SAYSON vs.

COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios, and Teodoro.
Eleno died on November 10, 1952, and Rafaela on May 15, 1976. Teodoro, who had married Isabel
Bautista, died on March 23, 1972. His wife dies nine years later, on March 26, 1981. Their properties were
left in the possession of Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel, all surnamed Sayson, who claim to be their children.
On April 25, 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios, together with Juana Bautista, Isabel's mother,
filed a complaint for partition and accounting of the estate of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson. The action was
resisted by Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel Sayson, who alleged successional rights to the disputed estate as
the decedent's lawful descendants. On July 11, 1983, Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel filed their own
complaint, this time for the accounting and partition of the intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela Sayson,
against the couple's four surviving children. The complainants asserted the defense that Delia and
Edmundo were the adopted children and Doribel was the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel. As
such, they were entitled to inherit Teodoro's share in his parents' estate by right of representation.
ISSUE:
collaterally.

Whether the challenge to the validity of the adoption of Delia and Edmundo can be made

RULING:
No.
A no less important argument against the petitioners is that their challenge to the validity of the adoption
cannot be made collaterally, as in their action for partition, but in a direct proceeding frontally addressing
the issue. The settled rule is that a finding that the requisite jurisdictional facts exists, whether erroneous
or not, cannot be questioned in a collateral proceeding, for a presumption arises in such cases where the
validity of the judgment is thus attacked that the necessary jurisdictional facts were proven.
In the case of Santos vs. Aranzano, this court declared - "Anent this point, the rulings are summed up in 2
American Jurisprudence, 2nd Series, Adoption, Sec. 75, p. 922, thus: An adoption order implies the finding
of the necessary facts and the burden of proof is on the party attacking it; it cannot be considered void
merely because the fact needed to show statutory compliance is obscure. While a judicial determination of
some particular fact, such as the abandonment of his next of kin to the adoption, may be essential to the
exercise of jurisdiction to enter the order of adoption, this does not make it essential to the jurisdictional
validity of the decree that the fact be determined upon proper evidence, or necessarily in accordance with
the truth; a mere error cannot affect the jurisdiction, and the determination must stand until reversed on
appeal, and hence cannot be collaterally attacked. If this were not the rule, the status of adopted children
would always be uncertain, since the evidence might not be the same at all investigations, and might be
regarded with different effect by different tribunals, and the adoption might be held by one court to have
been valid, while another court would hold it to have been of no avail."
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------TAMARGO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
On October 20, 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air
rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death. Accordingly, a civil complaint for damages was filed with
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Vigan, Ilocos Sur, by petitioner Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's adopting
parent, and petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer's natural parents, against respondent
spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adeberto's natural parents with whom he was living at the time of the
tragic incident. In addition to this case for damages, a criminal information for Homicide through Reckless
Imprudence was filed against Adelberto. Adelberto, however, was acquitted and exempted from criminal
liability on the ground that he had acted without discernment.
Prior to the incident, or on December 10, 1981, the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had filed a petition
to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc before the then Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur. This petition for
adoption was granted on November 18, 1982, that is, after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer.

In their Answer, respondent spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents, reciting the result of the
foregoing petition for adoption, claimed that not they, but rather the adopting parents, namely the spouses
Sabas and Felisa Rapisura, were indispensable parties to the action since parental authority had shifted to
the adopting parents from the moment the successful petition for adoption was filed.
Petitioners in their Reply contended that since Adelberto Bundoc was then actually living with his natural
parents, parental authority had not ceased nor been relinquished by the mere filing and granting of a
petition for adoption.
ISSUE:
Whether the effects of adoption as regards parental authority may be given retroactive
effect as to make the adopting parents the indispensable parties in a case for damages filed against the
adopted child for acts committed by the latter when actual custody was yet lodged with the natural
parents.
RULING:
No.
We do not believe that parental authority is properly regarded as having been retroactively transferred and
vested in the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, at the time the air rifle shooting happened. We do
not consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability upon
the adopting parents accruing at a time when the adopting parents had no actual or physical custody over
the adopted child. Retroactive effect may perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for adoption
where such is essential to permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child. In
the instant case, however, to hold that parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura
spouses so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act that they could not have foreseen and which
they could not have prevented (since they were at the time in the United States and had no physical
custody over the child Alberto) would be unfair and unconscionable. Such a result, moreover, would be
inconsistent with the philosophical and policy basis underlying the doctrine of vicarious liability. Put a little
differently, no presumption of parental dereliction on the part of the adopting parents, the Rapisura
spouses, could have arisen since Adelberto was not in fact subject to their control at the time the tort was
committed.
Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code fortifies the conclusion reached above. Article 35 provides
as follows: "Art. 35. Trial Custody - No petition for adoption shall be finally granted unless and until the
adopting parents are given by the courts a supervised trial custody period of at least six months to assess
their adjustment and emotional readiness for the legal union. During the period of trial custody, parental
authority shall be vested in the adopting parents." Under the said article, parental authority is provisionally
vested in the adopting parents during the period of the trial custody, i.e., before the issuance of a decree
of adoption, precisely because the adopting parents are given actual custody of the child during such trial
period. In the instant case, the trial custody period either had not yet begun or had already been
completed at the time of the air rifle shooting; in any case, actual custody of Adelberto was then with his
natural parents, not the adopting parents.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------SANTOS, JR. vs. REPUBLIC
FACTS:
Spouses Luis Santos, Jr. and Edipolo Santos filed the petition for adoption before the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court on January 8, 1963, praying that the minor Edwin Villa y Mendoza, 4 years old, be declared
their son by adoption. Evidence was presented that the order setting the case for hearing has been duly
published. There having no opposition registered to the petition, the petitioners were permitted to adduce
their evidence.
It was established that the petitioners are both 32 years of age, Filipinos, residing in the City of Manila.
They were married in 1957 and have maintained a conjugal home of their own. They do not have a child of
their own blood. Neither spouse has any legitimate, legitimated, illegitimate, acknowledged natural child,
or natural child by legal fiction, nor has any one of them been convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude. Edwin Villa y Mendoza, 4 years old, is a child of Francisco Villa and Florencia Mendoza who are
the common parents of the petitioner-wife Edipola Villa Santos and the minor. Luis Santos, Jr. is a lawyer,

with business interests in a textile development enterprise and the IBA electric plant, and is the general
manager of Medry, Inc. and the secretary-treasurer of Bearen Enterprises. His income is approximately
P600.00 a month. His co-petitioner wife is a nurse by profession, with an average monthly earning of about
P300.00.
It was also shown that Edwin Villa y Mendoza was born on May 22, 1958. He was a sickly child since birth.
Due to the child's impairing health, his parents entrusted him to the petitioners who reared and brought
him up for the years thereafter, and as a result, there developed between the petitioners and the child, a
deep and profound love for each other. The natural parents of the minor testified that they have voluntarily
given their consent to the adoption of their son by the petitioners, and submitted their written consent and
conformity to the adoption, and that they fully understand the legal consequences of the adoption of their
child by the petitioners.
ISSUE:

Whether an elder sister may adopt a younger brother.

RULING:
Yes.
Article 335of the Civil Code enumerates those persons who may not adopt, and it has been shown that
petitioners are not among those prohibited from adopting. Article 339 of the same code names those who
cannot be adopted, and the minor child whose adoption is under consideration is not one of those
excluded by the law. Article 338, on the other hand, allows the adoption of a natural child by the natural
father or mother, of other illegitimate children by their father or mother, and of a step-child by the stepfather or step-mother. This last article is, of course, necessary to remove all doubts that adoption is not
prohibited even in these cases where there already exist a relationship of parent and child between them
by nature. To say that adoption should not be allowed when the adopter and the adopted are related to
each other, except in these cases enumerated in Article 338 is to preclude the adoption among relatives
no matter how far removed or in whatever degree that relationship might be, which in our opinion is not
the policy of the law. The interest and welfare of the child to be adopted should be of paramount
consideration. Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, and designed to provide homes, care and
education for unfortunate children, should be construed so as to encourage the adoption of such children
by person who can properly rear and educate them.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA
FACTS:
On August 31, 2000, Honorato Catindig, petitioner, filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child
Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein, among others, that Stephanie was born on June 26,
1994; that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has been using her mother's middle name
and surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that
Stephanie's middle name "Astorga" be changed to "Garcia," her mother's surname, and that her surname
"Garcia" be changed to "Catindig," his surname.
On March 23, 2001, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision granting the adoption. On April 20, 2001,
petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration praying that Stephanie should be allowed
to use the surname of her natural mother (Garcia) as her middle name. On May 28, 2001, the trial court
denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an
adopted child to use the surname of her biological mother as her middle name.
ISSUE:
Whether an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name when
she is subsequently adopted by her natural father.
RULING:
Yes.
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed a legitimate child of the adopter for all intents
and purposes pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code and Section 17, Article V of RA 8552.

Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights
provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the
surname of her father and her mother. This is consistent with the intention of the members of the Civil
Code and Family Law Committee. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the mother
should immediately precede the surname of the father.
It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, humane and salutary, should be liberally construed to carry out
the beneficent purposes of adoption. The interests and welfare of the adopted child are of primary and
paramount consideration, hence, every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfil
these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.
Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie,
to use, as her middle name her mother's surname, we find no reason why she should not be allowed to do
so.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P. LIM AND MICHAEL JUDE P. LIM
FACTS:
Petitioner Monina P. Lim is an optometrist by profession. On June 23, 1974, she married Primo Lim. They
were childless. Minor children, whose parents were unknown, were entrusted to them by a certain Lucia
Ayuban. Being so eager to have a child of their own, petitioner and Lim registered the children to make it
appear that they were the children's parents. The children were named Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude P.
Lim. The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their own. They sent the children to
exclusive schools. They used the surname "Lim" in all their school records and documents. Unfortunately,
on November 238, 1998, Lim died. On December 27, 2000, petitioner married Angel Olario, an American
citizen.
Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given under RA 8552 to
those individuals who simulated the birth of a child. Thus, on April 24, 2002, petitioner filed separate
petitions for the adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court. At the time of the filing of the
petitions for adoption, Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while Michael was 18 years and 7
months old. Michelle and her husband gave their consent to the adoption as evidenced by their Affidavits
of Consent. Michael also gave his consent to his adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent. Petitioner's
husband Olario likewise executed an Affidavit of Consent for the adoption of Michelle and Michael.
On September 15, 2004, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the petitions. The trial court ruled
that since petitioner had remarried, petitioner should have filed the petition jointly with her new husband.
The trial court ruled that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory citing Section 7 (c),
Article III of RA 8552 and Article 185 of the Family Code. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
decision but the motion was denied. Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE:

Whether petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt.

RULING:
No.
Section 7, Article III of RA 8552 provides:
xxx
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided, however, That the
other spouse has
signified his/her consent thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.

In case the husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of
the other, joint parental
authority shall be exercised by the spouses.
The use of the word "shall" in the provision means that joint adoption by the husband and wife is
mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child which is the
ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to
require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses.
The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having remarried at the time the petitions for
adoption were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the petitions were filed only by petitioner herself, without
joining her husband Olario, the trial court was correct in denying the petitions for adoption on this ground.