Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-4615

May 12, 1952

JUAN DULDULAO and MODESTO DULDULAO, petitioners,

vs.
HON. EUSEBIO F. RAMOS, Judge, Court of First Instance of Oriental Mindoro and
TOMAS SALVADOR, respondents.
Florencio D.R. Ponce for petitioners.
Gonzales and Vizcocho for respondent Tomas Salvador.
Eusebio F. Ramos in his own behalf.
TUASON, J.:
This is an application for a writ of certiorari.
Juan Duldulao is the owner of a parcel of land located in the municipality of San Jose of what is
now the Province of Occidental Mindoro, with a homestead certificate of title. On January 26,
1951, Tomas Salvador, one of the respondents, filed a verified petition with "the Court of First
Instance of Oriental Mindoro," presided over by the respondent Judge, Hon. Eusebio F. Ramos,
in which he prayed for the issuance to him of a new owner's duplicate certificate, alleging that he
had bought a portion of the above parcel and that Juan Duldulao's certificate of title had been lost
or destroyed. As a matter of fact Duldulao had the certificate of tile in his possession.
On January 27, the respondent Judge, after the hearing, granted Salvador's petition and directed
"the register of deeds of Oriental Mindoro" to issue a second owner's duplicate in the name of the
registered owner, the new certificate to contain a memorandum of the fact that it was issued in
lieu of the one which had either been burned or destroyed.
Juan Duldulao in the petition for certiorari is joined by Modesto Duldulao and both alleged that
the deed which Tomas Salvador presented to the court was forged or otherwise invalid; that
Modesto Duldulao was the transferee of all the rights and interests which his co-petitioner had
over the property covered by the said certificate of title, by virtue of a deed of sale executed by
Juan Duldulao in his (Modesto's) favor on march 13, 1950.
The present petition is based on two grounds, namely, (1) that no notice was served on the
registered owner, Juan Duldulao, of Salvador's petition and of the hearing thereon; and (2) that
the respondent Judge acted outside of his territorial jurisdiction.
The alleged lack of notice to Duldulao is specifically denied in the answers, thus squarely putting
this question in issue. it was suggested that in view of this conflict in the pleadings, hearing
might be ordered to give the parties opportunity to substantiate, if they desired, their respective
allegations. The majority, however, opine that it was incumbent upon the petitioner, before their
petition was argued and submitted, to ask for such hearing, and that, having failed to do so, they
are deemed to have abandoned their controverted allegation or abided by the adverse party's
denial. This is the Court's ruling.

As to the territorial jurisdiction of the respondent Judge to make the order under review and the
authority of the Register of Deeds of Oriental Mindoro to issue the certificate of title, a brief
preliminary statement is appropriate.
Under Republic Act No. 296, known as the Judiciary Act, five judges were to be commissioned
for the 8th Judicial District, one of them to preside over the Court of First Instance of Mindoro
and Marinduque with station at the municipality of Calapan. By Republic Act No. 505 the
Province of Mindoro was divided into two separate provinces, one to be known as Oriental
Mindoro and another as Occidental Mindoro. Calapan happens to be the capital of oriental
Mindoro, as it was of the old Province of Mindoro, and San Jose, where the land in question is
situated, has become a municipality of the segregated province. But Republic Act No. 505 makes
no provisions for a new judge or new register of deeds for Occidental Mindoro nor for the
disposition of the cases pertaining to the last-mentioned province, pending or thereafter to be
filed.
The question then is had the respondent Judge and the Register of Deeds whose appointment
were for the former Province of Mindoro lost jurisdiction over the cases which by the division of
that province belonged to the newly created province? Or should not those cases at least be tried
within the territorial limits of Occidental Mindoro?
It is our opinion that in the absence of any provision to the contrary, the Court of First Instance
Judge and the Register of Deeds of the Province of Mindoro continued after its division to be the
Judge and the Register of Deeds for Occidental Mindoro after the passage of Republic Act No.
505, there is no valid ground for the proposition that they had ceased to be the same officials for
Occidental Mindoro. Occidental Mindoro is not inferior to oriental Mindoro in category and one
had been as much a part of the abolished province as the other.
Another reason for the above conclusion is that the law abhors a vacuum and that a provision not
violative of any enactment or the constitution is to be read into an act to supply the omission.
From this standpoint, the Judge of the Court of First instance and the Register of Deeds of
Mindoro had to be regarded as the judge and the Register of Deeds of Occidental mindoro if the
latter province was not to be left without officials so indispensable. Indeed, the absolute silence
of Republic Act No. 505 on this matter can admit only of the construction that the Congress
intended to maintain the status quo in this regard for the time being. it seems unreasonable to
suppose that had the legislative intent been otherwise, the enactment would have failed to so
state and appropriate necessary funds for the new positions and the new court.
By the same token, Judge Ramos must be held to have lawfully acted in Calapan on his corespondent's petition, and so must the Register of Deeds in executing the Judge's orders. There
was no court personnel in Occidental Mindoro to receive the petition and issue notices, or docket
in which to enter them, and there was no officer designated for Occidental Mindoro with
necessary facilities to perform the duties of register of deeds; all the books, certificate of title,
and other papers pertaining to Occidental mindoro were in Calapan under the custody of the
incumbent official. if sustained, the effect of the herein petitioners' contention would be no less
than a complete paralyzation of judicial functions in one of the two new provinces. Obviously,
the situation presented all the elements which called for the application of the principle of holdover, to preserve the continuity in the transaction of official business and the operation of the
machinery of justice.

Wherefore, the petition for certiorari must be, and it is, hereby denied, without prejudice, of
course, to the filing of an ordinary action and the taking of necessary steps authorized by the law
to annul the alleged forged deed of conveyance by Juan Duldulao to Tomas Salvador, to set aside
the assailed order and all actions taken in pursuance thereof, to recover or clear title to the land
alleged to have been purchased by the respondent, and otherwise to obtain all appropriate
remedies for the protection of the herein petitioners' alleged title, right and interest to and in that
property.
The preliminary injunction heretofore issued against Tomas Salvador in these proceedings is
hereby ordered dissolved.
TOLEDO V CSC and COMELEC
29 Jan
202 SCRA 507 | October 4, 1991 | J. Paras
Facts:
Atty. Augusto Toledo was appointed by then Comelec Chairman Ramon Felipe as Manager of
the Education and Information Department of the Comelec on May 1986, at which time Toledo
was already more than 57 years old. Toledos appointment papers and his oath of office were
endorsed by the Comelec to the CSC on June 1986 for approval and attestation. However, no
prior request for exemption from the provisions of Section 22, Rule III of the CSRPAPwhich
prohibits the appointment of persons 57 years old or above into government service without prior
CSC approvalwas secured. Petitioner then reported for work.
Comelec, upon discovery of the lack of authority required under CSRPAP, and CSC Memo
Circular 5 issued Resolution No. 2066, which declared void from the beginning Toledos
appointment. Petitioner appealed to CSC, which considered him a de facto officer and his
appointment voidable, and moved for reconsideration but was denied, hence the present petition
for certiorari.
Issue:
W/N CSRPAP provision is valid
Held:
No. The Civil Service Act of 959 (RA 2260), which established the CSC, contained no provision
prohibiting appointment or reinstatement into government service of any person already 57 years
old. Sec 5 Rule 6 of the Revised Civil Service Rules, which prohibits such, was purely the
creation of CSC.
Marcoss PD 807 (Civil Service Decree), which established a new CSC and superseded RA
2260, also provided that rules and regulations shall become effective only 30 days after
publication in the OG or in any newspaper of general circulation. The new CSC adopted the
CSRPAP . No provision re prohibition of appointment of 57 year old made in PD 807;
prohibition was purely created by CSC.
The provision cannot be valid, being entirely a CSC creation, it has no basis in the law which it
was meant to implement. It cannot be justified as a valid exercise of its function of promulgating
rules and regulations for that function, to repeat, may legitimately be exercised only for the
purpose of carrying the provisions of the law into effect; and since there is no prohibition or
restriction on the employment of 57-year old persons in the statuteor any provision respecting

age as a factor in employmentthere was nothing to carry into effect through an implementing
rule on the matter. The power vested in the CSC was to implement the law or put it into effect,
not to add to it; to carry the law into effect or execution, not to supply perceived omissions in it.
Additionally, the CSRPAP cannot be considered effective as of the time of the application to
Toledo of a provision thereof, for the reason that said rules were never published as required by
both RA 2260 and PD 807. The argument that it was a mere reiteration of existing law and
circularized cannot stand as formerly discussed.
Also, Toledos separation from service was through no fault of his own. Petition granted.
AMIL VS. COMELEC
Facts
The petitioner and private respondent are both candidates for the Mayorship of the
Municipality of Sultan Gumander. The private respondent objected the inclusion of a certain
election returns of several precincts due to election irregularities such as no signature of ER and
the like. The first MBC (municipal board of canvassers) took cognizance of the objection and
thereby ordered the exclusion of the contested precincts pending further investigations.
However, when the new MBC was constituted, the said objections were denied and proceeded
to the proclamation of the petitioner as the Mayor-elect of the said Municipality. The private
respondent appealed before the 2
nd
Division of the COMELEC which in turn overruled the
former previous proclamation using the pertinent provisions of the Omnibus Election Code
regarding the pending cases herein. Again, a new MBC was formed which proclaimed on the
other hand the private respondent as such. The petitioner appeal to the COMELEC en banc
which cannot make the required votes for proper disposition of the case, dismisses the same in
accordance with their own rules and regulations.
Issue
Whether or not the said proclamation was valid.
Ruling
The court held, that both proclamations were invalid. It is readily observed that the May
23, 1995 issuances cannot be considered as "rulings" within the contemplation of law; they are
not definitive rulings of exclusion by the MBC because they merely deferred the inclusion of the
election returns pending "further investigation." Hence, they are not "rulings" of the board of
canvassers that are deemed affirmed within the purview of Comelec's Omnibus Resolution on
pending cases dated June 29, 1995. The proclamation of the petitioner is invalid due to the
provisions of the said code which prohibits the MBC to proclaim a candidate with a pending
case thereof unless authorized by the COMELEC, there was none based on the facts. On the
other hand, the proclamation of the private respondent was also invalid it was not predicated on
a complete and valid canvass, but on supposed "rulings" of the Sansarona MBC which merely
"set aside for further investigation" the three challenged election returns from Precinct Nos. 5,
10-1 and 20-1. Said proclamation had clearly no basis in fact and in law. It is a settled rule that
an incomplete canvass of votes is illegal and cannot be the basis of a valid proclamation.
Furthermore, the SC ordered the COMELEC to proclaim and conduct investigations to fill the
txicab.
EN BANC

[A.M. No. P-98-1262. February 12, 1998]

JUDGE SALVADOR G. CAJOT, petitioner, vs. MA. THELMA JOSEPHINE V. CLEDERA,
Legal Researcher, Regional Trial Court, Branch 29, Libmanan, Camarines Sur,
respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
This matter was treated and so ordered to be docketed as an administrative case in the
resolution, dated 21 January 1998, of the Court.
On 28, October, 1996, Security Guard (SG) Jay Din, the on duty guard at the Bulwagan
ng Katarungan in Libmanan, Camarines Sur, caught Ma. Thelma Josephine V. Cledera,
Legal Researcher of the Regional Trial Court RTC of Libmanan, Camarines Sur, Branch
29, in the act of pouring grains of salt into the courts bundy clock. SG Din promptly
reported the misdemeanor to his supervisor, SG Jesus H. Puso, who, in turn, submitted
a written report to RTC Executive Judge Salvador G. Cajot. Cledera, following the
submission of the report, ceased from further reporting for work.
On 07 November 1996, Judge Cajot issued a memorandum addressed to Cledera
directing her to explain why she should not be administratively dealt with for grave
misconduct, as well as for habitual absenteeism and habitual tardiness during the
period from July to October 1996, and be made to answer accordingly. Clederas Daily
Time Records (DTRs) revealed that she went on sick leave for four (4) days in July
1996, four (4) days in August 1996 and twenty two (22) days in September 1996. In
addition, the DTRs showed that she would frequently arrive at the office after nine
oclock in the morning and would leave four-thirty in the afternoon. Cledera did not heed
the memorandum.
In a letter, dated 03 January 1997, Judge Cajot apprised the Supreme Court of the
above matter and charged Cledera with grave misconduct, habitual absenteeism and
habitual tardiness. In the meantime, Cledera submitted her resignation, dated 14
February 1997, to Judge Cajot. A copy of the resignation letter was furnished to Atty.
Adelaida Cabe-Baumann, Chief of the Office of Administrative Services, of the Supreme
Court.
On 05 March 1997, Judge Cajot sent a letter to Atty. Baumann inquiring about any
action taken on Clederas case. In a 1st Indorsement, dated 01 April 1997, Miss Rosario
Salvador, Officer in Charge of the Office of Administrative Services, Office of the Court
Administrator, referred back Clederas resignation letter to Judge Cajot for his comment
and recommendation. In a 2nd Indorsement, dated 22 April 1997, Judge Cajot
recommended that Cledera should not be allowed to resign without first being meted the
corresponding administrative sanction for her infractions.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) has found merit in the recommendation.
The Court finds no cogent reason for disagreement.
The charge of grave misconduct is supported by the sworn statement of SG Jay Din
taken by Judge Cajot in the course of his investigation. Thus:

Judge:

According to the report of Mr. Jaime A. Fabre, another Security Guard

of the Marino Security Agency that you were the one who caught in
the act Mrs. Ma. Thelma Josephine Cledera putting grains of salt
inside the bundy clock. Will you tell this investigator how did you see
or catch Mrs. Cledera putting or pouring salt in the bundy clock at the
Hall of Justice of Libmanan on October 28, 1996 about 12:05 P.M.

Answer: While I was sitting by the table of the security guard, Mrs. Ma. Thelma
Josephine Cledera came to punch her card. It was quite long already
and she was still there. So I look at her and I saw her trying to insert
the grains of salt inside the punch hold of the bundy clock and I saw
some salt falling on the floor.
Judge:

So what did you do?

Answer:
I stood up and confronted her why she was pouring salt inside the
bundy clock.
Judge:

What was her answer?

Answer:
salt?

She answered back Cant you see that I am eating something with

Judge:

What is that something she was eating with salt?

Answer:

There was nothing she was eating, sir.

Judge:

Then what happened?

Answer: I gathered the grains of salt on the rim of the punch hole and also
those grains of salt that fell on the floor.
Judge:

What did you do?

Answer:

I brought it to you, sir.

Judge:

That was the time when you showed it to me?

Answer:

Yes, sir.

Judge:

Then what happened to the salt?

Answer: I was instructed by you, the Executive Judge, to wrap it in a clean

paper to be placed inside an envelope.
Judge:

Where is that salt now?

Answer:

It is now here, sir, but perhaps melted already.

(witness got the salt wrapped by a bond paper inside his wallet and
presented it to the Judge).
The investigator, Judge Cajot, opened the folded bond paper and
found that after the first wrapper there still another bond paper wrapping the salt.
When it was opened, it was found that the salt already melted.
Judge:

Did you not throw the salt?

Answer:

No, sir. But the salt already melted.

Judge:

According to the report of Mr. Jaime A. Fabre, it was allegedly you

who told Mrs. Cledera to bring salt to be put in the Bundy clock, what
can you say to that?

Answer: Some days ago, I noticed that Mrs. Cledera usually punches her time
card very much late. Then, she uttered twice when she was punching
her time card I think I should bring salt next time. She also uttered I
think everytime I punch the time card, I will put salt in the bundy clock.
Judge:

What did you tell her?

Answer:
Since, as if that she was challenging me, I told her It is up to you to bring
salt.i[1]Respondents habitual tardiness is evident from her own DTRs clearly showing
that for the months of July to September 1996, there has no single day x x x that
respondent complied with the required eight hours of work. ii[2]With respect to the
charge for habitual absenteeism, it would appear that while Cledera had approved leave
applications for the months of July to September 1996, she, however, did not submit
any leave application for October 1996, iii[3] during which month, she failed to report for
work except for nine (9) days. From 04 November 1996, despite the call order sent to
her by Assistant Chief Rowena Castro Benipayo, Office of the Administrative Services,
Supreme Court, she stopped altogether from reporting for work.The OCA has
recommended that respondent Cledera should be dismissed from the service.
The Court adopts the recommendation. The Court cannot, under the circumstances,
simply accept the resignation being proffered by respondent. Resignation should be
used neither as an escape nor as an easy way out to evade administrative liability by a
court personnel facing administrative sanction.
While the penalty prescribed for the first offense of frequent unauthorized absences or
tardiness in reporting for duty and loafing or frequent unauthorized absences from duty
during regular office hours is mere suspension from six (6) months and one (1) year, iv[4]
here, however, respondent has likewise refused to acknowledge the call that she report
for work. Her lack of concern, if not defiance, has prejudiced the cause of public
services; coupled with the grave misconduct she has committed, v[5] her case warrants a
penalty of dismissal and its concomitants.
The court could not help but express great disappointment over the behavior of
respondent who, being a law graduate herself, should have been among the first to set
an example to fellow civil servants. Instead, she has badly tainted the image of the
judiciary. The Court must emphasize anew that
(T)he image of a court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official
or otherwise, of the men and women who work thereat, from the judge to he
least and lowest of its personnel hence, it becomes the imperative sacred duty
of each and everyone in the court to maintain its good name and standing as a
true temple of justice.vi[6]
WHEREFORE, respondent Ma. Thelma Josephine V. Cledera is DISMISSED from the
service for grave misconduct, habitual tardiness and habitual absenteeism, with

forfeiture of all benefits and with prejudice to re-employment in the government

including government owned or controlled corporations.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION

ESTHER S. PAGANO,

G.R. No. 149072

Petitioner,
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
- versus -

Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and

JUAN NAZARRO, Jr., ROSALINE Q.

ELAYDA, RODRIGO P. KITO and
ERNESTO M. CELINO,
Respondents.

REYES, JJ.
Promulgated:
September 21, 2007

x-------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of

Court, assailing the Decision[1] dated 7 March 2001, rendered by the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 53323. In reversing the Decision,[2] dated 4 January

1999, rendered by Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet,
the Court of Appeals declared that the petitioner, Esther S. Pagano, may still be
held administratively liable for dishonesty, grave misconduct and malversation of
public funds through falsification of official documents.viiviii
While the petitioner was employed as Cashier IV of the Office of the Provincial Treasurer
of Benguet, it was discovered that in her accountabilities she had incurred a shortage of
P1,424,289.99. On 12 January 1998, the Provincial Treasurer wrote a letter directing petitioner to
explain why no administrative charge should be filed against her in connection with the cash
shortage.[3] Petitioner submitted her explanation on 15 January 1998.[4] ixx
On 16 January 1998, petitioner filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Councilor in Baguio City.[5] xi
On 22 January 1998, the Office of the Provincial Governor of Benguet found the
existence of a prima facie case for dishonesty, grave misconduct and malversation
of public funds through falsification of official documents and directed the
petitioner to file an answer.[6] The Provincial Governor also issued Executive
Order No. 98-02, creating an xiiad hoc committee composed of herein respondents
to investigate and submit findings relative to the administrative charges against
petitioner.[7]xiii
On 10 February 1998, petitioner filed her Answer before the Office of the Provincial
Governor. Petitioner alleged that she had merely acted under the express direction of her
supervisor, Mr. Mauricio B. Ambanloc. She further claimed that the funds and checks were
deposited in the depository banks of the Province of Benguet, but the records are devoid of any
documents to support her claim.[8]xiv
On 19 February 1998, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the administrative case on the ground
that the committee created to investigate her case had no jurisdiction over the subject of the
action and over her person.[9] The respondents denied the said motion on 21 May 1998.[10]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was again denied on 1 July 1998.[11] xvxvixvii
On 14 August 1998, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for
issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction before Branch 10

of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet. The trial court issued a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction on 7 September 1998.[12]xviii
In the course of the audit and examination of the petitioners collection accounts, the
Commission on Audit (COA) discovered that the petitioner was unable to account for
P4,080,799.77, and not just the initial cash shortage of P1,424,289.99. Thus, the COA Provincial
Auditor, Getulio B. Santos, reported these findings to the Office of the Ombudsman in a letter
dated 11 September 1998 with the recommendation that civil, criminal and administrative cases
be filed against petitioner.[13]

xix

In its Decision, dated 4 January 1999, the trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner. It
noted that the most severe penalty which may be imposed on the petitioner is removal from
service, and that under Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, petitioner was already deemed
resigned when she filed her Certificate of Candidacy on 16 January 1998. Section 66 of the
Omnibus Election Code provides that:

Any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active

members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in
government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto
resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
Thus, it declared that even if the committee created by the Provincial Governor
had the jurisdiction to hear the administrative case against the petitioner, such
case was now moot and academic.[14] The dispositive part of the said Decision
reads:xx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor
of petitioner Esther Sison Pagano and against herein respondents:
1. Finding that the Committee of which the respondents are
members has no longer jurisdiction to conduct any investigation or
proceedings under civil service rules and regulations relative to the
administrative case filed against the petitioner;
2. Finding that the Committee has acted with grave abuse of
discretion and without jurisdiction in denying the Motion to Dismiss filed
by the petitioner in Administrative Case No. 98-01;

3. Declaring as null and void all acts, orders, resolutions and

proceedings of the Committee in Administrative Case No. 98-01;
4. Ordering the respondents, their agents, representatives and all
persons acting on their behalf, to desist from proceeding with
Administrative Case No. 98-01; and
5. Declaring the writ of preliminary injunction dated September
07, 1998 as permanent.
No pronouncement as to costs.[15]xxi
Respondents filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals. In reversing the Decision of the
trial court, the appellate court pronounced that even though petitioners separation from service
already bars the imposition upon her of the severest administrative sanction of separation from
service, other imposable accessory penalties such as disqualification to hold government office
and forfeiture of benefits may still be imposed.[16] xxii
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of the Court of Appeals,
which was denied in a Resolution dated 10 July 2001.[17]xxiii
Hence, in the present Petition, the sole issue is being raised:

WHETHER OR NOT A GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE WHO HAS BEEN

SEPARATED FROM THE CIVIL SERVICE BY OPERATION OF LAW
PURSUANT TO SECTION 66 OF BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 881 (THE
OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE) MAY STILL BE ADMINISTRATIVELY
CHARGED
UNDER
CIVIL
SERVICE
LAWS,
RULES
AND
xxiv
REGULATIONS[18]
Petitioner argues that a government employee who has been separated from service, whether by
voluntary resignation or by operation of law, can no longer be administratively charged. Such
argument is devoid of merit.[19]xxv
In Office of the Court Administrator v. Juan,[20] this Court categorically ruled that the
precipitate resignation of a government employee charged with an offense punishable by
dismissal from the service

xxvi

does not render moot the administrative case against him.

Resignation is not a way out to evade administrative liability when facing administrative

sanction. The resignation of a public servant does not preclude the finding of any administrative
liability to which he or she shall still be answerable.[21]xxvii
A case becomes moot and academic only when there is no more actual controversy between the
parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits of the case.[22] The instant
case is not moot and academic, despite the petitioners separation from government service. Even
if the most severe of administrative sanctions - that of separation from service - may no longer be
imposed on the petitioner, there are other penalties which may be imposed on her if she is later
found guilty of administrative offenses charged against her, namely, the disqualification to hold
any government office and the forfeiture of benefits.xxviii
Moreover, this Court views with suspicion the precipitate act of a government employee
in effecting his or her separation from service, soon after an administrative case has been
initiated against him or her. An employees act of tendering his or her resignation immediately
after the discovery of the anomalous transaction is indicative of his or her guilt as flight in
criminal cases.[23]xxix
In the present case, the Provincial Treasurer asked petitioner to explain the cash shortage
of P1,424,289.99, which was supposedly in her custody on 12 January 1998. In her explanation,
dated 15 January 1998, petitioner failed to render a proper accounting of the amount that was
placed in her custody; instead, she tried to shift the blame on her superior. Thus, the hasty filing
of petitioners certificate of candidacy on 16 January 1998, a mere four days after the Provincial
Treasurer asked her to explain irregularities in the exercise of her functions appears to be a mere
ploy to escape administrative liability.

Public service requires utmost integrity and discipline. A public servant must exhibit at all times
the highest sense of honesty and integrity for no less than the Constitution mandates the principle
that a public office is a public trust and all public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.
[24] The Courts cannot overemphasize the need for honesty and accountability in the acts of
government officials. In

xxx

Baquerfo v. Sanchez,[25] this Court reproached a government

employee for the theft of two unserviceable desk fans and one unserviceable stove. Moreover,

the Court refused to take into account the subsequent resignation of the said government
employee. In the aforecited case, this Court emphatically declared that:xxxi
Cessation from office of respondent by resignation or retirement neither
warrants the dismissal of the administrative complaint filed against him while he
was still in the service nor does it render said administrative case moot and
academic. The jurisdiction that was this Courts at the time of the filing of the
administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the respondent public
official had ceased in office during the pendency of his case. Respondents
resignation does not preclude the finding of any administrative liability to which he
shall still be answerable.[26]xxxii
Unlike the previously discussed case (Baquerfo), the present one does not involve unserviceable
scraps of appliances. The petitioner was unable to account for an amount initially computed at
P1,424,289.99, and later recomputed by the COA at P4,080,799.77. With all the more reason,
this Court cannot declare petitioner immune from administrative charges, by reason of her
running for public office.

In the very recent case, In re: Non-disclosure before the Judicial and Bar Council of the
Administrative Case Filed Against Judge Jaime V. Quitain, in His Capacity as the then Assistant
Regional Director of the National Police Commission, Regional Office XI, Davao City,[27] this
Court pronounced the respondent judge guilty of grave misconduct, despite his resignation:xxxiii
Verily, the resignation of Judge Quitain which was accepted by the Court without
prejudice does not render moot and academic the instant administrative case. The
jurisdiction that the Court had at the time of the filing of the administrative
complaint is not lost by the mere fact that the respondent judge by his resignation
and its consequent acceptance without prejudice by this Court, has ceased to be in
office during the pendency of this case. x x x. A contrary rule would be fraught with
injustice and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous implications. Indeed, if
innocent, the respondent official merits vindication of his name and integrity as he
leaves the government which he has served well and faithfully; if guilty, he deserves
to receive the corresponding censure and a penalty proper and imposable under the
situation.

This Court cannot countenance the petitioners puerile pretext that since no administrative
case had been filed against her during her employment, she can no longer be administratively
charged. Section 48, Chapter 6, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of Executive Order No. 292, also

known as the Administrative Code of 1987, provides for the initiation of administrative
proceedings by the proper personalities as part of the procedural process in administrative cases:

Section 48. Procedures in Administrative Cases Against Non-Presidential

Appointees. (1) Administrative proceedings may be commenced against a
subordinate officer or employee by the Secretary or head of office of equivalent
rank, or head of local government, or chiefs of agencies, or regional directors, or
upon sworn, written complaint of any other person.

At the time petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy, petitioner was already notified by the
Provincial Treasurer that she needed to explain why no administrative charge should be filed
against her, after it discovered the cash shortage of P1,424,289.99 in her accountabilities.
Moreover, she had already filed her answer. To all intents and purposes, the administrative
proceedings had already been commenced at the time she was considered separated from service
through her precipitate filing of her certificate of candidacy. Petitioners bad faith was manifest
when she filed it, fully knowing that administrative proceedings were being instituted against her
as part of the procedural due process in laying the foundation for an administrative case.

To support her argument that government employees who have been separated can no
longer be administratively charged, petitioner cites the following cases: Diamalon v. Quintillian,
[28]

xxxiv

Vda. de Recario v. Aquino,xxxv[29] Zamudio v. Penas, Jr.,[30]xxxvi Pardo v. Cunanan,[31]

and

xxxvii

Mendoza v. Tiongson.[32] A piecemeal reference to these cases is too insubstantial to

support the petitioners allegation that her separation from government service serves as a bar
against the filing of an administrative case for acts she committed as an appointive government
official. In order to understand the Courts pronouncement in these cases, they must be examined
in their proper contexts. xxxviii
In Diamalon v. Quintillian,[33] a complaint for serious misconduct was filed against the
respondent judge questioning his issuance of a warrant of arrest without the presence of the
accused. A cursory review of the facts in this case shows that the administrative complaint lacks
basis, as there is nothing irregular in the act of the respondent judge in issuing a warrant of arrest
without the presence of the accused during the hearing for such issuance. After the case was

filed, the respondent judge became seriously ill and his application for retirement gratuity could
not be acted upon because of the pending administrative case against him. Thus, the Court, out of
Christian justice, dismissed the administrative case against the respondent who was to retire and
desperately needed his retirement benefits. xxxix
In Vda. de Recario v. Aquino,[34] an administrative case was filed against the respondent judge
for failure to immediately act on a case for prohibition. In dismissing the complaint against the
judge, the Court ruled that there are no indications of bad faith on the part of the respondent
judge when he set for hearing in due course Civil Case No. 13335. If the complainants were
prejudiced at all x x x, it was because of complainants own error in not asking for a writ of
preliminary injunction or restraining order and not due to respondents error or delay in taking
action or any other fault. It was only an aside that the Court even mentioned that the respondent
judge had already resigned. Thus, this case cannot be the basis for enjoining the administrative
case against herein petitioner.xl
In Zamudio v. Penas, Jr.,[35] an administrative complaint for dishonorable conduct was filed
against the respondent judge. The Court did not exculpate him from administrative liability,
despite his retirement. The Court unequivocally declared: The jurisdiction of the Court over this
case was, therefore, not lost when the respondent retired from the judiciary and, in the exercise
of its power over the respondent as a member of the bar, the Court may compel him to support
his illegitimate daughters.[36] The Court merely mitigated the penalty when it took into account
the fact that respondents dishonorable conduct occurred before his appointment as a judge, along
with the fact that he had reached compulsory retirement age during the pendency of the
administrative case.[37] xlixliixliii
In Pardo v. Cunanan,[38] the Court did not dismiss the administrative case against the
respondent government employee, but merely imposed a lesser penalty of one-month suspension
for her failure to disclose the fact that she had a pending administrative case when she applied
for another government post. In mitigating the penalty, the Court considered her good faith, as
well as her resignation from her previous post. The Court took into account the notice of
acceptance of her resignation, stating that her services while employed in this office have been
satisfactory and your future application for reinstatement may be favorably considered.[39] xlivxlv

In Mendoza v. Tiongson,[40] this Court refused to accept the resignations filed by the
respondents, which were intended solely to allow them to evade the penalties this Court would
impose against them. This ruling cannot be construed as a bar against filing administrative cases
against government employees who have been separated from their employment, for what would
stop the latter from merely abandoning their posts to evade administrative charges against them?
To the contrary, this ruling can only strengthen this Courts resolve to diligently continue hearing
administrative cases against erring government employees, even after they are separated from
employment.xlvi
To summarize, none of the rulings in the aforecited cases can justify the dismissal of the
administrative case filed against herein petitioner simply because she had filed her certificate of
candidacy. The circumstances of the instant case are vastly different from those in Diamalon v.
Quintillianxlvii[41] and Vda. de Recario v. Aquino,[42] in which the respondent judges were able
to present valid and meritorious defenses in the administrative complaints filed against them.
Petitioner in this case did not even attempt to properly account for the cash shortage of
xlviii

P4,080,799.77 from the checks and funds that were in her custody. On the other hand, the

respondent government employees in Zamudio v. Penas, Jr.xlix[43] and Pardo v. Cunanan,[44]

were not absolved of their administrative liability; rather, the Court merely mitigated the penalty
it imposed upon them. In lMendoza v. Tiongson,[45] the Court emphatically denounced the
contemptible attempt of government employees to elude the consequences of their wrongdoings
by quitting their jobs. It is clear that this Court had dismissed administrative cases, taking into
consideration the resignation or retirement of the civil servants who presented meritorious
defenses and, in certain cases, even mitigated the penalties of those who were later found guilty
of the administrative charge. But this Court has never abetted government employees who
deliberately set out to effect their separation from service as a means of escaping administrative
proceedings that would be instituted against them.li
Petitioner relies on Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code to exculpate her from an
administrative charge. The aforementioned provision reads:

Any person holding a public appointive officer or position, including active

members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in

government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto

resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code should be read in connection with Sections 46(b)(26)
and 55, Chapters 6 and 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987:

Section 44. Discipline: General Provisions:

xxxx
(b) The following shall be grounds for disciplinary action:
xxxx
(26) Engaging directly or indirectly in partisan political activities by one
holding a non-political office.
xxxx
Section 55. Political Activity. No officer or employee in the Civil Service
including members of the Armed Forces, shall engage directly or indirectly in any
partisan political activity or take part in any election except to vote nor shall he use
his official authority or influence to coerce the political activity of any other person
or body.

Clearly, the act of filing a Certificate of Candidacy while one is employed in the civil service
constitutes a just cause for termination of employment for appointive officials. Section 66 of the
Omnibus Election Code, in considering an appointive official ipso facto resigned, merely
provides for the immediate implementation of the penalty for the prohibited act of engaging in
partisan political activity. This provision was not intended, and should not be used, as a defense
against an administrative case for acts committed during government service.

Section 47[46] of the Administrative Code of 1987 provides for the authority of heads of
provinces to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary actions against employees
under their jurisdiction. Thus, the Provincial Governor acted in accordance with law when it
ordered the creation of an independent body to investigate the administrative complaint filed

against petitioner for dishonesty, grave misconduct and malversation of public funds through
falsification of official documents in connection with acts committed while petitioner was
employed as Cashier IV in the Office of the Provincial Treasurer of Benguet.lii
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is DENIED and the assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 53323, promulgated on 7 March 2001, is
AFFIRMED. The Office of the Provincial Governor of Benguet is hereby DIRECTED to
proceed with Administrative Case No. 98-01 against the petitioner, Esther S. Pagano, for
dishonesty, grave misconduct and malversation of public funds through falsification of official
documents. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-15482. May 30, 1961.]
GUILLERMO GONZALES, Petitioner-Appellant, v. THE HON. JAIME HERNANDEZ, as
Secretary of Finance and JOVENCIO FOJAS, Respondents-Appellants.
Mario Bengzon for Petitioner-Appellant.
Solicitor General for Respondents-Appellants.
SYLLABUS
1. PUBLIC OFFICERS; RESIGNATION; WHEN NOT DEEMED COMPLETE AND
OPERATIVE. Where an an employees resignation from his position in the government
service was made expressly "subject to the result of my appeal to the Civil Service Board of
Appeals, and to the provisions of the Resolution of the Cabinet on July 17, 1937", there is no
resignation to speak of, because to constitute a complete and operative act of resignation, the
officer or employee must show a clear intention to relinquish or surrender his position.
2. ID.; ID.; ACCEPTANCE OF EMERGENCY POSITION AFTER CONDITIONAL
RESIGNATION; WHY NOT AN ABANDONMENT OF OLD POSITION. The acceptance,
by an employee who resigned conditionally from his position pending the termination of his case
in the Civil Service Board of Appeals, of another position as emergency laborer in a government
corporation, does not constitute an abandonment of his old position, because his temporary
employment is not incompatible with his old position, and he could resign from the same any
time, as soon as his case had been definitely decided in his favor.

3. ID.; ID.; WHY OBJECTION TO REINSTATEMENT AFTER WIFES APPOINTMENT TO

SAME OFFICE NOT TENABLE. Where an employees wife was appointed in the same
office where the husband was employed before his conditional resignation therefrom, no
objection can be made on this account to husbands reinstatement, since he was already
employed before his wife was appointed. If any objection is to be made at all, it should be
against the wifes appointment, not his own.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PAYMENT OF BACK SALARIES NOT PROPER IF EMPLOYEE WAS NOT
COMPLETELY EXONERATED. Back salaries may be ordered paid to an officer or
employee only if he is exonerated of the charge against him and his suspension or dismissal is
found and declared to be illegal. They should not be ordered paid where the employee was not
completely exonerated, as where, although the decision of the Commissioner of Civil Service
was modified and the employee was allowed to be reinstated, the decision ordered him to forfeit
two months pay and not to be given back salaries.
DECISION
LABRADOR, J.:
Appeal by both petitioner and respondents against a decision of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, Hon. Carmelino G. Alvendia, presiding, in Special Civil Action No. 37553, entitled
"Guillermo Gonzales, Petitioner, versus the Hon. Jaime Hernandez, as Secretary of Finance, and
Jovencio Fojas, Respondents." The dispositive part of said decision is as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the appointment of Atty. Jovencio Fojas as merely
temporary in nature. The Court furthermore orders the respondent Secretary of Finance to
terminate the appointment of Atty. Jovencio Fojas and to reinstate the petitioner Guillermo
Gonzales to the position presently occupied by Atty. Fojas as attorney-agent of the Investigation
and Secret Service Division of the Department of Finance, but without any right to salary until
he is actually reinstated and only from the date of his reinstatement.
"Petitioner is not entitled to recover damages nor attorneys fees. No pronouncement as to costs.
(Brief for the respondents, p. 8).
On September 16, 1958, petitioner Guillermo Gonzales filed an action for mandamus and quo
warranto with the Court of First Instance of Manila seeking (a) to compel respondent Secretary
of Finance to reinstate him to his former position as Attorney-Agent in the Department of
Finance; (b) payment of back salaries from May 23, 1955 up to the time of reinstatement,
excluding the salaries for two months of suspension in accordance with the decision of the Civil
Service Board of Appeals; (c) the removal of respondent Jovencio Fojas as Attorney-Agent in the
Department of Finance; (d) payment of P2,000 as attorneys fees; and (e) payment of costs of the
suit. Respondents alleged the following special and affirmative defenses: petitioners resignation

from his position and his acceptance of another position in the Government Service Insurance
System amounted to an abandonment of his right to reinstatement; Cabinet Resolution dated July
13, 1937 is inapplicable to the case at bar; the reinstatement of petitioner violates Executive
Order No. 11 against nepotism because his wife is already employed in the same Department;
and lastly, petitioner has not exhausted all administrative remedies. They therefore pray for the
dismissal of the action.
The case was submitted upon a stipulation of facts, which reads as follows (unnecessary portions
omitted):jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. That petitioner was appointed in February 1954 an attorney- agent of the Investigation and
Secret Service Division, Department of Finance, but in Administrative Case No. R-11119
instituted against him, he was found guilty of disreputable conduct prior to entering the service,
and called upon to resign or be separated for cause as per decision of the Commissioner of Civil
Service dated March 11, 1955;
x

"2. That on May 23, 1955 petitioner filed with the Department of Finance a letter of resignation,
the pertinent portion of which reads as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
. . . subject to the result of my appeal with the Civil Service Board of Appeals, and to the
provisions of the Resolution of the Cabinet on July 17, 1939;
x

"3. That petitioners aforequoted tender resignation was accepted on May 28, 1955 as per a letter
of the Undersecretary of Finance;
x

"4. That petitioner appealed from the decision of the Commissioner of Civil Service . . . but did
not formally notify respondent Secretary of Finance of the filing or pendency of the said appeal;
"5. That on November 15, 1955 petitioners wife Lilia V. Gonzales was appointed to his former
position, . . . Said appointment automatically became permanent with six (6) months from and
after November 15, 1955;
"6. That on July 1, 1957, petitioners wife was promoted as Economist Tax Researcher of the
Department of Finance and respondent Jovencio Fojas, a member of the Philippine Bar was
appointed to the position in turn vacated by her;
"7. That petitioner applied for and accepted an employment as emergency helper in the
Government Service Insurance System at P6 per day and worked as such from August 6, 1956

until his services were terminated effective on July 24, 1957;

"8. That the Civil Service Board of Appeals, modified the decision of the Commissioner of Civil
Service as per a decision dated August 5, 1957, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
In view of the foregoing this Board feels justified in modifying the penalty imposed by the
Commissioner of Civil Service and imposes upon the respondent a suspension of two months
without pay. Considering, however, that this decision is not exoneration, it is the feeling of this
Board that respondent, once reinstated to his former position, shall not be entitled to collect his
salaries during the period of his suspension;
x

"9. That the Civil Service Board of Appeals sent a copy of said decision to the Office of the
Secretary of Finance on November 22, 1957;
"10. That petitioner was notified and received a copy of the decision of the CSBA on January 17,
1958 and that forthwith on the following official day, January 20, 1958, petitioner went to the
Department of Finance and informed in writing the Secretary of Finance thru the Administrative
Officer, Ceminiano Cabangon, Sr., that petitioner is reporting for duty the following day, January
21, 1958, . . .;
"11. That effectively on the following three successive days, i. e., January 21, 22 and 23, 1957,
petitioner reported for duty . . .;
x

"15. That the Commissioner of Civil Service . . .; ruled among others, that petitioner is entitled as
of right and should now be reinstated to his former position, and with respect to the filling of
position by another pending final decision of his appeal by the CSBA, attention was invited to
the Cabinet Resolution dated July 17, 1937;
"16. That petitioner, in his letter of May 23, 1958 (Annex "E" of the petition) addressed to the
Secretary of Finance, reiterated his request for reinstatement in view of the ruling made by the
Commissioner of Civil Service;
"17. That in view of petitioners request for reinstatement respondent Secretary of Finance sent a
2nd indorsement dated June 2, 1958 to the Civil Service Board of Appeals, stating all the reasons
why he could not reinstate petitioner and requesting clarification or an opinion in regards to
petitioners case, but the Board has not yet replied to said communication. Petitioner was
furnished a signed copy of said indorsement on June 2, 1958, a true copy of which is attached as
Annex "1" of respondents answer." (pp. 32-35, record.)
Upon the pleadings and the above stipulation of facts, the lower court rendered the decision

appealed from. It declared that the Undersecretary of Finance had no right to treat petitioners
letter of conditional resignation as an absolute one, and held that the Undersecretarys
unconditional acceptance of petitioners conditional resignation is equivalent to a rejection of
said resignation and petitioners position did not become vacant thereby; that petitioners
acceptance of an emergency position in the Government Service Insurance System is not an
abandonment of the position in question, as it is not incompatible with his claim for
reinstatement; that the appointment of respondent Fojas to the position of the petitioner is only
temporary in nature, in accordance with Cabinet Resolution of July 13, 1937; that said
Resolution is applicable to the case at bar, otherwise, in case like this the Secretary of Finance
would have the power to negate the decision of the Civil Service Board of Appeals by issuing a
permanent appointment to another.
From this decision, both the petitioner and the respondents have appealed. Petitioner appeals
from the decision only insofar as it denies him payment of back salaries, attorneys fees and
costs.
The errors assigned by the Solicitor General may be resolved by determining the following
questions, namely, (a) May the petitioner be considered validly resigned when his conditional
resignation was unconditionally accepted by the Undersecretary of Finance? (b) Is petitioner
deemed to have abandoned his position by accepting another position of emergency laborer in
the GSIS?
The first question should be resolved in the negative. In the first place, there is no resignation to
speak of, because there was no intention on plaintiffs part to relinquish his position as attorneyagent in the Department of Finance. To constitute a complete and operative act of resignation, the
officer or employee must show a clear intention to relinquish or surrender his
position:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . But to constitute a complete and operative resignation of public office, there must be an
intention to relinquish a part of the term, accompanied by the act of relinquishment . . ." (43 Am.
Jur. p. 22)
". . . and a resignation implies an expression by the incumbent in some form, express or implied
of the intention to surrender, renounce, or relinquish, the office, and an acceptance by competent
and lawful authority." (Nome v. Rice, 3 Alaska 602) (2 Bouviers Law Dictionary, p. 2407)
In the case at bar, plaintiffs resignation was made expressly "subject to the result of my appeal
to the Civil Service Board of Appeals, and to the provisions of the Resolution of the Cabinet on
July 17, 1937." The decision of the Civil Service Board of Appeals modified that of the
Commissioner of Civil Service, ordering plaintiff to be reinstated to his old position. There can
not be any resignation to speak of therefore.
The second question should also be resolved in the negative. Plaintiffs position in the GSIS was
temporary in nature, during the period of an emergency only. He had the right to live during the
pendency of his appeal and naturally the right to accept any form of employment. In any case, as
the court below found, this temporary employment is not incompatible with his old position; he

could resign this temporary position any time as soon as his case has been definitely decided in
his favor. To this effect is a previous ruling of the Court, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The fact that during the pendency of the petitioners appeal in the Civil Service Board of
Appeals, he worked as clerk in the office of the Provincial Treasurer of Leyte from 2 March 1951
to 17 February 1955 and received the salary as such in the total sum of P5,509.63 does not
constitute abandonment of his former position. He was ordered to resign from the service with
prejudice to reinstatement pursuant to the decision of the Commissioner of Civil Service and by
virtue thereof was prevented from exercising the functions of his position and receiving the
corresponding compensation therefor. While thus deprived of his office and emoluments
thereunto appertaining the petitioner had to find means to support himself and his family. The
fact that during the time his appeal was pending and was thus deprived of his office and salary,
he sought and found employment in another branch of the government does not constitute
abandonment of his former position . . .." (Tan v. Gimenez, Et Al., L-12525, February 19, 1960;
Potot v. Bagano, G.R. No. L-2456, January 25, 1949).
Another objection against the petition is the fact that his wife is now employed in the same
office. This objection can not lie against petitioners reinstatement; the objection did not exist at
the time of his original appointment. He was already employed before his wife was appointed.
The objection does not lie, therefore, against his reinstatement; if it is to be applied at all it
should be against his wifes appointment, not against his own.
We now proceed to discuss the lone assignment of error of the plaintiff-appellee. Appellee is
claiming back salaries, attorneys fees and damages. His claim is devoid of merit.
The law which allows payment of back salaries in cases like this is Section 260 of the Revised
Administrative Code. A perusal of the decisions of this Court in cases similar to the case at bar,
however, show that back salaries are ordered paid to an officer or an employee only if he is
exonerated of the charge against him and his suspension or dismissal is found and declared to be
illegal. In the case at bar, plaintiff was not completely exonerated, because although the decision
of the Commissioner of Civil Service was modified and the plaintiff was allowed to be
reinstated, the decision ordered him to forfeit two months pay and not to be given back salaries.
In a statement filed before us by counsel for petitioner- appellant, it is made to appear that
respondent Jovencio Fojas is no longer holding the item in question. This manifestation is not
denied by the counsel for the respondents. However, there is no showing that said item, if already
vacated by respondent Jovencio Fojas, has been given to another, or has been eliminated from
the Appropriations Act. There is, therefore, no impediment to petitioners reinstatement.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed in toto, without costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon, De Leon and Natividad,
JJ., concur.
Concepcion and Barrera, JJ., took no par

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 78957 June 28, 1988
MARIO D. ORTIZ, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.
FERNAN, J.:
In this petition for certiorari, petitioner presents before the Court the issue of whether or
not a constitutional official whose "courtesy resignation" was accepted by the President
of the Philippines during the effectivity of the Freedom Constitution may be entitled to
retirement benefits under Republic Act No. 1568, as amended.
Petitioner was appointed Commissioner of the Commission on Elections [COMELEC]
by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos "for a term expiring May 17, 1992." 1 He took his
oath of office on July 30, 1985.
On March 5, 1986, together with Commissioners Quirino D. Marquinez and
Mangontawar G. Guro, petitioner sent President Corazon C. Aquino a letter which reads
as follows:
The undersigned Commissioners were appointed to the Commission on
Elections on July 30, 1985.
Following the example of Honorable Justices of the Supreme Court, on
the premise that we have now a revolutionary government, we hereby
place our position at your disposal. 2
Thereafter, or on March 25,1986, the Freedom Constitution was promulgated through
Proclamation No. 3, Artide III thereof provides:
SECTION 1. In the reorganization of the government, priority shall be
given to measures to promote economy, efficiency, and the eradication of
graft and corruption.
SEC. 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973
Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided by
proclamation or executive order or upon the designation or appointment
and qualification of their successors, if such is made within a period of one
year from February 25, 1986.
SEC. 3. Any public officer or employee separated from the service as a
result of the reorganization effected under this Proclamation shall, if
entitled under the laws then in force, receive the retirement and other
benefits accruing thereunder.
On April 16,1986, the COMELEC, then composed of Chairman Ramon H. Felipe, Jr.
and Commissioners Froilan M. Bacungan, Quirino A. Marquinez, Mario D. Ortiz

(petitioner herein), Ruben E. Agpalo and Jaime J. Layosa, adopted Resolution No. 862364 approving the application for retirement of Commissioners Victorino Savellano and
Jaime Opinion. Seven days later, the same body passed Resolution No. 862370
approving the application for retirement of Commissioner Mangontawar B. Guro.
On July 21, 1986, the Deputy Executive Secretary requested Acting Chairman Felipe to
convey the information to Commissioners Marquinez, Ortiz, Agpalo and Layosa that the
President had "accepted, with regrets, their respective resignations, effective
immediately." 3 After the presidential acceptance of said "resignations," the new
COMELEC was composed of Ramon H. Felipe, Jr. as Chairman and Commissioners
Froilan M. Bacungan, Leopoldo L. Africa, Haydee B. Yorac, Andres R. Flores, Dario C,
Rama and Anacleto D. Badoy, Jr., as members. It was to this body that Commissioners
Agpalo, Ortiz and Marquinez submitted on July 30, 1986 their respective applications for
retirement. They were followed by Commissioner Layosa on August 1, 1986.
To justify their petitions for retirement and their requests for payment of retirement
benefits, all seven former COMELEC Commissioners invoked Republic Act No. l568 as
amended by Republic Act No. 3595 and re-enacted by Republic Act No. 6118,
specifically the following provision:
SECTION 1. When the Auditor General or the Chairman or any Member of
the Commission on Elections retires from the service for having completed
his term of office or by reason of his incapacity to discharge the duties of
his office, or dies while in the service, or resigns at any time after reaching
the age of sixty years but before the expiration of his term of office, he or
his heirs shall be paid in lump sum his salary for one year, not exceeding
five years, for every year of service based upon the last annual salary that
he was receiving at the time of retirement incapacity, death or resignation,
as the case may be: Provided, That in case of resignation, he has
rendered not less than twenty years of service in the government; And
provided, further, That he shall receive an annuity payable monthly during
the residue of his natural life equivalent to the amount of monthly salary he
was receiving on the date of retirement, incapacity or resignation.
In its en banc Resolution No. 86-2491 * of August 13, 1986 4 the COMELEC revoked
Resolutions Nos. 86-2364 dated April 16, 1986 and 86-2370 dated April 23, 1986, and
denied the applications for retirement of Commissioners Marquinez, Agpalo, Ortiz and
Layosa on the ground that they were "not entitled to retirement benefits under Republic
Act No. 1568, as amended" without specifying the reason therefor. 5
Petitioner Ortiz moved for the reconsideration of said resolution, contending that he was
entitled to the benefits under Republic Act No. 1568, as amended. He averred therein
that he did not resign but simply placed his position at the disposal of the President; that
he had in fact completed his term as Commissioner by the "change in the term of [his]
office and eventual replacement," and that he was entitled to retirement benefits under
the aforementioned law because Article 1186 of the Civil Code which states that "the
condition [with regard to an obligation] shall be deemed fulfilled when the obligor
voluntarily prevents its fulfillment." He invoked the aforequoted provisions of
Proclamation No. 3 and cited the cases of former Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino and

Associate Justice Hermogenes Concepcion, Jr. who were allowed to retire by this Court
and receive retirement benefits. 6
Petitioner's letter/motion for reconsideration was denied by the COMELEC in its en
banc resolution of October 1, 1986.** On December 18, 1986, petitioner appealed the
denial of his claim to the Chairman of the Commission on Audit [COA]. In its
memorandum dated January 15, 1987, the COA referred the matter to the COMELEC
resident auditor for comment and recommendation. Having failed to receive any
communication from the COA for some six months, on June 3, 1987, petitioner
reiterated his appeal thereto. Again, the matter was referred to the COMELEC resident
auditor with a request for immediate action thereon.
A month later, or on July 9, 1987, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari alleging
that the COMELEC's "arbitrary and unjust denial" of his claim for retirement benefits and
of his subsequent motion for reconsideration constitutes "grave and whimsical abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction" which can only be remedied through the
instant petition in the absence of an appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy.
7
In his memorandum, however, petitioner admits that, as correctly stated by the
Solicitor General in respondents' comment on the petition, this petition is basically one
for a writ of mandamus aimed at compelling both the COMELEC and the COA to
approve his claim for retirement benefits. 8
We consider this case as a special civil action of both certiorari and mandamus and,
notwithstanding the Solicitor General's contention that action herein is premature as the
COA may yet render a decision favorable to the petitioner, We opt to decide this case to
shed light on the legal issue presented.
The respondents posit the view that petitioner's "voluntary resignation" prevented the
completion of his term of office, and, therefore, having rendered only sixteen years of
service to the government, he is not entitled to retirement benefits. 9
We disagree. Petitioner's separation from government service as a result of the
reorganization ordained by the then nascent Aquino government may not be considered
a resignation within the contemplation of the law. Resignation is defined as the act of
giving up or the act of an officer by which he declines his office and renounces the
further right to use it. 10 To constitute a complete and operative act of resignation, the
officer or employee must show a clear intention to relinquish or surrender his position
accompanied by the act of relinquishment. 11 Resignation implies an expression of the
incumbent in some form, express or implied, of the intention to surrender, renounce and
relinquish the office, and its acceptance by competent and lawful authority. 12
From the foregoing it is evident that petitioner's "resignation" lacks the element of clear
intention to surrender his position. We cannot presume such intention from his
statement in his letter of March 5, 1986 that he was placing his position at the disposal
of the President. He did not categorically state therein that he was unconditionally giving
up his position. It should be remembered that said letter was actually a response to
Proclamation No. 1 which President Aquino issued on February 25,1986 when she
called on all appointive public officials to tender their "courtesy resignation" as a "first
step to restore confidence in public administration.

Verily, a "courtesy resignation" can lot properly be interpreted as resignation in the legal
sense for it is not necessarily a reflection of a public official's intention to surrender his
position. Rather, it manifests his submission to the will of the political authority and the
appointing power.
A stringent interpretation of courtesy resignations must therefore be observed,
particularly in cases involving constitutional officials like the petitioner whose removal
from office entails an impeachment proceeding. 13 For even if working for the
government is regarded as no more than a privilege, discharge for disloyalty or for
doubt about loyalty may involve such legal rights as those in reputation and eligibility for
other employment. 14
The curtailment of his term not being attributable to any voluntary act on the part of the
petitioner, equity and justice demand that he should be deemed to have completed his
term albeit much ahead of the date stated in his appointment paper. Petitioner's case
should be placed in the same category as that of an official holding a primarily
confidential position whose tenure ends upon his superior's loss of confidence in him.
His cessation from the service entails no removal but an expiration of his term. 15
As he is deemed to have completed his term of office, petitioner should be considered
retired from the service. And, in the absence of proof that he has been found guilty of
malfeasance or misfeasance in office or that there is a pending administrative case
against him, petitioner is entitled to a life pension under Republic Act No. 1568 as
amended and reenacted by Republic Act No. 6118. He is, therefore, protected by the
mantle of the Freedom Constitution specifically Article III, Section 3 thereof which was in
effect when he was replaced by the appointment and qualification of a new
Commissioner.
Parenthetically, to a public servant, pension is not a gratuity but rather a form of
deferred compensation for services performed and his right thereto commences to vest
upon his entry into the retirement system and becomes an enforceable obligation in
court upon fulfillment of all conditions under which it is to be paid. 16 Similarly, retirement
benefits receivable by public employees are valuable parts of the consideration for
entrance into and continuation in public employment. 17 They serve a public purpose
and a primary objective in establishing them is to induce able persons to enter and
remain in public employment, and to render faithful and efficient service while so
employed. 18
Worth noting is the fact that, as originally enacted, Republic Act No. 1568 required not
less than twenty years of service in the government at the time of the retirement, death
or resignation of the Auditor General or the Chairman and any Member of the
COMELEC. The same length of service was required after Republic Act No. 3473
amended the law. However, Republic Act No. 3595 further amended Republic Act No.
1568 and the 20-year service requirement was mandated only in case of resignation of
the public official covered by the law. Although Republic Act No. 1568, as amended, was
inoperative and abolished in Section 9 of Republic Act No. 4968, it was re-enacted
under Republic Act No. 6118.
On the respondents' assertion that the retirement law is clear and hence, there is no
room for its interpretation, We reiterate the basic principle that, being remedial in

character, a statute creating pensions should be liberally construed and administered in

favor of the persons intended to be benefited thereby. 19 This is as it should be because
the liberal approach aims to achieve the humanitarian purposes of the law in order that
the efficiency, security, and well-being of government employees may be enhanced. 20
WHEREFORE, respondent Commission on Elections denial of petitioner's application
for retirement benefits is hereby reversed and set aside. The Commission on Audit and
other public offices concerned are directed to facilitate the processing and payment of
petitioner's retirement benefits.
SO ORDERED.
Yap, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Cortes, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Estrada vs Desierto; Arroyo
Posted by kaye lee on 2:48 AM
Estrada vs Desierto G.R. No. 146710-15; Estrada vs Arroyo G.R. No. 146738, March 2 2001
[Immunity from Suit; Resignation of the President; Justiciable controversy]
FACTS:
It began in October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings involving bribe-taking, illegal
gambling, and other forms of corruption were made against Estrada before the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee. On November 13, 2000, Estrada was impeached by the Hor and, on
December 7, impeachment proceedings were begun in the Senate during which more serious
allegations of graft and corruption against Estrada were made and were only stopped on January
16, 2001 when 11 senators, sympathetic to the President, succeeded in suppressing damaging
evidence against Estrada. As a result, the impeachment trial was thrown into an uproar as the
entire prosecution panel walked out and Senate President Pimentel resigned after casting his vote
against Estrada.
On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at
EDSA Shrine. Estrada called for a snap presidential election to be held concurrently with
congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in this election.
On January 20, SC declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada
constructively resigned his post. At noon, Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the
crowd at EDSA as the 14th President. Estrada and his family later left Malacaang Palace. Erap,
after his fall, filed petition for prohibition with prayer for WPI. It sought to enjoin the respondent
Ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against him not until his
term as president ends. He also prayed for judgment confirming Estrada to be the lawful and
incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties
of his office.
ISSUE(S):
1. WoN the petition presents a justiciable controversy.
2. WoN Estrada resigned as President.
3. WoN Arroyo is only an acting President.
4. WoN the President enjoys immunity from suit.

5. WoN the prosecution of Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity.

RULING:
1. Political questions- "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure."
Legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II:
EDSA I

EDSA II

exercise of the people power of revolution

which overthrew the whole government.

exercise of people power of freedom of

speech and freedom of assembly to petition
the government for redress of grievances which
only affected the office of the President.

extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the intra constitutional and the resignation of the
new government that resulted from it cannot be sitting President that it caused and the
the subject of judicial review
succession of the Vice President as President
are subject to judicial review.
presented a political question;

involves legal questions.

The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for resolution require
the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution: Sec 1 of Art II, and Sec 8
of Art VII, and the allocation of governmental powers under Sec 11 of Art VII. The issues
likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They also involve the
correct calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity.
2. Elements of valid resignation: (a)an intent to resign and (b) acts of relinquishment. Both were
present when President Estrada left the Palace.
Totality of prior contemporaneous posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing material
relevant issuesPresident Estrada is deemed to have resigned constructive resignation.
SC declared that the resignation of President Estrada could not be doubted as confirmed by his
leaving Malacaan Palace. In the press release containing his final statement:
1. He acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President;
2. He emphasized he was leaving the Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the
healing process (he did not say that he was leaving due to any kind of disability and that he was
going to reassume the Presidency as soon as the disability disappears);
3. He expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them as President
(without doubt referring to the past opportunity);
4. He assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come in the same service
of the country;
5. He called on his supporters to join him in promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity.
Intent to resignmust be accompanied by act of relinquishmentact or omission before, during
and after January 20, 2001.

3. The Congress passed House Resolution No. 176 expressly stating its support to Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines and subsequently passed H.R.
178 confirms the nomination of Teofisto T. Guingona Jr. As Vice President. Senate passed HR
No. 83 declaring the Impeachment Courts as Functius Officio and has been terminated. It is clear
is that both houses of Congress recognized Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that
recognition is the premise that the inability of Estrada is no longer temporary as the Congress has
clearly rejected his claim of inability.
The Court therefore cannot exercise its judicial power for this is political in nature and addressed
solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. In fine, even if Estrada can prove that he did not
resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is
merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the
decision that Arroyo is the de jure, president made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be
reviewed by this Court.
4. The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and
graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which
carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting
president. He cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal
acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. The rule is that unlawful acts of
public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but
stands in the same footing as any trespasser.
5. No. Case law will tell us that a right to a fair trial and the free press are incompatible. Also,
since our justice system does not use the jury system, the judge, who is a learned and legally
enlightened individual, cannot be easily manipulated by mere publicity. The Court also said that
Estrada did not present enough evidence to show that the publicity given the trial has influenced
the judge so as to render the judge unable to perform. Finally, the Court said that the cases
against Estrada were still undergoing preliminary investigation, so the publicity of the case
would really have no permanent effect on the judge and that the prosecutor should be more
concerned with justice and less with prosecution.
Categories: Constitutional Law 1, Estrada vs Arroyo Case Digest, Estrada vs Desierto Case
Digest
AGNES GAMBOA-HIRSCH
Petitioner,vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and FRANKLIN HARVEY HIRSCH,
Respondents.This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 which seeks to set aside the decision
of the CA whichgranted private respondent Franklin joint custody with petitioner Agnes of their
minor daughterSimone.Spouses Franklin and Agnes started to have marital problems as Agnes
wanted to stay in MakatiCity, while Franklin insisted that they stay in Boracay Island. When
Agnes came to their conjugal
home in Boracay, and asked for money and for Franklins permission for her to bring their daughter
to Makati City for a brief vacation she has an intention not to come back to Boracay.Franklin
then filed a petition for habeas corpus before the CA for Agnes to produce Simone in court,CA
issued a Resolution which ordered that a writ of habeas corpus be issued ordering that Simonebe
brought before said court. CA granted Franklin joint custody with Agnes of their minor

child.Agnes filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied.Hence, this

petition.Issue:WON the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion when it granted joint custody in
utter disregard ofthe provisions of the Family Code, as to minors seven (7) years of age and
below.Held:The court held that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted joint
custody of theminor child to both parents.The so-called "tender-age presumption" under Article
213 of the Family Code may be overcome onlyby compelling evidence of the mother
s unfitness. The mother is declared unsuitable to have custody
of her children in one or more of the following instances: neglect, abandonment,
unemployment,immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child,
insanity, or affliction witha communicable disease.
7
Here, the mother was not shown to be unsuitable or grossly incapable ofcaring for her minor
child. All told, no compelling reason has been adduced to wrench the child from
the mothers custody.
1avvphi1
Sole custody over Simone Noelle Hirsch is hereby
AWARDED
to the mother, petitioner AgnesGamboa-Hirsch
FACTS: Petitioners were incumbent commissioners of the National Police Commission when
Republic Act. No. 8851, otherwise known as the PNP Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998,
took effect. Section 8 of Republic Act. No. 8851 provided that the terms of office of the
incumbent commissioners were deemed expired. Petitioners claimed that this violated their
security of tenure.
HELD: Petitioners are members of the civil service. Republic Act No. 8551 did not expressly
abolish the positions of petitioners. Under RA No. 6975, the National Police Commission was
under the Department of Interior and Local Government, while under Republic Act. No. 8551 it
is made an agency attached to the Department of Interior and Local Government. The
organizational structure and the composition of the National Police Commission remain
essentially the same except for the addition of the Chief of PNP as ex-officio member. The
powers and duties of the National Police Commission remain basically unchanged. No bona
fide reorganization of the NPC having been mandated by Congress and insofar as RA 8851
declares the office of the petitioner as expired resulting in their separation from office, it is
tantamount to removing civil service employees from office without legal cause therefore, it
must be struck down for being constitutionally infirm.
Aparri vs CA GR L-30057
Facts:
On January 15, 1960, private respondent approved the following resolution # 13, hereby
appointing Mr. Bruno Aparri, as general manager of NARRA, with all the rights, prerogatives
and compensations to take effect on January 116, 1960.
On March 15, 1962, the board of directors approved resolution # 24 which stating thereat that the
incumbent general manager shall perform his duty up to the close of office hour on March 31,
1962. In accordance with the provisions of section 8, sub-section 2 of RA 1160. It hereby fixes
the term of office of the incumbent general manager until march 31, 1962. Petitioner file a

mandamus with preliminary injunction with the first instance court. The petition pray for the
annulment of the resolution of NARRA board.
Issue:
Whether or not board resolution No. 24 was a removal or dismissal of petitioner without cause.
Held:
It was affirmed that the term of office of petitioner expired on March 31, 1962. It is necessary in
each case to interpret the word "Term" with the purview of the statutes so as to effectuate the
statutory scheme pertaining to the office under examination. In the case at bar, the term of office
is not fixed by law. However, the power to fix the term is rested in the board of directors subject
to the recommendation of the office of economic coordination and the approval of the president
of the philippines. Resolution No. 24 speaks of no removal but an expiration of the term of office
of the petitioner. The statute is undeniably clear. "It is the rule in statutory construction that if the
words and phrases of a statute are not obscure or ambiguous. Its meaning and intention of the
legislative must be determined from the language employed and where there is no ambiguity in
words, there is no room for construction.
The petitioner in this case was not removed before the expiration of his term rather, his right to
hold office ceased by the expiration on March 31, 1962, of his term to hold such office.
IGOY vs. ATTY SORIANO
Facts:
Igoy was a peiioner in a certain case pending in the CA. He later sought help from a friend to
win his case in the event it would lose in CA. The said friend introduced IGOY from one of the
alleged
JUSTICE of the SC which later turned out to be Aty Soriano. The Jusice ofered IGOY to
help him
when his case reaches SC for a consideraion of 20k. When then they loss the case in CA, the
Jusice
prepared a peiion for review for a consideraion of another 20k. When IGOY found out that the
Jusice is not really a Jusice, and when the peiion for review was denied, IGOY now iled this
administraive case against ATTY SORIANO.
Held:

ATTY SORIANO is disbarred.

Rule 6.02. A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public posiion to promote or
advance his private interests, nor allow the later to interfere with his public duies. The foregoing
command acquires paricular signiicance given the prevailing facts of this case
considering that respondent is a senior lawyer of this Court. It bears stressing that government
lawyers
who are public servants owe utmost idelity to the public service, for public service is a public
trust. As
such, government lawyers should be more sensiive to their professional obligaions as their
disreputable conduct is more likely to be magniied in the public eye.
Lacson vs RomeroFacts:
Petitioner Lacson was on July 25, 1946, appointed by the President of thePhilippines, provincial
fiscal of Negros Oriental. The appointment was confirmed by theCommission on Appointment
on August 6, 1946. He took his oath of office on August10, 1946, and thereafter performed the
duties of that office.Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Justice, on May 17, 1949, the
Presidentnominated petitioner Lacson to the post of provincial fiscal of Tarlac. On the samedate,
the President nominated for the position of provincial fiscal of Negros Orientalrespondent
Romero. Both nominations were simultaneously confirmed by theCommission on Appointments
on May 19, 1949
Lacson neither accepted the appointment nor assumed the office of fiscal of Tarlac.But
respondent Romero took his oath of office (the post of fiscal of Negros Oriental) inManila on
June 16, 1949, notified the Solicitor General of the fact, and thereafter proceeded to his station.
Upon arrival at Dumaguete City, capital of Negros Oriental,he notified Lacson of his intention to
take over the office the following day, but Lacsonobjected. Hence this petition
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lacson is entitled to the position
Held :
The Court ruled that:The appointment to a government post like that of provincial fiscal to be
completeinvolves several steps. First, comes the nomination by the President. Then to makethat
nomination valid and permanent, the Commission on Appointments of theLegislature has to
confirm said nomination. The last step is the acceptance thereof bythe appointee by his
assumption of office. The first two steps, nomination andconfirmation, constitute a mere offer of
a post. They are acts of the Executive andLegislative departments of the Government. But the
last necessary step to make theappointment complete and effective rests solely with the appointee
himself. He may or he may not accept the appointment or nomination. As held in the case of
Borromeo vs.Mariano, 41 Phil. 327,"there is no Power in this country which can compel a man
toaccept an office." Consequently, since Lacson has declined to accept his appointmentas
provincial fiscal of Tarlac and no one can compel him to do so, then he continuesas provincial

fiscal of Negros Oriental and no vacancy in said office was created,unless Lacson had been
lawfully removed as Such fiscal of Negros Orienta

ii

iii

iv

vCuevas et al. v. Bacal, [G.R. No. 139382. December 6, 2000] 14 Oct

FACTS
This case involves the appointment and transfer of career executive service officers (CESOs). More
specifically, it concerns the appointment of respondent Josefina G. Bacal, who holds the rank of
CESO III, to the position of Chief Public Attorney in the Public Attorneys Office, which has a CES
Rank Level I, and her subsequent transfer, made without her consent, to the Office of the Regional
Director of the PAO because of the appointment of Atty. Carina Demaisip to the position of Chief
Public Defender (formerly Chief Public Attorney). Atty. Bacal filed a petition for quo warranto ruled in
her favor by the Court of Appeals. Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUES
Whether:

(1) Bacal is entitled of security of tenure considering that she belongs to Career Service;

(2) security of tenure in the Career Executive Service is acquired with respect to the position or
to the rank the officer is holding;

(3) CESOs may be shifted from one position to another without violating their security of
tenure;

(4) Bacals unconsented transfer from Acting Chief Public Attorney to Regional Director
constitutes a demotion;

RULING

(1) No. The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Service does not automatically
confer security of tenure on its occupant even if he does not possess the required
qualifications. Such right will have to depend on the nature of his appointment, which in turn
depends on his eligibility or lack of it. A person who does not have the requisite qualifications
for the position cannot be appointed to it in the first place or, only as an exception to the rule,
may be appointed to it merely in an acting capacity in the absence of appropriate eligibles.
Here, Atty. Bacal has a rank of CESO III appointed to a position of CESO I. The appointment
extended to him cannot be regarded as permanent even if it may be so designated.

(2) Security of tenure in the career executive service is acquired with respect to rank and not to
position.The guarantee of security of tenure to members of the CES does not extend to the
particular positions to which they may be appointed a concept which is applicable only to first
and second-level employees in the civil service but to the rank to which they are appointed by
the President. Here, respondent did not acquire security of tenure by the mere fact that she was
appointed to the higher position of Chief Public Attorney since she was not subsequently
appointed to the rank of CESO I based on her performance in that position as required by the
rules of the CES Board.

(3) Yes. Members of the Career Executive Service may be reassigned or transferred from one
position to another and from one department, bureau or office to another;provided that such
reassignment or transfer is made in the interest of public service and involves no reduction in
rank or salary; provided, further, that no member shall be reassigned or transferred oftener than
every two years. If a CESO is assigned to a CES position with a higher salary grade than that of
his CES rank, he is allowed to receive the salary of the CES position. Should he be assigned or
made to occupy a CES position with a lower salary grade, he shall continue to be paid the salary
attached to his CES rank. Here, there is a valid transfer of Atty. Bacal to the Regional Office as
it was made in the interest of public service and she is still compensated according to her CES
rank.

(4) No. Respondents appointment to the position of Chief Public Attorney was merely
temporary and that, consequently, her subsequent transfer to the position of Regional Director
of the same office, which corresponds to her CESO rank, cannot be considered a demotion,
much less a violation of the security of tenure guarantee of the Constitution. The rule that
outlaws unconsented transfers as anathema to security of tenure applies only to an officer who
is appointed not merely assigned to a particular station. Such a rule does not proscribe a
transfer carried out under a specific statute that empowers the head of an agency to periodically
reassign the employees and officers in order to improve the service of the agency

Padolina vs. Fernandez Demotion

Facts
Fernandez was PAGASAs Finance and Management Division Chief who was
reassigned to Taguig, pursuant to SO 129;
Fernandez protested this as being tantamount to constructive dismissal. Padolina
refused to set SO 129 aside, and was upheld by the CSC;
DOST Special Order returned certain employees to their original assignments, but
excluded others, including Fernandez;
An investigation found Fernandez guilty of insubordination, and was ordered to

accept the reassignment;

The CA on appeal declared SO 129 void for violating security of tenure. The SC
affirms, hence this MR.
Issues
W/N the reassignment is valid.
Held/Ratio
No. A reassignment is a movement from one unit to another in the same agency
which does not involve a reduction in rank, status, salary, and does not require an
appointment.
SO 129 does not have any definite duration for reassignment, it being expressly
subject to a separate DOST Special Order.
It is tantamount to an indefinite floating assignment resulting in a demotion. It
removes her power of supervision over 41 subordinate employees, thereby
diminishing her status

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 119903. August 15, 2000]

HON. RICARDO T. GLORIA, in his capacity as SECRETARY, AND

DIRECTOR NILO L. ROSAS in his capacity as REGIONAL DIRECTOR,
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS, petitioners,
vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND DR. BIENVENIDO A. ICASIANO,
respondents.

DECISION

PURISIMA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court brought by
Secretary and the Director for the National Capital Region of the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), to question the decision [1] of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35505.

The Court of Appeals found the facts as follows:

"On June 29, 1989, petitioner [private respondent herein] was appointed Schools
Division Superintendent, Division of City Schools, Quezon City, by the then President
Corazon C. Aquino.

On October 10, 1994, respondent Secretary Gloria recommended to the President of

the Philippines that the petitioner be reassigned as Superintendent of the MIST
[Marikina Institute of Science and Technology], to fill up the vacuum created by the
retirement of its Superintendent, Mr. Bannaoag F. Lauro, on June 17, 1994.

On October 12, 1994, the President approved the recommendation of Secretary Gloria.

On October 13, 1994, a copy of the recommendation for petitioners reassignment, as

approved by the President, was transmitted by Secretary Gloria to Director Rosas for
implementation.

On October 14, 1994, Director Rosas, informed the petitioner of his reassignment,
effective October 17, 1994.

Petitioner requested respondent Secretary Gloria to reconsider the reassignment, but

the latter denied the request. The petitioner prepared a letter dated October 18, 1994
to the President of the Philippines, asking for a reconsideration of his reassignment,
and furnished a copy of the same to the DECS. However, he subsequently changed
his mind and refrained from filing the letter with the Office of President.

On October 19, 1994, the petitioner filed the instant petition." [2]

On October 26, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied private respondents prayer for the
issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO). [3]

On November 22, 1994, it set aside its earlier resolution denying the prayer for the
issuance of a TRO; and thereafter, restrained the petitioners "from implementing the
re-assignment of the petitioner [private respondent herein] from incumbent Schools
Division Superintendent of Quezon City to Vocational Schools Superintendent of the
Marikina Institute of Science and Technology." [4]

On December 21, 1994, the Court of Appeals issued another resolution setting the
hearing of the petition for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and enjoining
the petitioners from implementing the reassignment of the private respondent.

On March 28, 1995, it issued its assailed decision; holding as follows:

"WHEREFORE, for lack of a period or any indication that it is only temporary, the
reassignment of the petitioner from Schools Division Superintendent, Division of City
Schools, Quezon City, to Vocational Schools Superintendent of the Marikina Institute of
Science and Technology pursuant to the Memorandum of Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria
to the President of the Philippines dated 10 October 1994, is hereby declared to be
violative of petitioners right to security of tenure, and the respondents are hereby
prohibited from implementing the same.

SO ORDERED."[5]

Petitioners are now before the Court seeking relief from the decision of the appellate
court, contending that:
I

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS HAS ALLOWED ITSELF TO BE

INSTRUMENTAL IN PRIVATE RESPONDENTS CIRCUMVENTION OF THE
PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY FROM SUIT BY GIVING DUE COURSE AND GRANTING
RELIEFS PRAYED FOR IN A SUIT PURPORTEDLY FILED AGAINST PETITIONERS
BUT ACTUALLY QUESTIONING AN ACT OF THE PRESIDENT.
II

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF

SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR APPLICABLE DECISIONS
OF THE SUPREME COURT[6]

The pivotal issue for resolution here is whether the reassignment of private respondent
from School Division Superintendent of Quezon City to Vocational School
Superintendent of MIST is violative of his security of tenure? Petitioners maintain that
there is no violation of security of tenure involved. Private respondent maintains
otherwise.

In taking favorable action on private respondents petition for prohibition, the Court of
Appeals ratiocinated:

"Notwithstanding the protestations of counsel for the respondents, the reassignment of

the petitioner to MIST appears to be indefinite. No period is fixed. No objective or
purpose, from which the temporariness of the assignment may be inferred, is set. In
fact, the recommendation of respondent Secretary Gloria to the President that the
position of superintendent of MIST will best fit his (petitioners) qualifications and
experience. (Exh. C-2) implies that the proposed reassignment will be indefinite." [7]

Petitioners theorize that the present petition for prohibition is improper because the
same attacks an act of the President, in violation of the doctrine of presidential
immunity from suit.

Petitioners contention is untenable for the simple reason that the petition is directed
against petitioners and not against the President. The questioned acts are those of
petitioners and not of the President. Furthermore, presidential decisions may be
questioned before the courts where there is grave abuse of discretion or that the
President acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. [8]

Petitioners submission that the petition of private respondent with the Court of Appeals
is improper for failing to show that petitioners constituted themselves into a "court"
conducting a "proceeding" and for failing to show that any of the petitioners acted
beyond their jurisdiction in the exercise of their judicial or ministerial functions, is
barren of merit. Private respondent has clearly averred that the petitioners acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction and/or excess of jurisdiction
in reassigning the private respondent in a way that infringed upon his security of
tenure. And petitioners themselves admitted that their questioned act constituted a
ministerial duty, such that they could be subject to charges of insubordination if they
did not comply with the presidential order. What is more, where an administrative
department acts with grave abuse of discretion, which is equivalent to a capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment, or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner, there is a justification for the courts to set aside the administrative
determination thus reached.[9]

Petitioners contend that the doctrine enunciated in Bentain vs. Court of Appeals[10] -that "a reassignment that is indefinite and results in a reduction in rank, status and
salary, is in effect, a constructive removal from the service" -- does not apply in the
present case for the reassignment in question was merely temporary, lasting only until
the appointment of a new Vocational School Superintendent of MIST.

After a careful study, the Court upholds the finding of the respondent court that the
reassignment of petitioner to MIST "appears to be indefinite". The same can be
inferred from the Memorandum[11] of Secretary Gloria for President Fidel V. Ramos to
the effect that the reassignment of private respondent will "best fit his qualifications and
experience" being "an expert in vocational and technical education." It can thus be
gleaned that subject reassignment is more than temporary as the private respondent
has been described as fit for the (reassigned) job, being an expert in the field. Besides,
there is nothing in the said Memorandum to show that the reassignment of private
respondent is temporary or would only last until a permanent replacement is found as

no period is specified or fixed; which fact evinces an intention on the part of petitioners
to reassign private respondent with no definite period or duration. Such feature of the
reassignment in question is definitely violative of the security of tenure of the private
respondent. As held in Bentain:

EN BANC

[G.R. Nos. 98340-42. April 10, 1992.]

GOVERNOR MARIANO J. PIMENTEL and LILIA L. SALUN-AT, Petitioners, v.
JUSTICES FRANCIS E. GARCHITORENA, REGINO HERMOSISIMA, JR. and
CIPRIANO A. DEL ROSARIO, Respondents.
[G.R. Nos. 101066-68. April 10, 1992.]
MARIANO J. PIMENTEL, LILIA L. SALUN-AT and EDGARDO MERJUDIO,
Petitioners, v. THE SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division, SANDIGANBAYAN (Second
Division) and OMBUDSMAN CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, Respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; PUBLIC OFFICERS; PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION;

PURPOSE. The purpose of the suspension order is to prevent the accused from using his
position and the powers and prerogatives of his office to influence potential witnesses or tamper
with records which may be vital in the prosecution of the case against him.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; MUST NOT EXCEED THE MAXIMUM PERIOD OF NINETY (90) DAYS.
In the aforementioned criminal cases, however, while the suspension of Governor Pimentel
and the Provincial Secretary, Mrs. Salun-at, was proper because the informations against them
charge "offense(s) involving fraud against the government or public funds or property . . ." (Sec.
13 of R.A. 3019), still, in the light of our decisions in Deloso v. Sandiganbayan, 173 SCRA 409;
Doromal v. Sandiganbayan, 177 SCRA 354; and Gonzaga v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 96131,
September 6, 1991, such suspension may not exceed the maximum period of ninety (90) days
fixed in Section 42 of P.D. No. 807. Since the petitioners were suspended from their positions
on April 15, 1991, their suspension has already exceeded the maximum limit of ninety (90)
days, hence, it should now be lifted.

DECISION

GRIO-AQUINO, J.:

Assailed in this petition for certiorari is the suspension by the Sandiganbayan of petitioners
Mariano J. Pimentel, provincial governor of Quirino province, Lilia L. Salun-at, the provincial

secretary, and Edgardo Merjudio, the private secretary of the Governor, in SB Crim. Cases Nos.
13834-36 and 16540 where they face four (4) counts of Falsification of Public Documents and
in SB Crim. Case No. 16560 where they are charged with Violation of Section 3(h) of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act.
In Crim. Cases Nos. 13834, 13835 and 13836, the petitioners, Pimentel and Salun-at, are
accused of having falsified or caused the falsification of the excerpts from the minutes of the
regular sessions of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Quirino province on August 15, 1988 and
September 19, 1988 by making it appear therein that:
chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

(a) on August 15, 1988, Resolution No. 116-A was passed appropriating P5,000 as
supplementary aid for the family of Crisostomo Antonio, the victim of an accident within the
provincial capitol compound, but the truth is that no such resolution was approved and adopted;
(b) on September 19, 1988, Resolution No. 136 was passed and approved implementing the
Supplemental Budget No. 4, and Appropriation Ordinance No,. 4 in the amount of P294,000,
although the truth is that no such resolution was passed and approved.
(c) also on September 19, 1988, Resolution No. 137 implementing the Supplemental Budget
No. 2, and Appropriation Ordinance No. 5 in the amount of P189,770.44 was supposedly passed
and approved, although the truth is that no such resolution was passed and approved.
In Crim. Case No. 16560, the petitioner, Governor Mariano J. Pimentel, was charged with
having illegally granted to his son-in-law and co-accused Edgardo Merjudio, the lease of a
government building in the capitol grounds together with the equipment therein, to be operated
as a canteen, although there was no formal lease contract between the provincial government
and Merjudio, nor a resolution awarding such lease to him.
On motion of the prosecution, the Sandiganbayan (First and Second Division) suspended
Governor Pimentel pendente lite pursuant to Section 13 of R.A. 3019 as amended, which
reads:
red:chanrobles.com.ph

"SECTION 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. Any incumbent public officer against whom
any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of
the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or
property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and
mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office . . . (Emphasis
supplied.)" (p. 68, Rollo.)
The purpose of the suspension order is to prevent the accused from using his position and the
powers and prerogatives of his office to influence potential witnesses or tamper with records
which may be vital in the prosecution of the case against him.
In the aforementioned criminal cases, however, while the suspension of Governor Pimentel and
the Provincial Secretary, Mrs. Salun-at, was proper because the informations against them
charge "offense(s) involving fraud against the government or public funds or property . . ." (Sec.
13 of R.A. 3019), still, in the light of our decisions in Deloso v. Sandiganbayan, 173 SCRA 409;

Doromal v. Sandiganbayan, 177 SCRA 354; and Gonzaga v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 96131,
September 6, 1991, such suspension may not exceed the maximum period of ninety (90) days
fixed in Section 42 of P.D. No. 807.
Since the petitioners were suspended from their positions on April 15, 1991, their suspension
has already exceeded the maximum limit of ninety (90) days, hence, it should now be lifted.

chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

The preventive suspension of petitioners Pimentel and Merjudio in Crim. Case No. 16560 was
fixed for a period of ninety (90) days, from August 2, 1991. or up to November 1, 1991 yet.
Their prayer to lift the said suspension, if it has not yet been done, is proper and meritorious.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are granted. The orders of suspension dated April 15, 1991 and
August 2, 1991 issued respectively by the First and Second Divisions of the Sandiganbayan, are
hereby lifted. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

"Security of tenure is a fundamental and constitutionally guaranteed feature of our civil

service. The mantle of its protection extends not only to employees removed without
cause but also to cases of unconsented transfers which are tantamount to illegal
removals (Department of Education, Culture and Sports vs. Court of Appeals, 183
SCRA 555; Ibanez vs. COMELEC, 19 SCRA 1002; Brillantes vs. Guevarra, 27 SCRA
138).

While a temporary transfer or assignment of personnel is permissible even without the

employees prior consent, it cannot be done when the transfer is a preliminary step
toward his removal, or is a scheme to lure him away from his permanent position, or
designed to indirectly terminate his service, or force his resignation. Such a transfer
would in effect circumvent the provision which safeguards the tenure of office of those
who are in the Civil Service (Sta. Maria vs. Lopez, 31 SCRA 651; Garcia vs. Lejano,
109 Phil. 116)."[12]

Having found the reassignment of private respondent to the MIST to be violative of his
security of tenure, the order for his reassignment to the MIST cannot be countenanced.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED, and the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35505 AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

vi

EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 98340-42. April 10, 1992.]
GOVERNOR MARIANO J. PIMENTEL and LILIA L. SALUN-AT, Petitioners, v. JUSTICES
FRANCIS E. GARCHITORENA, REGINO HERMOSISIMA, JR. and CIPRIANO A. DEL
ROSARIO, Respondents.
[G.R. Nos. 101066-68. April 10, 1992.]
MARIANO J. PIMENTEL, LILIA L. SALUN-AT and EDGARDO MERJUDIO, Petitioners, v.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division, SANDIGANBAYAN (Second Division) and
OMBUDSMAN CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; PUBLIC OFFICERS; PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION; PURPOSE.
The purpose of the suspension order is to prevent the accused from using his position and the powers
and prerogatives of his office to influence potential witnesses or tamper with records which may be
vital in the prosecution of the case against him.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; MUST NOT EXCEED THE MAXIMUM PERIOD OF NINETY (90) DAYS. In
the aforementioned criminal cases, however, while the suspension of Governor Pimentel and the
Provincial Secretary, Mrs. Salun-at, was proper because the informations against them charge
"offense(s) involving fraud against the government or public funds or property . . ." (Sec. 13 of R.A.
3019), still, in the light of our decisions in Deloso v. Sandiganbayan, 173 SCRA 409; Doromal v.
Sandiganbayan, 177 SCRA 354; and Gonzaga v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 96131, September 6, 1991,
such suspension may not exceed the maximum period of ninety (90) days fixed in Section 42 of P.D.
No. 807. Since the petitioners were suspended from their positions on April 15, 1991, their suspension
has already exceeded the maximum limit of ninety (90) days, hence, it should now be lifted.
DECISION
GRIO-AQUINO, J.:

Assailed in this petition for certiorari is the suspension by the Sandiganbayan of petitioners Mariano J.
Pimentel, provincial governor of Quirino province, Lilia L. Salun-at, the provincial secretary, and
Edgardo Merjudio, the private secretary of the Governor, in SB Crim. Cases Nos. 13834-36 and 16540
where they face four (4) counts of Falsification of Public Documents and in SB Crim. Case No. 16560
where they are charged with Violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
In Crim. Cases Nos. 13834, 13835 and 13836, the petitioners, Pimentel and Salun-at, are accused of
having falsified or caused the falsification of the excerpts from the minutes of the regular sessions of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Quirino province on August 15, 1988 and September 19, 1988 by
making it appear therein that:
chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

(a) on August 15, 1988, Resolution No. 116-A was passed appropriating P5,000 as supplementary aid
for the family of Crisostomo Antonio, the victim of an accident within the provincial capitol
compound, but the truth is that no such resolution was approved and adopted;
(b) on September 19, 1988, Resolution No. 136 was passed and approved implementing the
Supplemental Budget No. 4, and Appropriation Ordinance No,. 4 in the amount of P294,000, although
the truth is that no such resolution was passed and approved.
(c) also on September 19, 1988, Resolution No. 137 implementing the Supplemental Budget No. 2, and
Appropriation Ordinance No. 5 in the amount of P189,770.44 was supposedly passed and approved,
although the truth is that no such resolution was passed and approved.
In Crim. Case No. 16560, the petitioner, Governor Mariano J. Pimentel, was charged with having
illegally granted to his son-in-law and co-accused Edgardo Merjudio, the lease of a government
building in the capitol grounds together with the equipment therein, to be operated as a canteen,
although there was no formal lease contract between the provincial government and Merjudio, nor a
resolution awarding such lease to him.
On motion of the prosecution, the Sandiganbayan (First and Second Division) suspended Governor
Pimentel pendente lite pursuant to Section 13 of R.A. 3019 as amended, which reads:
red:chanrobl es.com.ph

"SECTION 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. Any incumbent public officer against whom any
criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised
Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as
a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is
pending in court, shall be suspended from office . . . (Emphasis supplied.)" (p. 68, Rollo.)
The purpose of the suspension order is to prevent the accused from using his position and the powers
and prerogatives of his office to influence potential witnesses or tamper with records which may be
vital in the prosecution of the case against him.
In the aforementioned criminal cases, however, while the suspension of Governor Pimentel and the
Provincial Secretary, Mrs. Salun-at, was proper because the informations against them charge
"offense(s) involving fraud against the government or public funds or property . . ." (Sec. 13 of R.A.
3019), still, in the light of our decisions in Deloso v. Sandiganbayan, 173 SCRA 409; Doromal v.
Sandiganbayan, 177 SCRA 354; and Gonzaga v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 96131, September 6, 1991,

such suspension may not exceed the maximum period of ninety (90) days fixed in Section 42 of P.D.
No. 807.
Since the petitioners were suspended from their positions on April 15, 1991, their suspension has
already exceeded the maximum limit of ninety (90) days, hence, it should now be lifted.
chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

The preventive suspension of petitioners Pimentel and Merjudio in Crim. Case No. 16560 was fixed for
a period of ninety (90) days, from August 2, 1991. or up to November 1, 1991 yet. Their prayer to lift
the said suspension, if it has not yet been done, is proper and meritorious.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are granted. The orders of suspension dated April 15, 1991 and August 2,
1991 issued respectively by the First and Second Divisions of the Sandiganbayan, are hereby lifted. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Garcia v. Mojica
Posted on October 3, 2012
G.R. No. 139043
September 10, 1999
Facts:
On May 7, 1998, petitioner, in his capacity as Cebu City mayor, signed a contract with F.E. Zuellig for
the supply of asphalt to the city. The contract covers the period 1998-2001, which was to commence on
September 1998 upon F.E. Zuelligs first delivery. Sometime in March 1999, news reports came out
regarding the alleged anomalous purchase of asphalt by Cebu City, through the contract signed by
petitioner. This prompted the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) to conduct an inquiry into the matter.
Respondent Jesus Rodrigo T. Tagaan, special prosecution officer of the Office of the Ombudsman, was
assigned to conduct the inquiry, docketed as INQ-VIS-99-0132. After investigation, he recommended
that the said inquiry be upgraded to criminal and administrative cases against petitioner and the other
city officials involved. Respondent Arturo C. Mojica, Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, approved
this recommendation
Issues:
1. Whether Garcia may be held administratively liable.
2. Whether the Ombudsman was stripped of its powers by virtue of the Local Government Code.
Held:
1. No. As previously held, a reelected local official may not be held administratively accountable
for misconduct committed during his prior term of office. The rationale is that when the electorate put
him back into office, it is presumed that it did so with full knowledge of his life and character,
including his past misconduct. If, armed with such knowledge, it still reelects him, then such is
considered a condonation of his past misdeeds.
However, in the present case, respondents point out that the contract entered into by petitioner with F.E.
Zuellig was signed just 4 days before the date of the elections. It was not made an issue during the
election, and so the electorate could not be said to have voted for petitioner with knowledge of this
particular aspect of his life and character.

Petitioner can no longer be held administratively liable for an act done during his previous term. The
agreement between petitioner and F.E. Zuellig was perfected on the date the contract was signed,
during petitioners prior term. At that moment, petitioner already acceded to the terms of the contract,
including stipulations now alleged to be prejudicial to the city government. Thus, any culpability
petitioner may have in signing the contract already became extant on the day the contract was signed. It
hardly matters that the deliveries under the contract are supposed to have been made months later.
While petitioner can no longer be held administratively liable for signing the contract with F. E.
Zuellig, this should not prejudice the filing of any case, other than administrative, against petitioner.
The ruling does not mean the total exoneration of petitioners wrongdoing, if any, that might have been
committed in signing the subject contract. The ruling is now limited to the question of his
administrative liability therefore, and it is our considered view that he may not.
2. No. There is nothing in the LGC to indicate that it has repealed, whether expressly or impliedly, the
pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act. The two statutes on the specific matter in question are not
so inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, as to compel us to only uphold one and strike down the other.
The decision of the Ombudsman (6 month suspension) will prevail over the LGC (60day suspension) if
the evidence of guilt is strong. The power to preventively suspend is available not only to the
Ombudsman but also to the Deputy Ombudsman.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-39557 May 3, 1984
ROMULO A. SALES, petitioner,
vs.
ISMAEL MATHAY, SR., as Auditor General, EPI REY PANGRAMUYEN, as Commissioner
of Civil Service, DAVID CONSUNJI, as Acting Secretary of Department of Public Works
and Communications and FELIZARDO TANABE, as Postmaster General, respondents.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
FERNANDO, C.J.:
This proceeding for mandamus against respondent Auditor General Ismael Mathay, Sr., the
then Auditor General, 1 now retired, arose from the denial of a claim for back salaries of petitioner Romulo Sales, appointed Clerk II in
the Bureau of Posts, previously designated Acting Postmaster of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, who was found short of P992.46 in his account on
March 21, 1963 and of P1,000.00 on May 24, 1963. The amount in question covers the period from February 9, 1966 to August 15, 1971, during
which time he was under suspension. It was on the latter date that he received a resolution of the then Commissioner of Civil Service reducing what
was originally the penalty of dismissal to six months suspension, finding petitioner guilty at most of gross neglect of duty.
The first letter of respondent Mathay, Sr., dated October 15, 1973, denying the claim 4 follows: "In reply to your letter, dated March 6, 1973, requesting
payment of back salaries during the period that you were allegedly prevented to work as Postal Clerk II in the Pinamalayan Post Office, Oriental
Mindoro, for the period from February 9, 1966 to August 15, 1971, please find enclosed a copy of the 4th Indorsement, dated September 18, 1973, of
the Acting Undersecretary of Public Works, which is self-explanatory. Accordingly, this Office is not inclined to allow payment of your salary
2
corresponding to the period you were out of the service." The second letter from the same respondent reads thus: "In

connection with your letter of October 20, 1973 followed up by your letters of October 22 and 31, 1973, we wish
to inform that after considering the fact and circumstances of your case in conjunction with your arguments and
the decisions of the Supreme Court you cited, we are of the opinion that your claim for back salaries from
February 9, 1966 to August 15, 1971, may not be authorized for the reaction that you have not shown that your
suspension for the period covered by your claim is unjustified; that you have not rendered service for said period;
and that you were not exonerated of the administrative charges against you. Furthermore, the Commissioner of

Civil Service in his decision of July 20, 1971, did not expressly order the payment of your back salary. Indeed, in
his latest decision (1st Indorsement, dated January 9, 1973, copy attached), the Commissioner of Civil Service
denied your claim for payment of back salaries. In view hereof, this Office finds no legal basis for allowing your
claim, and, therefore, reiterates its decision embodied in a letter, dated October 15, 1973, to you." 3 Hence this
petition.
Respondents were required to comment. Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza filed the Comment, later
considered as the answer, as petition was given due course. There was no dispute as to the above facts. After
the filing of the memoranda by both parties, the case was deemed submitted for decision.
This petition for mandamus to review the actuation of respondent Mathay, Sr. lacks merit.
1. On the above facts, the question posed is whether petitioner should be entitled to the payment of his back
salary from February 9, 1966 to August 15, 1971. The answer must be in the negative. That is to conform to the
ruling in the case of Villamor v. Lacson. 4 The pertinent excerpt, in the ponencia of Justice Parades, follows: "It
Will be noted also that the modified decision did not exonerate the petitioners. And if we take into account the
fact that they did not work during the period for which they are now claiming salaries, there can be no legal or
equitable basis to order the payment of their salaries. The general proposition is that a public official is not
entitled to any compensation if he has not rendered any service. As you work, so shall you earn. And even if we
consider the punishment as suspension, before a public official or employee is entitled to payment of salaries
withheld, it should be shown that the suspension was unjustified or that the employee was innocent of the
charges proffered against him (F. B. Reyes vs. J. Hernandez, 71 Phil., 397), which is not the case in the instant
proceedings." 5
2. The next paragraph of the above ponencia of Justice Parades is equally conclusive on the matter of why the
decision reached by respondent Mathay, Sr. cannot be reversed. Thus: "The action at bar is one of mandamus.
For mandamus to lie, the legal right of the petitioner must be well defined, clear and certain, otherwise the
petition for the issuance of such writ, will be denied (III Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 Ed. 172).
Petitioners have not shown that they are entitled to the salaries, as a matter of right." 6
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
Makasiar, Aquino, Guerrero and Abad Santos, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, Jr., De Castro and Escolin, JJ., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23670

September 30, 1969

ANGEL ENCISO, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
DEOGRACIAS REMO, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Luis General, Jr. for plaintiff-appellee.
Quirino A. Fabul for defendant-appellant Deogracias Remo.
First Assistant Provincial Fiscal Jose Nepomuceno for other defendants-appellants.
CASTRO, J.:
The petitioner Angel Enciso, a sergeant in the police force of Goa, Camarines Sur, with service in the
said police agency dating back to March 16, 1939, applied for leave of absence on February 15, 1952,
which the respondent Deogracias Remo, then mayor of Goa, granted. This leave of absence was later

extended, with the respondent Remo's approval. On the very day that Enciso went on leave, that is, on
February 16, 1952, Sergio Calingan, a non-eligible, was appointed "vice Angel Enciso," to serve "until
your successor shall have been duly qualified, unless sooner discharged by proper authority." When
Enciso reported back for duty (after his leave had expired), he was told that his position had been
"abolished" by the municipal council, allegedly pursuant to a directive (dated August 31, 1951) of the
Secretary of Finance, and that in its stead the, position of corporal had been "created." That Enciso was,
at the time adverted to, already a civil service eligible, is conceded.
Enciso then filed a complaint with the provincial board against the respondent Remo, but as no action
was forthcoming on his complaint, he elevated the matter to the Office of the President. In his
indorsement of March 15, 1964 to the respondent Remo, Assistant Executive Secretary Enrique C.
Quema ordered the reinstatement of Enciso.
Still the respondent Remo refused, prompting Enciso to file this petition for mandamus. He asked the
court to order Remo to reinstate him and to pay him P3,000 in moral damages, P1,200 in actual
damages, and P500 as attorney's fees.
On August 2, 1954, while the case was pending, the then acting municipal mayor (Alfonso Sarto) of
Goa reinstated Enciso. The respondent Remo then moved for dismissal of the action, but the court
denied his motion on the ground that there remained undecided the question of damages.
On October 7, 1954 Enciso filed an amended petition in which he asked that Remo be likewise ordered
to pay his monthly salary of P55 during all the time that he was out of the service. On the same day he
filed a supplemental petition charging that his reinstatement on August 2, 1954 was a sham as he was
not given back his badge and sidearm nor paid his salary, and asking for P5,000 as additional moral
damages.
On February 20, 1956 Enciso amended his petition again, this time to implead the Municipality of Goa,
the term of office of the respondent Remo having then expired.
On November 26, 1957 the lower court rendered judgment in favor of Enciso, but despite the inclusion
of the Municipality of Goa as party respondent the lower court failed to make it respond in damages.
Thus, the dispositive portion of the lower court's decision reads:
In view of all the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered: (a) ordering the
respondent, Deogracias Remo, in his capacity as Mayor of Goa, to pay the petitioner all his
salary from the time he was refused reinstatement to the police force of Goa, Camarines Sur in
August 1952, until the time when he was reinstated to his present position as Corporal in the
Police Force of Goa; (b) ordering the respondent, Mayor Remo of Goa, to pay the petitioner the
amount of P500.00 as attorney's fees; and (c) ordering the respondent Mayor Remo to pay the
costs of the suit.
Copies of the decision were received by the petitioner Enciso on December 3, 1957 and by the
respondent Remo on December 4, 1957, respectively. On December 18 the respondents Remo and
Municipality of Goa filed a notice of appeal bond, which the court received on December 26. In the
meantime, that is, on December 24, the petitioner filed a motion asking that the municipality be
adjudge solidarity liable with the respondent Remo.
On January 16, 1958 the court a quo granted the petitioner's motion and amended its judgment to read
thus:
The judgment in this case is hereby amended as follows: (a) ordering the respondents, ExMayor Deogracias Remo and the Municipality of Goa to pay jointly and solidarily the salaries

of the plaintiff-petitioner, Angel Enciso, from the time when he was refused reinstatement in the
Police Force of Goa on August, 1952 until the time when he was reinstated in his present
position as Corporal of the Police Force of Goa; (b) ordering the respondents, Ex-Mayor
Deogracias Remo of Goa and the Municipality of Goa, to jointly and severally pay the
petitioner, Angel Enciso the amount of P500.00 as moral damages and another amount of
P500.00 as attorney's fees and (e) ordering the respondents to pay the costs of the
suit.1awphl.nt
Thereafter the court disapproved the respondents' appeal on the ground that they had not filed a record
on appeal. The court took the view that the original action for mandamus had been converted into an
ordinary suit for damages as a result of the reinstatement of the petitioner, and, consequently, while no
record on appeal is required in an appeal in a special civil action, such record is required in appeals in
ordinary actions. The respondents disagreed with the lower court and elevated the question to this
Court. We held that the action retained its character as a suit for mandamus and, therefore, the
respondents, as appellants, did not have to file a record on appeal. We then ordered the lower court to
give due course to the respondents' appeal. 1 Hence, this appeal which, originally taken to the Court of
Appeals, was by that Court certified to this Court pursuant to section 31 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
The respondents contend (1) that the petitioner's position (sergeant of police) in the police force of Goa
had been abolished; (2) that the lower court could no longer amend its decision so as to make the
respondent municipality solidarily liable with the respondent Remo because at the time it did so the
decision had already become final as to the petitioner; and (3) that under the circumstance the
respondents should not be condemned to pay to the petitioner either damages or his salary during the
period in question.
1. The respondents' claim that the position occupied by Enciso had been abolished is without basis in
law and in fact.
In the first place, except for the naked verbal assertion of the respondent Remo, there is absolutely
nothing within the four corners of the record which supports this claim. The respondents' own
documentary evidence, more specifically exhibits 1, 1-A, 1-B and 1-C, upon which are spread the
minutes of the regular session of the Goa municipal council held on May 31, 1952 and the text of
resolution no. 48 approving the municipal budget for the fiscal year 1952-1953, contain not the
slightest intimation of the abolition of the item corresponding to the position held by the petitioner
Enciso; upon the contrary, while maintaining the salary of the position at P660 per annum, the budget
merely changed the rank from sergeant to corporal.
Republic Act 554, relied upon by the respondents and which went into effect on June 17, 1950,
amended section 2273 of the Revised Administrative Code (as amended by Republic Act 160) to read,
in its pertinent portions, as follows:
Section 2273. Salaries of members of police force. The salaries of the chief of police and
other members of the police force shall be fixed by the municipal council.
Except as otherwise specially provided, the annual salaries of members of the police force shall
not exceed the amounts hereinbelow fixed:
xxx

xxx

xxx

In municipalities of the third class: For the chief of police, sixteen hundred and eighty pesos; for
the corporal, thirteen hundred and eighty pesos; and for other members of the police force,
thirteen hundred and twenty pesos ... .

What was plainly intended by the Act was merely an increased adjustment of maximum rates of pay, as
the change of designation of rank had priorly been decreed by Republic Act 160 which took effect as
early as June 20, 1947. Sec. 2273 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Rep. Act 160,
reads, in its pertinent portions, as follows:
SEC. 2273. Salaries of members of police force. The salaries of the chief of police and other
members of the police force shall be fixed by the municipal council.
Except as otherwise specially provided, the annual salaries of members of the municipal police
shall not exceed the amounts hereinbelow fixed:
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In municipalities of the third class: for the chief of police, one thousand two hundred and sixty
pesos; for the corporal, nine hundred and sixty pesos; and for other members of the police force,
eight hundred and forty pesos.
So that since nothing in the record indicates that, during the period in question, there was a corporal as
well as a sergeant in the police agency of Goa, it is clear that the position occupied by Enciso, although
the given rank is that of sergeant, was actually that of corporal, in line with the legislative policy laid
down in Republic Act 160. If the Municipality of Goa whimsically chose to retain in its annual
budgetary resolutions the designation of sergeant when it should have been corporal, the fault cannot be
ascribed to Enciso. In fine, although Enciso erroneously called himself a sergeant of police and every
municipal budget of Goa prior to that for 1952-1953 compounded the error by recognizing that rank,
the fact remains that in law the item that he occupied was that of corporal.
At all events, as the Department of Finance, whose directive dated August 31, 1951 was cited as reason
for the supposed abolition of the petitioner's position, subsequently explained, there was no intention to
abolish existing positions and to create new ones but only to change the designation in order to
conform to the new legislation. Thus, in his 6th indorsement to the Executive Secretary, dated February
2, 1953, the then Undersecretary of Finance Sixto B. Ortiz, inter alia, said:
In requiring the change in designation as above-stated, this Department [in its letter dated
August 31, 1951 to the Goa municipal council] did not intend the abolition of position of
sergeant of police. It merely required that the design of the position be changed to corporal.
Neither did it intend to place the incumbent of the old position out of the service specially so
when he is, as herein shown, a civil service eligible. (Emphasis supplied)
In the second place, by reinstating the petitioner to the position of corporal, the respondents in effect
admitted that the position was the same one he formerly held although it now bears a different name.
The reinstatement order of August 2, 1954 states:
Effective upon receipt of this letter you are hereby reinstated to your position in the police
department of this municipality, and by virtue however of Republic Act 554 this will be a
reinstatement to the position of corporal, instead of sergeant. (Emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, the contention that there was no position to which the petitioner could be restored as it
had been abolished, is clearly untenable. 2
2. The next argument of the respondents is that as the petitioner received a copy of the decision on
December 3, 1957 he had only up to December 18 of that year, or a period of 15 days, within which to
ask for an amendment of the decision, so that when the petitioner actually filed his motion on
December 24, the lower court had already lost jurisdiction over the case. This claim is premised on the

assertion that the petitioner's action for mandamus retained its character as such, contrary to the lower
court's ruling that it was in effect converted into an ordinary action for damages upon the reinstatement
of the petitioner.
As already stated, this ruling of the lower court was made on the respondent Remo's motion to dismiss
the case on the ground of petitioner's reinstatement on August 2, 1954. Consistently with this ruling, the
court subsequently disapproved the respondents' appeal for their failure to file a record on appeal. This
was the ruling until April 28, 1960 when this Court's decision in Remo v. Palacio 3 was promulgated,
holding that the action for mandamus did not become an ordinary action for damages upon the
reinstatement of the petitioner. In the meantime, the petitioner justifiably relied upon the disputed
ruling of the lower court and accordingly computed the period of appeal at 30 days.
Parenthetically, it may be noted that while under the former Rules a period of only 15 days was allowed
for appealing from decisions in actions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and
employer's liability cases, 4 in contrast to the period of 30 days provided for appeals in ordinary action, 5
no such distinction appeals in the present Rules. 6 Instead a uniform period of 30 days is now allowed
for appeals in all actions.
3. The final issue to be resolved is whether under the circumstances the respondents should be made
liable to the petitioner for back salaries and moral damages.
Although for this purpose we may assume as correct, it being factual, the lower court's finding of bad
faith on the part of the respondent Remo in refusing to reinstate the petitioner, we deem it needful to
explain briefly why we agree with the court's imputation of bad faith. As we have already explained,
the position of sergeant of police was in fact never abolished by the municipal council of Goa and that
the only change effected was the name-designation of the position. When the petitioner, therefore,
returned from his leave, the excuse given by the respondent Remo that the position had been abolished
was patently false. On top of this, Remo obstinately refused to reinstate the petitioner, in defiance of
the orders of the Office of the President and in palpable disregard of the opinion of the Secretary of
Finance already adverted to. And more, the impression is inescapable from a close reading of the record
that the respondent Remo essentially refused to reinstate the petitioner because of political differences,
the principal one being that the petitioner Enciso was a Liberal appointed by a Liberal mayor and the
respondent Remo was a Nacionalista.
Well-settled is the rule that when a public officer goes outside the scope of his duty, particularly when
acting tortiously he is not entitled to protection on account of his office, but is liable for his acts like
any private individual. 7
It is a general rule that an officer-executive, administrative, quasi-judicial, ministerial, or otherwise
who acts outside the scope of his jurisdiction and without authorization of law may thereby render
himself amenable to personal liability in a civil suit. If he exceeds the power conferred on him by law,
he cannot shelter himself by the plea that he is a public agent acting under color of his office, and not
personally. In the eye of the law, his acts then are wholly without authority. 8
The pertinent provisions of the Administrative Code governing municipalities like Goa contain no
phraseology that would negative the liability of the respondent municipal corporation. In Busacay v.
Buenaventura, 93 Phil. 786 (1953) we strongly intimated that the province of Pangasinan, had it been
impleaded in the action, could have been ordered to pay the back salaries of an employee who was
illegally dismissed from office.

In point of fact this Court has in a number of cases reaffirmed the rule that municipal corporations may
be held liable for the backpay or wages of employees or laborers illegally separated from the service,
including those involving primarily governmental functions such as policemen. 9 The unlawful
exclusion of the petitioner Enciso from his position was, to all intents and purposes, essentially
equivalent to his illegal separation from the service for the period in question.
The lower court, therefore, correctly adjudged both respondents solidarily liable to the petitioner for
back salaries for the period specified in the judgment a quo.
With respect to moral damages, however, we hold that the award of back salaries already includes and
absorbs this item. This was our ruling in Diaz v. Amante, 104 Phil. 968, and we see no reason to depart
from it.
ACCORDINGLY, with the elimination of the award of moral damages, the judgment a quo is affirmed
in all other respects, at respondents' cost.
ONDO MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION v THE COURT OF APPEALS
527 SCRA 746 G.R. No. 167324
Facts:
1. In 1999, the DOH launched the Health Sector Reform Agenda (HSRA). It provided for five
general areas of reform:
1. To provide fiscal autonomy to government hospitals;
2. Secure funding for priority public health programs;
3. Promote the development of local health systems and ensure its effective performance;
4. Strengthen the capacities of health regulatory agencies;
5. Expand the coverage of the National Health Insurance Program (NHIP)
6. On 24 May 1999, then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Executive Order No.
102, entitled Redirecting the Functions and Operations of the Department of Health,
which provided for the changes in the roles, functions, and organizational processes of
the DOH. Under the assailed executive order, the DOH refocused its mandate from
being the sole provider of health services to being a provider of specific health services
and technical assistance, as a result of the devolution of basic services to local
government units.
7. A petition for the nullification of the Health Sector Reform Agenda (HSRA) Philippines
1999-2004 of the Department of Health (DOH); and Executive Order No. 102,
Redirecting the Functions and Operations of the Department of Health,
8. The Court of Appeals ruled that the HSRA cannot be declared void for violating
Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 18 of Article II; Section 1 of Article III; Sections 11 and 14
of Article XIII; and Sections 1 and 3(2) of Article XV, all of the 1987 Constitution,
which directly or indirectly pertain to the duty of the State to protect and promote the
peoples right to health and well-being. It reasoned that the aforementioned provisions
of the Constitution are not self-executing; they are not judicially enforceable
constitutional rights and can only provide guidelines for legislation.

9. 5.
The Court of Appeals held that Executive Order No. 102 is detrimental to the
health of the people cannot be made a justiciable issue. The question of whether the
HSRA will bring about the development or disintegration of the health sector is within
the realm of the political department.
Issue:
Whether or not the HSRA and EO NO. 102 violates the constitution?
Held:
The Court finds the present petition to be without merit.
1. As a general rule, the provisions of the Constitution are considered self-executing, and do not
require future legislation for their enforcement. For if they are not treated as self-executing, the
mandate of the fundamental law can be easily nullified by the inaction of Congress. However,
some provisions have already been categorically declared by this Court as non self-executing.
Some of the constitutional provisions invoked in the present case were taken from Article II of
the Constitution specifically, Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and 18 the provisions of which
the Court categorically ruled to be non self-executing in the aforecited case of Taada v.
Angara, wherein the Court specifically set apart the sections as non self-executing and ruled
that such broad principles need legislative enactments before they can be implemented.
Moreover, the records are devoid of any explanation of how the HSRA supposedly violated the
equal protection and due process clauses that are embodied in Section 1 of Article III of the
Constitution. There were no allegations of discrimination or of the lack of due process in
connection with the HSRA. Since they failed to substantiate how these constitutional guarantees
were breached, petitioners are unsuccessful in establishing the relevance of this provision to the
petition, and consequently, in annulling the HSRA.
2. Even granting that these alleged errors were adequately proven by the petitioners, they would
still not invalidate Executive Order No. 102. Any serious legal errors in laying down the
compensation of the DOH employees concerned can only invalidate the pertinent provisions of
Department Circular No. 312, Series of 2000. Likewise, any questionable appointments or
transfers are properly addressed by an appeal process provided under Administrative Order No.
94, series of 2000; and if the appeal is meritorious, such appointment or transfer may be
invalidated. The validity of Executive Order No. 102 would, nevertheless, remain unaffected.
Settled is the rule that courts are not at liberty to declare statutes invalid, although they may be
abused or disabused, and may afford an opportunity for abuse in the manner of application. The
validity of a statute or ordinance is to be determined from its general purpose and its efficiency
to accomplish the end desired, not from its effects in a particular case. Section 17, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution, clearly states: [T]he president shall have control of all executive
departments, bureaus and offices. Section 31, Book III, Chapter 10 of Executive Order No.
292, also known as the Administrative Code of 1987. It is an exercise of the Presidents
constitutional power of control over the executive department, supported by the provisions of
the Administrative Code, recognized by other statutes, and consistently affirmed by this Court.
CMM DIGEST
Dario v. Mison
August 8, 1989
G.R. No. 81954

(The Law on Public Officers, Civil Service Laws, Election Laws)

Petitioner: Dario
Respondent: Mison (Comm of Customs); Jayme (Sec of Finance); Macaraig (Exec Sec)
Ponente: Sarmiento
FACTS:
P. Cory Aquino issued Proclamation No. 3 in 1986. It provided for priority for the
reorganization of the government, eradication of unjust and oppressive structures,
and all iniquitous vestiges of the previous regime.
3 days later, she issued EO 17, prescribing the rules and regulations for the
implementation of section 2, article III of the freedom constitution. This recognized
the unnecessary anxiety and demoralization among the deserving officials and
employees and prescribed grounds for separation/replacement of personnel.
EO 127: Reorganizing the Ministry of Finance.
Commissioner Mison issued Memorandum Guidelines on the Implementation of
Regorganization Orders.
Mison sent notices to several customs officials, stating that those incumbents whose
positions are not carried in the new reorganization pattern are deemed separated
from service, and that they have been terminated.
CSC ordered reinstatement.
In 1988, RA 6656 was enacted: an act to protect the security of tenure of civil service
employees in the implementation of government reorganization. It mandated the
reinstatement/reappointment of officers/employees whose separation violated its
provisions.
Terminated employees filed this case.
There is no question that the admin may validly carry out a government
reorganization. The issue of the parties are as to the nature and extent.
Argument of Mison: Transitory Provision in Article XVIII, Section 16 explicitly
authorizes the removal of career civil service employees not for cause but as a result
of reorganization pursuant to Proclamation 3. Thus, the reorganization under EO 127
may continue even after the ratification of the Constitution, and employees may be
separated from service without cause as a result of the reorganization.
ISSUE: WON transitory provision in 1987 Constitution allows the government to remove
career public officials it could have validly done under an automatic vacancy authority
and without rhyme or reason. (since 1935 transition periods have been characterized by
provisions for automatic vacancies)

MONSANTO v. FACTORAN
October 26, 2012 Leave a comment
February 9, 1989 (G.R. No. 78239)
PARTIES:
Petitioner: SALVACION A. MONSANTO
Respondent: FULGENCIO S., JR.
FACTS:
In a decision by the Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto was accused of the
crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents and sentenced them to imprisonment and to

indemnify the government in the sum of P4,892.50 representing the balance of the amount defrauded
and to pay the costs proportionately.
She was given an absolute pardon by President Marcos which she accepted.
Petitioner requested that she be restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer since the same
was still vacant, she also asked for the backpay for the entire period of her suspension.
Finance Ministry ruled that petitioner may be reinstated to her position without the necessity of a
new appointment
The Office of the President said that that acquittal, not absolute pardon, of a former public officer is
the only ground for reinstatement to his former position and entitlement to payment of his salaries,
benefits and emoluments due to him during the period of his suspension pendente lite.
In fact, in such a situation, the former public official must secure a reappointment before he can
reassume his former position. And a pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from payment of the
civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence.
Petitioner argued that general rules on pardon cannot apply to her case by reason of the fact that she
was extended executive clemency while her conviction was still pending appeal in this Court. There
having been no final judgment of conviction, her employment therefore as assistant city treasurer could
not be said to have been terminated or forfeited.
The court viewed that is not material when the pardon was bestowed, whether before or after
conviction, for the result would still be the same
ISSUE:
(1) Effects of a full and absolute pardon
(2) WON a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, is entitled
to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new appointment.
HELD:
(1) A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender; and
when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye
of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offense. If granted before
conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and disabilities, consequent upon conviction, from
attaching; if granted after conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities and restores him to all his
civil rights; it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity. But unless
expressly grounded on the persons innocence (which is rare), it cannot bring back lost reputation for
honesty, integrity and fair dealing.
A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the past. It affords no relief
for what has been suffered by the offender. It does not impose upon the government any obligation to
make reparation for what has been suffered.
(2) No. To insist on automatic reinstatement because of a mistaken notion that the pardon virtually
acquitted one from the offense of estafa would be grossly untenable. A pardon, albeit full and plenary,
cannot preclude the appointing power from refusing appointment to anyone deemed to be of bad
character, a poor moral risk, or who is unsuitable by reason of the pardoned conviction.
The absolute disqualification or ineligibility from public office forms part of the punishment prescribed
by the Revised Penal Code for estafa thru falsification of public documents.
The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public
employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must
re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment.

CLAUDIO v. COMELEC
G.R. 140560. May 4, 2000
FACTS
Jovito Claudio was the duly elected mayor of Pasay City during the 11 May 1998 elections. He
assumed office on 1 July 1998.
On 19 May 1999, an ad hoc committee was formed for the purpose of convening a Preparatory
Recall Assembly (PRA).
On 29 May 1999, majority of the members of the PRA adopted a Resolution to Initiate the
Recall of Mayor Jovito Claudio for Loss of Confidence.
On 2 July 1999, the petition for recall was formally submitted to the Office of the Election
Officer. Copies of the petition were posted in public places in Pasay City and the authenticity of
the signatures therein was verified by the election officer for Pasay City.
The petition was opposed on several grounds. Principally, that the convening of the PRA took
place within the one-year prohibited period under Sec. 74, LGC which provides:
Limitations on Recall. - (a) Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall
election only once during his term of office for loss of confidence.
(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's
assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election.
xxxx

The COMELEC granted the petition. It ruled that the petition did not violate the one-year ban
because the petition was filed on 2 July 1999, one day after Claudios assumption of office.
ISSUES
1. WoN the word recall in Sec. 74(b), LGC covers a process which includes the convening of the
Preparatory Recall Assembly and its approval of the recall resolution.
2. WoN the term "regular local election" in the last clause of Sec. 74(b), LGC includes the election
period for that regular election or simply the date of such election.
HELD/RATIO
1. The word recall in Sec. 74(b), LGC refers to the to the election itself by means of which voters
decided whether they shall retain their local official or elect his replacement.
Recall is a process which involves the following steps:
(1) the convening of the preparatory assembly or gathering of the signatures of at least
25% registered voters in the LGU;
(2) the filing of the recall resolution or petition with the COMELEC;
(3) the verification of the resolution or petition;
(4) fixing of the date of the recall election; and
(5) holding of the election.
That the word recall used in Sec. 74(b), LGC, refers to the recall election itself is due to the
following reasons:
(1) Sec. 69, LGC provides that the power of recall shall be exercised by the registered
voters of the LGU to which the local elective official belongs. It is clear that the power

of recall referred to in Sec. 69 is the power to retain/replace officials and not the power
to initiate recall proceedings. Thus, the limitations under Sec. 74 (Limitations on Recall)
apply only to the recall elections.
In Garcia v. COMELEC, the delegation of the power to initiate recall proceedings from
the electorate to the PRAs was questioned. The Supreme Court held that what the
Constitution gave to the people is the power to recall and not the power to initiate the
recall proceedings. The holding of the PRA is not the recall itself.
(2) That the word recall refers to the recall election is consistent with the purposes of the
limitations on recall.
The purpose of the first limitation is to provide a reasonable basis for judging the
performance of the official (Angobung v. COMELEC). This judgment is not given
during the preliminary proceedings (such as the convening of the PRA) but through the
vote during the recall election itself.
(3) That the word recall refers to the recall election is to uphold the constitutional rights of
speech and freedom of assembly of PRA members.
To hold that limitation includes the formation of opinion through public discussions on
the matter of recall of an official is to curtail these constitutional rights.
2. The term regular elections does not include the election period.
To construe the word regular elections as including the election period would emasculate the right
of the people to exercise the power of recall.
In Paras v. COMELEC, the Supreme Court held that the limitations on Sec. 74 (a) and Sec. 74 (b)
would mean that a local elective official may be subject only to recall during the second year of
his/her term (in this case, from 1 July 1999 to mid-May 2000)
If the regular elections mentioned in Sec. 74(b) would include the election period, which
commences 90 days from the date of the election and extends to 30 days thereafter, the period during
which the power of recall may be exercised will be reduced even more. (in this case, from 1 July
1999 to mid-February 2000)
HELD/RATIO
Petition DISMISSED.

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