I.

Land Ownership in the Philippines

Valenton vs Marciano 3 Phil. Reports 537, 2 Off. Gaz.,
434, March 30, 1904

Cansino vs Valdez
G.R. No. L-2468, July 16, 1906
FACTS:
The decision in this case was announced on the
30th of April, 1906. The grounds of that decision are as
follows:
The case is almost identical with the case of
Valenton vs. Murciano (which resolved the question of
which is the better basis for ownership of land: long-time
occupation or paper title. Plaintiffs had entered into
peaceful occupation of the subject land in 1860.
Defendant's predecessor-in-interest, on the other hand,
purchased the land from the provincial treasurer of Tarlac
in 1892. The lower court ruled against the plaintiffs on the
ground that they had lost all rights to the land by not
objecting to the administrative sale. Plaintiffs appealed the
judgment, asserting that their 30-year adverse possession,
as an extraordinary period of prescription in the Partidas
and the Civil Code, had given them title to the land as
against everyone, including the State; and that the State,
not owning the land, could not validly transmit it.)
Magdalena Cansino, bought the property in
question, as public lands of the State from the Spanish
Government and received a deed therefor on the 27th of
October, 1893. In the former case of Valenton vs. Murciano
, the plaintiffs went into possession of the land in 1860 and
claimed ownership thereof by the extraordinary prescription
of thirty years. In this case some of the defendants testified
that they went into possession in 1862 and they claimed
the ownership of this land by the same extraordinary
prescription.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lands occupied and possessed
by Cansino for almost three decades could ripen into
adverse possession by virtue of extraordinary prescription.
HELD:
In Valenton vs. Murciano, the court decided that
title to lands such as were involved in that case could not
be acquired by prescription while they were the property of
the State. The decision in that case governs and controls
this case and upon its authority judgment in this case was
affirmed.

Cario vs Insular Government

212 U. S., 449
Facts:
On June 23, 1903, Mateo Cario went to the
Court of Land Registration (CLR) to petition his inscription
as the owner of a 146 hectare land hes been possessing
in the then municipality of Baguio. Mateo only presented
possessory information and no other documentation. The
application was granted by the court on March 4, 1904. An
appeal was taken to the court of first instance of the
province of Benguet, on behalf of the government of the
Philippines, and also on behalf of the United States, those
governments having taken possession of the property for
public and military purposes. The court of first instance
found the facts and dismissed the application upon
grounds of law. The State opposed the petition averring
that the land is part of the US military reservation. The CLR
ruled in favor of Mateo. The State appealed. Mateo lost.
Mateo averred that a grant should be given to him by
reason of immemorial use and occupation as in the
previous cases Cansino vs Valdez and Tiglao vs

Government;and that the right of the State over said land

has prescribed.
ISSUE: Whether or not Mateo is the rightful owner of the
land by virtue of his possession of it for some time.
HELD:
No. The statute of limitations did not run against
the government. The government is still the absolute owner
of the land (regalian doctrine). Further, Mateos possession
of the land has not been of such a character as to require
the presumption of a grant. No one has lived upon it for
many years. It was never used for anything but pasturage
of animals, except insignificant portions thereof, and since
the insurrection against Spain it has apparently not been
used by Cariofor any purpose.
In view of these provisions of the law, it seems to
us impossible to say that as to the public agricultural lands
in the Philippines there existed a conclusive presumption
after a lapse of thirty or any other number of years that the
Government of Spain had granted to the possessor thereof
a legal title thereto.
While the State has always recognized the right of
the occupant to a deed if he proves a possession for a
sufficient length of time, yet it has always insisted that he
must make that proof before the proper administrative
officers, and obtain from them his deed, and until he did the
State remained the absolute owner.

Jones vs. Insular Government

G.R. No. L-2506 ; April 16, 1906; 6 Phil 122
Facts:
F. Stewart Jones presented a petition to the Court
of Land Registration asking that he be inscribed as the
owner of a certain tract of land situatd in the Province of
Benguet, and within the reservation defined in Act No. 636.
The Solicitor-General appeared in the court below and
opposed the inscription upon the ground that the property
was public land. At the trial he objected to any
consideration of the case on the ground that the court had
no jurisdiction to register land situated in that reservation.
The objections were overruled and judgment entered in
favor of the petitioner, from which judgment the
Government appealed to this court.
The act creating the Court of Land Registration (No. 496)
gave it jurisdiction throughout the Archipelago. By Act No.
1224, which was approved August 31, 1904, and which
applied to pending cases, the court was deprived of
jurisdiction over lands situated in the Province of Benguet.
That act, however, contained a proviso by which the court
was given jurisdiction over applications for registration of
title to land in all cases coming within the provisions of Act
No. 648. It is therefore requested that the land mentioned
be forthwith brought under the operation of the Land
Registration Act and become registered land in the
meaning thereof, and that you proceed in accordance with
the provisions of Act No. 648. The court of Land
Registration, acting upon this notice from the Governor,
issued the notice required by Act No. 627, and in
pursuance of that notice Jones, the appellee, within the six
months referred to in the notice, presented his petition
asking that the land be registered in his name.
First claim of the Government is that the
provisions of Act No. 648 were not complied with in the
respect that this letter of the Governor did not amount to a
certificate that the lands had been reserved.
Act No. 648 conferred power upon the Governor
to reserve lands for public purposes, but it did not make
that power exclusive. The Commission did not thereby
deprive itself of the power to itself make reservations in the
future, if it saw fit; neither did it intend to annul any
reservations which it had formerly made. The contention of

the Government is true when applied to a case where the

land has not been reserved by the Commission. In such a
case it would be the duty of the Governor to first reserve it
by an executive order, and then to give notice to the Court
of Land Registration, but where the land had already been
reserved by competent authority, it not only was not
necessary for the Governor to issue any executive order
reserving the land but he had no power to do so. In such
cases the only duty imposed upon him was to give notice
to the Court of Land Registration that the land had been
reserved. This notice was given in the letter above quoted.
The court had jurisdiction to try the case.
Petitioner Jones, bought the land in question from
Sioco Cario, an Igorot. He caused his deed to the land to
be recorded in the office of the registrar of property. Prior
thereto, and while Sioco Cario was in possession of the
land, he commenced proceedings in court for the purpose
of obtaining a possessory information in accordance with
the provisions of the Mortgage Law. This possessory
information he caused to be recorded in the office of the
registrar of property. The evidence of Sioco Carino shows
that what he did in the way of presenting a petition to the
Spanish Government in regard to a deed of the land was
done by order of the then comandante, and was limited to
securing a measurement thereof, as he then believed.
These acts did not interrupt the running of the statute of
limitations.
Issue:
Whether or not the provision is void that the act
thereby disposes of public lands that Congress is the only
authority that can take such action, and that it has never
authorized or approved the action of the Commission in
applying the statute of limitations to proceedings under
Acts Nos. 648 and 627.
Held:
We do not think that this contention can be
sustained. Section 12 of the act of Congress of July 1,
1902, provides as follows:
SEC. 12. That all the property and rights which
may have been acquired in the Philippine Islands by the
United States under the treaty of peace with Spain, signed
December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight,
except such land or other property as shall be designated
by the President of the United States for military and other
reservations of the Government of the United States, are
hereby placed under the control of the Government of said
Islands, to be administered for the benefit of the inhabitants
thereof, except as provided in this act.
This gives the Government of the Philippine
Islands power to dispose of these lands, and of all public
lands, and to pass the law in question, unless there is
some provision in other parts of the act of July 1, 1902,
which takes away or limits that power. The government
says that such limitation is found in section 13 of the act.
That section and sections 14 and 15 are as follows:
SEC. 13. That the Government of the Philippine
Islands, subject to the provisions of this Act and except as
herein provided, shall classify according to its agricultural
character and productiveness, and shall immediately make
rules and regulations for the lease, sale, or other
disposition of the public lands other than timber or mineral
lands, but such rules and regulations shall not go into effect
or have the force of law until they have received the
approval of the President, and when approved by the
President they shall be submitted by him to Congress at
the beginning of the next ensuing session thereof and
unless disapproved or amended by Congress at said
session they shall at the close of such period have the
force and effect of law in the Philippine Islands: Provided,
That a single homestead entry shall not exceed sixteen
hectares in extent.
SEC. 14. That the Government of the Philippine

Islands is hereby authorized and empowered to enact rules

and regulations and to prescribe terms and conditions to
enable persons to perfect their title to public lands in said
Islands, who, prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain
to the United States, had fulfilled all or some of the
conditions required by the Spanish laws and royal decrees
of the Kingdom of Spain for the acquisition of legal title
thereto, yet failed to secure conveyance of title; and the
Philippine Commission is authorized to issue patents,
without compensation, to any native of said Islands,
conveying title to any tract of land not more than sixteen
hectares in extent, which were public lands and had been
actually occupied by such native or his ancestors prior to
and on the thirteenth of August, eighteen hundred and
ninety-eight.
SEC. 15. That the Government of the Philippine
Islands is hereby authorized and empowered, on such
terms as it may prescribe, by general legislation, to provide
for the granting or sale and conveyance to actual
occupants and settlers and other citizens of said Islands
such parts and portions of the public domain, other than
timber and mineral lands, of the United States in said
Islands as it may deem wise, not exceeding sixteen
hectares to any one person, and for the sale and
conveyance of not more than one thousand and twentyfour hectares to any corporation or association of persons:
Provided, That the grant or sale of such lands, whether the
purchase price be paid at once or in partial payments, shall
be conditioned upon actual and continued occupancy,
improvement, and cultivation of the premises sold for a
period of not less than five years, during which time the
purchaser or grantee can not alienate or encumber said
land or the title thereto; but such restriction shall not apply
to transfers of rights and title of inheritance under the laws
for the distribution of the estates of decedents.
It is first to be noted that section 13 does not apply
to all lands. Timber and mineral lands are expressly
excluded. If the Commission should pass laws relating to
mineral lands without submitting them to Congress, as it
has done (Act No. 624), their validity would not be
determined by inquiring if they had been submitted to
Congress under section 13, but rather by inquiring if they
were inconsistent with other provisions of the act relating to
mineral lands. In other words, the fact that such laws were
not submitted to Congress would not necessarily make
them void.
The same is true of legislation relating to coal lands, as to
which sections 53 and 57 contain provisions. By section 57
this Government is authorized to issue all needful rules and
regulations for carrying into effect this and preceding
sections relating to mineral lands. Such regulations need
not be submitted to Congress for its approval. Act No.
1128, relating to coal lands, was not submitted.
The act of Congress also contains provisions regarding the
purchase of lands belonging to religious orders. Section 65
provides as to those lands as follows:
SEC. 65. That all lands acquired by virtue of the
preceding section shall constitute a part and portion of the
public property of the Government of the Philippine Islands,
and may be held, sold, and conveyed, or leased
temporarily for a period not exceeding three years after
their acquisition by said Government, on such terms and
conditions as it may prescribe, subject to the limitations
and conditions provided for in this Act. . . . Actual settlers
and occupants at the time said lands are acquired by the
Government shall have the preference over all others to
lease, purchase, or acquire their holdings within such
reasonable time as may be determined by said
Government.
Does the clause "subject to the limitations and conditions of
this act" require a submission to Congress of legislation
concerning such land? If it does, then Act No. 1120, which
contains such provisions, is void, because it was never so
submitted.

Section 18 of the act of Congress provides as

follows:
That the forest laws and regulations now in force in the
Philippine Islands, with such modifications and
amendments as may be made by the Government of said
Islands, are hereby continued in force.
Must these modifications and amendments be submitted to
Congress for its approval? If they must be, then Act No.
1148, relating thereto, is void, because it was not so
submitted.
It seems very clear that rules and regulations
concerning mineral, timber, and coal lands, and lands
bought from religious orders need not be submitted to
Congress. If they are not inconsistent with the provisions of
the act of Congress relating to the same subjects, they are
valid.
Congress, by section 12 of the act, gave to the Philippine
Government general power all property acquired from
Spain. When it required the Commision to immediately
classify the agricultural lands and to make rules and
regulations for their sale, we do not think that it intended to
virtually repeal section 12. Such, however, would be the
effect of the rule contended for by the Govenrment. If,
notwithstanding the provisions of section 12, any law which
in any way directly or indirectly affects injuriously the title of
the Government to public lands must be submitted to the
President and Congress for approval, the general power
given by section 12 is taken away.
There is nothing in section 14 which requires the
rules and regulations therein mentioned to be submitted to
Congress. But it is said that although as to Act No. 648
submission to Congress was not required, it is
nevertheless void when applied to one not a native of the
Islands, because forbidden by this section; and that this
section limits the power of the Commission to declare
possession alone sufficient evidence of title to cases in
which the claimant is native and in which the amount of
land does not exceed 16 hectares. Section 14 is not limited
to agricultural lands, as are sections 13 and 15. It includes
mineral and timber lands. So far as it relates to
proceedings theretofore taken under Spanish laws its
benefits are not limited to natives of the Islands nor to
tracts not more than 16 hectares in extent. Where the only
claim is possession, no possession for any definite time
prior to August 13, 1898, is required, nor is proof of any
possession whatever after that date demanded. According
to the strict letter of the section a native would be entitled to
a patent who proved that he had been in possession for the
months of July and August only of 1898. It is not stated
whether or not one who receives such a patent must
occupy the land for five years thereafter, as required by
section 15. Neither is it stated whether or not a person who
was in possession for the month of August, 1898, would be
entitled to a patent in preference to the actual settler
spoken
The meaning of these sections is not clear, and it is difficult
to give to them a construction that will be entirely free from
objection. But we do not think that authority given by the
Commission to issue to a native a patent for 16 hectares of
land of which he was in possession during the month of
August, 1898, was intended to limit the general power of
control which by section 12 is given to the Commission.

5. Susi vs. Razon and Director of Lands, G.R. No.

L-24066, December 9, 1925

6. Mapa vs. Insular Government, G.R. No. L-3793,

February 19, 1908, 10 Phil.,1753

Cornelio Ramos vs. Director of Lands

(G.R. No. 13298 November 19, 1918)
FACTS:
Restituo Romero gained possession of a
considerable tract of land located in Nueva Ecija. He took
advantage of the Royal Decree to obtain a possessory
information title to the land and was registered as such.
Parcel No. 1 included within the limits of the possessory
information title of Romero was sold to Cornelio Ramos,
herein petitioner.
Ramos instituted appropriate proceedings to have
his title registered. Director of Lands opposed on the
ground that Ramos had not acquired a good title from the
Spanish government. Director of Forestry also opposed on
the ground that the first parcel of land is forest land. It has
been seen however that the predecessor in interest to the
petitioner at least held this tract of land under color of title.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the actual occupancy of a part of
the land described in the instrument giving color of title
sufficient to give title to the entire tract of land?
HELD:
The general rule is that possession and cultivation
of a portion of a tract of land under the claim of ownership
of all is a constructive possession of all, if the remainder is
not in the adverse possession of another. The claimant has
color of title; he acted in good faith and he has open,
peaceable, and notorious possession of a portion of the
property, sufficient to apprise the community and the world
that the land was for his enjoyment.
Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean
that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of
ground before it can be said that he is in possession.
Ramos and his predecessor in interest fulfilled the
requirements of the law on supposition that the premises
consisted of agricultural public land.
On the issue of forest land, Forest reserves of
public land can be established as provided by law. When
the claim of the citizen and the claim of the government as
to a particular piece of property collide, if the Government
desires to demonstrate that the land is in reality a forest,
the Director of Forestry should submit to the court
convincing proof that the land is not more valuable for
agricultural than for forest purposes.
In this case, the mere formal opposition on the
part of the Attorney-General for the Director of Forestry,
unsupported by satisfactory evidence will not stop the
courts from giving title to the claimant. Petitioner and
appellant has proved a title to the entire tract of land for
which he asked for registration. Registration in the name of
the petitioner is hereby granted. The general rule is that
possession and cultivation of a portion of a tract of land
under the claim of ownership of all is a constructive
possession of all, if the remainder is not in the adverse
possession of another.

Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Abella

G.R. No. L-25010 October 27, 1926, (49 Phil. 49)
Facts:
This is a petition for the registration of a certain parcel or
tract of land located in the municipality of San Jose,
Province of Nueva Ecija, Philippine Islands. It appears from
the record that on the 21st day of September, 1915, the
appellant Maria del Rosario presented a petition in the
Court of First Instance for the registration under the Torrens
system, of the very land now in question by virtue of her
appeal.

On the 26th day of April, 1921, when the Acting Director of

Lands presented the petition in the present case for the
registration, under the cadastral survey, of a portion of land
located in the municipality of San Jose, which included the
very land claimed by Maria del Rosario in the former
action.
Upon the issue and the proof adduced in the present case
the Honorable C. Carballo, Auxiliary Judge of the Sixth
Judicial District, ordered registered in the name of Maria
del Rosario, under the cadastral survey, lots 3238, 3240,
3242 and 3243, which are the very lots which had been
ordered registered in her name in the former action. From
that judgment she appealed to this court upon the ground
that the lower court committed an error in not registering all
of the land included in her opposition in her name. She
then presented a motion for rehearing and in support
thereof presents some proof to show that the northern
portion of the land in question is not forestry land but that
much of it is agricultural land.

predecessor in interest would have been entitled to a

decree of registration of the lot had they applied for its
registration; and that he having purchased or acquired it,
the right of his immediate predecessor in interest to a
decree of registration must be deemed also to have been
acquired by him. The benefits provided in the Public Land
Act for applicant;s immediate predecessors in interest
should comply with the condition precedent for the grant of
such benefits. The condition precedent is to apply for the
registration of the land of which they had been i possession
at least since July 26, 1894. The applican;t immediate
predecessors in interest have failed to do so. They did not
have any vested right in the lot amounting to the title which
was transmissible to the applicant. The only right, if it may
thus be called, is their possession of the lot which, tacked
to that of their predecessor in interest, may be availed of by
a qualified person to apply for its registration but not by a
person as the applicant who is disqualified. Thus, it is
urged that the sale of the lot to the applicant should have
been declared null and void. Accordingly, judgment is
reversed and the applicant for registration dismissed.

Issue:
Whether or not there is an error in registering the lands

Ruling:
It was held that no error has been committed. Whether
particular land is more valuable for forestry purposes than
for agricultural purposes, or vice-versa, is a question of fact
and must be established during the trial of the cause.
Whether the particular land is agricultural, forestry, or
mineral is a question to be settled in each particular case,
unless the Bureau of Forestry has, under the authority
conferred upon it, prior to the intervention of private
interest, set aside for forestry or mineral purposes the
particular land in question. (Ankron vs. Government of the
Philippine Islands, 40 Phil., 10.) During the trial of the
present cause the appellant made no effort to show that
the land which she claimed, outside of that which had been
decreed in her favor, was more valuable for agricultural
than forestry purposes.

Oh Cho vs Director of Lands

75 Phil. 890
FACTS:
Oh Cho, the applicant, is an alien, and his
predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the lot from 1880 to
filing of the application for registration on January 17, 1940.
The lower court declared that the sale of the lot to the
applicant was valid. Hence this appeal from a judgment
declaring the registration of a residential lot located in the
municipality of Guinayangan, Province of Tayabas in the
name of the applicant,
ISSUE:
Whether or not Oh Cho is entitled to decree of
registration of the lot, because he is alien, therefore is
disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain.
HELD:
No. The court ruled that the applicant failed to
show title to the lot that may be confirmed under the Land
Registration Act. Moreover, he failed to show that he or any
of his predecessors in interest have acquired the lot from
the Government, either by purchase or by grant, under the
laws, orders and decrees promulgated by the Spanish
Government in the Philippines, or by possessory
information under the Mortgage Law (Sec.19, Act 496). Nor
does the applicant come under the exception, for the
earliest possession of the lot by his predecessors in
interest begun in 1880. It may be argued that under the
provisions of the Public Land Act the applicant immediate

10. Uy Un vs. Perez, 71 Phil. 508 "En Espaol

11. Mindanao vs. Director of Lands, L-19535, July 10,
1967

II. Land Classification

Agencies Involved
DENR vs Yap
(G.R. No. 167707, October 08, 2008)
FACTS:
Boracay Mayor Jose Yap et al filed for declaratory relief to
have a judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of
land for titling purposes for the land theyve been
occupying in Boracay. Yap et al alleged that Proclamation
No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their
right to secure titles over their occupied lands. They
declared that they themselves, or through their
predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in
Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time
immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes
and paid realty taxes on them.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), opposed the petition for declaratory relief. The
OSG countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified
land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of
lands classified as public forest, which was not available
for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code. Since
Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable and
disposable, whatever possession they had cannot ripen
into ownership. RTC Ruled in favor of Yap et al. The OSG
appealed.
G.R. No. 173775
During the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, in May 2006,
then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued
Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay Island into four
hundred (400) hectares of reserved forest land (protection
purposes) and six hundred twenty-eight and 96/100
(628.96) hectares of agricultural land (alienable and
disposable). The Proclamation likewise provided for a
fifteen-meter buffer zone on each side of the centerline of
roads and trails, reserved for right-of-way and which shall

form part of the area reserved for forest land protection

purposes.
Subsequently, Dr. Orlando Sacay, and other Boracay
landowners in Boracay filed with the Supreme Court (SC)
an original petition for prohibition, mandamus, and
nullification of Proclamation No. 1064. They alleged that
the Proclamation infringed on their prior vested rights
over portions of Boracay. They have been in continued
possession of their respective lots in Boracay since time
immemorial. They have also invested billions of pesos in
developing their lands and building internationally
renowned first class resorts on their lots.
The OSG again opposed Sacays petition. The OSG
argued that Sacay et al do not have a vested right over
their occupied portions in the island. Boracay is an
unclassified public forest land pursuant to Section 3(a) of
PD No. 705. Being public forest, the claimed portions of the
island are inalienable and cannot be the subject of judicial
confirmation of imperfect title. It is only the executive
department, not the courts, which has authority to
reclassify lands of the public domain into alienable and
disposable lands. There is a need for a positive
government act in order to release the lots for disposition.
ISSUE:
Whether Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82
pose any legal obstacle for Yap et al and Sacay et al, and
all those similarly situated, to acquire title to their occupied
lands in Boracay Island.
HELD:
Yes. The SC ruled against Yap et al and Sacay et al. The
Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public
domain belong to the State, that the State is the source of
any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with
the conservation of such patrimony. All lands that have not
been acquired from the government, either by purchase or
by grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable
public domain.
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is
required. In keeping with the presumption of State
ownership, there must be a positive act of the government,
such as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable
public land into disposable land for agricultural or other
purposes. In the case at bar, no such proclamation,
executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or
certification was presented. The records are bereft of
evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of
Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a
government proclamation that the land is alienable and
disposable. Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible
evidence, the Court cannot accept the submission that
lands occupied by private claimants were already open to
disposition before 2006. Matters of land classification or
reclassification cannot be assumed.
Also, private claimants also contend that their continued
possession of portions of Boracay Island for the requisite
period of ten (10) years under Act No. 926 ipso facto
converted the island into private ownership. Private
claimants continued possession under Act No. 926 does
not create a presumption that the land is alienable. It is
plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine
Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, mere possession
by private individuals of lands creates the legal
presumption that the lands are alienable and disposable.
Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title under CA No. 141. Neither do
they have vested rights over the occupied lands under the
said law. There are two requisites for judicial confirmation

of imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely:

(1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of the subject land by himself or through
his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of
ownership since time immemorial or from June 12, 1945;
and
(2) the classification of the land as alienable and
disposable land of the public domain.
The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are
insufficient to prove the first element of possession. The
SC noted that the earliest of the tax declarations in the
name of private claimants were issued in 1993. Being of
recent dates, the tax declarations are not sufficient to
convince this Court that the period of possession and
occupation commenced on June 12, 1945.
Yap et al and Sacay et al insist that they have a vested
right in Boracay, having been in possession of the island
for a long time. They have invested millions of pesos in
developing the island into a tourist spot. They say their
continued possession and investments give them a vested
right which cannot be unilaterally rescinded by
Proclamation No. 1064.
The continued possession and considerable investment of
private claimants do not automatically give them a vested
right in Boracay. Nor do these give them a right to apply for
a title to the land they are presently occupying. The SC is
constitutionally bound to decide cases based on the
evidence presented and the laws applicable. As the law
and jurisprudence stand, private claimants are ineligible to
apply for a judicial confirmation of title over their occupied
portions in Boracay even with their continued possession
and considerable investment in the island.

Agricultural Land
de Aldecoa vs Insular Government
(G.R. No. 3894. March 12, 1909)
Facts:
Juan Ibaez de Aldecoa applied for the registration of his
title to a parcel of land, situated in the town of Surigao; a
plan and technical description of said parcel was attached
to his application.
After the formalities of the law were complied with, and an
opinion of the examiner of titles opposing the request of the
applicant, had been rendered, the Attorney-General
objected to the registration applied for, alleging that the
land in question was the property of the Government of the
United States, and is now under the control of the Insular
Government.
Aldecoa, amended his former petition, and relying upon the
provisions of paragraph 5 and 6 of section 54 of Act No.
926, alleged that at the time he requested the registration
of the land in question, comprised in the plan then
submitted, the aforesaid Act No. 926 was not yet in force,
and as the latter affords better facilities for securing titles to
property unprovided with them, as in the case with the land
in question, the applicant availing himself of the benefits
granted by the said Act, prayed that the same be applied to
the inscription of his land.
Issue:
Whether or not a parcel of land that is susceptible of being
cultivated, and, ceasing to be agricultural land, was
converted into a building lot, is subject to the legal
provisions in force regarding Government public lands

which may be alienated in favor of private individuals or

corporations.
Ruling:
Any parcel of land or building lot is susceptible of
cultivation, and may be converted into a field, and planted
with all kind of vegetation; for this reason, where land is not
mining or forestall in its nature, it must necessarily be
included within the classification of agricultural land, not
because it is actually used for the purposes of agriculture,
but because it was originally agricultural and may again
become so under other circumstances.
The SC said in special cases like the present one, wherein
is sought the registration of a lot situated within a town
created and acknowledged administratively, it is proper to
apply thereto the laws in force and classify it as agricultural
land, inasmuch as it was agricultural prior to its conversion
into a building lot, and is subject at any time to further
rotation and cultivation; moreover, it does not appear that it
was ever mining or forest land.
Article 1 of the royal decree states: "Vacant lands, soils,
grounds, and mountains in the Philippine Islands shall be
deemed to be alienable Crown lands, provided they are not
included within the following exceptions: (1) Those of
private ownership; (2) those belonging to the forest zone;
(3) those comprised in the communal laws, or within zones
reserved for the use in common by residents of the
community; and (4) those lands which are susceptible of
private appropriation by means of composition or
possessory information.
It is deduced that, with the exception of those comprised
within the mineral and timber zone, all lands owned by the
State or by the sovereign nation are public in character,
and per se alienable and, provided they are not destined to
the use of the public in general or reserved by the
Government in accordance with law, they may be acquired
by any private or judicial person; and considering their
origin and primitive state and the general uses to which
they were accorded, they are called agricultural lands,
urban lands or building lots being included in this
classification for the purpose of distinguishing rural and
urban estates from mineral and timber lands; the
transformation they may have undergone is no obstacle to
such classification as the possessors thereof may again
convert them into rural estates.

Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds of Manila

(18 G.R. No. L-630. November 15, 1947)
Facts:
Alexander Krivenko, an alien, bought a residential lot from
Magdalena Estate Inc. in December 1941. The registration
was interrupted by the war. In May 1945, he sought to
accomplish the said registration but was denied by the
Register of Deeds of Manila on the grounds that he is a
foreigner and he cannot acquire a land in this jurisdiction.
Krivenko brought the case to the CFI of Manila. The CFI
ruled that he cannot own a land, being an alien. Hence, this
petition.
Issue:
Whether or not an alien may own private lands in the
Philippines.
Held:
No. Sec. 1, Art 13 of the Constitution talks about the
conservation and utilization of natural resources. The said
provision embraces all lands of any kind of the public
domain. Its purpose is to establish a permanent and

fundamental policy for the conservation and utilization of all

natural resources of the nation. Although it mentions
agricultural, timber, and mineral lands, the court held that in
determining whether a parcel of land is agricultural, the test
is not only whether it is actually agricultural, but also its
susceptibility to cultivation for agricultural purposes. Hence,
public agricultural land was construed as referring to
those lands that were not timber or mineral. Therefore, it
includes residential lands.

Mineral Lands
Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co. vs. Dumyung
(GR No. L-31666, April 20, 1929)
Facts:
The Republic of the Philippines, represented by
the Director of Lands, commenced in the Court of First
Instance of Baguio City for annulment of Free Patents Nos.
V-152242, V-155050 and V-152243, and of the
corresponding Original Certificates of Title Nos. P-208,
P-210 and P-209, on the ground of misrepresentation and
false data and informations furnished by the defendants,
Manuel Dumyung, Fortunate Dumyung and Dumyung
Bonayan, respectively. the land embraced in the patents
and titles are Identified as Lots 1, 2 and 3 of survey plan
Psu-181763 containing a total area of 58.4169 hectares,
more or less, and situated in the Municipal District of
Mankayan, Sub-province of Benguet, Mountain Province.
The Register of Deeds of Baguio City was made a formal
party defendant.
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the same
on the ground that they had complied with all the legal
requirements in the acquisition of their patents which were
duly issued by the Director of Lands and that they are not
guilty of the alleged falsification of public documents.
The Court of First Instance of Baguio, Branch I,
dismissed the three (3) civil cases because the same were
duly registered with the office of the Register of Deeds of
Baguio and Benguet, pursuant to the provisions of Sec.
122 of Act 496, as amended, and consequently, these
properties became the private properties of the defendants,
under the operation of Sec. 38 of said Act; hence, these
titles enjoy the same privileges and safeguards as Torrens
titles (Director of Lands vs. Heirs of Ciriaco Carle, G. R.
No. L-12485, July 31, 1964). It is therefore clear that OCT
Nos. P-208, P-209 and P-210 belonging to the defendants
are now indefeasible and this Court has no power to
disturb such indefeasibility of said titles, let alone cancel
the same.
The records of this case further disclose that the
defendants are ignorant natives of Benguet Province and
are members of the so-called Cultural Minorities of
Mountain Province.
Issue:
Whether or not the Original Certificate of Title of
private respondents were 'indefeasible' simply because
that they were issued pursuant to the registration of the
free patents of the private respondents and whether or not
they are entitled to the benefit of R.A 3872.
Held: No!
Doctrine: A certificate of title is void when it covers
property of the public domain classified as forest or timber
and mineral lands. Any title issued on non-disposable lots
even in the hands of alleged innocent purchaser for value,
shall be cancelled.

Timber and mineral lands are not alienable or disposable.

The pertinent provisions of the Public Land Act,
Commonwealth Act No. 141, provide:
Sec. 2. The provisions of this Act shall apply to the lands of
the public domain; but timber and mineral lands shag be
governed by special laws and nothing in this Act provided
shall be understood or construed to change or modify the
administration and disposition of the lands commonly
called 'friar lands' and those which being privately owned,
have reverted to or become the property of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines, which administration
and disposition shall be governed by the laws at present in
force or which may hereafter be enacted.
Sec. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to
time classify the lands of the public domain into
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Timber, and
(c) Mineral lands,
and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such
lands from one class to another, for the purposes of their
administration and disposition.
Likewise, the trial court assumed without any factual basis
that the private respondents are entitled to the benefits of
Republic Act 3872. The pertinent provision of Republic Act
No, 3872 reads:
SECTION 1. A new paragraph is hereby added 1--o
Section 44 of Commonwealth Act Numbered One Hundredd forty-one, to read as follows:
SEC. 44. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who is
not the owner of more than twenty-four hectares and who
since July fourth, ninth hundred and twenty-six or prior
thereto, has continuously occupied and cultivated, either
by, himself' or through his predecessors-in-interest. a tract
or tracts of agricultural public lands subject to dispositionor who shall have paid the real estate tax thereon while the
same has, not been occupied by any person shall be
entitled, under the provision of this chapter, to have a free
patent issued to him for such tract or tracts of such land not
to exceed twenty-four hectares.
A member of the national cultural minorities who has
continuously occupied and cultivated, either by himself or
through his predecessors-in- interest, a tract or tracts of
land, whether disposable or not since July 4, 1955, shall be
entitled to the right granted in the preceding paragraph of
this section: Provided, That at the time he files his free
patent application he is not the owner of any real property
secured or disposable under this provision of the Public
Land Law.

Republic vs. Court of Appeals and dela Rosa

(GR No. L-43938, April 15, 1988)
Facts:
These cases arose from the application for
registration of a parcel of land filed on February 11, 1965,
by Jose de la Rosa on his own behalf and on behalf of his
three children, Victoria, Benjamin and Eduardo. The land,
situated in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet Province, was divided
into 9 lots and covered by plan Psu-225009. According to
the application, Lots 1-5 were sold to Jose de la Rosa and
Lots 6-9 to his children by Mamaya Balbalio and Jaime
Alberto, respectively, in 1964. The application was

separately opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. as to

Lots 1-5, Atok Big Wedge Corporation, as to Portions of
Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9, and by the Republic of the
Philippines, through the Bureau of Forestry Development,
as to lots 1-9.
In support of the application, both Balbalio and
Alberto testified that they had acquired the subject land by
virtue of prescription Balbalio claimed to have received
Lots 1-5 from her father shortly after the Liberation.
Benguet opposed on the ground that the June Bug mineral
claim covering Lots 1-5 was sold to it on September 22,
1934, by the successors-in-interest of James Kelly, who
located the claim in September 1909 and recorded it on
October 14, 1909. From the date of its purchase, Benguet
had been in actual, continuous and exclusive possession of
the land in concept of owner, as evidenced by its
construction of adits, its affidavits of annual assessment, its
geological mappings, geological samplings and trench side
cuts, and its payment of taxes on the land.
For its part, Atok alleged that a portion of Lots 1-5
and all of Lots 6-9 were covered by the Emma and Fredia
mineral claims located by Harrison and Reynolds on
December 25, 1930, and recorded on January 2, 1931, in
the office of the mining recorder of Baguio. These claims
were purchased from these locators on November 2, 1931,
by Atok, which has since then been in open, continuous
and exclusive possession of the said lots as evidenced by
its annual assessment work on the claims, such as the
boring of tunnels, and its payment of annual taxes thereon.
The Bureau of Forestry Development also
interposed its objection, arguing that the land sought to be
registered was covered by the Central Cordillera Forest
Reserve under Proclamation No. 217 dated February 16,
1929. Moreover, by reason of its nature, it was not subject
to alienation under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973.
The trial court denied the application, holding that
the applicants had failed to prove their claim of possession
and ownership of the land sought to be registered. The
applicants appealed to the respondent court, which
reversed the trial court and recognized the claims of the
applicant, but subject to the rights of Benguet and Atok
respecting their mining claims. In other words, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the surface rights of the de la Rosas over
the land while at the same time reserving the sub-surface
rights of Benguet and Atok by virtue of their mining claims.
Both Benguet and Atok have appealed to this Court,
invoking their superior right of ownership.
Issue:
Whether respondent courts decision, that the
surface rights of the de la Rosas over the land while at the
same time reserving the sub-surface rights of Benguet and
Atok by virtue of their mining claim is correct.
Held:
No. The Courts holding is that Benguet and Atok
have exclusive rights to the property in question by virtue of
their respective mining claims which they validly acquired
before the Constitution of 1935 prohibited the alienation of
all lands of the public domain except agricultural lands,
subject to vested rights existing at the time of its adoption.
The land was not and could not have been transferred to
the private respondents by virtue of acquisitive prescription,
nor could its use be shared simultaneously by them and
the mining companies for agricultural and mineral
purposes. It is true that the subject property was
considered forest land and included in the Central
Cordillera Forest Reserve, but this did not impair the rights
already vested in Benguet and Atok at that time. Such
rights were not affected either by the stricture in the
Commonwealth Constitution against the alienation of all
lands of the public domain except those agricultural in
nature for this was made subject to existing rights. The
perfection of the mining claim converted the property to
mineral land and under the laws then in force removed it

from the public domain. By such act, the locators acquired

exclusive rights over the land, against even the
government, without need of any further act such as the
purchase of the land or the obtention of a patent over it. As
the land had become the private property of the locators,
they had the right to transfer the same, as they did, to
Benguet and Atok. The Court of Appeals justified this by
saying there is no conflict of interest between the owners
of the surface rights and the owners of the sub-surface
rights. This is rather doctrine, for it is a well-known principle
that the owner of piece of land has rights not only to its
surface but also to everything underneath and the airspace
above it up to a reasonable height. Under the aforesaid
ruling, the land is classified as mineral underneath and
agricultural on the surface, subject to separate claims of
title. This is also difficult to understand, especially in its
practical application.

Ancestral Domain (RA No. 8371) "The Indigenous

Peoples Rights Act of 1997.
Cruz vs. DENR Secretary
(G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000)
FACTS:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a
suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and
taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain
provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as
the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its
implementing rules and regulations (IRR). The petitioners
assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the
ground that these amount to an unlawful deprivation of the
States ownership over lands of the public domain as well
as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation
of the regalian doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of
the Constitution.
ISSUES:
W/N Sec. 3 (a) and (b), 5,6,7,8, 57 and 58 of RA
8731 (IPRA) and its IRR are unconstitutional for unlawfully
depriving the State of its ownership over lands of the public
domain, minerals and other natural resources therein,
violating the Regalian Doctrine enshrined in Sec. 2, Art. XII
of the Constitution.
HELD:
The Supreme Court deliberated upon the matter.
After deliberation they voted and reached a 7-7 vote. They
deliberated again and the same result transpired. Since
there was no majority vote, Cruzs petition was dismissed
and the IPRA law was sustained. Hence, ancestral
domains may include natural resources.
SEPARATE OPINIONS: (NOTE: more important in this
case)
Justice Kapunan: NO
Said provision affirming the ownership by
indigenous people of their ancestral lands and
domains by virtue of native title do not diminish
the States ownership of lands within the public
domain, because said ancestral lands and
domains are considered as private land, and
never to have been part of the public domain,
following the doctrine laid down in Cario vs.
Insular Government.
Sec. 3(a) does not confer or recognise any right
of ownership over the natural resources to the
ICCs/IPs. Its purpose is definitional and not
declarative of a right or title.
Sec. 57 only grants priority rights to ICCs/IPs
in the utilisation of natural resources and not
absolute ownership thereof. The State retains
full control over the exploration, development
and utilisation of natural resources through the

imposition requirements and conditions for the

utilisation of natural resources under existing
laws, such as the Small-Scale Mining Act of
1991 and the Philippine Mining Act of 1995.
Neither does the grant of said rights exclude
non-indigenous people from undertaking the
same activities within the ancestral domains
upon authority granted by the proper
government authority.

Justice Puno: NO
Ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not
part of the lands of the public domain. They are
private and belong to the ICCs/IPs. The
classification of lands in the public domain
under Sec. 3, Art. XII of the Constitution does
not include ancestral lands nor ancestral
domains. The rights of ICCs/IPs to their
ancestral domains and ancestral lands may be
acquired in two modes: (1) by native title over
both ancestral lands and ancestral domains; or
(2) by torrens title under the Public Land Act
and the Land Registration Act with respect to
ancestral land only. Both modes presume or
recognise the land as private and not public.
The right of ownership to ancestral domain
under Sec. 7(a) involves lands,bodies of water
traditionally and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs,
sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing
grounds, and all improvements made by them
at any time within the domains, not waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum, and the mineral oils,
all forces of potential energy fisheries, forests
or timbers, wildlife, flora and fauna and other
natural resources enumerated in Sec. 2, Art. XII
of the constitution. Ownership therefore of
natural resources remain with the State.
Small-scale utilisation of resources in Sec. 7(b)
is also allowed under paragraph 3, Sec. 2, Art.
XII of the Constitution.
Finally, the large-scale utilisation of natural
resources in Sec. 57 of RA 8731/IPRA is
allowed under paragraphs 1 and 4, section 2,
Art. XII of the Constitution since only priority
rights are given to ICCs/IPs.
However, by including natural resources, Sec.
1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules
goes beyond Sec. 7(a) and therefore
unconstitutional.

Justice Panganiban: YES

Sec. 3(a) [whose definition of ancestral domain
encompasses natural resources found therein],
and 3(b) [defines ancestral lands as those
possessed by ICCs/IPs since time immemorial]
contravenes Sec. 2, Art. XII of the constitution,
which declares that the State owns all lands od
the public domain, minerals and natural
resourcesnone of which, except agricultural
lands, can be alienated. In addition, mere
possession or utilisation of land, however long,
does not automatically convert them into private
properties.
IPRA/RA 8371 does not specify limits to
ancestral lands and domains.
IPRA/RA 8731 relinquishes the States power
under Sec. 2, Art. XII of the Constitution of full
control of natural resources in ancestral lands
and ancestral domains in favor of ICCs/IPs,
who may exercise these rights without any time
limit. In addition, they are also given the right to
negotiate directly the terms and conditions for
the exploration of natural resources under Sec.

7(b), a right vested by the Constitution only to

the State.

Justice Vitug: YES

grant and to have received the same, and shall be entitled

to a certificate of title to such land under the provisions of
this chapter.
xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 7 and 57 go beyond to the context of the

fundamental law and virtually amount amount
to an undue delegation, if not an acceptable
abdication, of State authority over a significant
area of the country and its patrimony.

Director of Forestry vs. Villareal

(G.R. No. L-32266 February 27, 1989)
FACTS:

Survey Error
1. Republic vs. Peralta, et al., En Banc (G.R. No.
150327, June 18, 2003)

Lands declared by the courts as agricultural lands

prior to the introduction of land classification;
Sta. Monica Industrial and Development Corporation
vs. Court of Appeals
(189 SCRA 792)
FACTS:
In 1912, the Court of Land Registration of
Zambales, through Judge James Ostrand, confirmed the
title of Justo de Perio over two parcels of land in Zambales,
namely Parcel No. 1, which consists of an area of 11,697
sq.m., and Parcel No. 2, which consists of 340,820 sq.m.
In 1985, herein respondent Republic of the
Philippines, through the Solicitor General, filed with the
Court of Appeals a complaint for the annulment of the
decree, alleging that the decree in LRC No. 6431 was null
and void for lack of jurisdiction because the land was inside
the U.S. naval reservation and that it was still within the
forest zone in 1912, having been released therefrom only
in 1961, and as such, cannot be the subject of disposition
or alienation as private property.

Ruperto Villareal applied for its registration a land

consisting of 178, 113 sq.m. mangrove swamps located in
Sapian, Capiz on January 25, 1945. He alleged that he and
his predecessors in interest had been in possession of the
land for more than 40 years. Villeareal presented a tax
declaration as his evidence.
He was opposed by several persons including the
Director of Forestry. The Court of First Instance of Capiz
approved the application and was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. The Director of Forestry appealed to the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not mangrove swamps are public
lands and are not alienable under the constitution.
HELD:
Yes, under Section 1820 of the Administrative
Code of 1917 which was not amended declares that
mangrove swamps form part of the public forest of the
country.
SECTION 1820. Words and Phrases Defined.
For the purposes of this chapter, public forest includes,
except as otherwise specially indicated, all unreserved
public land including nipa and mangrove swamps and all
forest reserves of whatever character.
Hence, the land in dispute in not alienable under
the Constitution and may not be the subject of private
ownership until and unless they are first released as forest
land and classified as alienable agricultural land.

ISSUE: Whether or not the parcels of land are forest land.

Lands already registered by the Court as Private Lands

RULING:
It was held that the lands are agricultural. Act No.
926, known as the Public Land Act, which was enacted into
law on October 7, 1903 but which took effect on July 26,
1904, was the law applicable to De Perio's petition for
confirmation of his title to the two parcels of land. A person
who had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
session and occupation of public agricultural land for a
period of at least ten years prior to July 24, 1904 could
petition for the confirmation of his title over the land he had
so possessed and occupied.
*SEC. 54 OF ACT 926
SEC. 54. The following-described persons or their
legal successors in right, occupying public lands
i
n
the Philippine Islands, or claiming to own any such lands or
an interest therein, but whose titles to
such lands
have not been perfected, may apply to the Court of Land
Registration of the Philippine
Islands
for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate
of title therefor to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
6. All persons who by themselves or their
predecessors in interest have been in the open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural public lands, as defined by said
act of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and two,
under a bona fide claim of ownership except as against the
Government, for a period of ten years next preceding the
taking effect of this Act, except when prevented by war
or force majeure shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a government

1.

Republic vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 155450,

August 6, 2008)

Bureaucratic Constraints in Classification of Lands

Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, En
Banc
(G.R. No. 127245, January 30, 2001)
FACTS:
The cases at bar involve a vast tract of land with
an area of around ninety-nine (99) hectares presumptively
belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, which land
had been adjudicated to private individuals by a court
alleged to be without jurisdiction. Since the validity of the
said decision and the original certificate of title as well as
transfer certificates of title issued pursuant thereto hinges
on the classification of subject area at the time it was so
adjudicated, determination of the validity of the disposition
thereof is in order.
The assailed decision does not indicate the
classification of the land in question, when the herein
private respondents obtained their decree of registration
thereover.
Republic (Petitioner) contends that land not
classified as alienable and disposable remain so and it is
the private claimant who bears the burden of showing that
the Executive Department has in fact classified the land as
disposable and alienable; that under the regalian doctrine,

all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within

private ownership are presumed to belong to the State,
thus, whatever title issued before such classification is
considered null and voidab initio.
Margolles et al and Peltan (Private Respondents),
on the other hand, contends that it is not correct to say that
no valid torrens title to land can be obtained by individuals
and entities in a land registration case unless the land was
previously covered by an executive proclamation declaring
the land as alienable and disposable. Respondents claim
that property that was already privately owned or under
private ownership at the time the Spanish crown ceded
sovereignty over the Philippine Islands to the United States
remained private property, even if the owner had not
obtained a muniment of title to his property; thus, such
person who has held the property under color of title may
institute a land registration case to have the property
brought under the torrens system and have a title issue in
his name. Private individuals or entities who held
"agricultural public land" openly, continuously, exclusively
and notoriously, in the concept of owners "for a period of
ten years next preceding the twenty-sixth day of July 1904
were conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a "government grant" and to have
received the same, and shall be entitled to a certificate of
title to such land
ISSUE:
Whether or not land acquired by private parties
were released from the classification as forestland.
RULING:
Yes. The court is inclined to agree with the
respondents that it is legally doubtful if the authority of the
Governor General to declare lands as alienable and
disposable would apply to lands that have become private
property or lands that have been impressed with a private
right authorized and recognized by Act 2874 or any valid
law. By express declaration of section 45 (b) of Act 2874
which is quoted above, those who have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public-domain under
a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership since July 26,
1894 may file an application with the Court of First Instance
of the province where the land is located for confirmation of
their claims and these applicants shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to
a government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of
title. When the land registration court issued a decision for
the issuance of a decree which was the basis of an original
certificate of title to the land, the court had already made a
determination that the land was agricultural and that the
applicant had proven that he was in open and exclusive
possession of the subject land for the prescribed number of
years. It was the land registration court which had the
jurisdiction to determine whether the land applied for was
agricultural, forest or timber
Due to bureaucratic constraints, vast tracts of land
acquired by private parties in urbanized areas like the city
of Manila and Quezon City were released from
classification as forestland belatedly, or long after their
residential character as private property had become a
matter of judicial notice. It appears that the City of Manila
was declassified as forest land only in 1955 and Quezon
City only on October 24, 1989. As early as 1961, this Court
stated that an attorney-at-law "should have known that no
property around the City of Manila or in Quezon City is as
yet not covered by torrens title". In this case defendant
claimed that he was a possessor in good faith From
petitioners-movants' own submission. A part of Las Pias
comprising 1200 hectares was declared as alienable and
disposable on September 3, 1928, thus:

map indicating the 1200 hectares that then Sec.

Arturo Tanco issued FAO 4-1141 declaring the
entire Las Pias as well as part of the adjacent
municipalities as alienable and disposable on
January 3, 1968."
The implication is that the 1968 order was meant
to confirm or reiterate the earlier declaration and serves to
affirm that indeed parts of Las Pias, albeit the map
indicating this area has been lost, were already open to
disposition to private claimants long before the issuance of
FAO 4-1141. Since there are extant numerous titles
covering various portions of Las Pias.

III. Identifying Lands - surveying and mapping

1. Golloy v. Court of Appeals, (G.R. No. 47491, May 4,
1989)
2. Cambridge Realty and Resources Corporation vs.
Eridanus Development, Inc. and Chiton Realty Corp.,
(G.R. No. 152445, July 4, 2008)

Felipe de Guzman vs. Manuel de Santos

(G.R. No. 6609. December 2, 1911)
FACTS:
The appellant filed a petition in the Land Court,
case no. 5706, asking for the registration of the parcel of
land situated in Calle Santa Maria, in Tondo, Manila
bounded by the east by the said Calle Santa Maria; on the
north right side by the property of one Francisco Toribio
and Lucio Buzon; on the South with the Property of Isabel
Tambueco and Miguel Gatpatan. The parties to this action
are adjacent property owners and from the record it
appears that there is a strip of 154 sqm which is included
within the alleged boundaries of both litigants. This small
parcel in dispute lies north of the land of Santos and south
of that of Guzman. The court then found that this disputed
tract was not included within the lands of Guzman and was
the option that his southern line has been advanced over
on to Santos. The courses of the boundary lines are not
given but only distances, with the bounding limit stated in
general terms. The petitioner files as his Exhibit D a
certified transcript taken from the registrars book. From the
descriptions provided it can be seen that the land has the
form of an irregular quadrilateral. There is a defect in the
description and said defects and erroneous statements
with reference to the description of the petitioners of the
land in the old deeds are urged by the oppositor as making
it impossible to know what is the true description of the
land claimed and hence impossible to register.
ISSUE:
Whether the Land in dispute could not be
registered because of error of description?
HELD:
Errors of description which appear in an old
recorded title and which have been successively repeated
in subsequent transfers do not affect the validity of the
registered title when it is shown that the land sought to be
inscribed is exactly the same as that included in the old
deeds. When according to an old registered title, the land
appears to be slightly greater in area than it actually is,
such discrepancy does not operate to vitiate or weaken the
title this inscribed.

"The map showing the area included in the

1200 hectares was destroyed during the Second
World War, and it was in view of the loss of the

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