Case No 1.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 120898-99. May 14, 1998]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALFONSO BAUTISTA, accused-appellant.

DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
In a joint decision, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 48, of Urdaneta, Pangasinan rendered two
verdicts of conviction in Criminal Cases Nos. U-8191 and U-8192, finding accused-appellant Alfonso
Bautista, alias Poldo, guilty of the charge of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition and of the
complex crime of murder with frustrated murder and attempted murder, respectively. Appellant insists
in this present appellate review that the trial court should not have granted affirmative weight to the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses Ferdinand Datario and Rolando Nagsagaray as the bases for his
conviction, considering that, inter alia, after they alledgedly caught a glimpse of appellant at the scene
of the crime, they broke their silence about his supposed participation only after more than sixteen
months and under dubious circumstances.
The initiatory criminal information in Criminal Case No. U-8191 was lodged on June 13, 1994 with
Branch 48 of the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, [1] while that in Criminal Case No. U-
8192, dated June 16, 1994, was assigned to Branch 49 of said court. On motion of the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor, these cases were subsequently consolidated and assigned to Branch 48 for trial.
[2]
Appellant was indicted for the commission of the aforestated crimes, as follows:

Criminal Case No. U-8191

That on or about the 18th day of May, 1992, at Barangay Dilan, municipality of Pozorrubio, province of
Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully feloniously have in his possession, control and custody one (1)
long firearm of unknown caliber or make, without authority of law, and which he used in shooting
Barangay Captain Eduardo Datario, Bernabe Bayona and Cinderella Estrella [3]

Criminal Case No. U-8192

That on or about the 18th day of May, 1992, at Barangay Dilan, municipality of Pozorrubio, province of
Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
with intent to kill and with treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack and
sho(o)t on(e) Eduardo Datario hitting the latters face with the bullet exiting through his neck, which
wound caused his death, and further hitting the ear of Bernabe Bayona and bullet exiting through his
mouth, which wound would have caused the death of said Bernabe Bayona had it not been for the
timely medical assistance rendered to him, and the bullet finally hitting (the) right leg of Cinderella
Estrella, (through) which wound accused commenced the commission of the crime of Murder directly
by overt act but did not produce it by reason of some cause other than his spontaneous resistance, all
to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the deceased and the two other victims [4] (Corrections
Supplied).
At the arraignment of appellant on November 10, 1994 wherein he was duly assisted by counsel,
negative pleas to the charges were entered for him pursuant to his indication in open court. [5] Pre-trial
having been waived by appellant, trial proceeded thereafter with the presentation of several
prosecution witnesses, particularly the alleged eyewitnesses Ferdinand Datario and Rolando
Nagsagaray on whose testimonies the court below principally anchored its judgement of conviction. On
the other hand, appellant himself appeared in his defense, and one Norma Reyes, a neighbor, partly
corroborated this assertions.
 Professedly convinced by the evidence for the prosecution, the trial court found appellant guilty as
charged and imposed on him the penalty of life imprisonment, with costs, in Criminal Case No. U-
8191. In Criminal Case No. U-8192, appellant was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay civil indemnity of P50,000.00 actual damages in the sum of P20,000.00, and the
prescribed costs.[6]
According to the evidence of the prosecution, [7] Eduardo Datario, Barangay Captain of Dilan in
Pozorrubio, Pangasinan, was fatally shot by an assassin on the night of May 18 1992 at around ten o
clock. At the time of the treacherous assault, the victim was watching the sideshows of
their barangay fiesta which were being held within the school campus of the Dilan Elementary
School. Ferdinand Datario, younger brother of the deceased, recounted that when he arrived and took
his place beside his brother at the school premises, the latter was with Rolando Nagsagaray, Bernabe
Bayona and Cinderella Estrella, among others, watching a sideshow game.
Shortly thereafter, a gun report caused the people around to scamper in different directions. In
the few seconds prior to the ensuing melee, the deceased slumped to the ground with a gunshot
wound in the area of his chin which proved to be lethal. Bernabe Bayona and Cinderella Estrella, who
were beside the victim, were likewise hit apparently by the same bullet in succession, but they
fortunately survived. Bayona sustained only a wound on the left ear followed by a grazing wound on
his left upper lip, and the bullet thereafter lodge in the left thigh of Estrella.
The same prosecution eyewitness recalled that as soon as the long gun shot rang out, he
instinctively turned toward its source, and it was at the point that he saw the assailant, at an
approximate distance of ten meters, holding a long firearm aimed towards their group. That assailant,
according to this witness, was herein appellant who was then on the other side of a concrete fence
which was more than five feet high. The witness then turned his attention to his brother and with the
help of other persons, they brought him to a hospital where the victim expired. [8] Rolando Nagsagaray,
the other key prosecution eyewitness, testified along the same lines. He likewise claimed to have seen
appellant standing at the other side of the concrete fence and holding a long firearm. [9] Both of them
admittedly did not call the attention of the people around them or those near the fence to the fact of
the presence of appellant, either for his identification or apprehension.
Appellant, a farm helper and resident of Lipit, Manaoag, Pangasinan, vehemently denied any
involvement in the shooting incident. He asserted in court that he never knew personally the victims
and, although he himself could not specifically recall where he was at the time of the killing on May 18,
1992, his neighbor, Norma Reyes, testified that he was then at their house as a guest at the birthday
celebration of her husband.Appellant also recalled that when he was arrested in September, 1993 in
San Fabian, Pangasinan, reportedly in connection with another case, he was actually waiting for one
Francisco Periamil at the latters house to collect payment of his tobacco produce. However, Periamil
instead arrived with two law enforcers who promptly arrested appellant. He was then brought to
Lingayen, Pangasinan where he was detained and it was there where he was tortured and forced to
admit participation in some unsolved killings, one of which was the murder of Eduardo Datario. [10] It
was also at the time of his arrest that the two prosecution eyewitnesses, Ferdinand Datario and
Rolando Nagsagaray, came out into the open to announce what they allegedly witnessed on the night
of May 18, 1992.[11]
Appellant faults the trial court for its unwarranted acceptance of the version of prosecution. He
argues that the very long delay, which took all of sixteen months, on the part of Ferdinand Datario and
Rolando Nagsagaray in reporting to the authorities what they allegedly saw has definitely placed the
stamp of doubt, if not incredibility, on their testimonies. On top of that, there are inherent
improbabilities and inconsistencies in their declarations in court and which, according to appellant, are
factors obviously corrosive of the prosecutions cause. With the facts in this hypothesis, the Court is
inclined to agree. For, while it is true that the matter of assigning values and weight to the testimonies
of witnesses is at best the province of the trial court, it is equally the province of appellate courts to
disregard factual findings of the former where certain facts of substance have been plainly overlooked
and misappreciated by the said lower courts. [12]
In the case at bar, the aforesaid two eyewitnesses both averred that they feared for their lives,
hence they kept silent for sixteen months. It was only after appellant had been apprehended and had
allegedly owned up to the killing of the victim that they decided to speak and execute sworn affidavits
on the matter. The trouble with their posturing is that they had all the opportunity to pinpoint appellant
as the malefactor without having to necessarily place their lives, or of those of their families, in
danger. Thus, as pointedly noted by the defense, both these witnesses could very well have revealed
what they supposedly knew to the town mayor who took a hand in the investigation of the case, or any
of the police investigators or the barangay officials, some of whom in fact were their personal friends,
but they did not. An anonymous tip to these authorities would also have been a convinient and
effective course of action.
Witness these admission in the testimony of Ferdinand Datario:
Q When was the first time that you reveal(ed) the identity of the accused Alfonso Bautista to the
authorities or did you reveal to anybody the identity of the person who shot your brother
Eduardo Dat(a)rio?
A Only to my father, sir.
Q And when did you tell your father that it was Alfonso Bautista who shot your brother Eduardo
Datario?
A On the fourth day after the incident, sir.
COURT
Q Why did you not tell your father immediately that Alfonso Bautista shot your brother?
A Because my father might get shock(ed), Maam.
Q Why did you not reveal immediately that Alfonso Bautista was the one who shot your brother?
A We were afraid because Alfonso Bautista usually roams around, Maam.
Q When did the police go to your house?
A Before we brought home my brother, it was the 19 th of May, the day after my brother died, Maam.
xxxxxxxxx
Q When the policeman went to your house on May 19, 1992, you have not seen Alfonso Bautista
yet and yet did not tell the police that Alfonso Bautista was the one who shot your brother?
A Yes, Maam.
Q Why?
A We were afraid to tell, Maam.[13]
xxxxxxxxx
Q You never made any attempt to report what you saw who killed your brother on May 18, 1992?
A No, sir.
Q Now, do you know the Mayor of Pozorrubio at that time in 1992?
A Yes, sir.
Q Considering the fact that you are a barangay captains brother you are very close to him, am I
right?
A Yes, sir.
Q In spite of that, you never attempt(ed) even to whisper to him what you allegedly saw on May 18,
1992?
A No, sir.
Q Now, at that time, 1992, do you personally know any policeman in the municipality of Pozorrubio?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who were they, could you please inform us?
A Investigator Balelo, Pat. Fernandez, sir.
 Q You were very close to these policemen, am I right?
A Yes, sir.
Q And in spite of that you never attempted even to whisper to them that it was Alfonso Bautista
alias Poldo who allegedly shot your brother?
A I did not, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Q Who called you at the police headquarters at Lingayen, Pangasinan?
A SPO 1 Jaime Fernandez went to our house, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Q Now, what did SPO1 Jaime Fernandez tell you when he went to your house and convinced you to
give your sworn statement?
A He told us to go to the police headquarters, sir?
Q Did you ask him why they were calling you at the headquarters?
A Yes, sir.
Q And what was his reason?
A He told us that the one who shot the barangay captain was already arrested, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Q And what did you do when SPO1 Fernandez told you that Alfonso Bautista admitted that he was
the one who allegedly killed your brother?
A That is why we filed a case on behalf of my deceased brother, sir.
Q So that was the only evidence you relied on when you filed this complaint only 1993?
A Yes, sir.[14] (Italics and corrections in parentheses ours).
The veritable cock-and-bull account of witness Rolando Nagsagaray, which was obviously
patterned after and to corroborate that Ferdinand Datario, was even worse. Thus:
Q At the time the gunwielder shot Eduardo Datario, you already knew him?
A Yes, Maam.
Q So, what is the name?
A Alfonso Bautista, Maam.
xxxxxxxxx
Q Now, at what time did you go home after delivering the late Barangay Captain Datario a the
Sacred Heart Hospital?
A 1:00 oclock in the morning because he died at 1:00 oclock, sir.
Q Were you alone when you went home at that time?
A There were two (2) of us, sir.
Q Who is your companion?
A Reynaldo Datario, the brother of Eduardo Datario, Maam.
Q You never informed Reynaldo Datario of what you allegedly saw that night?
A No, sir.
COURT
 Q Why did you not inform Reynaldo Datario of what you allegedly saw?
A Because I was then afraid, Maam.
Q Reynaldo Datario is the brother of Eduardo?
A Yes, Maam.
Q Now, could you please inform this Honorable Court what was the physical condition or situation of
Reynaldo Datarion when you went home.
A He cried, sir.
Q And am I right to say that while he was crying he was crying for justice for his brother at that
time?
A Yes, sir.
Q And in spite of that you never informed him of what you saw that night?
A No, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Q You do not know any baranggay official at that time?
A Napoleon Sales, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Q How far is the house of Napoleon Sales to your house?
A Around 100 meters, sir.
Q Did you inform Napoleon Sales what you saw at that particular night?
A No, sir.
Q Do you know of any policeman stationed at Pozorrubio, Pangasinan?
A Yes, sir.
Q Could you please tell us the name of the policeman?
A Balelo, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Q You were very close to him, am I right?
A Yes, sir.
Q In spite of that, you never informed him of what you saw on that particular night?
A No, Maam.
Q Who is the incumbent Mayor at that time in Pozorrubio?
A Manuel Venezuela, sir.
Q You know him very well, am I right?
A Yes, sir.
Q And in spite of that, you never informed him, whispered to him, of what you know that night?
A No, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Q Do you have any parent?
 A Yes, sir.
Q You were living with them that particular time.
A Yes, sir.
Q And did you ever tell them of what you allegedly saw on that particular night?
A No, sir.[15]
Ferdinand Datario even saw appellant passing near their house during the victims wake but he
never bothered to sound the alarm, so to speak. This is an inconceivable reaction on his part,
considering that there was at that time sufficient manpower in the person of fourteen male relatives
and friends then in attendance who could have physically overpowered appellant and placed him in
the custody of the law.[16] More perplexing is the fact that while the witness is an aggrieved
consaguineous brother of the victim, yet he inexplicably remained tight-lipped over his avowed
knowledge of the identity of his own brothers killer. His behavior is certainly unnatural for one who had
just lost a sibling under the circumstances in this case, despite the opportunities under which he could
have relayed what he now alleges to have known all along which, if true, could secure retributive
justice for his brother.
The rule is ordinarily to the effect that delay by a witness in divulging what he or she knows about
the commission of a crime, such as the identity of the offender, is not by itself a setback to the
evidentiary value of such a witness testimony. [17] The courts, however, have been quick to deny
evidentiary weight where such delay is not sufficiently justified by any acceptable explanation.
For instance, well-founded fear of reprisal, or the unpredictable manner by which individuals react
when confronted by a gruesome event as to place the viewer in a state of shock for sometime, have
been considered as permissible situations resulting in delay. [18] Invariably, however, even under the
foregoing circumstances the delay must not be undue in point of time. Thus, failure to reveal what one
had witnessed about a crime for a number of days, or weeks, or even a number of months, is
allowable. But, that will not hold true where, as in the case now being reviewed, the delay had
unreasonably stretched all too far out into a year and four months, especially in the absence of any
compelling or rational basis for such self-imposed and lengthy silence.
In similar situations, the pronouncements of this Court have laid down guidelines applying
foursquare to the instant case. The holding in People vs. Cunanan, et al.[19] was emphatic that

The natural reaction of one who witnesses a crime is to reveal it to the authorities, unless, of course,
he is the author thereof. It defies credulity that no one or two but five such witnesses made no effort to
expose Cunanan if they really knew that he was the author thereof. This stultified silence casts grave
doubts as to their veracity.

In the end, we have here a specified case where evidence of identification is thoroughly
unreliable. Reason: No valid explanation was given why the Peoples witnesses did not report the
identity of appellant Cunanan to the authorities during a long period of time.
Thereafter, People vs. Cruz[20] reiterated that ruling and trenchantly stresses as follows:

2. It took forty-two (42) days after the incident for Modesto Alipio to come out and give his sworn
statement, Exhibit B, to the Philippine Constabulary narrating therein what he saw on the occasion. x x
x Failure on the part of Alipio to report to the authorities immediately a very essential detail in the
solution of the crime engenders a suspicion that he was not altogether candid and truthful in his
testimony. At any rate, the long delay, which is not caused by threat, intimidation or coercion by herein
appellant or anybody for that matter, in reporting the matter to the authorities the mayor, barangay
captain, police or the Philippine Constabulary, by one who himself was once an army man has
rendered the evidence for the prosecution insufficient to establish appellants guilty connection to the
requisite of moral certainty. x x x.
More recently, People vs. Gonzales, et al.[21] gave another instructive illustration, to wit:

Additionally, Huntorias credibility as a witness is likewise tarnished by the fact the he only came out to
testify in October 1981, or eight long months since he allegedly saw the killing on February 21,
1981. While ordinarily the failure of a witness to report at once to the police authorities the crime he
had witnessed should not be taken against him and should not affect his credibility, here, the
unreasonable delay in Huntorias coming out engenders doubt on his veracity. If the silence of an
alleged witness for several weeks renders his credibility doubtful, the more it should be for one who
was mute for eight months. Further, Huntorias long delay in revealing what he allegedly witnessed has
not been satisfactorily explained. His lame excuse that he feared his life would be endangered is too
pat to be believed. There is no showing that he was threatened by the accused or by anybody. x x x.
Even then, by themselves, the testimonies of these two prosecution witnesses are replete with
material inconsistencies and incongruities. Thus, to cite just a few, Ferdinand Datario narrated that he
in fact divulged to his father, Bernardino Datario, the identity of his brothers assailant four days after
the incident.[22] He claims that he deferred that revelation in order not to shock his father, but he does
not explain why the death of the victim would not shock his father, but the identity of the killer
would. Contrarily, Bernardino Datario, declared that he came to know about appellants participation in
the crime from Ferdinand on the very same night that Eduardo was killed but that he (the father)
likewise opted for silence allegedly on account of fear at the time. [23]
Rolando Nagsagaray, on his part, asserted in court that after shooting the deceased, appellant
then merely walked away from the concrete fence with rifle in hand. [24] Now, said witness could have
spoken the truth since the height of the fence was about a foot more than appellants admitted height,
hence the witness could not have really seen appellant walking away from the crime scene. [25] Besides,
it sounds somewhat absurd that if appellant had to quickly duck behind the fence immediately after
firing the single shot in order to avoid recognition, he would then nonchalantly walk away although
there were many people on both sides of the fence who would recognized him. His bringing a rifle
would also naturally attract attention.
Ferdinand Datario also admitted, and this is not disputed by the parties, that between the
concrete fence and the place where their groups was then watching the sideshow, there were people
milling around the structures erected for other sideshows, which collectively obstructed his view.
[26]
Although the other prosecution eye witness, Rolando Nagsagaray, hedged on the effect of such
obstructions to their vantage location, there are considerations hereafter explained showing the
correctness of Ferdinand Datarios testimony. Actually, the prosecution does not seriously question the
existence of those structures being used by the other sideshows.
There likewise in Nagsagarays version an evident taint of falsity. If he is to be believed, within the
swift span of a few seconds after hearing the gun report, he first glanced at his watch and thus recalled
that it was 10:30 in the evening when it happened; that in the process he also saw the victims Eduardo
Datario, Bernabe Bayona and Cinderella Estrella fall one after the other; that, at the same time, he
observed the frightened crowd running away in different directions, although he could not name any of
them; and on top of all these, he still managed to further obtain an excellent view of appellant behind
the concrete fence.[27] This exaggerated narration of the facts simultaneously taking place is certainly
beyond human experience. No person could have had the capacity to see all these events taking place
during those fleeting seconds, considering the rapidity of their occurrence as this witness himself
represents.
There are also a number of unexplained or inexplicable facts that enshroud the testimonies of
these witnesses in uncertainty and doubt. As ordered by the lower court, an ocular inspection of the
premises was conducted by its branch clerk of court, designated as commissioner therefor, and the
salient findings are as follows:

1. The height of the fence is 1.7 meters and the distance between the fence and the center of the
basketball court is 12 meters.

2. The distance between the center of the basketball court and the place where the victim fell down is
18 meters.

3. Between the basketball court and the fence are two full-grown acacia trees and one star-apple tree
very close to the fence. Immediately behind the fence is a house with two mango trees nearby. [28]
What these physical features of the crime scene reveal is that, although the place was illuminated
for the barangay feria, the presence of the big trees naturally cast shadows on wide portions thereof,
especially along parts of the concrete fence. There was no specification made by the two alleged
eyewitnesses of the particular portion of the fence where they supposedly saw appellant, except by
way of a vague general direction in relation to their own variant position, such as, to the left or right of
some of them. It cannot, therefore, be said that appellant was so clearly exposed as to be easily visible
to the so-called eye-witnesses.
At the trial, it was ascertained that appellant was 5 feet 4 inches in height, [29] obviously lower than
the height of the fence. Yet, witness Nagsagaray described appellants presence at the fence in various
position, such as holding the gun at breast level, [30] or putting down the gun and then walking towards
the east,[31] despite the fact that he was obscured by the shadows and the view was blocked by the
fence. An attempt was made to show the appellant must have been standing on top of a water
container behind the fence so he could aim his gun above it, but the records are barren of competent
evidence showing whether those containers really there that night, or who placed them there, and on
which portion along the fence they were located. In fine, we are presented with a situational problem
created by a surmise founded upon a conjecture.
The prosecution belittles appellants supposed alibi since it is easy of fabrication and is always
viewed with suspicion. However, the prosecutions own evidence which supposedly identifies appellant
as the malefactor falls far short of the requisite quantum of evidence, as earlier explained, not to
speak of the absence of any firearm presented in this court nor satisfactory evidence of appellants
possession thereof. While the defense of alibi must stand searching scrutiny, it acquires commensurate
strength where no proper and positive identification has been made. [32] The identity of the offender,
like the crime itself, must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. [33] After all, as a paramount element for
conviction, the prosecutions evidence must stand on its own merits and cannot draw strength from the
weakness of the defense.[34]
Strictly speaking, however, when viewed from another angle with a little more perception, it does
not appear that appellant really resorted to alibi. As conventionally understood, this exculpation is
invoked by an accused who represents, often with proffered corroboration, that at the time the offense
was committed he was elsewhere at a specific place, hence he could not have participated therein. In
the instant case, the peculiarity is that the appellant steadfastly denied being at the scene of the crime
but candidly admitted that he could not remember or did not know whether at the time of the killing he
was then in his tobacco field in Barangay Macayog, San Jacinto since he did not even know about the
crime in question.[35] Withal, he could remember the dates of other events where he personally
participated, such as when he was arrested, when he was detained in San Fabian, and when he
brought to Lingayen.
It is of general knowledge that in rural areas where farmers live a humdrum working existence,
and where the quotidian routine of every day is just like the last, one cannot expect them or even their
families to keep diaries or records which would enable them to honestly state where they were on
particular dates, unless there was an important reason therefor. Thus, it appeals more to common
sense and realistic truth that the innocent answer of appellant reflects more honesty than that of one
who could easily fix his definite whereabouts just to subserve his defense of alibi. The latter practice is
much a matter of judicial experience and repudiation.
It is also noteworthy that no motive was ever attributed to appellant as to why he should kill the
deceased or shoot the other victims since the evidence shows beyond cavil that he did not even know
any of them personally or had any previous association or dealings with them. The rule is that proof of
motive is unnecessary to impute a crime to the accused if the evidence concerning his identification is
convincing. A converso, if the evidence of identification is unclear, then the jurisprudential doctrine is
that proof of motive is a paramount necessity. [36]
At the trial, the witness from the Philippine National Police harped on the fact that, after his arrest
for another alleged crime, herein appellant was linked to a number of long unsolved killings in the
region, including the present case. This was an unfair proposition, such that the defense was forced to
rejoin that appellant was actually being made a scapegoat in order to camouflage official
incompetence by going through the motions of wiping clean the slate of unsolved crimes through the
expedient of indicting appellant for all of them. A sober note is interjected by the Solicitor General who
points out that those other cases should not be taken up here for being immaterial. Indeed, entangling
those other charges with the one at bar would run afoul of the second branch of the rule of res inter
alios acta[37] since, even taken altogether, they could not constitute an exception thereto.
ACCORDINGLY, on reasonable doubt irresistibly created by the foregoing premises, the
consolidated judgments of the court a quo in Criminal Cases Nos. U-8191 and U-8192 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.Accused-appellant Alfonso Bautista is hereby ACQUITTED of the present
charges against him and, unless otherwise detained for some other lawful cause, his release from
confinement is consequently directed. Cost de officio.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Puno, Mendoza, and Martinez, JJ., concur.

[1] Original Record, Criminal Case No. U-8191, 2.

[2] Ibid., Criminal Case No. U-8192, 77-78.
[3] Ibid., Criminal Case No. U-8191, 2.
[4] Ibid, Criminal Case No. U-8192, 1.
[5] Ibid., id., 85.
[6] Rollo, 38-39; per decision dated May 23, 1995 by Presiding Judge Alicia B. Gonzales-Decano.
[7] TSN, December 8, 1994, 6-11; December 12, 1994, 2-9.
[8] Ibid., id., 7-10.
[9] Ibid., December 8, 1994, 11-12.
[10] Ibid., February 28, 1995, 2-15.
[11] Original Record, Criminal Case No. U-8192, 12, 15; Exhibits D, D-1, E and E-1.
[12] People vs. Vallador, et al., G.R. No. 116071, June 20, 1996, 257 SCRA 515; People vs. Malazarte,
G.R. No. 108719, September 6, 1996, 261 SCRA 482.
[13] TSN, December 12, 1994, 11-12.
[14] Ibid., id., 20-25.
[15] TSN, December 28, 1994, 12-15.
[16] Ibid., id., 29.
[17] People vs. Alcantara, et al., G.R. Nos. 112858-59, March 6, 1996, 254 SCRA 384; People vs. Garcia,
G.R. No. 118824, July 5, 1996, 258 SCRA 411.
[18] People vs. Reoveros, G.R. No. 115987, August 23, 1995, 247 SCRA 628; People vs. Navales, Jr. et
al., G.R. No. 112977, January 23, 1997; People vs. Padao, G.R. No. 104400, January 28, 1997.
[19] G.R. No. L-17599, April 24, 1967, 19 SCRA 769. It was in this case that Sanchez, J., made this
observation, now often quoted in criminal adjudications: This calls to our mind what Alfonso El
Sabio was reputed to have said a long time ago: Mas vale que queden sin castigar diez reos
presuntos, que se castigue uno inocente.
[20] G.R. No. 60098, April 30, 1984, 129 SCRA 156
[21] G.R. No. 80762, March 19, 1996, 183 SCRA 309, citing People vs. Delavin, G.R. Nos. 73762-63,
February 27, 1987, 148 SCRA 257; People vs. Tulagan et al., G.R. No. 68620, July 22, 1986, 143
SCRA 107.
[22] TSN, December 12, 1994, 11.
[23] Original Record, Criminal Case No. U-8192, 11.
[24] TSN, December 8, 1994, 12.
[25] Ibid. id., 18; Exhibit W.
[26] Ibid., December 12, 1994, 25-26.
[27] Ibid., December 28, 1994, 6-7, 10-11.
[28] Original Record, Criminal Case No. U-8191, 136.
[29] TSN, December 12, 1994, 8, 20.
[30] Ibid., December 8, 1994, 9.
[31] Ibid., id., 11-12.
[32] People vs. Ola, G.R. No. L-47147, July 3, 1987, 152 SCRA 1.
[33] People vs. Clores, et al., G.R. No. 61408, October 12, 1983, 125 SCRA 67.
[34] People vs. Obar, Jr., G.R. No. 105688, February 7, 1996, 253 SCRA 288.
[35] TSN, February 28, 1995, 8.
[36] People vs. Agustin, G.R. No. 114681, July 18, 1995, 246 SCRA 673.
[37] Section 34, Rule 130, which provides that evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at
one time is not admissible to prove that did or did not do the same or similar thing at another
time.

Case no 2.
EN BANC

[G.R. No. 31049. November 29, 1929.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JUSTO A. PONFERRADA, ET

AL., Defendants. VIRGILIO NAVAL, Appellant.

M. H. de Joya, for Appellant.

Attorney-General Jaranilla, for Appellee.

SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENT; REGISTER OF ATTORNEYS. The Register of
Attorneys officially kept by the clerk of the Supreme Court and in which is inscribed the name of each
attorney admitted to the practice of law, with a statement of the fact that he had taken the oath,
signed the entry, and was inscribed as an attorney, is an official document, and the private person who
falsifies as entry in said register is amenable to the prescribed in article 301 of the Penal Code.

2. EVIDENCE; JUDICIAL NOTICE; EXTENSION OF ZONE OF JURISDICTION OF MANILA COURTS. It is

competent for a judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila to take judicial notice of the fact that San
Juan Heights is a suburb of the City of Manila and that an offense committed therein is located within
the zone over which the Court of First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction concurrent with that of the
contiguous province.

DECISION

STREET, J.:

This case has been brought upon appeal to the Supreme Court for the purpose of reversing a judgment
of the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila, finding the appellant, Virgilio Naval, guilty of the
offense of falsification of a public and official document and sentencing him to undergo imprisonment
for five years, four months and twenty-one days, prision correccional, with the accessory penalties
prescribed by law, and requiring him to pay a fine of 1,500 pesetas, with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, and to pay one- third the costs of prosecution. In the information which is the basis
of this prosecution Justo A. Ponferrada and Albino Candelaria were joined as codefendants, but the
case against the appellant was separately tried.
It appears that Justo A. Ponferrada, originally one of the coaccused in this case, graduated for the
Escuela de Derecho in 1923, after which he successively took the bar examinations for four times
without success. As the rules of the court permit a candidate to take the examinations four times only
the last examinations taken by Ponferrada in the year 1927 marked the end of his legitimate efforts to
be admitted to the practice of law. In this last examination his general average was 61 per cent, which
is 14 points below the 75 per cent required for a candidate to pass the examinations. After the results
of this examination has become known near the middle of December 1927, Ponferrada came into
contact with the appellant, Virgilio Naval, then the private secretary of one of the Justices of this court;
and in an interview that took place at No. 153 Legarda Street, in the City of Manila, where Ponferrada
lodged, the matter of securing a revision of Ponferradas grades, with the assistance of Naval, was
discussed. The next day Ponferrada was informed by Naval that the latter could fix the matter up
provided he should be paid the sum of one thousand pesos as his fees. This demand Naval
subsequently reduced to nine hundred pesos; and on three different occasions subsequent to this
Ponferrada paid to Naval three different sums of money amounting to nine hundred pesos.

In the course of the next two or three months Naval had frequent interviews with Ponferrada, and one
Segovia, who lives in the house with Ponferrada and needed the same sort of assistance, regarding the
expected revision of their examination papers. Upon one of these days, Naval called Ponferrada up by
telephone and informed him that favorable action had been taken by the Supreme Court on
Ponferradas motion for revision; and on or about February 16, 17, 1928, the appellant, accompanied
by Albino Candelaria, delivered to Ponferrada a copy off a purported resolution of the Supreme Court,
admitting Ponferrada and Segovia, as well as one Enage, who was also a failed candidate and like wise
an applicant for the revision of his papers, to the practice of law in the Philippine Islands. It may be
stated here that Albino Candelaria, as employee in the office of the clerk, was charged with the duty of
making out notices of the resolutions of the court. About the middle of March the appellant,
accompanied by the same Candelaria, again called upon Ponferrada and delivered him a formal
diploma, or certificate, which purported to have been issued by the court to authenticate Ponferradas
admission to the bar.

The two steps above-mentioned having been accomplished there further remained one thing to be
done, to give to the three candidates mentioned the appearance of legal and complete admission to
the bar. This remaining requisite was to get their names on the Roll of Attorneys, which is a register
kept by the Supreme Court as the final record of admission of candidates for the practice of law. This
Roll, or Register, is a large book kept by legal authority in the clerks office containing separate entries
signed by the candidates whose names are inscribed and authenticated by the signature of a deputy
clerk. The entries in this book (Exhibit D) are made in Spanish in the following
form:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Queda inscrito como abogado el Sr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., de . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .,

habiendo prestado el juramento prevenido y firmado este asiento con el Escribano Delegado que
certifica.

"Manila, I. F., hoy dia . . . . . . . . . del mes de . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . de 19. . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

"(Firma del Abogado)

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

"(Firma de Escribano Delegado)"

At the time with which we are here concerned the aforesaid Register was kept in the clerks office a
few feet from the desk of Albino Candelaria, in charge of one Bienvenido Mapa, also an employee in
the clerks office. In order to accomplish the enrollment of the three failed aspirants to who reference
has been made, naval induced one of the janitors of the Court, Getulio Bola by name, to remove the
Register from its place of repose in the clerks office and to deliver it without to Candelaria and the
appellant. With this book in their possession Naval and Candelaria embarked in an automobile one
evening in March and proceeded to No. 153 Legarda Street, where they found Ponferrada, Segovia, and
Enage, awaiting them. Upon arriving they invited these three to embark in the automobile, and the
party proceeded to drive to the bridge over the San Juan River, which constitutes, for some distance,
the eastern or the northeastern boundary of the City of Manila. Crossing this bridge, they drove
through the populous part of San Juan until they came to a vacant area in the place known as San Juan
Heights. Here Candelaria and the three aspirants for the degree of lawyer disembarked from the
automobile; and Candelaria drew from under the seat the big book, constituting the Register of
Attorneys. As it was then dark, Candelaria took the book to the rear of the car, and supported it upon
the tire-carrier in such position that the tail-light of the car made the pages of the open book visible.
Thereupon each of the candidates in turn approached and signed his name in the two places indicated
in the form for the name of the attorney.

The entry where the name of Ponferrada was thus inscribed bears the number 3061 in the Register, an
this entry had been previously filled out with the name of one Rafael Jose. This candidate had already
been regularly admitted to the bar as a result of his success in the same examinations of 1927, and in
order to prepare the entry for the reception of Ponferradas name, the name of Rafael Jose has been
effectively, but rather crudely, erased in the two places where it had been written. Segovia and Enage
likewise signed over erasures made in entries bearing the numbers 3126 and 3077 respectively. This
work having been accomplished, the party returned to the City of Manila.

The appellant, Virgilio Naval, denies participation in the acts above narrated; and the principal
contention raised by this appeal is based upon the supposed insufficiency of the evidence to justify
conviction. In this connection it is insisted that Ponferrada was a principal in the crime and that a
conviction cannot be lawfully based upon his uncorroborated testimony. It is undeniably true that the
testimony of an accomplice, using the word in the sense of co-author, is not entitled to the weight to
which the testimony of a truthful and disinterested witness is entitled. But this rule of law has relation
to the weight rather than to the legal admissibility of this sort of proof; and, in the case before us, the
testimony of Ponferrada is not only credible in itself but it is supported, in its implications against the
appellant, by circumstances which is our opinion demonstrate the truth of the witnesss statements
beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellant admits having received nine hundred pesos from
Ponferrada, and although he pretends, that he received this money from his coaccused Candelaria, in
ignorance of the criminal purpose for which this money was paid, this pretense seems to use to be
manifestly false. There is another incident which also points to the conclusion that the appellant
participated in the offense which is the subject of this prosecution with guilty knowledge and in the
manner narrated in the testimony of Ponferrada. Thus, it appears that, after the investigation of these
offenses was begun and the janitor, Getulio Bola, had been examined, with a view to the discovery of
what he might know, the accused appeared on the morning of September 26, 1928, in the apartment
of the Supreme court Building where Bola was found and requested Bola to retract what he had
declared, promising to furnish him with a lawyer in case he should be prosecuted for perjury and
agreeing to provide Bolas family with all their needs if Bola should be sent to jail. This conversation
was overheard by a detective who was so placed that he could hear what passed between Bola and
the appellant in this conversation. The statements then made by the appellant indicate his guilty
connection with the offense which was being investigated; for it he had been innocent he would not
have been driven to the resort of tampering with one of the witnesses for the prosecution. The
circumstances above alluded to supply in our opinion all the corroboration that is necessary to justify
the court in accepting the narrative of the witness Ponferrada as supplying in the main a true account
of the act of falsification which was undeniably committed.

In addition to the contention made over the sufficiency of the proof, the appeal presents two questions
of law which should be mentioned. The first question is whether the Roll, or Register of Attorneys is a
public or official document and whether the appellant can be convicted of participation in the
falsification thereof, under article 301 of the Penal Code. Upon this point we are at the opinion that the
official character of the document falsified in this case is not open to doubt. In the case of People v.
Bella Bautista (53 Phil., 158), a conviction was sustained by this court based upon a charge of the
falsification of the same document; and although the point now mentioned was passed sub silentio in
the decision of that case, no doubt was entertained by any member of this court that the document
referred to was of an official character. The Register of Attorneys is a final repository of the resolutions
of this court, and like any other written act or record of the court is an official document under Section
299 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Also, under section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the clerk of
the Supreme Court is required to keep such a roll as that now under consideration, to be signed by
each person receiving license to practice the profession of law. Inscriptions like No. 3061 are not mere
certificated of merit as contended for the appellant. They show that the lawyers whose names are
signed thereto have taken the required oath to practice law and that the entry is signed by the person
whose name appears therein.

The second question of law discussed in the appellants brief has relation to the territorial jurisdiction
of the Court of First Instance of Manila over the offense. In this connection we noted that the Court of
First Instance of Manila is by law given jurisdiction, concurrent with the courts of the contiguous
provinces, over crimes committed within a zone having a width of two and one-half miles from the
limits of the city. In the case before us it appears that the offense of falsification of entry No. 3061 in
the Register of Attorneys was committed in San Juan Heights; and we are of the opinion that the trial
judge could take judicial notice of the fact that the suburb of Manila known as San Juan Height is
located within the aforesaid zone. (U.S. v. Chua Mo, 23 Phil., 233.)

The offense committed in this case falls under article 301 of the Penal Code, and in view of the
aggravating circumstance that the appellant availed himself in the commission of this offense of his
official position as employee of the Supreme Court, no error was committed in placing the penalty of
imprisonment in the maximum degree of the penalty specified in said article.

The judgment appealed from will therefore be affirmed, and it is so ordered, with costs against
the Appellant.

Avancea, C.J., Johnson, Malcolm, Ostrand, Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur.

Case no. 3

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-31051 November 29, 1929

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
SALVADOR SEGOVIA, ET AL., defendants.
VIRGILIO NAVAL, appellant.

M.H. de Joya for appellant.

Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.

STREET, J.:

This appeal has been brought to reverse a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila,
finding the appellant, Virgilio Naval, guilty of the offense of falsification of a public and official
document and sentencing him to undergo imprisonment for five years, four months and twenty-one
days, prision correccional, with the accessory penalties prescribed by law, requiring him to pay a fine
of 1,500 pesetas, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay one third the costs of
prosecution.

This appeal is identical in all essential features with the case of People vs. Ponferrada (p. 68, ante), in
which the same appellant was convicted of the offense of falsification of a public and official document
in procuring the name of Justo A. Ponferrada to be written over the erasures of the name of Rafael Jose
in two places in entry No. 3061 of the Register of Attorneys. In the case now under consideration the
name of Salvador Segovia was written by Segovia, upon the same occasion, in entry No. 3126 of the
Register of Attorneys, in the places where the name of Jose F. Aquino had been erased. But in this case
all question as to the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila over the offense is
removed by the testimony of the witness Segovia to the effect that the place where the offense was
committed was about a kilometer from the San Juan bridge.

The only question submitted in the appellant's brief in this case, different from the questions raised in
the former case, is based upon the fact that the falsification which is the subject of this prosecution
was committed on the same occasion when the other falsification was committed. As will be noted
from a perusal of the opinion in the other case, each of the three candidates who signed their names
on that occasion in the Register of Attorneys, namely, Ponferrada, Segovia, and Enage, signed their
names in turn. The prosecution in the three cases is therefore not based upon the same offense or
even upon the same act, since the falsification of entry No. 3061 by the insertion of the name of
Ponferrada was an entirely different act, and offense, from the falsification committed in the insertion
of the name of Salvador Segovia in entry No. 3126 of the same book; and this is true notwithstanding
the circumstance that practically all the other external accompaniments of the two offenses were the
same. 1awphil.net

The judgment appealed from is without error, and the same will be affirmed, with costs against the
appellant. So ordered.

Avancea, C.J., Johnson, Malcolm, Ostrand, Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
Case no. 4

SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 720, June 17, 2015

FRANCISCO CAOILE, Complainant, v. ATTY. MARCELINO MACARAEG, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Alleging that his lawyer's neglect and dereliction of duty caused the dismissal of his appeal,
complainant Francisco Caoile (Francisco) filed on August 16, 1966 a Complaint 1 for disbarment against
Atty. Marcelino Macaraeg (Atty. Macaraeg).

Factual Antecedents

Francisco, and four others, engaged the services of Atty. Macaraeg to represent titiem in Civil Case No.
11119, an action for recovery of ownership filed before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Lingayen,
Pangasinan. After the CFI rendered judgment against them, Francisco and his co-defendants decided to
appeal their case before the Court of Appeals (CA).

Accordingly, Atty. Macaraeg filed a notice of appeal. Thrice he moved for extension of time to file
appellants' brief. In his last motion for extension, 2 he alleged that he was already in the process of
doing the finishing touches on the brief and just needed to have it printed. Yet, the extended period
expired without Atty. Macaraeg filing any brief. Hence, upon motion of the opposing party, the CA
dismissed the appeal.3 The dismissal became final and executory on December 13, 1963. 4

Francisco averred that they were unaware of the dismissal of their appeal until they were served with
the CFI's writ of execution 5 and a notice of sale at public auction 6 of their property in 1965. After
confirming with the CA that they indeed lost the case, Francisco confronted Atty. Macaraeg who
informed him that they lost the case because they failed to pay him in full. 7

Hence, this administrative complaint against Atty. Macaraeg for neglect and dereliction of duty.

In his Answer,8 Atty. Macaraeg averred that Francisco and his co-defendants did not pay in full for his
services in filing the appeal. Anent the pacto de retro sale which Francisco and his wife executed in his
favor supposedly to cover the balance of his professional fees, Atty. Macaraeg claimed that it was
Francisco who insisted on its execution, and that, contrary to Francisco's claim, it was intended as
payment for his services while representing Francisco before the CFI, and not as payment for his
services in filing the appeal. Atty. Macaraeg also claimed that, in any case, Francisco did not honor the
said pacto de retro sale as the possession of the lot was never turned over to him. 9

Atty. Macaraeg denied Francisco's accusation that he neglected their case. He pointed out that to push
through with the appeal he even advanced some of the appeal expenses. While he admitted that he
failed to submit an appellants' brief, he averred that the same was actually the fault of his clients who
failed to provide the necessary funds to file said brief. According to him, he constantly reminded
Francisco to give him the amount necessary to cover the costs of the transcript and printing of the
appeal brief. He even filed three motions for extension of time to file brief to give Francisco more time
to come up with the said payment. Still, Francisco was unable to pay. Moreover, Atty. Macaraeg was not
reimbursed for the amount he advanced for appeal expenses.

On September 22, 1966, this Court referred the Complaint to the Solicitor General for investigation,
report and recommendation.10

Proceedings before the Solicitor General

From March to November 1967, the Solicitor General conducted several hearings. 11 Thereafter, the
parties were required to submit their respective memoranda. 12 Atty. Macaraeg submitted his
Memorandum on January 18, 1968, 13 while Francisco submitted his Memorandum on March 25, 1968. 14

In November 1972, the Office of the Solicitor General again summoned the parties to appear before
it.15 Notably, the return of the subpoena served upon Atty. Macaraeg contained a
notation, viz:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Atty. Marcelino Macaraeg is now deceased.
(illegible)
Signature
wife16
Subsequently, this case was transferred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).

Report and Recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines

In an Order17 dated May 8, 1990, the IBP notified the parties to manifest whether they are still
interested in prosecuting the case, or whether supervening events have transpired rendering the case
moot and academic. The IBP received no response. On November 17, 1997, the IBP again sent notices
to the parties to appear,18 but the notices were unclaimed. Subsequently, the IBP, through an
Order19 dated November 27, 2001, directed the heirs of Atty. Macaraeg to submit a certified true copy
of his death certificate to no avail as the copy thereof sent to the said heirs was returned to sender.

Finally on October 19, 2011, Commissioner Oliver A. Cachapero (Commissioner Cachapero) of the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP came up with a Report and Recommendation. 20 Noting the
long period of time that the Complaint has been pending, he stated:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
For unknown reasons, this case x x x lingered [quite some time] in the Commission. It was filed on
August 16, 1966 in the Supreme Court and x x x subsequently found its way [to] the Commission
where it was initially assigned to a Commissioner. In the first week of October 2011, the undersigned,
who was tasked to prepare the resolution, received the folder and the records of the case.

Records show that on May 8, 1990, then Commissioner Ernesto L. Pineda wrote the parties asking
them to manifest within x x x (10) days from notice whether x x x they are still interested in
prosecuting this case, and whether supervening events have transpired which rendered the resolution
moot or academic. The Commission received no response from either litigant, hence this
resolution.21cralawlawlibrary
Anent the merits of the Complaint, Commissioner Cachapero ruled that Atty. Macaraeg neglected the
cause of his clients when he thrice moved for extension of time within which to file his brief. However,
he did not file any, reasoning out that the non-filing was due to his clients' failure to give him the
necessary funds. Commissioner Cachapero opined that the said excuse cannot stand. He thus found
Atty. Macaraeg to have violated Rule 12.03 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, viz.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the
period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so.
Accordingly, Commissioner Cachapero recommended that Atty. Macaraeg be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of two years.

In Resolution No. XX-2013-17422 dated February 13, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the findings of Commissioner Cachapero with the modification that the penalty be reduced to
a suspension of one year.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Court's Ruling

Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable.
A considerable length of time had elapsed from the time Atty. Macaraeg' filed the notice of appeal on
August 30, 1962 up to the time he filed the third motion for extension of time to file brief on October 5,
1963. Despite the passage of such time, however, Atty. Macaraeg still failed to file the brief, which
resulted in the dismissal of his clients' appeal. Suffice it to state that a motion for extension to file an
appellant's brief carries with it the presumption that the applicant-lawyer will file the pleading within
the requested extended period. Failure to dojo without any reasonable excuse violates the Code of
Professional Responsibility. 23

While Atty. Macaraeg attributed the non-filing of the brief to his clients' failure to give the amount
necessary for filing the same, he should have, as aptly stated by Commissioner Cachapero, shown a
more mindful and caring attitude towards the cause of his clients by advancing the payment. Besides,
the facts of this case show that his clients were making partial payments in their efforts to comply with
their obligation to him and were not deliberately refusing to pay him. In fact, as claimed by Atty.
Macaraeg himself, Francisco even insisted that they enter into a pacto de retro sale in order for them
to fully pay him for the services he rendered in connection with their civil case in the CFI. In fact, if
Atty. Macaraeg truly believed that the necessary funds from his clients were not forthcoming, he could
have excused himself from the case. The Code of Professional Responsibility allows a counsel to
withdraw his services for a good cause, including the client's failure to comply with the retainer
agreement.24 Indeed, Atty. Macaraeg violated Rule 12.03.

Nevertheless, while the actuation of Atty. Macaraeg warrants the imposition of a penalty, supervening
circumstances call for the dismissal of this administrative case.

The Supreme Court Law List shows that Atty. Macaraeg was admitted to the Bar on November 6,
1933.25 Records reveal that he was already 60 years old when the hearings in this disbarment case
were held in 1967. Hence, he would have been 108 years old by this time. It is also noteworthy that
the subpoena issued by the Solicitor General in 1972 contains a handwritten note that Atty. Macaraeg
had already died. Thereafter, nothing more was heard from either party despite notice. Under these
circumstances, it is safe to assume that the complainant had already lost interest in pursuing this
disbarment case against Atty. Macaraeg and that there is truth in the handwritten notation in the
return of the subpoena that Atty. Macaraeg had already passed away. In Apiag v. Cantero,26 the Court
dismissed the administrative case against therein respondent and no longer imposed any sanction
against him in view of his death during the pendency of said case.cralawred

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Complaint for Disbarment against Atty. Marcelino Macaraeg is
hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Carpio, (Chairperson), Brion, Mendoza, and Jardeleza,*JJ., concur.

Case no 5.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC
G.R. No. 213181 August 19, 2014

FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA Petitioner,

vs.
CHIEF JUSTICE MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO, THE JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL AND
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

Once again, the Couii is faced with a controversy involving the acts of an independent body, which is
considered as a constitutional innovation the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC). It is not the first time that
the Court is called upon to settle legal questions surrounding the JBC's exercise of its constitutional
mandate. In De Castro v. JBC,1the Court laid to rest issues such as the duty of the JBC to recommend
prospective nominees for the position of Chief Justice vis--vis the appointing power of the President,
the period within which the same may be exercised, and the ban on midnight appointments as set
forth in the Constitution. In Chavez v. JBC, 2 the Court provided an extensive discourse on constitutional
intent as to the JBCs composition and membership.

This time, however, the selection and nomination process actually undertaken by the JBC is being
challenged for being constitutionally infirm. The heart of the debate lies not only on the very
soundness and validity of the application of JBC rules but also the extent of its discretionary power.
More significantly, this case of first impression impugns the end-result of its acts - the shortlistfrom
which the President appoints a deserving addition to the Highest Tribunal of the land.

To add yet another feature of noveltyto this case, a member of the Court, no less than the Chief Justice
herself, was being impleaded as party respondent.

The Facts

The present case finds its genesis from the compulsory retirement of Associate Justice Roberto Abad
(Associate Justice Abad) last May 22, 2014. Before his retirement, on March 6, 2014, in accordance
with its rules,3 the JBC announced the opening for application or recommendation for the said vacated
position.

On March 14, 2014, the JBC received a letter from Dean Danilo Concepcion of the University of the
Philippines nominating petitioner Francis H. Jardeleza (Jardeleza), incumbent Solicitor General of the
Republic, for the said position. Upon acceptance of the nomination, Jardeleza was included in the
names of candidates, as well as in the schedule of public interviews. On May 29, 2014, Jardeleza was
interviewed by the JBC.

It appears from the averments in the petition that on June 16 and 17, 2014, Jardeleza received
telephone callsfrom former Court of Appeals Associate Justice and incumbent JBC member, Aurora
Santiago Lagman (Justice Lagman), who informed him that during the meetings held on June 5 and 16,
2014, Chief Justice and JBC ex-officioChairperson, Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno (Chief Justice
Sereno),manifested that she would be invoking Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 4 against him. Jardeleza
was then directed to "make himself available" before the JBC on June 30, 2014, during which he would
be informed of the objections to his integrity.

Consequently, Jardeleza filed a letter-petition (letter-petition) 5 praying that the Court, in the exercise of
itsconstitutional power of supervision over the JBC, issue an order: 1) directing the JBC to give him at
least five (5) working days written notice of any hearing of the JBC to which he would be summoned;
and the said notice to contain the sworn specifications of the charges against him by his oppositors,
the sworn statements of supporting witnesses, if any, and copies of documents in support of the
charges; and notice and sworn statements shall be made part of the public record of the JBC; 2)
allowing him to cross-examine his oppositors and supporting witnesses, if any, and the cross-
examination to be conducted in public, under the same conditions that attend the publicinterviews
held for all applicants; 3) directing the JBC to reset the hearing scheduled on June 30, 2014 to another
date; and 4) directing the JBC to disallow Chief Justice Sereno from participating in the voting on June
30,2014 or at any adjournment thereof where such vote would be taken for the nominees for the
position vacated by Associate Justice Abad.

During the June 30, 2014 meeting of the JBC, sansJardeleza, incumbent Associate Justice Antonio T.
Carpio (Associate Justice Carpio) appeared as a resource person to shed light on a classified legal
memorandum (legal memorandum) that would clarify the objection to Jardelezas integrity as posed by
Chief Justice Sereno. According to the JBC, Chief Justice Sereno questioned Jardelezas ability to
discharge the duties of his office as shown in a confidential legal memorandum over his handling of an
international arbitration case for the government.

Later, Jardeleza was directed to one of the Courts ante-rooms where Department of Justice Secretary
Leila M. De Lima (Secretary De Lima) informed him that Associate Justice Carpio appeared before the
JBC and disclosed confidential information which, to Chief Justice Sereno, characterized his integrity as
dubious. After the briefing, Jardeleza was summoned by the JBC at around 2:00oclock in the afternoon.

Jardeleza alleged that he was asked by Chief Justice Sereno if he wanted to defend himself against the
integrity issues raised against him. He answered that he would defend himself provided that due
process would be observed. Jardeleza specifically demanded that Chief Justice Sereno execute a sworn
statement specifying her objectionsand that he be afforded the right to cross-examine her in a public
hearing. He requested that the same directive should also be imposed on Associate Justice Carpio. As
claimed by the JBC, Representative Niel G. Tupas Jr. also manifested that he wanted to hear for himself
Jardelezas explanation on the matter. Jardeleza, however, refused as he would not be lulled
intowaiving his rights. Jardeleza then put into record a written statement 6 expressing his views on the
situation and requested the JBC to defer its meeting considering that the Court en banc would meet
the next day to act on his pending letter-petition. At this juncture, Jardeleza was excused.

Later in the afternoon of the sameday, and apparently denying Jardelezas request for deferment of the
proceedings, the JBC continued its deliberations and proceeded to vote for the nominees to be
included in the shortlist. Thereafter, the JBC releasedthe subject shortlist of four (4) nominees which
included: Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr. with six (6) votes, Jose C. Reyes, Jr. with six (6) votes, Maria Gracia
M. Pulido Tan with five (5) votes, and Reynaldo B. Daway with four (4) votes. 7

As mentioned in the petition, a newspaper article was later published in the online portal of the
Philippine Daily Inquirer, stating that the Courts Spokesman, Atty. Theodore Te, revealed that there
were actually five (5) nominees who made it to the JBC shortlist, but one (1) nominee could not be
included because of the invocation of Rule 10, Section 2 of the JBC rules.

In its July 8, 2014 Resolution, the Court noted Jardelezas letterpetition in view of the transmittal of the
JBC list of nominees to the Office of the President, "without prejudice to any remedy available in law
and the rules that petitioner may still wish to pursue." 8 The said resolution was accompanied by an
extensive Dissenting Opinion penned by Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion, 9 expressing his respectful
disagreement as to the position taken by the majority.

The Petition

Perceptibly based on the aforementioned resolutions declaration as to his availment of a remedy in

law, Jardeleza filed the present petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), seeking to compel the JBC
to include him in the list ofnominees for Supreme Court Associate Justice viceAssociate Justice Abad,
on the grounds that the JBC and Chief Justice Sereno acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in excluding him, despite having garnered a sufficient number of votes to
qualify for the position.

Notably, Jardelezas petition decries that despite the obvious urgency of his earlier letter-petition and
its concomitant filing on June 25, 2014, the same was raffled only on July 1, 2014 or a day after the
controversial JBC meeting. By the time that his letter-petition was scheduled for deliberation by the
Court en bancon July 8, 2014, the disputedshortlist had already been transmitted to the Office of the
President. He attributedthis belated action on his letter-petition to Chief Justice Sereno, whose action
on such matters, especially those impressed withurgency, was discretionary.

An in-depth perusal of Jardelezas petition would reveal that his resort to judicial intervention hinges on
the alleged illegality of his exclusion from the shortlist due to: 1) the deprivation of his constitutional
right to due process; and 2) the JBCs erroneous application, if not direct violation, of its own rules.
Suffice it to say, Jardelezadirectly ascribes the supposed violation of his constitutional rights tothe acts
of Chief Justice Sereno in raising objections against his integrity and the manner by which the JBC
addressed this challenge to his application, resulting in his arbitrary exclusion from the list of
nominees.

Jardelezas Position

For a better understanding of the above postulates proffered in the petition, the Court hereunder
succinctlysummarizes Jardelezas arguments, as follows:

A. Chief Justice Sereno and the JBC violated Jardelezas right to due process in the events leading up to
and during the vote on the shortlist last June 30, 2014. When accusations against his integrity were
made twice, ex parte, by Chief Justice Sereno, without informing him of the nature and cause thereof
and without affording him an opportunity to be heard, Jardeleza was deprived of his right to due
process. In turn, the JBC violated his right to due process when he was simply ordered to make himself
available on the June 30, 2014 meeting and was told that the objections to his integrity would be made
known to him on the same day. Apart from mere verbal notice (by way of a telephone call) of the
invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 against his application and not on the accusations against
him per se, he was deprived of an opportunity to mount a proper defense against it. Not only did the
JBC fail to ventilate questions on his integrity during his public interview, he was also divested of his
rights as an applicant under Sections 3 and 4, Rule 4, JBC-009, to wit:

Section 3. Testimony of parties. The Council may receive written opposition to an applicant on the
ground of his moral fitness and, at its discretion, the Council may receive the testimony of the
oppositor at a hearing conducted for the purpose, with due notice to the applicant who shall be
allowed to cross-examine the oppositor and to offer countervailing evidence.

Section 4. Anonymous Complaints. Anonymous complaints against an applicant shall not be given
due course, unless there appears on its face a probable cause sufficient to engender belief that the
allegations may be true. In the latter case, the Council may direct a discreet investigation or require
the applicant to comment thereon in writing or during the interview.

His lack of knowledge as to the identity of his accusers (except for yet again, the verbalinformation
conveyed to him that Associate Justice Carpio testified against him) and as to the nature of the very
accusations against him caused him to suffer from the arbitrary action by the JBC and Chief Justice
Sereno. The latter gravely abused her discretion when she acted as prosecutor, witness and
judge,thereby violating the very essence of fair play and the Constitution itself. In his words: "the sui
generis nature of JBC proceedings does not authorize the Chief Justice to assume these roles, nor does
it dispense with the need to honor petitioners right to due process." 10

B. The JBC committed grave abuse of discretion in excluding Jardeleza from the shortlist of nominees,
in violation of its own rules. The "unanimity requirement" provided under Section 2, Rule10 of JBC-009
does not find application when a member of the JBC raises an objection to an applicants integrity.
Here, the lone objector constituted a part of the membership of the body set to vote. The lone objector
could be completely capable oftaking hostage the entire voting process by the mere expediency of
raising an objection. Chief Justice Serenos interpretation of the rule would allow a situation where all
thata member has to do to veto other votes, including majority votes, would be to object to the
qualification of a candidate, without need for factual basis.

C. Having secured the sufficient number of votes, it was ministerial on the part of the JBC to include
Jardeleza in the subject shortlist.Section 1, Rule 10 of JBC-009 provides that a nomination for
appointment to a judicial position requires the affirmative vote of at least a majority of all members of
the JBC. The JBC cannot disregard its own rules. Considering that Jardeleza was able to secure four (4)
out of six (6) votes, the only conclusion is that a majority of the members of the JBC found him to be
qualified for the position of Associate Justice.

D. The unlawful exclusion ofthe petitioner from the subject shortlist impairs the Presidents
constitutional power to appoint.Jardelezas exclusion from the shortlist has unlawfully narrowed the
Presidents choices. Simply put, the President would be constrained to choose from among four (4)
nominees, when five (5) applicants rightfully qualified for the position. This limits the President to
appoint a member of the Court from a list generated through a process tainted with patent
constitutional violations and disregard for rules of justice and fair play. Until these constitutional
infirmities are remedied, the petitioner has the right to prevent the appointment of an Associate Justice
viceAssociate Justice Abad.

Comment of the JBC

On August 11, 2014, the JBC filed its comment contending that Jardelezas petition lacked
proceduraland substantive bases that would warrant favorable action by the Court. For the JBC,
certiorariis only available against a tribunal, a board or an officer exercising judicial or quasijudicial
functions.11 The JBC, in its exercise of its mandate to recommend appointees to the Judiciary, does not
exercise any of these functions. In a pending case, 12 Jardeleza himself, as one of the lawyers for the
government, argued in this wise: Certioraricannot issue against the JBC in the implementation of its
policies.

In the same vein, the remedy of mandamusis incorrect. Mandamus does not lie to compel a
discretionary act. For it to prosper, a petition for mandamus must, among other things, show that the
petitioner has a clear legal right to the act demanded. In Jardelezas case, there is no legal right to be
included in the list of nominees for judicial vacancies. Possession of the constitutional and statutory
qualifications for appointment to the Judiciary may not be used to legally demand that ones name be
included in the list of candidates for a judicial vacancy. Ones inclusion in the shortlist is strictly within
the discretion of the JBC.

Anent the substantive issues, the JBC mainly denied that Jardeleza was deprived of due process. The
JBC reiterated that Justice Lagman, on behalf of the JBC en banc, called Jardeleza and informed him
that Chief Justice Sereno would be invoking Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 due to a question on his
integrity based on the way he handled a very important case for the government. Jardeleza and Justice
Lagman spoke briefly about the case and his general explanation on how he handled the same.
Secretary De Lima likewise informed him about the content of the impending objection against his
application. On these occasions, Jardeleza agreed to explain himself. Come the June 30, 2014 meeting,
however, Jardeleza refused to shed light on the allegations against him,as he chose to deliver a
statement, which, in essence, requested that his accuser and her witnesses file sworn statements so
that he would know of the allegations against him, that he be allowed to cross-examine the
witnesses;and that the procedure be done on record and in public.

In other words, Jardeleza was given ample opportunity to be heard and to enlighten each member of
the JBC on the issues raised against him prior to the voting process. His request for a sworn statement
and opportunity to cross-examine is not supported by a demandable right. The JBC is not a fact-finding
body. Neitheris it a court nor a quasi-judicial agency. The members are notconcerned with the
determination of his guilt or innocence of the accusations against him. Besides, Sections 3 and 4, Rule
10,JBC-009 are merely directory as shown by the use of the word "may." Even the conduct of a hearing
to determine the veracity of an opposition is discretionary on the JBC. Ordinarily, if there are other
ways of ascertaining the truth or falsity of an allegation or opposition, the JBC would not call a hearing
in order to avoid undue delay of the selection process. Each member of the JBC relies on his or her own
appreciation of the circumstances and qualifications of applicants.

The JBC then proceeded to defend adherence to its standing rules. As a general rule, an applicant is
included in the shortlist when he or she obtains an affirmative vote of at least a majority of all the
members of the JBC. When Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009,however, is invoked because an applicants
integrity is challenged, a unanimous vote is required. Thus, when Chief Justice Sereno invoked the
saidprovision, Jardeleza needed the affirmative vote of all the JBC members tobe included in the
shortlist. In the process, Chief Justice Serenos vote against Jardeleza was not counted. Even then, he
needed the votes of the five(5) remaining members. He only got four (4) affirmative votes. As a
result,he was not included in the shortlist. Applicant Reynaldo B. Daway, who gotfour (4) affirmative
votes, was included in the shortlist because his integrity was not challenged. As to him, the "majority
rule" was considered applicable.

Lastly, the JBC rued that Jardeleza sued the respondents in his capacity as Solicitor General.
Despiteclaiming a prefatory appearance in propria persona, all pleadings filed with the Court were
signed in his official capacity. In effect, he sued the respondents to pursue a purely private interest
while retaining the office of the Solicitor General. By suing the very parties he was tasked by law to
defend, Jardeleza knowingly placed himself in a situation where his personal interests collided against
his public duties, in clear violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Code of Professional
Ethics. Moreover, the respondents are all public officials being sued in their official capacity. By
retaining his title as Solicitor General, and suing in the said capacity, Jardeleza filed a suit against his
own clients, being the legal defender of the government and its officers. This runs contrary to the
fiduciary relationship sharedby a lawyer and his client.

In opposition to Jardelezas prayer for the issuance of a TRO, the JBC called to mind the constitutional
period within which a vacancy in the Court must be filled. As things now stand, the President has until
August 20, 2014 to exercise his appointment power which cannot be restrained by a TRO or an
injunctive suit.

Comment of the Executive Secretary

In his Comment, Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa Jr. (Executive Secretary)raised the possible
unconstitutionality of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009, particularly the imposition ofa higher voting
threshold in cases where the integrity of an applicant is challenged. It is his position that the subject
JBC rule impairs the bodys collegial character, which essentially operates on the basis of majority rule.
The application of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 gives rise to a situation where all that a member needs
to do, in order to disqualify an applicant who may well have already obtained a majority vote, is to
object to his integrity. In effect, a member who invokes the said provision is given a veto powerthat
undermines the equal and full participation of the other members in the nomination process. A lone
objector may then override the will ofthe majority, rendering illusory, the collegial nature of the JBC
and the very purpose for which it was created to shield the appointment process from political
maneuvering. Further, Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 may beviolative of due process for it does not
allow an applicant any meaningful opportunity to refute the challenges to his integrity. While other
provisions of the JBC rules provide mechanisms enabling an applicant to comment on an opposition
filed against him, the subject rule does not afford the same opportunity. In this case, Jardelezas
allegations as to the events which transpired on June 30, 2014 obviously show that he was neither
informed ofthe accusations against him nor given the chance to muster a defense thereto.

The Executive Secretary then offered a supposition: granting that the subject provision is held to be
constitutional, the "unanimity rule" would only be operative when the objector is not a member of the
JBC. It is only in this scenario where the voting ofthe body would not be rendered inconsequential. In
the event that a JBC member raised the objection, what should have been applied is the general rule of
a majority vote, where any JBC member retains their respective reservations to an application with a
negative vote. Corollary thereto, the unconstitutionality of the said rule would necessitate the inclusion
of Jardeleza in the shortlist submitted to the President.

Other pleadings

On August 12, 2014, Jardeleza was given the chance to refute the allegations of the JBC in its
Comment. He submitted his Reply thereto on August 15, 2014. A few hours thereafter, orbarely ten
minutes prior to the closing of business, the Court received the Supplemental Comment-Reply of the
JBC, this time with the attached minutes of the proceedings that led to the filing of the petition,and a
detailed "Statementof the Chief Justice on the Integrity Objection." 13 Obviously, Jardelezas Reply
consisted only of his arguments against the JBCs original Comment, as it was filed prior to the filing of
the Supplemental Comment-Reply.
At the late stage of the case, two motions to admit comments-inintervention/oppositions-in-
intervention were filed. One was by Atty. Purificacion S. Bartolome-Bernabe, purportedly the President
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Bulacan Chapter. This pleading echoed the position of the JBC. 14

The other one was filed by Atty. Reynaldo A. Cortes, purportedly a former President of the IBP Baguio-
Benguet Chapter and former Governor of the IBP-Northern Luzon. It was coupled with a complaint for
disbarment against Jardeleza primarily for violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility for
representing conflicting interests.15

Both motions for intervention weredenied considering that time was of the essence and their motions
were merely reiterative of the positions of the JBC and were perceived to be dilatory. The complaint for
disbarment, however, was re-docketed as a separate administrative case.

The Issues

Amidst a myriad of issues submitted by the parties, most of which are interrelated such that the
resolution of one issue would necessarily affect the conclusion as to the others, the Court opts to
narrow down the questions to the very source of the discord - the correct application of Section 2, Rule
10 JBC-009 and its effects, if any, on the substantive rights of applicants.

The Court is not unmindful of the fact that a facial scrutiny of the petition does not directly raise the
unconstitutionality of the subject JBC rule. Instead, it bewails the unconstitutional effects of its
application. It is only from the comment of the Executive Secretary where the possible
unconstitutionality of the rulewas brought to the fore. Despite this milieu, a practical approach
dictatesthat the Court must confront the source of the bleeding from which the gaping wound
presented to the Court suffers.

The issues for resolution are:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT CAN ASSUME JURISDICTION AND GIVE DUECOURSE TO THE SUBJECT
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND MANDAMUS (WITH APPLICATION FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER).

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE ISSUES RAISED AGAINST JARDELEZA BEFIT "QUESTIONS OR CHALLENGES ON
INTEGRITY" AS CONTEMPLATED UNDER SECTION 2, RULE 10 OF JBC-009.

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS IS AVAILABLE IN THE COURSE OF JBC PROCEEDINGS IN
CASES WHERE AN OBJECTION OR OPPOSITION TO AN APPLICATION IS RAISED.

III.

WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER JARDELEZA MAY BE INCLUDED IN THE SHORTLIST OF NOMINEES

SUBMITTED TO THE PRESIDENT.

The Courts Ruling

I Procedural Issue: The Court has constitutional bases to assume jurisdiction over the case

A - The Courts Power of Supervision over the JBC

Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides for the creation of the JBC. The Court was given
supervisory authority over it. Section 8 reads:

Section 8.

A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Courtcomposed of
the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress
as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of
the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector. [Emphasis supplied]

As a meaningful guidepost, jurisprudence provides the definition and scope of supervision. It is the
power of oversight, or the authority to see that subordinate officers perform their duties.It ensures that
the laws and the rules governing the conduct of a government entity are observed and complied with.
Supervising officials see to it that rules are followed, but they themselves do not lay down such rules,
nor do they have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, they may
order the work done or redone, but only to conform to such rules. They may not prescribe their own
manner of execution of the act. They have no discretion on this matter except to see to it that the rules
are followed.16

Based on this, the supervisory authority of the Court over the JBC covers the overseeing of compliance
with its rules. In this case, Jardelezas principal allegations in his petition merit the exercise of this
supervisory authority.

B- Availability of the Remedy of Mandamus

The Court agrees with the JBC that a writ of mandamus is not available. "Mandamuslies to compel the
performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, but not to compel the performance of a discretionary
duty. Mandamuswill not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion of a public officer where
the law imposes upon said public officer the right and duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any
matter in which he is required to act. It is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the
court.17 There is no question that the JBCs duty to nominate is discretionary and it may not
becompelled to do something.

C- Availability of the Remedy of Certiorari

Respondent JBC opposed the petition for certiorarion the ground that it does not exercise judicial or
quasi-judicial functions. Under Section 1 of Rule 65, a writ of certiorariis directed against a tribunal
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function. "Judicial functions are exercised by a body or officer
clothed with authority to determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are with
respect to the matter in controversy. Quasijudicial function is a term that applies to the action or
discretion of public administrative officers or bodies given the authority to investigate facts or
ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their
official action using discretion of a judicial nature." 18 It asserts that in the performance of its function of
recommending appointees for the judiciary, the JBC does not exercise judicial or quasijudicial functions.
Hence, the resort tosuch remedy to question its actions is improper.

In this case, Jardeleza cries that although he earned a qualifying number of votes in the JBC, it was
negated by the invocation of the "unanimity rule" on integrity in violation of his right to due process
guaranteed not only by the Constitution but by the Councils own rules. For said reason, the Court is of
the position that it can exercise the expanded judicial power of review vestedupon it by the 1987
Constitution. Thus:

Article VIII.

Section 1. The judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.

It has been judicially settled that a petition for certiorari is a proper remedy to question the act of any
branch or instrumentality of the government on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch orinstrumentality of the government, even if the latter does
not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. 19

In a case like this, where constitutional bearings are too blatant to ignore, the Court does not find
passivity as an alternative. The impassemust be overcome.

II Substantial Issues

Examining the Unanimity Rule of the JBC in cases where an applicants integrity is challenged

The purpose of the JBCs existence is indubitably rooted in the categorical constitutional declaration
that"[a] member of the judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and
independence." To ensure the fulfillment of these standards in every member of the Judiciary, the JBC
has been tasked toscreen aspiring judges and justices, among others, making certain that the
nominees submitted to the President are all qualified and suitably best for appointment. In this way,
the appointing process itself is shieldedfrom the possibility of extending judicial appointment to the
undeserving and mediocre and, more importantly, to the ineligible or disqualified.

In the performance of this sacred duty, the JBC itself admits, as stated in the "whereas clauses" of JBC-
009, that qualifications such as "competence, integrity, probity and independence are not easily
determinable as they are developed and nurtured through the years." Additionally, "it is not possible or
advisable to lay down iron-clad rules to determine the fitness of those who aspire to become a Justice,
Judge, Ombudsman or Deputy Ombudsman." Given this realistic situation, there is a need "to promote
stability and uniformity in JBCs guiding precepts and principles." A set of uniform criteria had to be
established in the ascertainment of "whether one meets the minimum constitutional qualifications and
possesses qualities of mind and heart expected of him" and his office. Likewise for the sake
oftransparency of its proceedings, the JBC had put these criteria in writing, now in the form of JBC-009.
True enough, guidelines have been set inthe determination of competence," 20 "probity and
independence,"21 "soundness of physical and mental condition, 22 and "integrity."23

As disclosed by the guidelines and lists of recognized evidence of qualification laid down in JBC-009,
"integrity" is closely related to, or if not, approximately equated to an applicants good reputation for
honesty, incorruptibility, irreproachableconduct, and fidelity to sound moral and ethical standards. That
is why proof of an applicants reputation may be shown in certifications or testimonials from reputable
government officials and non-governmental organizations and clearances from the courts, National
Bureau of Investigation, and the police, among others. In fact, the JBC may even conduct a discreet
background check and receive feedback from the public on the integrity, reputation and character of
the applicant, the merits of which shall be verifiedand checked. As a qualification, the term is taken to
refer to a virtue, such that, "integrity is the quality of persons character." 24

The foregoing premise then begets the question: Does Rule 2, Section 10 of JBC-009, in imposing the
"unanimity rule," contemplate a doubt on the moral character of an applicant? Section 2, Rule 10 of
JBC-009 provides:

SEC. 2. Votes required when integrity of a qualified applicant is challenged. - In every case where the
integrity of an applicant who is not otherwise disqualified for nomination is raised or challenged, the
affirmative vote of all the Members of the Council must be obtained for the favorable consideration of
his nomination.

A simple reading of the above provision undoubtedly elicits the rule that a higher voting requirement is
absolute in cases where the integrity of an applicant is questioned. Simply put, when an integrity
question arises, the voting requirement for his or her inclusion as a nominee to a judicial post becomes
"unanimous" instead of the "majority vote" required in the preceding section. 25 Considering that JBC-
009 employs the term "integrity" as an essential qualification for appointment, and its doubtful
existence in a person merits a higher hurdle to surpass, that is, the unanimous vote of all the members
of the JBC, the Court is of the safe conclusion that "integrity" as used in the rules must be interpreted
uniformly. Hence, Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 envisions only a situation where an applicants moral
fitness is challenged. It follows then that the "unanimity rule" only comes into operation when the
moral character of a person is put in issue. It finds no application where the question is essentially
unrelated to an applicants moral uprightness.

Examining the "questions of integrity" made against Jardeleza

The Court will now examine the propriety of applying Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 to Jardelezas case.

The minutes of the JBC meetings, attached to the Supplemental Comment-Reply, reveal that during the
June 30, 2014 meeting, not only the question on his actuations in the handling of a case was called for
explanation by the Chief Justice, but two other grounds as well tending to show his lack of integrity: a
supposed extra-marital affair in the past and alleged acts of insider trading. 26

Against this factual backdrop, the Court notes that the initial or original invocation of Section 2, Rule 10
of JBC-009 was grounded on Jardelezas "inability to discharge the duties of his office" as shown in a
legal memorandum related to Jardelezas manner of representing the government in a legal dispute.
The records bear that the "unanimity rule" was initially invoked by Chief Justice Sereno during the JBC
meeting held on June 5, 2014, where she expressed her position that Jardeleza did not possess the
integrity required tobe a member of the Court. 27 In the same meeting, the Chief Justice shared withthe
other JBC members the details of Jardelezas chosen manner of framing the governments position in a
case and how this could have been detrimental to the national interest.

In the JBCs original comment, the details of the Chief Justices claim against Jardelezas integrity were
couched in general terms. The particulars thereof were only supplied to the Court in the JBCs
Supplemental Comment-Reply. Apparently, the JBC acceded to Jardelezas demand to make the
accusations against him public. At the outset, the JBC declined to raise the fine points of the integrity
question in its original Comment due to its significant bearing on the countrys foreign relations and
national security. At any rate, the Court restrains itself from delving into the details thereof in this
disposition. The confidential nature of the document cited therein, which requires the observance of
utmost prudence, preclude a discussion that may possibly affect the countrys position in a pending
dispute.

Be that as it may, the Court has to resolve the standing questions: Does the original invocation of
Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 involve a question on Jardelezas integrity? Doeshis adoption of a specific
legal strategy in the handling of a case bring forth a relevant and logical challenge against his moral
character? Does the "unanimity rule" apply in cases where the main point of contention is the
professional judgment sans charges or implications of immoral or corrupt behavior?

The Court answers these questions in the negative.

While Chief Justice Sereno claims that the invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 was not borne
out ofa mere variance of legal opinion but by an "act of disloyalty" committed by Jardeleza in the
handling of a case, the fact remains that the basis for her invocation of the rule was the
"disagreement" in legal strategy as expressed by a group of international lawyers. The approach taken
by Jardeleza in that case was opposed to that preferred by the legal team. For said reason, criticism
was hurled against his "integrity." The invocation of the "unanimity rule" on integrity traces its roots to
the exercise ofhis discretion as a lawyer and nothing else. No connection was established linking his
choice of a legal strategy to a treacherous intent to trounce upon the countrys interests or to betray
the Constitution.

Verily, disagreement in legal opinion is but a normal, if not an essential form of, interaction among
members of the legal community. A lawyer has complete discretion on whatlegal strategy to employ in
a case entrusted to him28provided that he lives up tohis duty to serve his client with competence and
diligence, and that he exert his best efforts to protect the interests of his client within the bounds of
the law. Consonantly, a lawyer is not an insurer of victory for clients he represents. An infallible grasp
of legal principles and technique by a lawyer is a utopian ideal. Stripped of a clear showing of gross
neglect, iniquity, or immoral purpose, a strategy of a legal mind remains a legal tactic acceptable to
some and deplorable to others. It has no direct bearing on his moral choices.

As shown in the minutes, the other JBC members expressed their reservations on whether the ground
invoked by Chief Justice Sereno could be classified as a "question of integrity" under Section 2, Rule 10
of JBC-009.29 These reservations were evidently sourced from the factthat there was no clear indication
that the tactic was a "brainchild" of Jardeleza, as it might have been a collective idea by the legal team
which initially sought a different manner of presenting the countrys arguments, and there was no
showing either of a corrupt purpose on his part. 30 Even Chief Justice Sereno was not certain that
Jardelezas acts were urged by politicking or lured by extraneous promises. 31 Besides, the President,
who has the final say on the conduct of the countrys advocacy in the case, has given no signs that
Jardelezas action constituted disloyalty or a betrayal of the countrys trust and interest. While this
point does notentail that only the President may challenge Jardelezas doubtful integrity, itis
commonsensical to assume that he is in the best position to suspect a treacherous agenda. The
records are bereft of any information that indicatesthis suspicion. In fact, the Comment of the
Executive Secretary expressly prayed for Jardelezas inclusion in the disputed shortlist.

The Court notes the zeal shown by the Chief Justice regarding international cases, given her
participation in the PIATCO case and the Belgian Dredging case. Her efforts inthe determination of
Jardelezas professional background, while commendable, have not produced a patent demonstration
of a connection betweenthe act complained of and his integrity as a person. Nonetheless, the Court
cannot consider her invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 as conformably within the
contemplation of the rule. To fall under Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009, there must be a showing that the
act complained of is, at the least, linked to the moral character of the person and not to his judgment
as a professional. What this disposition perceives, therefore, is the inapplicability of Section 2, Rule 10
of JBC-009 to the original ground of its invocation.

As previously mentioned, Chief Justice Sereno raised the issues of Jardelezas alleged extra-marital
affair and acts of insider-trading for the first time onlyduring the June 30, 2014 meeting of the JBC. As
can be gleaned from the minutes of the June 30, 2014 meeting, the inclusion of these issues had its
origin from newspaper reports that the Chief Justice might raise issues of "immorality" against
Jardeleza.32 The Chief Justice then deduced that the "immorality" issue referred to by the media might
have been the incidents that could have transpired when Jardeleza was still the General Counsel of San
Miguel Corporation. She stated that inasmuch as the JBC had the duty to "take every possible step to
verify the qualification of the applicants," it might as well be clarified. 33

Do these issues fall within the purview of "questions on integrity" under Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009?
The Court nods in assent. These are valid issues.

This acquiescence is consistent with the Courts discussion supra. Unlike the first ground which
centered onJardelezas stance on the tactical approach in pursuing the case for the government, the
claims of an illicit relationship and acts of insider trading bear a candid relation to his moral character.
Jurisprudence34 is replete with cases where a lawyers deliberate participation in extra-marital affairs
was considered as a disgraceful stain on ones ethical and moral principles. The bottom line is that a
lawyer who engages in extra-marital affairs is deemed to have failed to adhere to the exacting
standards of morality and decency which every member of the Judiciary is expected to observe. In fact,
even relationships which have never gone physical or intimate could still be subject to charges of
immorality, when a lawyer, who is married, admits to having a relationship which was more than
professional, more than acquaintanceship, more than friendly. 35 As the Court has held: Immorality has
not been confined to sexual matters, but includes conduct inconsistentwith rectitude, or indicative of
corruption, indecency, depravity and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant, or shameless conduct
showing moral indifference to opinions of respectable members of the communityand an inconsiderate
attitude toward good order and public welfare. 36 Moral character is not a subjective term but one that
corresponds to objective reality.37 To have a good moral character, a person must have the personal
characteristic ofbeing good. It is not enough that he or she has a good reputation, that is, the opinion
generally entertained about a person or the estimate in which he or she is held by the public in the
place where she is known.38 Hence, lawyers are at all times subject to the watchful public eye and
community approbation.39

The element of "willingness" to linger in indelicate relationships imputes a weakness in ones values,
self-control and on the whole, sense of honor, not only because it is a bold disregard of the sanctity of
marriage and of the law, but because it erodes the publics confidence in the Judiciary. This is no longer
a matter of an honest lapse in judgment but a dissolute exhibition of disrespect toward sacredvows
taken before God and the law.

On the other hand, insider trading is an offense that assaults the integrity of our vital securities
market.40Manipulative devices and deceptive practices, including insider trading, throw a monkey
wrench right into the heart of the securities industry. Whensomeone trades inthe market with unfair
advantage in the form of highly valuable secret inside information, all other participants are defrauded.
All of the mechanisms become worthless. Given enough of stock marketscandals coupled with the
related loss of faith in the market, such abuses could presage a severe drain of capital. And investors
would eventuallyfeel more secure with their money invested elsewhere. 41 In its barest essence, insider
trading involves the trading of securities based on knowledge of material information not disclosed to
the public at the time. Clearly, an allegation of insider trading involves the propensity of a person
toengage in fraudulent activities that may speak of his moral character.

These two issues can be properly categorized as "questions on integrity" under Section 2, Rule 10 of
JBC-009. They fall within the ambit of "questions on integrity." Hence, the "unanimity rule" may come
into operation as the subject provision is worded.

The Availability of Due Process in the

Proceedings of the JBC

In advocacy of his position, Jardeleza argues that: 1] he should have been informed of the accusations
against him in writing; 2] he was not furnished the basis of the accusations, that is, "a very confidential
legal memorandum that clarifies the integrityobjection"; 3] instead of heeding his request for an
opportunity to defend himself, the JBC considered his refusal to explain, during the June 30, 2014
meeting, as a waiver of his right to answer the unspecified allegations; 4] the voting of the JBC was
railroaded; and 5] the alleged "discretionary" nature of Sections 3 and 4 of JBC-009 is negated by the
subsequent effectivity of JBC-010, Section 1(2) of which provides for a 10-day period from the
publication of the list of candidates within which any complaint or opposition against a candidate may
be filed with the JBC Secretary; 6] Section 2 of JBC-010 requires complaints and oppositions to be in
writing and under oath, copies of which shall be furnished the candidate in order for him to file his
comment within five (5) days from receipt thereof; and 7] Sections 3 to 6 of JBC-010 prescribe a logical,
reasonable and sequential series of steps in securing a candidates right to due process.

The JBC counters these by insisting that it is not obliged to afford Jardeleza the right to a hearing in the
fulfillment of its duty to recommend. The JBC, as a body, is not required by law to hold hearings on the
qualifications of the nominees. The process by which an objection is made based on Section 2, Rule 10
of JBC-009 is not judicial, quasi-judicial, or fact-finding, for it does not aim to determine guilt or
innocence akin to a criminal or administrative offense but toascertain the fitness of an applicant vis--
vis the requirements for the position. Being sui generis, the proceedings of the JBC do not confer the
rights insisted upon by Jardeleza. He may not exact the application of rules of procedure which are, at
the most, discretionary or optional. Finally, Jardeleza refused to shed light on the objections against
him. During the June 30, 2014 meeting, he did not address the issues, but instead chose totread on his
view that the Chief Justice had unjustifiably become his accuser, prosecutor and judge.

The crux of the issue is on the availability of the right to due process in JBC proceedings. After a
tedious review of the parties respective arguments, the Court concludes that the right to due process
is available and thereby demandable asa matter of right.

The Court does not brush aside the unique and special nature of JBC proceedings. Indeed, they are
distinct from criminal proceedings where the finding of guilt or innocence of the accused is sine qua
non. The JBCs constitutional duty to recommend qualified nominees to the President cannot be
compared to the duty of the courts of law to determine the commission of an offense and ascribe the
same to an accused, consistent with established rules on evidence. Even the quantum ofevidence
required in criminal cases is far from the discretion accorded to the JBC.

The Court, however, could not accept, lock, stock and barrel, the argument that an applicants access
tothe rights afforded under the due process clause is discretionary on the part of the JBC. While the
facets of criminal42 and administrative43 due process are not strictly applicable to JBC proceedings, their
peculiarity is insufficient to justify the conclusion that due process is not demandable.

In JBC proceedings, an aspiring judge or justice justifies his qualifications for the office when he
presents proof of his scholastic records, work experience and laudable citations. His goal is to establish
that he is qualified for the office applied for. The JBC then takes every possible step to verify an
applicant's trackrecord for the purpose ofdetermining whether or not he is qualified for nomination. It
ascertains the factors which entitle an applicant to become a part of the roster from which the
President appoints.

The fact that a proceeding is sui generisand is impressed with discretion, however, does not
automatically denigrate an applicants entitlement to due process. It is well-established in
jurisprudence that disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generisin that they are neither
purely civil nor purely criminal; they involve investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its
officers, not the trial of an action or a suit. 44 Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court
merely calls upon a member of the Bar to accountfor his actuations as an officer of the Court with the
end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of
justice by purging the profession of members who, by their misconduct, have proved themselves no
longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an
attorney. In such posture, there can be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor. 45 On the
whole, disciplinary proceedings are actually aimed to verifyand finally determine, if a lawyer charged is
still qualifiedto benefit from the rights and privileges that membership in the legal profession evoke.

Notwithstanding being "a class of itsown," the right to be heard and to explain ones self is availing.
The Court subscribes to the view that in cases where an objection to an applicants qualifications is
raised, the observance of due process neither negates nor renders illusory the fulfillment of the duty of
JBC torecommend. This holding is not an encroachment on its discretion in the nomination process.
Actually, its adherence to the precepts of due process supports and enriches the exercise of its
discretion. When an applicant, who vehemently denies the truth of the objections, is afforded the
chance to protest, the JBC is presented with a clearer understanding of the situation it faces, thereby
guarding the body from making an unsound and capriciousassessment of information brought before
it. The JBC is not expected to strictly apply the rules of evidence in its assessment of an objection
against an applicant. Just the same, to hear the side of the person challenged complies with the
dictates of fairness for the only test that an exercise of discretion must surmount is that of soundness.

A more pragmatic take on the matter of due process in JBC proceedings also compels the Court to
examine its current rules. The pleadings of the parties mentioned two: 1] JBC-009 and 2] JBC-010. The
former provides the following provisions pertinent to this case:

SECTION 1. Evidence of integrity. - The Council shall take every possible step to verify the applicant's
record of and reputation for honesty, integrity, incorruptibility, irreproachable conduct, and fidelity to
sound moral and ethical standards. For this purpose, the applicant shall submit to the Council
certifications or testimonials thereof from reputable government officials and non-governmental
organizations, and clearances from the courts, National Bureau of Investigation, police, and from such
other agencies as the Council may require.

SECTION 2. Background check. - The Council mayorder a discreet background check on the integrity,
reputation and character of the applicant, and receive feedback thereon from the public, which it shall
check or verify to validate the merits thereof.

SECTION 3. Testimony of parties.- The Council may receive written opposition to an applicant on
groundof his moral fitness and, at its discretion, the Council mayreceive the testimony of the oppositor
at a hearing conducted for the purpose, with due notice to the applicant who shall be allowed to cross-
examine the oppositor and to offer countervailing evidence.

SECTION 4. Anonymous complaints. - Anonymous complaints against an applicant shall not begiven
due course, unless there appears on its face a probable cause sufficient to engender belief that the
allegations may be true. In the latter case, the Council may either direct a discreet investigation or
require the applicant to comment thereon in writing or during the interview. [Emphases Supplied]

While the "unanimity rule" invoked against him is found in JBC-009, Jardeleza urges the Court to hold
that the subsequent rule, JBC-010, 46 squarely applies to his case. Entitled asa "Rule to Further Promote
Public Awareness of and Accessibility to the Proceedings of the Judicial and Bar Council," JBC-010
recognizes the needfor transparency and public awareness of JBC proceedings. In pursuance thereof,
JBC-010 was crafted in this wise:

SECTION 1. The Judicial and Bar Council shall deliberate to determine who of the candidates meet
prima facie the qualifications for the positionunder consideration. For this purpose, it shall prepare a
long list of candidates who prima facieappear to have all the qualifications.

The Secretary of the Council shall then cause to be published in two (2) newspapers of general
circulation a notice of the long list of candidates in alphabetical order.

The notice shall inform the public that any complaint or opposition against a candidate may be filed
with the Secretary within ten (10) days thereof.

SECTION 2.The complaint or opposition shall be in writing, under oath and in ten (10) legible copies,
together with its supporting annexes. It shall strictly relate to the qualifications of the candidate or lack
thereof, as provided for in the Constitution, statutes, and the Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council, as
well as resolutions or regulations promulgated by it.

The Secretary of the Council shallfurnish the candidate a copy of the complaint or opposition against
him. The candidate shall have five (5) days from receipt thereof within which to file his comment to the
complaint or opposition, if he so desires.

SECTION 3.The Judicial and Bar Council shall fix a date when it shall meet in executive session to
consider the qualification of the long list of candidates and the complaint or opposition against them, if
any. The Council may, on its own, conduct a discreet investigation of the background of the candidates.

On the basis of its evaluationof the qualification of the candidates, the Council shall prepare the
shorter list of candidates whom it desires to interview for its further consideration.

SECTION 4.The Secretary of the Council shall again cause to be published the dates of the interview of
candidates in the shorter list in two (2) newspapers of general circulation. It shall likewise be posted in
the websites of the Supreme Court and the Judicial and Bar Council.

The candidates, as well as their oppositors, shall be separately notified of the dateand place of the
interview.

SECTION 5.The interviews shall be conducted in public. During the interview, only the members ofthe
Council can ask questions to the candidate. Among other things, the candidate can be made to explain
the complaint or opposition against him.

SECTION 6. After the interviews, the Judicial and Bar Council shall again meet in executive session for
the final deliberation on the short list of candidates which shall be sent to the Office of the President as
a basis for the exercise of the Presidential power of appointment. [Emphases supplied]

Anent the interpretation of these existing rules, the JBC contends that Sections 3 and 4, Rule 10 of JBC-
009 are merely directory in nature as can be gleaned from the use of the word "may." Thus, the
conduct of a hearing under Rule 4 of JBC-009 is permissive and/or discretionary on the part of the JBC.
Even the conduct of a hearing to determine the veracity of an opposition is discretionary for there are
ways, besides a hearing, to ascertain the truth or falsity of allegations. Succinctly, this argument
suggests that the JBC has the discretion to hold or not to hold a hearing when an objection to an
applicants integrity is raised and that it may resort to other means to accomplish its objective.
Nevertheless, JBC adds, "what is mandatory, however, is that if the JBC, in its discretion, receives a
testimony of an oppositor in a hearing, due notice shall be given to the applicant and that shall be
allowed to cross-examine the oppositor." 47 Again, the Court neither intends to strip the JBC of its
discretion to recommend nominees nor proposes thatthe JBC conduct a full-blown trial when objections
to an application are submitted. Still, it is unsound to say that, all together, the observance of due
process is a part of JBCs discretion when an opposition to an application is made of record. While it
may so rely on "other means" such as character clearances, testimonials, and discreet investigation to
aid it in forming a judgment of an applicants qualifications, the Court cannot accept a situation where
JBC is given a full rein on the application of a fundamental right whenever a persons integrity is put to
question. In such cases, an attack on the person of the applicant necessitates his right to explain
himself.

The JBCs own rules convince the Court to arrive at this conclusion. The subsequent issuance of JBC-
010 unmistakably projects the JBCs deference to the grave import of the right of the applicant to be
informed and corollary thereto, the right to be heard. The provisions of JBC-010, per se, provide that:
any complaint or opposition against a candidate may be filed with the Secretary within ten (10) days
thereof; the complaint or opposition shall be in writing, under oath and in ten (10) legible copies; the
Secretary of the Council shall furnish the candidate a copy of the complaint or opposition against him;
the candidate shall have five (5) days from receipt thereof within which to file his comment to the
complaint or opposition, if he so desires; and the candidate can be made to explain the complaint or
opposition against him.

The Court may not close its eyes to the existence of JBC-010 which, under the rules of statutory
construction,bears great weight in that: 1] it covers "any" complaint or opposition; 2] it employs the
mandatory term, "shall"; and 3] most importantly, it speaks of the very essence of due process. While
JBC-010 does not articulate a procedure that entails a trialtype hearing, it affords an applicant, who
faces "any complaint or opposition," the right to answer the accusations against him. This constitutes
the minimum requirements of due process.

Application to Jardelezas Case

Nearing the ultimate conclusion of this case, the Court is behooved to rule on whether Jardeleza was
deprived of his right to due process in the events leading up to, and during, the vote on the shortlist
last June 30, 2014.

The JBC gives great weight and substance to the fact that it gave Jardeleza the opportunity to answer
the allegations against him. It underscores the fact that Jardeleza was asked to attend the June 30,
2014 meeting so that he could shed light on the issues thrown at him. During the said meeting, Chief
Justice Sereno informed him that in connection with his candidacy for the position of Associate Justice
of the Supreme Court, the Council would like to propound questions on the following issues raised
against him: 1] his actuations in handling an international arbitration case not compatible with public
interest;48 2] reports on his extra-marital affair in SMC; and 3] alleged insider trading which led to the
"show cause" order from the Philippine Stock Exchange. 49

As Jardeleza himself admitted, he declined to answer or to explain his side, as he would not want to be
"lulled into waiving his rights." Instead, he manifested that his statement be put on record and
informed the Council of the then pendency of his letter-petition with the Court en banc. When Chief
Justice Sereno informed Jardeleza that the Council would want to hear from him on the three (3) issues
against him,Jardeleza reasoned out that this was precisely the issue. He found it irregular that he was
not being given the opportunity to be heard per the JBC rules.He asserted that a candidate must be
given the opportunity to respond to the charges against him. He urged the Chief Justice to step down
from her pedestal and translate the objections in writing. Towards the end of the meeting, the Chief
Justice said that both Jardelezas written and oral statements would be made part of the record. After
Jardeleza was excused from the conference, Justice Lagman suggested that the voting be deferred, but
the Chief Justice ruled that the Council had already completed the process required for the voting to
proceed.

After careful calibration of the case, the Court has reached the determination that the application of
the "unanimity rule" on integrity resulted in Jardelezas deprivation of his right to due process.

As threshed out beforehand, due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in all
situations require a trial-type proceeding. Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the
charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. 50 Even as Jardeleza was
verbally informed of the invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 against him and was later asked to
explain himself during the meeting, these circumstances still cannot expunge an immense perplexity
that lingers in the mind of the Court. What is to become of the procedure laid down in JBC-010 if the
same would be treated with indifference and disregard? To repeat, as its wording provides, any
complaint or opposition against a candidate may be filed with the Secretary withinten (10) days from
the publication of the notice and a list of candidates. Surely, this notice is all the more conspicuous to
JBC members. Granting ex argumenti, that the 10-day period 51 is only applicable to the public,
excluding the JBC members themselves, this does not discount the fact that the invocation of the first
ground in the June 5, 2014 meeting would have raised procedural issues. To be fair, several members
of the Council expressed their concern and desire to hear out Jardeleza but the application of JBC-010
did not form part of the agenda then. It was only during the next meeting on June 16, 2014, that the
Council agreed to invite Jardeleza, by telephone, to a meeting that would be held on the same day
when a resource person would shed light on the matter.

Assuming again that the classified nature of the ground impelled the Council to resort to oral notice
instead of furnishing Jardeleza a written opposition, why did the JBC not take into account its authority
to summon Jardeleza in confidence at an earlier time? Is not the Council empowered to "take every
possible step to verify the qualification of the applicants?" It would not be amiss to state, at this point,
that the confidential legal memorandum used in the invocation ofthe "unanimity rule" was actually
addressed to Jardeleza, in his capacity as Solicitor General. Safe to assume is his knowledge of the
privileged nature thereof and the consequences of its indiscriminate release to the public. Had he been
privately informed of the allegations against him based on the document and had he been ordered to
respond thereto in the same manner, Jardelezas right to be informed and to explain himself would
have been satisfied.

What precisely set off the protest of lack of due process was the circumstance of requiring Jardeleza to
appear before the Council and to instantaneously provide those who are willing to listen an intelligent
defense. Was he given the opportunity to do so? The answer is yes, in the context of his physical
presence during the meeting. Was he given a reasonable chance to muster a defense? No, because he
was merely asked to appear in a meeting where he would be, right then and there, subjected to an
inquiry. It would all be too well to remember that the allegations of his extra-marital affair and acts of
insider trading sprung up only during the June 30, 2014 meeting. While the said issues became the
object of the JBC discussion on June 16, 2014, Jardeleza was not given the idea that he should prepare
to affirm or deny his past behavior. These circumstances preclude the very idea of due process in
which the right to explain oneself is given, not to ensnare by surprise, but toprovide the person a
reasonable opportunity and sufficient time to intelligently muster his response. Otherwise, the
occasion becomes anidle and futile exercise.

Needless to state, Jardelezas grievance is not an imagined slight but a real rebuff of his right to be
informed of the charges against him and his right to answer the same with vigorouscontention and
active participation in the proceedings which would ultimately decide his aspiration to become a
magistrate of this Court.

Consequences

To write finisto this controversy and in view of the realistic and practical fruition of the Courts findings,
the Court now declares its position on whether or not Jardeleza may be included in the shortlist, just in
time when the period to appoint a member of the Court is about to end.

The conclusion of the Court is hinged on the following pivotal points:

 1. There was a misapplication of the "unanimity rule" under Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 as to
Jardelezas legal strategy in handling a case for the government.

2. While Jardelezas alleged extra-marital affair and acts of insider trading fall within the
contemplation of a "question on integrity" and would have warranted the application of the
"unanimity rule," he was notafforded due process in its application.

3. The JBC, as the sole body empowered to evaluate applications for judicial posts, exercises
full discretion on its power to recommend nomineesto the President. The sui generischaracter
of JBC proceedings, however, is not a blanket authority to disregard the due process under JBC-
010.

4. Jardeleza was deprived of his right to due process when, contrary to the JBC rules, he was
neither formally informed of the questions on his integrity nor was provided a reasonable
opportunity to prepare his defense.

With the foregoing, the Court is compelled to rule that Jardeleza should have been included in the
shortlist submitted to the President for the vacated position of Associate Justice Abad. This
consequence arose not from the unconstitutionality of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009, per se, but from
the violation by the JBC of its own rules of procedure and the basic tenets of due process. By no means
does the Court intend to strike down the "unanimity rule" as it reflects the JBCs policy and, therefore,
wisdom in its selection of nominees. Even so, the Court refuses to turn a blind eye on the palpable
defects in its implementation and the ensuing treatment that Jardeleza received before the Council.
True, Jardeleza has no vested right to a nomination, but this does not prescind from the fact that the
JBC failed to observe the minimum requirements of due process.

In criminal and administrative cases, the violation of a partys right to due process raises a serious
jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the
fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for
lack of jurisdiction.52 This rule may well be applied to the current situation for an opposing view
submits to an undue relaxation of the Bill of Rights. To this, the Court shall not concede. Asthe branch
of government tasked to guarantee that the protection of due process is available to an individual in
proper cases, the Court finds the subject shortlist as tainted with a vice that it is assigned to guard
against. Indeed, the invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 must be deemed to have never come
into operation in light of its erroneous application on the original ground against Jardelezas integrity.
At the risk of being repetitive, the Court upholds the JBCs discretion in the selection of nominees, but
its application of the "unanimity rule" must be applied in conjunction with Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-010
being invoked by Jardeleza. Having been able to secure four (4) out of six (6) votes, the only conclusion
left to propound is that a majority of the members of the JBC, nonetheless, found Jardeleza to be
qualified for the position of Associate Justice and this grants him a rightful spot in the shortlist
submitted to the President. Need to Revisit JBCs

Internal Rules

In the Courts study of the petition,the comments and the applicable rules of the JBC, the Court is of
the view that the rules leave much to be desired and should be reviewed and revised. It appears that
the provision on the "unanimity rule" is vagueand unfair and, therefore, can be misused or abused
resulting in the deprivation of an applicants right to due process.

Primarily, the invocation of the "unanimity rule" on integrity is effectively a veto power over the
collective will of a majority. This should be clarified. Any assertion by a member aftervoting seems to
be unfair because it effectively gives him or her a veto power over the collective votes of the other
members in view of the unanimous requirement. While an oppositor-member can recuse himself
orherself, still the probability of annulling the majority vote ofthe Council is quite high.

Second, integrity as a ground has not been defined. While the initial impression is that it refers to the
moral fiber of a candidate, it can be, as it has been, used to mean other things. Infact, the minutes of
the JBC meetings n this case reflect the lack of consensus among the members as to its precise
definition. Not having been defined or described, it is vague, nebulous and confusing. It must be
distinctly specified and delineated.

Third, it should explicitly provide who can invoke it as a ground against a candidate. Should it be
invoked only by an outsider as construed by the respondent Executive Secretary or also by a member?

Fourth, while the JBC vetting proceedings is "sui generis" and need not be formal or trial type, they
must meet the minimum requirements of due process. As always, an applicant should be given a
reasonable opportunity and time to be heard on the charges against him or her, if there are any.

At any rate, it is up to the JBC to fine-tune the rules considering the peculiar nature of its function. It
need not be stressed that the rules to be adopted should be fair, reasonable, unambiguous and
consistent with the minimum requirements of due process.

One final note.

The Court disclaims that Jardeleza's inclusion in the shortlist is an endorsement of his appointment as
a member of the Court.1wphi1 In deference to the Constitution and his wisdom in the exercise of his
appointing power, the President remains the ultimate judge of a candidate's worthiness.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, it is hereby declared that Solicitor General Francis
I-I. Jardeleza is deemed INCLUDED in the shortlist submitted to the President for consideration as an
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court vice Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad.

The Court further DIRECTS that the Judicial and Bar Council REVIEW, and ADOPT, rules relevant to the
observance of due process in its proceedings, particularly JBC-009 and JBC-010, subject to the approval
of the Court.

This Decision is immediately EXECUTORY. Immediately notify the Office of the President of this
Decision.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
Hersie Bunda Mary Vi Monje Solinap
Case no 6.

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 4103 September 7, 1995

VERONICA S. SANTIAGO, BENJAMIN Q. HONTIVEROS, MR. SOCORRO F. MANAS, and

TRINIDAD NORDISTA, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. AMADO R. FOJAS, respondent.
DAVIDE JR., J.:

In their letter of 8 September 1993, the complainants, former clients of the respondent, pray that the
latter be disbarred for "malpractice, neglect and other offenses which may be discovered during the
actual investigation of this complaint." They attached thereto an Affidavit of Merit wherein they
specifically allege:

1. That we are Defendants-Appellates [sic] in the Court of Appeals Case No. CA-G.N. CV
No. 38153 of which to our surprise lost unnecessarily the aforesaid Petition [sic]. A
close perusal of the case reveals the serious misconduct of our attorney on record,
Atty. Amado Fojas tantamount to malpractice and negligence in the performance of his
duty obligation to us, to defend us in the aforesaid case. That the said attorney without
informing us the reason why and riding high on the trust and confidence we repose on
him either abandoned, failed to act accordingly, or seriously neglected to answer the
civil complaint against us in the sala of Judge Teresita Capulong Case No. 3526-V-91
Val. Metro Manila so that we were deduced [sic] in default.

2. That under false pretenses Atty. Fojas assured us that everything was in order. That
he had already answered the complaint so that in spite of the incessant demand for
him to give us a copy he continued to deny same to us. Only to disclose later that he
never answered it after all because according to him he was a very busy man. Please
refer to Court of Appeals decision dated August 17, 1993.

3. That because of Atty. Amado Foja's neglect and malpractice of law we lost the Judge
Capulong case and our appeal to the Court of Appeals. So that it is only proper that
Atty. Fojas be disciplined and disbarred in the practice of his profession.

In his Comment, the respondent admits his "mistake" in failing to file the complainants' answer in Civil
Case No. 3526-V-91, but he alleges that it was cured by his filing of a motion for reconsideration, which
was unfortunately denied by the court. He asserts that Civil Case No. 3526-V-91 was a "losing cause"
for the complainants because it was based on the expulsion of the plaintiff therein from the Far Eastern
University Faculty Association (FEUFA) which was declared unlawful in the final decision in NCR-OD-M-
90-10-050. Thus, "[t]he unfavorable judgment in the Regional Trial Court is not imputable to [his]
mistake but rather imputable to the merits of the case, i.e., the decision in the Expulsion case wherein
defendants (complainants herein) illegally removed from the union (FEUFA) membership Mr. Paulino
Salvador. . . ." He further claims that the complainants filed this case to harass him because he refused
to share his attorney's fees in the main labor case he had handled for them. The respondent then
prays for the dismissal of this complaint for utter lack of merit, since his failure to file the answer was
cured and, even granting for the sake of argument that such failure amounted to negligence, it cannot
warrant his disbarment or suspension from the practice of the law profession.

The complainants filed a Reply to the respondent's Comment.

Issues having been joined, we required the parties to inform us whether they were willing to submit
this case for decision on the basis of the pleadings they have filed. In their separate compliance, both
manifested in the affirmative.

The facts in this case are not disputed.

Complainants Veronica Santiago, Benjamin Hontiveros, Ma. Socorro Manas, and Trinidad Nordista were
the President, Vice-President, Treasurer, and Auditor, respectively, of the FEUFA. They allegedly
expelled from the union Paulino Salvador. The latter then commenced with the Department of Labor
and Employment (DOLE) a complaint (NCR-OD-M-90-10-050) to declare illegal his expulsion from the
union.

In his resolution of 22 November 1990, Med-Arbiter Tomas Falconitin declared illegal Salvador's
expulsion and directed the union and all its officers to reinstate Salvador's name in the roll of union
members with all the rights and privileges appurtenant thereto. This resolution was affirmed in toto by
the Secretary of Labor and Employment.

Subsequently, Paulino Salvador filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
Branch 172, a complaint against the complainants herein for actual, moral, and exemplary damages
and attorney's fees, under Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code. The case was docketed as Civil
Case No. 3526-V-91.

As the complainants' counsel, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss the said case on grounds of
(1) res judicata by virtue of the final decision of the Med-Arbiter in NCR-OD-M-90-10-050 and (2) lack of
jurisdiction, since what was involved was an intra-union issue cognizable by the DOLE. Later, he filed a
supplemental motion to dismiss.

The trial court, per Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong, granted the motion and ordered the dismissal of the
case. Upon Salvador's motion for reconsideration, however, it reconsidered the order of dismissal,
reinstated the case, and required the complainants herein to file their answer within a nonextendible
period of fifteen days from notice.

Instead of filing an answer, the respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and dismissal of the case.
This motion having been denied, the respondent filed with this Court a petition for certiorari, which was
later referred to the Court of Appeals and docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP No. 25834.

Although that petition and his subsequent motion for reconsideration were both denied, the
respondent still did not file the complainants' answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91. Hence, upon plaintiff
Salvador's motion, the complainants were declared in default, and Salvador was authorized to present
his evidence ex-parte.

The respondent then filed a motion to set aside the order of default and to stop the ex-parte reception
of evidence before the Clerk of Court, but to no avail.

Thereafter, the trial court rendered a decision ordering the complainants herein to pay, jointly and
severally, plaintiff Salvador the amounts of P200,000.00 as moral damages; P50,000.00 as exemplary
damages or corrective damages; and P65,000.00 as attorney's fees; plus cost of suit.

The complainants, still assisted by the respondent, elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which,
however, affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.

The respondent asserts that he was about to appeal the said decision to this Court, but his services as
counsel for the complainants and for the union were illegally and unilaterally terminated by
complainant Veronica Santiago.

The core issue that presents itself is whether the respondent committed culpable negligence, as would
warrant disciplinary action, in failing to file for the complainants an answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91
for which reason the latter were declared in default and judgment was rendered against them on the
basis of the plaintiff's evidence, which was received ex-parte.

It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for every person who may
wish to become his client. He has the right to decline employment, 1 subject, however, to Canon 14 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer
owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in
him. 2 He must serve the client with competence and diligence, 3 and champion the latter's cause with
wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. 4 Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of
the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client's rights, and the exertion of his
utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the
rules of law, legally applied. 5 This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and
every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to
assert every such remedy or defense. 6 If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the
entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to
the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not
only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and
helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession. 7

The respondent admits that it was his duty to file an answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91. He justifies his
failure to do so in this wise:

[I]n his overzealousness to question the Denial Order of the trial court, 8 [he] instead,
thru honest mistake and excusable neglect, filed a PETITION FOR CERTIORARI with the
Honorable Court, docketed as G.R. No. 100983. . . .

And, when the Court of Appeals, to which G.R. No. 100983 was referred, dismissed the petition,
he again "inadvertently" failed to file an answer "[d]ue to honest mistake and because of his
overzealousness as stated earlier. . . . "

In their Reply, the complainants allege that his failure to file an answer was not an honest mistake but
was "deliberate, malicious and calculated to place them on the legal disadvantage, to their damage
and prejudice" for, as admitted by him in his motion to set aside the order of default, his failure to do
so was "due to volume and pressure of legal work." 9 In short, the complainants want to impress upon
this Court that the respondent has given inconsistent reasons to justify his failure to file an answer.

We agree with the complainants. In his motion for reconsideration of the default order, the respondent
explained his non-filing of the required answer by impliedly invoking forgetfulness occasioned by a
large volume and pressure of legal work, while in his Comment in this case he attributes it to honest
mistake and excusable neglect due to his overzealousness to question the denial order of the trial
court.

Certainly, "overzealousness" on the one hand and "volume and pressure of legal work" on the other
are two distinct and separate causes or grounds. The first presupposes the respondent's full and
continuing awareness of his duty to file an answer which, nevertheless, he subordinated to his
conviction that the trial court had committed a reversible error or grave abuse of discretion in issuing
an order reconsidering its previous order of dismissal of Salvador's complaint and in denying the
motion to reconsider the said order. The second ground is purely based on forgetfulness because of his
other commitments.

Whether it be the first or the second ground, the fact remains that the respondent did not comply with
his duty to file an answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91. His lack of diligence was compounded by his
erroneous belief that the trial court committed such error or grave abuse of discretion and by his
continued refusal to file an answer even after he received the Court of Appeals' decision in
the certiorari case. There is no showing whatsoever that he further assailed the said decision before
this Court in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to prove his claim of
overzealousness to challenge the trial court's order. Neither was it shown that he alleged in his motion
to lift the order of default that the complainants had a meritorious defense. 10 And, in his appeal from
the judgment by default, he did not even raise as one of the errors of the trial court either the
impropriety of the order of default or the court's grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion to lift
that order.

Pressure and large volume of legal work provide no excuse for the respondent's inability to exercise
due diligence in the performance of his duty to file an answer. Every case a lawyer accepts deserves
his full attention, diligence, skill, and competence, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts
it for a fee or for free.

All told, the respondent committed a breach of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which requires him to serve his clients, the complainants herein, with diligence and, more specifically,
Rule 18.03 thereof which provides: "A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable."
The respondent's negligence is not excused by his claim that Civil Case No. 3526-V-91 was in fact a
"losing cause" for the complainants since the claims therein for damages were based on the final
decision of the Med-Arbiter declaring the complainants' act of expelling Salvador from the union to be
illegal. This claim is a mere afterthought which hardly persuades us. If indeed the respondent was so
convinced of the futility of any defense therein, he should have seasonably informed the complainants
thereof. Rule 15.05, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility expressly provides:

A lawyer, when advising his client, shall give a candid and honest opinion on the merits
and probable results of the client's case, neither overstating nor understanding the
prospects of the case.

Then too, if he were unconvinced of any defense, we are unable to understand why he took all
the trouble of filing a motion to dismiss on the grounds of res judicata and lack of jurisdiction
and of questioning the adverse ruling thereon initially with this Court and then with the Court
of Appeals, unless, of course, he meant all of these to simply delay the disposition of the civil
case. Finally, the complainants were not entirely without any valid or justifiable defense. They
could prove that the plaintiff was not entitled to all the damages sought by him or that if he
were so, they could ask for a reduction of the amounts thereof.

We do not therefore hesitate to rule that the respondent is not free from any blame for the sad fate of
the complainants. He is liable for inexcusable negligence.

WHEREFORE, ATTY. AMADO R. FOJAS is hereby REPRIMANDED and ADMONISHED to be, henceforth,
more careful in the performance of his duty to his clients.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Bellosillo, Kapunan and Hermosisima Jr., JJ., concur.

Case no. 7

EN BANC

A.C. No. 7594, February 09, 2016

ADELPHA E. MALABED, Complainant, v. ATTY. MELJOHN B. DE LA PEA, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:
The Case

Before the Court is an administrative complaint filed by Adelpha E. Malabed (complainant) against Atty.
Meljohn B. De la Pea (respondent) for dishonesty and grave misconduct.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Facts

In her Complaint1 dated 7 August 2007, complainant charged respondent with dishonesty for
"deliberately and repeatedly making falsehood" that "misled the Court." First, complainant claimed
that the Certificate to File Action in the complaint filed by respondent refers to a different complaint,
that is the complaint filed by complainant's brother against Fortunato Jadulco. In effect, there was no
Certificate to File Action, which is required for the filing of a civil action, in the complaint filed by
respondent on behalf of his client Fortunato Jadulco.

Second, complainant alleged that respondent did not furnish her counsel with a copy of the free patent
covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 1730, but respondent forwarded a copy to the Court
of Appeals. Complainant claimed that she could not properly defend herself without a copy of the title.
She further claimed that the title presented by respondent was fabricated. To support such claim,
complainant presented Certifications from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) and the Registry of Deeds in Naval, Biliran, allegedly confirming that there is no file in their
offices of OCT No. 1730.

Complainant also alleged that respondent was guilty of conflict of interest when he represented the
occupants of the lot owned by complainant's family, who previously donated a parcel of land to the
Roman Catholic Church, which deed of donation respondent notarized.

Complainant further accused respondent of conniving with Regional Trial Court (RTC), Naval, Biliran,
Branch 16 Judge Enrique C. Asis, who was his former client in an administrative case, to rule in his
clients' favor. Complainant narrated the outcomes in the "cases of Estrellers which were filed in the
[Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC)] and reversed by the RTC, in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction to favor respondent x x x and his client[s] x x x."

Complainant charged respondent with grave misconduct when he defied the accessory penalty of his
dismissal as a judge. Respondent worked as Associate Dean and Professor of the Naval Institute of
Technology (NIT) - University of Eastern Philippines College of Law, which is a government institution,
and received salaries therefor, in violation of the accessory penalty of dismissal which is his perpetual
disqualification from reemployment in any government office.

In his Comment2 dated 16 December 2007, respondent basically denied the charges against him.
Respondent alleged that "the [Certificate to File Action] he used when he filed Civil Case No. [B-] 1118
for quieting of title before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Naval, Biliran was the certification of
Lupon Chairman, the late Rodulfo Catigbe, issued on May 9, 2001." 3chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Respondent also claimed that the free patent title was attached to the folio of the records in Civil Case
No. B-1118 and he furnished a copy of the same to complainant's counsel. Assuming opposing counsel
was not furnished, respondent wondered why he raised this matter only upon filing of the instant
complaint.

Respondent argued that notarization of the deed of donation had no relation to the case filed against
the occupants of the lot. Respondent likewise stressed that the matter regarding Judge Asis's rulings
favorable to his clients should be addressed to Judge Asis himself.

As regards the charge of grave misconduct for defying the accessory penalty of dismissal from the
service, respondent admitted that he accepted the positions of Associate Dean and Professor of the
NIT - University of Eastern Philippines College of Law, which is a government institution. However,
respondent countered that he was no longer connected with the NIT College of Law; and thus, this
issue had become moot. Respondent further claimed that his designation as Assistant Dean was only
temporary, and he had not received any salary except honorarium. Respondent stated that he even
furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) and the MCLE Office a copy of his designation as
Associate Dean, and since there were no objections, he proceeded to perform the functions
appurtenant thereto. He likewise submitted an affidavit from Edgardo Garcia, complainant in the
administrative case against him, who interposed no objection to his petition for judicial clemency filed
before this Court.

Complainant filed a Reply-Affidavit 4 on 22 January 2008. Respondent filed a Rejoinder to Reply 5 on 20

February 2008. Complainant filed a Surrejoinder to the Rejoinder to Reply 6 on 20 February 2008. All
these submissions basically reiterated the respective arguments of the parties and denied each other's
allegations.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Ruling of the IBP

In his Report and Recommendation, 7 Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commissioner Norberto B.
Ruiz noted the foul language used by respondent in his pleadings submitted before the IBP.
Respondent described complainant's counsel as "silahis" and accused complainant of "cohabiting with
a married man x x x before the wife of that married man died." According to the IBP Commissioner,
such offensive language "[is a] clear manifestation[] of respondent's gross misconduct that seriously
affect his standing and character as an officer of the court."

With respect to the charges of dishonesty and grave misconduct, the IBP Commissioner found that
respondent is guilty of the same "as evidenced by the numerous documents attached by complainant
in all the pleadings she has submitted." Respondent committed acts of dishonesty and grave
misconduct (1) for using a Certificate to File Action which was used in a complaint filed by
complainant's brother Conrado Estreller against Fortunato Jadulco, who is respondent's client; (2) for
not furnishing complainant's counsel with a copy of the free patent covered by OCT No. 1730 which
was attached to the Comment respondent filed with the Court of Appeals; and (3) for accepting the
positions of Associate Dean and Professor of the NIT - University of Eastern Philippines College of Law
and receiving salaries therefor, in violation of the accessory penalty of prohibition on reemployment in
any government office as a result of his dismissal as a judge.

The IBP Commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one
year.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On 28 October 2011, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution adopting the IBP Commissioner's
recommendation. The Resolution reads:
RESOLUTION NO. XX-2011-137
Adm. Case No. 7594
Adelpha E. Malabed vs. Atty. Meljohn De La Pea

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part
of this Resolution as Annex "A" and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, and finding Respondent guilty of dishonesty and grave
misconduct, Atty. Meljohn B. De La Pea is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1)
year.9chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Issue

The sole issue in this case is whether respondent is guilty of dishonesty and grave
misconduct.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Ruling of the Court

Respondent is guilty of gross misconduct.

Using foul language in pleadings

In his Comment, respondent called complainant's counsel "silahis by nature and complexion" 10 and
accused complainant of "cohabiting with a married man x x x before the wife of that married man
died."11 In his Rejoinder, respondent maintained that such language is not foul, but a "dissertation of
truth designed to debunk complainant's and her counsel's credibility in filing the administrative
case."12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

We are not convinced. Aside from such language being inappropriate, it is irrelevant to the resolution
of this case. While respondent is entitled and very much expected to defend himself with vigor, he
must refrain from using improper language in his pleadings. In Saberon v. Larong,13 we
stated:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
x x x [W]hile a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not
justify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with countless possibilities for
one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.

On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive
personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless
required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. In keeping with the dignity of the legal
profession, a lawyers language even in his pleadings must be dignified.
For using improper language in his pleadings, respondent violated Rule 8.01 of Canon 8 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which states:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper.
Non-submission of certificate to file action

The submission of the certificate to file action, which evidences the non-conciliation between the
parties in the barangay, is a pre-condition for the filing of a complaint in court. 14 Complainant claims
that there is no such certificate in the complaint filed by respondent on behalf of Fortunato Jadulco, et
al. Instead, what respondent submitted was the certificate to file action in the complaint filed by
complainant's brother, Conrado Estreller, against Fortunato Jadulco. 15chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Respondent counters that what he used "when he filed Civil Case No. [B-] 1118 for Quieting of Title,
etc. x x x was the certification x x x issued on May 9, 2001, x x x."

Based on the records, the complaint for quieting of title in Civil Case No. B-1118 was filed with the RTC
on 18 October 2000. The Certificate of Endorsement, which respondent claimed was the certificate to
file action he used in Civil Case No. B-1118, was issued on 9 May 2001, or after the filing of the
complaint on 18 October 2000. It is apparent that the Certificate of Endorsement did not exist yet
when the complaint in Civil Case No. B-1118 was filed. In other words, there is no truth to respondent's
allegation that the subject matter of Civil Case No. B-1118 was brought before the Lupon
Tagapamayapa and that a certificate to file action was issued prior to the filing of the complaint.
Clearly, respondent misrepresented that he filed a certificate to file action when there was none, which
act violated Canon 10, Rule 10.01, and Rule 10.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to
wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
CANON 10. A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood; nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, x x x.
Failure to furnish opposing counsel with copy of title

With regard to respondent's alleged act of not furnishing complainant's counsel with a copy of the free
patent title, we find that it does not constitute dishonesty.

Admittedly, the Court of Appeals was furnished a copy of OCT No. 1730, which means that a copy of
the title exists. There is no showing that respondent deliberately did not furnish complainant's counsel
with a copy of the title. The remedy of complainant should have been to file with the Court of Appeals
a motion to furnish complainant or counsel with a copy of the title so she and her counsel could
examine the same.

Moreover, whether OCT No. 1730 is fabricated, as complainant alleges, is a question of fact demanding
an examination of the parties' respective evidence. Obviously, this matter falls outside the scope of
this administrative case, absent any clear and convincing proof that respondent himself orchestrated
such fabrication. The DENR and Registry of Deeds certifications do not prove that respondent
manufactured OCT No. 1730. Such documents merely confirm that OCT No. 1730 does not exist in their
official records.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Conflict of interest

Complainant accuses respondent of conflict of interest when the latter allegedly notarized a deed of
donation of a parcel of land executed by complainant's family in favor of the Roman Catholic Church.
Eventually, respondent allegedly sought to litigate as counsel for the opposing parties who are
occupants in the lot owned by complainant's family.

Suffice to state that notarization is different from representation. A notary public simply performs the
notarial acts authorized by the Rules on Notarial Practice, namely, acknowledgments, oaths and
affirmations, jurats, signature witnessings, and copy certifications. Legal representation, on the other
hand, refers to the act of assisting a party as counsel in a court action.

As regards complainant's serious accusations against respondent of conniving with Judge Asis and
conspiring with the latter to render judgments favorable to respondent's clients, such are bare
allegations, without any proof. Complainant simply narrated the outcomes of the proceedings in Civil
Case Nos. 1017, 860 and 973, which were filed by the Estrellers in the MCTC and reversed by the RTC.
Complainant conveniently failed to present any concrete evidence proving her grave accusation of
conspiracy between respondent and Judge Asis. Moreover, charges of bias and partiality on the part of
the presiding judge should be filed against the judge, and not against the counsel allegedly favored by
the judge.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Violation of prohibition on reemployment in government office

In our 9 February 1994 Resolution, 16 we dismissed respondent as Acting Judge of Municipal Trial Court
of Naval, Leyte and Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Caibiran-Culaba, Leyte for
partiality, with prejudice to reappointment to any public office, including government-owned or
controlled corporations.

There is no dispute that respondent knows full well the consequences of his dismissal as a judge, one
of which is the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from reemployment in any government
office, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Despite being disqualified, respondent
accepted the positions of Associate Dean and Professor of NIT-College of Law, a government
institution, and received compensation therefor.

Respondent alleges that his designation was only temporary, and "no fixed salary was attached to his
designation except for honorarium." Respondent also claims that he furnished a copy of his
designation to the OBC and MCLE office as a "gesture of x x x respect, courtesy and approval from the
Supreme Court." He further avers that complainant in the administrative case against him (as a judge)
posed no objection to his petition for clemency.

Respondent's contentions are untenable. The prohibition on reemployment does not distinguish
between permanent and temporary appointments. Hence, that his designation was only temporary
does not absolve him from liability. Further, furnishing a copy of his designation to the OBC and MCLE
office does not in any way extinguish his permanent disqualification from reemployment in a
government office. Neither does the fact that complainant in his previous administrative case did not
object to his petition for clemency.

In view of his disqualification from reemployment in any government office, respondent should have
declined from accepting the designation and desisted from performing the functions of such
positions.17 Clearly, respondent knowingly defied the prohibition on reemployment in a public office
imposed upon him by the Court.

In Santeco v. Avance,18 where respondent lawyer "willfully disobeyed this Court when she continued
her law practice despite the five-year suspension order," the Court held that failure to comply with
Court directives constitutes gross misconduct, insubordination or disrespect which merits a lawyer's
suspension or even disbarment.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Gross Misconduct

In sum, respondent committed gross misconduct for (1) misrepresenting that he submitted a certificate
to file action issued by the Lupon Tagapamayapa when in fact there was none prior to the institution of
the civil action of his client, Fortunato Jadulco, in Civil Case No. B-1118; (2) using improper language in
his pleadings; and (3) defying willfully the Court's prohibition on reemployment in any government
office as accessory penalty of his dismissal as a judge. Gross misconduct is defined as "improper or
wrong conduct, the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a
dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies a wrongful intent and not a mere error in
judgment."19chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, gross misconduct is a ground for disbarment or
suspension from the practice of law.
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. A member of
the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of
his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required
to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to
do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
In view of respondent's repeated gross misconduct, we increase the IBP's recommended penalty to
suspension from the practice of law for two (2) years.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Meljohn B. De la Pea GUILTY of gross misconduct and
accordingly SUSPEND him from the practice of law for two (2) years with a WARNING that the
commission of the same or similar act or acts shall be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar
Confidant, and all courts in the Philippines for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

Case no 8.

SECOND DIVISION

NEMESIO FLORAN and A.C. No. 5325

CARIDAD FLORAN,

Complainants, Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

BRION,

- versus - SERENO,

REYES, and

PERLAS-BERNABE,* JJ.

ATTY. ROY PRULE EDIZA, Promulgated:

Respondent. October 19, 2011

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This administrative case arose from an Affidavit/Complaint filed by spouses Nemesio (Nemesio)
and Caridad (Caridad) Floran against Atty. Roy Prule Ediza (Atty. Ediza) for unethical conduct.

The Facts

Spouses Floran own an unregistered 3.5525 hectare parcel of land, particularly described as Cad. Lot
No. 422-A, Pls-923 and situated in San Martin, Villanueva, Misamis Oriental. The land is covered by a
tax declaration in the name of Sartiga Epal (Epal), a relative, who gave the property to the
Spouses Floran.

On 9 August 1996, a certain Esteban Valera filed an action 1 for judicial foreclosure of mortgage on the
house situated on the land owned by the Spouses Floran with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan
de Oro City, Branch 41. The action for foreclosure involved an amount of P7,500.

Spouses Floran sought the assistance of Atty. Ediza. On 24 September 1996, Atty. Ediza filed a Motion
to Dismiss on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and cause of action. On 23 October 1996, the RTC
granted the motion to dismiss the case without prejudice based on non-compliance
with barangay conciliation procedures under the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law.

Sometime in 1997, the Spouses Floran sold a hectare or 10,910 square meters of their 3.5525 hectare
land to Phividec Industrial Authority (Phividec) for P25 per square meter totaling to the amount
of P272,750, payable in three installments (1) P55,132; (2) P120,000, and (3) P97,618. The
installments were paid and released within the months of June to July 1997. The sale was evidenced by
a Deed of Undertaking of Lot Owner executed by Nemesio and Phividecs representative and notarized
by Atty. Ediza on 31 March 1997.

Phividec then required the couple to execute a waiver in Phividecs favor. The Spouses Floran again
sought the help of Atty. Ediza for the preparation and notarization of the waiver. Atty. Ediza informed
the Spouses Floran to have the original owner of the land, Epal, sign a Deed of Absolute Sale in their
favor. Atty. Ediza gave the Spouses Floran several documents for Epal to
sign. Caridad visited Epal in Bunawan, Agusan del Sur and acquired her approval and expressed assent
to the conveyance, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale made by Epal in favor
of Nemesio for P2,000.

On 11 June 1998, Nemesio and Phividec executed the Deed of Absolute Sale of Unregistered Land. Out
of the total amount of P272,750, which Phividec paid and released to the Spouses Floran,
Atty. Ediza received the amount of P125,463.38 for the titling of the remaining portion of the land,
other expenses and attorneys fees.

Spouses Floran went back to Atty. Ediza several times to follow-up on the title. However,
Atty. Ediza failed to fulfill his promises. After the lapse of two years, with the land still unregistered, the
Spouses Floran asked Atty. Ediza for the return of their money. Atty. Ediza refused. Thus,
Spouses Floran presented their complaint before the chapter president of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Misamis Oriental.

The IBP called the Spouses Floran and Atty. Ediza to a conference. During the dialogue,
Atty. Ediza refused to return the money but promised to tear a document evidencing sale by the
Spouses Floran to him of one hectare land of their property for P50,000. The Spouses Floran claimed
that they had no knowledge that they executed such document in favor of Atty. Ediza and suspected
that they might have signed a document earlier which Atty. Ediza told them not to read. Afterwards,
the Spouses Floran filed their formal complaint before the Supreme Court.

In the Complaint/Affidavit dated 8 September 2000, Caridad alleged that Atty. Ediza gave them certain
documents, including a Deed of Absolute Sale, for Epal to sign in order to transfer the land in their
name. However, the Spouses Floran later discovered that one of the documents given by Atty. Ediza is
a deed of sale for a one hectare land in the same property executed by Epal in favor of Atty. Ediza for a
consideration of P2,000. When the Spouses Floran confronted Atty. Ediza, he initially denied the
document but then later promised to tear and destroy it.

In his Comment dated 23 January 2001, Atty. Ediza claimed that the Spouses Floran voluntarily gave
him one hectare of the 3.5525 hectare land as payment for handling and winning the civil case for
foreclosure of mortgage. Atty. Ediza explained that the Spouses Floran did not find the lot interesting,
lacking in good topography. He also stated that the property only had an assessed value of P23,700 at
the time it was presented to him.

Thereafter, towards the end of 1996, when Atty. Ediza learned that Phividec was interested to buy a
hectare of the Spouses Florans land, and considering that he has a hectare of undivided portion in the
property, he suggested to the Spouses Floran that both of them sell half a hectare each and equally
share in the proceeds of the sale. After Phividec made its full payment, Atty. Ediza gave fifty percent of
the proceeds to the Spouses Floran and he kept the other half. Thereafter, Atty. Ediza wanted his
remaining share in the land consisting of 4,545 square meters be titled in his name.
Atty. Ediza conveyed this to the Spouses Floran and volunteered to take care of titling the land,
including the Spouses Florans remaining share, with no cost to them.

Atty. Ediza stated that since Phividec had not yet applied for a separate tax declaration which would
segregate its portion from the remainder of the property, he thought of holding in abeyance the
separate survey on the remainder of the land. Also, Atty. Ediza was in a hurry to have the land titled
with the intention of selling it so he informed the Spouses Floran to just follow up with Phividec.

At the IBP conference, Atty. Ediza stated that he only agreed to return the 4,545 square meter portion
of the land to amicably settle the case with the Spouses Floran. He asserted that the Deed of Sale
signed by the Spouses Floran in his favor served as payment for the dismissal of the case he handled
for the Spouses Floran. Atty. Ediza denied that the money he received was intended for the titling of
the remaining portion of the land. Atty. Ediza claimed that the complaint against him stemmed from a
case where he represented a certain Robert Sabuclalao for recovery of land. The land was being
occupied by the Church of the Assembly of God where Nemesio Floran serves as pastor.

In a Resolution dated 7 March 2001, the Court resolved to refer the case to the IBP for investigation,
report and recommendation.

The IBPs Report and Recommendation

On 14 August 2008, the investigating commissioner of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP
submitted his Report and found that Atty. Ediza (1) failed to meet the standards prescribed by Rule
1.01 of Canon 1 and Canon 15, and (2) violated Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The IBP recommended that Atty. Ediza be imposed the penalty of six months suspension
from the practice of law.

In finding Atty. Ediza guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Investigating
Commissioner opined:

After careful evaluation of the claims of the parties vis-a-vis the documents available,
the version of the complainants appear to be credible while that of the respondent is shot
through with inconsistencies.

xxx

b. The foreclosure case of complainants involved only P7,500.00 and respondent Ediza filed
only a single motion and attended only two hearings. Thus, it is highly incredible [that]
complainants whom respondent Ediza claims were destitute will voluntarily and generously
donate to him 1 hectare of their land valued at P50,000.00. As it turned out, the 1 hectare
portion is worth not only P50,000.00 [but] more than P200,000.00.

c. The deed of sale of a portion of complainants land to respondent Ediza is admittedly

simulated because while it states that the consideration for the sale is P50,000.00, neither
party claims that any money was paid by respondent Edizato complainants.

d. As a lawyer, Atty. Ediza must be aware that a deed of sale involving real property must be
notarized to be enforceable. The document was unexplainably never notarized.
 Thus, this Commission finds that respondent Ediza must have caused the complainants to
unknowingly sign the deed of sale of a portion of their property in his favor. It may further be
noted that in their complaint, complainants allege that they saw in the files of
respondent Ediza a copy of deed of sale of a property executed by Sartiga Epal in favor of
Atty. Ediza which he promised to destroy when confronted about it by complainants. This was
never denied by Atty. Ediza.

Such conduct fails to come up to the standard prescribed by Canon 1.01 that A lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct and Canon 15 that A lawyer shall
observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transaction with his client.

On the second issue, x x x the claim of the complainants that they agreed to
give P125,000.00 of the proceeds of the sale of their property to respondent Ediza to register
the remaining portion also appears to be more credible for the following reasons:

1. There is no credible reason for complainants to expect and demand that

respondent Ediza undertake the registration of their property except that they have paid for it.
If they were aware that they gave 1 hectare of their property to respondent Ediza for handling
their civil case and that they are not paying respondent Ediza to register their property, it is
not likely that simple folks like them would be so bold to demand for such valuable service
from him for free.

2. There is no credible reason for respondent to willingly undertake for free for complainants the
not so simple task of registering an untitled property.

3. As previously stated, the P125,000.00 given to respondent Ediza by complainants is

obviously too generous for simply having handled the civil case involving only P7,500.00.
There must have been another reason for complainants to willingly pay the said amount to
respondent and the registration for their remaining property appears to be a credible reason.

It should also be noted that respondent Atty. Ediza does not even allege that he has taken any
step towards accomplishing the registration of the property of the complainants prior to the
filing of this complaint. Whether or not he agreed to do it for free or for a fee,
respondent Ediza should have complied with his promise to register the property of
 complainants unless he has valid reasons not to do so. He has not also given any credible
explanation why he failed to do so.

Such conduct of respondent Ediza violates Canon 18.03 that A lawyer shall not neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

Atty. Ediza filed a Motion for Reconsideration. On 26 June 2011, in Resolution No. XIX-2011-433, the
Board of Governors of the IBP affirmed the findings of the investigating commissioner. The resolution
states:

RESOLVED to unanimously DENY Respondents Motion for Reconsideration, there being no

cogent reason to reverse the findings of the Board and it being a mere reiteration of the
matters which had already been threshed out and taken into consideration. Thus, for lack of
substantial ground or reason to disturb it, the Board of Governors Resolution No. XVIII-2008-
401 dated August 14, 2008 is hereby AFFIRMED.

The Courts Ruling

After a careful review of the records of the case, we agree with the findings of the IBP and find
reasonable grounds to hold respondent Atty. Ediza administratively liable.

The practice of law is a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess the legal
qualifications for it. Lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency
and morality, including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. They must perform their fourfold duty to
society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with the values and norms of
the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. 2

Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Canon 15, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provide:

CANON 1

A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE
RESPECT FOR LAW OF AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. x x x
CANON 15

A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND
TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.

CANON 18

A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.

In the present case, the Spouses Floran assert that they had no knowledge that they signed a deed of
sale to transfer a portion of their land in favor of Atty. Ediza. They also insist that Atty. Ediza failed to
comply with his promise to register their property despite receiving the amount of P125,463.38. On the
other hand, Atty. Ediza maintains that he acquired the land from the Spouses Floran because of their
deep gratitude to him in the dismissal of the civil case for foreclosure of mortgage. Atty. Ediza further
claims that the amount of P125,463.38 which he received was his rightful share from the sale of the
land.

It is clear from the records that Atty. Ediza deceived the Spouses Floran when he asked them to
unknowingly sign a deed of sale transferring a portion of their land to Atty. Ediza. Atty. Ediza also did
the same to Epalwhen he gave Caridad several documents for Epal to sign. Atty. Ediza made it appear
that Epal conveyed her rights to the land to him and not to the Spouses Floran. Moreover, when the
sale of the Spouses Floransland pushed through, Atty. Ediza received half of the amount from the
proceeds given by the buyer and falsely misled the Spouses Floran into thinking that he will register
the remaining portion of the land.

Lamentably, Atty. Ediza played on the navet of the Spouses Floran to deprive them of their valued
property. This is an unsavory behavior from a member of the legal profession. Aside from giving
adequate attention, care and time to his clients case, a lawyer is also expected to be truthful, fair and
honest in protecting his clients rights. Once a lawyer fails in this duty, he is not true to his oath as a
lawyer.

In Santos v. Lazaro3 and Dalisay v. Mauricio,4 we held that Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility is a basic postulate in legal ethics. Indeed, when a lawyer takes a clients cause, he
covenants that he will exercise due diligence in protecting the latters rights. Failure to exercise that
degree of vigilance and attention expected of a good father of a family makes the lawyer unworthy of
the trust reposed in him by his client and makes him answerable not just to his client but also to the
legal profession, the courts and society.
The Supreme Court, as guardian of the legal profession, has ultimate disciplinary power over attorneys.
This authority to discipline its members is not only a right, but a moral and legal obligation as well. The
Court will not tolerate such action from a member of the legal profession who deliberately and
maliciously did not protect his clients interests.

In view of the foregoing, we find that suspension from the practice of law for six months is warranted.
Atty. Ediza is directed to return to the Spouses Floran the two (2) sets of documents that he misled the
spouses and Epal to sign. Atty. Ediza is also directed to return the amount of P125,463.38, representing
the amount he received from the proceeds of the sale of the land belonging to the Spouses Floran,
with legal interest from the time of the filing of the administrative complaint until fully paid.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Roy Prule Ediza administratively liable for violating Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1, Canon 15, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six months, effective upon receipt of this Decision.
He is DIRECTED to return to the Spouses Nemesio and Caridad Floran the two (2) sets of documents
that he misled the spouses and Sartiga Epal to sign. He is further ORDERED to pay
Spouses Nemesio and Caridad Floran, within 30 days from receipt of this Decision, the amount
of P125,463.38, with legal interest from 8 September 2000 until fully paid. He is warned that a
repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the record of respondent as attorney. Further, let other copies
be served on the IBP and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all
the courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

Associate Justice

* Designated Acting Member per Special Order No. 1114 dated 3 October 2011.

1 Docketed as Civil Case No. 96-516.

2 Spouses Garcia v. Atty. Bala, 512 Phil. 486 (2005).

3 445 Phil. 1 (2003).

4 496 Phil. 393 (2005).

Case no. 9

THIRD DIVISION

A.C. No. 9684, September 18, 2013

MARY ROSE A. BOTO, Complainant, v. SENIOR ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR VINCENT L.
VILLENA, CITY PROSECUTOR ARCHIMEDES V. MANABAT AND ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR
PATRICK NOEL P. DE DIOS, Respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:
This administrative matter stemmed from an information for Libel against complainant Mary Rose A.
Boto (Boto) filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch LXXIV, Taguig City (MeTC). The information
was prepared by Assistant City Prosecutor Patrick Noel P. De Dios (De Dios), the investigating
prosecutor; and approved by City Prosecutor Archimedes Manabat (Manabat). Senior Assistant City
Prosecutor Vincent Villena (Villena) was the trial prosecutor assigned to Branch LXXIV.

In her Complaint-Affidavit, 1 Boto charged respondents Villena, Manabat and De Dios with gross
ignorance of the law for filing the information for libel before the MeTC and for opposing the motion to
quash despite the knowledge that the said first level court had no jurisdiction over the case.

Boto alleged that on January 13, 2012, the Information 2 charging her with libel was filed before the
MeTC; that on the same day, the MeTC issued a warrant for her arrest; 3 that on January 25, 2012, she
posted bail4 and was informed that the arraignment and trial were scheduled on February 13, 2012;
that before the scheduled arraignment, she filed the Motion to Quash 5 the information on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction as the crime of libel falls within, the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) and not with the MeTC and that there was no crime as internet libel; that acting thereon, the
MeTC, instead of dismissing the case, issued the Order 6 requiring the trial prosecutor to file his
comment within ten (10) days and resetting the arraignment to April 13, 2012; that despite the lapse
of the period granted, Villena failed to file the required comment within the period prompting the MeTC
to extend the filing of the same and reset the hearing on June 27, 2012, thereby, delaying the process
by five (5) months; that the delay violated her constitutional right to a speedy trial; and that in his
Comment7 filed before the MeTC, Villena opposed the motion to quash and contended that "the court
had already determined probable cause when it issued the warrant of arrest, thus, it has effectively
mooted the resolution of any issue concerning jurisdiction, venue and sufficiency of evidence against
the complainant."8cralawlibrary

Boto further averred that she had previously filed a libel case against one George Tizon (Tizon) and
others, but the said case was dismissed by Villena without conducting an investigation; that Tizon was
the Administrative Officer V of the Department of Education Division, Taguig City, and the "godson" of
Hon. Senator Allan Peter Cayetano, spouse of Taguig City Mayor, Lani Cayetano; that she received the
resolution of the case only in January 2012 after the period to appeal had lapsed; that, however, when
Tizon filed a complaint for libel against her, his complaint was immediately acted upon by the Taguig
City prosecutors; and that so much interest was shown in the case, from its filing to the issuance of the
warrant of arrest on the same day the case was filed before the MeTC.

Boto added that Manabat, De Dios, and Villena had all been practicing law for quite a number of years
and it would be impossible for them not to know that the crime of libel falls within the jurisdiction of
the RTC. She asserted that the respondents were all ignorant of the law, whose incompetence was a
disgrace not only to the Department of Justice but to the legal profession as a whole.

The records further disclose that on October 17, 2012, the Information was properly filed with the RTC,
Taguig City.9cralawlibrary

On December 12, 2012, the Court issued the Resolution 10 requiring the respondents to file their
comment within ten (10) days from receipt thereof.

Positions of the Respondents

Being not similarly situated, the respondents filed their separate comments. In his Comment, 11 De
Dios, the investigating prosecutor, averred that the information for libel against complainant was filed
before the MeTC due to inadvertence and that no malice or gross ignorance of the law attended it. He
added that the information was later on filed with the RTC-Pasig, Branch 266, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 149408, after the case filed before the MeTC was quashed.
In his separate Comment,12 Manabat, the City Prosecutor who approved the Information, stated that
the libel was filed based on the uncontroverted evidence of the complainant therein; that the
information, however, was filed inadvertently with the MeTC; that there was no ignorance of the law or
malice involved as they had previously filed cases of libel with the RTC; that the inadvertent filing was
already corrected when the information was later on filed with the RTC; and that after the filing of the
information with the RTC, the said court issued an order finding that probable cause existed to hold
Boto for trial.

The trial prosecutor, Villena, in his Comment, 13 countered that the filing of the information was not
within his discretion as he was not the investigating prosecutor and that it was not his duty to review
the resolution of the investigating prosecutor as he had no authority to approve or disapprove an
information or its filing in court. His participation commenced only after it was filed with the MeTC. He
averred that the "Supreme Court had been very clear that once the information was filed in court, what
to do with it is solely the court's prerogative and discretion. No one else can impose on the court, not
even the Secretary of Justice much more this respondent." 14 Thus, he could not be expected to call the
court's attention that it erred in taking cognizance of the case. He could not be charged with gross
ignorance of the law since he was not the person whose judgment was called on to decide on whether
or not the court had jurisdiction.

On the libel case filed by Boto against one Tizon, he denied being biased when he dismissed it. He
claimed that in his ten (10) years as a practicing lawyer, he had been conscientious and judicious in all
his actions:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The Court's Ruling

The Court finds that Boto has valid reasons to file this complaint against the respondents who, being
prosecutors, are members of the bar and officers of the court.

Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) explicitly provides that jurisdiction over libel cases are
lodged with the RTC. The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations shall be
filed simultaneously or separately with the RTC of the province or city where the libelous article is
printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the
commission of the offense. Jurisprudence is replete with decisions on the exclusive jurisdiction of the
RTC to hear and try libel cases. In fact, the language of the law cannot be any clearer; its meaning is
free from doubt. All that is required is application. 15cralawlibrary

De Dios candidly admitted that inadvertence attended the filing of the information for libel with the
MeTC. He did not, however, proffer any justification or explanation for the error. He did not claim that
the mistake was either typographical or was a result of the application of a default form or template. In
the Court's view, it was plain carelessness. As no malice can be attributed, he merely deserves a
reprimand.

Manabat, on the other hand, should have been more cautious and careful in reviewing the report and
recommendation of his subordinate. He should not have approved the information and its filing in the
wrong court considering that his office was very knowledgeable of the law that jurisdiction in libel
cases lies with the RTC. In fact, he cited several libel cases which his office filed with the proper court.
As the head of office, he should be admonished to be more careful as his office is in the forefront in the
administration of criminal justice.

While De Dios and Manabat can validly claim inadvertence, Villena cannot invoke the same defense in
his handling of the case. Indeed, he did not file the information with the MeTC as he was not the
investigating prosecutor, but merely the trial prosecutor. He, however, mishandled the case which
prejudiced the complainant.

When the motion to quash was filed by Boto for lack of jurisdiction, Villena should have immediately
acted on it by not opposing the dismissal of the case. The records disclose that in his
Comment,16Villena prayed that the motion to quash be DENIED. His Comment
reads:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The undersigned prosecutor respectfully states that:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

1. For lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, insufficiency of evidence, and that the allegations contained
information do not constitute an offense, accused moves for the quashal of the information.

2. As to the first three (3) grounds relied upon by the accused, the Honorable Court had already
determined probable cause when it issued a warrant of arrest against the accused. Thus, it has
effectively mooted the resolution of any issue concerning jurisdiction, venue and sufficiency of
evidence against the accused.

3. Accused herself contended that there is no jurisprudence yet defining the extent of the coverage of
the crime of libel over social network. Thus, with more reason, the findings of the undersigned's office
must be respected.

Wherefore, premises considered, the undersigned respectfully prays of this Honorable Court to DENY
accused's motion to quash.

xxxx.17 [Italicization supplied]

Patently, this responsive pleading of Villena demonstrates that he did not know the elementary rules
on jurisdiction. Fundamental is the rule that jurisdiction is conferred by law and is not within the courts,
let alone the parties themselves, to determine or conveniently set aside. 18 It cannot be waived except
for those judicially recognizable grounds like estoppel. And it is not mooted by an action of a court in
an erroneously filed case. It has been held in a plethora of cases that when the law or procedure is so
elementary, not to know, or to act as if one does not know it, constitutes gross ignorance of the law,
even without the complainant having to prove malice or bad faith. 19cralawlibrary

Villena should have even initiated the move for the dismissal of the case on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. Instead of taking the initiative, he even opposed the motion to quash the information. At
any rate, respondents are not barred from refiling the case before the proper court if probable cause to
hold the complainant liable really exists. His dismal failure to apply the basic rule on jurisdiction
amounts to ignorance of the law and reflects his lack of prudence, if not his incompetence, in the
performance of his duties.20cralawlibrary

Moreover, by not immediately filing a comment, he cannot blame the complainant for claiming that her
right to a speedy trial was violated. It cannot be argued that no prejudice was caused against her
because the error was immediately corrected and the information was properly filed with the RTC. Boto
was adversely affected not because the MeTC immediately issued a warrant for her arrest, but because
the prosecution of the case, meritorious or not, was considerably delayed. The Court takes judicial
notice that proceedings at the first level courts, especially in cities and capital towns, are relatively
slower than those at the RTC because of its more numerous pending cases.

As a responsible public servant, a prosecutor's primary duty is not to simply convict but to see that
justice is done.21 He is obliged to perform his duties fairly, consistently and expeditiously, and respect
and protect human dignity and uphold human rights in contributing to ensuring due process and the
smooth functioning of the criminal justice system. 22 As such, he should not initiate or continue
prosecution, or shall make every effort to stay the proceedings when it is apparent that the court has
no jurisdiction over the case. This is where Villena failed.

As lawyers, the respondents are officers of the court with the duty to uphold its dignity and authority
and not promote distrust in the administration of justice. 23 No less than the Code of Professional
Responsibility mandates all lawyers to exert every effort to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice.24cralawlibrary

WHEREFORE, Senior Assistant City Prosecutor Vincent L. Villena is found liable for Ignorance of the
Law and is hereby FINED in the amount of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos, payable within 30 days
from receipt of this resolution with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be
dealt with more severely.

Assistant City Prosecutor Patrick Noel P. De Dios, for his negligence, is REPRIMANDED with a warning
that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.

City Prosecutor Archimedes V. Manabat is admonished to be more careful and circumspect in the
review of the actions of his assistants.
SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Del Castillo,*Abad, and Leonen, JJ., concur.

Case no 10.

FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 10483, March 18, 2016

THE CHRISTIAN SPIRITISTS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC., PICO LOCAL CENTER, REPRESENTED
BY THEIR ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, EDWIN A. PANTE, Complainant, v. ATTY. DANIEL D.
MANGALLAY, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

This administrative case against the respondent attorney did not arise from any attorney-client
relationship gone wrong between the parties but from the ejectment action in which the respondent
attorney, as the plaintiff, successfully defeated the local congregation of the Christian Spiritists in the
Philippines, Inc., Pico Local Center (CSP-PLC), whose church building and other structures were the
objects of the action. After the defendants filed their notice of appeal, the parties agreed to settle
among themselves, with the defendants withdrawing the notice of appeal and agreeing to voluntarily
vacate and remove their structures by August 31, 2013 in consideration of the respondent's financial
assistance of P300,000.00. But, despite receiving the respondent's financial assistance, the defendants
reneged on their end of the agreement; hence, at the respondent's instance, the trial court issued the
writ of execution and the writ of demolition, by virtue of which the structures of the defendants were
ultimately demolished.

The demolition impelled the CSP-PLC, represented by its local Minister, Edwin A. Pante (Pante), to bring
the disbarment complaint against the respondent based on his allegedly gross misconduct and deceit
in causing the demolition of the structures without the demolition order from the court, violation of the
Lawyer's Oath, and disobedience to a lawful order of the court, positing that he thereby abused his
legal knowledge.
Antecedents

Pante avers that the CSP-PLC constructed its church building on the land located in JE 176 Pico, La
Trinidad, Benguet, which was owned by Maria Omiles who had bought it from Larry Ogas; 1 that on June
11, 2012, Omiles and Pastor Elvis Maliked received the summons issued by the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet requiring them to answer the complaint for unlawful detainer filed
against them by the respondent; that based on the allegations of the complaint (docketed as Civil Case
No. R-1256 entitled Daniel Dazon Mangallay v. Maria Tomino Omiles and all persons staying with
and/or acting on her behalf, including all Officers and/or patrons of the Church of the Christian
Spiritists in the Philippines, represented by Pastor Elvis S. Maliked), the respondent claimed ownership
of the land where the church of the CSP-PLC had been erected, attaching the copy of Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 45241 issued by the Register of Deeds of Benguet, and the deed of
absolute sale executed between him and one Pedro Loy; 2 that the MTC later on decided the case by
declaring the respondent to have the better right of possession; and that the MTC further declared that
the CSP-PLC was a builder in good faith, without prejudice to the respondent exercising his option to
appropriate the building in accordance with Article 448 of the Civil Code.3

As earlier mentioned, the respondent sought and obtained the writ of execution from the MTC after the
defendants, including the complainant, reneged on the promise to voluntarily vacate and surrender the
premises by August 31, 2013 in consideration of the respondent's financial assistance of P300,000.00.
The writ of execution was issued on December 13, 2013 and the writ of demolition on December 19,
2013. Sheriffs Joselito S. Tumbaga and John Marie O. Ocasla, accompanied by the respondent and
elements of the Philippine National Police, implemented the writ of execution and writ of demolition on
January 22 and January 23, 2014 by demolishing the church building and the pastoral house of the
CSP-PLC.4

Pante now insists that the demolition was done without a demolition order from the MTC; that the
dismantled materials worth P462,236.00 were forcibly taken away by the respondent, who had taken
advantage of his legal knowledge to cause the premature demolition of the structures sans the
demolition order; that such taking away of the dismantled materials constituted robbery and malicious
mischief; and that his act warranted his disbarment.

In response, the respondent denies any wrong doing. He counters that the demolition was backed up
by a court order;5 that after receiving the decision of the MTC, the parties entered into a compromise
agreement by virtue of which the CSP-PLC withdrew its appeal and promised to voluntarily vacate and
surrender the disputed premises in consideration of P300,000.00 to be paid by him; 6 that despite his
having paid the same, the CSP-PLC did not vacate the premises even within the grace period given to
them;7 that he then moved for the execution of the judgment, and his motion was granted by the
MTC;8 that the sheriffs report dated November 21, 2013 9 stated that after the CSP-PLC did not comply
with the writ of execution to remove or demolish its structures on the premises; that he consequently
sought from the MTC the writ of demolition; and that the MTC issued the writ of demolition. 10

The respondent avers that it was not he but the sheriffs who implemented the writ of demolition; that
the sheriffs report dated January 30, 2014 stated that the conduct of the implementation was peaceful,
and that Pante and the other members of the church personally observed the conduct of the
demolition; and that the sheriffs report further stated that Pante showed no defiance of the lawful
order of the court.11

The respondent submits that there was nothing wrong in his appropriating the dismantled materials to
ensure compensation for the expenses incurred in the demolition; and that the complaint for his
disbarment should be dismissed.
Ruling of the Court

The complaint for disbarment is absolutely devoid of merit and substance.

Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, provides as follows:

Section 1. How Instituted. Proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys
may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
upon the verified complaint of any person. The complaint shall state clearly and concisely the facts
complained of and shall be supported by affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of the facts
therein alleged and/or by such documents as may substantiate said facts.

The IBP Board of Governors may, motu proprio or upon referral by the Supreme Court or by a Chapter
Board of Officers, or at the instance of any person, initiate and prosecute proper charges against erring
attorneys including those in the government service. Provided, however, That all charges against
Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan, and Judges of the Court of Tax Appeals and
lower courts, even if lawyers are jointly charged with them, shall be filed with the Supreme
Court;Provided, further, That charges filed against Justices and Judges before the IBP, including those
filed prior to their appointment in the Judiciary, shall immediately be forwarded to the Supreme Court
for disposition and adjudication

Six (6) copies of the verified complaint shall be filed with the Secretary of the IBP or the Secretary of
any of its chapter who shall forthwith transmit the same to the IBP Board of Governors for assignment
to an investigator. (As amended, Bar Matter No. 1960, May 1, 2000.)

Under the foregoing rule, the proceedings for the disbarment, suspension or discipline of an attorney
may be taken by the Court, motu proprio, or by the IBP itself upon the verified complaint of any
person.

Should the disciplinary complaint against the attorney be filed directly with the Court, the complaint is
referred to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation. The reference to the IBP is resorted
to whenever the factual basis for the charge may be contested or disputed, or may require the
reception of the evidence of the complainant and the respondent attorney. After the referral and
hearings, the IBP renders its findings and recommendations on the complaint, subject to the review by
the Court.12 Yet, the Court may dispense with the referral to the IBP and resolve the charge without
delay. This happens particularly when the charge is patently frivolous, or insincere, or unwarranted, or
intended only to harass and spite the respondent attorney.

The Court has not enunciated any rule that prohibits the direct filing with it of administrative
complaints against attorneys in order to emphasize its role as the guardian of the legal profession with
the ultimate disciplinary power over attorneys. The disciplinary power of the Court is both a right and a
duty.13 Quite recently, however, the Court has revised Rule 139-B 14 to eliminate any ambiguity about
the authority of the Court to directly receive administrative complaints against attorneys, thus:
Section 1. How Instituted. - Proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys may
be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or upon the filing of a verified complaint of any
person before the Supreme Court or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). The complaint shall
state clearly and concisely the facts complained of and shall be supported by affidavits of persons
having personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such documents as may substantiate
said facts.

The IBP shall forward to the Supreme Court for appropriate disposition all complaints for disbarment,
suspension and discipline filed against incumbent Justices of the Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan,
Court of Tax Appeals and judges of lower courts, or against lawyers in the government service, whether
or not they are charged singly or jointly with other respondents, and whether or not such complaint
deals with acts unrelated to the discharge of their official functions. If the complaint is filed before the
IBP. six (6) copies of the verified complaint shall be filed with the Secretary of the IBP or the Secretary
of any of its chapter who shall forthwith transmit the same to the IBP Board of Governors for
assignment to an investigator.

x x x x

B. PROCEEDINGS IN THE SUPREME COURT

Section 13. Investigation of complaints. - In proceedings initiated by the Supreme Court, or in other
proceedings when the interest of justice so requires, the Supreme Court may refer the case for
investigation to the Office of the Bar Confidant, or to any officer of the Supreme Court or
judge of a lower court, in which case the investigation shall proceed in the same manner provided in
sections 6 to 11 hereof, save that the review of the report of investigation shall be conducted directly
by the Supreme Court.

The complaint may also be referred to the IBP for investigation, report, and
recommendation, [bold emphasis supplied to indicate the revisions]

Under the foregoing revisions of Rule 139-B, the administrative complaints against attorneys are
generally not dismissed outright but are instead referred for investigation, report and recommendation
either to the IBP, or the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC), or any office of the Court or even a judge of
a lower court. Such referral ensures that the parties' right to due process is respected as to matters
that require further inquiry and which cannot be resolved by the mere evaluation of the documents
attached to the pleadings. 15 Consequently, whenever the referral is made by the Court, the IBP, the
OBC or other authorized office or individual must conduct the formal investigation of the administrative
complaint, and this investigation is a mandatory requirement that cannot be dispensed with except for
valid and compelling reasons because it serves the purpose of threshing out all the factual issues that
no cursory evaluation of the pleadings can determine. 16

However, the referral to the IBP is not compulsory when the administrative case can be decided on the
basis of the pleadings filed with the Court, or when the referral to the IBP for the conduct of formal
investigation would be redundant or unnecessary, such as when the protraction of the investigation
equates to undue delay. Dismissal of the case may even be directed at the outset should the Court find
the complaint to be clearly wanting in merit. 17 Indeed, the Rules of Court should not be read as
preventing the giving of speedy relief whenever such speedy relief is warranted.

It is upon this that we dispense with the need to refer the complaint against the respondent to the IBP
for the conduct of the formal investigation. The documents he submitted to substantiate his denial of
professional wrongdoing are part of the records of the trial court, and, as such, are sufficient to
establish the unworthiness of the complaint as well as his lawful entitlement to the demolition of the
structures of the defendants in Civil Case No. R-1256.
Specifically, the demolition was authorized by the order issued by the MTC on December 19, 2013. 18In
the execution of the final and executory decision in Civil Case No. R-1256, the sheriffs dutifully
discharged their functions. The presence of the respondent during the execution proceedings was by
no means irregular or improper, for he was the plaintiff in Civil Case No. R-1256. The complainant was
then represented by Pante and some other members of the congregation, who did not manifest any
resistance' or objection to any irregularity in the conduct of the execution. After all, elements of the
Philippine National Police were also present to ensure the peaceful implementation of the writ of
execution.

Neither do we find anything wrong, least of all criminal, in the act of the respondent of taking away the
materials of the demolished structures. The parties put an end to their dispute by the defendants,
including the complainant and Pante, opting to withdraw their notice of appeal and undertaking to
voluntarily vacate and to peacefully turn over the premises to the respondent by August 31, 2013 in
exchange for the latter's financial assistance of the P300,000.00. The respondent paid the amount in
the MTC on March 20, 2013, and the amount was later on received by Maria Omiles, Feliciano Omiles,
Jr., and Noralyn T. Abad as the representatives of the CSP-PLC on the same day. 19 But the latter reneged
on their part of the agreement without returning the P300,000.00 to the respondent, who was left to
exhaust his legal remedies to enforce the judgment against them. It is notable that the judgment
expressly directed him "to exercise his option pursuant to the provisions of Article 448 of the New Civil
Code of the Philippines within thirty (30) days from the finality of this judgment insofar as the
improvements introduced by the defendants on the subject property."20 Article 448 of the Civil Code
granted to him as the owner of the premises, among others, "the right to appropriate as his own the
works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548." His
act of taking the materials of the demolished structures was undoubtedly the exercise of the right of
appropriating them in light of the fact that the P300,000.00 earlier delivered as financial assistance
was most likely meant to indemnify the supposed builders in good faith.

The respondent has called attention to the letter of the Christian Spiritists in the Philippines, Inc., 21the
mother organization to which the CSP-PLC belonged, to the effect that it was disavowing knowledge of
or participation in the disbarment complaint, and that it was categorically declaring that the complaint
had been filed by Pante only for his personal interest at the expense of the congregation. The
sentiments expressed in the letter manifested the inanity of the complaint, and the ill motives behind
Pante's filing of the complaint against the respondent. The proper outcome for such a complaint is its
immediate dismissal.

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the complaint for disbarment against Atty. Daniel Dazon
Mangallay for its utter lack of merit.

SO ORDERED