Article IX: CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
power of appointment of all officials and employees of the judiciary granted to the Supreme
IXA. COMMON PROVISIONS
Section 1. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent, are the Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit.
The Constitutional Commissions
Created as independent Constitutional bodies in order to protect their integrity
Civil Service Commission
Personnel office of government
Created under 1973 Constitution
Commission on Audit
Auditing office of the government
Created under 1935 Constitution as a one-man body (later expanded by 1973 Constitution
Commission on Elections
Tasked with the administration of the electoral process
Created under the 1935 Constitution
MACALINTAL V. COMELEC (2003) Macalintal claims that Section 19 and 25 of The Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003 which created the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee
composed of members of Congress with the power to review, revise, amend and approve
the IRR promulgated by the COMELEC violates Art. IX-A, Sec. 1 of the Constitution.
Ruling: GRANTED. The ambit of legislative power under Article VI of the Constitution is
circumscribed by other constitutional provisions. One such provision is Sec.1 of Art. IX-A
ordaining that constitutional commissions such as the COMELEC shall be "independent."
COMELEC should be allowed considerable latitude in devising means and methods that
will insure the accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created free, orderly
and honest elections.
Funa v. Villar (2012 ) Following the retirement of Carague on February 2, 2008 and during the
fourth year of respondent as COA Commissioner, Villar was designated as Acting Chairman of
COA from February 4, 2008 to April 14, 2008. Villar subsequently became COA Chairman and
was to serve, as expressly indicated in the appointment papers, until the expiration of the
original term of his office as COA Commissioner or on February 2, 2011. Funa asserts the
view that Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the 1987 Constitution proscribes reappointment of any kind
within the commission, the point being that a second appointment is a prohibited
reappointment.
Ruling: GRANTED. However, it is not for the reasons that petitioner posit. The provision, on its
face, does not prohibit a promotional appointment from commissioner to chairman as long as
the commissioner has not served the full term of seven years. A clear perusal of the provision
provides the restricting features in the matter of the composition of COA and the appointment
of its members (commissioners and chairman) designed to safeguard the independence and
impartiality of the commission as a body and that of its individual members.
Section 2. No member of a Constitutional Commission shall, during his tenure, hold any other
office or employment. Neither shall he engage in the practice of any profession or in the active
management or control of any business which in any way may be affected by the functions of
his office, nor shall he be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with or in
any franchise or privilege granted by the Government, any of its subdivisions, agencies or
instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
Sabili v. COMELEC (2012) *relevant to Section 6, IX-A Meynardo Sabili filed a petition for
certiorari seeking the annulment of a COMELEC en banc resolution because although Librea
was able to receive his copy of the Resolution, no prior notice setting the date of
promulgation of the said Resolution was received by him in accordance with COMELEC
Resolution No. 8696.
RULING: DISMISSED (with regard to this issue). The rules governing the Petition for
Cancellation of COC in this case is COMELEC Resolution No. 8696. However, the COMELEC
Order dated 4 May 201048 suspended this provision by ordering that "all resolutions be
delivered to the Clerk of the Commission for immediate promulgation" in view of "the proximity
of the Automated National and Local Elections and lack of material time." COMELEC has the
power to suspend its own rules of procedure based on Section 6, Article IX-A of the
Constitution, which gives it the power "to promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings and
practice before it or before any of its offices." In Lindo v. Commission on Elections, the Court
ruled that the additional rule requiring notice to the parties prior to promulgation of a
decision is not part of the process of promulgation.
Section 3. The salary of the Chairman and the Commissioners shall be fixed by law and shall
not be decreased during their tenure.
Section 4. The Constitutional Commissions shall appoint their officials and employees in
accordance with law.
Appointing Power
Constitutional Commissions are authorized to appoint their officials but are subject to Civil
Service Law and Rules.
OMBUDSMAN V. CSC (2005) The Office of the Ombudsman challenges the actions of the
Civil Service Commission to determine the qualifications of the members of the Office of the
Ombudsman. Such qualifications include Civil Service Executive (CSE) eligibility which is
governed by the Career Executive Service Board (CESB).
Ruling: GRANTED. Ineluctably, the judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, the Office of the
Ombudsman, and the Commission on Human Rights are not covered by the CES
governed by the CESB. The power of these constitutional offices to appoint their own
1| Acampado, Bien, Escudero, Flameno, Macasaet, Santos, Silva, Vergeire, Villanueva, Yangco
officers and employees is mainly intended to safeguard their independence, which is the same
Court.
Section 5. The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved annual appropriations
shall be automatically and regularly released.
Automatic Release of Funds
The Dept. of Budget and Management (DBM) has the obligation to automatically release the
appropriations and cannot enforce the no report, no release policy against offices with fiscal
autonomy. DBM cannot retain a portion of the amount nor program-release it.
CSC v. DBM (2005)The Civil Service Commission seeks to compel the Department of Budget
and Management to release the balance of its budget for fiscal year 2002. This balance was
intentionally withheld by respondent on the basis of its "no report, no release" policy; the CSC
contends that the application of the policy upon independent constitutional bodies of which it is
one is a violation of the principle of fiscal autonomy and, therefore, unconstitutional.
Ruling: GRANTED. To hold that petitioner may be subjected to withholding or reduction of
funds in the event of a revenue shortfall would, to that extent, place petitioner and the other
entities vested with fiscal autonomy on equal footing with all others which are not granted the
same autonomy, thereby reducing to naught the distinction established by the Constitution.
The agencies which the Constitution has vested with fiscal autonomy should thus be
given priority in the release of their approved appropriations over all other agencies not
similarly vested when there is a revenue shortfall.
ESTRELLA V. COMELEC (2004) *relevant to Section 6, IX-A COMELEC Commissioner
Lantion participated in the COMELEC En Banc Status Quo Ante Order despite inhibiting
himself from a previous case involving the same parties. In the said Order, five out of seven
incumbent members took part. Four voted in favor of the issuance of the Order. The Supreme
Court ruled that Lantions participation was invalid because nowhere in the COMELEC Rules
does it allow a Commissioner to voluntarily inhibit with reservation. Thus, private
respondent argues that following the doctrine laid out in Cua vs COMELEC, three votes would
have been sufficient to constitute a majority to carry the decision of the COMELEC En Banc as
provided by the Constitution and the appropriate rules.
Ruling: DISMISSED. COMELEC violated Rule 3 Section 5(a) of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure which provides that the concurrence of a majority of the Members of the
Commission shall be necessary for the pronouncement of a decision, resolution, order or
ruling. Even former Constitutional Commissioner Fr. Joaquin Bernas, SJ, questions the Cua
ruling in light of Section 7 Article IX-A of the Constitution, which says "majority of all the
Members." He thus concludes that "three is not the majority of seven." The Court hereby
abandons the doctrine laid down in Cua.
Section 6. Each Commission en banc may promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings and
practice before it or before any of its offices. Such rules however shall not diminish, increase,
or modify substantive rights.
Independence of the Commissions
Since the commissions perform vital functions of government, it is essential that they be
protected against outside influences and political pressures. These protective measures are
found in the previous commissions.
It should also be noted that Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution provides in part that
rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court. If however, the rules promulgated by a Commission are
inconsistent with a statute, the statute prevails.
ARUELO V. CA (1993) Aruelo and Gatchalian were rival candidates in the May 1992 elections
for the office of the Vice Mayor of the Municipality of Balagtas. Gatchalian was pronounced the
winner and thereafter Aruelo filed a petition with COMELEC to seeking to annul Gatchalians
proclamation. He also filed a petition with the trial court. Gatchalian submitted before the trial
court his Answer with Counter Protest and Counterclaim. Earlier, Gatchalian filed before the
trial court a Motion for Bill of Particulars, which was denied. Aruelo claims that in election
contests, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure gives the respondent therein only five days from
receipt of summons within which to file his answer to the petition and that this five-day period
had lapsed when Gatchalian filed his answer; that the filing of motions to dismiss and motions
for bill of particulars is prohibited by the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
Ruling: DISMISSED. No such rule can be found. Constitutionally speaking, the COMELEC
cannot adopt a rule prohibiting the filing of certain pleadings in the regular courts. The power
to promulgate rules concerning pleadings, practice and procedure in all courts is vested
on the Supreme Court.
ANTONIO V. COMELEC (1999) Antonio argues that in barangay electoral protest cases, the
period of appeal is ten days from receipt of the decision of the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial
Court under the Omnibus Election Code as opposed to the 5-day rule provided for in the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
Ruling: DISMISSED. Jurisprudence has consistently recognized that the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure are controlling in election protests heard by a regional trial court. The Court en banc
has held in Rodillas vs. COMELEC that "the procedure for perfecting an appeal from the
decision of the Municipal Trial Court in a barangay election protest case is set forth in the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure." Significantly, Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution
provides in part that "[r]ules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall
remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or
matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or
resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of
the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by the
Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision,
order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.
Decisions of the Commissions
Commissions are collegial bodies. Hence decisions are made by the body and not
individually.
 Decisions are reached by a majority vote whether en banc or by Division.
There is no decision until draft is signed and promulgated.
60-day mandatory period within which decisions must be made. Failure to do so does not
affect the merits of the case. The case must still be decided at the earliest possible time.
Review of Decisions
Decisions of Commissions may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Rule 65
(Rules of Court) based on three grounds:
o Grave abuse of discretion
o Lack of jurisdiction
o Excess of jurisdiction
Certiorari petition must only be filed after a Motion for Reconsideration. SC may, however,
dispense with the need for Reconsideration under exceptional circumstances.
Certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is limited to decisions by the Commissions
exercised under their adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions.
Due to the issuance of Revised Administrative Circular I-95 (1 June 1995), judgments and final
orders of quasi-judicial bodies may now be appealed to the Court of Appeals within 15 days
from notice thereof.
CUA V. COMELEC Petition to review the Comelec En Bancs order enjoining Cua from
assuming office. The order was in response to the Urgent Motion to suspend Cuas
proclamation filed by his opponent assailing the 2-1 decision of Comelecs First Division in
favor of Cuas assumption of office which En banc affirmed in a 3-2 decision. Cuas opponent
(private respondent) insists that no decision was reached by the First Division because the
required unanimous vote was not obtained. It was also argued that no valid decision was
reached by the Comelec En Banc because only 3 votes were cast in favor of the petitioner and
these did not constitute the majority of the body.
RULING: GRANTED. The 2-1 decision was valid. Further, the 3 members who voted to affirm
the First division constituted a majority of the 5 members who voted and deliberated thereon
en banc and their decision is also valid under Art. IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution.
N.B. Fr. Bernas disagrees and argues that it shall be decided by the majority vote of all its
members and not just those who participated and took part in the deliberation. (COMELEC has
a Chairman and 6 Commissioners).
MISON V. COMMISSION ON AUDIT Damages were sought from COA by the owners of a
vessel which sank while in the custody of Bureau of Customs. Espiritu, Technical Services
manager of COA, in a decision he rendered denied the claim. Later, the new COA chairman
reversed the Espiritu decision.
RULING: DISMISSED. A decision rendered by a mere manager of COA and not by the
Commission itself as a body is not valid. Neither the COA Chairman, much less a manager,
had power to render or promulgate a decision of or for the COA. Power is lodged in the COA
as a collegial body composed of a Chairman and 2 Commissioners. And assuming valid,
neither can the acting COA Chairman ratify it.
MATEO V. COURT OF APPEALS The Board Members (including Mateo) of Morong Water
District (MOWAD) suspended and later dismissed Edgar Sta. Maria, MOWAD General
Manager. Sta. Maria filed a petition which Mateo moved to dismiss. RTC denied the motion to
dismiss and the Motion for Reconsideration. This is a petition assailing the jurisdiction of RTC
over a case involving the dismissal of an employee of a quasi-public corporation.
RULING: GRANTED. RTC has no jurisdiction. The rule is that the hiring and firing of
employees of govt-owned and controlled corporations are governed by the provisions of the
Civil Service Law and Rules and Regulations. RTCs have no jurisdiction to entertain cases
involving dismissal of officers and employees covered by the Civil Service Law.
AMBIL V. COMELEC Ramirez filed an election protest before COMELECs First Division
against Ambil, who beat him as governor. Ambil allegedly received a purported resolution in
favor of Ramirez (the draft of which was penned by Commissioner Guiani before he retired).
COMELEC First Division issued an order setting the promulgation of the Guiani resolution.
Without waiting for the promulgation, Ambil filed a petition with the SC seeking to prohibit the
promulgation of the Guiani resolution.
RULING: DISMISSED. The Supreme Court has no power to review via certiorari an
interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a Division. The Court interprets Sec 7, Art
IX-A to mean final orders, rulings and decisions of COMELEC en banc and not of a
Division, and certainly not an interlocutory order of a Division. A decision, order or resolution
of a Division of the COMELEC must be reviewed by the COMELEC en banc via a motion for
reconsideration (MR) before the final en banc decision may be brought to the SC on certriorari.
MR is mandatory as a pre-requisite requirement. There are exceptions but the case at bar
does not fall under those exceptions. Furthermore, the Guiani Resolution is void because a
final decision or resolution is binding only after it is promulgated. Commissioner Guiani who
was already retired at the time when the final decision or resolution was promulgated cannot
validly take part in that resolution or decision.
DUMAYAS V. COMELEC In a Resolution promulgated 2 March 2000, COMELEC en banc
DENIED petition of Dumayas, in effect reversing the decision of 2nd Division of COMELEC,
and annulling his proclamation as mayor. Dumayas assailed the En banc Resolution for
allegedly violating Art IX-A, Sec 7 on the basis that only 4 Commissioners voted and that 2
Commissioners have already retired at the time of the promulgation.
HELD: DISMISSED. Decision was valid. A decision becomes binding only after its
promulgation. The 2 Commissioners, who had retired after they had signed and registered their
vote, are considered withdrawn or cancelled because their retirement preceded the
promulgation. The effect of withdrawal of votes would be as if they had not signed the
resolution. Only the votes of the remaining commissioners would be considered. In any event,
incumbent Commissioners still constituted a quorum. The remaining votes among the 4
Commissioners at the time of promulgation would still be 3-to-1 in favor of respondent Bernal.
FILIPINAS ENGINEERING & MACHINE SHOP V. FERRER Filipinas filed an injunction suit
and applied for writ of preliminary injunction before the Court of First Instance of Manila (Judge
2| Acampado, Bien, Escudero, Flameno, Macasaet, Santos, Silva, Vergeire, Villanueva, Yangco
Ferrer) contesting the COMELEC decision to award the bid to Amec for the manufacture and
delivery of voting booths. Writ was DENIED. COMELEC filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
grounds that the lower court (CFI) has no jurisdiction over the nature of the suit. Judge Ferrer
granted the Motion to Dismiss. Petitioner assailed the granting of the Motion to Dismiss.
RULING: DISMISSED. The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over a suit involving an order of
COMELEC dealing with an award of contract from its invitation to bid. True, it is the SC and not
the lower courts which has exclusive jurisdiction to review by certiorari the final decisions,
orders or rulings of the COMELEC relative to the conduct of elections and enforcement of
election laws. HOWEVER, the Court in the case at bar ruled that the COMELEC Order
awarding a contract to a private party as a result of bidding does not fall under the concept of
final order which is exclusively and directly appealable to SC on certiorari.
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY V. ATILANO (This case is pertinent to our section only to the
extent that it discusses the meaning of adjudicatory functions of a quasi-judicial agency/body)
DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body and the action of the DOJ Secretary in reviewing a
prosecutors order or resolution via appeal or petition for review cannot be considered a quasi-
judicial proceeding.
Quasi-judicial agency performs adjudicatory functions when its awards determine the rights of
parties, and its decisions have the same effect as a judgment of a court. The preliminary
investigation conducted by the prosecutor is not a quasi-judicial proceeding but an
investigative or inquisitorial powers. Investigative power is not judicial adjudication which
signifies the exercise of power and authority to adjudicate upon the rights and
obligations of concerned parties.
DELA LLANA V. COA CHAIR With the normalization of the political system after EDSA II,
COA saw it fit to issue Circular No. 89-299 which lifted the pre-audit of government
transactions of national government agencies and GOCCs. Dela Llana wrote to COA regarding
the recommendation of the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Food that the Department of
Agriculture set up an internal pre-audit service. In its reply, COA informed the Dela Llana of
prior issuance of Circular No. 89-299. COA also mentioned that there was already an
Administrative Order which required the installation of an internal audit service. Petitioner filed
before the SC a certiorari.
RULING: DISMISSED. Dela Llanas filing of certiorari is improper. Only quasi-judicial decisions
and orders rendered by COA are reviewable by the SC (per Sec 7 Art IX-A of Consti). Circular
89-299 was promulgated by COA under its quasi-legislative or rule-making powers. Hence, not
reviewable by SC. Furthermore, petition for prohibition is not appropriate in this case. Petition
for prohibition is filed against any tribunal, corporation, board or person whether exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions who has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with GAD. HOWEVER, prohibition only lies against judicial or minister functions
but not against legislative or quasi-legislative functions.
CAGAS V. COMELEC Petition for certiorari assailing the order denying the defenses raised by
Cagas, and the order denying his motion for reconsideration, both issued by the COMELEC
First Division in an election protest.
RULING: DISMISSED. The Cagas filing of certiorari before the SC is improper. Ambil v.
Commission on Elections stated that the SC interpreted Sec 7 of Art VIII to mean final orders,
rulings and decisions of the COMELEC rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-
judicial powers. This decision must be a final decision or resolution of the Comelec en banc,
not of a division, certainly not an interlocutory order of a division. The Supreme Court has no
power to review via certiorari, an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a Division of
the Commission on Elections. The proper remedy is for the petitioner to wait for the COMELEC
First Division to first decide the protest on its merits, and if the result should aggrieve him, to
appeal the denial of his special affirmative defenses to the COMELEC en banc along with the
other errors committed by the Division upon the merits.
N.B. The Court has no power to review on certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final
resolution issued by a Division of Comelec.
Exception: The Court may take cognizance of a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 to review
an interlocutory order issued by a Division of Comelec on the ground of the issuance being
made without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it does not appear to be specifically provided
under the Comelec Rules of Procedure that the matter is one that the Comelec en banc may
sit and consider, or Division is not authorized to act, or the members of the Division
unanimously vote to refer to the Comelec en banc.
Sevilla v. COMELEC Petition for certiorari, with prayer for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and/or Status Quo Ante Order, filed by petitioner Mamerto T. Sevilla, Jr., to nullify the
Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division and Resolution of the COMELEC en banc.
These assailed Resolutions reversed and set aside the Order of the Muntinlupa City MTC,
dismissing respondent Renato R. Sos election protest against Sevilla.
RULING: DISMISSED. The petition was prematurely filed. Section 7 of Article IX-A of the
Constitution require that a majority vote of all the members of the Comelec en banc, and not
only those who participated and took part in the deliberations, is necessary for the
pronouncement of a decision, resolution, order or ruling. In the present case, the COMELEC
en banc had a decision with an equally divided voting of 3 concurring and 3 dissenting
commissioners. COMELEC en bancs resolution must be heard pursuant to Section 6, Rule 18
of its Rules of Procedure. COMELEC en banc did not issue an order for a rehearing of the
case. Petition is dismissed and remanded to the COMELEC en banc.
N.B. Majority vote of all the members of Comelec en banc is required for a decision to be
made and not only those who participated and took part in the deliberation. The 3-3 vote of
Comelec en banc was short of one vote to obtain a majority decision. The vote of 4 members
must always be attained in order to decide, irrespective of the number of Commissioners in
attendance.
REBLORA V. AFP Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision and Resolution of
the Commission on Audit (COA) which denied the Rebloras claim for additional retirement
benefit. Petitioner retired after a total of 34 years of active service as a Commander in the
Philippine Navy.
RULING: DISMISSED. Reblora availed of the wrong remedy. The SC stated that decisions and
resolutions of the COA are reviewable by this Court, not via an appeal by certiorari under Rule
45, as is the present petition, but thru a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 64 in relation
to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The difference of an appeal under Rule 45 and a special civil
action under Rule 64 to Rule 65 is the permissible scope of inquiry of each. Unless there was
 grave abuse of discretion, simple errors of judgment committed by the COA cannot be 1.
reviewed even by the SC. The petition does not allege any grave abuse of jurisdiction.
2.
SAHALI V. COMELEC Matba and Usman who lost to petitioner Sahali and Ruby for the
positions of governor and vice-governor, respectively, filed an Election Protest with the
COMELEC. Matba contested the results in 39 out of 282 clustered precincts in the province of
TawiTawi. Sahali and Ruby jointly filed with the COMELEC First Division a Motion for
Reconsideration.The COMELEC First Division issued the herein assailed Order which denied
the said motion for reconsideration. Sahali and Ruby filed the instant petition asserting that the
COMELEC First Division committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the
predecessor.
The starting point of all the first appointments was February 2, 1987, when the Constitution
took effect, and the term of all subsequent appointees start on a February 2 even if they
actually assume office later than February 2. Whatever gap there may be between February 2
and their actual assumption of office affects their tenure only and not their term.
GAMINDE V. COA (2000): The Court explained that the term of the first appointees under the
1987 Constitution started on February 2, 1987. The extension of the term of the old
Commissioners simply meant that they used up a portion of the tenure to which new
appointees were entitled.

RULING: DISMISSED. The petition is improper. The power of the Supreme Court to review
election cases falling within the original exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC only extends to
final decisions or resolutions of the COMELEC en banc, not to interlocutory orders issued by a
Division thereof.
The order issued by the First Division of the COMELEC was merely interlocutory since it only
disposed of an incident in the main case i.e. the propriety of the technical examination of the
said election paraphernalia. Thus, the proper recourse for Sahali and Ruby was to await the
decision of the COMELEC First Division in the election protests filed by Matba and Usman and
to appeal the same to the COMELEC en banc by filing a motion for reconsideration.
N.B. The Courts power to review by certiorari only extends to final decisions of Comelec en
banc. However, (referring to Ambil vs Comelec) it may take cognizance of a certiorari action
directed against an interlocutory order by a Division of Comelec when the following
circumstances are present:
1. The order was issued without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction
2. Under the Comelec Rules of Procedure, the subject of the controversy is a matter which:
a. The Comelec en banc may not sit and consider
b. A Division is not authorized to act
c. The members of the Division unanimously vote to refer to the
Comelec en banc.
Section 2.
1. The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.
The CSC covers not all GOCCs but only those with original charters, which refers to those
corporations which have been created by special law and not through the general corporation
law. The test for determining whether officers and employees of a GOCC fall under the Civil
Service System is the manner of creation of the corporation to which they belong. However,
the moment a corporation ceases to be government controlled, it ceases to fall under
the Civil Service.
EIIB V. CA (1998): The Court rejected the claim of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation
Board (EIIB) of the DOF that it was exempt from the scope of the Civil Service since the nature
of its operation was primarily confidential. While the status of being primarily confidential
exempts an office from the rules on appointment, it does not exempt it from other rules. Thus,
the Court ordered the EIIB to make its documents concerning personal services and salary
vouchers available to the Ombudsman.
PNOC v. NLRC (1993) Manuel S. Pineda was an employee of PNOC and decide to run as a
councilor of Leyte. The Legal Department of PNOC ordered him to be considered ipso facto
resigned upon filing his candidacy as councilor in pursuant to section 66 or the election code.
Pineda contends that sec 66 only applies to employees of GOCCs with original charter that is
governed by the Civil Service Law. PNOC created under the general law is subjected to the
provisions of Labor code therefore sec 66 will not apply

Section 8: Each Commission shall perform such other functions as may be provided by law.
IXB. THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
Incumbent Officers of the Civil Service Commission:
Chairman: Alicia dela Rosa-Bala
Commissioner: Robert Martinez
Commissioner: Nieves Osorio
Central Office:
Civil Service Commission, Constitution Hills, Batasang Pambansa Complex Diliman 1126
Quezon City, Philippines
Section 1:
1. The civil service shall be administered by the Civil Service Commission composed of a
Chairman and two Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at
the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, with proven capacity for public
administration, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the elections
immediately preceding their appointment.
2. The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of
the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those
first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, a Commissioner for five years,
and another Commissioner for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any
vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member
be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
History, Term and Organization of the Civil Service Commission
The general purpose of a civil service system is for there to be an establishment and promotion
of professionalism and efficiency in public service, which is the objective as well of the Civil
Service system under the 1987 Constitution.
The Civil Service system, managed by the Civil Service Commission, is composed of a
Chairman and two Commissioners who should be appointed by the President with the consent
of the Commission on Appointments.
The Chairman and two Commissioners must be:
natural-born citizens of the Philippines
at the time of their appointment, at least 35 years of age
with proven capacity for public administration
must not have been candidates for any elective position in the elections immediately
preceding their appointment.
The Commissioners term is set at a period of seven years to which they may not be
reappointed. This prohibition applies even if the Commissioner served for less than 7 years.
After the first set of Commissioners have been appointed, the Chairman shall also have a term
of seven years, the next of five years, and the third of three years.
RULING: DISMISSED. Under the Juco doctrine and under section 2(1) of Article IX-B that civil
service embraces GOCCs with original charter. GOCCs under the general law (Corporation
Code) are subject to the provisions of the Labor code. But the legislators in making section 66
of the election code did not distinguish its applicability between the two types of GOCCs. Even
if PNOC is subjected to the provisions of labor code still section 66 will apply to its employees
making Pineda ipso facto resigned the moment he file his candidacy for councilor.
MWSS v. Hernandez (1986) MWSS contented that NLRC does not have jurisdiction over the
case because the company is a GOCC. Labor arbiter in response said that it has jurisdiction
over the case because the complainants are contractual employees and not regular employees
of MWSS. MWSS made a petition of certiorari and prohibition to invalidate the decision of the
NLRC.
RULING: GRANTED. R .A. 6234 created MWSS as a government corporation. It is governed
by the civil service rules and regulations. If there are controversies arising from its
employment they are not cognizable by the NLRC. Wherefore it is rendered that NLRC
decision is without jurisdiction.
BLISS v Callejo ( 1994) THE focal issue in the case at bench is whether or not BLISS
Development Corporation (BDC) is a government-owned or controlled corporation subject to
Civil Service Laws, rules and regulations. The med-arbiter contended that BDC is a GOCC
because its majority stock is owned by HSDC a wholly government owned corporation
therefore they are subject to the provisions of Civil Service Law.
RULING: Under Article IX-B section 2 it states that Civil Service embraces government owned
or controlled corporations with original charter; and, therefore, by clear implication, the Civil
Service does not include government owned or controlled corporations which are organized as
subsidiaries of government owned or controlled corporations under the general corporation
law. BDC is not corporation with an original charter and just because majority of its stocks is
owned by HSDC does not make it a GOCC defined under Article IX-B section 2 of the 1987
constitution.
FELICIANO V. GISON (2010) Leyte Metropolitan Water District (LMWD) asked the
Department of Finance (DOF) for tax exemption for some water supply equipment and a
pickup truck given to them by the Japanese government. DOF granted tax exemption to water
supply equipment but not to the pickup truck. LMWD requested for reconsideration, but was
denied because the tax exemption privileges of government agencies and government owned
and controlled corporations (GOCCs) had already been withdrawn by Executive Order No. 93.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), which found LMWD to be a GOCC with
an original charter. Petitioner seeks to set aside the CA decision affirming the CTA ruling which
dismissed LMWDs case for lack of jurisdiction to try the case.
Ruling: DENIED. A water district is a GOCC with a special charter since it is created pursuant
to P.D. 198, a special law. LWDs are not private corporations because they are not created
under a the Corporation Code. What has been excluded from the coverage of the CSC are
those corporations created pursuant to the Corporation Code. The Constitution emphatically
prohibits the creation of private corporations except by a general law applicable to all citizens.
Only corporations created under a general law can qualify as private corporations.

The logic behind this is to achieve continuity by not allowing the Commissioners terms to
expire all at the same time. Thus, every two years, one Commissioners term expires leaving
two Commissioners behind.

There are two requisites for the smooth functioning of the CSCs rotational system:
3| Acampado, Bien, Escudero, Flameno, Macasaet, Santos, Silva, Vergeire, Villanueva, Yangco
 TIDC v. CSC (2013) Arsenio de Guzman was appointed Financial Management Specialist IV
of TIDCORP, a GOCC created under P.D. No. 1080. His appointment was submitted to the
CSC-DBM Field Office, wherein his appointment was disallowed because such position was
not included in the DBMs Index of Occupational Service. TIDCORP avers that RA 8494 which
amended its charter, empowers its Board of Directors to create its own organizational structure
and staffing pattern, and to approve its own compensation and position classification system
and qualification standards. Petitioner seeks to reverse the CA decision affirming the CSC
resolution invalidating de Guzmans appointment.
Ruling: GRANTED. While the CSC has authority over personnel actions in GOCCs, the rules it
formulates pursuant to this mandate should not contradict or amend the civil service laws it
implements. The CSCs rulemaking power, albeit constitutionally granted, is still limited to the
implementation and interpretation of the laws it is tasked to enforce. The rules that the CSC
formulates must not override, but must be in harmony with, the law it seeks to apply and
implement. The CSC shall still enforce position classifications at TIDCORP, but must do this
under the terms that TIDCORP itself established in RA 6758 (Compensation and Classification
Act of 1989).
NASECO v. NLRC Eugenia Credo was the Chief of Property and Records of NASECO. Credo
was administratively charged for her non-compliance with a memorandum. Credo was
terminated by NASECO after deliberations; the former filed a complaint a with the NLRC
alleging that she was illegally dismissed. The NLRC ruled in favor of Credo ordering her
reinstatement and payment of backwages. NASECO argues that NLRC has no jurisdiction to
order her reinstatement
Ruling: DISMISSED. The NHC v. Juco should not be given retroactive effect that is to cases
before its promulgation on January 1985. To do so would be oppressive to Credo and other
employees similarly situated. Under the 1973 Constitution, but prior to the ruling in NHC v.
Juco, this Court recognized the applicability of the Labor Code over disputes involving
terms and conditions of employment in GOCCs, among them is NASECO.
2. Appointments in the civil service shall be made only according to merit and fitness to be
determined, as far as practicable, and, except to positions which are policy-determining,
primarily confidential, or highly technical, by competitive examination
CANONIZADO V. AGUIRRE Canonizado was compelled to leave his position as
Commissioner, not by an erroneous decision, but by an unconstitutional provision of law.
Canonizado held a second office during the period that his appeal was pending.
Prohibiting Canonizado from accepting a second position during the pendency of his petition
would be to unjustly compel him to bear the consequences of an unconstitutional act which
under no circumstance can be attributed to him. However, before Canonizado can re-assume
his post as Commissioner, he should first resign as Inspector General of the IAS-PNP.
Classification of positions
The classification made by the Executive, while to be accorded the weight it deserves, is not
definitively determinative of the nature of the position. Purpose of the classification into policy-
determining, primarily confidential or highly technical positions is to exempt these categories
from competitive examination as a means for determining merit and fitness.
Appointments to competitive positions > must be made according to merit and fitness as
determined, by competitive examinations.
Appointments to non-competitive positions > merit and fitness are not determined by
competitive examinations but by other modes which may be prescribed by law. ex. a certain
level of academic degree.
3.
Non-competitive positions - those which by their nature are policy-determining, primarily
confidential, or highly technical.
Role of the Civil Service Commission in appointments
CSCs role in the appointing process is limited to the determination of the qualifications of
the candidates for appointment. CSC is prohibited from choosing who will be appointed.
It may, at most, certify to the qualification of those being considered for appointment.
In case an appointing power appoints, then withdraws and appoints another in place of the
one who immediately accepted the previous appointment, the CSC has authority to reinstate
the previously-appointed person whose appointment was withdrawn and extended to
another. Such action by the appointing power violates of the right to security of tenure.
A next-in-rank rule may be prescribed by law, but is not to be mandatorily followed.
BINAMIRA V. GARRUCHO (1990) Minister of Tourism designated Binamira as Philippine
Tourism Authority (PTA) General Manager under the Department of Tourism (DOT) which was
approved by the President. However, when the President appointed Garrucho as the new
Secretary of DOT, it also gave the latter the power to assume the position of PTA General
Manager until she appoints someone in permanent capacity. Upon Garruchos assumption as
General Manager, Binamira protested the same and filed for illegal dismissal.
RULING: DISMISSED. Binamiras appointment as General Manager was invalid because it fell
short of the requirement to be appointed by the President. The appointing power is vested
with the President, and as such, it is within her discretion to appoint and cannot be
delegated to anyone. Hence, Binamiras appointment by the Minister of Tourism constituted
an unlawful encroachment on the Presidents prerogative. Therefore, since Binamira never
acquired the valid title of General Manager, he is not entitled to security of tenure.
LUEGO V. CSC (1986) Cebu City Mayor extended a permanent appointment to Luego as
Administrative Officer 11 in the Mayors Office, but upon seeking the CSCs approval of the
same, the CSC only recognized his appointment as temporary pending the protest filed by
Tuozo. Subsequently, when the CSC found Tuozo more qualified than Luego to the same
4| Acampado, Bien, Escudero, Flameno, Macasaet, Santos, Silva, Vergeire, Villanueva, Yangco
position, it appointed Tuozo with permanent capacity and revoked Luegos appointment
thereto.
RULING: GRANTED. The CSC is not empowered to determine the nature of appointment
extended by the appointing officer because its authority is limited to
approving/reviewing the appointment in light of the requirements of the Civil Service
Law. When an appointee is qualified and other legal requirements satisfied, the CSC has no
choice but to attest the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law. Hence, the CSC
encroached the discretion of the City Mayor as it had no authority to revoke Luegos
appointment because it believed that Tuozo was more qualified.
SANTIAGO V. CSC (1989) Customs Commissioner extended a permanent appointment to
Santiago as Collector of Customs III which was approved by the CSC. However, Jose
protested the same before the CSC Merit Systems Promotion Board (Board) on the ground
that he was next-in-rank to the said position. Initially, the Board ruled in favor of Santiago, but
on appeal, revoked Santiagos appointment, and instead appointed Jose to the same.
Consequently, CSC affirmed the ruling because it found Jose more qualified to the said
position.
RULING: GRANTED. There is no mandatory requirement in the Civil Service Law that
persons next in rank are entitled to preference appointment. The appointing power has
the prerogative and discretion as to who is best qualified for the position and to apply the
one next-in-rank would impose a rigid formula which would limit his power. In this case,
it was within the discretion of the Customs Commissioner to appoint Santiago, with the latter
having complied with the minimum qualifications and standards of fitness to the position.
AQUINO V. CSC (1992) San Pablo City Division Superintendent extended a permanent
appointment to de la Paz as Supply Officer I in the Department of Education, Culture, and
Sports (DECS) which was approved by the CSC upon a finding of no pending administrative
complaint against the appointee, no pending protest against the appointment, not any decision
by competent authority that will adversely affect the approval of the appointment. While de la
Paz was already in office, Upon protest, the DECS Secretary revoked de la Pazs appointment
and awarded such permanent appointed to Aquino. Upon approval of the CSC, it revoked
Aquinos appointment claiming that de la Paz had already possessed the right to security of
tenure to the said position. This prompted Aquino to file another protest on the ground that he
is more qualified.
RULING: DISMISSED. An appointment is deemed completed when an appointee
assumes the position in the civil service and may not be removed or revoked except for
valid cause. The ground that Aquino is more qualified compared to de la Paz is not a valid
ground for revocation. Assuming arguendo, that Aquino had a valid cause to protest, his
appointment could not be resolved because there was no vacancy in the position he was to fill,
for it was still occupied by de la Paz. Therefore, Aquinos appointment to an office which was
not yet vacant is null and void.
LAPINID V CSC (1991) Renato M. Lapinid was appointed by the PPA for the position of
terminal supervisor. CSC contended that Junsay was more qualified to be appointed as a
terminal supervisor other than Lapinid. Lapinid then file a petition in the CSC questioning the
authority of CSC to disapprove his appointment.
RULING: AFFIRMED. Appointment is purely discretionary upon the person vested with
such power and the only qualifications that appointee must have is what is required by
law. The function of the CSC is to review the appointment if it is in light with the
requirements set by the civil service law. It has no authority to revoke appointments on
the basis of subjectivity of ones qualifications.
No officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause
provided by law.
Security of tenure
A next-in-rank rule may be prescribed by law, but is not to be mandatorily followed.
Guarantee of security of tenure, a guarantee against arbitrary impairment (whether total or
partial), and the right to continue in the position held are basic in a healthy civil service
system.
Guarantee of security of tenure is enjoyed only by permanent appointees. Temporary
appointees are removable any time without just cause.
Guarantee of security of tenure covers removal, other disciplinary measures, and transfers.
Suspension or dismissal can be made only for cause provided by law. Dismissal includes
demotion of transfer which involves reduction of pay or rank.
Due process is also necessary in case of suspension or dismissal. Exception: Sec. 40 of
the Civil Service Code pertains to summary procedure, without need for hearing, to take care
of certain categories of offenders, such as notoriously undesirable ones.
Comm. Padilla: A law must already be in existence when the act for which a person is
being subjected to disciplinary action was committed.
Constitutional guarantee of security of tenure does not extend to positions which are
policy-determining, primarily confidential, or highly technical. However, they can be
removed only for cause as provided by law.
The term of confidential officials and employees is co-terminus with the confidence of
the appointing power.
Abolition of office, when not as a cover for unconstitutional removal, should be done in good
faith, not for personal or political reasons, and not in violation of the law. Also, abolition of an
office created by law can only be done so by law.
For an appointment to be permanent, the person must be qualified for the position, and it
must be a real appointment by the appointing authority not just a mere designation by one
who does not possess such authority to appoint.
ACHACOSO V. MACARAIG (1991) Achacoso was appointed as POEA Administrator and
assumed office thereto. However, he was requested to file a courtesy resignation pursuant to
the request of the President. Upon the request to turn over his office, he protested the same on
the ground that he is a member of the CSC and is entitled to security of tenure. Hence, he
claimed he was illegally dismissed.
Ruling: DISMISSED. Achacoso was validly dismissed because he did not qualify as POEA
Administrator having failed to meet the required participation in the Career Executive
Service Development Program before appointment. In that, Achacoso was only an acting
appointee because at the time of his appointment was not eligible to such position. As
such, he was not entitled to security of tenure and could be terminated.
BRIONES V. OSMEA (1958) Briones and Rosagaran (petitioners) were employees in the
Cebu City Mayors Office. However, the Municipal Board, upon the request of the President,
restructured the Mayors Office which resulted in the abolishment of 32 positions, including that
of petitioners. Hence, they protested the same on the ground that such restructure was
tantamount to violation of their security of tenure for termination without a valid cause.
Ruling: DISMISSED. Since petitioners were employees in the Mayors Office, they are
considered members of the CSC and entitled to security of tenure under the Constitution. The
Mayor could not terminate them without just cause. Absent any of the just causes, it was held
that petitioners were illegally dismissed and entitled to reinstatement.
RULING: DISMISSED. Permanent appointments can only be issued to a person who
meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed, including the
appropriate eligibility. In order for an appointment to qualify as permanent, the appointee
must possess the RANK appropriate for the position. Failure in this respect will render
the appointment merely TEMPORARY. The mere fact that a position belongs to the Civil
Executive Service does not automatically confer the security of tenure on its occupant even if
he does not possess the required qualifications.
MIRANDA V. CARREON Carreon et al. were appointed by the Vice Mayor of the City of
Santiago and approved by the Civil Service Commission (CSC), when the acting mayor and
petitioner, Mayor Miranda, was suspended. When Miranda resumed his position, he formed an
audit team to assess the performance of the respondents. The report of the audit team stated
that the respondents were found wanting in performance. Miranda issued an order
terminating the respondents services. Respondents appealed to the CSC which ruled in their
favor, which was then again affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeal.
Ruling: DISMISSED. The 1987 Constitution provides that no officer of the civil service shall
be removed or suspended EXCEPT for cause provided by law and with due notice. The
Civil Service Law provides specific grounds for dismissing a government officer or
employee: inefficiency and incompetency. Such grounds can only be determined after
the passage of sufficient time. In the case at bar, Carreon et. al were terminated upon the
3rd month within the 6-month probationary period.

MAYOR V. MACARAIG (1991) Mayor, et al. (petitioners) were Commissioners, Labor Arbiters,
and Executive Directors of the NLRC, but their positions were subsequently declared vacant
pursuant to Section 35 of RA 6715 reorganizing the NLRC. In effect, they were considered
terminated from service. Hence, petitioners were assailing the constitutionality of the assailed
provision.
RULING: GRANTED. Section 35 was declared unconstitutional because petitioners are
entitled the right to remain in office until the expiration of the term for which they were
appointed, unless sooner removed for just causes. Having found no valid cause for petitioners
termination, they were considered illegally dismissed. Although one of the valid causes of
termination of employment is the reorganization to remove redundancy of functions, it is not
applicable in this case because petitioners petitions were declared vacant which is not
equivalent to the abolition of the same.
ASTROQUILLO V. MANGLAPUS (1990) Petitioners Astroquillo, et al. (petitioners) were
appointed, by authority of the President, as Ambassadors Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
and Chiefs of Missions to the UAE, Kuwait, and Moscow. However, they were all terminated
from service by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and approved by the President. This prompted
petitioners to file for petitions for illegal dismissal on the grounds of a violation of their right to
security of tenure.
RULING: DISMISSED. None of the petitioners were shown to have any right to be reinstated
to their office after the separation by the President because it was found that they were non-
career service appointees since their appointments to the Foreign Service were made on basis
other than the usual test of merit and fitness. Thus, they may be terminated subject to the
pleasure of the President as their tenure is coterminous to the appointing authority.
GRINO V CSC (1991) Sixto Demaisip, a provincial lawyer, and some legal officers were
removed by Gov Grio. They contented that they were illegally removed or suspended by the
governor. CSC ruled in favor with them. Gov Grio filed a petition for review on the decision of
CSC.
HERNANDEZ V. VILLEGAS Villegas, a lawyer and civil service eligible, was appointed
Director for Security of the Bureau Customs. Petitioner was then re-appointed as Arrastre
Superintendent and did not know that another person was put in his stead until he learned that
the said person was receiving his salary. Villegas filed a quo warranto in the CFI of Manila
which rendered judgment in favor of the respondent, and such decision was affirmed by the
CA. Villegas relied on Section 671 of the Revised Administrative Code: the following officers
and employees constitute the unclassified service: xxx (1) positions which may be declared by
the President, upon recommendation of the Commissioner of the Civil Service, as policy
determining, primarily confidential, or highly technical
RULING: DISMISSED. The only authority who, by constitutional and legal provisions, is
competent to classify a position into primarily confidential is the President . The heads of
departments and the Commissioner of Civil Service can only recommend or make comments.
SAMSON V. COURT OF APPEALS Talens was an Assistant Secretary to the Mayor of
Caloocan City. Mayor Samson, released an Administrative Order qualifying the services of
Talens as non-competitive and terminating his employment on the ground of lack and loss of
confidence. Samson argues that as Assistant Secretary, like the Secretary, renders a non-
competitive service which is primarily confidential and highly technical in nature where
termination may be made due to lack and loss of confidence. Talens filed with the CFI of
Caloocan to annul the administrative order and to compel the public officials to pay salaries
and emoluments due to him. CFI and CA ruled in favor of Talens.
Ruling: DISMISSED. The position of Assistant Secretary is not one of those enumerated nor
does it qualify as Secretary or Head of Departments under Section 5 of the Civil Service of
Law, and thus the position concerned is classified as competitive. Employees of
COMPETITIVE classification CANNOT be terminated on the ground of lack or loss of
confidence, rather only for cause and after due process.

4.
RULING: AFFIRMED. The position of provincial officer is a position that is primarily
confidential. It was stated in the Cadiente ruling that services of a legal officer as
primarily confidential and is deemed terminated upon loss of confidence. In such position
there is no removal or dismissal rather an expiration of term, which is the cessation of
confidence. So the CSC is wrong in its decision that Arandela was illegally dismissed because
his term just merely expired.
CSC V SALAS (1997) Salas an employee of PAGCOR was removed by the board of directors
of PAGCOR of his position because he was alleged being a part of a proxy betting. CA ruled in
favor of his contention that he was illegally removed or suspended by the board of directors.
The board of directors filed to this court that CA committed grave abuse of discretion.
No officer or employee in the civil service shall engage, directly or indirectly, in any
electioneering or partisan political campaign.
Electioneering or partisan political activity
Bernas: The purpose of this provision is to keep the Civil Service free of the deleterious effects
of political partisanship.
Civil service employees are not prohibited from expressing his political views, or mentioning
the names of candidates they support, or voting or from joining non-partisan civic
organizations.
Does not apply to members of the Cabinet, as their positions are essentially political in nature,
thus they may engage in partisan political activity.

RULING: DISMISSED. the primary purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution in providing
or the declaration of a position as policy determining, primarily confidential or highly technical is
to exempt these categories from competitive examination as a means for determining merit
and fitness. It must be stressed further that these positions are covered by security of tenure
therefore cannot be remove without a just cause.
PCSO BOD V LAPID (2011) Marie Jean C. Lapid a clerk appealed to the decision of the
PCSO which found which found her guilty of Discourtesy in the Course of Official Duties and
Grave Misconduct and imposed on her the penalty of Dismissal from the Service.
SENERES V. COMELEC Robles was elected president and chairperson of BUHAY, a party list
group duly registered with the Commission on Elections. BUHAY participated in the 2001 and
2004 elections with Robles as its president. BUHAY again filed a Manifestation of Desire to
Participate in the Party-List System of Representation which bore the signature of Robles.
Seneres filed with the COMELEC a petition to deny due course to certificates. In it Seneres
alleged that he was the acting president and secretary-general of BUHAY. Seneres would
charge Robles engaging in partisan political activity which he was prohibited from doing as a
civil service member.

RULING: DISMISSED. Casual employees may also be terminated anytime though subject
to certain conditions or qualifications. Thus, they may be laid off anytime before the
expiration of the employment period provided any of the following occurs: (1) when their
services are no longer needed; (2) funds are no longer available; (3) the project has already
been completed/finished; or (4) their performance are below par.
DIMAYUGA V. BENEDICTO II Dimayuga, an appointed Executive Director II of the Toll
Regulatory Board, was demoted to the position of an assistant in the Legal Department and
put another person in her stead via Memorandum Circular No. 21 issued by Benedicto II.
Dimayuga filed a petition for quo warranto.
5| Acampado, Bien, Escudero, Flameno, Macasaet, Santos, Silva, Vergeire, Villanueva, Yangco
Ruling: DISMISSED. The term electioneering and partisan political activities have well-
established meanings in Section 79 of the Omnibus Election Code which enumerates
instances considered to be as such activities:
the term election campaign or partisan political activity refers to an act of the candidate or
candidates to a public office which shall include the following:
1.) forming or organizations, associations, clubs, committees, or other groups of persons for the
purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign for or against a candidate;
2.) holding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar assemblies
for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign for or against a candidate;
3.) making speeches, announcements or commentaries, or holding interviews for or against the
election of any candidate for public office;
4.) publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials designed to support or oppose the
election of any candidate; or
5.) directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for or against a candidate
the foregoing enumerated acts if performed for the purpose of enhancing the chances
aspirants for nominations for candidacy to a public office by a political party, agreement, or
coalition of parties shall not be considered as election campaign or partisan election
activity.
The act of submitting a nomination list cannot be considered electioneering or partisan
political activity. The acting of signing and filing of the nomination lists are purely
internal processes of the party or organization and are not designed to enable or ensure the
victory of the candidate in the elections.
5. The right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees.
The right to self-organization
Does the right to self-organization also include the right to strike? Con. Comm. Lerum: No.
Government employees only have the right to organize (self-organize), uniting as a union. It
does not include the right to strike.
Government employees do not have a constitutional right to strike. However, they may be
given such a right by statute.
SSSEA V. CA (1989) Since the Social Security System failed to act on the unions, i.e.,
SSSEA,demands, as a result, the latter resulted in a strike against the former. This prompted
SSS to file a complaint before the RTC for damages against SSSEA for staging an illegal strike
and barricading the entrances to the SSS building thereby preventing non-striking employees
to report for work and SSS members from transacting business. However, in their defense,
SSSEA maintained that the subject matter involves a labor dispute and should fall within the
jurisdiction of the NLRC or DOLE.
RULING: DISMISSED. The Civil Service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the government, including GOCCs. SSS is
considered a GOCC having been created under RA 1161, and thus, its employees are
part of the civil service and are covered by the CSCs memorandum prohibiting strikes.
The appropriate remedy for government unions is to petition the Congress for betterment of the
terms and conditions of their employment. The strike of SSSEA was illegal because they are
government employees whose terms and conditions are governed by the Civil Service Law.
GSIS V. KAPISANAN (2006) GSIS employees staged a 4-day concerted demonstration,
rallies, and en masse walkout in front of GSIS main office. GSIS President and General
Manager Garcia issued formal charges against the employees who took part in the mass
action, deemed a strike or a concerted mass action. GSIS assails the CA decision enjoining
GSIS from issuing formal charges against respondent employees.
Ruling: GRANTED. Freedom of expression and assembly and the right to petition the
government for a redress of grievances do not include the right on the part of government
personnel to strike. Any collective activity undertaken by government employees with the
intent of effecting work stoppage or service disruption in order to realize their demands or force
concessions, economic or otherwise, is a prohibited concerted mass action and doubtless
actionable administratively.
6. Temporary employees of the Government shall be given such protection as may
be provided by law.
Protection of temporary employment
Temporary appointees are can only be removed by the appointing authority.
A person lacking the necessary qualifications who is given a temporary
appointment does not automatically become a permanent appointee when he or she
acquires the required qualification. He or she must receive a new commission (a
permanent appointment) to become a permanent employee.
ONG V. OP (2012) Ong was appointed NBI Director III by the President. Respondent Wycoco
informed Ong that his appointment will soon end without the President reappointing him to his
current position, as his appointment is co-terminus with the appointing authoritys tenure.
However, the President appointed Bessat to replace Ong. Petitioners assail the CA decision
denying Ongs reinstatement.
Ruling: DISMISSED. In the hands of the appointing authority are lodged the power to
remove. Ong lacked the CES eligibility required for the position of Director III and his
appointment was co-terminous with the appointing authority [and serves at the pleasure of
the President and his appointment may be recalled anytime]. His appointment being both
temporary and co-terminus in nature, it can be revoked by the President even without
cause and at a short notice. The right to security of tenure is not available to those
employees whose appointments are contractual and co-terminous in nature.
Section 3. The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the Government,
shall establish a career service and adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity,
responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service. It shall strengthen the merit
and rewards system, integrate all human resources development programs for all levels and
ranks, and institutionalize a management climate conducive to public accountability. It shall
submit to the President and the Congress an annual report on its personnel programs.
6| Acampado, Bien, Escudero, Flameno, Macasaet, Santos, Silva, Vergeire, Villanueva, Yangco
Power of the Commission
Administrative agency, nothing more. It can only perform and be given powers
proper to an administrative agency.
Can perform executive powers, quasi-judicial powers, and quasi-legislative or
rule-making power.
Power to promulgate and enforce policies on personnel actions, classify
positions, prescribe conditions of employment except as to compensation and other monetary
benefits which shall be provided by law.
CSC is the central personnel agency of the the government; may revoke a
certificate of eligibility motu propio.
SANA V. CESB (2011) Petitioner assails the validity of E.O. 883 which granted the Career
Executive Service Officer rank to eligible lawyers in the executive branch, and Career
Executive Service Board Resolution No. 870 for violating Section 15, Article VII of the
Constitution.
Ruling: DISMISSED. Petition was dismissed on the ground of its mootness since President
Aquino had already issued EO 3 revoking EO 883 expressly and CESB Resolution No. 870
impliedly.
LRTA V. SALVAA (2014) Administrator of the Light Rail Transit Authority, Melquiades Robles,
issued Office Order No. 119 which revoked Atty. Aurora A. Salvaas designation as Officer-in-
Charge (OIC) of the LRTA Administrative Department. LRTA issued a formal charge against
respondent for dishonesty, falsification of documents, etc. Respondent appeal to the CSC
which modified the LRTA board of directors decision. LRTA filed a petition to the Supreme
Court (SC), arguing that it has the legal personality to appeal the decision of the CSC before
the CA.
Ruling: GRANTED. Article IX (B), Section 3 of the Constitution mandates that the Civil Service
Commission shall be "the central personnel agency of the Government. In line with the
constitutionally enshrined policy that a public office is a public trust, the Commission was
tasked with the duty "to set standards and to enforce the laws and rules governing the
selection, utilization, training, and discipline of civil servants." The SC stated that the
right to appeal being merely a statutory privilege can only be availed of by the party
specified in the law. Since the law presumes that appeals will only be made in decisions
prescribing a penalty, this court concluded that the only parties that will be adversely affected
are the respondents that are charged with administrative offenses. Since the right to appeal
is a remedial right that may only be granted by statute, a government party cannot by
implication assert that right as incidental to its power, since the right to appeal does not
form part of due process. The LRTA had standing to appeal the modification by the CSC of
its decision.
Section 4. All public officers and employees shall take an oath or affirmation to uphold and
defend this Constitution.
Oath to defend this Constitution
Provision is meant to cover all civilian public officers, whether elected or appointed.
Section 5. The Congress shall provide for the standardization of compensation of government
officials and employees, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations with
original charters, taking into account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and the
qualifications required for, their positions.
Standardization of compensation
Rationalization for this provision came from the Integration Reorganization Plan of 1972 Article
II - Re-examination of the WAPCO Plans.
Section 6. No candidate who has lost in any election shall, within one year after such election,
be appointed to any office in the Government or any Government-owned or controlled
corporations or in any of their subsidiaries.
Political lame ducks
Prohibits the appointment of defeated candidates within one year following their defeat to any
office in the government or in any GOCC or in any of their subsidiaries.
Helps eradicate the spoils system
PEOPLE V. SANDIGANBAYAN (2008) Petition for certiorari filed by the Office of the
Ombudsman through the Office of the Special Prosecutor assails the Decision of the
Sandiganbayan granting private respondent Alejandro A. Villapando Demurrer to Evidence and
acquitting him of the crime of unlawful appointment under Article 244 of the Revised Penal
Code. Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction because its interpretation of Article 244 of
the Revised Penal Code does not complement the provision on the one-year prohibition found
in the 1987 Constitution and the Local Government Code, particularly Section 6, Article IX of
the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner argues that the court erred when it ruled that temporary
prohibition is not synonymous with the absence of lack of legal qualification.
Ruling: GRANTED. Clearly, Section 6, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution and Section
94(b) of the Local Government Code of 1991 prohibits losing candidates within one year
after such election to be appointed to any office in the government or any government-
owned or controlled corporations or in any of their subsidiaries. Ubi lex non distinguit nec
nos distinguere debemus. Where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not
distinguish. Sandiganbayans decision is declared null and void. Case is remanded to the
Sandiganbayan for further proceedings.
Section 7. No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to
any public office or position during his tenure.
 Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive
official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency
or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries.
Elective and appointive officials, distinguished.
The first paragraph covers elective officials other than members of Congress, who are
specifically governed by the prohibitions of Article VI, Section 13.
If the elective official accepts an appointment without first resigning his elective position, his
appointment is invalid.
The second paragraph governs appointive officials. As a reiteration, such officials may not hold
any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
However, this prohibition is not absolute, as appointive officials may hold another office if
allowed by law or by the primary functions of his function.
Vice-President may be appointed member of the Cabinet
Member of Congress may be designated to sit in the Judicial and Bar Council
It must be noted that performing a function covered by the primary functions of an office does
not necessarily mean appointment to a different office.
Commissioner Monsod, during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:
There are certain appointive officials who, by reason of the function of their office, have to
occupy other positions, i.e., Minister of Trade and Industry, as Chairman of the National
Development Council.
The rule on appointive officials is not applicable to Cabinet members.
The applicable provision for members of the Cabinet is Article VII, Section 13.
FLORES V. DRILON (1993) RA 7227 was enacted, creating the SBMA. The same law states
that the Mayor of Olongapo City (Gordon) shall be appointed chairman and CEO of the SBMA
for the first year. Petitioner argues that it is in violation of Article IX-B, Section 7(1).
Ruling: GRANTED. While the second paragraph authorizes the holding of multiple offices
by an appointive official when allowed by law or by the primary functions of his
position, the first paragraph appears to be more stringent by not providing any exception
to the rule against appointment or designation of an elective official to the government
post, except as are particularly recognized in the Constitution itself.
RE: GROSS VIOLATION OF CIVIL SERVICE LAW ON THE PROHIBITION AGAINST DUAL
EMPLOYMENT AND DOUBLE COMPENSATION COMMITTED BY MR. EDUARDO
ESCALA (2011) Mr. Escala was appointed as SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer, while being an
active member of the PNP assigned with the Aviation Security Group at the Manila Domestic
Airport. It is averred that Mr. Escala, having employment in both the SC and the PNP, is in
violation of Article IX-B, Section 7. Respondent Escala counters that he has already applied for
retirement before his appointment.
Ruling: DISMISSED FROM SERVICE. The prohibition against government officials and
employees, whether elected or appointed, from concurrently holding any other office or
position in the government is contained in Article IX-B, Section 7. In addition, EO 292, Rule
XVIII, echoes such prohibition:
Section 1: No appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government
or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including GOCCs with original charters or
their subsidiaries, unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position.
Section 2: No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double,
or indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by law.
In the case at bar, it was observed that while he was employed in the SC and was receiving his
regular compensation, he still continued to be a bonafide member of the PNP until a year after
accepting the SC post.
LA CARLOTA CITY V. ROJO (2012) Then Vice-Mayor Rex Jalandoon of La Carlota City,
Negros Occidental appointed Atty. Rojo who had just tendered his resignation as member of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod the day preceding such appointment, as Sangguniang
Panlungsod Secretary; the status of appointment was permanent. Petitioners allege that Rojos
appointment as Secretary is void, and maintain that Rojos resignation was not deemed
accepted when it was presented during the regular session for lack of quorum. Rojo maintains
that the vice-mayor should be included in determining the existence of a quorum. Rojo
contends that there were 7 members present, including the vice-mayor, which constitutes a
quorum.
Ruling: DISMISSED. Senate deliberations on the LGC show the intent of the Legislature to
treat the vice-mayor, not only as the presiding officer, but also as a member of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod.
POSADAS V. SANDIGANBAYAN (2013) Dr. Posadas designated Dr. Dayco, then UP Diliman
Vice-Chancellor for Administration, as OIC in his absence. On his last day as OIC Chancellor,
Dr. Dayco appointed Dr. Posadas as Project Director of the TMC Project. In addition, Dr. Dayco
also appointed Dr. Posadas as a consultant to the project.
Ruling: DISMISSED. The appointment of Dr. Posadas as TMC Project Director falls within the
prohibition against holding of multiple position since there is no distinction in Article IX-B,
Section 7 as to the employment status, i.e. whether permanent, temporary or coterminous.
Petitioners also failed to cite any law to justify Dr. Posadas holding of concurrent positions as
Chancellor and TMC Project Director.
Section 8. No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double,
or indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by law, nor accept without the consent
of the Congress, any present, emolument, office, or title of any kind from any foreign
government.
Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double, or indirect compensation.
Public office is a public trust
Fundamental principle that a public office is a public trust. It is expected of a government
official or employee that keeps uppermost in mind the demands of public welfare. He is there
to render public service. He is of course entitled to be rewarded for the performance of the
functions entrusted to him, but that should not be the overriding consideration
7| Acampado, Bien, Escudero, Flameno, Macasaet, Santos, Silva, Vergeire, Villanueva, Yangco
Additional compensation
When an extra reward is added to a fixed compensation for one and the same office, it is
considered an additional compensation
When a per diem or an allowance is given as a reimbursement for expenses incident to the
discharge of an officers duties, it is not an additional compensation prohibited by the
Constitution
PERALTA V. MATHAY (1967) Peralta, a trustee of the GSIS claims to receive the cost of living
allowance, incentive bonus and Christmas bonus.
Ruling: DISMISSED. Petition was dismissed on the ground that he is an officer of the
government and cannot receive additional or double compensation unless specifically
authorized by law.
NEA V. CSC (2010) National Electrification Administration contends that they may be allowed
to designate its own officials to electric cooperatives. They also claim that allowances from
cooperatives are constitutional.
Ruling: DISMISSED. The petition is dismissed on the grounds that it is illegal to receive
additional compensation or allowances as NEA is created a government-owned and
controlled corporation. The NEA charter, specifically Section 5(a) (6) of PD 260 as amended
by PD 1645 allows NEA to designate their personnel in a cooperative.
YAP V. COA (2010) Yap, the Department Manager of the National Development Company,
was appointed as Vice President for Finance for Manila Gas Corporation. He is claiming
various allowances.
Ruling: DISMISSED. The petition is dismissed on the grounds that it did not pass the public
purpose requirement. The additional allowances such as magazines, newspaper
subscription, annual credit card fee and fellowship expenses are not relevant to the
fulfillment of official duties and functions of the government officers and employees.
Approval by the board of directors is not considered as authorized by law.
DIMAGIBA V. ESPARTERO (2012) Dimagiba, Mendoza, Rasco, employees of Livelihood
Corporation (LIVECOR) were designated to Human Settlement Development Corporation
(HSDC). They were separated from service from LIVECOR but were given separation pay.
They filed a petition to claim their gratuity package from HSDC.
Ruling: DISMISSED. Petition was dismissed on the ground that an additional grant of
gratuity pay amounts to additional compensation prohibited by the Constitution. Another
gratuity would not fall under the exception in the second paragraph of the provision.
PEZA V. COA (2012) Petitioners, the Board of Trustees of the Philippine Economic Zone
Authority, claim to receive per diem for every attendance in a board meeting.
Ruling: DISMISSED. Petition was dismissed on the ground that such additional
compensation is prohibited by the Constitution, whether in the form of a per diem or an
honorarium or an allowance. Section 13 Article VII of the Constitution and the ruling of Civil
Liberties Union emphasized that a public official holding an ex-officio position has no
right to receive additional compensation since these services are already paid for and
covered by the compensation attached to his principal office.
Double compensation
Double compensation is considered when two sets of compensations for two different offices
held concurrently by one officer
Prohibition is only if double compensation is based on exactly the same services and on the
same creditable period
No general prohibition against holding two offices which are not incompatible
It is allowed when the law authorizes the double compensation
SANTOS V. COURT OF APPEALS (2000) Antonio Santos optionally retired from the Judiciary
under RA 910 and has received his retirement gratuity. A year after his retirement, he re-
entered the government service, and was appointed Director III of the Traffic Operation Center
of the MMA, later renamed MMDA. Pursuant to RA 7924, MMDA issued Resolution 16 which
authorized the payment of separation benefits; Santos applied for separation, and insisted that
all years of his government service, including those in the Judiciary should be credited in the
computation of his separation benefits.
Ruling: DISMISSED. To credit his years of service in the Judiciary in the computation of
his separation pay under RA 7924, notwithstanding the fact that he had received or has been
receiving the retirement benefits under RA 910, would be to countenance double
compensation for exactly the same services.
CARBONILLA V. BOARD; OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT V. BOARD (2011) Petitioners,
Office of the President and customs personnel Carbonilla et. al claim the enforceability of CAO
7-92 and CAO 1-2005 which increases the overtime pay and adjustment of the exchange rate.
Ruling: GRANTED. Petition was granted on the ground that overtime pay, travel and meal
allowances are not double compensation. CAO 7-92 and CAO 1-2005 are authorized by
law in Section 2506 of the Tariff and Customs Law of the Philippines
OCAMPO V. COA (2013) Ocampo assumed as Board Member of Energy Regulatory Board.
She retired under EO 172 Creating the Energy Regulatory Board in relation to RA 1568 An
Act to Provide Life Pension to the Auditor General and the Chairman or any Member of the
Commission on Elections. She availed of the five year lump sum benefit and the
corresponding monthly pension to be paid out for the reminder for the reminder of her life.
Then she was appointed as Chairman of the Energy Regulatory Board and sought retirement
under the same law EO 172. She claims to receive retirement benefits as ERB chair and
member.
Ruling: DISMISSED. Ocampo is entitled to receive only one set of the retirement benefits
under RA 1568.The law only allows payment of a single gratuity and a single annuity out
 of a single compensable requirement. Court remands to Commission on Audit to recompute
the gratuity and annuity. Mere circumstance of appointment for more than one term does
not mean that they would be entitled of a set of retirement benefits for each of their
completed term. In the event that that the recomputed gratuity or annuity is greater than the
gratuity or annuity already received by Ocampo, to allow the payment to Ocampo of only the
excess. In the event that the recomputed gratuity or annuity is lesser than the gratuity or
annuity already received by Ocampo, to disallow the excess payments to Ocampo and require
the refund thereof.
Specifically authorized by law
Constitution requires specific authority given to a particular employee or officer for the payment
of extra or additional compensation
GSIS V. COA (2011) GSIS Board of Trustees approved Board Resolution No. 326 which
adopted the GSIS Employees Loyalty Incentive Plan then renamed to GSIS Retirement
Financial Plan (RFP). Commission on Audit affirmed the Notice of Disallowances of the RFP by
the Corporate Auditor because it is in conflict with Section 28 (b) of Commonwealth Act No.
186 or Teves Retirement Law.
Ruling: DISMISSED. Petition was dismissed on the ground that GSIS RFP is a supplementary
retirement plan prohibited by Teves Retirement Law. GSIS Act of 1997 or RA 8291 did not
expressly repeal the Teves Retirement Law. Court ruled that payees are liable for the return
of the disallowed amounts but the Board of Trustees will not be liable in presumption of
good faith.

SADUESTE V. MUNICIPALITY OF SURIGAO (1941) Sadueste is district Engineer for

Province of Surigao then was designated as Sanitary and Waterworks Engineer of the
province. He claims additional compensation for the new designation. He contends that there
is a provision of law in Section 1916 of the Revised Administrative Code which authorized such
additional compensation.

Ruling: DISMISSED. Petition was dismissed on the ground that there is no law which
specifically authorizes the Sanitary and Waterworks engineer to receive additional
compensation for his services. Section 1916 of the Revised Administrative Code has been
repealed by the General Appropriation Act of 1936 which prohibits extra compensation to any
full time officer or employee of the government.

BENGUET STATE UNIVERSITY V. COA (2007) Congress passed RA 8292, providing for
uniform compensation of officials of Chartered State Universities and Colleges. Pursuant to the
law, the Board of Regents of BSU passed a Resolution which granted rice subsidy and health
care allowance to its employees.

Ruling: DISMISSED. Petition is dismissed on the ground that RA 8292 only grants the Board
to disburse funds only for the purposes of instruction, research, extension or other
programs/projects of the university or college. Under the maxim of ejusdem generis,
other programs/projects does not include incentives such as rice subsidies and health care
allowances, as these benefits are not one of instruction, research or extension.

8| Acampado, Bien, Escudero, Flameno, Macasaet, Santos, Silva, Vergeire, Villanueva, Yangco