EN BANC

the rent which it produced or might produce until the delivery of the same, and to pay to
the plaintiff the sum of P8,000 and the half of the rent which the other piece of property

March 27, 1916

G.R. No. 10580

TEODORO DE LOS REYES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MAXIMINO PATERNO, administrator of the estate of Tomas G. del Rosario
deceased, defendant-appellant.

JOHNSON, J.:

may have produced or may produce up to the time of the death of the deceased, Tomas G.
del Rosario.

From that conclusion the defendant appealed to this court and made several assignments
of error the most important of which, and the one which is our judgment shows that the
lower court committed an error in its conclusions, is assignment No. 5. Said assignment is
that the lower court "erred in not holding that the decree of the Court of Land Registration,
copied in plaintiff's Exhibit C, is res judicata against the plaintiff; and that the two
certificates of title of the properties that are the subject matter of the complaint, issued in

This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila on the 7th of

behalf of Tomas G. de Rosario by virtue of said decree, are conclusive and decisive proof

February, 1914. The purpose of the action on the part of the plaintiff was to be declared

against the plaintiff."

the owner of one-half of two lots or parcels of land located in the district of Santa Cruz in
the city of Manila, to require the defendant to render an account of the administration of
said lots or parcels of land, and to obtain a judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against
the defendant for whatever amount said rendition of accounts shows the plaintiff was
entitled to.

To the petition the defendant filed a general and special answer. In his general answer he
denied each and all of the material allegations alleged in the complaint. In his special
defense he alleged that the said Tomas G. Del Rosario, at the time of his death, was the
sole and only owner of said lots or parcels of land.

Upon the issue thus presented and after hearing the evidence adduced during the trial of
the cause, the court a quo rendered a judgment in which he ordered the defendant to
deliver to the plaintiff one-half of one of said parcels of land, together with the one-half of

1 | SUCCESSION

If it is true that during the lifetime of Tomas G. del Rosario he obtained a Torrens title for
the lots or parcels of land in question, and if that judgment or decree of the Court of Land
Registration became final, or if more than one year had elapsed after the decree then his
title is unimpeachable and can not be annulled or set aside, even for fraud.

As was noted above, the present action was commenced on the 7th of February, 1914.
During the trial of the cause the defendant presented as proof Exhibit C. An examination of
Exhibit C shows the following facts:

First. That the said Tomas G. del Rosario presented a petition in the Court of Land
Registration on the 24th of April, 1909, for the registration under the Torrens system of two
parcels of land. There is no dispute that the two parcels of land described in said petition
for registration are exactly the same parcels of land in litigation in the present action.

Second. Said Exhibit C further shows that on the 21st of September, 1909, the judge of the

On June 3, 1900, the said Concepcion del Rosario y Reyes also died, at the age of nine

Court of Land Registration, after considering the petition, rendered the following decree,

years, according to the death certificate Exhibit F, and was succeeded in all her rights and

ordering said parcels of land to be registered in the name of Tomas G. del Rosario, in

actions, and in respect to one-half of the property, by the said applicant, Tomas G. del

accordance with the provisions of Act No. 496:

Rosario, who was already the owner of the other half of the property.

Two properties are described in the application, both urban; the first is a parcel of land

After general notice of default, the adjudication and registration of the property in question

situated on Calle Curtidor, district of Santa Cruz, city of Manila, and includes the building

is decreed (10 a. m.) in the name of the applicant, Tomas G. del Rosario.

thereon constructed of strong materials; and the other is a piece of land on Calle Asuncion,
district of San Nicolas, city of Manila, which includes the building, also of strong materials,
thereon.

The applicant has presented documentary and parol evidence, the former consisting of the
documents, all of which are public, on file in this case, and the latter, of the testimony of
witnesses. From the said documents and from the certified copy issued by the register of
deeds of Manila on July 17, 1907, of the entry made in the old property registry, it is
deduced that these properties have been the subject of successive and legal conveyances
since the year 1879, until they were acquired by the applicant in August and September,
1891, by purchase, during his conjugal partnership, now dissolved, with his wife, Juana
Reyes y Reyes, and that the ownership of both properties was recorded in the said property

Let a translation be made of the stenographic notes taken of the testimony of the
witnesses, and attached to the record of the proceedings.

In the margin of the entries of registration, which, on folio 34 of volume 4 of the section of
Quiapo, and 9 of the register, property No. 131, registration No. 3, and folio 115 of volume
7 of the section of Binondo, property No. 314, appears in the names of Tomas G. del
Rosario y Tongco and his daughter, Concepcion Crispina Dorotea Severina del Rosario y
Reyes, let record be made by the register of deeds of the city of Manila, that the properties
to which said entries refer have been adjudicated to Tomas G. del Rosario, in accordance
with Act No. 496.

MANILA, September 21, 1909.

registry in the name of the aforementioned Tomas G. del Rosario, as the representative of
the said partnership.

From the 21st of September, 1909, until the 7th of February, 1914, much more than one
year elapsed. The title, therefore, of Tomas G. del Rosario was absolute and complete. The

Upon the death of Juana Reyes y Reyes, who died intestate, Concepcion Crispina Dorotea
Severina del Rosario y Reyes, a daughter of the marriage of the deceased with the
applicant, Tomas G. del Rosario, was declared to be the sold heir of decedent by the Court
of First Instance of the district of Quiapo in a decree of February 20, 1892.

failure of the plaintiff, if he ever had any interest or title in said land, to appear and oppose
the registration of the same in the name of Tomas G. del Rosario or to question the
registration in his name during a period of one year after the certificate of title had been
issued, operates to exclude him forever from questioning the title granted under the
Torrens system. (Sec. 38, Act No. 496; Cuyugan and Lim Tuico vs. Sy Quia, 24 Phil. Rep.,
567; Maloles vs. Director of Lands, 25 Phil. Rep., 548.)

2 | SUCCESSION

The plaintiff having lost his right to claim any interest in the lots or parcels of land in

and Gregorio, legitimate children by his first wife Julia Quillos; and Eli Rodriguez, legitimate

question, by virtue of his (a) failure to present any opposition to the registration of the

son by his second wife Ruperta A. Vda. de Rodriguez. After his death sometime in 1924,

same under the Torrens system in favor of Tomas G. del Rosario, or (b) to question the

proceedings for the administration and settlement of his estate was instituted in the Court

validity of such registration within a period of one year thereafter he has forever lost his

of First Instance of Occidental Negros (Special Proceedings No. 2758). On 24 March 1924

right therein, if he ever had any.

the heirs executed an agreement of partition and submitted it to the probate court for
approval. After approval, the heirs took possession of their respective shares.

Therefore the judgment of the lower court is hereby reversed and the defendant is
absolved from all liability under the complaint, and without any finding as to costs, it is so

The real estate awarded to Eli Rodriguez are the following: (1) 1/15 share in Lots Nos. 846,

ordered.

848 and 965; (2) Lot No. 847; and (3) Lot No. 951, all of the Cadastral Survey of La Carlota.
These parcels of land are planted to sugar cane and the produce milled at the Central
Azucarera de La Carlota. Upon the enactment of Act No. 4166, known as the Sugar

EN BANC

Limitation Law, on 4 December 1934, a quota of 596.26 piculs of sugar, divided into
export, consumer, and emergency reserve, manufactured from the sugar cane grown

August 30, 1957

therein, was allocated to the said parcels of land.

G.R. No. L-9234

On 19 May 1942 Eli Rodriguez died intestate, single and without issue in O'Donnel

INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ELI RODRIGUEZ.

concentration camp, Capas, Tarlac. On 28 December 1945 his mother Ruperta A. Vda. de

SAMSON RODRIGUEZ, ET AL., movants-appellants,

Rodriguez commenced proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros for

vs.

the administration and settlement of the deceased and prayed that after hearing she be

RUPERTA A. VDA. DE RODRIGUEZ, administratix-appellee,

appointed administratrix of the estate of the deceased; that she be exempted from filing a

RUPERTA A VDA. DE RODRIGUEZ, administratix-appellant,

vs.
SAMSON RODRIGUEZ, ET AL., movants-appellees.

PADILLA, J.:

bond; and that she be declared the sole heir of the deceased (Special Proceedings No.
220). On 23 September 1954 Samson Rodriguez, Juanita Rodriguez, Inicerio Rodriguez,
Gregorio Rodriguez and Josefina Rodriguez, half-brothers and half-sisters of the deceased,
and Jesus Segura, son of Nicanora Rodriguez, another half-sister of the deceased, filed a
motion in the probate court praying that the parcels of land inherited by the administratrix
from her late son Eli Rodriguez be held subject to a reserva troncal in their favor under and

In his lifetime the late Fortunate Rodriguez executed a will instituting as heirs entitled to

pursuant to the provisions of article 891 of the new Civil Code (811 of the old), and that the

his estate, the following: Josefina and Nicanora, natural children; Samson, Juanita, Inicerio

administratrix be directed to register or cause to be recorded on the back of the transfer

3 | SUCCESSION

certificates of title to be issued in her name by the Registrar of Deeds in and for the

Article 891 of the new Civil Code (811 of the old), provides:

province of Occidental Negros for the said parcels of land, their right to such reserva
troncal. After hearing, on 27 November 1954 the probate court held that Josefina
Rodriguez, a natural sister of the deceased, and Jesus Segura, the son of the late Nicanora
Rodriguez, another natural sister, are not entitled to a reserva troncal, but that the rest of
the movants are entitled to have their right to a reserva troncal recorded on the transfer
certificates of title to be issued to the administratrix for the parcels of land inherited by her
from her late son Eli Rodriguez; and that the sugar quota of 596.26 piculs allocated to the

The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have
acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to
reserve such property is he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of
relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the line from which said
property came.

Commenting on this article Manresa says:

parcels of land is not subject to such reserva troncal and ordered the administratix
Los bienes pasan en primer termino al ascendiente legitimario: este los reserva, los guarda
. . . to record in the Registry of Deeds of Negros Occidental, the reservable character of lots
Nos. 847, 951, 11, 965 and 7 of the la Carlota Cadastre (the last three lots correspond
previously to 1/15 pro indiviso of Lots 846, 965 and 848 of the La Carlota Cadastre) in favor
of Samson, Juanita, Inicerio and Gregorio, all surnamed Rodriguez.

Motions for reconsideration filed on 22 December 1954 and 22 February 1955 were denied
on 14 February 1955 and 10 March 1955, respectively.

The movants appeal from that part of the order denying their petition to include in the
reservation the sugar quota allotment of 596.26 piculs that may be manufactured from the
sugar cane grown in the parcels of land inherited by the administratrix from her late son.
The movants Josefina Rodriguez and Jesus Segura did not appeal. The administratrix
appeals from that part of the order directing her to register or cause to be recorded the
right of Samson, Juanita, Inicerio and Gregorio, all surnamed Rodriguez, to a reserva
troncal on the transfer certificates of title to be issued to the administratrix by the Rigistrar
of Deeds of the province of Occidental Negros for the parcels of land inherited by her from
her late son Eli Rodriguez.

disfruta durante su vida, y a su muerte van a parar a la linea a que pertenecieron si hay
parientes dentro del tercer grado en esa linea, y caso de no haberlos en ese moimento, la
reserve desaprece, los bienesquedan libres y se sigue el orden natural de la sucesion. En
cambgio los parientes han de respetar ese usufructo, y tienen una esperanza a esos
bienes,que solo ven realizada los que vivan en la epoca del fallecimiento del ascendiente.

De aqui se deduce que el ascendiente es algo mas que un simple usufructuario; su

derecho es analogo al del poseedor de bienes sujetos a una condicion resolutoria. Hay, en
efecto, un hecho futuro e incierto del que depende laadquisicion definitiva o la extincion
del derecho por el ascendiente o porsus herederos, asi como la adquisicion o la extencion
del derecho de losparientes. Quedaran o no parientes lineales, dentro del tercer grado, a
lamuerte del ascendiente obligado a reserva? Tal es la cuestion. Quedan? Adquieren los
bienes, que son perdidos para los herederos del ascendiente,porque la condicion se ha
cumplido. No quedan? El hecho incierto no se harealizado, y se hace definitivo y firme el
derecho del ascendiente o de susherederos. Y no se crea que siempre habra que esperar a
la muerte del ascendiente: habra casos en los cuales despues de nacida la reserva,
eseascendiente presenciara la muerte de la misma, por desparecer los parientesque a ella

4 | SUCCESSION

pudieran tener derecho, y no ser posible que lleguen a existirotros. (Comentrios al Codigo

vinculo determina cierta preferencia en materia de tutelas y sucesiones; mas al efecto de

Civil Espaol, Vol. 6 pp. 252-253, 6th Ed.)

buscar la procedencia de log bienes en el art. 811, basta que se trate de hermanos,
seande doble vinculo, uterinos o consanguineos. Hay sobre todo una razon decisiva,como

Properties reservable under the aforequoted article are those that the propositus acquired
by gratuitos title from another ascenda, or brother or sister. Although in 1924, at the time
the late Eli Rodriguez inherited by will the parcels of land from his late father Fortunato,
the sugar quota allotment was not yet in existence, still such sugar quota allotment, in the

veremos despues; en ultimo termino, la reserva se establece en favor delos parientes que
pertenezcan a la linea del hermano de quien los bienesproceden, y puesto que se trata de
lineas, el doble vinculo es indiferente.(Comentarios al Codigo Civil Espaol, Vol. 6, p. 257,
6th Ed.)

language of the law, 1 is "an improvement attaching to the land. . . ." If there be no land
[[

]]

planted to sugar cane there would be no sugar quota allotment. The fact that "Mill

Debe ser el parentesco de doble vinculo? Scaevola afirma que, por ser la reserva del

companies and plantation owners may sale, transfer, or assign their allotments received

articulo 811 puramente lineal, no es licito distinguir entre pariente de vinculo entero o de

under the terms of this Act," [[2]] is another compelling reason which leads us to regard the

medio vinculo, y cita en apoto de su opinion la sentencia de 29 de diciember de 1897, en

sugar quota allotment as part of the land to be reserved for the reservees, because if the

la que se declaro la reserva a favor de uno medio hermano. (Manresa, Comentarios al

sugar quota allotment be sold by the reservor, the land subject to reserva troncal would

Codigo Civil Espaol, Vol. 6, pp. 328-329, 7th Ed.)

greatly depreciate in value to the prejudice and detriment of the right of the reservees.
The provisions of article 891 of the new Civil Code (811 of the old) do not exclude the half
In support of her appeal, counsel for the administratrix quotes in his brief a passage from

brothers and sisters from the benefit provided for therein, as long as they are of the line

Manresa thus

from which the property to be reserved came.

Que en cuanto al hermano, desde luego es aplicable el precepto a los hermanosde doble

The order appealed from is modified by including the sugar quota allotment of the parcels

vinculo. Pero si los bienes proceden de un medio hermano, no tendria, luego (lugar) la

of land in the reservation to be recorded on the transfer certificates of the title to be issued

reserva. (Manresa Vol. 6 page 256) Pp. 6-7, brief for the administratrix appellant.

to and in the name of Ruperta A. Vda. de Rodriguez, without pronouncement as to costs.

This is not correct. The correct passage is

En cuanto al hermano, desde luego es aplicable el precepto a los hermanos de doble

vinculo. Pero si los bienes proceden de un medio hermano, no tendralugar la reserva? No
hay duda alguna: hermanos son unos y otros, y con esa sola denominacion se comprenden
los medio hermanos en los articulos 143, 144,294, 770, 952, 953 y 954. Legitimos son
tambien todos, y sin una disposicion expresa de la ley no pueden ser excluidos. El doble

5 | SUCCESSION

G.R. No. L-29901 August 31, 1977

IGNACIO FRIAS CHUA, DOMINADOR CHUA and REMEDIOS CHUA, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, BRANCH V and
SUSANA DE LA TORRE, in her capacity as Administratrix of the Intestate Estate
of Consolacion de la Torre, respondents.
MARTIN, J.:
Petition for review of the decision of the respondent Court which dismissed the complaint
of petitioners in Civil Case No. 7839-A, entitled "Ignacio Frias Chua, et al. vs. Susana de la
Torre, Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la Torre"

It appears that in the first marriage of Jose Frias Chua with Patricia S. Militar alias Sy Quio
he sired three children, namely: Ignacio, Lorenzo and Manuel, all surnamed Frias Chua.
When Patricia S. Militar died, Jose Frias Chua contracted a second marriage with
Consolacion de la Torre with whom he had a child by the name of Juanita Frias Chua.
Manuel Frias Chua died without leaving any issue. Then in 1929, Jose Frias Chua died
intestate leaving his widow Consolacion de la Torre and his son Juanito Frias Chua of the
second marriage and sons Ignacio Frias Chua and Lorenzo Frias Chua of his first marriage.
In Intestate Proceeding No. 4816, the lower court issued an order dated January 15,
1931 1 adjudicating, among others, the one-half (1/2,) portion of Lot No. 399 and the sum
of P8,000.00 in favor of Jose Frias Chua's widow, Consolacion de la Torre, the other half of
Lot No. 399 in favor of Juanito Frias Chua, his son in the second marriage; P3,000.00 in
favor of Lorenze Frias chua; and P1,550.00 in favor of Ignacio Frias, Chua, his sons of the
first marriage. By virtue of said adjudication, Transfer Certificate of Title No. TR-980
(14483) 2 dated April 28, 1932 was issued by the Register of Deeds in the names of
Consolacion de la Torre and Juanito Frias Chua as owners pro-indiviso of Lot No. 399.
On February 27, 1952, Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage died intestate without
any issue. After his death, his mother Consolacion de la Torre succeeded to his pro-indivisio
share of Lot No. 399. In a week's time or on March 6, 1952, Consolacion de la Torre
executed a declaration of heirship adjudicating in her favor the pro-indiviso share of her
son Juanito as a result of which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31796 covering the whole
Lot No. 399 was issued in her name. Then on March 5, 1966, Consolacion de la Torre died
intestate leaving no direct heir either in the descending or ascending line except her
brother and sisters.
In the "Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la Torre", docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 7839-A, the
petitioners herein, Ignacio Frias Chua, of the first marriage and dominador and Remedios
Chua, the supposed legitimate children of the deceased Lorenzo Frias Chua, also of the
first marriage filed the complaint a quo 3 (subseqently segregated as a distinct suit and
docketed as Civil Case No. 7839-A) on May 11, 1966 before the respondent Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch V, praying that the one-half (1/2) portion of Lot No.
399 which formerly belonged to Juanito Frias but which passed to Consolacion de la Torre
upon the latter's death, be declaredas a reservable property for the reason that the lot in
questionn was subject to reserval troncal pursuant to Article 981 of the New Civil Code,
Private respondent as administratrix of the estate of individually the complaint of
petitioners 4
On July 29, 1986, the respondent Court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint of
petitioner. Hence this instant.
The pertinent provision of reserva troncal under the New Civil Code provides:
ART. 891. The ascendant who inheritts from his descendant any property
which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another

6 | SUCCESSION

ascendat, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he

may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are
within the third degree and belong to the line from which said property
came.
Persuant to the foregoing provision, in order that a property may be impressed with a
reservable character the following requisites must exist, to wit: (1) that the property was
acquired by a descendant from an asscendant or from a brother or sister by gratuitous
title; (2) that said descendant died without an issue; (3) that the property is inherited by
another ascendant by operation of law; and (4) that there are relatives within the third
degree belonging to the line from which said property came. 5 In the case before Us, all of
the foregoing requisites are present. Thus, as borne out by the records, Juanoito Frias Chua
of the second marriage died intestate in 1952; he died withour leaving any issue; his proindiviso of 1/2 share of Lot No. 399 was acquired by his mother, Consolacion de la Torre
died, Juannnito Frias Chua who died intestate had relatives within the third degree. These
relatives are Ignacio Frias Chua and Dominador Chua and Remidios Chua, the suppose
legitimate children of the deceased Lorenzo Frias Chua, who are the petitioners herein.
The crux of the problem in instant petition is focused on the first requisit of reserva troncal
whether the property in question was acquired by Juanito Frias Chua from his father Jose
Frias Chua, gratuitously or not. In resolving this point, the respondent Court said:
It appears from Exh. "3", which is part of Exh. "D", that the property in
question was not acquired by Consolacion de la Torre and Juanito Frias
Chua gratuitously but for a consideration, namely, that the legatees were
to pay the interest and cost and other fees resulting from Civil Case No.
5300 of this Court. As such it is undeniable that the lot in question is not
subject tot a reserva troncal, under Art. 891 of the New Civil Code, and as
such the plaintiff's complaint must fail.
We are not prepared to sustain the respondent Court's conclusion that the lot in question is
not subject to areserva troncal under Art. 891 of the New Civil Code. It is, As explained by
Manresa which this Court quoted with approval in Cabardo v. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, "The
transmission is gratuitous or by gratuitous title when the recipient does not give anything
in return." It matters not whether the property transmitted be or be not subject to any prior
charges; what is essential is that the transmission be made gratuitously, or by an act of
mere liberality of the person making it, without imposing any obligation on the part of the
recipient; and that the person receiving the property gives or does nothing in return; or, as
ably put by an eminent Filipino commentator, 6 "the essential thing is that the person who
transmits it does so gratuitously, from pure generosity, without requiring from the
transferee any prestation." It is evident from the record that the transmission of the
property in question to Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage upon the death of his
father Jose Frias Chua was by means of a hereditary succession and therefore gratuitous. It

is true that there is the order (Exh. "D") of the probate Court in Intestate Proceeding No.
4816 which estates in express terms;
2. Se adjudicada pro el presente a favor de Consolacion de la Torre,
viuda, mayor de edad, y de su hiju, Juanito Frias Chua, menor de edad,
todos residente de San Enrique, Negros Occidental, I.F.,como herederos del
finado Jose Frias Chua Choo, estas propiadades:
14483
La parcela de terrenno concida por Lote No. 399 del Catsatro de la Carlota,
Negros Occidental, de 191.954 metros cuadddrados y cubierto por el
Certificado de Titulo No. 11759, en partes equales pro-indiviso; por con la
obligscion de pagar a las Standard Oil Co. of New York la deuda de
P3971.20, sus intereses, costas y demas gastos resultantes del asunto civil
No. 5300de este jusgado
But the obligation of paying the Standard Oil Co. of New York the amount of P3,971.20 is
imposed upon Consolacion de la Torre and Juanito Frias Chua not personally by the
deceased Jose Frias Chua in his last will and testament but by an order of the court in the
Testate Proceeding No.4816 dated January 15, 1931. As long as the transmission of the
property to the heirs is free from any condition imposed by the deceased himself and the
property is given out of pure generosity, itg is gratuitous. it does not matter if later the
court orders one of the heirs, in this case Juanito Frias Chua, to pay the Standare oil co. of
New York the amount of P3,971.20. This does not change the gratuitous nature of the
transmission of the property to him. This being the case the lot in question is subject
to reserva troncal under Art, 891 of the New Civil Code.
It is contented that the distribution of the shares of the estate of Jose Frias Chua to the
respondent heirs or legatees was agreed upon by the heirs in their project of partition
based on the last will and testament of Jose Frias Chua. But petitioners claim that the
supposed Last Will and Testament of Jose Frias Chua was never probated. The fact that the
will was not probated was admitted in paragraph 6 of the respondents' answer. 7 There is
nothing mentioned in the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 7839 A which is the
subject of the present appeal nor in the order of January 15, 1931 of the trial court in the
Testate Estate Proceeding No. 4816 nor in the private respondent's brief, that the Last Will
and Testament of Jose Frias Chua has ever been probated. With the foregoing, it is easy to
deduce that if the Last Will and Testament has in fact been probated there would have
been no need for the testamentary heirs to prepare a project of partition among
themselves. The very will itself could be made the basis for the adjudication of the estate
as in fact they did in their project of partition with Juanito Frias Chua getting one-half of Lot
399 by inheritance as a sone of the deceased Jose Frias Chua by the latter's second
marriage.

7 | SUCCESSION

According to the record, Juanito Frias Chua died on February 27, 1952 without any issue.
After his death his mother Consolation de la Torre succeeded to his one-half pro-indiviso
share of Lot 399. This was, however, subject to the condition that the property was
reservable in character under Art. 891 of the Civil Code in favor of relatives within the third
degree of Jose Frias Chua from whom the property came. These relatives are the petitioner
herein.
It is claimed that the complaint of petitioners to recover the one-half portion of Lot 399
which originally belonged to Juanito Frias Chua has already prescribed when it was filed on
May 11, 1966. We do not believe so. It must be remembered that the petitioners herein are
claiming as reservees did not arise until the time the reservor, Consolacion de la Torre,
died in March 1966. When the petitioners therefore filed their complaint to recover the
one-half (1/2) portion of Lot 399, they were very much in time to do so.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside. The
petitioners Ignacio Frias Chua, Dominador Chua and Remedios Chua are declared owners
of 1/2 undivided portion of Lot 399; and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental is
hereby ordered to cancel. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31796 covering Lot No. 399
issued in the name of Consolacion de la Torre and to issue a new Certificate of Title in the
names of Consolacion de la Torre, 1/2 undivided portion; Ignacio Frias Chua, 1/4 undivided
portion; and Dominador Chua and Remedios Chua, 1/4 undivided portion, of said lot.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-10701
January 16, 1959
MARIA CANO, applicant-appellee,
vs.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, EUSTAQUIA GUERRERO, ET AL., oppositors-appellants.
JOSE FERNANDEZ, ET AL., oppositors-appellants.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
In an amended decision dated October 9, 1951, issued in Land Registration Case No. 12,
G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 2835, the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon decreed the registration of
Lots Nos. 1798 and 1799 of the Juban (Sorsogon) Cadastre, under the following terms and
conditions:
In view of the foregoing, and it appearing that the notices have been duly
published and posted as required by law, and that the title of the applicant to the
above-mentioned two parcels of land is registrable in law, it is hereby adjudged
and decreed, and with reaffirmation of the order of general default, that the two
parcels of land described in plan SWO-24152, known as Lots Nos. 1798 and 1799
of the Cadastral Survey of Juban, with their improvements, be registered in the
name of Maria Cano, Filipina, 71 years of age, widow and resident of Juban,

province of Sorsogon, with the understanding that Lot No. 1799 shall be subject to
the right of reservation in favor of Eustaquia Guerrero pursuant to Article 891 of
the Civil code. After this decision shall have become final for lack of appeal
therefrom within the 30-day period from its promulgation, let the corresponding
decree issue.
So ordered. (Rec. App. pp. 18-19)
The decision having become final, the decree and the Certificate of Title (No. 0-20) were
issued in the name of Maria Cano, subject to reserva troncal in favor of Eustaquia Guerrero.
In October 1955, counsel for the reserve (reservatorio) Guerrero filed a motion with the
Cadastral Court, alleging the death of the original registered owner and reservista, Maria
Cano, on September 8, 1955, and praying that the original Certificate of Title be ordered
cancelled and a new one issued in favor of movant Eustaquia Guerrero; and that the Sheriff
be ordered to place her in possession of the property. The motion was opposed by Jose and
Teotimo Fernandez, sons of thereservista Maria Cano, who contended that the application
and operation of the reserva troncal should be ventilated in an ordinary contentious
proceeding, and that the Registration Court did not have jurisdiction to grant the motion.
In view of the recorded reserva in favor of the appellee, as expressly noted in the final
decree of registration, the lower court granted the petition for the issuance of a new
certificate, for the reason that the death of the reservistavested the ownership of the
property in the petitioner as the sole reservatorio troncal.
The oppositors, heirs of the reservista Maria Cano, duly appealed from the order, insisting
that the ownership of the reservatorio can not be decreed in a mere proceeding under sec.
112 of Act 496, but requires a judicial administration proceedings, wherein the rights of
appellee, as the reservatorio entitled to the reservable property, are to be declared. In this
connection, appellants argue that the reversion in favor of the reservatorio requires the
declaration of the existence of the following facts:
(1) The property was received by a descendant by gratuitous title from an
ascendant or from a brother or sister;
(2) Said descendant dies without issue;
(3) The property is inherited by another ascendant by operation of law; and
(4) The existence of relatives within the third degree belonging the line from which
said property came. (Appellants' Brief, p. 8)

8 | SUCCESSION

We find the appeal untenable. The requisites enumerated by appellants have already been
declared to exist by the decree of registration wherein the rights of the appellee
as reservatario troncal were expressly recognized:
From the above-quoted agreed stipulation of facts, it is evident that Lot No. 1799
was acquired by the Appellant Maria Cano by inheritance from her deceased
daughter, Lourdes Guerrero who, in turn, inherited the same from her father
Evaristo Guerrero and, hence, falls squarely under the provisions of Article 891 of
the Civil Code; and that each and everyone of the private oppositors are within the
third degree of consaguinity of the decedent Evaristo Guerrero, and who belonging
to the same line from which the property came.
It appears however, from the agreed stipulation of facts that with the exception of
Eustaquia Guerrero, who is the only living daughter of the decedent Evaristo
Guerrero, by his former marriage, all the other oppositors are grandchildren of the
said Evaristo Guerrero by his former marriages. Eustaquia Guerrero, being the
nearest of kin, excludes all the other private oppositors, whose decree of
relationship to the decedent is remoter (Article 962, Civil Code; Director of
Lands vs. Aguas, 62 Phil., 279). (Rec. App. pp. 16-17)
This decree having become final, all persons (appellees included) are bared thereby from
contesting the existence of the constituent elements of the reserva. The only requisites for
the passing of the title from thereservista to the appellee are: (1) the death of
the reservista; and (2) the fact that the reservatario has survived the reservista. Both facts
are admitted, and their existence is nowhere questioned.
The contention that an intestacy proceeding is still necessary rests upon the assumption
that the reservatario will succeed in, or inherit, the reservable property from the reservista.
This is not true. The reservatario is not thereservista's successor mortis causa nor is
the reservable property part of the reservista's estate; the reservatarioreceives the
property as a conditional heir of the descendant ( prepositus), said property merely
reverting to the line of origin from which it had temporarily and accidentally strayed during
the reservista's lifetime. The authorities are all agreed that there being reservatarios that
survive the reservista, the latter must be deemed to have enjoined no more than a life
interest in the reservable property.
It is a consequence of these principles that upon the death of the reservista,
the reservatario nearest to theprepositus (the appellee in this case) becomes,
automatically and by operation of law, the owner of the reservable property. As already
stated, that property is no part of the estate of the reservista, and does not even answer
for the debts of the latter. Hence, its acquisition by the reservatario may be entered in the
property records without necessity of estate proceedings, since the basic requisites
therefor appear of record. It is equally well settled that the reservable property can not be
transmitted by a reservista to her or his own successors mortis causa,(like appellants

herein) so long as a reservatario within the third degree from the prepositus and belonging
to the line whence the property came, is in existence when the reservista dies.

Deeds of Manila, copies of which are attached to this stipulation as

Annexes 'B', 'B-l', and 'B-2'.

Of course, where the registration decree merely specifies the reservable character of the
property, without determining the identity of the reservatario (as in the case of Director of
Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil., 279) or where several reservatarios dispute the property among
themselves, further proceedings would be unavoidable. But this is not the case. The rights
of the reservataria Eustaquia Guerrero have been expressly recognized, and it is nowhere
claimed that there are other reservatarios of equal or nearer degree. It is thus apparent
that the heirs of the reservista are merely endeavoring to prolong their enjoyment of
the reservable property to the detriment of the party lawfully entitled thereto.

4. They stipulate that Toribia Tioco died intestate in l9l5, survived by her
husband, Eustacio Dizon, and their two legitimate children, Faustino Dizon
and Trinidad Dizon (mother of defendant Dalisay D, Tongko-Camacho) and
leaving the afore-mentioned four (4) parcels of land as the inheritance of
her said two children in equal pro-indiviso shares.

We find no error in the order appealed from and therefore, the same is affirmed with costs
against appellants in both instances. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-28032 September 24, 1986
FRANCISCA TIOCO DE PAPA, MANUEL TIOCO, NICOLAS TIOCO and JANUARIO
PAPA, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
DALISAY
TONGKO
CAMACHO,
PRIMO
TONGKO
and
GODOFREDO
CAMACHO, defendants-appellants.
NARVASA, J.:
This case, which involves the application of Article 891 of the Civil Code on reserva
troncal, was submitted for judgment in the lower court by all the parties on the following
"Stipulation of Facts and Partial Compromise":
1. They stipulate that the defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho and the
plaintiffs, Francisco Tioco de Papa, Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco, are
legitimate relatives, plaintiffs being said defendant's grandaunt and
granduncles.
2. They stipulate that plaintiffs and defendant Dalisay D. Tongo-Camacho
have as a common ancestor the late Balbino Tioco (who had a sister by the
name of Romana Tioco), father of plaintiffs and great grandfather of
defendant. The family relationship of the parties is as shown in the chart
attached hereto as Annex 'A' and made an integral part of this stipulation.
3. They stipulate that Romana Tioco during her lifetime gratuitously
donated four (4) parcels of land to her niece Toribia Tioco (legitimate sister
of plaintiffs), which parcels of land are presently covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. A-64165, 64166 and 64167 of the Registry of

9 | SUCCESSION

5. They stipulate that in 1928, Balbino Tioco died intestate, survived by his
legitimate children by his wife Marciana Felix (among them plaintiffs) and
legitimate grandchildren Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon. In the partition
of his estate, three (3) parcels of land now covered by Transfer Certificates
of Title Nos. 16545 and 16554 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila, copies of
which are attached hereto as Annexes 'C' and 'C-l', were adjudicated as the
inheritance of the late Toribia Tioco, but as she had predeceased her
father, Balbino Tioco, the said three (3) parcels of land devolved upon her
two legitimate children Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon in equal proindiviso shares.
6. They stipulate that in 1937, Faustino Dizon died intestate, single and
without issue, leaving his one-half (1/2) pro-indiviso share in the seven (7)
parcels of land above-mentioned to his father, Eustacio Dizon, as his sole
intestate heir, who received the said property subject to a reserva troncal
which was subsequently annotated on the Transfer Certificates of Title
Annexes 'B', 'B-l', 'B-2', 'C' and 'C-l'.
7. They stipulate that in 1939 Trinidad Dizon-Tongko died intestate, and her
rights and interests in the parcels of land abovementioned were inherited
by her only legitimate child, defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho, subject
to the usufructuary right of her surviving husband, defendant Primo
Tongko.
8. They stipulate that on June 14, 1965, Eustacio Dizon died intestate,
survived his only legitimate descendant, defendant Dalisay D. TongkoCamacho.
9. The parties agree that defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho now owns
one-half (1/2) of all the seven (7) parcels of land abovementioned as her
inheritance from her mother, Trinidad Dizon-Tongko.
10. Defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho also claims, upon legal advice,
the other half of the said seven (7) parcels of land abovementioned by

virtue of the reserva troncal imposed thereon upon the death of Faustino
Dizon and under the laws on intestate succession; but the plaintiffs, also
upon legal advice, oppose her said claim because they claim three-fourths
(3/4) of the one-half pro-indiviso interest in said parcel of land, which
interest was inherited by Eustacio Dizon from Faustino Dizon, or threeeights (3/8) of the said parcels of land, by virtue of their being also third
degree relatives of Faustino Dizon.
11. The parties hereby agree to submit for judicial determination in this
case the legal issue of whether defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho is
entitled to the whole of the seven (7) parcels of land in question, or
whether the plaintiffs, as third degree relatives of Faustino Dizon are
reservatarios (together with said defendant) of the one-half pro-indiviso
share therein which was inherited by Eustacio Dizon from his son Faustino
Dizon, and entitled to three-fourths (3/4) of said one-half pro-indiviso
share, or three eights (3/8) of said seven (7) parcels of land, and, therefore,
to three-eights (3/8) of the rentals collected and to be collected by
defendant Dalisay P. Tongko Camacho from the tenants of said parcels of
land, minus the expenses and/or real estate taxes corresponding to
plaintiffs' share in the rentals.
12. In view of the fact that the parties are close blood relatives and have
acted upon legal advice in pursuing their respective claims, and in order to
restore and preserve harmony in their family relations, they hereby waive
all their claims against each other for damages (other than legal interest
on plaintiffs' sore in the rentals which this Honorable Court may deem
proper to award), attorney's fees and expenses of litigation which shall be
borne by the respective parties. 1
On the basis thereof, the lower Court declared the plaintiffs Francisco Tioco, Manuel Tioco
and Nicolas Tioco, as well as the defendant Dalisay Tongko-Camacho, entitled,
as reservatarios, to one-half of the seven parcels of land in dispute, in equal proportions,
rendering judgment as follows:
... . Resolving, therefore, the legal question submitted by the parties, the
court holds that plaintiffs Francisca Tioco, Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco
are entitled to three-fourths (3/4) of one-half (1/2) pro-indiviso shares or
three-eights (3/8) of the seven (7) parcels of land involved in this action.
Consequently, they are, likewise, entitled to three-eights (3/8) of the
rentals collected and to be collected by the defendant Dalisay D. TiocoCamacho from the tenants of the said parcels of land, minus the expenses
and/or real estate taxes corresponding to plaintiffs' share in the rentals.

10 | S U C C E S S I O N

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, and inasmuch as the parties expressly

waived all their claims against each other for damages including attorney's
fees and expenses of litigation other than the legal interests on plaintiffs'
share in the rentals, the court renders judgment adjudging the plaintiffs
entitled to three-eights (3/8) of the seven (7) parcels of land described in
Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-64165, T-64166, T-64167, T-16546 and T16554 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila. The defendant Dalisay D. TiocoCamacho is hereby ordered to make an accounting of all rents received by
her on the properties involved in this action for the purpose of determining
the legal interests which should be paid to the plaintiffs on their shares in
the rentals of the property in question.
SO ORDERED. 2
Not satisfied, the defendant appealed to this Court.
The issue raised is whether, as contended by the plaintiffs-appellees and ruled by the
lower Court, all relatives of the praepositus within the third degree in the appropriate line
succeed without distinction to the reservable property upon the death of the reservista, as
seems to be implicit in Art. 891 of the Civil Code, which reads:
Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property
which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another
ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he
may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are
within the third degree and who belong to the line from which said
property came. (811),
or, as asserted by the defendant-appellant, the rights of said relatives are subject to, and
should be determined by, the rules on intestate succession.
That question has already been answered in Padura vs. Baldovino, 3 where
the reservatario was survived by eleven nephews and nieces of the praepositus in the line
of origin, four of whole blood and seven of half blood, and the claim was also made that all
eleven were entitled to the reversionary property in equal shares. This Court, speaking
through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, declared the principles of intestacy to be controlling, and
ruled that the nephews and nieces of whole blood were each entitled to a share double
that of each of the nephews and nieces of half blood in accordance with Article 1006 of the
Civil Code. Said the Court:
The issue in this appeal may be formulated as follows: In a case of reserva
troncal, where the onlyreservatarios (reservees) surviving the reservista,
and belonging to the fine of origin, are nephews of the descendant

(prepositus), but some are nephews of the half blood and the others are
nephews of the whole blood, should the reserved properties be
apportioned among them equally, or should the nephews of the whole
blood take a share twice as large as that of the nephews of the half blood?
xxx xxx xxx
The case is one of first impression and has divided the Spanish
commentators on the subject. After mature reflection, we have concluded
that the position of the appellants is correct. The reserva troncal is a
special rule designed primarily to assure the return of the reservable
property to the third degree relatives belonging to the line from which the
property originally came, and avoid its being dissipated into and by the
relatives of the inheriting ascendant (reservista).
xxx xxx xxx
The stated purpose of the reserva is accomplished once the property has
devolved to the specified relatives of the line of origin. But from this time
on, there is no further occasion for its application. In the relations between
one reservatario and another of the same degree there is no call for
applying Art. 891 any longer; wherefore, the respective share of each in
the reversionary property should be governed by the ordinary rules of
intestate succession. In this spirit the jurisprudence of this Court and that
of Spain has resolved that upon the death of the ascendant reservista, the
reservable property should pass, not to all the reservatarios as a class but
only to those nearest in degree to the descendant (prepositus), excluding
those reservatarios of more remote degree (Florentino vs. Florentino, 40
Phil. 489-490; T.S. 8 Nov. 1894; Dir. Gen. de los Registros, Resol. 20 March
1905). And within the third degree of relationship from the descendant
(prepositus), the right of representation operates in favor of nephews
(Florentino vs. Florentino, supra).
Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession when there
are relatives of the descendant within the third degree, the right of the
nearest relative, called reservatarios over the property which the reservista
(person holding it subject to reservation) should return to him, excludes
that of the one more remote. The right of representation cannot be alleged
when the one claiming same as a reservatario of the reservable property is
not among the relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from
which such property came, inasmuch as the right granted by the Civil Code
in Article 811 is in the highest degree personal and for the exclusive
benefit of designated persons who are within the third degree of the
person from whom the reservable property came. Therefore, relatives of

11 | S U C C E S S I O N

the fourth and the succeeding degrees can never be considered as

reservatarios, since the law does not recognize them as such.
In spite of what has been said relative to the right of representation on the
part of one alleging his right as reservatario who is not within the third
degree of relationship, nevertheless there is right of representation on the
part of reservatarios who are within the third degree mentioned by law, as
in the case of nephews of the deceased person from whom the reservable
property came. ... . (Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480, 489-490)
(Emphasis supplied) See also Nieva and Alcala vs. Alcala and de Ocampo,
41 Phil. 915)
Proximity of degree and right of representation are basic principles of
ordinary intestate succession; so is the rule that whole blood brothers and
nephews are entitled to a share double that of brothers and nephews of
half blood. If in determining the rights of the reservatarios inter se,
proximity of degree and the right of representation of nephews are made
to apply, the rule of double share for immediate collaterals of the whole
blood should be likewise operative.
In other words, the reserva troncal merely determines the group of
relatives reservatarios to whom the property should be returned;
but within that group, the individual right to the property should be
decided by the applicable rules of ordinary intestate succession, since Art.
891 does not specify otherwise. This conclusion is strengthened by the
circumstance that the reserva being an exceptional case, its application
should be limited to what is strictly needed to accomplish the purpose of
the law. As expressed by Manresa in his Commentaries (Vol. 6, 6th Ed., p.
250):
... creandose un verdadero estado excepcional del derecho, no debe
ampliarse, sino mas bien restringirse, el alcance del precepto,
manteniendo la excepcion mientras fuere necesaria y estuviese realmente
contenida en la disposicion, y aplicando las reglas generales y
fundamentales del Codigo en materia de sucesi6n, en aquehos extremes
no resueltos de un modo expreso, y que quedan fuera de la propia esfera
de accion de la reserva que se crea.
The restrictive interpretation is the more imperative in view of the new
Civil Code's hostility to successional reservas and reversions, as
exemplified by the suppression of the reserva viudal and the reversion
legal of the Code of 1889 (Art. 812 and 968-980).

Reversion of the reservable property being governed by the rules on intestate succession,
the plaintiffs-appellees must be held without any right thereto because, as aunt and
uncles, respectively, of Faustino Dizon (thepraepositus), they are excluded from the
succession by his niece, the defendant-appellant, although they are related to him within
the same degree as the latter. To this effect is Abellana vs. Ferraris 4 where Arts. 1001,
1004, 1005 and 1009 of the Civil Code were cited and applied:
Nevertheless, the trial court was correct when it held that, in case of
intestacy nephews and nieces of the de cujus exclude all other collaterals
(aunts and uncles, first cousins, etc.) from the succession. This is readily
apparent from Articles 1001, 1004, 1005 and 1009 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, that provide as follows:
Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the
widow or widower, the latter shall be entitle to one-half of the inheritance
and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.
Art. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full
blood, they shall inherit in equal shares.
Art. 1005. Should brothers and sisters survive together with nephews and
nieces who are the children of the decedent's brothers and sisters of the
full blood, the former shall inherit per capita, and the latter per stirpes.
Art. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of
brothers and sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the
estate.
Under the last article (1009), the absence of brothers, sisters, nephews and
nieces of the decedent is a precondition to the other collaterals (uncles,
cousins, etc.) being called to the succession. This was also and more
clearly the case under the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, that immediately
preceded the Civil Code now in force (R.A. 386). Thus, Articles 952 and 954
of the Code of 1889 prescribed as follows:
Art. 952. In the absence of brothers or sisters and of nephews or nieces,
children of the former, whether of the whole blood or not, the surviving
spouse, if not separated by a final decree of divorce shall succeed to the
entire estate of the deceased.
Art. 954. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of
brothers or sisters, nor a surviving spouse, the other collateral relatives
shall succeed to the estate of deceased.

12 | S U C C E S S I O N

The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among

them by reason of the whole blood.
It will be seen that under the preceding articles, brothers and sisters and
nephews and nieces inherited ab intestato ahead of the surviving spouse,
while other collaterals succeeded only after the widower or widow. The
present Civil Code of the Philippines merely placed the spouse on a par
with the nephews and nieces and brothers and sisters of the deceased, but
without altering the preferred position of the latter vis a vis the other
collaterals.
xxx xxx xxx
We, therefore, hold, and so rule, that under our laws of succession, a
decedent's uncles and aunts may not succeed ab intestato so long as
nephews and nieces of the decedent survive and are willing and qualified
to succeed. ...
This conclusion is fortified by the observation, also made in Padura, supra, that as to the
reservable property, thereservatarios do not inherit from the reservista, but from the
descendant praepositus:
... . It is likewise clear that the reservable property is no part of the estate
of the reservista, who may not dispose of it by will, as long as there
are reservatarios existing (Arroyo vs. Gerona, 58 Phil. 237). The latter,
therefore, do not inherit from the reservista, but from the
descendant prepositus, of whom the reservatarios are the heirs mortis
causa, subject to the condition that they must survive thereservista.
(Sanchez Roman, Vol. VI, Tomo 2, p. 286; Manresa, Commentaries, Vol. 6,
6th Ed., pp. 274, 310) ... .
To the same effect is Cano vs, Director of Lands 5, where it was ruled that intestacy
proceedings to determine the right of a reservatarioare not necessary where the final
decree of the land court ordering issuance of title in the name of the reservista over
property subject to reserva troncalIdentifies the reservatario and there are no other
claimants to the latter's rights as such:
The contention that an intestacy proceeding is still necessary rests upon
the assumption that thereservatario win succeed in, or inherit, the
reservable property from the reservista. This is not true. The reservatario is
not the reservista's successor mortis causa nor is the reservable property
part of the reservista's estate; the reservatario receives the property as a
conditional heir of the descendant (prepositus), said property merely

reverting to the line of origin from which it had temporarily and

accidentally strayed during the reservista's lifetime. The authorities are all
agreed that there beingreservatarios that survive the reservista, the
matter must be deemed to have enjoyed no more than a life interest in the
reservable property.

Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Laguna in the consolidated cases in
Civil Case No. SC-956 1 and Civil Case No. SC-957. 2

It is a consequence of these principles that upon the death of

the reservista, the reservatario nearest to the prepositus (the appellee in
this case) becomes, automatically and by operation of law, the owner of
the reservable property. As already stated, that property is no part of the
estate of thereservista, and does not even answer for the debts of the
latter. ... .

Raul Balantakbo inherited from two (2) different ascendants the two (2) sets of properties
subject of this case: 1) A one-third (1/3) interest, pro-indiviso in a parcel of land situated in
Dita, Lilio (Liliw) Laguna and described in paragraph 7 of the complaint in Civil Case No.
SC-956 from his father Jose, Sr., who died on January 28, 1945; and 2) A one-seventh (1/7)
interest pro-indiviso in ten (10) parcels of registered lands described in paragraph 6 of the
complaint in Civil Case No. SC-957 from his maternal grandmother, Luisa Bautista, who
died on November 3, 1950.

Had the reversionary property passed directly from the praepositus, there is no doubt that
the plaintiffs-appellees would have been excluded by the defendant-appellant under the
rules of intestate succession. There is no reason why a different result should obtain simply
because "the transmission of the property was delayed by the interregnum of
the reserva;" 6 i.e., the property took a "detour" through an ascendant-thereby giving rise
to the reservation before its transmission to the reservatario.
Upon the stipulated facts, and by virtue of the rulings already cited, the defendantappellant Dalisay Tongko-Camacho is entitled to the entirety of the reversionary property
to the exclusion of the plaintiffs-appellees.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the lower Court is reversed and set aside and the
complaint is dismissed, with costs against the plaintiffs-appellants. SO ORDERED.

The parties entered into a stipulation of facts in the court a quo, which is summarized as
follows:

On June 13, 1952, Raul died intestate, single, without any issue, and leaving only his
mother, Consuelo Joaquin Vda. de Balantakbo, as his sole surviving heir to the real
properties above-mentioned.
On November 3, 1952, Consuelo adjudicated unto herself the above described properties
in an Affidavit entitled "Caudal Herederario del finado Raul Balantakbo" which provided,
among others:
I. Que de mi legitimo matrimonio con mi difunto esposo, Jose Balantakbo,
he tenido varios hijos, entre ellos si difunto hijo, llamado Raul Balantakbo.
II. Que mi referido hijo Raul Balantakbo, fallencio el 13 de Junio de 1952, en
la Ciudad de Pasay, durante su minolia de edad sin dejar testamento
alguno.
III. Que el finado Raul Balantakbo al morir no ha dejado descendiente
alguno.

G.R. No. 68843-44 September 2, 1991

MARIQUITA O. SUMAYA and LAGUNA AGRO-INDUSTRIAL COCONUT COOPERATIVE,
INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, and AMADEO, SANCHO, DONATO,
LUIS,
ERASTO,
LUISA,
JOSE
and
DOLORES,
all
surnamed
BALANTAKBO, respondents.
MEDIALDEA, J.:p
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court
(now Court of Appeals) in C.A. G.R. No. CV-01292-93, which affirmed the decision of the

13 | S U C C E S S I O N

IV. Que soy la unica ascendiente superviviento de mi referido hijo Raul

Balantakbo y por lo tanto su unica heredera formosa, legitima y universal.
V. Que el finado Raul Balantakbo murio sin dejar deuda alguna.
VI. Que el finado al morir dejo propiedades consistentes en bienes
inmuebles situados en la Provincia de Laguna.
VII. Que dichas propriedades fueron a su vez adquiridas por el finado Raul
Balantakbo per herencia de su difunto padre, Jose Balantakbo, y de su tia
abuela Luisa Bautista.

xxx xxx xxx

1. Ordering the defendant Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative,

Inc. to convey to the plaintiffs

(Rollo, p. 29)
a) In Civil Case No. SC-956 the one-third (1/3) interest
and ownership, pro-indiviso, in and over the parcel of land
described in paragraph three (3) sub-paragraph 1, of pages
one (1) and two (2) of this decision;

On December 21, 1959, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo sold the property described
in Civil Case No. SC-956 to Mariquita H. Sumaya. The sale was evidenced by a deed
attached as Annex "C" to the complaint. The same property was subsequently sold by
Mariquita Sumaya to Villa Honorio Development Corporation, Inc., on December 30, 1963.
On January 23, 1967, Villa Honorio Development Corporation transferred and assigned its
rights over the property in favor of Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc. The
documents evidencing these transfers were registered in the Registry of Deeds of Laguna
and the corresponding certificates of titles were issued. The properties are presently in the
name of Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc., 2/3 share and the remaining 1/3 share
is in the name of Sancho Balantakbo.

b) In Civil Case No. SC-957 the one-seventh (1/7)

interest and ownership, pro-indiviso, in and over the ten
(10) parcels of land described in paragraph three (3), subparagraph 2, of pages two (2) and three (3) of this
decision;
c) The plaintiffs are to share equally in the real properties
herein ordered to be conveyed to them by the defendants
with plaintiffs Luisa, Jose and Dolores, all surnamed
Balantakbo, receiving one-third (1/3) of the one share
pertaining to the other plaintiffs who are their uncles:

Also on December 30, 1963, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo sold the properties
described in the complaint in Civil Case No. SC-957 to Villa Honorio Development
Corporation, Inc. The latter in turn transferred and assigned all its rights to the properties
in favor of Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc. which properties are presently
in its possession.
The parties admit that the certificates of titles covering the above described properties do
not contain any annotation of its reservable character.
On June 3, 1968, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo died.

2. Ordering the Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc. to

account for and pay to the plaintiffs the value of the produce from the
properties herein ordered to be returned to the plaintiffs, said accounting
and payment of income being for the period from January 3, 1968 until
date of reconveyance of the properties herein ordered:

On March 4, 1970, Amadeo, Sancho, Donato, Luis, and Erasto, all surnamed Balantakbo,
brothers in full blood of Raul Balantakbo and Luisa, Jose and Dolores, also all surnamed
Balantakbo, surviving children of deceased Jose Balantakbo, Jr., another brother of the first
named Balantakbos, filed the above mentioned civil cases to recover the properties
described in the respective complaints which they claimed were subject to a reserva
troncal in their favor.

3. In each of Civil Cases Nos. SC-956 and SC-957, defendants are to pay
plaintiffs

The court a quo found that the two (2) cases varied only in the identity of the subject
matter of res involved, the transferees, the dates of the conveyances but involve the same
legal question of reserva troncal. Hence, the consolidation of the two (2) cases.

4. Defendants are to pay the costs in each of Civil Cases Nos. SC-956 and
957.

After trial, the court a quo rendered a joint decision in favor of the Balantakbos, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in both Civil Cases Nos. SC-956 and SC-957, judgment is
hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, as
follows:

14 | S U C C E S S I O N

a. One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos in litigation expenses.

b. Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos in attorney's fees.

xxx xxx xxx

(p. 46, Rollo)
This decision was appealed to the appellate court which affirmed the decision of the
court a quo in toto. The motion for reconsideration was denied (p. 65, Rollo) by the
appellate court which found no cogent reason to reverse the decision.

This petition before Us was filed on November 12, 1984 with the petitioners assigning the
following errors allegedly committed by the appellate court:
I. The trial court erred in not finding defendants an (sic) innocent purchaser
for value and in good faith of the properties covered by certificates of title
subject of litigation.
II. The trial court erred in finding it unnecessary to annotate the reservable
interest of the reservee in the properties covered by certificates of title
subject of litigation.
III. The trial court erred in finding that the cause of action of the plaintiffs
(private respondents) has not yet prescribed.
IV. The trial court erred in awarding moral and actual damages in favor of
the plaintiffs by virtue of the institution of Civil Cases Nos. 956 and 957.
Petitioners would want this Court to reverse the findings of the court a quo, which the
appellate court affirmed, that they were not innocent purchasers for value. According to
petitioners, before they agreed to buy the properties from the reservor (also
called reservista), Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo, they first sought the legal advice
of their family consultant who found that there was no encumbrance nor any lien
annotated on the certificate of title coveting the properties.

Sec. 52. CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE UPON REGISTRATION. Every

conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien attachment, order, judgment,
instrument or entry affecting registered land shall, if registered, filed or
entered in the Office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where
the land to which it relates lies, be constructive notice to all persons from
the time of such registering, filing or entering.
Thus, in Gatioan v. Gaffud, G.R. No. L-21953, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 706, 712-713, cited
in People v. Reyes, G.R. Nos. 74226-27, July 27, 1989, 175 SCRA 597; Garcia v. CA and PNB
v. CA, et al., G.R. Nos. L-48971 and L-40911, both dated January 22, 1980, 95 SCRA 380
and Legarda and Prieto v. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590, 600, We held:
When a conveyance has been properly recorded such record is
constructive notice of its contents and all interests, legal and equitable,
included therein . . .
Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined
every instrument of record affecting the title. Such presumption is
irrebuttable. He is charged with notice of every fact shown by the record
and is presumed to know every fact which an examination of the record
would have disclosed. This presumption cannot be overcome by proof of
innocence or good faith. Otherwise, the very purpose and object of the law
requiring a record would be destroyed. Such presumption cannot be
defeated by proof of want of knowledge of what the record contains any
more than one may be permitted to show that he was ignorant of the
provisions of the law. The rule that all persons must take notice of the facts
which the public record contains is a rule of law. The rule must be absolute,
any variation would lead to endless confusion and useless litigation. . . .

The court a quo found otherwise. Upon the death of the propositus, Raul Balantakbo,
the reservista, Consuelo vda. de Balantakbo caused the registration of an affidavit of selfadjudication of the estate of Raul, wherein it was clearly stated that the properties were
inherited by Raul from his father Jose, Sr., as regards the subject matter of Civil Case No.
SC-956 and from his maternal grandmother, Luisa Bautista, as regards the subject matter
of Civil Case No. SC-957. The court a quo further ruled that said affidavit was, in its form,
declaration and substance, a recording with the Registry of Deeds of the reservable
character of the properties. In Spanish language, the affidavit clearly stated that the
affiant, Consuelo, was a lone-ascendant and heir to Raul Balantakbo, her son, who died
leaving properties previously inherited from other ascendants and which properties were
inventoried in the said affidavit.

In the case of Bass v. De la Rama, 73 Phil. 682, 685, the rule was laid down that the mere
entry of a document in the day book without noting it on the certificate of title is not
sufficient registration. However, that ruling was superseded by the holding in the later six
cases of Levin v. Bass, 91 Phil. 420. As explained in Garcia v. CA, et al., G.R. Nos. L-48971
and 49011, January 20, 1980, 95 SCRA 380, 388, which is the prevailing doctrine in this
jurisdiction.

It was admitted that the certificates of titles covering the properties in question show that
they were free from any liens and encumbrances at the time of the sale. The fact remains
however, that the affidavit of self-adjudication executed by Consuelo stating the source of
the properties thereby showing the reservable nature thereof was registered with the
Register of Deeds of Laguna, and this is sufficient notice to the whole world in accordance
with Section 52 of the Property Registration Decree (formerly Sec. 51 of R.A. 496) which
provides:

That ruling was superseded by the holding in the later six cases of Levin
v. Bass, 91 Phil. 420, where a distinction was made between voluntary and
involuntary registration, such as the registration of an attachment, levy
upon execution, notice of lis pendens, and the like. In cases of involuntary
registration, an entry thereof in the day book is a sufficient notice to all
persons even if the owner's duplicate certificate of title is not presented to
the register of deeds.

15 | S U C C E S S I O N

On the other hand, according to the said cases of Levin v. Bass, in case of
voluntary registration of documents an innocent purchaser for value of
registered land becomes the registered owner, and, in contemplation of
law the holder of a certificate of title, the moment he presents and files a
duly notarized and valid deed of sale and the same is entered in the day
book and at the same time he surrenders or presents the owner's duplicate
certificate of title covering the land sold and pays the registration fees,
because what remains to be done lies not within his power to perform. The
register of deeds is duty bound to perform it. (See Potenciano v. Dineros,
97 Phil. 196).
In this case, the affidavit of self adjudication executed by Consuelo vda. de Balantakbo
which contained a statement that the property was inherited from a descendant, Raul,
which has likewise inherited by the latter from another ascendant, was registered with the
Registry of Property. The failure of the Register of Deeds to annotate the reservable
character of the property in the certificate of title cannot be attributed to Consuelo.
Moreover, there is sufficient proof that the petitioners had actual knowledge of the
reservable character of the properties before they bought the same from Consuelo. This
matter appeared in the deed of sale (Exhibit "C") executed by Consuelo in favor of
Mariquita Sumaya, the first vendee of the property litigated in Civil Case No. SC-956, as
follows:
xxx xxx xxx
That, I (Consuelo, vendor) am the absolute and exclusive owner of the onethird (1/3) portion of the above described parcel of land by virtue of the
Deed of Extra-judicial Partition executed by the Heirs of the deceased Jose
Balantakbo dated December 10, 1945 and said portion in accordance with
the partition above-mentioned was adjudicated to Raul Balantakbo, single,
to (sic) whom I inherited after his death and this property is entirely free
from any encumbrance of any nature or kind whatsoever, . . . (p. 42, Rollo)
It was admitted though that as regards the properties litigated in Civil Case SC-957, no
such admission was made by Consuelo to put Villa Honorio Development on notice of the
reservable character of the properties. The affidavit of self-adjudication executed by
Consuelo and registered with the Registry would still be sufficient notice to bind them.

16 | S U C C E S S I O N

Moreover, the Court a quo found that the petitioners and private respondents were long
time acquaintances; that the Villa Honorio Development Corporation and its successors,
the Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative Inc., are family corporations of the
Sumayas and that the petitioners knew all along that the properties litigated in this case
were inherited by Raul Balantakbo from his father and from his maternal grandmother, and
that Consuelo Vda. de Balantakbo inherited these properties from his son Raul.
The obligation to reserve rests upon the reservor, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo.
Article 891 of the New Civil Code on reserva troncal provides:
Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property
which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another
ascendant or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he
may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are
within the third degree and who belong to the line from which said
property came. (Emphasis supplied)
We do not agree, however, with the disposition of the appellate court that there is no need
to register the reservable character of the property, if only for the protection of the
reservees, against innocent third persons. This was suggested as early as the case
of Director of Lands v. Aguas, G.R. No. 42737, August 11, 1936, 63 Phil. 279. The main
issue submitted for resolution therein was whether the reservation established by Article
811 (now Art. 891 of the New Civil Code) of the Civil Code, for the benefit of the relatives
within the third degree belonging to the line of the descendant from whom the ascendant
reservor received the property, should be understood as made in favor of all the relatives
within said degree and belonging to the line above-mentioned, without distinction
legitimate, natural and illegitimate ones not having the legal status of natural children.
However, in an obiter dictum this Court stated therein:
The reservable character of a property is but a resolutory condition of the
ascendant reservor's right of ownership. If the condition is fulfilled, that is,
if upon the ascendant reservor's death there are relatives having the status
provided in Article 811 (Art. 891, New Civil Code), the property passes, in
accordance with this special order of succession, to said relatives, or to the
nearest of kin among them, which question not being pertinent to this
case, need not now be determined. But if this condition is not fulfilled, the
property is released and will be adjudicated in accordance with the regular
order of succession. The fulfillment or non-fulfillment of the resolutory
condition, the efficacy or cessation of the reservation, the acquisition of
rights or loss of the vested ones, are phenomena which have nothing to do
with whether the reservation has been noted or not in the certificate of
title to the property. The purpose of the notation is nothing more than to
afford to the persons entitled to the reservation, if any,

due protection against any act of the reservor, which may make it
ineffective . . . (p. 292, Ibid)
Likewise, in Dizon and Dizon v. Galang, G.R. No. 21344, January 14, 1926, 48 Phil. 601,
603, this Court ruled that the reservable character of a property may be lost to innocent
purchasers for value. Additionally, it was ruled therein that the obligation imposed on a
widowed spouse to annotate the reservable character of a property subject of reserva
viudal is applicable to reserva troncal. (See also Edrozo v. Sablan, G.R. No. 6878,
September 13, 1913, 25 Phil. 295).
Since these parcels of land have been legally transferred to third persons,
Vicente Galang has lost ownership thereof and cannot now register nor
record in the Registry of Deeds their reservable character; neither can he
effect the fee simple, which does not belong to him, to the damage of Juan
Medina and Teodoro Jurado, who acquired the said land in good faith, free
of all incumbrances. An attempt was made to prove that when Juan Medina
was advised not to buy the land he remarked, "Why did he (Vicente
Galang) not inherit it from his son?" Aside from the fact that it is not clear
whether this conservation took place in 1913 or 1914, that is, before or
after the sale, it does not arise that he had any knowledge of the
reservation. This did not arise from the fact alone that Vicente Galang had
inherited the land from his son, but also from the fact that, by operation of
law, the son had inherited it from his mother Rufina Dizon, which
circumstance, so far as the record shows, Juan Medina had not been aware
of. We do not decide, however, whether or not Juan Medina and Teodoro
Jurado are obliged to acknowledge the reservation and to note the same in
their deeds, for the reason that there was no prayer to this effect in the
complaint and no question raised in regard thereto.
Consistent with the rule in reserva viudal where the person obliged to reserve (the
widowed spouse) had the obligation to annotate in the Registry of Property the reservable
character of the property, in reserva troncal, the reservor (the ascendant who inherited
from a descendant property which the latter inherited from another descendant) has the
duty to reserve and therefore, the duty to annotate also.
The jurisprudential rule requiring annotation in the Registry of Property of the right
reserved in real property subject of reserva viudal insofar as it is applied to reserva
troncal stays despite the abolition of reserva viudal in the New Civil Code. This rule is
consistent with the rule provided in the second paragraph of Section 51 of P.D. 1529, which
provides that: "The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the
land insofar as third persons are concerned . . ." (emphasis supplied)

17 | S U C C E S S I O N

The properties involved in this case are already covered by a Torrens title and unless the
registration of the limitation is effected (either actual or constructive), no third persons
shall be prejudiced thereby.
The respondent appellate court did not err in finding that the cause of action of the private
respondents did not prescribe yet. The cause of action of the reservees did not commence
upon the death of the propositus Raul Balantakbo on June 13, 1952 but upon the death of
the reservor Consuelo Vda. de Balantakbo on June 3, 1968. Relatives within the third
degree in whose favor the right (or property) is reserved have no title of ownership or of
fee simple over the reserved property during the lifetime of the reservor. Only when the
reservor should die before the reservees will the latter acquire the reserved property, thus
creating a fee simple, and only then will they take their place in the succession of the
descendant of whom they are relatives within the third degree (SeeVelayo Bernardo v.
Siojo, G.R. No. 36078, March 11, 1933, 58 Phil. 89). The reserva is extinguished upon the
death of the reservor, as it then becomes a right of full ownership on the part of the
reservatarios, who can bring a reivindicatory suit therefor. Nonetheless, this right if not
exercised within the time for recovery may prescribe in ten (10) years under the old Code
of Civil Procedure (see Carillo v. De Paz, G.R. No. L-22601, October 28, 1966, 18 SCRA 467,
473) or in thirty years under Article 1141 of the New Civil Code. The actions for recovery of
the reserved property was brought by herein private respondents on March 4, 1970 or less
than two (2) years from the death of the reservor. Therefore, private respondents' cause of
action has not prescribed yet.
Finally, the award of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) for actual litigation expenses and two
thousand pesos (P2,000.00) for attorney's fees is proper under Article 2208(2) of the New
Civil Code. Private respondents were compelled to go to court to recover what rightfully
belongs to them.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED. The questioned decision of the Intermediate
Appellate Court is AFFIRMED, except for the modification on the necessity to annotate the
reversable character of a property subject of reserva troncal.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

February 18, 1926

G.R. No. 23770

deeds on November 6, 1920. On November 3, 1920, Marcelina Casas sold these eight

MAGIN RIOSA, plaintiff-appellant,

parcels of land to Pablo Rocha for the sum of P60,000 in a public document which was

vs.

recorded in the registry of deeds on November 6, 1920. On September 24, 1921, Pablo

PABLO ROCHA, MARCELINA CASAS, MARIA CORRAL and CONSOLACION R. DE

Rocha returned parcels No. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6 to Maria Corral stating in the deed executed for

CALLEJA, defendants-appellees.

the purpose that these parcels of land had been erroneously included in the sale made by
Maria Corral to Marcelina Casas.

AVANCEA, C.J.:
The Court of first Instance denied the probate of the will of Jose Riosa, but on appeal this
Maria Corral was united in marriage with the deceased Mariano Riosa, it being her first and
only marriage and during which time she bore him three children named Santiago, Jose
and Severina. The latter died during infancy and the other two survived their father,
Mariano Riosa. Santiago Riosa, no deceased, married Francisca Villanueva, who bore him
two children named Magin and Consolacion Riosa. Jose Riosa, also deceased, married
Marcelina Casas and they had one child who died before the father, the latter therefore

court reversed the decision of the lower court and allowed the will to probate. [[1]]The legal
proceedings for the probate of the will and the settlement of the testate estate of Jose
Riosa were followed; and, at the time of the partition, Maria Corral and Marcelina Casas
submitted to the court the contract of extrajudicial partition which they had entered into
on May 16, 1917, and which was approved by the court, by order of November 12, 1920,
as though it had been made within the said testamentary proceedings.

leaving no issue. Mariano Riosa left a will dividing his property between his two children,
Santiago and Jose Riosa, giving the latter the eleven parcels of land described in the

From the foregoing is appears that the eleven parcels of land described in the complaint

complaint. Upon the death of Jose Riosa he left a will in which he named his wife, Marcelina

were acquired by Jose Riosa, by lucrative title, from his father Mariano Riosa and that after

Casas, as his only heir.

the death of Jose Riosa, by operation of law, they passed to his mother Maria Corral. By
virtue of article 811 of the Civil Code these eleven parcels of land are reservable property.

On May 16, 1917, the will of Jose Riosa was filed for probate. Notwithstanding the fact that
Marcelina Casas was the only heir named in the will, on account of the preterition of Maria
Corral who, being the mother of Jose Riosa, was his legitimate heir, I Marcelina Casas and
Maria Corral, on the same date of the filing of the will for probate, entered into a contract
by which they divided between themselves the property left by Jose Riosa, the eleven

It results, furthermore, that parcels 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 still belong in fee simple to

Maria Corral, and that parcels 10 and 11 were successively sold by Maria Corral to
Marcelina Casas and by the latter to Pablo Rocha. Lastly, it appears that Magin and
Consolacion Riosa are the nearest relatives within the third degree of the line from which
this property came.

parcels of land described in the complaint being assigned to Maria Corral.

This action was brought by Magin Riosa, for whom the property should have been
On October 26, 1920, Maria Corral sold parcels Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10 and 11 to Marcelina
Casas for the sum of P20,000 in a public instrument which was recorded in the registry of

18 | S U C C E S S I O N

reserved, against Maria Corral, whose duty it was to reserve it, and against Marcelina
Casas and Pablo Rocha as purchasers of parcels 10 and 11. Consolacion Riosa de Calleja

who was also bound to make the reservation was included as a defendant as she refused

should either of them survive her, either by a mortgage thereon or by a bond in the

to join as plaintiff.

amount of P30,000, without express pronouncement as to costs.

The complaint prays that the property therein described be declared reservable property

The other defendants are absolved from the complaint.

and that the plaintiffs Jose and Consolacion Riosa be declared reservees; that this
reservation be noted in the registry of deeds; that the sale of parcels 10 and 11 to
Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha be declared valid only in so far as it saves the right of
reservation in favor of the plaintiff Magin Riosa and of the defendant Consolacion Riosa,
and that this right of reservation be also noted on the deeds of sale executed in favor of
Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha; that Maria Corral, Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha give
a bond of P50,000, with good and sufficient sureties, in favor of the reservees as surety for
the conservation and maintenance of the improvements existing on the said reservable
property. The dispositive part of the court's decision reads as follows:

For the foregoing reasons it is held:

Inasmuch as the reservation from its inception imposes obligations upon the reservor
(reservista) and creates rights in favor of the reservation (reservatarios) it is of the utmost
importance to determine the time when the land acquired the character of reservable
property.

It will be remembered that on May 16, 1917, Maria Corral and Marcelina Casas entered into
a contract of extrajudicial partition of the property left by Jose Riosa, in which they
assigned to Maria Corral, as her legitime, the parcels of land here in question, and at the
same time petitioned for the probate of the will of Jose Riosa and instituted the
testamentary proceeding. In support of the legality of the extrajudicial partition between
Maria Corral and Marcelina Casas the provision of section 596 of the Code of Civil

1. That the eleven parcels of land described in paragraph 6 of the complaint have the

Procedure is invoked, which authorizes the heirs of a person dying without a will to make a

character of reservable property; 2. That the defendant Maria Corral, being compelled to

partition without the intervention of the courts whenever the heirs are all of age and the

make the reservation, must reserve them in favor of the plaintiff Magin Riosa and the

deceased has left no debts. But this legal provisions refers expressly to intestate estates

defendant Consolacion Riosa de Calleja in case that either of these should survive her; 3.

and, of course, excludes testate estates like the one now before us.

That Magin Riosa and Consolacion Riosa de Calleja have the right, in case that Maria Corral
should die before them, to receive the said parcels or their equivalent.

When the deceased has left a will the partition of his property must be made in accordance
therewith. According to section 625 of the same Code no will can pass property until it is

In virtue whereof, the defendant Maria Corral is ordered: 1. To acknowledge the right of

probated. And even after being probated it cannot pass any property if its provisions impair

Magin Riosa and Consolacion Riosa de Calleja to the reservation of the said parcels of lands

the legitime fixed by law in favor of certain heirs. Therefore, the probate of the will and the

described in the complaint, which she shall expressly record in the registration of said

validity of the testamentary provisions must be passed upon by the court.

lands in the office of the register of deeds of this province; 2. To insure the delivery of said
parcels of lands, or their equivalent, to Magin Riosa and Consolacion Riosa de Calleja,

For the reasons stated, and without making any express finding as to the efficacy of the
extrajudicial partition made by Maria Corral and Marcelina Casas, we hold that for the

19 | S U C C E S S I O N

purposes of the reservation and the rights and obligations arising thereunder in connection

the reservation known as "reserva troncal," referred to in article 811, which is the

with the favored relatives, the property cannot be considered as having passed to Maria

reservation now under consideration.

Corral but from the date when the said partition was approved by the court, that is, on
November 12, 1920. In the case of Pavia vs. De la Rosa (8 Phil., 70), this court laid down
the same doctrine in the following language:

In accordance with article 977, Maria Corral, reservor, is obliged to have the reservation
noted in the registry of deeds in accordance with the provisions of the Mortgage Law which
fixes the period of ninety days for accomplishing it (article 199, in relation with article 191,

The provisions of Act No. 190 (Code of Civil Procedure) have annulled the provisions of

of the Mortgage Law). According to article 203 of the General Regulation for the application

article 1003 and others of the Civil Code with regard to the pure or simple acceptance of

of the Mortgage Law, this time must be computed from the acceptance of the inheritance.

the inheritance of a deceased person or that made with benefit of inventory and the

But as this portion of the Civil Code, regarding the acceptance of the inheritance, has been

consequences thereof.

repealed, the time, as has been indicated, must be computed from the adjudication of the
property by the court to the heirs, in line with the decision of this court hereinabove

xxx

xxx

xxx

The heir legally succeeds the deceased from whom he derives his right and title, but only
after the liquidation of the estate, the payment of the debts of same, and the adjudication
of the residue of the estate of the deceased, and in the meantime the only person in
charge by law to attend to all claims against the estate of the deceased debtor is the
executor or administrator appointed by a competent court.

As has been indicated, parcels 10 and 11 described in the complaint were first sold by
Maria Corral to Marcelina Casas who later sold them to Pablo Rocha. In this appeal it is
urged that Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha, who were absolved by the court below, be
ordered to acknowledge the reservation as to parcels 10 and 11, acquired by them, and to
have the said reservation noted on their titles. This argument, of course, is useless as to
Marcelina Casas for the reason that she transferred all her rights to Pablo Rocha.

quoted. After the expiration of this period the reservees may demand compliance with this
obligation.

If Maria Corral had not transferred parcels 10 and 11 to another there would be no doubt
that she could be compelled to cause the reservable character of this property to be noted
in the registry of deeds. This land having been sold to Marcelina Casas who, in turn, sold it
to Pablo Rocha the question arises whether the latter can be compelled to have this
reservation noted on his title. This acquisition by Pablo Rocha took place when it was the
duty of Maria Corral to make the notation of the reservation in the registry and at the time
when the reservees had no right to compel Maria Corral to make such notation, because
this acquisition was made before the expiration of the period of ninety days from
November 12, 1920, the date of the adjudication by the court, after which the right of the
reservees to commence an action for the fulfillment of the obligation arose. But the land
first passed to Marcelina Casas and later to Pablo Rocha together with the obligation that

It has been held by jurisprudence that the provisions of the law referred to in article 868

the law imposes upon Maria Corral. They could not have acquired a better title than that

tending to assure the efficacy of the reservation by the surviving spouse are applicable to

held by Maria Corral and if the latter's title was limited by the reservation and the

20 | S U C C E S S I O N

obligation to note it in the registry of deeds, this same limitation is attached to the right

The appellant also claims that the obligation imposed upon Maria Corral of insuring the

acquired by Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha.

return of these parcels of land, or their value, to the reservees by means of a mortgage or
a bond in the amount of P30,000, also applies to Pablo Rocha. The law does not require

In the transmission of reservable property the law imposes the reservation as a resolutory
condition for the benefit of the reservees (article 975, Civil Code). The fact that the
resolvable character of the property was not recorded in the registry of deed at the time
that it was acquired by Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha cannot affect the right of the
reservees, for the reason that the transfers were made at the time when it was the
obligation of the reservor to note only such reservation and the reservees did not them
have any right to compel her to fulfill such an obligation.

Marcelina Casas, as well as Pablo Rocha, Knew of the reservable character of the property
when they bought it. They had knowledge of the provisions of the last will and testament
of Mariano Riosa by virtue of which these parcels were transferred to Jose Riosa. Pablo
Rocha was one of the legatees in the will. Marcelina Casas was the one who entered into
the contract of partition with Maria Corral, whereby these parcels were adjudicated to the
latter, as a legitimate heir of Jose Riosa. Pablo Rocha was the very person who drafted the
contracts of sale of these parcels of land by Maria Corral to Marcelina Casas and by the
latter to himself. These facts, together with the relationship existing between Maria Corral
and Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha, the former a daughter-in-law and the latter a
nephew of Maria Corral, amply support the conclusion that both of them knew that these
parcels of land had been inherited by Maria Corral, as her legitime from her son Jose Riosa
who had inherited them, by will, from his father Mariano Riosa, and were reservable
property. Wherefore, the duty of Maria Corral of recording the reservable character of lots
10 and 11 has been transferred to Pablo Rocha and the reservees have an action against
him to compel him to comply with this obligation.

that the reservor give this security, the recording of the reservation in the registry of deeds
being sufficient (art. 977 of the Civil Code). There is no ground for this requirement
inasmuch as, the notation once is made, the property will answer for the efficacy of the
reservation. This security for the value of the property is required by law (art. 978,
paragraph 4, of the Civil Code) in the case of a reservation by the surviving spouse when
the property has been sold before acquiring the reservable character (art 968 of the Civil
Code), but is not applicable to reservation known asreserva troncal (art 811 of the Civil
Code). In the case of Dizon and Dizon vs. Galang (page 601, ante), this court held that:

* * * As already intimated, the provisions of the law tending to give efficacy to a

reservation by the widowed spouse mentioned in article 968 are applicable to thereserva
troncal provided for in article 811. But as these two reservations vary in some respects,
these rules may be applied to the reserva troncal only in so far as the latter is similar to a
reservation by the widowed spouse. In the reserva troncal the property goes to the
reservor as reservable property and it remains so until the reservation takes place or is
extinguished. In a reservation by the widowed spouse there are two distinct stages, one
when the property goes to the widower without being reservable, and the other when the
widower contracts a second marriage, whereupon the property, which theretofore has
been in his possession free of any encumbrance, becomes reservable. These two stages
also affect differently the transfer that may be made of the property. If the property is sold
during the first stage, before becoming reservable, it is absolutely free and is transferred to
the purchaser unencumbered. But if the sale is made during the second stage, that is,
when the duty to reserve has arisen, the property goes to the purchaser subject to the
reservation, without prejudice to the provisions of the Mortgage Law. This is the reason

21 | S U C C E S S I O N

why the law provides that should the property be sold before it becomes reservable, or
before the widower contracts another marriage, he will be compelled to secure the value of
the property by a mortgage upon contracting a new marriage, so that the reservation may
not lose its efficacy and that the rights of those for whom the reservation is made may be
assured. This mortgage is not required by law when the sale is made after the reservation
will follow the property, without prejudice to the contrary provisions of the Mortgage Law
and the rights of innocent purchasers, there being no need to secure the value of the
property since it is liable for the efficacy of the reservation by a widowed spouse to secure
the value of the property sold by the widower, before becoming reservable are not

SANTOS, ROSA BUENA VENTURA, ZENAIDA P. DELOS SANTOS VDA. DE MATEO,

LEONILA P. DELOS SANTOS, ELVIRA P. DELOS SANTOS VDA. DE JOSE, TERESITA P.
DELOS SANTOS-CABUHAT, MERCEDITA P. DELOS SANTOS, LYDIA P. DELOS SANTOS
VDA. DE HILARIO, PERFECTO P. DELOS SANTOS, JR., and CECILIA M.
MENDOZA, Respondents.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure the return of a reservable
property to the third degree relatives belonging to the line from which the property
originally came, and avoid its being dissipated into and by the relatives of the inheriting
ascendant.1
The Facts

applicable to the reserva troncal where the property goes to the ascendant already
reservable in character. A sale in the case of reserva troncalmight be analogous to a sale
made by the widower after contacting a second marriage in the case of a reservation by
the widowed spouse.

Since Maria Corral did not appeal, we cannot modify the appealed judgment in so far as it
is unfavorable to her. As she has been ordered to record in the registry the reservable
character of the other parcels of land, the subject of this action, the questions raised by
the appellant as to her are decided.

The judgment appealed from is modified and Pablo Rocha is ordered to record in the
registry of deeds the reservable character of parcels 10 11, the subject of this complaint,
without special pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

G.R. No. 176422

March 20, 2013
MARIA MENDOZA, in her own capacity and as Attorney-in-fact of DEOGRACIAS,
MARCELA, DIONISIA, ADORA CION, all surnamed MENDOZA, REMEDIOS
MONTILLA, FELY BAUTISTA, JULIANA GUILALAS and ELVIRA MENDOZA, Petitioners,
vs.
JULIA POLl CARPIO DELOS SANTOS, substituted by her heirs, CARMEN P. DELOS

22 | S U C C E S S I O N

The properties subject in the instant case are three parcels of land located in Sta. Maria,
Bulacan: (1) Lot 1681-B, with an area of 7,749 square meters; 2 (2) Lot 1684, with an area
of 5,667 sq m;3 and (3) Lot No. 1646-B, with an area of 880 sq m. 4 Lot Nos. 1681-B and
1684 are presently in the name of respondent Julia Delos Santos 5(respondent). Lot No.
1646-B, on the other hand, is also in the name of respondent but co-owned by Victoria
Pantaleon, who bought one-half of the property from petitioner Maria Mendoza and her
siblings.
Petitioners are grandchildren of Placido Mendoza (Placido) and Dominga Mendoza
(Dominga). Placido and Dominga had four children: Antonio, Exequiel, married to Leonor,
Apolonio and Valentin. Petitioners Maria, Deogracias, Dionisia, Adoracion, Marcela and
Ricardo are the children of Antonio. Petitioners Juliana, Fely, Mercedes, Elvira and
Fortunato, on the other hand, are Valentins children. Petitioners alleged that the properties
were part of Placido and Domingas properties that were subject of an oral partition and
subsequently adjudicated to Exequiel. After Exequiels death, it passed on to his spouse
Leonor and only daughter, Gregoria. After Leonors death, her share went to Gregoria. In
1992, Gregoria died intestate and without issue. They claimed that after Gregorias death,
respondent, who is Leonors sister, adjudicated unto herself all these properties as the sole
surviving heir of Leonor and Gregoria. Hence, petitioners claim that the properties should
have been reserved by respondent in their behalf and must now revert back to them,
applying Article 891 of the Civil Code on reserva troncal.
Respondent, however, denies any obligation to reserve the properties as these did not
originate from petitioners familial line and were not originally owned by Placido and
Dominga. According to respondent, the properties were bought by Exequiel and Antonio
from a certain Alfonso Ramos in 1931. It appears, however, that it was only Exequiel who
was in possession of the properties.6

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 6, found merit in petitioners
claim and granted their action for Recovery of Possession by Reserva Troncal, Cancellation
of TCT and Reconveyance. In its Decision dated November 4, 2002, the RTC disposed as
follows:

A.
THE HONORABLE [CA] GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SUBJECT
PROPERTIES ARE NOT RESERVABLE PROPERTIES, COMING AS THEY DO FROM THE
FAMILY LINE OF THE PETITIONERS MENDOZAS.

WHEREFORE, premised from the foregoing judgment is hereby rendered:

B.
1. Ordering respondents (heirs of Julia Policarpio) to reconvey the three (3) parcels
of land subject of this action in the name of the plaintiffs enumerated in the
complaint including intervenor Maria Cecilia M. Mendoza except one-half of the
property described in the old title, TCT No. T-124852(M) which belongs to Victorina
Pantaleon;

THE HONORABLE [CA] GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITIONERS

MENDOZAS DO NOT HAVE A RIGHT TO THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES BY VIRTUE OF
THE LAW ON RESERVA TRONCAL.12

2. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Bulacan to cancel the titles in the name of
Julia Policarpio, TCT No. T-149033(M), T-183631(M) and T-149035(M) and reconvey
the same to the enumerated plaintiffs; and

Petitioners take exception to the ruling of the CA, contending that it is sufficient that the
properties came from the paternal line of Gregoria for it to be subject to reserva troncal.
They also claim the properties in representation of their own predecessors, Antonio and
Valentin, who were the brothers of Exequiel.13

3. No pronouncement as to claims for attorneys fees and damages and costs.

Ruling of the Court

SO ORDERED.7
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed and set aside the RTC decision and
dismissed the complaint filed by petitioners. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision
dated November 16, 2006 provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the November 4, 2002 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Br. 6, Third Judicial Region, Malolos, Bulacan, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Third
Amended Complaint in Civil Case No. 609-M-92 is hereby DISMISSED. Costs against the
Plaintiffs-Appellants.

This petition is one for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The general
rule in this regard is that it should raise only questions of law. There are, however,
admitted exceptions to this rule, one of which is when the CAs findings are contrary to
those of the trial court.14 This being the case in the petition at hand, the Court must now
look into the differing findings and conclusion of the RTC and the CA on the two issues that
arise one, whether the properties in dispute are reservable properties and two, whether
petitioners are entitled to a reservation of these properties.
Article 891 of the Civil Code on reserva troncal
The principle of reserva troncal is provided in Article 891 of the Civil Code:

SO ORDERED.8
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied the same per
Resolution9 dated January 17, 2007.
In dismissing the complaint, the CA ruled that petitioners failed to establish that Placido
and Dominga owned the properties in dispute. 10 The CA also ruled that even assuming that
Placido and Dominga previously owned the properties, it still cannot be subject to reserva
troncal as neither Exequiel predeceased Placido and Dominga nor did Gregoria predecease
Exequiel.11
Now before the Court, petitioners argue that:

23 | S U C C E S S I O N

Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter
may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is
obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the
benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and belong to the line from which said
property came. (Emphasis ours)
There are three (3) lines of transmission in reserva troncal. The first transmission is by
gratuitous title, whether by inheritance or donation, from an ascendant/brother/sister to a
descendant called the prepositus. The second transmission is by operation of law from the
prepositus to the other ascendant or reservor, also called the reservista. The third and last
transmission is from the reservista to the reservees or reservatarios who must be relatives
within the third degree from which the property came.15

The
lineal
character
reservable
property
is
from
the
ascendant
from
prepositus
received
the
gratuitous title

of
whom
property

the
reckoned
the
by

Based on the circumstances of the present case, Article 891 on reserva troncal is not
applicable.

(3) The reservor (reservista), the other ascendant who obtained the property from
the prepositus by operation of law; and
(4) The reservee (reservatario) who is within the third degree from the prepositus
and who belongs to the (linea o tronco) from which the property came and for
whom the property should be reserved by the reservor. 16
It should be pointed out that the ownership of the properties should be reckoned only from
Exequiels as he is the ascendant from where the first transmission occurred, or from
whom Gregoria inherited the properties in dispute. The law does not go farther than such
ascendant/brother/sister in determining the lineal character of the property. 17 It was also
immaterial for the CA to determine whether Exequiel predeceased Placido and Dominga or
whether Gregoria predeceased Exequiel. What is pertinent is that Exequiel owned the
properties and he is the ascendant from whom the properties in dispute originally came.
Gregoria, on the other hand, is the descendant who received the properties from Exequiel
by gratuitous title.
Moreover, Article 891 simply requires that the property should have been acquired by the
descendant or prepositus from an ascendant by gratuitous or lucrative title. A transmission
is gratuitous or by gratuitous title when the recipient does not give anything in return.18 At
risk of being repetitious, what was clearly established in this case is that the properties in
dispute were owned by Exequiel (ascendant). After his death, Gregoria
(descendant/prepositus) acquired the properties as inheritance.
Ascendants,
collateral
964 of the Civil Code

The fallacy in the CAs resolution is that it proceeded from the erroneous premise that
Placido is the ascendant contemplated in Article 891 of the Civil Code. From thence, it
sought to trace the origin of the subject properties back to Placido and Dominga,
determine whether Exequiel predeceased Placido and whether Gregoria predeceased
Exequiel.
The persons involved in reserva troncal are:
(1) The ascendant or brother or sister from whom the property was received by the
descendant by lucrative or gratuitous title;
(2) The descendant or prepositus (propositus) who received the property;

24 | S U C C E S S I O N

descendants
relatives

under

and
Article

Article 891 provides that the person obliged to reserve the property should be an
ascendant (also known as the reservor/reservista) of the descendant/prepositus. Julia,
however, is not Gregorias ascendant; rather, she is Gregorias collateral relative.
Article 964 of the Civil Code provides for the series of degrees among ascendants and
descendants, and those who are not ascendants and descendants but come from a
common ancestor, viz:
Art. 964. A series of degrees forms a line, which may be either direct or
collateral.1wphi1 A direct line is that constituted by the series of degrees among
ascendants and descendants.
A collateral line is that constituted by the series of degrees among persons who are not
ascendants and descendants, but who come from a common ancestor. (Emphasis and
italics ours)

Gregorias ascendants are her parents, Exequiel and Leonor, her grandparents, greatgrandparents and so on. On the other hand, Gregorias descendants, if she had one, would
be her children, grandchildren and great-grandchildren. Not being Gregorias ascendants,
both petitioners and Julia, therefore, are her collateral relatives. In determining the
collateral line of relationship, ascent is made to the common ancestor and then descent to
the relative from whom the computation is made. In the case of Julias collateral
relationship with Gregoria, ascent is to be made from Gregoria to her mother Leonor (one
line/degree), then to the common ancestor, that is, Julia and Leonors parents (second
line/degree), and then descent to Julia, her aunt (third line/degree). Thus, Julia is Gregorias
collateral relative within the third degree and not her ascendant.
First
cousins
descendant/prepositus
degree
relatives
considered reservees/reservatarios

of
are
and

cannot

the
fourth
be

Moreover, petitioners cannot be considered reservees/reservatarios as they are not

relatives within the third degree of Gregoria from whom the properties came. The person
from whom the degree should be reckoned is the descendant/prepositusthe one at the
end of the line from which the property came and upon whom the property last revolved
by descent.19 It is Gregoria in this case. Petitioners are Gregorias fourth degree relatives,
being her first cousins. First cousins of the prepositus are fourth degree relatives and are
not reservees or reservatarios.20
They cannot even claim representation of their predecessors Antonio and Valentin as
Article 891 grants a personal right of reservation only to the relatives up to the third
degree from whom the reservable properties came. The only recognized exemption is in
the case of nephews and nieces of the prepositus, who have the right to represent their
ascendants (fathers and mothers) who are the brothers/sisters of the prepositus and
relatives within the third degree.21 In Florentino v. Florentino,22 the Court stated:
Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession, when there are relatives of
the descendant within the third degree, the right of the nearest relative, called
reservatario, over the property which the reservista (person holding it subject to
reservation) should return to him, excludes that of the one more remote. The right of
representation cannot be alleged when the one claiming same as a reservatario of the
reservable property is not among the relatives within the third degree belong to the line
from which such property came, inasmuch as the right granted by the Civil Code in Article
811 now Article 891 is in the highest degree personal and for the exclusive benefit of the
designated persons who are the relatives, within the third degree, of the person from
whom the reservable property came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth and the succeeding
degrees can never be considered as reservatarios, since the law does not recognize them
as such.

25 | S U C C E S S I O N

x x x Nevertheless there is right of representation on the part of reservatarios who are

within the third degree mentioned by law, as in the case of nephews of the deceased
person from whom the reservable property came. x x x. 23 (Emphasis and underscoring
ours)
The conclusion, therefore, is that while it may appear that the properties are reservable in
character, petitioners cannot benefit from reserva troncal. First, because Julia, who now
holds the properties in dispute, is not the other ascendant within the purview of Article 891
of the Civil Code and second, because petitioners are not Gregorias relatives within the
third degree. Hence, the CAs disposition that the complaint filed with the RTC should be
dismissed, only on this point, is correct. If at all, what should apply in the distribution of
Gregorias estate are Articles 1003 and 1009 of the Civil Code, which provide:
Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving
spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in
accordance with the following articles.
Art. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of brothers or sisters,
the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by reason of
relationship by the whole blood.
Nevertheless, the Court is not in the proper position to determine the proper distribution of
Gregorias estate at this point as the cause of action relied upon by petitioners in their
complaint filed with the RTC is based solely on reserva troncal. Further, any determination
would necessarily entail reception of evidence on Gregorias entire estate and the heirs
entitled thereto, which is best accomplished in an action filed specifically for that purpose.
A
the
reservation
extinguished

reservista
reservable
takes

acquires
property
place

ownership
until
or

of
the
is

Before concluding, the Court takes note of a palpable error in the RTCs disposition of the
case. In upholding the right of petitioners over the properties, the RTC ordered the
reconveyance of the properties to petitioners and the transfer of the titles in their names.
What the RTC should have done, assuming for arguments sake that reserva troncal is
applicable, is have the reservable nature of the property registered on respondents titles.
In fact, respondent, as reservista, has the duty to reserve and to annotate the reservable
character of the property on the title. 24 In reserva troncal, the reservista who inherits from
a prepositus, whether by the latters wish or by operation of law, acquires the inheritance

by virtue of a title perfectly transferring absolute ownership. All the attributes of ownership
belong to him exclusively.25

discussion does not detract from the fact that petitioners are not entitled to a reservation
of the properties in dispute.

The reservor has the legal title and dominion to the reservable property but subject to the
resolutory condition that such title is extinguished if the reservor predeceased the
reservee. The reservor is a usufructuary of the reservable property. He may alienate it
subject to the reservation. The transferee gets the revocable and conditional ownership of
the reservor. The transferees rights are revoked upon the survival of the reservees at the
time of the death of the reservor but become indefeasible when the reservees predecease
the reservor.26(Citations omitted)

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 16, 2006 and
Resolution dated January 17, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 77694 insofar
as it dismissed the Third Amended Complaint in Civil Case No. 609-M-92 are AFFIRMED.
This Decision is without prejudice to any civil action that the heirs of Gregoria

It is when the reservation takes place or is extinguished, 27 that a reservatario becomes, by

operation of law, the owner of the reservable property. 28 In any event, the foregoing

SO ORDERED.

26 | S U C C E S S I O N

Mendoza may file for the settlement of her estate or for the determination of ownership of
the properties in question.