THE PROBLEM OF DEEP DISAGREEMENT

The Problem of Deep Disagreement#

by Klemens Kappel, Division of Philosophy, University of

Copenhagen

Abstract

We sometimes disagree not only about facts, but also about how best
to acquire evidence or justified belief within the domain of facts that
we disagree about. And sometimes we have no dispute-independent
ways of settling what are the best ways of acquiring evidence in
these domains. Following Michael Lynch, I will call this deep
disagreement. In the paper, I outline various forms of deep
disagreement, following but also in certain respects revising and
expanding Lynchs exposition in (Lynch 2010) and (Lynch 2012). As,
is well known that for the externalist about knowledge and epistemic
justification, deep disagreements may be nothing more than an
unfortunate failure of communication. Yet, even granting this, Lynch
argues that deep disagreement points to a sort of practical problem. I
agree. In my paper I propose a revised account of the sort of practical
problem that deep disagreement may pose. In short, my claim will be
that that deep disagreement may be a problem because of the role
that shared factual beliefs may have in common decision-making. I
then discuss and assess various reactions to the problem of deep
disagreement, including the one proposed by Lynch. I argue that
none of the solutions discussed in the paper are satisfactory.

#
An earlier version of this material was presented at the
European Epistemology Network conference in Modena and Bologna,
June 28-30, 2012, and at a workshop on Deference, Testimony and
Diversity, November 22 and 23, 2012, at the University of
Copenhagen. I would like to thank those present a both occasions for
comments and suggestions.

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1. Deep Disagreement
We sometimes disagree not only about facts, but also about how best
to acquire evidence or justified belief within the domain of facts that
we disagree about. And sometimes we have no dispute-independent
ways of settling what are the best ways of acquiring evidence in
these domains. Following Michael Lynch, I will call this deep
disagreement. Surely, deep disagreements are deeply disturbing.
However, as is well known, for the externalist about knowledge and
epistemic justification, a deep disagreement may be nothing more
than an unfortunate failure of communication, see eg. (Alston 1986)
(Alston 1993) (Bergmann 2006). Yet, Lynch argues that deep
disagreement points to a sort of practical problem. In my discussion,
I will follow this lead, though slightly revising Lynch account of
deep disagreement and the sort of practical problem that deep
disagreement may pose. I then discuss and assess various reactions
to deep disagreement, including the one that has been proposed by
Lynch.
Let me start by presenting and in certain ways revising the
account of deep disagreement proposed by Lynch. Adapting his
framework, let's say an epistemic principle is a 'normative principle
to the effect that some source or way of forming beliefs has some
valuable epistemic status' {Lynch, 2010 #1343@264}. In the next
sentence Lynch adds: ' So we might say that an epistemic principle is
one that says that some doxastic practice or method is reliable'
(Lynch 2010, 264).1
Actually, it seems rather controversial to claim that epistemic
principles merely say that some method is reliable. Epistemic
principles typically do more than merely asserting that some
doxastic practice or method is reliable. Epistemic principles may say
that we ought to use a certain method or practice when inquiring
certain questions, which adds to the claim that this method is in fact

1
Throughout the paper, I will talk interchangeably about
methods and doxastic practices, and I take these labels simply to
refer to, roughly, ways of forming or sustaining beliefs.

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reliable. And epistemic principles may say that beliefs are accorded a
certain epistemic status such as being known or epistemically justified
to some degree when acquired by certain methods.
For the purpose of the ensuing discussion, we can ignore
these further elements of epistemic principles. So, let us assume that
epistemic principles single out some method or doxastic practice,
and says that it is a proper source of belief or evidence, or roughly
equivalently, a source that confers some positive or desirable
epistemic status, such as epistemic justification or knowledge.
Clearly, doxastic practices and methods can be assessed for
their reliability, their tendency to produce true and avoid false
beliefs. Of course, for some method to be assigned a definite level of
reliability, we need to fix the circumstances under which is used, and
the domain of facts or propositions that it is applied to. Visual
perception is quite reliable for questions such as the colour of
medium sized physical objects, but only under suitable conditions.
Without relativizing to domain and circumstances, a process such as
visual perception cannot be assigned any level of reliability. As is
well know, the proper assignment of domain and circumstances, and
similar questions about the individuation of methods, raise thorny
questions discussed under the heading of the generality problem
(Conee and Feldman 1998) (Feldman and Conee 2002) (Kappel 2006).
In this paper, I will set aside these questions, and simply take proper
individuation and relativisations to domain and circumstances for
read when speaking about the reliability of doxastic practices.
Granted this, it is a squarely factual matter whether some
doxastic practice is reliable to a certain degree or not. Consequently,
in so far as an epistemic principle makes a claim about the level
reliability of a particular doxastic practice, it makes a squarely factual
claim. So, let us assume that epistemic principles make factual claims
about the degree of reliability, and let us simply say that an epistemic
principle is true or false, depending on whether the method
endorsed in the principle is in fact reliable to a high enough degree
or not (henceforth, for expositional simplicity, I will skip the
qualifications about degrees of reliability). Consequently, most

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epistemic principles are fact-dependent. Their truth or falsity

depends on factual states of the world.
Sometimes, however, one cannot show that some method is
reliable without at some point presupposing or relying upon that
very method. Again, roughly following Lynch (Lynch 2010, 264), we
can initially say that some doxastic practice is basic just if its
reliability cannot be shown without at some point making appeal to
that very method. There are important qualifications to be made
regarding what it means that a method can be shown to be reliable,
and I will do so in a moment. But first it will be helpful to introduce
the corollary notion of a basic epistemic principle. An epistemic
principle is basic just when, to assess the truth of the principle (i.e.
the truth of the claim that the particular doxastic practice
commended by the principle are reliable), one needs at some point to
assume the truth of that very principle (i.e. one needs in some sense
to rely on the very doxastic method commended by the principle).
Note that basicality was introduced by way of talk about what
can be shown. An epistemic principle is basic just when its truth
cannot be shown without at some point asserting that principle, and
similarly with doxastic practices. We now need to elaborate this. I
will assume that the notion of showing here should be explained in
terms of epistemic reasons, and let me now say a bit in order to make
clear how I want to use that term. An epistemic reason is a truth-
directed reason for believing the truth, or likely truth of a
proposition. Roughly, an epistemic reason for a target-proposition
can be represented as an argument for that target-proposition, that is
a set of premises, and a conclusion, such that the premises
purportedly entail or probabilify the conclusion. Moreover, I will
assume a form of internalism about epistemic reasons; an epistemic
reason is a belief-like entity, a doxastic mental state the content of
which can be represented in the sort of argument I just mentioned. I
take it that whether some doxastic state is a good epistemic reason
for S for believing a target-proposition generally depends on which
other doxastic states S has. So, there is some agent-relativity to
epistemic reasons. One proposition might be a good epistemic reason

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for one agent but need not be so for another. I also use 'epistemic
reason' as a non-success term. One can have or give epistemic
reasons, yet they are bad reasons, or unsuccessful reasons, reasons
that do not, and should not persuade a rational individual.
We can now restate the notion of basicness of epistemic
principles and doxastic practices with the help of the notion of an
epistemic reason. A basic epistemic epistemic principle is a principle
such that the best epistemic reason we can present in favour of the
truth of the principle at some point assume the epistemic principle in
question.2 A basic doxastic practice can be defined similarly.
So, there is a correlation between basicness and what is
known as epistemic circularity. An epistemic principle is basic just
when the best epistemic reasons for it are epistemically circular. Let's
briefly expand on that notion also. An epistemic reason for some
target proposition P is epistemically circular just when the epistemic
status of one or more premises constituting that epistemic reason
depends in certain ways on the truth of the very target proposition P.
Suppose that I want to argue that visual perception is reliable
in ordinary circumstances. I then use a track record argument
consisting of a set premises observation that my visual perception
did supply me with a correct visual belief on various occasions, and
a premise stating some form of inductive generalisation from those
premises. Consider now whether I am justified in accepting each of
the former premises. Presumably, I am epistemically justified in
accepting each of these premises. But evidently, my epistemic
justification may depend certain ways on my attitude to the target
proposition: suppose that I cannot become justified in the empirical
premises without at some point relying on visual perception. When
this holds, there will be dependencies between the target-proposition
(visual perception is reliable) in my argument and my epistemic
justification for the premises in that argument. Suppose that I quite
sincerely question or deny the truth of the target proposition - for

2
I leave the notion of betterness of epistemic reasons
undefined.

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some reason I don't accept the idea that visual perception is reliable;
even if I somehow managed to believe the premises of track-record
argument, I would, on most views, be deprived of epistemic
justification of the observational premises of my track-record
argument because of a defeater. On other views the following
dependence holds: if I fail to know (in advance) or be epistemically
justified (in advance) that visual perception is reliable, I would not be
epistemically justified in my visual beliefs. Yet other views require
that even if I do not really know that visual perception is reliable
(prior to advancing my track-record argument) I should at least be
entitled to this assumption (Wright 2004). Otherwise my use of this
premise in the background of my reasoning in my track-record
argument is not legitimate.
This is not the place to dwell into the details of the nature of
epistemic circularity. The important thing to note is that because of
the dependencies involved, we should suspect to see the following
features of epistemically circular epistemic reasons. Suppose that S is
presented with an epistemically circular epistemic reason for P. If S
questions or denies the truth of P, then S should not consider herself
justified in one or more of the premises constituting the epistemic
reason. This is a consequence of the dependence relation that defines
epistemic circularity. When S questions or denies P, she questions or
denies one of the conditions in her being epistemically justified in the
epistemic reason for P that she is presented with. She should not
consider herself justified in accepting that premises. So, this
epistemically circular argument for P will not constitute a good
reason for her to think that P is true.
For much the same reason we should expect that epistemically
circular arguments are not rationally dialectically effective. If S is
offered an epistemically circular epistemic reason for P, and if S
initially questions or doubts P, then S should not consider herself
justified in accepting one or more of the premises of the epistemically
circular reason for P. Consequently, S should not consider herself
having possessing a good reason for changing her views on P.

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Recall, that basic epistemic principles are principles such that

the best epistemic reasons for them are epistemically circular. So, if
the above is correct, then we don't have good epistemic reasons for
basic epistemic principles. And if we disagree about basic epistemic
principles, then we don't have rationally dialectically effective to
offer to settle the disagreements. So, following the non-success usage
above, there can be epistemic reasons for basic epistemic principles,
there just cannot be good epistemic reasons.
We are now finally closing in on the main topic of this paper.
Clearly, we often disagree about facts, even facts playing a very
important role in political decision making, such as the extent or
causes of climate change, or the nature of evolution. Sometimes these
disagreements involve disputes about how to acquire evidence about
the disputed facts, or about which methods to use to acquire beliefs
about the facts. These are disagreements about epistemic principles.
Let's call disagreements over epistemic principles for epistemic
disagreements. Sometimes, agents disagree not only facts and
epistemic principles, but about basic epistemic principles - principles
that receive their best support from epistemically circular arguments.
This is what I have been referring to as deep disagreements.3
We need to step carefully here. Since the notions of an
epistemic reason and epistemic circularity are agent-relative, the
notion of a basic epistemic principle also becomes agent-relative.
Basicness is relative to agents' doxastic states. What is a basic
epistemic principle for one agent depends on this agent's beliefs
about the world, so what is basic for one agent need not be a basic for
another agent. This implies that it is at least a conceptual possibility
that there is what we might call asymmetric deep disagreements: A and
B disagrees about some epistemic principle P because A accepts P,
while B does not (B rejects or abstains form taking a view). And for
A, the epistemic principle P is basic, while P is not basic for B.

3
Note about earlier definition: no dispute-independent way of
settling the matter. I mean this to be a consequence of the more
fundamental definition given in terms of epistemic reasons.

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Maybe it is puzzling how can this be. But to see that it is a live
possibility, consider Lynch's own case of Abel and Cain.

'Cain and Abel, lets imagine, are having coffee and arguing
about the age of the Earth. Abel asserts with great confidence
that the earth is a mere 7,000 years old. Cain, amazed, points
out that Abels claim is not justified by the evidence of the
fossil record, the best explanation of which is that the Earth is
far older. Inference to the best explanation from the fossil and
historical record can work sometimes Abel concedes, but the
best method for knowing about the distant past is to consult
the Holy Book; it overrides any other competing evidence.
Cain scoffs and rejects the book as an unreliable source for
knowing about the distant past; the only reliable method, he
insists, is to employ a combination of abduction and induction
from the fossil and historical record.' (Lynch 2010, 264).

Abel accepts an epistemic principle that accords the holy book

overriding epistemic authority within certain domains, including
questions concerning the age of the earth. Assume that this principle
is basic for Abel. So, any epistemic reason in favour of the principle
available to Abel is affected by epistemic circularity: at some point,
those reasons depends on that very epistemic principle. For Cain,
however, that same principle need not be basic. For Cain could resort
to plenty of other epistemic principles, and beliefs acquired in
accordance with these other principles, when assessing the
plausibility of Abel's epistemic principle. We can even suppose that
when Cain assesses Abel's epistemic principle according the holy
book overriding epistemic authority, it appears highly implausible or
outright false. So, this is a case of an asymmetric deep disagreement.
Maybe, however, in order to be stable, deep disagreements
need to be become symmetrical in certain ways. At least one would
think that Abel himself could hardly accept the epistemic principles
that would be part of Cain's reasons to reject Abel's epistemic
principle. So, when alerted to these other principles, Abel would

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need to find some reasons to reject them, or otherwise ignore them.

Otherwise Abel's own view would not be stable, or would be
affected by some sort of incoherence. In order to be stable, one might
think, deep disagreements would have to be symmetrical.
So, let us consider epistemic disagreements that are
symmetrical: Assume that A asserts the mundane fact F, whereas B
denies F. Assume that disagreement traces back to a more
fundamental disagreement about basic epistemic principles P and Q.
A accepts the epistemic principle P (but not Q) and this is essential
for A being justified in accepting F. P is basic for A. On the other
hand, B accepts Q (but not P), which is essential for her being
justified in her denial of F, and Q is basic for B.4
For the rest of this paper, my main focus will be on
symmetrical deep disagreements. Such deep disagreements would
appear to be unresolvable by rational dialectical means. We cannot
rationally come to agree about these principles merely by exchanging
epistemic reasons in favour of our respective principles. This is a
consequence of what was said above about the rational dialectical
force of epistemically circular arguments. When some epistemic
principle P is basic for A, then A cannot provide a cogent epistemic
reason for P to someone who denies or questions P. More precisely,

4
Lynch details the notion of a deep disagreement in a slightly
different way (Lynch 2010, 265). According to Lynch, an epistemic
disagreement is mutual 'when both sides to the dispute deny a
principle that the other asserts'. A mutual epistemic disagreement is
deep when the following holds: (1) the parties to the disagreement
share common epistemic goals, (2) the principles they disagree about
concern the same subject-matter, and (3) there is no further epistemic
principle, accepted by both parties, that could settle the
disagreement, and finally (4) 'when the epistemic principles in
question can be justified only means of an epistemically circular
argument.' There are certain minor differences between this way of
stating the issues and mine, but I believe that we can ignore them for
present purposes.

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A cannot provide a cogent argument that she herself accepts - there

might be non-circular arguments for P that happen to rely on
premises that A does not herself accept. Yet, A might make no
rational mistake in accepting P. All the same, B might be fully
rational to reject P and to accept some incompatible epistemic
principle Q.
It is worth pausing briefly to consider why deep
disagreements are possible. Lynch notes that 'it seems pretty clear
that deep epistemic disagreements can and do occur.' (Lynch 2010,
265). This seems right to me, but I actually think that this might
strike some readers as a controversial assumption, especially bearing
in mind that no mistake of rationality (a certain sort of rationality)
need be involved. One might think that there cannot be a sustained
deep disagreement, unless one of the parties is afflicted by a
significant form of irrationality.
Why are deep disagreements possible? One part of the
explanation is that epistemic principles are mostly fact-dependent.
So, the truth of many epistemic principles depends on facts about the
world. So, for a particular agent, the reasonability of adopting a
particular epistemic principle depends on this agent's factual beliefs
about the world. Clearly, then, if two agents disagree about the facts,
it might be rational for them to adopt very different epistemic
principles.
Yet, we all confront the same world, and we are roughly equal
in our cognitive setup. How can we nonetheless end up with vastly
different views about the world? We know what the answer to this
question is. We acquire a huge proportion of our beliefs about the
world, in particular theoretical beliefs, through our upbringing,
education, training, and culture. We also get at fair proportion of the
epistemic principles we adopt from education and culture. In many
respects, bare confrontation with the world does not constrain which
theoretical beliefs and epistemic principles we should accept. As a
result, we might end up accepting very different packages of
theoretical beliefs and epistemic principles, at least in certain
domains, sometimes in very important domains. As a consequence,

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we might end up with very different beliefs about the world that in
turn sustain very different epistemic principles. In part, this is why
deep disagreements are possible.

2. The Problem of Deep Disagreement

In what sense is deep disagreement a problem? Of course, deep
disagreement (and the sorts of dependencies involved in epistemic
circularity) raise a host of interesting questions in epistemology
concerning what to think about epistemic externalism, closure,
transmission, cogency, boot-strapping, easy knowledge, and
skepticism. Philosophers are interested in these questions for
theoretical reasons, and rightly so.5 But apart from that, one might
wonder whether deep disagreement is anything but an unfortunate
circumstance communication, akin to not having a shared language,
or being unable to communicate because one is in a noisy
environment. Maybe we just need to live with the fact that others
may be beyond our reach by discursive means.
Yet, according to Lynch, there is a distinct problem that he
calls the 'practical problem of deep disagreement' (Lynch 2010, 273):

'... the underlying issue isnt a matter of what we know or

dont know, but of what we should or shouldnt do. It is not
even best conceived as a problem about which principles we
ought to believe (because one might say we ought to believe
what we know to be true).

5
As Lynch briefly mentions, one might wonder if the
occurrence of deep disagreement constitute a reason to accept non-
factualism about epistemic principles. I agree with Lynch's
skepticism about this. Note in addition that given the way I have
framed the notion of an epistemic principle, the disputed part of an
epistemic principle might be just the factual part - whether some
belief forming method is in fact reliable or not. It would be extremely
surprising if this part of epistemic principles were to turn out to be
non-factual.

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After all, the root issue at the heart of an epistemic

disagreementthat which makes the dispute an epistemic
oneis the question of which methods we ought to employ.
What we want is a reason for employing one method over
another. Thats a practical matter.' (Lynch 2010, 274)

'It is not a matter of trying to justify our belief in our epistemic

principles, it is a matter of trying to justify our actionsour
employment of a method.' (Lynch 2010, 274)

I am sympathetic to this idea, and now want to elaborate it. What

exactly is the practical problem of deep disagreement? Note that it
cannot be an individual choice problem. Suppose I already accept a
basic epistemic principle P that recommends the use of some
doxastic practice M. I now ask myself whether I should go on using
M or some competing method not endorsed by P. Clearly, since I
already accept P, there is no hard problem about what to do; I should
make my choice of method with reference to P, that is, go on with M.
This is so, even if P is basic. So, my epistemic reason for preferring M
to competing practices may be epistemically circular in that I cannot
be epistemically justified in holding P to be true without at some
point resorting practices such as M. Still, given that I actually believe
P, I would be irrational to reject M in favour of candidate methods
not endorsed by P.
Suppose then that you and I disagree about epistemic
principle P. I accept P, but you don't. Would this affect my choice of
method? It seems not. Again, what method I should choose just
depends on what I believe, and this is entirely unaffected by the fact
that you happen to disagree about P (or M for that matter). Your
disagreement with me about P, whether deep or not, does not affect
the rationality of my choice of method. Of course, I cannot offer a
non-circular epistemic reason to myself of why I ought to use M
rather than some incompatible method. Similarly, I cannot offer a
good epistemic reason to you for choosing M, because you deny

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epistemic principle P. So you will reject part of what for me supports

M. But task facing me is what method I should use, not how I should
rationally persuade you to choose the same method. One might think
that it is a sort of defective situation that I cannot offer a cogent
epistemic reason for my choice to you who deny P. But why should
that concern me? My problem is one of choice of methods, not of
rationally convincing.
If this is right, the practical problem of deep disagreement is
not an individual choice problem. Surely, that is why Lynch uses the
plural in the quote above, when he says that the crucial matter 'is the
question of which methods we ought to employ. What we want is a
reason for employing one method over another. Thats a practical
matter.' [my emphasis]. Clearly, then, we should think of the
practical problem of deep disagreement in terms of a collective
choice problem. The problem Lynch has in mind arises when we for
some reason need a collective choice of epistemic principles, but
simultaneously face a deep disagreement regarding these principles.
I shall say more about this the next section, and offer a more general
account of this type of choice problem.
The problem Lynch has in mind concerns collective choice of
epistemic principles, when the disputed principles are basic. In one
respect this might seem to be a rather narrow issue. How often do we
need to make common decisions regarding disputed, basic epistemic
principles? Yet, the problem of choosing epistemic principles is but
an instance of a much broader class of problems, as I shall now
explain. Roughly, I want to suggest that deep disagreement is a
practical problem in cases where groups of individuals need to
decide what to do in common, or what policies to impose on
everyone, and where these decisions depends on what we take the
facts to be, and when disputes about the relevant facts involve deep
disagreements.
Let me spell this out in more detail. Very often, when we face
a choice between different policy options, the ranking of these
options depend not only on values, but also non-normative features
of the world. In such cases, individual rankings of policy options

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reflect our moral and prudential values, but also on our factual
beliefs about a range of non-normative features of the world. Even if
we did agree about all value questions, we could still agree about
what to do simply because we disagree about the facts. Let's refer to
this as fact-dependent political disagreements, disagreement about
common policies, where the disagreement depends a disagreement
about some non-normative issue.
Surely fact-dependent political disagreements may depend on
deep disagreements. That is, they may depend on disagreements
about factual questions that trace back to disagreements about
epistemic principles, where these principles, in turn, are basic.
Remember that in symmetrical deep disagreements, both parties to
the disagreement regard the basic epistemic principle upon which
the opponents belief is based as flawed. And though each agent is
fully rational, and makes no mistake in reasoning, neither agent can
rationally persuade the other to change his or her mind regarding the
factual question that separates them.
How should we choose in such cases? Well, this is a large
question, but suppose now that we follow Rawls and many others in
accepting some version of what is known as the liberal principle of
legitimacy. Roughly, and subject to many refinements and questions
of scope and interpretation, this principles says that political power
is legitimate only when exercised in accordance with principles that
all reasonable citizens could accept, cf. (Rawls 1993, 137). We can
now see why fact-dependent policy choices, deep disagreements and
the liberal principle of legitimacy may conspire to make a thorny
practical problem. Fact-dependent political disagreements can
depend on symmetrical disagreements about basic epistemic
principles. In symmetrical disagreements about basic principles,
there will be no resolution of the factual disagreement in sight. Yet,
everyone involved might be fully rational, at least in the epistemic
sense. Assume that they are also reasonable. According to the liberal
principle of legitimacy, choices should be in accordance with
principles that all reasonable citizens could accept. But that might be

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a demand that is impossible to meet because of the symmetrical deep

disagreement.6
To illustrate the problem, let us return to Abel and Cain.
Suppose that Abel and Cain both have children in the same school,
and that they are both members of the school board. They are now
about to decide what the school curriculum in biology classes should
be. Abel and Cain both think that the correct or most plausible
theory should be given a preeminent place in the curriculum, but
they disagree about what the relevant facts are. And, let us suppose,
they disagree about these facts because they have an underlying
disagreement about epistemic principles, and this, in turn is a
symmetrical deep disagreement. In their justification of their
favoured curriculum, neither can appeal to reasons that the other
could accept. Yet, neither Abel nor Cain makes any mistake in
reasoning, and let us for now assume that they are reasonable in the
sense require by the principle of legitimacy. It is not clear that there
is any common policy that both Abel and Cain could accept, given
what they believe about the world. Abel and Cain face a peculiar
practical problem concerning how to agree on a common policy.
Generalising from this, we can see that a symmetrical deep
disagreement generates a distinctive practical problem when the
following holds: (i) the disagreement underlies a fact-dependent
political disagreement (ii) everyone in the deep disagreement are
reasonable, (iii) the liberal principle of legitimacy applies to the
political disagreement. Since we assume that the principle of
legitimacy applies to the policy-disagreement in question, the choice
of a policy should be justifiable to everyone involved. This means
that it should be justifiable to everyone by recourse to principles that
what each individual can accept as a reasonable citizen. But what
separates the parties is an underlying symmetrical deep

6
I am not aware of direct references to the liberal principle of
legitimacy in Lynch's writings. But for the reasons mentioned, I
believe that a principle of this sort underlies the problem of deep
disagreement.

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disagreement. So neither part to the policy-disagreement can appeal

to reasons that the other could accept, and there is no other rational
resolution forthcoming.
A special case of fact-dependent common policy choice is
when we consider which shared epistemic principles, or doxastic
practices, epistemic principles of doxastic practices that we for some
reason need to agree upon, say for the purpose of shared inquiry.
This seems to be the case that Lynch focus upon, but it is a special
case of a much more inclusive category I have outlined.
It should be clear enough that the liberal principle of
legitimacy is part of what makes deep disagreement a distinctive
practical problem. Without this principle, or some other normative
principle playing a similar role in constraining collective decision,
deep disagreement would hardly constitute more than an intellectual
problem, and an unfortunate barrier of communication.
It is important to note that there are important issues of
interpretation pertaining to the liberal principle of legitimacy. Rawls,
for example, restricts its domain to concern the design of the basic
institutions of a liberal society. I didn't make that restriction. Others
don't accept this limitation of the principle of legitimacy scope (see
the overview in (D'Agustino 1996)). Another important question
concerns the interpretation of the requirement of reasonability. In my
illustrations above, I have been assuming that when the parties to a
deep disagreement are epistemically rational, they might well also be
reasonable. However, to be reasonable in Rawls sense is not merely a
matter of being rational in the sense of making no mistakes in
reasoning, of doing everything one is epistemically required to do.
Among other things, reasonability requires a moral disposition to
'propose principles and standards as fair terms of cooperation and to
abide by them willingly, given the assurance that others will likewise
do so.' (Rawls 1993, 49). So, it is clearly a possibility that Abel and
Cain are both fully epistemically rational in their sustained deep
disagreement, and yet one or both fails to be reasonable in the sense
required for the liberal principle of legitimacy. If we, for some
reason, can bear out the claim while fully epistemically rational,

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parties to a symmetrical deep disagreement leading to a fact-

dependent policy disagreement are nonetheless not reasonable in the
sense required by a plausible rendering of the liberal principle of
legitimacy, then matters are more complicated. To settle this question
requires discussions that I cannot go into here.

3. Choosing Epistemic Principles Behind the Veil of

Ignorance
Our problem is what to do when facing the problem of deep
disagreement. In this section, I present and critically assess Lynch's
proposal, but before turning to that I briefly want comment on to
two other strategies that might seem attractive, though space does
not permit a full discussion.
One appealing strategy would be to argue that at least in some
prominent cases of deep disagreement, one of the parties fails to
meet minimal standards of rationality. This is what Kitcher suggests
in his recent book, though he does not use the term 'deep
disagreement'. Kitcher considers what he calls chimeric
epistemology, which is an epistemology including two methods of
certifying that can deliver opposing verdicts about acceptance and
rejection' (Kitcher 2011, 157) see also (Kitcher 2008). The case of Cain
and Abel might illustrate what Kitcher has in mind. Abel is asserting
the epistemic authority of the holy book with respect to certain
questions regarding the origin of life, but accepts conflicting
epistemic principles involved in ordinary scientific rationality in
many apparently similar questions. So Abel adopts a chimeric
epistemology. But Kitcher wants to suggest that if this chimeric
epistemology were brought into the open and scrutinized, it would
be seen as a very uncomfortable position ((Kitcher 2011, 157).
Though Kitcher himself does not put it in those terms, one might
argue that chimeric epistemologies, such as the one adopted by Abel,
are not reasonable in the sense required in the liberal principle of
legitimacy. So, as far as common political decision making is
concerned, we need not worry about the likes of Abel and other

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proponents of chimeric epistemologies. Their acceptance of a

common policy in fact-dependent policy choices is not required.
The problem for this strategy is whether it can be borne out
that reasonable individuals cannot sustain chimeric epistemologies.
A full discussion of this important problem is beyond the scope of
the present paper. But note that I argued above that epistemic
principles are in general fact-dependent. Whether they are true of
false depends on features of the world. If this is right, then the
rationality of sustaining a particular epistemic principle would
depend on one's beliefs about the nature of the world. This also
holds for very general epistemic principles like those featuring in
accounts of scientific rationality emphasising epistemic desiderata
such as parsimony and scope of ones theoretical beliefs about the
world. Maybe you don't think that the world is simple and uniform.
Maybe you think that different domains of questions require very
different methods of inquiry. If you think that the world has a
chimeric nature, then it might be entirely reasonable for you to adopt
a chimeric epistemology.
Another strategy to deal with the problem of deep
disagreement would be to adopt conciliationism with respect to
disagreement (Feldman 2006; Christensen 2007). According to
conciliationism, the proper response to known disagreement with an
epistemic peer on some question is to conciliate, that is, to reduce
one's confidence in one's view.7 So, if I believe that P, and I realise
that you deny P, and I consider you just as competent and well-
informed regarding this question, then I should reduce my
confidence in my view. If one is sympathetic to conciliationism, one
might argue that the proper response to deep disagreement is to
reduce one's confidence in one's own basic epistemic principles. This
could eliminate the deep disagreement, as both parties to the deep
disagreement would adjust their level of credence in the disputed
epistemic principles until the point there they agree. Perhaps this

7
This rough characterisation of conciliationism omits a number
of qualifications, but that need not detain us here.

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requires that they suspend beliefs about all the epistemic principles
in dispute. The result would be that according to conciliationism,
two individuals cannot both sustain a deep disagreement, be aware
of it, and remain in compliance with what rationality requires.
Again, space does not permit a discussion of this strategy, but
let me just note that it is not obvious that this is what defenders of
conciliationist views should say regarding deep disagreements. After
all, in cases of deep disagreement both parties to the dispute have
reasons not to regard the other as an epistemic peer. So it is not clear
that they would be rationally required to reduce confidence in their
own view. And each party to the deep disagreement would have
good epistemic reason to regard the social evidence provided by the
fact that there is a deep disagreement as not indicative of a mistake
or fault in their own reasoning. So, they should remain unmoved in
their confidence regarding their favoured epistemic principles, and
doing so is not a failure of rationality. See the similar discussion in
(Bergmann 2009).
Let us now turn to the solution to the problem of deep
disagreement that Lynch proposes. Lynch suggests what he calls the
Method Game. The basic idea is that we should choose privileged
epistemic principles behind a veil of ignorance, in close analogy to
Rawls choice of principles of justice in the original position.
Everything depends on the specification of the choice
situation. What Lynch has in mind a choice of epistemic principle on
the assumption that, first, players have no information about the
reliability of various candidate doxastic practices; they cannot
assume that any particular method is better than others: 'all methods
for forming beliefs are as reliable as others because none are reliable'
Second, players cannot assume any particular metaphysical picture
of the world. They cannot assume, for example, that naturalism or
some form of Christian theism is true. Third, players known that
they will inhabit the world in which the chosen methods are
privileged. Fourth, players do not know 'all the methods they will -
because of upbringing, education, religion and so forth - wish to

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employ themselves in' the world they are concerned about (Lynch
2010, 275).
In a good Rawlsian fashion, Lynch then looks what epistemic
principles (or methods or doxastic practices) it would be in our
rational self-interest to prefer. Note that according to Lynch, the
choice behind the veil of provide a practical reason for preferring
certain methods/epistemic principles over others: 'It gives practical,
self-interested, reason for adopting some standards over others'
(Lynch 2010, 276). And, according to Lynch: 'it would seem in our
self-interest to favour privileging those methods that, to the greatest
degree possible, were repeatable, adaptable, public, and widespread.'
(Lynch 2010, 275). Lynch specifies this very succinctly as follows:

'It would be in our interest to favour repeatable methods

because such methods could be used over and over again by
people with different social standings. Adaptable methods are
those that can be employed on distinct kinds of problems and
which produce results given a variety of kinds of inputs. It
would be in our interest to favour such methods because we
don't know what sort of problems we'll face in w. Public
methods are those whose effectiveness could, in principle be
judged publicly - that is, it is not the case that only one person
it its sole judge of effectiveness. It would be in our self-interest
to favour public methods because we don't know if we'll be
lucky enough to be that one person in w. And finally,
widespread methods are those that many people in fact
employ. It seems rational that we would privilege methods
with these features simply because doing so, we would
maximize each of our chances to both use and assess the use
of privileged methods.'(Lynch 2010, 276)

Note what it means for an epistemic principle to be privileged.

Lynch says: 'an epistemic principle is privileged when it is worthy of
teaching in the schools, used in evaluating research, and seen as
trumping other, possibly conflicting methods' (Lynch 2010, 275). In

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line with what I have said above, I would like to propose a

somewhat more general rendering of a privileged principle: an
epistemic principle is privileged when it legitimizes common policy
choices. In fact-dependent political choices, a choice of a common
policy is legitimate only if this choice of an option can be justified by
privileged epistemic principles. So, in the case of Abel and Cain
debating the school curricula, the choice of a policy would have to be
made by recourse to such privileged epistemic principles. I am
assuming that the point of the Method Game is that it allows us to
identify epistemic principles capable of playing this role in common
decision-making.
I believe that the Method Game faces a critical dilemma.
Either the Method Game underdetermines choice of epistemic
principles. Or it does not underdetermine these principles, but then
the Method Game involves a commitment to epistemic irrationality.
Let me explain.
The Method Game requires that we set aside a wide range of
our factual beliefs about the world. It is not only that we cannot
assume naturalism or Christian theism - for us to be neutral with
respect to the whole range of candidate epistemic principles, we
need to assume ignorance about a wide range of facts about the
world. We cannot, for example, assume the laws of physics. If we did
certain candidate epistemic practices, say clairvoyance, would be
ruled out. But then it is really hard to see how the constraints listed
by Lynch - the constraints laying down that the chosen methods
should be repeatable, adaptable, public, and widespread - serve to
identify epistemic principles. It would seem that far too many
candidate principles meet these constraints. It is hard to see, for
example, how one could insist that clairvoyance would not meet the
constraints. We cannot assume in advance that the world has turned
out not to sustain the reliability of clairvoyance as a doxastic practice.
For all we know, clairvoyance might be just like ordinary vision. And
if it were, it would be repeatable, adaptable, public and could well be
widespread. But then we would seem to have no reason to deny that
clairvoyance is a candidate for a privileged doxastic practice.

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The root of the matter is that most epistemic principles are

fact-dependent. Whether they are true or not depend on facts about
the world. If we ignore what we know about the world, criteria for
the choice of epistemic principles such as those defended by Lynch
simply leaves the choice of privileged epistemic or doxastic practices
underdetermined. So, agreement about the constraints on admissible
epistemic principles derived from the Method Game is compatible
with plenty of deep disagreements involving fact-dependent
epistemic principles.
In his more recent book In Praise of Reason, Lynch presents a
somewhat more elaborate discussion of the Method Game (Lynch
2012, 99ff). Among other things, Lynch stresses the importance of
choosing epistemic principles that 'are part of our natural instincts'
or 'which we can't help but use' ((Lynch 2012, 107), as well as the
virtues that methods or principles may have by being repeatable,
adaptable, inter-subjective and transparent (Lynch 2012, 102).
Perhaps, this will reduce the indeterminateness of choice being the
veil of ignorance. One idea would be that we think of this a sort of
two-step procedure. First, we admit a large set of epistemic
principles that meet the above criteria, focusing on pragmatic
feasibility and openness. Second, as the evidence comes in, we prune
and revise our set of epistemic principles thereby narrowing down
the set of privileged principles.
Space does not permit a discussion of these further options.
But assume now that the Method Game does not underdetermine the
choice of privileged epistemic principles. So, assume that the Method
Game picks out a fairly specific set of principles, maybe for the sort
of reason just mentioned. In that case, the Method Game seem to
commit at least one of the parties to a symmetrical deep
disagreement to epistemic irrationality, i.e. to doing what she has
epistemic reason to believe is less rational from an epistemic point of
view. To see why, think again Cain and Abel discussing their
common decision regarding the curriculum in biology classes. Cain
might say that behind a veil of ignorance of the sort specified, Abel
would not be entitled to regard the holy book as an authority, or as a

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privileged source of evidence. Suppose, setting aside problems about

under-determination, that this is true. Suppose that that Abel agrees.
The problem is why he should care. Abel would agree that if situated
behind the veil of ignorance, then he would end up accepting some
other epistemic principles than the ones he actually accepts. Clearly
however, this is because the veil of ignorance partially blinds Abel to
the facts of the world, or the facts as Abel sees them. Why, in his
conversation with Cain, should Abel want to ignore what he takes
himself to know? Why should he want to ignore or reject an
epistemic principle that he accepts? Why should this partially
blinded perspective taken up in the Method Game take priority over
his actual view of the world?
Contrast this to the rather different story that Rawls can offer
about why choice of principle of justice behind the veil of ignorance
should be accorded a distinctive authority. The reason is that such
choices offer a way of modelling a particular moral stance, the
impartial point of view. We can see why ignoring our own interests
may improve our moral perspective, presupposing that we do accept
the moral force an impartial point of view in moral matters. This is
surprising in a way, but we can see why this is so. Our partial
interests and knowledge of the particularities of our own case distort
our moral judgement. So, our choices of moral principles become
more reliable, when we have less information (of a certain sort) about
the world. Partially blinding ourselves makes us wiser in some moral
matters. And if we are morally committed to the impartial point of
view, we have a moral reason to care about what we would choose
behind the veil of ignorance. Even when we are not behind that veil,
it will motivate us when we understand which the hypothetical
judgments about moral principles we would make in that position.
This is not so in the epistemic case. Our choice of epistemic
principles does not improve when we remove specific information
about the world; rather it deteriorates. It is difficult to see why this
information-deprived hypothetical choice situation should exert any
force upon us.

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Recall here that Lynch thinks of choice of epistemic principles

as a practical matter:

... the root issue at the heart of an epistemic disagreement

that which makes the dispute an epistemic oneis the
question of which methods we ought to employ. What we
want is a reason for employing one method over another.
Thats a practical matter.' (Lynch 2010, 274).

I have basically objected that choice of epistemic principles behind

veil of ignorance is epistemically irrational. But since, the choice is
admittedly a practical matter, is this objection beside the point? I
don't think so. Let's focus on the question of a practical reason. Is
there, in general, a practical reason to accept epistemic principles
selected behind veil of ignorance as laid out in the Method Game,
and ignore epistemic principles not supported by the Method Game,
even epistemic principles that one takes oneself to know to be true?
It is hard to see why this should be so in general. Assume that
practical reasons can be of two kinds, self-regarding practical reasons
that concern the promotion of one's self-interest or wellbeing, and
other-regarding practical reasons that concern other individuals and
perhaps non-sentient beings. Of course, one does not have a self-
regarding practical reason to set aside epistemic principles that one
considers true. Similarly, it is difficult to see why one should set
aside such principles when pursuing one's moral concern for other
beings, including non-sentient beings. In his moral concerns for Abel,
Cain should not ignore the epistemic principles that he - Cain - takes
to be correct.
Of course, Abel and Cain may both have moral reasons as
well as self-regarding practical reasons to find some solution to the
common choice problem they face. And they may both have moral as
well as prudential reasons to prefer a solution that the other part
finds acceptable. They may both want a policy choice that can be
justified by principles not only they themselves accept but which can
also be accepted by the other part. This is the problem of deep

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disagreement. What I have been arguing in this section is that

Lynch's Method Game is not a plausible solution the problem of
deep disagreement.

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