MANGILA vs.

CA
Facts:

Petitioner Anita Mangila is an

exporter of seafoods with an outlet in
Guam.
Respondent is Manager and President
of Air Sift internatioanl, a freight
service.
Petitioner contracted the services of
respondent.
Petitioner failed to pay respondent for
three shipment
Despite several demands petitioner
never paid respondent, thus prompted
the latter to file for collection of sum
of money.
August 1, 1988, Sheriff filed his
return showing that summons was not
served
on
petitioner,
because
petitioners transfered residence and
later on was found out that Petitioner
had left the Philippines for Guam.
Respondent filed a motion for WPA,
for petitioners departure was done
with intent to defraud creditors.
Sept 26, 1988, court issued an order
of WPA. It was served on petitioners
help at Pampanga.
Petitioner filed an urgent motion to
discharge attachment. Pointing out
that she had not been served a copy of
the complaint and summon. The court
she said had not acquired jurisdiction
over her person.
Jan 26, 1989, summons was served on
petitioner.
Issue:
WON Trial court had acquired jurisdiction
over the person of the petitioner and is the
service of the writ valid.
Held:

Invalid, did not acquire jurisdiction.

when the sheriff or other proper
officer commences implementation of
the writ of attachment, it is essential
that he serve on the defendant not
only a copy of the applicants affidavit
and attachment bond, and of the order
of attachment, as explicitly required
by Section 5 of Rule 57, but also
the summons addressed
to
said
defendant as well as a copy of the
complaint.
the grant of the provisional remedy of
attachment involves three stages: first,
the court issues the order granting the
application; second, the writ of
attachment issues pursuant to the
order granting the writ; and third, the
writ is implemented. For the initial
two stages, it is not necessary that
jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant
be
first
obtained. However, once
the
implementation
of
the
writ
commences, the court must have
acquired jurisdiction over the
defendant
for
without
such
jurisdiction, the court has no power
and authority to act in any manner
against the defendant. Any order
issuing from the Court will not bind
the defendant.
In the instant case, the Writ of
Preliminary Attachment was issued
on September 27, 1988 and
implemented
on
October
28,
1988. However, the alias summons
was served only on January 26, 1989
or almost three months after the
implementation of the writ of
attachment.
on the day the writ was implemented,
the trial court should have, previously
or
simultaneously
with
the

implementation of the writ, acquired

jurisdiction over the petitioner. Yet, as
was shown in the records of the case,
the summons was actually served on
petitioner several months after the
writ had been implemented.
on the day the writ was implemented,
the trial court should have, previously
or
simultaneously
with
the
implementation of the writ, acquired
jurisdiction over the petitioner.
Yet, as was shown in the records of
the case, the summons was actually
served on petitioner several months
after the writ had been implemented.

CARLOS vs. SANDOVAL

(walay mas taas pa na case ani te? Lol)
Facts:
Carlos asserted that he was the sole
surviving compulsory heir of his
parents, Felix and Felipa, who
acquired 6 parcels of land during their
marriage.
His brother, Teofilo (Teofilo), died
intestate in 1992.
At the time of his death, Teofilo was
apparently married to Sandoval, and

cohabiting with her and their child,

respondent Teofilo II.
Nonetheless, Carlos alleged in
his Complaint that
Teofilo
and
Sandoval were not validly married as
they had not obtained any marriage
license.
Furthermore, Carlos also asserted that
Teofilo II could not be considered as
Teofilos child.
As a result, Carlos concluded that he
was also the sole heir of his brother
Teofilo, since the latter had died
without leaving any heirs.
Carlos also claimed that Teofilo, prior
to their father Felixs death in 1963,
developed a scheme to save the elder
Carloss estate from inheritance taxes.
Under the scheme, the properties of
the father would be transferred to
Teofilo who would, in turn, see to it
that the shares of the legal heirs are
protected and delivered to them.
Felix assented to the plan. and the
subject properties were transferred in
the name of Teofilo.
After Teofilos death, Carlos entered
into certain agreements with Sandoval
in connection with the subject
properties. Carlos did so, believing
that the latter was the lawful wife of
his brother Teofilo. Subsequently
though, Carlos discovered that
Sandoval and his brother were never
validly married, as their marriage was
contracted without a marriage license.
Carlos now sought to nullify these
agreements with Sandoval for want of
consideration, the premise for these
contracts being non-existent.
Carlos likewise prayed for the
issuance of the provisional relief of
preliminary attachment.
The RTC issued an Order dated 7
September 1995 granting the prayer
for preliminary attachment.

 Shortly thereafter, a Notice of

Garnishment was served upon the
Philippine National Bank (PNB) over
the deposit accounts maintained by
respondents.
Respondents filed an Urgent Motion
to Discharge the Writ of Attachment.
The Court of Appeals found that there
was no sufficient cause of action to
warrant the preliminary attachment,
since Carlos had merely alleged
general averments in order to support
his prayer.
Carlos argues that the Court of
Appeals, through the Former Special
Fourth Division, could not have
resolved the Motion for Judgment on
the Attachment Bond since the case
had not yet been re-raffled under the
two-raffle system for study and
report; that the Court of Appeals erred
in resolving the motion without
conducting any hearing.
Issue:
whether the Court of Appeals properly
complied with the hearing requirement
under Section 20, Rule 57 prior to its
judgment on the attachment bond.
Held:
Yes
The core questions though lie in the
proper interpretation of the condition
under Section 20, Rule 57 that reads:
Such damages may be awarded only
after proper hearing and shall be
included in the judgment on the main
case. Petitioners assert that there was
no proper hearing on the application
for damages and that the Court of
Appeals had wrongfully acted on the
application in that it resolved it prior
to the rendition of the main judgment.

Section 20 of Rule 57 requires that

there be a proper hearing before the
application for damages on the
attachment bond may be granted.
The hearing requirement ties with the
indispensable demand of procedural
due process. Due notice to the adverse
party and its surety setting forth the
facts supporting the applicant's right
to damages and the amount thereof
under the bond is essential. No
judgment for damages may be entered
and executed against the surety
without giving it an opportunity to be
heard as to the reality or
reasonableness of the damages
resulting from the wrongful issuance
of the writ.
In this case, both Carlos and
SIDDCOR were duly notified by the
appellate court of the Motion for
Judgment
on
the
Attachment
Bond and were required to file their
respective
comments
thereto.
[41]
Carlos and SIDDCOR filed their
respective comments in opposition to
private respondents motion.
Clearly, all the relevant parties had
been afforded the bare right to be
heard on the matter.
We rule that the demands of a proper
hearing were satisfied as of the time
the Court of Appeals rendered
assailed judgment on the attachment
bond.
The due process guarantee has been
satisfied in this case.

FILINVEST CREDIT CORP vs.

RELOVA and SALAZAR

Facts:
FILINVEST filed a complaint against
Rallye Motor Co and Salazar for
collection of sum of money with
damages and WPA.
Salazar executed a promissory note in
favor of Rallye in payment of a motor
vehicle.
To secure the note Salazar executed in
favor of Rallye a deed of chattel
mortgage.
Rallye for valuable consideration
assigned all its rights, title and interest
to FILINVEST.
FILINVEST came to know that
Rallye had not delivered the motor
vehicle to Salazar.
Salazar defaulted in complying with
the terms and conditions of the
aforesaid promissory note and chattel
mortgage.
Rallye
also refused to
pay
FILINVEST
despite
repeated
demands.
According to FILINVEST, the
defendants intentionally, fraudulently
and with malice concealed from it the
fact that there was no vehicle
delivered under the documents
negotiated and assigned to it,
otherwise, it would not have accepted
the negotiation and assignment of the
rights and interest covered by the
promissory note and chattel mortgage.
They are praying for a WPA.
More than a year later, defendant
Salazar prayed that the writ of
preliminary attachment issued ex
parte and implemented solely against
his property be recalled and/or
quashed.

He argued that when he signed the

promissory note and chattel mortgage
on May 5, 1977 in favor of RALLYE,
FILINVEST was hot vet his creditor
or obligee, therefore, he could not be
said to have committed fraud when he
contracted the obligation on May 5,
1977. Salazar added that as the motor
vehicle which was the object of the
chattel
mortgage
and
the
consideration for the promissory note
had admittedly not been delivered to
him by RALLYE, his repudiation of
the loan and mortgage is more
justifiable.
Ernesto Salazar, on his part
complained that he was himself
defrauded, because while he signed a
promissory note and chattel mortgage
over the motor vehicle which he
bought from Rallye Motor, Rallye
Motor did not deliver to him the
personal property he bought; that the
address and existence of Rallye Motor
can no longer be found.
Issue:
WON the court erred in finding that there
was no fraud on the part of Salazar,
despite evidence in abundance to show the
fraud perpetuated by Salazar at the very
inception of the contract.
Held:
We do not agree. Considering the
claim of respondent Salazar that
Rallye Motors did not deliver the
motor vehicle to him, it follows that
the Invoice, Exhibit "C", for the
motor vehicle and the Receipt,
Exhibit "G", for its delivery and both
signed by Salazar, Exhibits "C-1 " and
"G-1", were fictitious.

 It also follows that the Promissory

Note, Exhibit "A", to pay the price of
the undelivered vehicle was without
consideration and therefore fake; the
Chattel Mortgage, Exhibit "B", over
the non-existent vehicle was likewise
a fraud; the registration of the vehicle
in the name of Salazar was a falsity
and the assignment of the promissory
note by RALLYE with the conforme
of respondent Salazar in favor of
petitioner over the undelivered motor
vehicle was fraudulent and a
falsification.
Respondent Salazar, knowing that no
motor vehicle was delivered to him by
RALLYE, executed and committed all
the above acts as shown the exhibits
enumerated above.
He agreed and consented to the
assignment by RALLYE of the
fictitious promissory note and the
fraudulent chattel mortgage, affixing
his signature thereto, in favor of
petitioner FILINVEST who, in the
ordinary course of business, relied on
the regularity and validity of the
transaction.
We rule that the failure of respondent
Salazar to disclose the material fact of
non-delivery of the motor vehicle,
there being a duty on his part to reveal
them, constitutes fraud.