets and the future of a child. Consequently, we should not suppose we know
the causal connection between two billiard balls or our mind and body. Instead, Malebranche holds
that we should think of causation in the following way.
Finally, they should not judge that a moving ball is the true and principal cause of the
motion of the ball it finds in its path, since the former ball does not have the power
to move itself. They can only judge that the collision of two balls is the occasion for
the Author of all the motion of matter to execute the decree of his will, which is the
universal cause of all things. This he does by communicating to the second ball part
of the motion of the first that is, to speak more clearly, by willing that the latter ball
should acquire as much motion in the same direction as the former loses for the
motive force of bodies can only be the will of the one who preserves them, as we
shall show elsewhere.
Malebranche holds that all causes are occasional causes. When one billiard ball strikes another and the
second ball moves, the first ball did not exert causal power on the second. Instead, this is simply the
occasion that God chose to bring about certain events. The same holds for interaction between our
mind and body. We will see the Leibniz holds a similar sort of view.
1

Nicolas Malebranche, The Search After Truth, Book III, Part II, Chapter 3.

2: DIVINE PERFECTION
2.1 GODS PERFECTION
At the foundation of Leibnizs system is the idea that God is an absolutely perfect being. Of course,
this itself is not novel conception of God. God is the being that possesses all possible perfections to
the highest possible degree. You will recall that this is the basis of the Ontological Argument that we
saw in Meditation Five.
Descartes Ontological Argument
P1 Whenever I clearly and distinctly that some properties must belong to some idea,
we can be certain that those properties belong to the idea (i.e. we can be certain that
3 sidedness belongs to our idea of a triangle).
P2 I clearly and distinctly perceive that, because God is a being with all perfections,
existence is part of Gods essence.
C I can be certain that God exists.
Some have criticized P2 of this argument. How can we know for sure that we actually have a clear
and distinct idea of God? Is it actually coherent to think of a being with all perfections? Leibniz
notes that some things are not capable of a highest perfection.
We must also know what a perfection is. A fairly sure test for being a perfection is
that forms or natures that are not capable of a highest degree are not perfections, as
for example, the nature of number or figure. For the greatest of all numbers (or even
the number of all numbers, as well as the greatest of all figures, imply a contradiction
(1).
Things like numbers and figures cannot be perfections because we can always imagine a greater
number or a larger figure. However, there does not seem to be any contradiction in thinking about
perfections like omnipotence or omniscience.
but the greatest knowledge and omnipotence do not involve any impossibility.
Consequently, power and knowledge are perfections, and, insofar as they belong to
God, they do not have limits (1).
Importantly this also means that God is all omnibenevolent or all-good and that everything God
makes is excellent.
Whence it follows that God, possessing supreme and infinite wisdom, acts in the
most perfect manner, not only metaphysically, but also morally speaking, and that,
with respect to ourselves, we can say that the more enlightened and informed we are
about Gods works, the more we will be disposed to find them excellent and in
complete conformity with what we might have desired (1).

2.2 VOLUNTARISM AND INTELLECTUALISM


What is it that makes Gods creation good? There are two answers here: voluntarism and intellectualism.
Voluntarism The world is good because God made it.
Intellectualism God made the world because it is good.
Here we see Leibniz address a question that was made famous in Platos dialogue Euthyphro. Leibniz
makes clear that he supports the latter view.
Thus I am far removed from the opinion of those who maintain that there are no
rules of goodness and perfection in the nature of things or in the ideas God has of
them and who say that the works of God are good solely for the formal reason that
God has made them (2).
Leibniz holds that God decided to make the world the way it is because this world is objectively
good in itself. The goodness of this world was the reason God choose to make it. If we adopted the
voluntarist option, then it does not seem there would be any reason to praise God.
Thus, in saying that things are not good by virtue of any rule of goodness but solely
by virtue of the will of God, it seems to me that we unknowingly destroy all of Gods
love and all his glory. For why praise him for what he has done if he would be
equally praiseworthy in doing the exact contrary? Where will his justice and wisdom
reside if there remains only a certain despotic power, if will holds the place of reason,
and if, according to the definition of tyrants, justice consists in whatever pleases the
most powerful (2)?
Voluntarism makes God seem like an arbitrary dictator rather than a benevolent creator. The
goodness of this world, then, is explained by Gods understanding not by his will.
[I]nstead, it seems to me, they are only the consequences of this understanding,
which, assuredly, does not depend on his will, any more than does his essence (2).
2.3 THE BEST POSSIBLE WORLD
One of the potentially surprising consequences of the claim that God is perfect, is that the world we
live in is the best possible world.
Nor can I approve of the opinion of some moderns who maintain boldly that what
God has made is not of the highest perfection and that he could have done much
better. For it seems to me that the consequences of this opinion are wholly contrary
to the glory of God: as a lesser evil is relatively good, so a lesser good is relatively
evil. And to act with less perfection than one could have is to act imperfectly (3).

If this world was not the best, then that means God would not be perfect, because God could have
acted in a better fashion. Thus, this is the best possible world. We can outline Leibnizs argument
formally in the following manner.
Argument from Gods Perfection
P1 God is perfect in every way (God is omnibenevolent, omnipotent, and
omniscient) and created the world.
P2 If this world is not the best of all possible worlds, then God is imperfect.
C This world is the best of all possible worlds.
Some have rejected P1, but we will focus on P2 for the moment. Both Descartes and Leibniz
conceived of God as absolutely perfect. The support for this premise is based upon the idea that
God would have to lack some perfection for imperfection to exist in the world. If the world was not
perfect, and thus a better world is possible, then one of the following must be true.
(i) God must not be powerful enough to bring about a better world, or
(ii) God did not know that this world would not be the best, or
(iii) God did not want to make a better world, or
(iv) God did not create the world.
Thus, the world cannot be imperfect without God being imperfect in some way as well.
2.4 VOLTAIRES OBJECTION AND THEODICY
Leibnizs contention seems immediately absurd and has been the target of a great deal of criticism.
Famously, Voltaire mocked Leibnizs optimism in his novel Candide which pointed to all the seeming
imperfections of our world. This requires what is known as a theodicy, or an attempt to defend God
from the charge that God is responsible for the evil and imperfections in the world. Leibniz
responds to the criticism in the following way.
[S]carcely any will be found favoring the opinion of these moderns, an opinion
which is, in my judgment, unknown to all antiquity and which is based only on the
universe and of the hidden reasons for Gods conduct. This enables us to judge
audaciously that many things could have been better (3).
From our limited perspective it seems like things are imperfect, but if we could take a Gods-eye
point of view we would see this is a rash judgment. He gives further explanation to this point in On
the Ultimate Origination of Things.
We know but a small part of the eternity which extends without measure, for how
short is the memory of several thousand years which history gives us. But yet, from
such meager experience we rashly make judgments about the immense and the
eternal, like people born and raised in prison or, if you prefer, in the subterranean
saltmines of the Sarmatians, people who think that there is no light in the world but
the dim light of their torches, light scarcely sufficient to guide their steps. Look at the
very beautiful picture, and cover it up except for some small part. What will it look
like, but some confused combination of colors, without delight, without art; indeed
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the more closely we examine it the more it will look that way. But as soon as the
covering is removed, and you see the whole surface from an appropriate place, you
will understand that what looked like accidental splotches on the canvas were made
with consummate skill by the creator of the work (46).
Just as we cannot see the beauty of a work of art if we only consider one part of it, we also cannot
recognize the perfection of Gods creation from our limited perspective. Leibniz even goes on to
offer a positive reason why God would want to include evil in the world.
What the eyes discover in the painting, the ears discover in music. Indeed, the most
distinguished masters of composition quite often mix dissonances with consonances
in order to arouse the listener, and pierce him, as it were, so that, anxious about what
is to happen, the listener might feel all the more pleasure when order is soon
restored, just as we delight in small dangers or in the experience of misfortune for
the very feeling or manifestation they provide of our power or happiness, or just as
we delight in the spectacle of ropewalkers or sword dancing for their ability to incite
fear, or just as we ourselves laughingly half toss children, as if we are about to throw
them off (46-47).
There are cases where having painful or scary experiences actually increase our enjoyment overall.
Ultimately, the bad things in the universe make the good things better by contrast.
On that same principle it is insipid to always eat sweet things; sharp, acidic, and even
bitter tastes should be mixed in to stimulate the palate. He who hasnt tasted bitter
things hasnt earned sweet things, nor, indeed, will he appreciate them. Pleasure does
not derive from uniformity, for uniformity brings forth disgust and makes us dull,
not happy: this very principle is a law of delight (47).
2.5 DIVINE FREEDOM
Leibniz also addresses those who would argue that God cannot be free if God is not capable of
choosing to create a world other than this one (the best possible world).
They also believe that in this way they are able to safeguard Gods freedom, as
though it were not freedom of the highest sort to act in perfection following
sovereign reason (3).
Leibniz responds much how Descartes, in Meditation Four, to the idea that we are no longer free if
we only assent to clear and distinct ideas. The highest sort of freedom for God is not to act without
any reason (the freedom of indifference), but to be motivated to choose what is best.
For to believe that God does something without having any reason for his will
overlooking the fact this seems impossible is an opinion that conforms little to his
glory. Let us assume, for example, that God chooses between A and B and that he
takes A without having any reason to prefer it to B. I say that this action of God is at
the very least not praiseworthy; for all praise must be based on some reason, and by

hypothesis there is none here. Instead I hold that God does nothing for which he
does not deserve to be glorified (3).
God is the most free because God always does what is best and this is the basis upon which God
deserves our praise.
2.6 QUIETISM
We might think that if God always ensures that the best possible world will come about, then our
actions do not have any importance. Something like this was held by the quietists, followers of
Miguel Molinos (1640-1697), who held that we ought to sit in quiet contemplation of God totally
resigned to Gods will. Leibniz thought this doctrine was ridiculous.
As for the future, we must not be quietists and stand ridiculously with arms folded,
awaiting that which God will do, according to the sophism of the ancients called
logon aergon, the lazy reason. But we must act in accordance with what we presume to
be the will of God, insofar as we can judge it, trying with all our might to contribute
to the general good and especially to the embellishment and perfection of that which
affects us or that which is near us, that which is, so to speak, in our grasp (4).

3: MIRACLES AND THE ORDER OF THE UNIVERSE


After establishing that this is the best of all possible worlds, Leibniz moves to considering how the
perfection of Gods creation is demonstrated in the order of the universe.
3.1 SIMPLICITY OF MEANS AND RICHNESS OF EFFECTS
Leibniz notes that it is characteristic of excellent designers that they act in the most efficient way
possible.
We can therefore say that one who acts perfectly is similar to an excellent geometer
who can find the best constructions for a problem; or to a good architect who makes
us of his location and the funds set aside for building in the most advantageous
manner, allowing nothing improper or lacking in the beauty of which it is capable
(5).
Similarly, God will act in a similar way. God will not just produce the best world but do so in the
most elegant and beautiful way possible.
As for the simplicity of the ways of God, this holds properly with respect to his
means, as opposed to the variety, richness, and abundance, which holds with respect
to his ends or effects (5).
Gods actions are characterized by simple means and a great wealth of effects. Namely, God makes
use of a limited number of physical laws which govern the universe but produce a wide abundance
of diverse occurrences and beings.
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3.2 THE REGULARITY OF THE UNIVERSE


Not only is the universe that God creates governed by general laws, but also by regularity. Even
miracles are part of the general order of the universe.
The volitions or acts of God are commonly divided into ordinary and extraordinary.
But it is good to consider that God does nothing which is not orderly. Thus, what
passes for extraordinary only with respect to some particular order established
among creatures; for everything is in conformity with the universal order (5-6).
It may seem to us to be a miraculous event, which subverts the laws of nature, but in reality
it is simply a manifestation of the general laws of the universe. Thus,
[M]iracles are as much within the order as are natural operations, operations which
are called natural because they are in conformity with certain subordinate maxims
that we call the nature of things (7).
The way things usually happen is simply a subordinate maxim. These are the means that are
generally employed by God to bring about certain ends, but God can choose to go against
these customs where necessary. However, this does not mean that things do not occur
according to some orderly plan.
Furthermore, this provides Leibniz a way of further supporting his claim that God is all good.
We can say also that God wills everything that is an object of his particular volition.
But we must make a distinction with respect to the objects of his general volition,
such as the actions of other creatures, particularly the actions of those that are
reasonable, actions with which God wishes to concur. For, if the action is good in
itself, we can say that God wills it and sometimes commands it, even when it does
not take place. But if the action is evil in itself and becomes good only by accident,
because the course of things (particularly punishment and atonement) corrects its
evilness and repays the evil with interest in such as way that in the end there is more
perfection in the whole sequence than if the evil had not occurred, then we must say
that God permits this but does not will it (7).
God does not will the evil that occurs. He simply permits it to occur in the universe because
it increases the overall perfection of the universe.

4: LEIBNIZ ON INDIVIDUAL SUBSTANCES


Leibniz next considers the question of how we distinguish individual creatures (such as you or I)
from God. Recall that for an occasionalist like Malebranche, this will be difficult to explain, because
all actions are ultimately caused by God: some believe that God does everything, while others
imagine that he merely conserves the force he has given to creatures (7). It might seem that Leibniz
encounters a similar problem insofar as God is ultimate responsible for everything that happens in
the universe.

4.1 SUBSTANCE AND PREDICATION


Leibniz defines individual substance in the following way.
It is indeed true that when several predicates are attributed to a single subject and
this subject is attributed to no other, it is called an individual substance (7-8).
For instance, Ryan is an individual substance. Ryan has a number of attributes: 63, 225 pounds,
brown hair, blue eyes, etc. However, Ryan is not an attribute of anything else. However, this still
leaves the question of what it means for something to be attributed to a subject.
Now it is evident that all true predication has some basis in the nature of things and
that, when a proposition is not an identity, that is, when the predicate is not explicitly
contained in the subject, it must be contained in it virtually (8).
In some cases it is obvious how the predicate is contained in the subject. The subject triangle
obviously contains the predicate of having three sides because that is simply in the definition of
triangle. However, even in cases where this connection is not so obvious Leibniz still thinks that
predicates relate to their subjects in the same way.
Thus, the subject term must always contain the predicate term, so that one who
understands perfectly the notion of the subject would also know that the predicate
belongs to it (8).
Understanding the point that Leibniz is making here requires understanding the difference between
analytic and synthetic truths.
Analytic Truths Statements that are true in virtue of their meaning. Generally we
think the statement all triangles have three sides is analytically true.
Synthetic Truths Statements that are true in virtue of their relation to the world.
It is common to think that a statement such as Ryan is over six feet tall is
synthetically true.
If what Leibniz is saying here is true, then all true statements are actually analytically true. We can
understand all the predicates that apply to some subject by (at least in principle) considering its
essence. This has some rather surprising consequences.
On the other hand, God, seeing Alexanders individual notion or haecceity, sees in it
at the same time the basis and reason for all the predicates which can be truly said of
him, for example, that he vanquished Darius and Porus; he even knows a priori (and
not by experience) whether he died a natural death or whether he was poisoned,
something we can know only through history. Thus, when we consider carefully the
connection of things, we can say that from all time in Alexanders soul there are
vestiges of everything that has happened to him and marks of everything that will
happen to him and even traces of everything that happens in the universe, even
though God alone could recognize them all (8).
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That means the following proposition is analytically true.


Alexander the Great will defeat Darius and Porus.
In principle, this is something that could be known by God without any experience of Alexander the
Great, just from considering his essence. However, human beings (because of our limitations have
to learn this from history). Yet, it would still be possible to know this a priori (without any
experience) if we truly understood the concept of Alexander, just like we know that a triangle has
three sides by understanding the essence of triangle.
4.2 INDIVIDUAL SUBSTANCE AND GODS PERFECTION
Why does Leibniz hold this rather strange view of individual substance? In large measure it seems
that it is necessary to preserve the idea that God is perfect. For Leibniz, as for Descartes, the most
perfect model of knowledge is mathematical or logical (2+2=4). Not only is this certain, but also we
know it by a pure intuition. It is only because we are imperfect that we have to know other
knowledge historically and through experience. God, however, because God is perfect, knows
everything through pure intuition.
4.3 COMPLETE CONCEPTS
Thus, having knowledge of a substance means having knowledge of its complete concept.
Complete Concept A concept of a substance including every property it will
ever have and every relation it will ever be in.
Leibniz notes that the following is one of the consequences of the view that substances are defined
by there complete concepts.
[I]t follows that it is not true that two substances can resemble each other completely
and differ only in number, and that what Saint Thomas asserts on this point about
angels or intelligences (that here every individual is a lowest species) is true of all
substances (9).
If two individual substances completely resemble one another, then they are necessarily identical.
Furthermore, Leibniz explains that every substance contains in it everything that happens in the
entire universe.
Moreover, every substance is like a complete world and like a mirror of God or of
the whole universe, which each one expresses in its own way, somewhat as the city is
variously represented depending upon the different positions from which it is
viewed. Thus the universe is in some way multiplied as many times as there are
substances, and the glory of God is likewise multiplied by as many different
representations of his work. It can even be said that every substance bears in some
way the character of Gods infinite wisdom and omnipotence and imitates him as
much as it is capable. For it expresses, however confusedly, everything that happens
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in the universe, whether past, present , or future this has some resemblance to an
infinite perception or knowledge. And since all other substances in turn express this
substance and accommodate themselves to it, one can say that it extends its power
over all the others, in imitation of the creators omnipotence (9).
Because every individual substance is related to all other substances, each one of them contains
some mark of every other substance in the world. Leibniz describes each substance as representing
the universe from a different point of view and multiplies the glory of God.

5: SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION AND FREEDOM


Leibniz responds to two potential objects that one might make of his notion of substance: (i) that is
undermines scientific explanation and (ii) that it makes human freedom impossible.
5.1 SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION
We might worry that Leibnizs notion of individual substance will cause us to revert back to an old
way of explaining things. In the Medieval period it was common to use essences to explain
occurrences in the natural world. For instance, the rock fell downward because it is the nature of
material bodies to move downward. However, with the new science that came about in this period
we now appeal to laws of nature (such as the law of gravity) to explain the motion of bodies. Leibniz
agrees the former sort of explanation is outdated.
This is where the Scholastics failed, as did the physicians of the past who followed
their example, believing that they could account for the properties of bodies by taling
about forms and qualities without taking the trouble to examine their manner of
operation. It is as if we were content to say that the a clock has a quality of clockness
derived from its form without considering in what all of this consists (10).
The worry is that we will do the same thing when explaining human actions give Leibnizs view. If
we ask Why did Caesar cross the Rubicon? the answer we give would be because it is part of
Caesars essence instead of something like as an act of war. Leibniz, however, does not think that
his theory of individual substance requires this rather extreme result.
And if he uses Gods concourse, or else a soul, animating force, or something else of
this nature, he is raving just as much as the person who, in the course of an
important practical deliberation, enters into a lofty discussion concerning the nature
of destiny and the nature of freedom (10).
5.2 A DILEMMA ABOUT FREEDOM
One of the major problems that Leibniz has to confront at this point deals with how free will can
exist if each substances concept contains every predicate that can ever be attributed to it.
We have said that the notion of an individual substance includes once and for all
everything that can ever happen to it and that, by considering this notion, one can
see there everything that can truly be said of it, just as we can see in the nature of a
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circle all the properties that can be deduced from it. But it seems that this would
eliminate the difference between contingent and necessary truths, that there would
be no place for human freedom, and that an absolute fatalism would rule all our
actions as well as the other events of the world (12).
If the fact that Caesar will cross the Rubicon is already included in his complete concept, then it
does not seem that Caesar is free to choose not to cross the Rubicon.
5.3 NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY
Leibniz responds by pointing out that there are two different senses in which something can be
necessary: absolute necessity and hypothetical necessity (13).
Absolute Necessity Something is absolutely necessary when its contrary implies
a contradiction. It is contradictory for a triangle to have four sides, thus it is
absolutely necessary that triangles have three sides.
Hypothetical Necessity Something is hypothetically necessary if, although it
had to be a certain way, its contrary does not imply a contradiction. It is the case that
Barack Obama was reelected president in 2012 (and if Leibniz is correct, then it
could not have happened otherwise). However, there is no contradiction in thinking
Mitt Romney was elected president instead.
According to Leibniz, hypothetical necessities are certain to occur, but also contingent since their
contrary implies no contradiction. It is only hypothetically necessary that Caesar crossed the
Rubicon. This is important because it secures one of the three conditions that Leibniz says are
necessary for someone to be free.
1. Intelligence Someone does some action, A, intelligently if s/he does A for a reason and
with an understanding of what s/he is doing.
2. Spontaneity Someone does some action, A, spontaneously if s/he is the cause of A.
3. Contingency Some action, A, is contingent, if the contrary of that action does not imply
a contradiction.2
Under these conditions, then, we can say that Caesar was free when he crossed the Rubicon. He did
so intelligently (i.e. had a reason and understood the action), he was the source of the action (his
own body was the cause of the action), and the action was contingent.
5.4 IS THIS FREEDOM?
One problem here is that it does not actually seem like this captures what is essential about human
freedom. It is true that it is only hypothetically necessary that Caesar cross the Rubicon. However, if
Caesar exists, then Caesar must cross the Rubicon. Otherwise it would not be Caesar, it would be
2

Leibniz: Theodicy, trans. E.M. Huggard (Chicago and La Salle: Open Court 1990), 303.

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someone else. That means that the existence of every human necessitates that they must act in a
certain way.
5.5 FREEDOM AND THE BEST OF ALL POSSIBLE WORLDS
An additional problem stems from the fact that Leibniz believes that this is the best possible world
and, therefore, that God had to choose this world. This creates that same type of issue at another
level. It is true that it was only hypothetically necessary that God create this world, It is reasonable
and certain in almost the same way that God will always do the best, even though what is less
perfect does not imply a contradiction (14). However, it also seems that God could not have done
otherwise. Consequently, Alexander had to exist and, if he had to exist, then he had to cross the
Rubicon.

6: INTERSUBSTANTIAL INTERACTION
If each substance simply acts according to its own nature, or essence, then we might wonder how
Leibniz accounts for the interaction of different substances in his system. When someone says
hello to me I respond by saying hello back. Usually, we think that my response was (to some
extent) caused by the original statement. Or when we all see a rainbow and say beautiful! we see
that our actions correspond together nicely. However, if Leibniz is right, then every action I perform
is simply the product of my own essence. It should not really matter what other people do. Leibniz
first reminds us that God is still in control of this entire system.
Now, first of all, it is very evident that created substances depend upon God, who
preserves them and who even produces them continually by a kind of emanation,
just as we produce our thoughts (15).
Leibniz explains that God coordinates everything so that substances interact with one another in a
way that makes sense despite the fact that each substance is like a world apart (15).
Nevertheless, it is very true that the perceptions or expressions of all substances
mutually correspond in such a way that each one, carefully following certain reasons
or laws it has observed, coincides with others doing the same in the same way that
several people who have agreed to meet in some place at some specified time can
really do this if they so desire [] In just the same way, several spectators believe
that they are seeing the same thing and agree among themselves about it, even
though each sees and speaks in accordance with his view (15).
Leibniz is quite clear that the substances are not responsible for the interactions that occur between
them. Rather, God simply ensures that substances will correspond in a regular way.
[I]f I were capable of considering distinctly everything that happens or appears to me
at this time, I could see in it everything that will ever happen or appear to me. This
would never fail, and it would happen to me regardless, even if everything outside of
me were destroyed, provided there remained only God and me (16).

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In section 15 Leibniz explains the action of one substance upon another as the increase and
diminution of expression of the various substances.
Therefore, when a change takes place by which several substances are affected (in
fact every change affects all of them), I believe one may say that the substance which
immediately passes to a greater degree of perfection or to a more perfect expression
excercises its power and acts, and the substance which passes to a lesser degree
shows its weakness and is acted upon (16-17).
We will see when we read Leibnizs Monadology that he uses a similar sort of strategy to account for
the interaction between mind and body.
Briefly returning to the issue of miracles in section 16, Leibniz points out that we can still call certain
things miraculous even though every action in the universe is already included in our complete
concept.
Thus, in order that my words may be as irreproachable as my meaning, it would be
good to connect certain ways of speaking with certain thoughts. We could call that
which includes everything we express our essence or idea; since this expresses our
union with God himself, it has no limits and nothing surpasses it. But that which is
limited in us could be called our nature or our power; and in that sense, that which
surpasses the natures of all created substances is supernatural (18).

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