1
CANON 6 - THESE CANONS SHALL APPLY TO LAWYERS IN GOVERNMENT SERVICES IN THE
DISCHARGE OF THEIR TASKS.
Rule 6.01 - The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is not to convict but
to see that justice is done. The suppression of facts or the concealment of witnesses capable
of establishing the innocence of the accused is highly reprehensible and is cause for
disciplinary action.
Rule 6.02 - A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or
advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.
Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.
DIANA RAMOS V. IMBANG
DIANA RAMOS, complainant, vs. ATTY. JOSE R. IMBANG respondent.
PONENTE: PER CURIAM
FACTS:
Nature of the Complaint: Disbarment or Suspension against Atty. Jose R. Imbang for
multiple violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
1992, Ramos sought the assistance of Atty. Imbang in filing civil and criminal actions
against the spouses Roque and Elenita Jovellanos.
o She gave Imbang P8,500 as attorney's fees but the latter issued a receipt for P5,000
only.
o Ramos tried to attend the scheduled hearings of her cases against the Jovellanoses.
Imbang never allowed her to enter the courtroom and always told her to wait outside. He
would then come out after several hours to inform her that the hearing had been cancelled
and rescheduled. This happened six times and for each appearance in court, respondent
charged her P350. (*Ito yung sinasabing case ni Atty. Canlas na nagdedelay ng case, lagging
suspend )
o Ramos was shocked to learn that Imbang never filed any case against the
Jovellanoses and that he was in fact employed in the Public Attorney's Office (PAO). (*Utak ni
Imbang!)
IMBANGs CONTENTIONS:
o Ramos knew that he was in the government service from the very start. In fact, he
first met the complainant when he was still a district attorney in the Citizen's Legal Assistance
Office (predecessor of PAO) of Bian, Laguna and was assigned as counsel for Ramos'
daughter.
o In 1992, Ramos requested him to help her file an action for damages against the
Jovellanoses. Because he was with the PAO and aware that Ramos was not an indigent, he
declined. (*Alibi)
o Nevertheless, he advised Ramos to consult Atty. Tim Ungson, a relative who was a
private practitioner. Atty. Ungson, however, did not accept the case as she was unable to
come up with the acceptance fee agreed upon.
o Notwithstanding Atty. Ungson's refusal, Ramos allegedly remained adamant. She
insisted on suing the Jovellanoses. Afraid that she might spend the cash on hand, Ramos
asked Imbang to keep the P5,000 while she raised the balance of Atty. Ungson's acceptance
fee. (*Utak talaga! Galing mag-alibi!)
o On April 15, 1994, Imbang resigned from the PAO. A few months later or in September
1994, Ramos again asked Imbang to assist her in suing the Jovellanoses. Inasmuch as he was
now a private practitioner, Imbang agreed to prepare the complaint. However, he was unable
to finalize it as he lost contact with Ramos.
IBP findings (CBD):
o The CBD concluded that respondent violated the following provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for
or from a client.
Rule 18.01. A lawyer should not undertake a legal service which he knows or should
know that he is not qualified to render. However, he may render such service if, with the
consent of his client, he can obtain as collaborating counsel a lawyer who is competent on the
matter.
o CBD Recommendations: Suspension from the practice of law for three years and
ordered him to immediately return to the complainant the amount of P5,000 which was
substantiated by the receipt.
o Board of Governors: adopted and approved the findings of the CBD, however,
modified the CBD's recommendation with regard to the restitution ofP5,000 by imposing
interest at the legal rate, reckoned from 1995 or, in case of Imbangs failure to return the total
amount, an additional suspension of six months.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Imbang should be disbarred.
HELD: YES, as per SCs decision
RATIO DECIDENDI: Lawyers are expected to conduct themselves with honesty and integrity.
More specifically, lawyers in government service are expected to be more conscientious of
their actuations as they are subject to public scrutiny. They are not only members of the bar
but also public servants who owe utmost fidelity to public service.
The SC supported this with three explanations:
1. Code of Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees
Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees
provides:
o Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. -- In addition to acts and omissions of
public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the
following constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and
are hereby declared unlawful:
o (b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto, public officials and
employees during their incumbency shall not:
o (1) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the Constitution
or law, provided that such practice will not conflict with their official function.
In this instance, Imbang received P5,000 from the complainant and issued a receipt
on July 15, 1992 while he was still connected with the PAO. Acceptance of money from a client
establishes an attorney-client relationship.
2. Revised Administrative Code
Section 14(3), Chapter 5, Title III, Book V of the Revised Administrative Code provides:
 2

o The PAO shall be the principal law office of the Government in extending free legal - Complainant deposited with respondent on six different occasions from April 1995 to
assistance to indigent persons in criminal, civil, labor, administrative and other quasi-judicial April 1996 the total amount of US$20,000, believing it was required by law.
cases.
As a PAO lawyer, Imbang should not have accepted attorney's fees from the
complainant as this was inconsistent with the office's mission. - Respondent prepared receipts/vouchers as proofs that he received the amounts
deposited by the complainant but refused to give her copies of official receipts
3. Code of Professional Responsibility despite her demands
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
o CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE - Complainant demanded the deposited sum after a year but respondent failed to
LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR THE LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
return.
Every lawyer is obligated to uphold the law. This undertaking includes the observance
of the above-mentioned prohibitions blatantly violated by Imbang when he accepted the
complainant's cases and received attorney's fees in consideration of his legal services. - Thus, the World Mission for Jesus (of which complainant was a member) sent a
Consequently, Imbang's acceptance of the cases was also a breach of Rule 18.01 of demand letter to respondent for the immediate return of the money
the Code of Professional Responsibility because the prohibition on the private practice of
profession disqualified him from acting as Ramos' counsel.
- In a letter (March 9, 1999), respondent promised to release the amount not later than
9 March 1999. But he failed to do so.

- World Mission for Jesus sent another demand letter

GISELA HUYSSEN VS ATTY. FRED L. GUTIERREZ, AC NO. 6707, MARCH 24, 2006
- In a letter explaining the alleged reasons for the delay in the release of deposited
amount (19 March 1999), he enclosed two blank checks postdated to 6 April and 20
GISELA HUYSSEN vs. ATTY. FRED L. GUTIERREZ April 1999 and authorized complainant to fill in the amounts.

A.C. No. 6707; March 24, 2006 - When complainant deposited the postdated checks on their due dates, the same were
dishonored because respondent had stopped payment on the same.

- In a letter (25 April 1999) respondent explained again for stopping payments and
gave complainant five postdated checks with the assurance that said checks would be
Facts:
honoured

A A Complaint for disbarment was filed by Huyssen against respondent Atty. Fred L.
- Complainant deposited the five postdated checks on their due dates but they were all
Gutierrez. Allegations are as follows:
dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds or payment thereon was
ordered stopped by respondent.
- that in 1995, while respondent was still connected with the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation (BID), she (petitioner herein) and her three sons, who are all American
- Hence, complainant referred the matter to a lawyer who sent two demand letters to
citizens, applied for Philippine Visas under Section 13[g] of the Immigration Law
respondent, which remained unheeded.

- Respondent told the petitioner that their visa applications will be acted favourably if
they deposit a certain sum of money for a period of one year which could be
withdrawn after one year.
B Complaint disbarment was filed by Huyssen in the Commission on Bar Discipline of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). On 15 November 2000, Victor C.

Fernandez, Director for Bar Discipline, required respondent to submit his answer
within 15 days from receipt thereof
C Counter-Affidavit dated 2 July 2001, respondent denied the allegations in the
complaint claiming that having never physically received the money mentioned in the
complaint, he could not have appropriated or pocketed the same. He said the amount
was used as payment for services rendered for obtaining the permanent visas in the
Philippines. Read defense below:
[a)Through a close-friend, Jovie Galaraga, a Pastor and likewise a friend of
the complainant, the latter was introduced to me at my office at the Bureau
of Immigration with a big problem concerning their stay in the Philippines,
herself and three sons, one of which is already of major age while the two
others were still minors then. Their problem was the fact that since they
have been staying in the Philippines for almost ten (10) years as holders of
missionary visas (9G) they could no longer extend their said status as under
the law and related polic[i]es of the government, missionary visa holders
could only remain as such for ten (10) years after which they could no
longer extend their said status and have to leave the country.
b)Studying their case and being U.S. Citizen (sic), I advised them that they
better secure a permanent visa under Section 3 of the Philippine
Immigration Law otherwise known as Quota Visa and thereafter, provided
them with list of the requirements in obtaining the said visa, one of which is
that the applicant must have a $40,000 deposited in the bank. I also inform
that her son Marcus Huyssen, who was already of major age, has to have
the same amount of show money separate of her money as he would be
issued separate visa, while her two minor children would be included as her
dependents in her said visa application. I advised them to get a lawyer (sic),
complainant further requested me to refer to her to a lawyer to work for
their application, which I did and contacted the late Atty. Mendoza, an
Immigration lawyer, to do the job for the complainant and her family.
c)The application was filed, processed and followed-up by the said Atty.
Mendoza until the same was finished and the corresponding permanent visa
were obtained by the complainant and her family. Her son Marcus Huyssen
was given an independent permanent visa while the other two were made
as dependents of the complainant. In between the processing of the papers
and becoming very close to the complainant, I became the intermediary
between complainant and their counsel so much that every amount that the
3
latter would request for whatever purpose was coursed through me which
request were then transmitted to the complainant and every amount of
money given by the complainant to their counsel were coursed thru me
which is the very reason why my signature appears in the vouchers
attached in the complaint-affidavit;
d)That as time goes by, I noticed that the amount appeared to be huge for
services of a lawyer that I myself began to wonder why and, to satisfy my
curiosity, I met Atty. Mendoza and inquired from him regarding the matter
and the following facts were revealed to me:
1)That what was used by the complainant as her show money from
the bank is not really her money but money of World Mission for
Jesus, which therefore is a serious violation of the Immigration Law
as there was a misrepresentation. This fact was confirmed later
when the said entity sent their demand letter to the undersigned
affiant and which is attached to the complaint-affidavit; ECISAD
2)That worst, the same amount used by the complainant, was the
very same amount used by her son Marcus Huyssen, in obtaining
his separate permanent visa. These acts of the complainant and her
son could have been a ground for deportation and likewise
constitute criminal offense under the Immigration Law and the
Revised Penal Code. These could have been the possible reason why
complainant was made to pay for quite huge amount.
e)That after they have secured their visas, complainant and her family
became very close to undersigned and my family that I was even invited to
their residence several times;
f)However after three years, complainant demanded the return of their
money given and surprisingly they want to recover the same from me. By
twist of fate, Atty. Mendoza is no longer around, he died sometime 1997;
g)That it is unfortunate that the real facts of the matter is now being hidden
and that the amount of money is now being sought to be recovered from
me;
h)That the fact is I signed the vouchers and being a lawyer I know the
consequences of having signed the same and therefore I had to answer for
it and pay. I tried to raised the fund needed but up to the present my
 4

standby loan application has not been released and was informed that the
same would only be forthcoming second week of August. The same should
have been released last March but was aborted due to prevalent condition.
The amount to be paid, according to the complainant has now become
doubled plus attorney's fees of P200,000.00.]
D 4 September 2002 and April 2003 Complainant submitted her evidence
H 4 November 2004 IBP Board of Governors approved the Investigating
Commissioner's report with modification. Atty. Fred L. Gutierrez was DISBARRED from
the practice of law and ordered to return the amount with legal interest from
receipt of the money until payment.
a The case was also referred to the Office of the Ombudsman for prosecution for
violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Acts and to the Department of
Justice for appropriate administrative action

E 25 August 2003 Complainant filed her Formal Offer of Evidence

Issue: WON respondent has violated Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional
F 11 settings of hearings were all rest by respondent, who was allegedly out of the Responsibility and must severely penalized.
country to attend to his client's needs. The last, on 28 September 2004, respondent
failed to appear, despite due notice and without just cause.

G 5 November 2004 Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan submitted her Held: YES.
report recommending the disbarment of respondent

a Basis: From the letters sent by respondent, he made it appear that the
US$20,000 was officially deposited with the Bureau of Immigration and SC explained that:
Deportation. However, if this is true, how come only Petty Cash Vouchers were
issued by respondent to complainant to prove his receipt of the said sum and A Lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official task have more
official receipts therefore were never issued by the said Bureau? Also, why restrictions than lawyers in private practice. Want of moral integrity is to be more
would respondent issue his personal checks to cover the return of the money severely condemned in a lawyer who holds a responsible public office.
to complainant if said amount was really officially deposited with the Bureau
of Immigration? All these actions of respondent point to the inescapable
B Defense of respondent remains unsubstantiated as he failed to submit evidence on
conclusion that respondent received the money from complainant and
the matter. While he claims that Atty. Mendoza already died, he did not present the
appropriated the same for his personal use. It should also be noted that
death certificate of said Atty. Mendoza. Worse, the action of respondent in shifting the
respondent has failed to establish that the "late Atty. Mendoza" referred to in
blame to someone who has been naturally silenced by fate, is not only impudent but
his Counter-Affidavit really exists. There is not one correspondence from Atty.
downright ignominious. When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is
Mendoza regarding the visa application of complainant and his family, and
not enough that he deny the charges against him; he must meet the issue and
complainant has also testified that she never met this Atty. Mendoza referred
overcome the evidence against him. He must show proof that he still maintains that
to by respondent. Considering that respondent was able to perpetrate the
degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of him. In the case at
fraud by taking advantage of his position with the Board of Special Inquiry of
bar, respondent clearly fell short of his duty. Records show that even though he was
the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, makes it more reprehensible as it
given the opportunity to answer the charges and controvert the evidence against him
has caused damage to the reputation and integrity of said office. It is
in a formal investigation, he failed, without any plausible reason, to appear several
submitted that respondent has violated Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the Code of
times whenever the case was set for reception of his evidence despite due notice. The
Professional Responsibility
defense of denial proferred by respondent is, thus, not convincing. It is settled that
denial is inherently a weak defense. To be believed, it must be buttressed by a strong

evidence of non-culpability; otherwise, such denial is purely self-serving and is with nil
evidentiary value
C When respondent issued the postdated checks as his moral obligation, he indirectly
admitted the charge. Such admissions were also apparent in the letters of respondent
to complainant. (lifted parts of the letter were quoted by SC decision)
D Normally, this is not the actuation of one who is falsely accused of appropriating the
money of another. As correctly observed by the Investigating Commissioner,
respondent would not have issued his personal checks if said amount were officially
deposited with the BID. This is an admission of misconduct.
E WHAT WAS VIOLATED IN THE CPR?
a Respondent's act of asking money from complainant in consideration of the
latter's pending application for visas is violative of Rule 1.01, which prohibits
members of the Bar from engaging or participating in any unlawful, dishonest,
or deceitful acts.
b Moreover, said acts constitute a breach of Rule 6.02 of the Code which bars
lawyers in government service from promoting their private interest.
Promotion of private interest includes soliciting gifts or anything of monetary
value in any transaction requiring the approval of his office or which may be
affected by the functions of his office.
i Respondent's conduct in office betrays the integrity and good moral
character required from all lawyers, especially from one occupying a
high public office. A lawyer in public office is expected not only to
refrain from any act or omission which might tend to lessen the trust
and confidence of the citizenry in government; he must also uphold
the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high
standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in
government service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened
with high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than his
brethren in private practice.
ii In a desperate attempt to put up a smoke or to camouflage his
misdeed, he went on committing another by issuing several worthless
checks, thereby compounding his case.
5
iii Respondent's acts are more despicable. Not only did he
misappropriate the money of complainant; worse, he had the gall to
prepare receipts with the letterhead of the BID and issued checks to
cover up his misdeeds. Clearly, he does not deserve to continue,
being a member of the bar.
iv Time and again, we have declared that the practice of law is a noble
profession. It is a special privilege bestowed only upon those who are
competent intellectually, academically and morally. A lawyer must at
all times conduct himself, especially in his dealings with his clients
and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner
beyond reproach. He must faithfully perform his duties to society, to
the bar, to the courts and to his clients. A violation of the high
standards of the legal profession subjects the lawyer to administrative
sanctions which includes suspension and disbarment. More
importantly, possession of good moral character must be continuous
as a requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice;
otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such
privilege.
v Indeed, the primary objective of administrative cases against lawyers
is not only to punish and discipline the erring individual lawyers but
also to safeguard the administration of justice by protecting the courts
and the public from the misconduct of lawyers, and to remove from
the legal profession persons whose utter disregard of their lawyer's
oath have proven them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed
in them as members of the bar. These pronouncement gain practical
significance in the case at bar considering that respondent was a
former member of the Board of Special Inquiry of the BID. It bears
stressing also that government lawyers who are public servants owe
fidelity to the public service, a public trust. As such, government
lawyers should be more sensitive to their professional obligations as
their disreputable conduct is more likely to be magnified in the public
eye. As a lawyer, who was also a public officer, respondent miserably
failed to cope with the strict demands and high standards of the legal
profession.
vi Respondent's acts constitute gross misconduct; and consistent with
the need to maintain the high standards of the Bar and thus preserve
the faith of the public in the legal profession, respondent deserves the
ultimate penalty of expulsion from the esteemed brotherhood of
lawyers

F Atty. Fred L. Gutierrez is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and ordered to
return the amount he received from the complainant with legal interest from his
receipt of the money until payment.
a This case shall be referred to the Office of the Ombudsman for criminal
prosecution for violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Acts and to the
Department of Justice for appropriate administrative action.
b Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Bar Confidant to be spread on the
records of the respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution
to all its chapters; and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination
to all courts throughout the country.
RUTHIE LIM-SANTIAGO VS ATTY. CARLOS B. SAGUCIO
A.C. No. 6705 March 31, 2006
RUTHIE LIM-SANTIAGO, Complainant, vs.ATTY. CARLOS B. SAGUCIO, Respondent.
CARPIO, J.:
DOCTRINE: the law does not distinguish between consultancy services and retainer
agreement. For as long as respondent performed acts that are usually rendered by lawyers
with the use of their legal knowledge, the same falls within the ambit of the term "practice of
law."
NATURE: Disbarment complaint
FACTS:
1 Ruthie Lim-Santiago ("complainant") is the daughter of Alfonso Lim and Special
Administratrix of his estate. Alfonso Lim is a stockholder and the former President of
Taggat Industries, Inc, a domestic corporation engaged in the operation of timber
concessions from the government. PCGG sequestered it and its operations ceased.
2 Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio ("respondent") was the former Personnel Manager and
Retained Counsel of Taggat Industries, Inc. until his appointment as Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor of Tuguegarao, Cagayan.
3 employees of Taggat ("Taggat employees") filed a criminal complaint entitled "Jesus
Tagorda, Jr. et al. v. Ruthie Lim-Santiago," docketed as I.S. No. 97-240 ("criminal
6
complaint"). Taggat employees alleged that complainant, who took over the
management and control of Taggat after the death of her father, withheld payment of
their salaries and wages without valid cause
4 Respondent, as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, was assigned to conduct the
preliminary investigation. He resolved the criminal complaint by recommending the
filing of 651 Informations for violation of Article 288 in relation to Article 116 of the
Labor Code of the Philippines.
5 Complainant now charges respondent with the following violations:
a Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility- guilty of representing
conflicting interests. Respondent, being the former Personnel Manager and
Retained Counsel of Taggat, knew the operations of Taggat very well.
Respondent should have inhibited himself from hearing, investigating and
deciding the case filed by Taggat employees.
b Engaging in the private practice of law while working as a government
prosecutor- Engaging in the private practice of law while working as a
government prosecutor. He received retainers fees which respondent claims
to only consultation fees.
6 Complainant seeks the disbarment of respondent for the violations committed.
7 Respondent claims that when the criminal complaint was filed, respondent had
resigned from Taggat for more than five years and refutes complainants allegations
and counters that complainant was merely aggrieved by the resolution of the criminal
complaint which was adverse and contrary to her expectation.
8 Respondent points out that complainant did not file a motion to inhibit respondent
from hearing the criminal complaint and states that complainants reason in not filing
a motion to inhibit was her impression that respondent would exonerate her from the
charges filed
9 While this disbarment case was pending, the Resolution and Order issued by
respondent to file 651 Informations against complainant was reversed and set aside
by Regional State Prosecutor. Hence, the criminal complaint was dismissed.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent was engaged in private practice of law while
being a public official.
YES. Government prosecutors are prohibited to engage in the private practice of
law. The act of being a legal consultant is a practice of law. To engage in the practice of law is
to do any of those acts that are characteristic of the legal profession. It covers any activity, in
or out of court, which required the application of law, legal principles, practice or procedures
and calls for legal knowledge, training and experience.
ISSUE: whether being a former lawyer of Taggat conflicts with his role as Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor

HELD: YES. A lawyer owes something to a former client. Herein Respondent owes to
Taggat, a former client, the duty to "maintain inviolate the clients confidence or to refrain
from doing anything which will injuriously affect him in any matter in which he previously
represented him."
I.S. No. 97-240 was filed for "Violation of Labor Code" (see Resolution of the Provincial
Prosecutors Office, Annex "B" of Complaint). Herein Complainant, Ruthie Lim-Santiago, was
being accused as having the "management and control" of Taggat. Clearly, as a former
Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat, herein Respondent undoubtedly handled the
personnel and labor concerns of Taggat. Respondent, undoubtedly dealt with and related with
the employees of Taggat. Therefore, Respondent undoubtedly dealt with and related with
complainants in I.S. No. 97-240.
It should not be forgotten, however, that a lawyer has an immutable duty to a former
client with respect to matters that he previously handled for that former client. In this case,
matters relating to personnel, labor policies, and labor relations that he previously handled as
Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat. I.S. No. 97-240 was for "Violation of the
Labor Code." Here lies the conflict. Perhaps it would have been different had I.S. No. 97-240
not been labor-related, or if Respondent had not been a Personnel Manager concurrently as
Legal Counsel. But as it is, I.S. No. 97-240 is labor-related and Respondent was a former
Personnel Manager of Taggat.
RULING. The Court exonerates respondent from the charge of violation of Rule 15.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (conflicting interest.) In the present case, we find no
conflict of interests when respondent handled the preliminary investigation of the criminal
complaint filed by Taggat employees in 1997. The issue in the criminal complaint pertains to
non-payment of wages that occurred from 1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997. Clearly, respondent
was no longer connected with Taggat during that period since he resigned sometime in 1992.
However, the Court finds respondent liable for violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility against unlawful conduct. 42 Respondent committed unlawful
conduct when he violated Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees or Republic Act No. 6713 ("RA 6713").
7
Respondent is mandated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 not to engage in "unlawful x x x
conduct." Unlawful conduct includes violation of the statutory prohibition on a government
employee to "engage in the private practice of [his] profession unless authorized by the
Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with [his]
official functions."
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio GUILTY of violation of Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent
Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio from the practice of law for SIX MONTHS effective upon finality of this
Decision
COLLANTES V. RENOMERON
Nature: Disbarment case against Renomeron, Register of Deeds, for the latter's
irregular actuations with regard to the application of V & G for registration of 163 pro
forma Deeds of Absolute Sale with Assignment of lots in its subdivision.
Facts: This is in relation to the administrative case filed by Atty. Collantes, counsel
for V&G Better Homes Subdivision, Inc. (V&G), against Atty. Renomeron, for the
latters irregular actuations with regard to the application of V&G for registration of
163 pro forma Deed of Absolute Sale with Assignment (in favor of GSIS) of lots in its
subdivision.
Although V&G complied with the desired requirements, Renomeron suspended
the registration of the documents with certain special conditions between them,
which was that V&G should provide him with weekly round trip ticket from Tacloban to
Manila plus P2,000.00 as pocket money per trip, or, in lieu thereof, the sale of
respondents Quezon City house and lot by V&G or GSIS representatives.
Eventually, Renomeron formally denied the registration of the documents. He
Himself elevated the question on the registrability of the said documents to
Administrator Bonifacio (of the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration
Administration-NLTDRA). The Administrator then resolved in favor of the registrability
of the documents.
Despite the resolution of the Administrator, Renomeron still refused the
registration thereof but demanded from the parties interested the submission of
additional requirements not adverted in his previous denial.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Renomeron, as a lawyer, may also be disciplined by the
Court for his malfeasance as a public official.
Ruling: Yes for his misconduct as a public official also constituted a violation
of his oath as a lawyer.
The lawyer's oath (Rule 138, Section 17, Rules of Court; People vs. De Luna,
102 Phil. 968), imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or

malice. The lawyer's oath is a source of his obligations and its violation is a ground for
his suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary action (Legal Ethics, Ruben E. Agpalo,
1983 Edition, pp. 66-67).
As the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro said:
A person takes an oath when he is admitted to the Bar which is
designed to impress upon him his responsibilities. He thereby becomes an
"officer of the court" on whose shoulders rests the grave responsibility of
assisting the courts in the proper. fair, speedy, and efficient administration of
justice. As an officer of the court he is subject to a rigid discipline that
demands that in his every exertion the only criterion he that truth and justice
triumph. This discipline is what as given the law profession its nobility, its
prestige, its exalted place. From a lawyer, to paraphrase Justice Felix
Frankfurter, are expected those qualities of truth-speaking, a high sense of
honor, full candor, intellectual honesty, and the strictest observance of
fiduciary responsibility all of which, throughout the centuries, have been
compendiously described as moral character.
Membership in the Bar is in the category of a mandate to public
service of the highest order. A lawyer is an oath-bound servant of society
whose conduct is clearly circumscribed by inflexible norms of law and ethics,
and whose primary duty is the advancement of the quest of truth and justice,
for which he has sworn to be a fearless crusader. (Apostasy in the Legal
Profession, 64 SCRA 784, 789- 790; emphasis supplied.)
The Code of Professional Responsibility applies to lawyers in government
service in the discharge of their official tasks (Canon 6). Just as the Code of Conduct
and Ethical Standards for Public Officials requires public officials and employees to
process documents and papers expeditiously (Sec. 5, subpars. [c] and [d] and
prohibits them from directly or indirectly having a financial or material interest in any
transaction requiring the approval of their office, and likewise bars them from
soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in the course of any transaction which
may be affected by the functions of their office (See. 7, subpars. [a] and [d]), the
Code of Professional Responsibility forbids a lawyer to engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct (Rule 1.01, Code of Professional Responsibility), or delay
any man's cause "for any corrupt motive or interest" (Rule 103).
A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession. (Rule 7.03, Code of Professional
Responsibility.)
This Court has ordered that only those who are "competent, honorable, and
reliable" may practice the profession of law (Noriega vs. Sison, 125 SCRA 293) for
every lawyer must pursue "only the highest standards in the practice of his calling"
(Court Administrator vs. Hermoso, 150 SCRA 269, 278).
The acts of dishonesty and oppression which Attorney Renomeron committed
as a public official have demonstrated his unfitness to practice the high and noble
calling of the law (Bautista vs. Judge Guevarra, 142 SCRA 632; Court Administrator vs.
Rodolfo G. Hermoso, 150 SCRA 269). He should therefore be disbarred.
8
PEOPLE V. PINEDA
SUAREZ V. PLATON
n May 1935, Atty. Fortunato Suarez was riding a train on his way to Calauag, Tayabas.
Apparently he was very vocal and he was despising the abuses made by government officers.
Incidentally, Lieutenant Vivencio Orais was aboard the train. Orais arrested Suarez and
charged him with sedition. Orais however later moved for the dismissal of the case upon the
instruction of his superior. Thereafter, Suarez filed a case against Orais for arbitrary detention.
Provincial Fiscal Ramon Valdez moved for the dismissal of the case due to insufficiency of
evidence. Suarez asked Valdez to inhibit and later asked for a special prosecutor to take his
place as he alleged that Valdez does not have the courage to prosecute the case. Valdez was
then replaced by special prosecutor Jacinto Yamzon who also found that there is insufficient
evidence to prosecute the case. Eventually, the case was dismissed by Judge Servillano Platon
on the ground that there is insufficiency of evidence. Suarez appealed the dismissal of the
case but his appeal was denied on the ground that mandamus is the proper remedy. Hence,
Suarez filed this Mandamus case to compel Platon to reinstate the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the case should be reinstated.
HELD: No. The fiscals are well within their rights not to push through with the case if they find
the evidence to be insufficient. The prosecuting officer is the representative not of an ordinary
party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as
compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal
prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a
peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt
shall not escape or innocence shall suffer.
PENTICOSTES V. IBAEZ
ATTY. PRUDENCIO S. PENTICOSTES, complainant, vs. PROSECUTOR DIOSDADO S. IBAEZ,
respondent.
[A.C. CBD No. 167; March 9, 1999]
Ponente: Romero, J.
SYNOPSIS
Sometime in 1989, respondent Prosecutor Diosdado S. Ibaez was assigned to conduct
a preliminary investigation of the complaint for non-remittance of SSS payments filed against
Encarnacion Pascual, the sister-in-law of the complainant. In the course of the investigation,
Encarnacion Pascual gave P 1,804.00 to respondent as payment of her Social Security System
(SSS) contributions in arrears. Respondent, however, did not remit the amount to the SSS.
Hence, on November 16, 1990, Atty. Prudencio S. Penticostes, the brother-in-law of Pascual,
filed a complaint for professional misconduct against Ibaez alleging that the respondents
misappropriation of Encarnacion Pascuals SSS contributions amounted to the violation of his
oath as a lawyer. Seven days later, respondent paid P1,804.00 to the SSS on behalf of
Encarnacion Pascual. In his defense, respondent, claimed that the action was moot and
academic, since the amount of P1,804.00 had already been paid by him to the SSS and that
the acts complained of were not done by him in his capacity as a practicing lawyer but on
account of his office as a prosecutor.

The Court found respondent guilty of professional misconduct. The Court has
repeatedly admonished lawyers that a high sense of morality, honesty and fair dealing is
expected and required of a member of the bar. Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that [a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. It is glaringly clear that respondents non-remittance for over one year of
the funds coming from Encarnacion Pascual constitutes conduct in gross violation of the
above canon. The belated payment of the same SSS does not excuse his misconduct.
Further, respondents claim that he may not be held liable because he committed such
acts, not in his capacity as a private lawyer, but as a prosecutor is unavailing. Canon 6 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility provides: These canons shall apply to lawyers in
government service in the discharge of their official tasks.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court REPRIMANDED the respondent.
Facts:
In 1989, Encarnacion Pascual, sister-in-law of Atty. Prudencio S. Penticostes
(complainant) was sued for non-remittance of SSS payments. The complaint was
assigned to Prosecutor Diosdado S. Ibaez (respondent) for preliminary investigation.
In the course of the investigation, Encarnacion Pascual gave P1,804.00 to respondent
as payment of her SSS contribution in arrears. But respondent did not remit the
amount and the fact of non-payment was certified to by the SSS on October 2, 1989.
Over a year later, complainant filed with the Tarlac RTC a complaint for professional
misconduct against Ibaez due to the latters failure to remit the SSS contributions of
his sister-in-law. It alleged that respondents misappropriation of Encarnacion
Pascuals SSS contributions amounted to a violation of his oath as a lawyer. Seven
days later, or on November 23, 1990, respondent paid P1,804.00 to the SSS on behalf
of Encarnacion Pascual.
In the meantime, the case was referred to the IBP-Tarlac Chapter, the court observing
that it had no competence to receive evidence on the matter. Upon receipt of the
case, the Tarlac Chapter forwarded the same to IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline.
In his defense, respondent claimed that his act of accommodating Encarnacion
Pascuals request to make payment to the SSS did not amount to professional
misconduct but was rather an act of Christian charity. Furthermore, he claimed that
the action was moot and academic, the amount of P1,804.00 having already been
paid by him to the SSS. Lastly, he disclaimed liability on the ground that the acts
complained were not done by him in his capacity as a practicing lawyer but on
account of his office as a prosecutor.
On September 3, 1998, the Commission recommended that the respondent be
reprimanded, with a warning that the commission of the same or similar offense
would be dealt with more severely in the future. On November 5, 1998, the Board of
Governors of the IBP adopted and approved its Commissions recommendation.
Issue: WON Respondents non-remittance of the funds coming from Encarnacion Pascual
constitutes misconduct.
Held: Yes
SC adopted IBPs recommendation and found respondent guilty of professional
misconduct. While there is no doubt that payment of the contested amount had been
effected to the SSS on November 23, 1990, it is clear however, that the same was
made only after a complaint had been filed against respondent. Furthermore, the
9
duties of a provincial prosecutor do not include receiving money from persons with
official transactions with his office.
The Court has repeatedly admonished lawyers that a high sense of morality, honesty
and fair dealing is expected and required of a member of the bar. Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility provides that [a] lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
It is glaringly clear that respondents non-remittance for over one year of the funds
coming from Encarnacion Pascual constitutes conduct in gross violation of the above
canon. The belated payment of the same to the SSS does not excuse his misconduct.
While Pascual may not strictly be considered a client of respondent, the rules relating
to a lawyers handling of funds of a client is applicable.
In Daroy v. Legaspi, it was held that (t)he relation between an attorney and his client
is highly fiduciary in nature...[thus] lawyers are bound to promptly account for money
or property received by them on behalf of their clients and failure to do so constitutes
professional misconduct. The failure of respondent to immediately remit the amount
to the SSS gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own
use. This is a gross violation of general morality as well as professional ethics; it
impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment.
Respondents claim that he may not be held liable because he committed such acts,
not in his capacity as a private lawyer, but as a prosecutor is unavailing. Canon 6 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
These canons shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their
official tasks.
As stated by the IBP Committee that drafted the Code, a lawyer does not shed his
professional obligations upon assuming public office. In fact, his public office should
make him more sensitive to his professional obligations because a lawyers
disreputable conduct is more likely to be magnified in the publics eye. Want of moral
integrity is to be more severely condemned in a lawyer who holds a responsible public
office.
Respondent was REPRIMANDED with a STERN WARNING that a commission of the
similar offense will be dealt with more severely in the future.
MISAMIN V. SAN JUAN
Facts: Herein respondent admits having appeared as counsel for the New Cesars Bakery in
the proceeding before the NLRC while he held office as captain in the Manila Metropolitan
Police. Respondent contends that the law did not prohibit him from such isolated exercise of
his profession. He contends that his appearanceas counsel while holding a government
position is not among the grounds provided by the Rules of Court for the suspension or
removal of attorneys.
Issue: Whether or not the administrative case against the defendant should prosper
Held: The court ruled in the negative. The court ruled that the matter is to be decided in an
administrative proceeding as noted in the recommendation of the Solicitor General.
Nonetheless, the court held that while the charges have to be dismissed, still it would not be
inappropriate for respondent member of the bar to avoid allappearances of impropriety.
Certainly, the fact that the suspicion could be entertained that far from living true to the
concept of a public office being a public trust, he did make use, not so much of whatever legal

knowledge he possessed, but the influence that laymen could assume was inherent in the
office held not only to frustrate the beneficent statutory scheme that labor be justly
compensated but also to be at the beck and call of what the complainant called alien interest,
is a matter that should not pass unnoticed. Respondent, in his future actuations as a member
of the bar should refrain from laying himself open to such doubts and misgivings as to his
fitness not only for the position occupied by him but also for membership in the bar. He is not
worthy of membershipin an honorable profession who does not even take care that his honor
remains unsullied.
CUENCA VS CA, GR NO. 109870, DECEMBER 1, 1995
ALI VS ATTY. BUBONG, AC NO. 4018, MARCH 8, 2005
OMAR P. ALI, complainant, vs. ATTY. MOSIB A. BUBONG, respondent. A.C. No. 4018.
March 8, 2005
FACTS: This is a verified petition for disbarment filed against Atty. Mosib Ali Bubong for
having been found guilty of grave misconduct while holding the position of Register of Deeds
of Marawi City. It appears that this disbarment proceeding is an off-shoot of the administrative
case earlier filed by complainant against respondent, which was initially investigated by the
Land Registration Authority (LRA), complainant charged respondent with illegal exaction;
indiscriminate issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT); and manipulating the criminal
complaint filed against Hadji Serad Bauduli Datu and others for violation of the Anti-Squatting
Law. It appears from the records that the Baudali Datus are relatives of respondent. The initial
inquiry by the LRA was resolved in favor of respondent, absolved respondent of all the
charges brought against him.
The case was then forwarded to the DOJ for review, then SoJ Franklin Drilon exonerated
respondent of the charges of illegal exaction and infidelity in the custody of documents, but
held guilty of grave misconduct for his imprudent issuance of TCT and manipulating the
criminal case for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law instituted against Hadji Serad Bauduli
Datu and the latters co-accused. As a result of this finding, former President FVR issued AO
No. 41 adopting in toto the conclusion reached by Secretary Drilon. Respondent questioned
said AO before this Court through a petition for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition claiming
that the Office of the President did not have the authority and jurisdiction to remove him from
office and insisted that respondents violated the laws on security of tenure and that
respondent Reynaldo V. Maulit, then the administrator of the LRA committed a breach of Civil
Service Rules when he abdicated his authority to resolve the administrative complaint against
him (herein respondent), but was dismissed for failure on the part of petitioner to sufficiently
show that public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned
order. Respondent MR was denied with finality.
10
On the disbarment proceeding, complainant claims that it has become obvious that
respondent had proven himself unfit to be further entrusted with the duties of an attorney and
that he poses a serious threat to the integrity of the legal profession. Respondent maintains
that there was nothing irregular with his issuance of TCT No. T-2821 in the name of the
Bauduli Datus. According to him, both law and jurisprudence support his stance that it was his
ministerial duty, as the Register of Deeds of Marawi City, to act on applications for land
registration on the basis only of the documents presented by the applicants. In the case of the
Bauduli Datus, nothing in the documents they presented to his office warranted suspicion,
hence, he was duty-bound to issue TCT No. T-2821 in their favor.
Respondent also insists that he had nothing to do with the dismissal of criminal complaint for
violation of the Anti-Squatting Law and explains that his participation in said case was a result
of the two subpoenas duces tecum issued by the investigating prosecutor who required him to
produce the various land titles involved in said dispute. The IBP commenced the investigation
of this disbarment suit. On 23 February 1996, Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez denied the
order relative to the transfer of venue of this case and penalized with dismissal from the
service, as Register of Deeds of Marawi City. The finding of Grave Misconduct on the part of
respondent by the Office of the President was fully supported by evidence and as such carries
a very strong weight in considering the professional misconduct of respondent in the present
case. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved, with modification, which pertained
solely to the period of suspension from the practice of law from a five-year suspension to a
two-year suspension to be proper.
On 17 January 2003, respondent MR was denied as by that time, the matter had already been
endorsed to this Court.
ISSUE: WON respondent may be disbarred for grave misconduct committed while he was in
the employ of the government.
RULING: We resolve this question in the affirmative. The Code of Professional Responsibility
does not cease to apply to a lawyer simply because he has joined the government service. In
fact, by the express provision of Canon 6 thereof, the rules governing the conduct of lawyers
shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks. Thus,
where a lawyers misconduct as a government official is of such nature as to affect his
qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a
member of the bar on such grounds. Although the general rule is that a lawyer who holds a
government office may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for infractions he
committed as a government official, he may, however, be disciplined as a lawyer if his
misconduct constitutes a violation of his oath a member of the legal profession.
In the case at bar, respondents grave misconduct, as established by the Office of the
President and subsequently affirmed by this Court, deals with his qualification as a lawyer. By

taking advantage of his office as the Register of Deeds of Marawi City and employing his
knowledge of the rules governing land registration for the benefit of his relatives, respondent
had clearly demonstrated his unfitness not only to perform the functions of a civil servant but
also to retain his membership in the bar. Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is
explicit on this matter. It reads: Rule 6.02 A lawyer in the government service shall not use his
public position to promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere
with his public duties.
Respondents conduct manifestly undermined the peoples confidence in the public office he
used to occupy and cast doubt on the integrity of the legal profession. The ill-conceived use of
his knowledge of the intricacies of the law calls for nothing less than the withdrawal of his
privilege to practice law.
As for the letter sent by Bainar Ali, the deceased complainants daughter, requesting for
the withdrawal of this case, we cannot possibly favorably act on the same as proceedings of
this nature cannot be interrupted or terminated by reason of desistance, settlement,
compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges or failure of the complainant to prosecute
the same. As we have previously explained in the case of Irene Rayos-Ombac v. Atty. Orlando
A. Rayos:
A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest
of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the
record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven. This rule
is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or
disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the
respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest
and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely
for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of
justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is
called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant
or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorneys alleged misconduct is
in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good
citizens may have in the proper administrative of justice.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Mosib A. Bubong is hereby DISBARRED and his name is
ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.
11
OLAZO VS. JUSTICE TINGA
JOVITO S. OLAZO, Complainant, vs. JUSTICE DANTE O. TINGA (Ret.), Respondent.
A.M. No. 10-5-7-SC, DECEMBER 07, 2010
FACTS:
In March 1990, the complainant filed a sales application covering a parcel of land situated in
Barangay Lower Bicutan in the Municipality of Taguig. The land was previously part of Fort
Andres Bonifacio that was segregated and declared open for disposition pursuant to
Proclamation No. 2476, issued on January 7, 1986, and Proclamation No. 172, issued on
October 16, 1987.
To implement Proclamation No. 172, Memorandum No. 119 was issued by then Executive
Secretary Catalino Macaraig, creating a Committee on Awards whose duty was to study,
evaluate, and make a recommendation on the applications to purchase the lands declared
open for disposition. The Committee on Awards was headed by the Director of Lands and the
respondent was one of the Committee members, in his official capacity as the Congressman
of Taguig and Pateros (from 1987 to 1998); the respondents district includes the areas
covered by the proclamations.
Violation of Rule 6.02: In the complaint, the complainant claimed that the respondent abused
his position as Congressman and as a member of the Committee on Awards when he unduly
interfered with the complainants sales application because of his personal interest over the
subject land when respondent exerted undue pressure and influence over the complainants
father, Miguel P. Olazo, for the latter to contest the complainants sales application and claim
the subject land for himself. The respondent prevailed upon Miguel Olazo to accept, on
various dates, sums of money as payment of the latters alleged rights over the subject land.
The complainant further claimed that the respondent brokered the transfer of rights of the
subject land between Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, who is the nephew of the
respondents deceased wife. As a result, complainants sales application was denied. The
conveyance of rights to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez and his sales application were subsequently
given due course by the DENR.
Violation of Rule 6.03: The second charge involves another parcel of land within the
proclaimed areas belonging to Manuel Olazo, the complainants brother. The respondent
persuaded Miguel Olazo to direct Manuel to convey his rights over the land to Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez. As a result of the respondents promptings, the rights to the land were transferred
to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. In addition, the complainant alleged that the respondent met with
Manuel for the purpose of nullifying the conveyance of rights over the land to Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez. The complainant claimed that the respondent wanted the rights over the land
transferred to one Rolando Olazo, the Barangay Chairman of Hagonoy, Taguig. The
respondent in this regard executed an Assurance where he stated that he was the lawyer of
Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez.

Violation of Rule 1.01: The complainant alleged that the respondent engaged in unlawful
conduct considering his knowledge that Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez was not a qualified
beneficiary under Memorandum No. 119. Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez is not a bona fide resident
of the proclaimed areas and does not qualify for an award. Thus, the approval of his sales
application by the Committee on Awards amounted to a violation of the objectives of
Proclamation No. 172 and Memorandum No. 119.
The complainant also alleged that the respondent violated Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees or Republic Act (R.A.) No.
6713 since he engaged in the practice of law, within the one-year prohibition period, when he
appeared as a lawyer for Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez before the Committee on
Awards.
In his Comment, the respondent claimed that the present complaint is the third malicious
charge filed against him by the complainant. The first one was submitted before the Judicial
and Bar Council when he was nominated as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court; the
second complaint is now pending with the Office of the Ombudsman, for alleged violation of
Section 3(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended.
ISSUE:
WON respondents actions constitute a breach of the standard ethical conduct first, while the
respondent was still an elective public official and a member of the Committee on Awards;
and second, when he was no longer a public official, but a private lawyer who represented a
client before the office he was previously connected with.
RULING:
Generally, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the
Bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official. He may be
disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar only when his misconduct also constitutes a
violation of his oath as a lawyer. After a careful evaluation of the pleadings filed by both
parties and their respective pieces of evidence, we resolve to dismiss the administrative
complaint.
Accountability of a government lawyer in public office
The first charge involves a violation of Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It
imposes the following restrictions in the conduct of a government lawyer: A lawyer in the
government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his private
interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.
The above provision prohibits a lawyer from using his or her public position to: (1) promote
private interests; (2) advance private interests; or (3) allow private interest to interfere with
his or her public duties. We previously held that the restriction extends to all government
lawyers who use their public offices to promote their private interests.
In Huyssen v. Gutierrez, we defined promotion of private interest to include soliciting gifts or
anything of monetary value in any transaction requiring the approval of his or her office, or
may be affected by the functions of his or her office. In Ali v. Bubong, we recognized that
private interest is not limited to direct interest, but extends to advancing the interest of
12
relatives. We also ruled that private interest interferes with public duty when the respondent
uses the office and his or her knowledge of the intricacies of the law to benefit relatives. In
Vitriolo v. Dasig, we found the act of the respondent (an official of the Commission on Higher
Education) of extorting money from persons with applications or requests pending before her
office to be a serious breach of Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. We
reached the same conclusion in Huyssen, where we found the respondent (an employee of
the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation) liable under Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, based on the evidence showing that he demanded money from the
complainant who had a pending application for visas before his office. Similarly, in Igoy v.
Soriano we found the respondent (a Court Attorney of this Court) liable for violating Rule 6.02
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, after considering the evidence showing that he
demanded and received money from the complainant who had a pending case before this
Court.
Applying these legal precepts to the facts of the case, we find the absence of any concrete
proof that the respondent abused his position as a Congressman and as a member of the
Committee on Awards in the manner defined under Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
First, the records do not clearly show if the complainants sales application was ever brought
before the Committee on Awards. Complainant filed a sales application in March 1990 before
LMB. By 1996, the complainants sales application was pending before the Office of the
Regional Director, NCR of the DENR due to the conflicting claims of Miguel Olazo, and,
subsequently, of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. The records show that it was only on August 2,
2000 that the Office of the Regional Director, NCR of the DENR rendered its decision, or after
the term of the respondents elective public office and membership to the Committee on
Awards, which expired in 1997.These circumstances do not show that the respondent did in
any way promote, advance or use his private interests in the discharge of his official duties.
Since the sales application was not brought before the Committee on Awards when the
respondent was still a member, no sufficient basis exists to conclude that he used his position
to obtain personal benefits. We note in this regard that the denial of the complainants sales
application over the subject land was made by the DENR, not by the Committee on Awards.
Second, the complainant's allegation that the respondent orchestrated the efforts to get the
subject land does not specify how the orchestration was undertaken.
Third, the other documents executed by Miguel Olazo, that the complainant presented to
support his claim that the respondent exerted undue pressure and influence over his father,
do not contain any reference to the alleged pressure or force exerted by the respondent over
Miguel Olazo. The documents merely showed that the respondent helped Miguel Olazo in
having his farm lots (covered by the proclaimed areas) surveyed. They also showed that the
respondent merely acted as a witness in the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July 17, 1996.
In turn, the respondent was able to provide a satisfactory explanation. The affidavit of Joseph
Jeffrey Rodriguez further corroborated the respondents claim that the latters involvement was
limited to being paid the loans he gave to Miguel Olazo and Francisca Olazo. According to
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, he and Miguel Olazo agreed that a portion of the loan would be

directly paid by Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez to the respondent and the amount paid would be
considered as part of the purchase price of the subject land.
It also bears stressing that a facial comparison of the documentary evidence, specifically the
dates when the sums of money were extended by the respondent on February 21, 1995,
September 2, 1995 and October 17, 1995, and the date when the Deed of Conveyance[27]
over the subject land was executed or on October 25, 1995, showed that the sums of money
were extended prior to the transfer of rights over the subject land. These pieces of evidence
are consistent with the respondents allegation that Miguel Olazo decided to sell his rights over
the subject land to pay the loans he obtained from the respondent and, also, to finance his
continuing medical treatment.
Private practice of law after separation from public office
As proof that the respondent was engaged in an unauthorized practice of law after his
separation from the government service, the complainant presented the Sinumpaang
Salaysay, dated January 20, 2000, of Manuel and the document entitled Assurance where the
respondent legally represented Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. Nevertheless, the
foregoing pieces of evidence fail to persuade us to conclude that there was a violation of Rule
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In Cayetano v. Monsod,[28] we defined the practice of law as any activity, in and out of court,
that requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience.
Moreover, we ruled that to engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession; to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service,
which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.
Under the circumstances, the foregoing definition should be correlated with R.A. No. 6713 and
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which impose certain restrictions on
government lawyers to engage in private practice after their separation from the service.
Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 reads:
Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. In addition to acts and
omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing
laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and
employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. Public officials and employees
during their incumbency shall not:
xxxx
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or
law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions;
xxx
These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one (1) year after resignation,
retirement, or separation from public office, except in the case of subparagraph (b) (2) above,
but the professional concerned cannot practice his profession in connection with any matter
13
before the office he used to be with, in which case the one-year prohibition shall likewise
apply.
As a rule, government lawyers are not allowed to engage in the private practice of their
profession during their incumbency.[29] By way of exception, a government lawyer can
engage in the practice of his or her profession under the following conditions: first, the private
practice is authorized by the Constitution or by the law; and second, the practice will not
conflict or tend to conflict with his or her official functions.[30] The last paragraph of Section 7
provides an exception to the exception. In case of lawyers separated from the government
service who are covered under subparagraph (b) (2) of Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713, a one-year
prohibition is imposed to practice law in connection with any matter before the office he used
to be with.
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility echoes this restriction and prohibits
lawyers, after leaving the government service, to accept engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service. The keyword
in Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is the term intervene which we
previously interpreted to include an act of a person who has the power to influence the
proceedings.[31] Otherwise stated, to fall within the ambit of Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, the respondent must have accepted engagement or employment
in a matter which, by virtue of his public office, he had previously exercised power to
influence the outcome of the proceedings.
As the records show, no evidence exists showing that the respondent previously interfered
with the sales application covering Manuels land when the former was still a member of the
Committee on Awards. The complainant, too, failed to sufficiently establish that the
respondent was engaged in the practice of law. At face value, the legal service rendered by
the respondent was limited only in the preparation of a single document. In Borja, Sr. v.
Sulyap, Inc.,[32] we specifically described private practice of law as one that contemplates a
succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding ones self to the public
as a lawyer.
In any event, even granting that respondents act fell within the definition of practice of law,
the available pieces of evidence are insufficient to show that the legal representation was
made before the Committee on Awards, or that the Assurance was intended to be presented
before it. These are matters for the complainant to prove and we cannot consider any
uncertainty in this regard against the respondents favor.
Violation of Rule 1.01
Rule 1.01 prohibits a lawyer from engaging in unlawful, immoral or deceitful conduct. From
the above discussion, we already struck down the complainants allegation that respondent
engaged in an unauthorized practice of law when he appeared as a lawyer for Ramon Lee and
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez before the Committee on Awards.
We find that a similar treatment should be given to the complainants claim that the
respondent violated paragraph 4(1)[33] of Memorandum No. 119 when he encouraged the
sales application of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez despite his knowledge that his nephew was not a

qualified applicant. The matter of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguezs qualifications to apply for a sales
application over lots covered by the proclaimed areas has been resolved in the affirmative by
the Secretary of the DENR in the decision dated April 3, 2004,[34] when the DENR gave due
course to his sales application over the subject land. We are, at this point, bound by this
finding.
As pointed out by the respondent, the DENR decision was affirmed by the Office of the
President, the Court of Appeals[35] and, finally, the Court, per our Minute Resolution, dated
October 11, 2006, in G.R. No. 173453. In our Resolution, we dismissed the petition for review
on certiorari filed by the complainant after finding, among others, that no reversible error was
committed by the Court of Appeals in its decision.[36]
All told, considering the serious consequences of the penalty of disbarment or suspension of a
member of the Bar, the burden rests on the complainant to present clear, convincing and
satisfactory proof for the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers.[37] The respondent
generally is under no obligation to prove his/her defense,[38] until the burden shifts to
him/her because of what the complainant has proven. Where no case has in the first place
been proven, nothing has to be rebutted in defense.[39]
With this in mind, we resolve to dismiss the administrative case against the respondent for
the complainants failure to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the former committed
unethical infractions warranting the exercise of the Courts disciplinary power.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the administrative case for violation of Rule
6.02, Rule 6.03 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, filed against retired
Supreme Court Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga, for lack of merit.
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
Rule 7.01 - A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement or
suppressing a material fact in connection with his application for admission to the bar.
Rule 7.02 - A lawyer shall not support the application for admission to the bar of any person
known by him to be unqualified in respect to character, education, or other relevant attribute.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to
the discredit of the legal profession.
IN RE: 1989 ELECTIONS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, 178 SCRA
398 (1989)
SANTOS V. LLAMAS, 322 SCRA 529
Nature: Disbarment case filed by Soliman Santos against Atty. Llamas for his false
misrepresentation and non-payment of IBP dues.
Facts: This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues
filed against respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas It appears that Atty. Llamas, who for a
number of years now, has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP OR Nos. and data in his
14
pleadings. If at all, he only indicated IBP Rizal 259060 but he has been using this for at least
3 years already.
On April 18, 1997, complainant filed a certification[3] dated March 18, 1997, by the then
president of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Atty. Ida R. Macalinao-Javier, that
respondents "last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991. Since then he has not paid or
remitted any amount to cover his membership fees up to the present."
On the other hand, respondent, who is now of age, averred that since 1992, he has engaged
in law practice without having paid his IBP dues. Moreover, and more than anything else,
respondent being a Senior Citizen since 1992, is legally exempt under Section 4 of Rep. Act
7432 which took effect in 1992, in the payment of taxes, income taxes as an example. Being
thus exempt, he honestly believe in view of his detachment from a total practice of law, but
only in a limited practice, the subsequent payment by him of dues with the Integrated Bar is
covered by such exemption. In fact, he never exercised his rights as an IBP member to vote
and be voted upon.
Nonetheless, if despite such honest belief of being covered by the exemption and if only to
show that he never in any manner wilfully and deliberately failed and refused compliance with
such dues, he is willing at any time to fulfill and pay all past dues even with interests, charges
and surcharges and penalties. He is ready to tender such fulfillment or payment, not for
allegedly saving his skin as again irrelevantly and frustratingly insinuated for vindictive
purposes by the complainant, but as an honest act of accepting reality if indeed it is reality for
him to pay such dues despite his candor and honest belief in all food faith, to the contrary.
Issue: Whether the respondent has misled the court about his standing in the IBP by using the
same IBP O.R. number in his pleadings of at least six years and therefore liable for his actions.
Ruling: Yes. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to
the public and the courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is
guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION, AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. Esmso
CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any court; nor
shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
Respondents failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in
court indeed merit the most severe penalty. However, in view of respondents advanced age,
his express willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more temperate application of the law,
[8] we believe the penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law or until he has paid
his IBP dues, whichever is later, is appropriate
 15

IN RE: RAMON GALANG 66 SCRA 282 1. Upon return to civilian life, the educational authorities considered his army
In Re: Victorio D. Lanuevo, A.M. No. 1162 August 29, 1975; In Re: Ramon E. Galang, service as the equivalent of 3rd and 4th year high school.
A.C. No. 1163 August 29, 1975; In Re: HON. BERNARDO PARDO, HON. RAMON 2. No certification. However, it is unnecessary to dwell on this, since the second
PAMATIAN, ATTY. MANUEL TOMACRUZ, ATTY. FIDEL MANALO And ATTY. GUILLERMO charge is clearly meritorious:
PABLO, JR., Members, 1971 Bar Examining Committee, A.M. No. 1162 i. Never obtained his diploma. from Quisumbing College; and yet his application for
It is patent likewise from the records that respondent Lanuevo too undue advantage of the examination represented him as an A.A. graduate.
trust and confidence reposed in him by the Court and the Examiners implicit in his position as ii. Now, asserting he had obtained his A.A. title from the Arellano University in April,
Bar Confidant as well as the trust and confidence that prevailed in and characterized his 1949
relationship with the five members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee, who were thus 1. He said erroneously certified, due to confusion, as a graduate of Quisumbing College, in his
deceived and induced into re-evaluating the answers of only respondent Galang school records.
in five subjects that resulted in the increase of his grades therein, ultimately enabling him to
be admitted a member of the Philippine Bar.
ISSUE:
Section 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964, in connection, among WON DIAO still continue admission to the Bar, for passing the Bar despite not completing pre-
others, with the character requirement of candidates for admission to the Bar, provides that law requirements? NO.
"every applicant for admission as a member of the Bar must be ... of good moral
HELD:
character ... and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral STRIKE OUT NME OF DIAO IN ROLL OF ATTORNEYS. DIAO REQUIRED TO RETURN HIS LAWYERS
character, and that no charges against him involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are DIPLOMA WITHIN 30 DAYS.
pending in any court in the Philippines." 1. Explanation of error or confusion is not acceptable.
1. Had his application disclosed his having obtained A.A. from Arellano
Respondent Galang when he took the Bar for the first time in 1962 did not expressly require University, it would also have disclosed that he got it in April, 1949, thereby showing that he
began his law studies (2nd semester of 1948-1949) six months before obtaininghis Associate
the disclosure of the applicant's criminal records, if any. in Arts degree.
2. He would not have been permitted to take the bar tests:
Galang continued to intentionally withhold or conceal from the Court his criminal case of i. Bar applicant must affirm under oath, "That previous to the study of law, he had
slight physical injuries which was then and until now is pending in the City Court of Manila; successfully and satisfactorily completed the required pre-legal education (A.A.).
ii. Therefore, Diao was not qualified to take the bar examinations
and thereafter repeatedly omitted to make mention of the same in his applications to take the iii. Such admission having been obtained under false pretenses must be, and is hereby
Bar examinations in 1967, 1969 and 1971. revoked.
2. Passing such examinations is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law;
taking the prescribed courses of legal study in the regular manner is equally essential.

DIAO VS. MARTINEZ 7 SCRA 475

In the matter of the Petition for Disbarment of Telesforo Diao vs. Severino Martinez

FACTS: VILLASANTA VS. PERALTA

1. DIAO was admitted to the Bar. In Re Charges of LILIAN F. VILLASANTA for Immorality, vs.HILARION M. PERALTA, respondent.
1. 2 years later, Martinez charged him with having falsely represented in his April 30, 1957
application for the Bar examination, that he had the requisite academic qualifications. Ponente: PARAS, C. J.:
2. Solicitor General investigated and recommended that Diao's name be erased FACTS:
from the roll of attorneys Complainant seeks to disqualify the respondent, a 1954 successful bar candidate,
i. DIAO did not complete pre-law subjects: from being admitted to the bar.
1. Did not complete his high school training
On April 16, 1939, the respondent was married to Rizalina E. Valdez in Rizal, Nueva
2. Never attended Quisumbing College
Ecija.
3. Never obtained a diploma.
2. DIAO admitting first charge but claims that although he had left high school in his On or before March 8, 1951, he courted the complainant who fell in love with him. To
third year, he entered the service of the U.S. Army, passed the General Classification Test have carnal knowledge of her, the respondent procured the preparation of a fake
given therein, which (according to him) is equivalent to a high school diploma

marriage contract which was then a blank document. He made her sign it on March 8,
1951.
A week after, the document was brought back by the respondent to the complainant,
signed by the Justice of the Peace and the Civil Registrar of San Manuel, Tarlac, and by
two witnesses.
Since then the complainant and the respondent lived together as husband and wife.
Sometime later, the complainant insisted on a religious ratification of their marriage
and on July 7, 1951, the corresponding ceremony was performed in Aparri by the
parish priest of said municipality. The priest no longer required the production of a
marriage license because of the civil marriage contract shown to him.
After the ceremony in Aparri, the couple returned to Manila as husband and wife and
lived with some friends. The complainant then discovered that the respondent was
previously married to someone else; whereupon, she filed the criminal action for a
violation of Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code in the Court of First Instance of
Cagayan and the present complaint for immorality in this court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Hilarion Peralta is guilty of gross immorality and should not be admitted to the
bar.
HELD:
YES. Upon consideration of the records of G.R. No. L-9513 and the complaint, this
Court is of the opinion that the respondent is immoral. He made mockery of marriage which is
a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. His conviction in the criminal case
involves moral turpitude. The act of respondent in contracting the second marriage (even his
act in making love to another woman while his first wife is still alive and their marriage still
valid and existing) is contrary to honesty, justice, decency, and morality.
Thus lacking the good moral character required by the Rules of Court, the respondent
is hereby declared disqualified from being admitted to the bar.
IN RE: ARTHUR M. CUEVAS
85 SCRA 59 Legal Ethics Lawyers Oath
In 1991, a neophyte died during the initiation rites of Lex Talionis Fraternitas in the San Beda
College of Law. Arthur Cuevas Jr was one of the persons charged (with murder) for the death
of the neophyte. He pleaded guilty and was later convicted to the lesser crime of Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide. Thereafter, Cuevas was granted probation and he
continued taking up law. In 1995, he was discharged from probation. In 1996, the Supreme
Court allowed Cuevas to take the bar on the condition that in case he will pass, his oath
taking will have to be approved by the Supreme Court first. Cuevas did pass the 1996 bar
exams and in 1997, he filed a petition before the Supreme Court asking the latter to allow him
to take the Lawyers Oath.
ISSUE: Whether or not Cuevas may be allowed to take the Lawyers Oath.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court is duty bound to prevent the entry of undeserving aspirants,
as well as to exclude those who have been admitted but have become a disgrace to the
profession. Cuevas participation in the senseless killing of the neophyte is highly
16
reprehensible however, the Supreme Court is willing to give him a chance considering that
Cuevas has received various certifications regarding his good behavior while on probation.
The Supreme Court also stressed that the lawyers oath is not a mere formality recited for a
few minutes in the glare of flashing cameras and before the presence of select witnesses. As
a lawyer, Cuevas shall be expected to abide by the oath strictly and to conduct himself
beyond reproach at all times. As a lawyer he will now be in a better position to render legal
and other services to the more unfortunate members of society.
SAMANIEGO VS. FERRER
SAMANIEGO V. ATTY. FERRER
(Complaint for immorality, abandonment and willful refusal to give support to an illegitimate
child)
Facts:
Samaniego was a client of Atty. Ferrer and their lawyer-client relationship became
intimate, when Atty. Ferrer courted her and she fell in love. They lived together as "husband
and wife" from 96-97 and their daughter was born. The affair ended in 2000 and since then he
failed to give support to their daughter.
Before the IBP Samaniego testified that she knew that Atty. Ferrer was in a
relationship but did not think he was already married. Atty. Ferrer refused to appear during the
hearing since he did not want to see Samaniego.
Atty. Ferrer manifested his willingness to support their daughter in a position paper.
He also reasoned that he found it unconscionable to abandon his wife and 10 children to
cohabit with Samaniego.
IBP Board of Governors imposed upon Atty. Ferrer the penalty of 6 months suspension
for his refusal to support his daughter.
Atty. Ferrer filed MR with prayer for to reduce the penalty because it will further cause
extreme hardship to his family of 10 children. Upon finding that Atty. Ferrer lacked the degree
of morality required of a member of the bar, his prayer for reduced penalty was denied.
Held:
SC finds Atty. Ferrer guilty of gross immorality and he is ordered suspended for 6
months.
Atty. Ferrer admitted his extra-marital affair and SC considers such illicit relation as a
disgraceful and immoral conduct subject to disciplinary action. Although it is true that
Samaniego was not entirely blameless for knowing about Atty. Ferrers wife, it does not make
this case less serious since it is immaterial whether both are in pari delicto.
Atty. Ferrer was held to have violated Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03.
ARNOBIT VS. ARNOBIT
ARNOBIT V. ARNOBIT
FACTS

Petitioner Rebecca Arnobit filed this complaint against her husband, respondent Atty.
Ponciano Arnobit, praying that the court exercise its disciplinary power over him.
Rebecca alleged that she and respondent were married on 1942; that they bore 12
children; that she saw respondent through law school, continuously supporting him until he
passed the bar; that several years after their marriage, or in 1968, respondent left the
conjugal home and began cohabiting with Benita Buenafe Navarro who later bore him four
more children. Because of this, Rebecca was impelled to file a complaint for legal separation
and support, and a criminal case for adultery.
Respondent admitted that Rebecca is his wedded wife but he denied having cohabited
with Benita. He also stated that Rebecca was the cause of their separation alleging that she
was always traveling for business purposes without his knowledge and consent, thereby
neglecting her obligations toward her family. Hearings were conducted before the Office of the
SolGen and subsequently, before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline.
Aside from herself, Rebecca presented 2 other witnesses: her sister, who identified a
letter sent to her by respondent apologizing for the unhappiness he caused the family; and
the other was Melecio Navarro, the husband of Benita, who testified about how respondent
took his wife Benita as a mistress knowing fully well of their marriage. During the hearings,
respondent, despite due notice, repeatedly absented himself when it was his turn to present
evidence. He would also seek postponement, pleading illness, on the hearing dates.
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline Report:
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found respondent liable for abandonment and
recommended his suspension from the practice of law for 3 months. It averred that an
indefinite suspension is not recommended because respondent supports himself
through the practice of law and that it would be cruel deny him of this at this time
when he is already advanced in age.
HELD
The Court agreed with the IBP recommendation but ruled that gross immoral conduct
was sufficiently proven warranting disbarment of respondent.
CANON 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
17
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on this fitness
to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Possession of good moral character is not only a condition precedent to the practice
of law, but a continuing qualification for all members of the bar.
Good moral character is more than just the absence of bad character. It expresses
itself in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right and the resolve not to do the pleasant
thing if it is wrong.
Immoral conduct has been described as conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or
shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the
community. To be the basis of disciplinary action, such conduct must not only be immoral, but
grossly immoral.
Grossly immoral meaning it must be so corrupt as to virtually constitute a criminal act
or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.
Lawyers must not only be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of
good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the
community.
The fact that respondents philandering ways are far removed from the exercise of his
profession would not save the day from him. A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any
misconduct which, albeit unrelated to the actual practice of his profession, would show him to
be unfit for the office and unworthy of his license.
Respondent has the duty to show that he is morally fit to remain a member of the bar.
This, he failed to do. He never attended the hearings to rebut the charges against him,
irresistibly suggesting that they are true.
Undoubtedly, respondents act of leaving his wife and 12 children to cohabit and have
children with another woman constitutes gross immoral conduct. He should therefore be
disbarred.