ARMANDO C. CARPIO, petitioner, vs.

SULU RESOURCES
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondent.
G.R. No. 148267
August 8, 2002
FACTS:
A petition filed by respondent (Sulu Resources Development
Corporation]) for Mines Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) No.
MPSA-IV-131, covering certain areas in Antipolo, Rizal. Petitioner
Armando C. Carpio filed an opposition/adverse claim thereto,
alleging, inter alia, that his landholdings in Cupang and Antipolo,
Rizal will be covered by respondents claim, thus he enjoys a
preferential right to explore and extract the quarry resources on
his properties. After due proceedings were held, the Panel of
Arbitrators of the Mines and Geo-Sciences Bureau of the DENR
rendered a Resolution that Armando C. Carpio is hereby upheld.
Accordingly, the properties of CARPIO are ordered excluded from
the area of PMPSA-IV-131 of SULU RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, and the area not covered by the adverse claim as
subject to mining locations in accordance with existing laws, rules
and regulations. Respondent appealed the foregoing Resolution to
the Mines Adjudication Board. Meanwhile, petitioner filed a motion
to dismiss appeal on the ground of respondents failure to comply
with the requirements of the New Mining Acts Implementing Rules
and Regulations.
On June 20, 1997, the Mines Adjudication Board rendered the
assailed Order dismissing petitioners opposition/adverse claim.
Citing Section 79 of Chapter XIII of the Philippine Mining Act of
1995 (RA 7942), the CA ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to
review the Decision of the Mines Adjudication Board (MAB). The
adjudication of conflicting mining claims is completely
administrative in nature. Under RA 7942, the settlement of
disputes involving rights to mining areas, mineral agreements,
and surface owners, occupants and claimholders/concessionaires
shall pertain exclusively to a Panel of Arbitrators in the regional
office of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources,
whose decisions are appealable to the Mines Adjudication Board.
Under Section
79 of RA 7942, the findings of fact by the MAB as well as its
decision or order shall be final and executory.

ISSUE:
Whether or not appeals from the Decision or Final Orders of the
Mines Adjudication Board should be made directly to the Supreme
Court as contended by the respondent and the Court of Appeals,
or such appeals be first made to the Court of Appeals as
contended by herein petitioner.
HELD:
Factual controversies are usually involved in administrative
actions; and the CA is prepared to handle such issues because,
unlike this Court, it is mandated to rule on questions of fact. In
Metro Construction, we observed that not only did the CA have
appellate jurisdiction over Construction Industry Arbitration
Commission (CIAC) decisions and orders, but the review of such
decisions included questions of fact and law. At the very least
when factual findings of the MAB are challenged or alleged to
have been made in grave abuse of discretion as in the present
case, the CA may review them, consistent with the constitutional
duty of the judiciary.
There are sufficient legal footings authorizing a review of the MAB
Decision under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. First, Section 30 of
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, mandates that [n]o law shall
be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and
consent. On the other hand, Section 79 of RA No. 7942 provides
that decisions of the MAB may be reviewed by this Court on a
petition for review by certiorari. This provision is obviously an
expansion of the Courts appellate jurisdiction, an expansion to
which this Court has not consented. Indiscriminate enactment of
legislation enlarging the appellate jurisdiction of this Court would
unnecessarily burden it. The Supreme Court, in the exercise of its
rule-making power, transfers to the CA pending cases involving a
review of a quasi-judicial bodys decisions, such transfer relates
only to procedure; hence, it does not impair the substantive and
vested rights of the parties. The aggrieved parties right to appeal
is preserved; what is changed is only the procedure by which the
appeal is to be made or decided. The parties still have a remedy
and a competent tribunal to grant this remedy. The Revised Rules

of Civil Procedure included Rule 43 to provide a uniform rule on

appeals from quasi-judicial agencies. Under the rule, appeals from
their judgments and final orders are now required to be brought
to the CA on a verified petition for review. A quasi-judicial agency
or body has been defined as an organ of government, other than
a court or legislature, which affects the rights of private parties
through either adjudication or rule making. MAB falls under this
definition; hence, it is no different from the other quasi-judicial
bodies enumerated under Rule 43. Besides, the introductory
words in Section 1 of Circular No. 1-91 among these agencies
are -- indicate that the enumeration is not exclusive or conclusive
and acknowledge the existence of other quasi-judicial agencies
which, though not expressly listed, should be deemed included
therein. The Court realizes that under Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg.
129 as amended by RA No. 7902, factual controversies are usually
involved in decisions of quasi-judicial bodies; and the CA, which is
likewise tasked to resolve questions of fact, has more elbow room
to resolve them. By including questions of fact among the issues
that may be raised in an appeal from quasi-judicial agencies to
the CA, Section 3 of Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 and
Section 3 of Rule 43 explicitly expanded the list of such issues.
According to Section 3 of Rule 43, [a]n appeal under this Rule may
be taken to the Court of Appeals within the period and in the
manner herein provided whether the appeal involves questions of
fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. Hence, appeals
from quasi-judicial agencies even only on questions of law may be
brought to the CA. The judicial policy of observing the hierarchy of
courts dictates that direct resort from administrative agencies to
this Court will not be entertained, unless the redress desired
cannot be obtained from the appropriate lower tribunals, or
unless exceptional and compelling circumstances justify
availment of a remedy falling within and calling for the exercise of
our primary jurisdiction. Consistent with these rulings and legal
bases, we therefore hold that Section 79 of RA 7942 is likewise to
be understood as having been modified by Circular No. 1-91, BP
Blg. 129 as amended by RA 7902, Revised Administrative Circular
1-95, and Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. In brief, appeals from
decisions of the MAB shall be taken to the CA through petitions for

review in accordance with the provisions of Rule 43 of the 1997

Rules of Court.
LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING CO. v. WMC RESOURCES
INTL. PTY. LTD., WMC PHILIPPINES, INC. and SAGITTARIUS
MINES, INC.
G.R. No. 162331
November 20, 2006
FACTS:
In 1995, the Philippine Government and WMC Philippines
executed a Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement
(Columbio FTAA) to the expoloration and development of possible
mineral resources in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del
Sur, and North Cotabato.
The Columbio FTAA is covered in part by 156 mining claims
held under various Mineral Production Sharing Agreements
(MPSA) by the Tampakan Companies. The Option Agreement also
provides for the grant of the right of first refusal to the Tampakan
Companies in case WMC Philippines desires to dispose of its rights
and interests in the mining claims. In 2000, WMC Resources
executed a Sale and Purchase Agreement with Lepanto, however
the Tampakan Companies sought to exercise its right of first
refusal. The petitioner filed a case against WMC Philippines and
the Tampakan Companies. The case was dismissed.
In 2001, WMC Resources and Sagittarius Mines, Inc.
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale of Shares of Stocks. The DENR
Secretary approved the transfer of the Columbio FTAA. The
petitioner filed a Petition for Review of the Order of the DENR
Secretary with the Office of the President on several grounds. One
of which is that it violates Section 40 of the Mining Act (RA No.
7942). The petition was dismissed. The appeal before the CA was
also dismissed.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 40 of RA No. 7942 should be
applied to the Columbio FTAA.
HELD:

No. Section 40 of RA No. 7942 should not be applied to the

Columbio FTAA. The Columbio FTAA was entered into by the
Philippine Government and WMC Philippines in March 1995,
before the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 took effect on April 1995.
In the case at bar, there is an absence of either an express
declaration or an implication in the Philippine Mining Act of 1995
that the provisions of said law shall be made to apply
retroactively.
Furthermore, if petitioner was indeed of the mind Section 40
of RA No. 7942 is applicable to the Columbio FTAA, thus
necessitating the approval of the President for the validity of its
transfer or assignment, it would seem contradictory that
petitioner sought the approval of the DENR Secretary, and not
that of the President, of its July 2000 Sale and Purchase
Agreement with WMC Resources. Hence, it may be glimpsed from
the very act of petitioner that it recognized that the provision of
the Columbio FTAA regarding the consent of the DENR Secretary
with respect to the transfer of said FTAA must be upheld.
Section 40 of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 requiring the
approval of the President with respect to assignment or transfer
of FTAAs, if made applicable retroactively to the Columbio FTAA,
would be tantamount to an impairment of the obligations under
said contract as it would effectively restrict the right of the parties
thereto to assign or transfer their interests in the said FTAA.
Furthermore, if made to apply to the Columbio FTAA, it will
effectively modify the terms of the original contract and thus
impair the obligations of the parties thereto and restrict the
exercise of their vested rights under the original agreement.
The petition is denied.

UNGAY MALOBAGO MINES, INC. vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE

APPELLATE COURT, DIRECTOR OF LANDS
G.R. No. 69997

September 30, 1987

FACTS:
On July 20, 1962, the President of the Philippines granted
mining patents on mineral claims located at Ungay Malobago,
Rapu-Rapu, Albay to herein petitioners and other private
individuals.
Way back on October 30, 1959, John Canson, Jr. and Carlos
Stilianopulos assigned their rights to their mining claims in favor
of the petitioner. The assignment of rights was recorded in the
Office of the Mining Recorder of Albay on December 2, 1959.

The aforestated mining patents, after their issuance on July

20, 1962, were all recorded in the Office of the Mining Recorder of
Albay on August 28, 1962 and transcribed on September 4, 1962
in the Registration Book of the Registry of Deeds of Albay.
Consequently, the Register of Deeds of Albay issued the
respective original certificates of titles pursuant to Section 122 of
Act No. 496 in the names of John Canson, Jr., Carlos Stilianopulos,
and the petitioner.

Subsequently, or from 1968 to 1974, tree patents were

granted by the respondent Director of Lands and the
corresponding original certificates of titles were issued by the
Register of Deeds to private respondents.

All of the above patents covered portions of the lots covered

by the patents belonging to the petitioner.

The petitioner filed a complaint for annulment and

cancellation of patents against the private respondents and
prayed that all the free patent titles issued in their favor for
properties over which original certificates of title had already
been issued in its favor be declared null and void.
The trial court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint
The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE:
a) Whether or not the lands in question belong to the public
domain;
b) Whether or not the appellate court erred in dismissing the
complaint on the ground that the petitioner had no
personality to institute the same
HELD:
No. Article XIII, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution provides:
"All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public
domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils,
all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the
Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation,
development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the
Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per
centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject
to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the
inauguration of the Government established under this
Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of public
agricultural land, shall not be alienated and no license,
concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or

utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a

period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another
twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water
supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of
water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure
and the limit of the grant." (Emphasis supplied)

Therefore, applying the aforequoted provision to the case at

bar, we conclude that the issuance of the lode patents on mineral
claims by the President of the Philippines in 1962 in favor of the
petitioner granted to it only the right to extract or utilize the
minerals which may be found on or under the surface of the land.
On the other hand, the issuance of the free patents by the
respondent Director of Lands in 1979 in favor of the private
respondents granted to them the ownership and the right to use
the land for agricultural purposes but excluding the ownership of,
and the right to extract or utilize, the minerals which may be
found on or under the surface.
There is no basis in the records for the petitioner's stand that it
acquired the right to the mineral lands prior to the effectivity of
the 1935 Constitution, thus, making such acquisition outside its
purview and scope.
Anent the second issue, the petitioner has no personality to
institute the action below for annulment and cancellation of
patents. The mineral lands over which it has a right to extract
minerals remained part of the inalienable lands of the public
domain and thus, only the Solicitor General or the person acting
in his stead can bring an action for reversion.
JOHN ERIC LONEY, STEVEN PAUL REID and B. HERNANDEZ
vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 152644
February 10, 2006

FACTS:
Petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid, and Pedro B.
Hernandez are the President and Chief Executive Officer, Senior
Manager, and Resident Manager for Mining Operations,
respectively, of Marcopper Mining Corporation (Marcopper), a
corporation engaged in mining in the province of Marinduque.
Marcopper had been storing tailings from its operations in a
pit that discharged millions of tons of tailings into the Boac and
Makalupnit rivers.
The DOJ separately charged petitioners in the MTC of Boac,
Marinduque with violation of Article 91(B), sub-paragraphs 5 and
6 of Presidential Decree No. 1067 or the Water Code of the
Philippines (PD 1067), Section 8 of PD No. 984 or the National
Pollution Control Decree of 1976 (PD 984), Section 108 of
Republic Act No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 (RA
7942), and Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) for
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property.
Petitioners moved to quash the Information on the following
grounds:
(1)
the Information were duplicitous as the Department
of Justice charged more than one offense for a single act;
(2)
petitioners John Eric Loney and Steven Paul Reid were
not yet officers of Marcopper when the incident subject of
the Information took place; and
(3)
the Informations contain allegations which constitute
legal excuse or justification.
MTC issued a Consolidated Order), granting partial
reconsideration to its Joint Order and quashing the Information for
violation of PD 1067 and PD 984. The MTC maintained the
Information for violation of RA 7942 and Article 365 of the RPC.
Petitioners subsequently filed a petition for certiorari with the RTC
of Boac, Marinduque, assailing that portion of the Consolidated
Order maintaining the Informations for violation of RA 7942. The
RTC granted public respondents appeal but denied petitioners

petition. Branch 94 set aside the Consolidated Order in so far as it

quashed the Informations for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984 and
ordered those charges reinstated. RTC affirmed the Consolidated
Order in all other respects. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari
with the Court of Appeals. Petitioners contended that since the
acts complained of in the charges for violation of PD 1067, PD
984, and RA 7942 are the very same acts complained of in the
charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC, the latter absorbs
the former. Hence, petitioners should only be prosecuted for
violation of Article 365 of the RPC. The Court of Appeals affirmed
RTCs ruling.
ISSUE:
Whether all the charges filed against petitioners except one
should be quashed for duplicity of charges and only the charge for
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property should
stand.
HELD:
NO. The information filed by the petitioner should not be
quashed.
There is no duplicity of charges in the present case.
There is duplicity (or multiplicity) of charges when a single
Information charges more than one offense. Under Section
3(e), Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, duplicity
of offenses in a single information is a ground to quash the
Information. The Rules prohibit the filing of such Information to
avoid confusing the accused in preparing his defense. Here,
however, the prosecution charged each petitioner with four
offenses, with each Information charging only one offense.
Thus, petitioners erroneously invoke duplicity of charges as a
ground to quash the Informations. On this score alone, the
petition deserves outright denial.

MARCOPPER MINING CORPORATION vs. ALBERTO G.

BUMOLO
G.R. No. 139548
December 22, 2000
FACTS:
MARCOPPER MINING CORPORATION registered its mining
claims in Pao, Kasibu, Nueva Vizcaya with the DENR from
February 02,1982 to October 12, 1982. Private respondents
Alberto G. Bumolo and others registered their mining claims in the
same area from 28 July 1981 to 22 September 1988, which claims
were subsequently converted into Mineral Production Sharing
Agreements (MPSA).
On March 12, 1982 petitioner entered into Option
Agreements over the mining. Under the Agreements, petitioner
was granted the exclusive and irrevocable right to explore the
mining claims for three (3) years with provision for extension.
On December 23, 1982 and March 26, 1987 petitioner filed
Prospecting Permit Applications (PPA) with the Bureau of Forest
Development, DENR, on the alleged ground that a portion of the
area covered by the mining claims was within the Magat River
Forest Reservation under Proc. 573 of June 26, 1969 and with
DAR on account of alleged coverage of the other portion within
the Nueva Vizcaya-Quirino Civil Reservation under Proc. 1498 of
11 September 1975.
On 15 July 1991 Executive Director Leonardo A. Paat rejected
petitioners Prospecting Permit Application (PPA) on the ground
that the Memorandum of July 08, 1991 endorsed by the Regional
Technical Director for Mines revealed that the area covered was
outside government reservation; that the prospect claim was in
conflict with existing claims; and, that the area had been
extensively explored in the early 1980's.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. Regional Executive
Director Samuel Paragas recommended to the DENR Secretary
that petitioner's request for reconsideration be denied; that the

existing rights of mining claim holders be respected; and, that the

prior legal rights of MPSA/Financial and Technical Assistance
Agreement applicants over subject area be recognized.
As regards petitioner's PPA filed with the DAR, it appeared
that it was issued a clearance to prospect for six (6) months from
December 11, 1995.
On August 15, 1997 petitioner appealed to public respondent
Mines Adjudication Board (MAB). Petitioner maintained that
subject area was within the Magat River Forest Reservation. On
June 11, 1998 the rejection of the PPA was affirmed whereas the
mining claims of respondents Alberto G. Bumolo et al. that had
been converted into a MPSA, subject to compliance with R.A. 7942
and DAO No. 96-40, were given due course.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration.
denied petitioners motion .

Respondent MAB

ISSUE:
Whether respondent MAB erred in finding that the area
subject of the PPA was outside the Magat River Forest
Reservation.
HELD:
Respondent MAB correctly upheld the ratiocination of
Regional Executive Director Paragas in denying petitioner's PPA.
The disapproval of Marcoppers PPA moreover, did not
emanate from a single recommendation of the RTD for Mines.
Records would show that as early as May 31, 1989 x x x the
Bumolo group of PD 463 claims which Marcopper has eventually
surrounded by filing its own PAO 1-30 group of claims x x x x was
confirmed by the Forest Engineering Section of the region to be
outside proclaimed watershed areas, wilderness, national parks
and existing government reforestation projects x x x x
In other words, the circumstance that the area covered by
petitioner's PPA is outside the Magat River Forest Reservation has

been adequately established by the following evidence: (a)

confirmation as early as 31 May 1989 by the Forest Engineering
Section of Tuguegarao, Cagayan; (b) the 8 July 1991
Memorandum Report of Regional Technical Director Punsal Jr.;
and, (c) plotting provided by the National Mapping and Resources
Information Authority per its 2 June 1995 indorsement of the
maps to the office of the Regional Executive Director. Petitioner
contests the exclusion of the area subject of its PPA within the
Magat River Forest Reservation based merely on the alleged
"typographical error committed by somebody in the Engineering
Section of the DENR." Aside from the fact that the allegation does
not have anything to support it, the aforementioned documents
which the Regional Executive Directors relied upon in denying the
PPA had already settled the issue.
Furthermore, respondent MAB even fortified the bases for
the rejection of petitioner's PPA.
As plotted by the Lands
Management Sector of DENR Region 2 contained in the sketch
plan of 11 November 1996 and as shown in the Land Use map of
the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of
Dupax, Nueva Vizcaya, the area covered under the PPA is indeed
outside any government reservation.

PICOP RESOURCES, INC. vs. BASE METALS MINERAL

RESOURCES CORPORATION and THE MINES ADJUDICATION
BOARD
G.R. No. 163509
December 6, 2006
FACTS:
Central Mindanao Mining and Development Corporation
(CMMCI for brevity) entered into a Mines Operating Agreement
(Agreement for brevity) with Banahaw Mining and Development
Corporation (Banahaw Mining for brevity) whereby the latter
agreed to act as Mine Operator for the exploration, development,
and eventual commercial operation of CMMCIs eighteen (18)
mining claims located in Agusan del Sur.
Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, Banahaw Mining
filed applications for Mining Lease Contracts over the mining

claims with the Bureau of Mines. So that Banahaw Mining was

issued a Mines Temporary Permit authorizing it to extract and
dispose of precious minerals found within its mining claims. Upon
its expiration, the temporary permit was subsequently renewed
thrice by the Bureau of Mines, the last being on June 28, 1991.
Since a portion of Banahaw Minings mining claims was
located in petitioner PICOPs logging concession in Agusan del
Sur, Banahaw Mining and petitioner PICOP entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement, whereby, in mutual recognition of
each others right to the area concerned, petitioner PICOP allowed
Banahaw Mining an access/right of way to its mining claims.
Banahaw Mining converted its mining claims to applications for
Mineral Production Sharing Agreements (MPSA for brevity).
While the MPSA were pending, Banahaw Mining, on
December 18, 1996, decided to sell/assign its rights and interests
over thirty-seven (37) mining claims in favor of private
respondent Base Metals Mineral Resources Corporation (Base
Metals for brevity). The transfer included mining claims held by
Banahaw Mining in its own right as claim owner, as well as those
covered by its mining operating agreement with CMMCI.
Upon being informed of the development, CMMCI, as claim
owner, immediately approved the assignment made by Banahaw
Mining in favor of private respondent Base Metals, thereby
recognizing private respondent Base Metals as the new operator
of its claims.
On March 10, 1997, private respondent Base Metals
amended Banahaw Minings pending MPSA applications with the
Bureau of Mines to substitute itself as applicant and to submit
additional documents in support of the application. Area
clearances from the DENR Regional Director and Superintendent
of the Agusan Marsh and Wildlife Sanctuary were submitted, as
required.

On October 7, 1997, private respondent Base Metals

amended MPSA applications were published in accordance with
the requirements of the Mining Act of 1995.
On November 18, 1997, petitioner PICOP filed with the Mines
Geo-Sciences Bureau (MGB), Caraga Regional Office No. XIII an
Adverse Claim and/or Opposition to private respondent Base
Metals application. After the submission of their respective
position paper, the Panel Arbitrator issued an Order disapproving
private respondent Base Metals MPSA on the reasons that
adverse claim was filed on time, that the granting of the MPSA
application on area subject of an IFMA or PTLA which is covered
by a Presidential Warranty, the panel believes it cannot, unless
the grantee consents thereto, without the grantees consent, the
area is considered closed to mining location (sec. 19) (b) (No. 2),
DAO No. 96-40) and that the mining location in forest or
timberland is allowed only if such forest or timberland is not
leased by the government to a qualified person or entity and if it
is leased the consent of the lessor is necessary, in addition to the
area clearance to be issued by the agency concerned before it is
subjected to mining operation.
Plantation is considered closed to mining locations because
it is off tangent to mining. Both are extremes. They can not exist
at the same time. The other must necessarily stop before the
other operate.
Private respondent Base Metals filed a Notice of Appeal with
public respondent MAB, the latter rendered the assailed decision
setting aside the Panel Arbitrators order. The Court of Appeals
upheld the decision of the MAB.
Hence this petition.
PICOP presents the following issues: (1) the 2,756 hectares
subject of Base Metals MPSA are closed to mining operations
except upon PICOPs written consent pursuant to existing laws,
rules and regulations and by virtue of the Presidential Warranty;
(2) its Presidential Warranty is protected by the non-impairment

clause of the Constitution; and (3) it does not raise new issues in
its petition.
PICOP asserts that its concession areas are closed to mining
operations as these are within the Agusan-Surigao-Davao forest
reserve established under Proclamation No. 369 of then Gov. Gen.
Dwight Davis. The area is allegedly also part of permanent forest
established under Republic Act No. 3092 (RA 3092), and overlaps
the wilderness area where mining applications are expressly
prohibited under RA 7586. Hence, the area is closed to mining
operations under Sec. 19(f) of RA 7942.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the area covered by Base Metals MPSA is, by
law, closed to mining activities
Whether or not the Presidential Warranty is a contract
protected by the non-impairment clause of the 1987 Constitution.
HELD:
Anent the first issue, the Court ruled that the area
covered by Base Metals MPSA is, by law, not closed to mining
activities.
There is no evidence in this case that the area covered by
Base Metals MPSA has been proclaimed as watershed forest
reserves.
Even granting that the area covered by the MPSA is part of
the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve, such does not
necessarily signify that the area is absolutely closed to mining
activities. Contrary to PICOPs obvious misreading of our decision
in Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. Garcia, supra, to the effect that mineral
agreements are not allowed in the forest reserve established
under Proclamation 369, the Court in that case actually ruled that
pursuant to PD 463 as amended by PD 1385, one can acquire
mining rights within forest reserves, such as the Agusan-DavaoSurigao Forest Reserve, by initially applying for a permit to
prospect with the Bureau of Forest and Development and

subsequently for a permit to explore with the Bureau of Mines and

Geosciences.
Moreover, Sec. 18 RA 7942 allows mining even in timberland
or forestty subject to existing rights and reservations. Similarly,
Sec. 47 of PD 705 permits mining operations in forest lands which
include the public forest, the permanent forest or forest reserves,
and forest reservations
With regard to the second issue, the Court do not subscribe
to PICOPs argument that the Presidential Warranty dated
September 25, 1968 is a contract protected by the nonimpairment clause of the 1987 Constitution. An examination of
the Presidential Warranty at once reveals that it simply reassures
PICOP of the governments commitment to uphold the terms and
conditions of its timber license and guarantees PICOPs peaceful
and adequate possession and enjoyment of the areas which are
the basic sources of raw materials for its wood processing
complex. The warranty covers only the right to cut, collect, and
remove timber in its concession area, and does not extend to the
utilization of other resources, such as mineral resources, occurring
within the concession.
The Presidential Warranty cannot be considered a contract
distinct from PTLA No. 47 and IFMA No. 35. It is merely a
collateral undertaking which cannot amplify PICOPs rights under
its timber license. Since timber licenses are not contracts,
the non-impairment clause cannot be invoked.

SANTA ROSA MINING COMPANY, INC. vs. HON. MINISTER

OF NATURAL RESOURCES JOSE J. LEIDO, JR. AND DIRECTOR
OF MINES JUANITO C. FERNANDEZ
G.R. No. L-49109

December 1, 1987

FACTS:
Petitioner , Santa Rosa Mining Company, Inc., is a mining
corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines. It alleges that it is the holder of fifty (50) valid mining
claims situated in Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, acquired
under the provisions of the Act of the U.S. Congress dated 1 July
1902 (Philippine Bill of 1902, for short).
On 14 October 1977, Presidential Decree No. 1214 was
issued, requiring holders of subsisting and valid patentable mining
claims located under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902
to file a mining lease application within one (1) year from the
approval of the Decree. Petitioner accordingly filed a mining
lease application, but "under protest", on 13 October 1978, with a
reservation annotated on the back of its application that it is not
waiving its rights over its mining claims until the validity of
Presidential Decree No. 1214 shall have been passed upon by this
Court.
On 10 October 1978, petitioner filed this special civil action
for certiorari and prohibition, alleging that it has no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law to
protect its rights (except by said petition). Petitioner assails
Presidential Decree No. 1214 as unconstitutional in that it
amounts to a deprivation of property without due process of law.
Petitioner avers that its fifty (50) mining claims had already
been declared as its own private and exclusive property in final
judgments. The respondents, on the other hand, allege that
petitioner has no standing to file the instant petition as it failed to
fully exhaust administrative remedies.
ISSUE:
Whether
constitutional.

or

not

Presidential

Decree

No.

1214

HELD:
Presidential Decree No. 1214 is not unconstitutional.

is

It is a valid exercise of the sovereign power of the State, as

owner, over lands of the public domain, of which petitioner's
mining claims still form a part, and over the patrimony of the
nation, of which mineral deposits are a valuable asset. It may be
underscored, in this connection, that the Decree does not cover
all mining claims located under the Phil. Bill of 1902, but only
those claims over which their locators had failed to obtain a
patent. And even then, such locators may still avail of the
renewable twenty-five year (25) lease prescribed by Pres. Dec.
No. 463, the Mineral Development Resources Decree of 1974.
Presidential Decree No. 1214 is in accord with Sec. 8, Art. XIV
of the 1973 Constitution.
Petition is dismissed.
PYRO COPPER MINING CORPORATION vs. MINES
ADJUDICATION BOARD-DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT
AND NATURAL RESOURCES,
G.R. no. 179674
July 28, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioner is a corporation duly organized and existing under
Philippine laws engaged in the business of mining. On 31 March
2000, petitioners Application for Mineral Production Sharing
Agreement (MPSA), for the exploration, development and
commercial utilization of certain pyrite ore and other mineral
deposits in a 4,360.71-hectare land in Dasol, Pangasinan, was
approved and MPSA No. 153-2000-1 was issued in its favor.
Private respondent is also a corporation organized and
existing under the laws of the Philippines and engaged in the
business of mining. Private respondent filed an Application for
Exploration Permit with MGB covering the same properties
covered by and during the subsistence of APSA-SF-000089 and
MPSA No. 153-2000-1 of petitioner. In turn, petitioner filed a
Verified Protest/Opposition to the Application for Exploration

Permit of the private respondent. It was allegedly filed with the

Panel of Arbitrators on 30 August 2005 and was received by the
latter on 5 September 2005.
Prior, however, to petitioners filing of its Verified
Protest/Opposition to the private respondents Application for
Exploration Permit, petitioners MPSA No. 153-2000-1 was
cancelled, a Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied.
The MGB issued EP No. 05-001 to private respondent.
Panel of Arbitrators dismissed motu proprio the Verified
Protest/Opposition of petitioner. Petitioner elevated by appeal to
the MAB which was also dismissed.
The case was elevated to the Court of appeals but judgment
was rendered against the petitioner.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the Panel of Arbitrators has jurisdiction to cancel,
deny and/or revoke EP No. 05-001 issued by MGB to private
respondent.
HELD:
NO. The Panel of Arbitrators has no jurisdiction to cancel,
deny and/or revoke EP No. 05-001 issued by MGB to private
respondent
Section 77 of Republic Act No. 7942 establishes the
jurisdiction of the Panel of Arbitrators, thus:
Sec. 77. Panel of Arbitrators. x x x. Within thirty (30)
working days, after the submission of the case by the parties for
decision, the panel shall have exclusive and original
jurisdiction to hear and decide on the following:
1. Disputes involving rights to mining areas;

2. Disputes involving mineral agreements or permits;

3. Disputes involving surface owners, occupants and
claimholders/concessionaires; and
4. Disputes pending before the Bureau and the Department
at the date of the effectivity of this Act.
The Panel of Arbitrators only has jurisdiction over
adverse claims, conflicts, and oppositions relating to
applications for the grant of mineral rights, but not over
cancellation of mineral rights already granted and
existing.
As to who has jurisdiction to cancel an existing exploration
permit, Section 28 of DAO NO. 96-40 explicitly provides:
Section 28. Cancellation of an Exploration Permit.
The
Director/concerned Regional Director may
cancel the Exploration Permit for
failure
of
the
Permittee to comply with any of the requirements and
for violation(s) of the terms and conditions under
which the Permit is issued.
For enewed Exploration
Permits, the Secretary upon the recommendation of the
Director shall cause the cancellation of the same.
According to Section 5 of DAO No. 96-40, Director means
the Director of the MGB Central Office, while Regional Director
means the Regional Director of any MGB Regional Office. As the
authority to issue an Exploration Permit is vested in the MGB, then
the same necessarily includes the corollary power to revoke,
withdraw or cancel the same. Indisputably, the authority to deny,
revoke, or cancel EP No. 05-001 of private respondent is already
lodged with the MGB, and not with the Panel of Arbitrators.

SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLD MINING CORPORATION vs.

BALITE PORTAL MINING COOPERATIVE

G.R. No. 135190

April 3, 2002

FACTS:
The instant case involves a rich tract of mineral land situated
in the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve known as the
Diwalwal Gold Rush Area. Located at Mt. Diwata in the
municipalities of Monkayo and Cateel in Davao Del Norte, the land
has been embroiled in controversy since the mid-80s due to the
scramble over gold deposits found within its bowels.
On March 10, 1988, Marcopper Mining Corporation
(Marcopper) was granted Exploration Permit No. 133 (EP No. 133)
over 4,491 hectares of land, which included the hotly-contested
Diwalwal area.
Not long thereafter, Congress enacted on June 27, 1991
Republic Act No. 7076, or the Peoples Small-Scale Mining Act.
The law established a Peoples Small-Scale Mining Program to be
implemented by the Secretary of the DENR and created the
Provincial Mining Regulatory Board (PMRB) under the DENR
Secretarys direct supervision and control. The statute also
authorized the PMRB to declare and set aside small-scale mining
areas subject to review by the DENR Secretary and award mining
contracts to small-scale miners under certain conditions.
On December 21, 1991, DENR Secretary Fulgencio S.
Factoran issued Department Administrative Order (DAO) No. 66,
declaring 729 hectares of the Diwalwal area as non-forest land
open to small-scale mining. The issuance was made pursuant to
the powers vested in the DENR Secretary by Proclamation No.
369, which established the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve.
On June 24, 1997, the DENR Secretary issued Memorandum
Order No. 97-03 which directs the DENR to study thoroughly and
exhaustively the option of direct state utilization of the mineral
resources in the Diwalwal Gold-Rush Area. Such study shall
include, but shall not be limited to, studying and weighing the

feasibility of entering into management agreements or operating

agreements, or both, with the appropriate government
instrumentalities or private entities, or both, in carrying out the
declared policy of rationalizing the mining operations in the
Diwalwal Gold Rush Area; such agreements shall include
provisions for profit-sharing between the state and the said
parties, including profit-sharing arrangements with small-scale
miners, as well as the payment of royalties to indigenous cultural
communities, among others. The Undersecretary for Field
Operations, as well as the Undersecretary for Legal and
Legislative Affairs and Attached Agencies, and the Director of the
Mines and Geo-sciences Bureau are hereby ordered to undertake
such studies. x x x
Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus before the Court of Appeals against PMRB-Davao, the
DENR Secretary and Balite Communal Portal Mining Cooperative
(BCPMC), which represented all the OTP grantees. It prayed for
the nullification of the above-quoted Memorandum Order No. 9703 on the ground that the direct state utilization espoused
therein would effectively impair its vested rights under EP No.
133.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. It ruled that the
DENR Secretary did not abuse his discretion in issuing
Memorandum Order No. 97-03 since the same was merely a
directive to conduct studies on the various options available to
the government for solving the Diwalwal conflict.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it concluded
that the assailed memorandum order did not adopt the direct
state utilization scheme in resolving the Diwalwal dispute.

Held:
We agree with the Court of Appeals ruling that the
challenged MO 97-03 did not conclusively adopt direct state
utilization as a policy in resolving the Diwalwal dispute. The
terms of the memorandum clearly indicate that what was directed
thereunder was merely a study of this option and nothing else.
Contrary to petitioners contention, it did not grant any
management/operating or profit-sharing agreement to small-scale
miners or to any party, for that matter, but simply instructed the
DENR officials concerned to undertake studies to determine its
feasibility.

APEX MINING CO., INC., v. Southeast Mindanao Gold

Mining Corp. et al
G.R. Nos. 152613 & 152628
November 20,
2009
FACTS
In its June 2006 decision, the Supreme Court held that
the assignment of Exploration Permit (EP) 133 in favor of
SEM violated one of the conditions stipulated in the permit,
that the same shall be for the exclusive use and benefit of
Marcopper Mining Corporation (MMC) or its duly authorized
agents. Because SEM did not claim or submit evidence that it
was a designated agent of MMC, the latter cannot be
considered as an agent of the former that can use EP 133
and benefit from it.
the transfer of EP 133 violated Presidential Decree No. 463,
which requires that the assignment of a mining right be
made with the prior approval of the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).

 the EP 133 expired by non-renewal since it was not renewed

before or after its expiration.
Proclamation No. 297 is valid absent any question against its
validity. IN relation, under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7942,
mining operations in mineral reservations may be
undertaken directly by the State or through a contractor, the
Court deemed the issue of ownership of priority right as
having been overtaken by the said proclamation.
It is now within the prerogative of the Executive Department
to undertake directly the mining operations of the disputed
area or to award the operations to private entities such as
Apex, subject to applicable laws, rules and regulations, and
provided that these private entities are qualified.
Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corporation (SEM) filed a motion
for reconsideration of the Supreme Courts assailed decision. Apex
filed a Motion for Clarification asking that the Court elucidate on
the Decisions pronouncement that mining operations, are now,
therefore within the full control of the State through the executive
branch. Moreover it asked the Court to order the Mines and
Geosciences Board (MGB) to accept its application for an
exploration permit. Balite echoes the same concern as that of
Apex on the actual takeover by the State of the mining industry in
the disputed area to the exclusion of the private sector. In
addition, Balite prayed that the Court will direct MGB to accept its
application for an exploration permit.
ISSUES
1. Whether the transfer or assignment of Exploration Permit
(EP) 133 by MMC to SEM was validly made without violating
any of the terms and conditions set forth in Presidential
Decree No. 463 and EP 133 itself.
2. Whether Southeast Mindanao Mining Corp. acquired a vested
right over the disputed area, which constitutes a property
right protected by the Constitution.

3. Assuming that the legality/constitutionality of Proclamation

No. 297 was timely raised, whether said proclamation
violates Article XII, Section 4 of the Constitution.
4. Whether RA 7942 is the applicable law.

RULING
1. No, the assignment of EP 133 violated its terms and
conditions and Sec. 97, PD 463. Section 97 is entitled,
Assignment of Mining Rights. This hints that before
mining rights namely, the rights to explore, develop and
utilize are transferred or assigned, prior approval must be
obtained from the DENR Secretary. An exploration permit,
thus, cannot be assigned without the imprimatur of the
Secretary of the DENR.
While Presidential Decree No. 463 has already been repealed by
Executive Order No. 279, the administrative aspect of the former
law nonetheless remains applicable. Hence, the transfer or
assignment of exploration permits still needs the prior approval of
the Secretary of the DENR.
In addition, the terms of the permit was violated. Condition
Number 6 categorically states that the permit shall be for the
exclusive use and benefit of MMC or its duly authorized agents.
While it may be true that SEM, the assignee of EP 133, is a 100%
subsidiary corporation of MMC, records are bereft of any evidence
showing that the former is the duly authorized agent of the latter.
2. No, SEM does not acquire aver or prove that its mining rights
had been perfected and completed when the Philippine Bill
of 1902 was still the operative law.
It is impossible for SEM to successfully assert that it acquired
mining rights over the disputed area in accordance with the same
bill, since it was only in 1984 that MMC, SEMs predecessor-in-

interest, filed its declaration of locations and its prospecting

permit application in compliance with Presidential Decree No.
463. It was on 1 July 1985 and 10 March 1986 that a Prospecting
Permit and EP 133, respectively, were issued to MMC.
Considering these facts, there is no possibility that MMC or SEM
could have acquired a perfected mining claim under the auspices
of the Philippine Bill of 1902.
SEM likens EP 133 with a building permit. SEM likewise equates its
supposed rights attached to the exploration permit with the rights
that a private property land owner has to said landholding. This
analogy has no basis in law.
In addition, national wealth, such as mineral resources, are owned
by the State and not by their discoverer. The discoverer or locator
can only develop and utilize said minerals for his own benefit if he
has complied with all the requirements set forth by applicable
laws and if the State has conferred on him such right through
permits, concessions or agreements. Without the imprimatur of
the State, any mining aspirant does not have any definitive right
over the mineral land because, unlike a private landholding,
mineral land is owned by the State, and the same cannot be
alienated to any private person as explicitly stated in Section 2,
Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution.
The right that SEM acquired was limited to exploration, only
because MMC was a mere holder of an exploration permit. As
previously explained, SEM did not acquire the rights inherent in
the permit, as the assignment by MMC to SEM was done in
violation of the condition stipulated in the permit, and the
assignment was effected without the approval of the proper
authority in contravention of the provision of the mining law
governing at that time. In addition, the permit expired on 6 July
1994. It is, therefore, quite clear that SEM has no right over the
area.
An exploration permit does not automatically ripen into a right to
extract and utilize the minerals; much less does it develop into a
vested right. The holder of an exploration permit only has the
right to conduct exploration works on the area awarded.

Presidential Decree No. 463 defined exploration as the

examination and investigation of lands supposed to
contain valuable minerals, by drilling, trenching, shaft
sinking, tunneling, test pitting and other means, for the
purpose of probing the presence of mineral deposits and
the extent thereof. Exploration does not include development
and exploitation of the minerals found. Development is defined
by the same statute as the steps necessarily taken to reach
an ore body or mineral deposit so that it can be mined,
whereas exploitation is defined as the extraction and
utilization of mineral deposits. An exploration permit is
nothing more than a mere right accorded to its holder to be given
priority in the governments consideration in the granting of the
right to develop and utilize the minerals over the area. An
exploration permit is merely inchoate, in that the holder still has
to comply with the terms and conditions embodied in the permit
SEM did not acquire the rights attached to EP 133, since their
transfer was without legal effect. Granting for the sake of
argument that SEM was a valid transferee of the permit, its right
is not that of a mining contractor. An exploration permit
grantee is vested with the right to conduct exploration only,
while an FTAA or MPSA contractor is authorized to extract
and carry off the mineral resources that may be discovered in
the area. An exploration permit holder still has to comply with the
mining project feasibility and other requirements under the
mining law. It has to obtain approval of such accomplished
requirements from the appropriate government agencies. Upon
obtaining this approval, the exploration permit holder has to file
an application for an FTAA or an MPSA and have it approved also.
Until the MPSA application of SEM is approved, it cannot lawfully
claim that it possesses the rights of an MPSA or FTAA holder. But
again, SEM is not qualified to apply for an FTAA or any mineral
agreement, considering that it is not a holder of a valid
exploration permit, since EP 133 expired by non-renewal and the
transfer to it of the same permit has no legal value.
3. No, Proclamation No. 297 does not violate the following:

Article XII, Sec. 4: It is only after the specific limits of the forest
lands shall have been determined by the legislature will this
constitutional restriction apply. SEM does not allege nor present
any evidence that Congress had already enacted a statute
determining with specific limits forest lands and national parks. In
addition, there is nothing in the constitutional provision that
prohibits the President from declaring a forest land as an
environmentally critical area and from regulating the mining
operations therein by declaring it as a mineral reservation in order
to prevent the further degradation of the forest environment and
to resolve the health and peace and order problems that beset
the area.
There is nothing contradictory between the two. Proclamation No.
297, a measure to attain and maintain a rational and orderly
balance between socio-economic growth and environmental
protection, jibes with the constitutional policy of preserving and
protecting the forest lands from being further devastated by
denudation. In other words, the proclamation in question is in line
with Section 4, Article XII of the Constitution, as the former fosters
the preservation of the forest environment of the Diwalwal area
and is aimed at preventing the further degradation of the same.
4. Yes, RA 7942 is the applicable law. Proclamation No. 297,
declaring a certain portion of land located in Monkayo,
Compostela Valley, with an area of 8,100 hectares, more or
less, as a mineral reservation, was issued by the President
pursuant to Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7942, also known
as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995. Section 5 of Republic
Act No. 7942 authorizes the President to establish mineral
reservations
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY, ET. AL. VS. HONORABLE JOSE
ATIENZA, JR.
G.R. NO. 156052

FACTS:

MARCH 7, 2007

Chevron is engaged in the business of importing, distributing

and marketing of petroleum products in the Philippines while Shell
and Petron are engaged in the business of manufacturing, refining
and likewise importing and marketing of petroleum products.
Petitioners sought to compel Mayor Tienza to enforce Ordinance
No. 8027 which was enacted by Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Manila and became effective upon approval by Mayor Atienza.
This ordinance reclassifies the area described from industrial to
commercial and directed the owners to cease and desist from
operating their business within 6 months. Among the business is
the Pandacan Terminal of the Oil companies. Oil companies
intervened in the issue attacking the validity of the ordinance.

ISSUE:
Whether the ordinance approved by respondent is valid or
not

HELD:
Valid. Because the tremendous event happened near the
area which many were put into danger, the Manila Municipal
Office shall do its ministerial duty to protect all property and
health of those people who lived in the vicinity and nearby cities.
The court ordered the transfer of Pandacan Terminal within a non
extendible period of 90 days. The life of the people shall be the
utmost priority of the government in terms of its security, though
the business will lose billions of money, the municipality cannot
sacrifice its people.

BENGUET CORPORATION vs. DEPARTMENT OF

ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES-MINES
ADJUDICATION BOARD and J.G. REALTY AND MINING
CORPORATION
G.R. No. 163101
February 13, 2008
FACTS:
Benguet and J.G. Realty entered into a Royalty Agreement
with Option to Purchase (RAWOP) , wherein J.G. Realty was
acknowledged as the owner of four mining claims with a total
area of 288.8656 hectares. The parties also executed a
Supplemental Agreement. The mining claims were covered by
Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) Application No.
APSA-V-0009 jointly filed by J.G. Realty as claim-owner and
Benguet as operator.
After some time, the Executive Vice-President of Benguet,
Antonio N. Tachuling, issued a letter informing J.G. Realty of its
intention to develop the mining claims. However, J.G. Realty,
through its President, Johnny L. Tan, then sent a letter to the
President of Benguet informing the latter that it was terminating
the RAWOP. The latter alleged that petitioner violated some of
the provisions of the RAWOP, specifically on non-payment of
royalties and non-fulfillment of obligations stipulated therein.
J.G.
Realty
filed
a
Petition
for
Declaration
of
Nullity/Cancellation of the RAWOP. POA issued a Decision,
cancelling the RAWOP and its Supplemental Agreement.
BENGUET was subsequently excluded from the joint MPSA
Application over the mineral claims. Subsequent MR was denied.
Said decision was upheld by DENR-MAB.
Hence this instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner the filing of the petition with the
Supreme Court is proper.
HELD:

NO. the instant petition can be denied outright as Benguet

resorted to an improper Remedy.
The last paragraph of Section 79 of Republic Act No. (RA)
7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 states, A petition for
review by certiorari and question of law may be filed by the
aggrieved party with the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days
from receipt of the order or decision of the [MAB].
The Revised Rules of Civil Procedure included Rule 43 to
provide a uniform rule on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies.
Under the rule, appeals from their judgments and final orders are
now required to be brought to the CA on a verified petition for
review. A quasi-judicial agency or body has been defined as an
organ of government, other than a court or legislature, which
affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or
rule-making. MAB falls under this definition; hence, it is no
different from the other quasi-judicial bodies enumerated under
Rule 43. Besides, the introductory words in Section 1 of Circular
No. 1-91among these agencies areindicate that the
enumeration is not exclusive or conclusive and acknowledge the
existence of other quasi-judicial agencies which, though not
expressly listed, should be deemed included therein.
The judicial policy of observing the hierarchy of courts
dictates that direct resort from administrative agencies to this
Court will not be entertained, unless the redress desired cannot
be obtained from the appropriate lower tribunals, or unless
exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a
remedy falling within and calling for the exercise of our primary
jurisdiction.
Thus Benguet should have filed the appeal with the CA.
Petitioner having failed to properly appeal to the CA under
Rule 43, the decision of the MAB has become final and executory.
On this ground alone, the instant petition must be denied.

CELESTIAL NICKEL MINING EXPLORATION CORPORATION

vs.
MACROASIA CORPORATION(formerly INFANTA MINERAL
AND INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION), BLUE RIDGE MINERAL
CORPORATION, and LEBACH MINING CORPORATION.
G.R. No. 169080 and G.R. No. 172936
March 5,
2008
FACTS:
The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and
Infanta Mineral and Industrial Corporation (Infanta) entered into a
Mining Lease Contract V-1050.
Infantas corporate name was then changed to Cobertson
Holdings Corporation and subsequently to its present name,
Macroasia Corporation.
After sometime, Celestial filed a Petition to Cancel the
subject mining lease contracts and other mining claims of
Macroasia including those covered by Mining Lease Contract No.
V-1050, before the Panel of Arbitrators (POA) of the Mines and
Geo-Sciences Bureau (MGB) of the DENR.
Blue Ridge, in an earlier letter-petition, also wrote the
Director of Mines to seek cancellation of mining lease contracts
and other mining rights of Macroasia and another entity, Lebach
Mining Corporation (Lebach), in mining areas in Brookes Point.
Celestial is the assignee of 144 mining claims covering such
areas contiguous to Infantas (now Macroasia) mining lode claims.
Celestial also holds an MPSA with the government which covers
2,835 hectares located at Ipilan/Maasin, Brookes Point, Palawan
and two pending applications covering another 4,040 hectares in
Barangay Mainit also in Brookes Point.

Celestial sought the cancellation of Macroasias lease

contracts.
Macroasia refuted the grounds for cancellation invoked by
Celestial.
Based on the records of the Bureau of Mines and findings of
the field investigations, the POA granted the petition of Celestial
to cancel the Mining Lease Contracts of Macroasia; and found the
claims of the others indubitably meritorious. It gave Celestial the
preferential right to Macroasias mining areas. 1 It upheld Blue
Ridges petition, but only as against the Mining Lease Contract
areas of Lebach, and the said leased areas were declared
automatically abandoned. It gave Blue Ridge priority right to the
aforesaid Lebachs areas/mining claims.
Blue Ridge and
Macroasia appealed before the MAB.
Lebach did not file any notice of appeal with the required
memorandum of appeal; thus, with respect to Lebach, the above
resolution became final and executory.
The MAB made a decision upholding the Decision of the POA
to cancel the Mining Lode/Lease Contracts of Macroasia.
However, the MAB, subsequently issued a resolution
vacating its previous decision, holding that neither the POA nor
the MAB had the power to revoke a mineral agreement duly
entered into by the DENR Secretary. The MAB further held that the
power to cancel or revoke a mineral agreement was exclusively
lodged with the DENR Secretary.
Celestial and Blue Ridge made an appeal.
The CA Special12th Division affirmed the MAB Resolution
which upheld the exclusive authority of the DENR Secretary to
approve, cancel, and revoke mineral agreements. The CA also
denied Celestials Motion for Reconsideration.
1

While the CA Special 10th Division granted Blue Ridges

petition; reversed and set aside the Resolutions of the MAB; and
treated the cancellation of a mining lease agreement as a mining
dispute within the exclusive jurisdiction of the POA under Sec. 77
of RA 7942, explaining that the power to resolve mining disputes,
which is the greater power, necessarily includes the lesser power
to cancel mining agreements.
ISSUE:
Whether or not it is only the Secretary of the DENR who has
the jurisdiction to cancel mining contracts and privileges?
HELD:
YES. It is only the Secretary of the DENR who has jurisdiction
to cancel mining contracts and privileges.
After a scrutiny of the provisions of PD 463, EO 211, EO 279, RA
7942 and its implementing rules and regulations, executive
issuances, and case law, we rule that the DENR Secretary, not the
POA, has the jurisdiction to cancel existing mineral lease
contracts or mineral agreements based on the following reasons:
The power of the DENR Secretary to cancel mineral
agreements emanates from his administrative authority,
supervision, management, and control over mineral resources
under Chapter I, Title XIV of Book IV of the Revised Administrative
Code of 1987.
It is the DENR, through the Secretary, that manages,
supervises, and regulates the use and development of all mineral
resources of the country. It has exclusive jurisdiction over the
management of all lands of public domain, which covers mineral
resources and deposits from said lands. It has the power to
oversee, supervise, and police our natural resources which
include mineral resources. Derived from the broad and explicit
powers of the DENR and its Secretary under the Administrative

Code of 1987 is the power to approve mineral agreements and

necessarily to cancel or cause to cancel said agreements.
Under RA 7942, the power of control and supervision of the
DENR Secretary over the MGB to cancel or recommend
cancellation of mineral rights clearly demonstrates the authority
of the DENR Secretary to cancel or approve the cancellation of
mineral agreements.
The DENR Secretarys power to cancel mining rights or
agreements through the MGB can be inferred from Sec. 230,
Chapter XXIV of DENR AO 96-40 on cancellation, revocation, and
termination of a permit/mineral agreement/FTAA.
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY V COURT OF
APPEALS
GR No. 110120
March 16, 1994
FACTS:
The LLDA Legal and Technical personnel found that the City
Government of Caloocan was maintaining an open dumpsite at
the Camarin area without first securing an Environmental
Compliance Certificate (ECC) from the Environmental
Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, as required under
Presidential Decree N o. 1586, and clearance from LLDA as
required under Republic Act N o. 4850 and issued a CEASE and
DESIST ORDER (CDO) for the City Government of Caloocan to stop
the use of the dumpsite.
ISSUES:
1. Does the LLDA and its amendatory laws, have the
authority to entertain the complaint against the dumping of
garbage in the open dumpsite in Barangay Camarin
authorized by the City Government of Caloocan?
2. Does the LLDA have the power and authority to issue a "cease
and desist" order?

HELD:
1. YES, LLDA has authority. It must be recognized in this
regard that the LLDA, as a specialized administrative agency,
is specifically mandated under Republic Act No. 4850 and its
amendatory law s to carry out and make effective the declared
national policy of promoting and accelerating the development
and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the
surrounding provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities of
San Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan with due regard
and adequate provisions for environmental management and
control, preservation of the quality of human life and
ecological systems, and the prevention of undue ecological
disturbances, deterioration and pollution. Under such a broad
grant and power and authority, the LLDA, by virtue of its special
charter, obviously has the responsibility to protect the inhabitants
of the Laguna Lake region from the deleterious effects of
pollutants emanating from the discharge of wastes from the
surrounding areas.
2. YES, pursuant to EO 927 Section 4. While it is a fundamental
rule that an administrative agency has only such powers as are
expressly granted to it by law , it is likewise a settled rule that an
administrative agency has also such powers as are necessarily
implied in the exercise of its ex press powers. In the exercise,
therefore, of its express powers under its charter as a
regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution
cases in the Laguna Lake region, the authority of the LLDA
to issue a "cease and desist order" is, perforce, implied.
RICHARD HIZON vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 119619
December 13, 1996
FACTS:
Hizon et al. were charged with violating PD 704 for
supposedly fishing without the use of a poisonous substance
(sodium cyanide). A report that some fishing boats were fishing
by "muroami" led to the apprehension of such boat (F/B
Robinson), where Hizon et al were present. The police (PNP

Maritime Command and the Task Force BantayDagat) directed the

boat captain to get random samples of the fish from the fish cage
for testing. The initial results tested the fish positive for sodium
cyanide and that was the basis of the information against Hizon et
al. However, a second set of fish samples yielded a negative
result on the sodium cyanide.
Notwithstanding this, the RTC found Hizon et al. guilty and
sentenced them to imprisonment and forfeiture of the fishes. The
CA affirmed this decision. Hizon et al., together with the Solicitor
general now question the admissibility of the evidence against
petitioners in view of the warrantless search of the fishing boat
and the subsequent arrest of petitioners.
ISSUES:
Whether Hizon et al., are guilty of illegal fishing with the use
of poisonous substances.
RULING:
Hizon et al. were charged with illegal fishing penalized under
sections 33 and 38 of P.D. 704. These provisions create a
presumption of guilt for possession of explosives or poisonous
substances. However, this presumption is merely prima facie and
the accused has the right to present evidence to rebut this
presumption.
In this case, the only basis for the charge of fishing with
poisonous substance is the result of the first NBI laboratory test
on the four fish specimens. The apprehending officers who
boarded and searched the boat did not find any sodium cyanide
nor any poisonous or obnoxious substance. Neither did they find
any trace of the poison in the possession of the fishermen or in
the fish cage itself. Under the circumstances of the case, however,
this finding does not warrant the infallible conclusion that the
fishes in the F/B Robinson, or even the same four specimens, were
caught with the use of sodium cyanide.
HEIRS OF EMILIANO NAVARRO vs. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT & HEIRS OF SINFOROSO PASCUAL

G.R. No. 68166

October 13, 1997

FACTS:
On October 3, 1946, Sinforoso Pascual filed an application for
foreshore lease covering a tract of foreshore land in Sibocon,
Balanga, Bataan, having an area of approximately seventeen (17)
hectares. This application was denied on January 15, 1953. So
was his motion for reconsideration. Subsequently, petitioners'
predecessor-in-interest, also now deceased, Emiliano Navarro,
filed a fishpond application with the Bureau of Fisheries covering
twenty five (25) hectares of foreshore land also in Sibocon,
Balanga, Bataan. Initially the application was denied, eventually
however the grant was given. Pascual claimed that this land is an
accretion to his property, The Talisay River as well as the Bulacan
River flow downstream and meet at the Manila Bay thereby
depositing sand and silt on Pascual's property resulting in an
accretion thereon. Sinforoso Pascual claimed the accretion as the
riparian owner. On March 25, 1960, the Director of Lands,
represented by the Assistant Solicitor General, filed an opposition
thereto stating that neither Pascual nor his predecessors-ininterest possessed sufficient title to the subject property, the
same being a portion of the public domain and, therefore, it
belongs to the Republic of the Philippines. On November 10, 1975,
the courta quorendered judgment finding the subject property to
be foreshore land and, being a part of the public domain, it cannot
be the subject of land registration proceedings. On appeal, the
respondent court reversed the findings of the courta quoand
granted the petition for registration of the subject property but
excluding certain areas. A motion for reconsideration was filed by
in the CA but the same was denied. Anchoring their claim of
ownership on Article 457 of the Civil Code, petitioners vigorously
argue that the disputed 14-hectare land is an accretion caused by
the joint action of the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers which run their
course on the eastern and western boundaries, respectively, of
petitioners' own tract of land.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners can rightfully claim the land
under the principle of accretion

HELD:
The petitioners claim is misplaced. The principle of accretion
is only applicable to owners whose estates are adjacent to rivers
as stated in Article 457 of the Civil Code. The disputed land is an
accretion not on a river bank but on a sea bank, or on what used
to be the foreshore of Manila Bay which adjoined petitioners' own
tract of land on the northern side. As such, the applicable law is
not Article 457 of to Civil Code but Article 4 of the Spanish Law of
Waters of 1866. The disputed property is an accretion on a sea
bank, Manila Bay being an inlet or an arm of the sea; as such, the
disputed property is, under Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters
of 1866, part of the public domain. As part of the public domain,
the herein disputed land is intended for public uses, and "so long
as the land in litigation belongs to the national domain and is
reserved for public uses, it is not capable of being appropriated by
any private person, except through express authorization granted
in due form by a competent authority."Only the executive and
possibly the legislative departments have the right and the power
to make the declaration that the lands so gained by action of the
sea is no longer necessary for purposes of public utility or for the
cause of establishment of special industries or for coast guard
services.Petitioners utterly fail to show that either the executive
or legislative department has already declared the disputed land
as qualified, under Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866,
to be the property of petitioners as owners of the estates adjacent
thereto.
People of the Philippines versus Renerio P. Vergara,
Ernesto T. Cuesta Jr., Pedro G. Dagao and Bernardo P.
Cuesta,
G.R. No. 110286

FACTS:

April 2, 1997.

At about 7:30 in the morning of July 4, 1992, a team

consisting of deputized Fish Warden and President of the Leyte
Fish Warden Association Jesus P. Bindoy, Police Officers Casimiro
Villas and Diosdado Moron of the Palo PNP Station, Leyte, Fish
Wardens Mario Castillote and Estanislao Cabreros and Fish
Examiner Nestor Aldas of the Department of Agriculture were on
board, "Bantay-Dagat," a pumpboat, on "preventive patrol" along
the municipal waters fronting barangays Baras and Candahug of
Palo, Leyte, stumbled upon a blue-colored fishing boat at a
distance of approximately 200 meters away. On the said boat
were Renerio Vergara and his three co-accused Bernardo Cuesta,
Pedro Dagao and Ernesto Cuesta, Jr., They were on a parallel
course toward the general direction of Samar.
Momentarily, the team saw Vergara throw into the sea a bottle
known in the locality as "badil" containing ammonium nitrate and
having a blasting cap on top which, when ignited and thrown into
the water, could explode. The explosion would indiscriminately kill
schools and various species of fish within a certain radius.
Approximately three seconds after appellant had thrown the
"badil" into the sea, the explosion occurred. Vergara and Cuesta
then dove into the sea with their gear while Dagao and Cuesta, Jr.,
stayed on board to tend to the air hose for the divers.
The team approached the fishing boat. SPO2 Casimiro Villas
boarded the fishing boat while Fish Warden Jesus Bindoy held on
to one end of the boat. Moments later, Vergara and Cuesta
surfaced, each carrying a fishnet or "sibot" filled with about a kilo
of "bolinao" fish scooped from under the water. Having been
caught red-handed, the four accused were apprehended and
taken by the patrol team to the "Bantay-Dagat" station at Baras,
and later to the police station in Palo, Leyte. The fishing boat and
its paraphernalia, as well as the two fishnets of "bolinao," were
impounded. The accused, however, refused to sign and
acknowledge the corresponding receipts therefor.

On February 10, 1993, the trial court rendered judgment

convicting Vergara. Vergara then appealed to the CA.

ISSUE:
Whether the Court committed grave abuse of authority when
it completely ignored the testimony of Emilio Linde.

HELD:
No. Emilio Linde sought to corroborate the claim of appellant
that it was another unidentified group of fishermen who threw the
bottle of explosives at a school of "bolinao" fish. It was obvious,
however, said the trial court, that the statement of this defense
witness was incredulous since he apparently had not at all been
on board the fishing boat in the company of the accused at the
time of the incident. Even the rather lengthy counter-affidavit of
the four accused completely missed to mention Linde. The court a
quo went on to observe that the demeanor of the accused at the
witness stand and the substance of his testimony failed to elicit
belief.
Trial courts are tasked to initially rule on the credibility of
witnesses for both the prosecution and the defense. Appellate
courts seldom would subordinate, with their own, the findings of
trial courts which concededly have good vantage points in
assessing the credibility of those who take the witness
stand. Nevertheless, it is not all too uncommon for this Court, in
particular, to peruse through the transcript of proceedings in
order to satisfy itself that the records of a case do support the
conclusions of trial courts.The Court is convinced that the trial

court has acted correctly in finding accused-appellant guilty of the

offense charged.
LA BUGAL-B'LAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION, INC., VS. DENR
G.R. No. 127882
January 27, 2004
Facts:
On July 25, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 2796 authorizing the DENR Secretary
to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign-owned
corporations or foreign investors for contracts or agreements
involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale
exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, which, upon
appropriate recommendation of the Secretary, the President may
execute with the foreign proponent.
On March 3, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved R.A.
No. 7942 to "govern the exploration, development, utilization and
processing of all mineral resources." R.A. No. 7942 defines the
modes of mineral agreements for mining operations, outlines the
procedure for their filing and approval, assignment/transfer and
withdrawal, and fixes their terms. Similar provisions govern
financial or technical assistance agreements.
On April 9, 1995, 30 days following its publication on March 10,
1995 in Malaya and Manila Times, two newspapers of general
circulation, R.A. No. 7942 took effect. Shortly before the effectivity
of R.A. No. 7942, however, or on March 30, 1995, the President
entered into an FTAA with WMCP covering 99,387 hectares of land
in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North
Cotabato.
On August 15, 1995, then DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos issued
DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 95-23, s. 1995, otherwise
known as the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No.
7942. This was later repealed by DAO No. 96-40, s. 1996 which
was adopted on December 20, 1996.

On January 10, 1997, counsels for petitioners sent a letter to the

DENR Secretary demanding that the DENR stop the
implementation of R.A. No. 7942 and DAO No. 96-40, giving the
DENR fifteen days from receipt to act thereon. The DENR,
however, has yet to respond or act on petitioners' letter.
Petitioners claim that the DENR Secretary acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction.
They pray that the Court issue an order:
(a) Permanently enjoining respondents from acting on any
application for Financial or Technical Assistance Agreements;
(b) Declaring the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 or Republic Act No.
7942 as unconstitutional and null and void;
(c) Declaring the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the
Philippine Mining Act contained in DENR Administrative Order No.
96-40 and all other similar administrative issuances as
unconstitutional and null and void; and
(d) Cancelling the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement
issued to Western Mining Philippines, Inc. as unconstitutional,
illegal and null and void.
Issue:
Whether or not Republic Act No. 7942 is unconstitutional.
Ruling:
The Court finds the following provisions of R.A. No. 7942 to be
violative of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution and hereby
declares unconstitutional and void:
(1) The proviso in Section 3 (aq), which defines "qualified person,"
to wit:
Provided, That a legally organized foreign-owned corporation shall
be deemed a qualified person for purposes of granting an
exploration permit, financial or technical assistance agreement or
mineral processing permit.
(2) Section 23, which specifies the rights and obligations of an

exploration permittee, insofar as said section applies to a financial

or technical assistance agreement,
(3) Section 33, which prescribes the eligibility of a contractor in a
financial or technical assistance agreement;
(4) Section 35, which enumerates the terms and conditions for
every financial or technical assistance agreement;
(5) Section 39, which allows the contractor in a financial and
technical assistance agreement to convert the same into a
mineral production-sharing agreement;
(6) Section 56, which authorizes the issuance of a mineral
processing permit to a contractor in a financial and technical
assistance agreement;
The following provisions of the same Act are likewise void as they
are dependent on the foregoing provisions and cannot stand on
their own:
(1) Section 3 (g), which defines the term "contractor," insofar as it
applies to a financial or technical assistance agreement.
Section 34, which prescribes the maximum contract area in a
financial or technical assistance agreements;
Section 36, which allows negotiations for financial or technical
assistance agreements;
Section 37, which prescribes the procedure for filing and
evaluation of financial or technical assistance agreement
proposals;
Section 38, which limits the term of financial or technical
assistance agreements;
Section 40, which allows the assignment or transfer of financial or
technical assistance agreements;

Section 41, which allows the withdrawal of the contractor in an

FTAA;
The second and third paragraphs of Section 81, which provide for
the Government's share in a financial and technical assistance
agreement; and
Section 90, which provides for incentives to contractors in FTAAs
insofar as it applies to said contractors;
When the parts of the statute are so mutually dependent and
connected as conditions, considerations, inducements, or
compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the
legislature intended them as a whole, and that if all could not be
carried into effect, the legislature would not pass the residue
independently, then, if some parts are unconstitutional, all the
provisions which are thus dependent, conditional, or connected,
must fall with them.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
CRISOSTOMO VILLARIN and ANIANO LATAYADA Vs. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R No. 175289
August 31, 2011
FACTS:
Petitioner Aniano Latayada (Latayada) and three others namely,
Barangay Captain Sudaria of Tagpangi, CDO, Baillo and Boyatac,
were charged with violation of Section 68, P.D.No. 705 as
amended by Executive Order No. 277. City Prosecutor
recommended charging Villarin as well. The Version of the
Defense: In response to the clamor of the residents of Barangays
Tampangan, Pigsag-an,Tuburan and Taglinao, all in Cagayan De
Oro City, Villarin, decided to repair the impassable Batinay bridge.
The project was allegedly with the concurrence of the Barangay
Council. Pressured to immediately commence the needed repairs,
Villarin commissioned Boyatac to inquire from Sudaria about the
availability of timber without first informing the City Engineer.
Sudaria asked for the specifications which Villarin gave. Villarin

then asked Baillo and Boyatacto attend to the same. When the
timber was already available, it was transported from Tagpangi to
Batinay. However, the timber flitches were seized by the DENR
Strike Force Teamand taken to its office where they were received
by Vera Cruz, the security guard on duty. RTC found them guilty.
CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
WON mere possession of timber without criminal intent is
punishable.
HELD:
"There are two distinct and separate offenses punished under
Section 68 of P.D.No. 705, to wit:(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting
and removing timber or other forest products from any forest
land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from
private land without any authorization; and(2) Possession of
timber or other forest products without the legal documents
required under existing forest laws and regulations. "The
Information charged petitioners with the second offense which is
consummated by the mere possession of forest products without
the proper documents. As a special law, the nature of the offense
is malum prohibitum and as such, criminal intent is not an
essential element. "However, the prosecution must prove that
petitioners had the intent to possess (animus possidendi)" the
timber. "Possession, under the law, includes not only actual
possession, but also constructive possession. Actual possession
exists when the [object of the crime] is in the immediate physical
control of the accused. On the other hand, constructive
possession exists when the [object of the crime] is under the
dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to
exercise dominion and control over the place where it is found."
There is no dispute that petitioners were in constructive
possession of the timber without the requisite legal documents.
Villarin and Latayada were personally involved in its procurement,
delivery and storage without any license or permit issued by any
competent authority. Given these and considering that the offense
is malum prohibitum, petitioners contention that the possession

of the illegally cut timber was not for personal gain but for the
repair of said bridge is, therefore, inconsequential. Petition denied
OLYMPIO REVALDO Vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 170589
April 16, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioner was charged with the offense of illegal possession
of premium hardwood lumber in violation of Section 68 of the
Forestry Code. That on or about the 17th day of June 1992,
Revaldo, with intent of gain, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously possess 96.14 board ft. of flat lumber
with a total value of P1,730.52, Philippine Currency, without any
legal document as required under existing forest laws and
regulations from proper government authorities, to the damage
and prejudice of the government. Upon arraignment, petitioner,
assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued. The RTC
rendered judgment on 1997 convicting petitioner of the offense
charged, he appealed and the Court of Appeals ruled that motive
or intention is immaterial for the reason that mere possession of
the lumber without the legal documents gives rise to criminal
liability. Hence, this petition for certiorari. Petitioner contends that
the warrantless search and seizure conducted by the police
officers was illegal and thus the items seized should not have
been admitted in evidence against him. Petitioner argues that the
police officers were not armed with a search warrant when they
went to his house to verify the report that petitioner had in his
possession lumber without the corresponding license
ISSUE:
Whether or not the evidence obtained without search warrant is
admissible in court
HELD:
When the police officers arrived at the house of petitioner, the
lumber were lying around the vicinity of petitioners house. The
lumber were in plain view. Under the plain view doctrine, objects
falling in "plain view" of an officer who has a right to be in the
position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be
presented as evidence. When asked whether he had the

necessary permit to possess the lumber, petitioner failed to

produce one. Petitioner merely replied that the lumber in his
possession was intended for the repair of his house and for his
furniture shop. There was thus probable cause for the police
officers to confiscate the lumber. There was, therefore, no
necessity for a search warrant. Petitioner was in possession of the
lumber without the necessary documents when the police officers
accosted him. In open court, petitioner categorically admitted the
possession and ownership of the confiscated lumber as well as
the fact that he did not have any legal documents therefor and
that he merely intended to use the lumber for the repair of his
dilapidated house. Mere possession of forest products without the
proper documentation consummates the crime. Dura lex sed
lex. The law may be harsh but that is the law. Therefore, the
appealed decision convicting petitioner for violation of Section 68
(now Section 77) of the Forestry Code is affirmed.
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, ET.
AL., Vs. CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY, ET. AL.,
G.R. Nos. 171947-48
February 15, 2011
Facts:
January 29, 1999, concerned residents of Manila Bay filed a
complaint before the RTC Imus, Cavite against several
government agencies for the clean-up, rehabilitation and
protection of the Manila Bay/ The complaint alleged that the water
quality of Manila Bay is no longer within the allowable standards
set by law (esp. PD 1152, Philippine environment Code).
DENR testified for the petitioners and reported that the samples
collected from the beaches around Manila Bay is beyond the safe
level for bathing standard of the DENR. MWSS testified also about
MWSS efforts to reduce pollution along the bay. Philippine Ports
Authority presented as evidence its Memorandum Circulars on the
study on ship-generated waste treatment and disposal as its Linis
Dagat project.
RTC ordered petitioners to Clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay.

The petitioners appealed arguing that the Environment Code

relate only to the cleaning of the specific pollution incidents and
do not cover cleaning in general. Raising the concerns of lack of
funds appropriated for cleaning, and asserting that the cleaning of
the bay is not a ministerial act which can be compelled by
mandamus.
CA sustained the RTC stressing that RTC did not require the
agencies to do tasks outside of their usual basic functions.
Issue:
(1) Whether PD 1152 relate only to the cleaning of specific
pollution incidents.
(2) Whether the cleaning or rehabilitation of the Manila Bay is not
ministerial act of petitioners that can be compelled by
mandamus.
Held:
(1) The cleaning of the Manila bay can be compelled by
mandamus.
Petitioners obligation to perform their duties as defined by law,
on one hand, and how they are to carry out such duties, on the
other, are two different concepts. While the implementation of the
MMDAs mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process,
the enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law
exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and may be compelled
by mandamus.
The MMDAs duty in the area of solid waste disposal, as may be
noted, is set forth not only in the Environment Code (PD 1152)
and RA 9003, but in its charter as well. This duty of putting up a
proper waste disposal system cannot be characterized as
discretionary, for, as earlier stated; discretion presupposes the
power or right given by law to public functionaries to act officially
according to their judgment or conscience.
(2) Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code
Include Cleaning in General

The disputed sections are quoted as follows:

Section 17. Upgrading of Water Quality.Where the quality of
water has deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely
affect its best usage, the government agencies concerned shall
take such measures as may be necessary to upgrade the quality
of such water to meet the prescribed water quality standards.
Section 20. Clean-up Operations.It shall be the responsibility of
the polluter to contain, remove and clean-up water pollution
incidents at his own expense. In case of his failure to do so, the
government agencies concerned shall undertake containment,
removal and clean-up operations and expenses incurred in said
operations shall be charged against the persons and/or entities
responsible for such pollution.
Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the government agencies
concerned ought to confine themselves to the containment,
removal, and cleaning operations when a specific pollution
incident occurs. On the contrary, Sec. 17 requires them to act
even in the absence of a specific pollution incident, as long as
water quality has deteriorated to a degree where its state will
adversely affect its best usage. This section, to stress,
commands concerned government agencies, when appropriate,
to take such measures as may be necessary to meet the
prescribed water quality standards. In fine, the underlying duty
to upgrade the quality of water is not conditional on the
occurrence of any pollution incident.
Note:
- The writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a
ministerial duty. Ministerial duty is one that requires neither
official discretion nor judgment.
GREATER METROPOLITAN MANILA SOLID WASTE
MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE and the METRO MANILA
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. JANCOM ENVIRONMENTAL

CORPORATION and JANCOM INTERNATIONAL

DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS
G.R. No. 163663
June 30, 2006
FACTS:
President Fidel Ramos issued Presidential Memorandum
Order no. 202 creating an Executive Committee (EC) to oversee
and develop waste-to-energy projects for the waste disposal sites
in Rizal and Carmona under the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT)
scheme. Respondent Jancom International Development Projects
Pty. Limited of Australia was one of the bidders for the Rizal Site
which subsequently entered into a partnership with its corespondent Asea Brown Boveri under the firm name Jancom
Environmental Corporation (JANCOM). Consequently, EC declared
JANCOM as the sole complying bidder of the Rizal Waste Disposal
Site hence a Contract for the BOT implementation of the Solid
Waste Management Project for the Rizal Site was entered
between Greater Metropolitan Manila Solid Waste Management
Committee (GMMSWMC) and Metro Manila Development Authority
(MMDA), and JANCOM. The contract was submitted for approval to
President Ramos who subsequently endorsed it to then incoming
President Joseph E. Estrada. Owing to the clamor of the residents
of Rizal, the Estrada administration ordered the closure of the San
Mateo landfill. GMMSWMC thereupon adopted a Resolution not to
pursue the contract with JANCOM, citing as reasons therefore the
passage of Republic Act 8749, otherwise known as the Clean Air
Act of 1999, the non-availability of the San Mateo site, and costly
tipping fees.
JANCOM filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasig City to declare the GMMSWMC Resolution and the acts of
MMDA calling for the bids for and authorizing the forging of a new
contract for the Metro Manila waste management as illegal,
unconstitutional and void, and to enjoin them from implementing
the Resolution and making another award. The trial court ruled in
favor of JANCOM which was subsequently affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. The Supreme Court declared the contract valid and
perfected, albeit ineffective and unimplementable pending the
approval by the President.

JANCOM and MMDA later entered into negotiations to modify

certain provisions of the contract which were embodied in a draft
Amended Agreement which bore no signature of the parties.
JANCOM then filed before the Pasig City RTC an Omnibus Motion
for a writ of execution which upon its issuance, was challenged by
GMMSWMC and MMDA. The Court of Appeals however affirmed
the RTC Order.
ISSUE:
Whether or not contract is ineffective and unimplentable
until and unless it is approved by the President.
HELD:
The only question before the Court is whether or not there is
a valid and perfected contract between the parties. As to
necessity, expediency, and wisdom of the contract, these are
outside the realm of judicial adjudication. These considerations
are primarily and exclusively a matter for the President to decide.
While the Court recognizes that the garbage problem is a matter
of grave public concern, it can only declare that the contract in
question is a valid and perfected one between the parties, but the
same is still ineffective or unimplementable until and unless it is
approved by the President, the contract itself providing that such
approval by the President is necessary for its effectivity.
In issuing the alias writ of execution, the trial court in effect
ordered the enforcement of the contract despite this Courts
unequivocal pronouncement that albeit valid and perfected, the
contract shall become effective only upon approval by the
President.
HILARION M. HENARES, JR. vs. LAND TRANSPORTATION
FRANCHISINGAND REGULATORY BOARD and DEPARTMENT
OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS
G.R. No. 158290
October 23, 2006
FACTS:

Petitioners challenge this Court to issue a writ of mandamus

commanding respondents Land Transportation Franchising and
Regulatory Board (LTFRB) and the Department of Transportation
and Communications (DOTC) to require public utility vehicles
(PUVs) to use compressed natural gas (CNG) as alternative fuel.
ISSUES:
(1) Do petitioners have legal personality to bring this petition
before us?
(2) Should mandamus issue against respondents to compel
PUVs to use CNG as alternative fuel?
HELD:
(1) YES. There is no dispute that petitioners have standing to
bring their case before this Court. Moreover, as held previously, a
party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality
which may, in the exercise of the Court's discretion, be set aside
in view of the importance of the issue raised. We brush aside this
issue of technicality under the principle of the transcendental
importance to the public, especially so if these cases demand that
they be settled promptly.
(2) NO. plain, speedy and adequate remedy herein sought by
petitioners, i.e., a writ of mandamus commanding the
respondents to require PUVs to use CNG, is unavailing. Mandamus
is available only to compel the doing of an act specifically
enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there is no law that mandates the
respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to order owners of motor
vehicles to use CNG. Mandamus will not generally lie from one
branch of government to a coordinate branch, for the obvious
reason that neither is inferior to the other.
It appears that more properly, the legislature should provide
first the specific statutory remedy to the complex environmental
problems bared by herein petitioners before any judicial recourse
by mandamus is taken.

AZUCENA SALALIMA VS. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION

COMM. AND SOC. SEC. SYSTEM
G.R. NO.-146360

MAY 20, 2004

FACTS:
Petitioners husband Juancho Saldima was employed for
twenty nine years as a route helper and salesman for the
Meycauayan Plant of Coca Cola Bottlers Philippines Inc. during the
annual company medical examination, Juancho was diagnosed
with pulmonary tuberculosis. Later found him to have cancer of
the lungs and died after few months. Azucena, the wife of Juancho
is now claiming for the benefits of her husband from the company
and the SSS. RTC dismissed the case. CA affirmed and this
petition was therefore filed.

ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner is entitled to benefits provided by P.D.
626

HELD:
The Supreme Court answered in the affirmative. Because the
facts of the case showed that the cause of Juanchos death was
his mere work and that his medical history states that his stay at

Coca cola is a contributory to his sickness. SSS was ordered to

pay the claimant and the RTCs and CAs decisions were reversed
and set aside.

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ vs. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY

G.R. No. 164527
August 15, 2007
FACTS:
On August 5, 2004, former Solicitor General Francisco
Chavez, filed an instant petition raising constitutional issues on
the JVA entered by National Housing Authority and R-II Builders,
Inc.
On March 1, 1988, then-President Cory Aquino issued
Memorandum order No. (MO) 161 approving and directing
implementation
of
the
Comprehensive
and
Integrated
Metropolitan Manila Waste Management Plan. During this time,
Smokey Mountain, a wasteland in Tondo, Manila, are being made
residence of many Filipinos living in a subhuman state.
As presented in MO 161, NHA prepared feasibility studies to
turn the dumpsite into low-cost housing project, thus, Smokey
Mountain Development and Reclamation Project (SMDRP), came
into place. RA 6957 (Build-Operate-Transfer Law) was passed on
July 1990 declaring the importance of private sectors as
contractors in government projects.
Thereafter, Aquino
proclaimed MO 415 applying RA 6957 to SMDRP, among others.
The same MO also established EXECOM and TECHCOM in the
execution and evaluation of the plan, respectively, to be assisted
by the Public Estates Authority (PEA).
Notices of public bidding to become NHAs venture partner
for SMDRP were published in newspapers in 1992, from which R-II
Builders, Inc. (RBI) won the bidding process. Then-President
Ramos authorized NHA to enter into a Joint Venture Agreement
with RBI.

Under the JVA, the project involves the clearing of Smokey

Mountain for eventual development into a low cost housing
complex and industrial/commercial site. RBI is expected to fully
finance the development of Smokey Mountain and reclaim 40
hectares of the land at the Manila Bay Area. The latter together
with the commercial area to be built on Smokey Mountain will be
owned by RBI as enabling components. If the project is revoked
or terminated by the Government through no fault of RBI or by
mutual agreement, the Government shall compensate RBI for its
actual expenses incurred in the Project plus a reasonable rate of
return not exceeding that stated in the feasibility study and in the
contract as of the date of such revocation, cancellation, or
termination on a schedule to be agreed upon by both parties.
To summarize, the SMDRP shall consist of Phase I and Phase
II. Phase I of the project involves clearing, levelling-off the
dumpsite, and construction of temporary housing units for the
current residents on the cleared and levelled site. Phase II
involves the construction of a fenced incineration area for the onsite disposal of the garbage at the dumpsite.
Due to the recommendations done by the DENR after
evaluations done, the JVA was amended and restated (now ARJVA)
to accommodate the design changes and additional work to be
done to successfully implement the project. The original 3,500
units of temporary housing were decreased to 2,992. The
reclaimed land as enabling component was increased from 40
hectares to 79 hectares, which was supported by the issuance of
Proclamation No. 465 by President Ramos. The revision also
provided for the 119-hectare land as an enabling component for
Phase II of the project.
Subsequently, the Clean Air Act was passed by the
legislature which made the establishment of an incinerator illegal,
making the off-site dumpsite at Smokey Mountain necessary. On
August 1, 1998, the project was suspended, to be later
reconstituted by President Estrada in MO No. 33.

On August 27, 2003, the NHA and RBI executed a

Memorandum of Agreement whereby both parties agreed to
terminate the JVA and subsequent agreements. During this time,
NHA reported that 34 temporary housing structures and 21
permanent housing structures had been turned over by RBI.
ISSUES:
1.
Whether respondents NHA and RBI have been granted the
power and authority to reclaim lands of the public domain as
this power is vested exclusively in PEA as claimed by petitioner.
2.
Whether respondents NHA and RBI were given the power
and authority by DENR to reclaim foreshore and submerged
lands.
3.
Whether respondent RBI can acquire reclaimed foreshore
and submerged lands considered as alienable and outside the
commerce of man.
4.
Whether respondent RBI can acquire reclaimed lands when
there was no declaration that said lands are no longer needed
for public use.
5.
Whether there is a law authorizing sale of reclaimed lands.
6.
Whether the transfer of reclaimed lands to RBI was done by
public bidding.
7.
Whether RBI, being a private corporation, is barred by the
Constitution to acquire lands of public domain.
8.
Whether respondents can be compelled to disclose all
information related to the SMDRP.
9.
Whether the operative fact doctrine applies to the instant
position.
HELD:
1.
Executive Order 525 reads that the PEA shall be primarily
responsible for integrating, directing, and coordinating all
reclamation projects for and on behalf of the National
Government. This does not mean that it shall be responsible
for all. The requisites for a valid and legal reclamation project
are approval by the President (which were provided for by
MOs), favourable recommendation of PEA (which were seen as
a part of its recommendations to the EXECOM), and undertaken
either by PEA or entity under contract of PEA or by the National

2.

3.
4.

5.
6.

7.

Government Agency (NHA is a government agency whose

authority to reclaim lands under consultation with PEA is
derived under PD 727 and RA 7279).
Notwithstanding the need for DENR permission, the DENR is
deemed to have granted the authority to reclaim in the Smokey
Mountain Project for the DENR is one of the members of the
EXECOM which provides reviews for the project. ECCs and
Special Patent Orders were given by the DENR which are
exercises of its power of supervision over the project.
Furthermore, it was the President via the abovementioned MOs
that originally authorized the reclamation. It must be noted
that the reclamation of lands of public domain is reposed first
in the Philippine President.
The reclaimed lands were classified alienable and disposable
via MO 415 issued by President Aquino and Proclamation Nos.
39 and 465 by President Ramos.
Despite not having an explicit declaration, the lands have
been deemed to be no longer needed for public use as stated
in Proclamation No. 39 that these are to be disposed to
qualified beneficiaries. Furthermore, these lands have already
been necessarily reclassified as alienable and disposable lands
under the BOT law.
Letter I of Sec. 6 of PD 757 clearly states that the NHA can
acquire property rights and interests and encumber or
otherwise dispose of them as it may deem appropriate.
There is no doubt that respondent NHA conducted a public
bidding of the right to become its joint venture partner in the
Smokey Mountain Project. It was noted that notices were
published in national newspapers. The bidding proper was
done by the Bids and Awards Committee on May 18, 1992.
RA 6957 as amended by RA 7718 explicitly states that a
contractor can be paid a portion as percentage of the
reclaimed land subject to the constitutional requirement that
only Filipino citizens or corporation with at least 60% Filipino
equity can acquire the same. In addition, when the lands were
transferred to the NHA, these were considered Patrimonial
lands of the state, by which it has the power to sell the same to
any qualified person.

8.

This relief must be granted. It is the right of the Filipino

people to information on matters of public concerned as stated
in Article II, Sec. 28, and Article III, Sec. 7 of the 1987
Constitution.
9.
When the petitioner filed the case, the JVA had already been
terminated by virtue of MOA between RBI and NHA. The
properties and rights in question after the passage of around
10 years from the start of the projects implementation cannot
be disturbed or questioned. The petitioner, being the Solicitor
General at the time SMDRP was formulated, had ample
opportunity to question the said project, but did not do so. The
moment to challenge has passed.