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(2) This is also true of petitioner's contention that the jeepney being bumped while it was
improperly parked constitutes caso fortuito. The jeepney was not properly parked, its
rear portion being exposed about two meters from the broad shoulders of the
highway, and facing the middle of the highway in a diagonal angle and that
petitioner's driver took in more passengers than the allowed seating capacity of the
jeepney. Petitioner should have foreseen the danger of parking his jeepney with its
body protruding two meters into the highway.
(3) In this case, there is no legal basis for awarding moral damages since there was no
factual finding by the appellate court that petitioner acted in bad faith in the
performance of the contract of carriage. Sunga's contention that petitioner's
admission in open court that the driver of the jeepney failed to assist her in going to
a nearby hospital cannot be construed as an admission of bad faith. The fact that it
was the driver of the Isuzu truck who took her to the hospital does not imply that
petitioner was utterly indifferent to the plight of his injured passenger. If at all, it is
merely implied recognition by Verena that he was the one at fault for the accident.
Held:
(1) Paragraph 5 of Art. 2180 with Art. 2184 of the same Code which provides: "In motor
vehicle mishap, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the
vehicle, could have by the use of due diligence, prevented the misfortune . . . . If the owner
was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of article 2180 are applicable." Obviously, this
provision of Art. 2184 is neither applicable because of the absence of master-driver
relationship between respondent FILCAR and Dahl-Jensen. Clearly, petitioner has no cause of
action against respondent FILCAR on the basis of quasi-delict; logically, its claim against
respondent FORTUNE can neither prosper.
(2) Petitioner failed to prove the existence of one of the requisites; the (b) fault or
negligence of defendant FILCAR, because only the fault or negligence of Dahl-Jensen was
sufficiently established, not that of FILCAR. The liability imposed by Art. 2180 arises by
virtue of a presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of the persons made
responsible thereunder, derived from their failure to exercise due care and vigilance over the
acts of subordinates to prevent them from causing damage. Yet, as correctly observed by
respondent court, Art. 2180 is hardly applicable because none of the circumstances
mentioned therein obtains in the case under consideration. Respondent FILCAR being
engaged in a rent-a-car business was only the owner of the car leased to Dahl-Jensen. As
such, there was no vinculum juris between them as employer and employee. Respondent
FILCAR cannot in any way be responsible for the negligent act of Dahl-Jensen, the former not
being an employer of the latter. Therefore only Dahl-Jensen is held liable.
the issuance of a first class ticket was no guarantee that he would have a first class ride, but
that such would depend upon the availability of first class seats.
ISSUE:
Is Carrascoso entitled to damages?
RULING:
Yes. The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a first class seat;
worse, he imposed his arbitrary will; he forcibly ejected him from his seat, made him suffer
the humiliation of having to go to the tourist class compartment - just to give way to another
passenger whose right thereto has not been established. Certainly, this is bad faith. Unless,
of course, bad faith has assumed a meaning different from what is understood in law.
For, "bad faith" contemplates a "state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or
with some motive of self-interest or will or for ulterior purpose."
For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner, his employer, must answer.
Article 21 of the Civil Code says:
ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.
The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty.
Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees, naturally, could give ground for an action
for damages.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the
carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration.
Although the relation of passenger and carrier is "contractual both in origin and nature"
nevertheless "the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort". The stress of
Carrascoso's action as we have said, is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a
violation of public duty by the petitioner air carrier a case of quasi-delict. Damages are
proper.
that damages for quasi-delict cannot be sustained because the relationship between the
parties is contractual. Petitioner and his wife appealed the case.
Issue:
Whether damages based on torts can be awarded based on a contract
Held:
The existence of a contract between the parties does not bar the commission of a tort by the
one against the order and the consequent recovery of damages therefor. The act that breaks
the contract may also be a tort.
and in breaches of contract moral damages may be recovered only where the defendant
acted fraudulently or in bad faith (Art. 2220), and neither fraud nor bad faith is alleged in the
complaint here.
This doctrine finds application in this case. On the day of the operation, Erlinda Ramos
already surrendered her person to the private respondents who had complete and exclusive
control over her. Apart from the gallstone problem, she was neurologically sound and fit.
Then, after the procedure, she was comatose and brain damagedres ipsa loquitur!the
thing speaks for itself!
Negligence Private respondents were not able to disprove the presumption of negligence
on their part in the care of Erlinda and their negligence was the proximate cause of her
condition. One need not be an anesthesiologist in order to tell whether or not the intubation
was a success. [res ipsa loquitur applies here]. The Supreme Court also found that the
anesthesiologist only saw Erlinda for the first time on the day of the operation which
indicates unfamiliarity with the patient and which is an act of negligence and irresponsibility.
The head surgeon, Dr. Hosaka was also negligent. He failed to exercise the proper authority
as the captain of the ship in determining if the anesthesiologist observed the proper
protocols. Also, because he was late, he did not have time to confer with the
anesthesiologist regarding the anesthesia delivery.
The hospital failed to adduce evidence showing that it exercised the diligence of a good
father of the family in hiring and supervision of its doctors (Art. 2180). The hospital was
negligent since they are the one in control of the hiring and firing of their consultants.
While these consultants are not employees, hospitals still exert significant controls on the
selection and termination of doctors who work there which is one of the hallmarks of an
employer-employee reationship. Thus, the hospital was allocated a share in the liability.
If the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at the
time, it is more medically probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild
cause of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd dayafter the
hacking incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset
time should have been more than six days. Javier, however, died on the second day from
theonset time. The more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted
by the appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present.
Consequently, Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking
incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have
been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence
of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we are dealing with a criminal
conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational
mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct
possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later
or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was,
therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.
There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent infection,
for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause
of Javier's death with which the petitioner had nothing to do. "A prior and remote cause
cannot be made the be of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the
condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there
intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive,
unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have
happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except
because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an
independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the instances which
result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is
the proximate cause."
top laden with formica. It protruded towards the customer waiting area and its base was not
secured. CRISELDA too, should be absolved from any contributory negligence. Initially,
ZHIENETH held on to CRISELDA's waist, later to the latter's hand. CRISELDA momentarily
released the child's hand from her clutch when she signed her credit card slip. At this precise
moment, it was reasonable and usual for CRISELDA to let go of her child. Further, at the time
ZHIENETH was pinned down by the counter, she was just a foot away from her mother; and
the gift-wrapping counter was just four meters away from CRISELDA. The time and distance
were both significant. ZHIENETH was near her mother and did not loiter as petitioners would
want to impress upon us. She even admitted to the doctor who treated her at the hospital
that she did not do anything; the counter just fell on her.
10. Taylor vs. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co., 16 Phil. 8
Facts:
David Taylor was a 15 year old boy who spent time as a cabin boy at sea; he was also able
to learn some principles of mechanical engineering and mechanical drawing from his dads
office (his dad was a mechanical engineer); he was also employed as a mechanical
draftsman earning P2.50 a day all said, Taylor was mature well beyond his age.
One day in 1905, he and another boy entered into the premises of Manila Electric power
plant where they found 20-30 blasting caps which they took home. In an effort to explode
the said caps, Taylor experimented until he succeeded in opening the caps and then he
lighted it using a match which resulted to the explosion of the caps causing severe injuries
to his companion and to Taylor losing one eye.
Taylor sued Manila Electric alleging that because the company left the caps exposed to
children, they are liable for damages due to the companys negligence.
ISSUE: Whether or not Manila Electric is liable for damages.
HELD: No. The SC reiterated the elements of quasi delict as follows:
(1) Damages to the plaintiff.
(2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or some person for whose
acts it must respond, was guilty.
(3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damage.
In the case at bar, it is true that Manila Electric has been negligent in disposing off the caps
which they used for the power plant, and that said caps caused damages to Taylor. However,
the causal connection between the companys negligence and the injuries sustained by
Taylor is absent. It is in fact the direct acts of Taylor which led to the explosion of the caps as
he even, in various experiments and in multiple attempts, tried to explode the caps. It is
from said acts that led to the explosion and hence the injuries.
Taylor at the time of the accident was well-grown youth of 15, more mature both mentally
and physically than the average boy of his age; he had been to sea as a cabin boy; was able
to earn P2.50 a day as a mechanical draftsman thirty days after the injury was incurred; and
the record discloses throughout that he was exceptionally well qualified to take care. The
evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that he well knew the explosive character of the
cap with which he was amusing himself. The series of experiments made by him in his
attempt to produce an explosion admit of no other explanation. His attempt to discharge the
cap by the use of electricity, followed by his efforts to explode it with a stone or a hammer,
and the final success of his endeavors brought about by the applications of a match to the
contents of the cap, show clearly that he knew what he was about. Nor can there be any
reasonable doubt that he had reason to anticipate that the explosion might be dangerous.