VOL.

383,JULY2,2002 625
Mesinavs.Meer
*
G.R.No.146845.July2,2002.

SPOUSESMICHAELANGELOandGRACEMESINA,petitioners,
vs.HUMBERTOD.MEER,respondent.

ActionsJudgmentsRelieffromJudgmentRelief from judgment is an

equitable remedy and is allowed only under exceptional circumstances and
onlyiffraud,accident,mistake,orexcusablenegligenceispresent.Relief
fromjudgmentisanequitableremedyandisallowedonlyunderexceptional
circumstances and only if fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence
ispresent.Wherethedefendanthasotheravailableoradequateremedysuch
asamotionfornewtrialorappealfromtheadversedecision,hecannotavail
himselfofthisremedy.
Same Same Same The petition for relief must be filed within sixty
(60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, and should be filed
withthesamecourtwhichrenderedthedecision.Underthe1997Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition for relief must be filed within sixty
(60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order or other
proceedingtobesetasideandmustbeaccompaniedwithaffidavitsshowing
the fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence relied upon, and the
facts constituting the petitioners good and substantial cause of action or
defense, as the case may be. Most importantly, it should be filed with the
samecourtwhichrenderedthedecision.
Same Same Same As revised, Rule 38 radically departs from the
previous rule as it now allows the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Court
whichdecidedthecaseorissuedtheordertohearthepetitionforrelief.
Asrevised,Rule38radicallydepartsfromthepreviousruleasitnowallows
theMetropolitanorMunicipalTrialCourtwhichdecidedthecaseorissued
theordertohearthepetitionforrelief.Undertheoldrule,petitionforrelief
from the judgment or final order of municipal trial courts should be filed
withtheregionaltrialcourt.
SameSameSameThe procedural change in Rule 38 is in line with
Rule 5, prescribing uniform procedure for municipal and regional trial
courts and designation of municipal/metropolitan trial courts as courts of
record,andthatwhileRule38usesthephraseanycourt,itrefersonlyto
municipal/metropolitan and regional trial courts As it stands, neither the
RulesofCourtnortheRevisedInternalRulesoftheCourtofAppealsallow
_____________

*THIRDDIVISION.

626

626 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED

Mesinavs.Meer

theremedyofpetitionforreliefintheCourtofAppeals.Petitionersargue
thatapartfromthischange,thepresentRuleextendstheremedyofreliefto
includejudgmentsorordersoftheCourtofAppealssincetheRuleusesthe
phraseanycourt.Wedisagree.TheproceduralchangeinRule38isinline
with Rule 5, prescribing uniform procedure for municipal and regional trial
courts and designation of municipal/metropolitan trial courts as courts of
record. While Rule 38 uses the phrase any court, it refers only to
municipal/metropolitanandregionaltrialcourts.TheprocedureintheCourt
of Appeals and the Supreme Court are governed by separate provisions of
the Rules of Court and may, from time to time, be supplemented by
additional rules promulgated by the Supreme Court through resolutions or
circulars. As it stands, neither the Rules of Court nor the Revised Internal
RulesoftheCourtofAppealsallowtheremedyofpetitionforreliefinthe
CourtofAppeals.
SameSameSameEquityTheSupremeCourtwillnotallowaparty,
inguiseofequity,tobenefitfromitsownnegligence.Ascorrectlypointed
out by the Court of Appeals, the petitioners allegation of extrinsic fraud
should have been brought at issue in the Metropolitan Trial Court. If they
truly believe that the default of the spouses Mesina prejudiced their rights,
they should have questioned this from the beginning. Yet, they chose to
participateintheproceedingsandactivelypresentedtheirdefense.Andtheir
efforts were rewarded as the Metropolitan Trial Court ruled in their favor.
When the respondent appealed the case to the Regional Trial Court, they
never raised this issue. Even after the Regional Trial Court reversed the
finding of the MeTC, and the Court of Appeals sustained this reversal,
petitioners made no effort to bring this issue for consideration. This Court
will not allow petitioners, in guise of equity, to benefit from their own
negligence.
SameSameSameAttorneysItisasettledrulethatreliefwillnotbe
grantedtoapartywhoseekstoberelievedfromtheeffectsofthejudgment
when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence, or a
mistaken mode of procedure In exceptional cases, when the mistake of
counsel is so palpable that it amounts to gross negligence, the Supreme
Courtaffordsapartyasecondopportunitytovindicatehisright.Finally,
it is a settled rule that relief will not be granted to a party who seeks to be
relievedfromtheeffectsofthejudgmentwhenthelossoftheremedyatlaw
wasduetohisownnegligence,oramistakenmodeofprocedureotherwise,
thepetitionforreliefwillbetantamounttorevivingtherightofappealwhich
has already been lost either because of inexcusable negligence or due to
mistaken mode of procedure by counsel. Petitioners, however, place the
blameontheircounselandinvokehonestmistakeoflaw.

627

VOL.383,JULY2,2002 627

Mesinavs.Meer

They contend that they lack legal education, hence, were not aware of the
required period for filing an appeal. In exceptional cases, when the mistake
of counsel is so palpable that it amounts to gross negligence, this Court
affords a party a second opportunity to vindicate his right. But this
opportunityisunavailingintheinstantcase,especiallysincepetitionershave
squanderedthevariousopportunitiesavailabletothematthedifferentstages
ofthiscase.Publicinterestdemandsanendtoeverylitigationandabelated
efforttoreopenacasethathasalreadyattainedfinalitywillservenopurpose
otherthantodelaytheadministrationofjustice.

PETITIONforreviewoncertiorariofthedecisionoftheCourtof
Appeals.

ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
GrajoT.Albanoforpetitioners.
R.P.NogalesLawOfficeforrespondent.

PUNO,J.:
1
Beforeusisapetitionforreviewoncertiorari underRule45ofthe
RulesofCourt,assailingtwoResolutionsoftheCourtofAppealsin
CAGR SP No. 52942 dated October2 10, 2000 and January 26,
2001,respectively.ThefirstResolution deniedpetitionersPetition
3
for Relief from Judgment while the second Resolution denied
reconsiderationthereof.Theantecedentfactsareasfollows:
RespondentHumbertoMeerisaregisteredownerofaparcelof
land located at Lot 15, Block 5, Pandacan, Manila evidenced by
TCTNo.158886.SometimeinJune1993,heappliedforaloanto
construct a house thereon. However, he discovered that his
certificate of title has been cancelled and a new one, TCT No.
166074, was issued in the name of spouses Sergio and Lerma
Bunquin. The latter acquired said property by virtue of a deed of
saledatedJune3,1985purportedlyexecutedbyrespondentintheir
4
favor.
_____________

1Rollo,pp.922.

2 Penned by Associate Justice Fermin A. Martin and concurred in by Associate

JusticesRomeoA.BrawnerandAndresB.Reyes,Jr.,Rollo,pp.2425.
3Id.,p.27.

4 Decision penned by Tranquil P. Salvador, Jr. of Metropolitan Trial Court of

Manila,Branch10,datedFebruary16,1998,Rollo,p.50.TCT

628

628 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Mesinavs.Meer

On January 12, 1994, respondent sought the cancellation of TCT

No.166074withtheMetropolitanTrialCourtofManila,Branch10.
Onthesameday,anoticeoflispendenswasannotatedattheback
5
ofTCTNo.166074.
OnJune15,1994,whilethecasewaspending,TCTNo.166074
wascancelledandreplacedbyTCTNo.216518issuedinthename
of the petitioners, spouses Michaelangelo and Grace Mesina. It
appears that the subject property has been conveyed to the
petitionersonSeptember28,1993,evenpriortotheannotationoflis
pendens.TheAbsoluteDeedofSaleevidencingtheconveyancewas
notarized on the same day, including the payment of taxes
appurtenantthereto.ThetransferofthetitlefromLermaBunquinto
petitioners was effected only on June 15, 1994 because 6
of some
requirementsimposedbytheNationalHousingAuthority.
Duetotheforegoingdevelopments,Meerimpleadedpetitioners
7
asadditionalpartydefendants.
DefendantspousesBunquinneverappearedduringthehearings,
leading the court to declare them in default. Petitioners,
8
however,
participatedactivelyindefenseoftheirposition.
InitsDecisiondatedFebruary16,1998,thetrialcourtruledthat
the alleged sale between Meer and Bunquin was fraudulent.
However, petitioners were adjudged buyers in good faith and thus
were entitled to the possession of the subject property. Pertinent
portionofthedecisionreads:

It bears notice that defendantspouses Mesina not only relied on what

appearedinLermaBunquinstitlebutbeyondthelatterstitleandevenmade
verification with the NHA and sought legal advice prior to the subject
propertys purchase. Their actuations incline the court to hold and consider
that defendantspouses Mesina acted in good faith when they acquired
subjectproperty.

______________
 No.166704wasinthenameofLermaD.Bunquin,marriedtoSergioBunquin.See
Records,p.183.
5Id.,pp.5154.

6Ibid.TCTNo.216518wasinthenameofMichaelangeloG.Mesina,marriedto

GraceDomingo.SeeRecords,p.186.
7Ibid.

8Id.,p.56.

629

VOL.383,JULY2,2002 629
Mesinavs.Meer

Asabasicrule,everypersondealingwithregisteredlandmaysafelyrelyon
thecorrectnessofthecertificateoftitleandissuedthereforeandthelawwill
nolongerobligetogobeyondthecertificatetodeterminetheconditionofthe
property(DirectorofLandsvs.Abache,73Phil.606).Also,personsdealing
with the property covered by the Torrens certificate of title are not required
togobeyondwhatappearsonthefaceofthetitle(Pinovs.CA,198SCRA
434).
Measured by the above criteria, defendantspouses Mesina were indeed
purchasers in good faith and purchasers for value of subject property, and
consequently,theyhavetherighttothepossessionthereofwhichispresently
titledintheirnames.xxx
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the complaint
against defendantspouses Michael and Grace Mesina and the Register of
DeedsofManila.ThecounterclaimofdefendantspousesMesinaagainstthe
plaintiffisherebydeniedforlackofmerit.
DefendantspousesSergioandLermaBunquinareordered:

1. To pay plaintiff the value of the subject property based on the

prevailingpriceonthedateofthedecision
2. To pay the plaintiff exemplary damages in the amount of
P20,0000.00
3. TopayattorneysfeesintheamountofP30,000.00.
9
SOORDERED.

Respondent Meer filed a Motion for Reconsideration against the

said Decision but the trial court denied the same. Respondent
thereafterfiledanAppealwiththeRegionalTrialCourt. 10
Reversing the ruling of the MeTC, the Regional Trial Court
ruled that petitioners were not purchasers in good faith, reasoning
thatitistheregistrationoftheDeedofSale,andnotthedateofits
consummationthatwillconfertitletotheproperty.SincetheDeed
of Sale was registered subsequent to the annotation of the lis
pendens,petitionerswereboundbytheoutcomeofthecase,viz.:
Having thus correctly ruled that the Deed of Sale between plaintiff
Humberto Meer and Sps. Bunquin was a forgery and that the signature of
HumbertoMeerwasforgedandhavingrecognizedthatapriorlyregis

_____________

9Id.,pp.6162.

10 The decision was penned by Judge Enrico A. Lanzanas of RTC Manila, Branch 7. See

Rollo,pp.6482.

630

630 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Mesinavs.Meer

teredlispendens is superior to a belatedly registered Deed of Sale because

the efficacy of the belatedly registered Deed of Sale depends upon the
outcome of the case for which the lis pendens was annotated and having
come to the conclusion that the case filed by Humberto Meer against the
Bunquin is legally correct and justified, this court therefore has no other
alternativebuttoruleinfavoroftheappellantandorderthecancellationnot
onlyofthetitleissuedinfavoroftheBunquinbutalsoofthetitleissuedin
favoroftheMesinas.TheCourtcannotconsiderthelatterasbuyersingood
faith.
WHEREFORE and considering the foregoing, the appealed decision is
therefore reversed and a new one is issued in favor of the plaintiff and
againstthedefendantannullingtheDeedofSaleexecutedbyHumbertoMeer
infavorofdefendantsSergioandLermaBunquinandorderingtheRegister
of Deeds of Manila to cancel TCT No. 166704 issued in the name of the
defendantsBunquinandTCTNo.216518inthenameofdefendantMesinas
and restore TCT No. 158886 in the name of plaintiff Humberto Meer
ordering the defendant jointly and severally to pay plaintiff the sum of
P50,000.00 as attorneys fees, plus the costs of suit. The counterclaim of
defendantMesinaisdismissedforlackofmerit.
11
SOORDERED.

Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the

ruling12 of the Regional Trial Court in a Resolution dated May 10,
2000.
On July 17, 2000 and after reglementary period for appeal has
lapsed, petitioners filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment and
prayedthattheCourtofAppealssetasideitsResolutiondatedMay
10, 2000 for the following reasons: (a) extrinsic fraud was
committed which prevented petitioners from presenting his case to
the court and/or was used to procure the judgment without fair
submissionofthecontroversy(b)mistakeandexcusablenegligence
has prevented the petitioner from taking an appeal within the
prescribed period and13
(c) petitioner has good and substantial
defenseinhisaction.
 On the first ground, petitioners argued that there has been
collusionbetweentherespondentandtheBunquinsduringthetrial

_____________

11Id.,pp.8182.

12SeeRollo,pp.8395.

13Rollo,pp.2830.

631

VOL.383,JULY2,2002 631
Mesinavs.Meer

of the case at the Metropolitan Trial Court. Had the Bunquins

testifiedincourtastothevalidityoftheDeedofSaleaswellasthe
authenticityoftherespondentssignature,petitionersarguedthatthe
result would have been in their favor. Anent the second ground,
petitioners averred that their failure to file the requisite appeal on
timewaslargelyduetothedelayofcounselofrecordtoproducethe
requesteddocumentsofthecase.Finally,petitionersclaimthatthey
14
havegoodandsubstantialdefense.
Asaforesaid,theCourtofAppealsdeniedthepetitionreasoning
that:

As aptly pointed out by the respondent, the first ground raised by the
petitioner spouses should have been filed before the court of origin, the
MetropolitanCourtofManila,pursuanttoSection1,Rule38ofthe1997

_____________

14Rollo,pp.3031.Petitionersallegedthat:

a.) ThenotarizedDeedofSalebetweenrespondentandtheBunquinsshall,foralllegal
intents and purposes, be presumed genuine, authentic and regular in the absence of
prooforevidencetothecontrarypursuanttoRule131,section5oftheRevisedRules
ofCourtwhichgivesfavorablepresumptionstoprivatetransactions.
b.) Toovercomesuchpresumption,respondentshouldhaveadducedevidenceinsupport
ofhisallegationsotherthanhisselfservingandgratuitousdenialthathissignatureon
saidDeedofSaleisfakecomingasitdoesfromaninterestedpartyintheinstantcase.
c.) Further,respondentaswellasthelowercourts,couldhaveeasilysecuredtheservices
ofahandwritingexperttoestablishtheallegation.Butnosuchexpertwassoughtand
the lower court on its own motion and instance relied on the identification cards
presentedbytherespondenthimselfandcomparedthesamewiththesignatureonthe
Deedexecutedeleven(11)yearsago.
d.) Had the signatures been subjected to scientific examination and comparison by an
impartialexpertwitness,theDeedwouldhavebeendeterminedtobeauthenticandthe
 signature genuine. As such, the position of the petitioner being purchasers for value
andingoodfaithwouldhaveprevailed.
e.) Letitnotbeoveremphasizedthatanotarypublicparticipatedintheexecutionofsaid
Deed of Sale giving rise to the presumptions, which were not overcome but the
respondent, that official duty has been regularly performed and that the ordinary
courseofbusinesshasbeenfollowed.

632

632 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Mesinavs.Meer

RevisedRulesofCivilProcedureasamended.Astothesecondground,the
petitioner spouses who were the prevailing party before the Metropolitan
TrialCourtofManila,didnotmentiontheallegedextrinsicfraudwhenthe
casewasonappealbeforetheRegionalTrialCourt.Petitionerscannotnow
challengethedecisionofthisCourtforthefraudallegedlyperpetratedinthe
courtoforigin.
Besides, it is extremely doubtful that the remedy of a petition for relief
underRule38maybeavailedoffromajudgmentoftheCourtofAppealsin
theexerciseofitsappellatejurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitioners Petition for Relief
fromJudgmentisDENIEDforlackofmerit.
15
SOORDERED.

Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied, hence, this

Petition for Review raising as issue the availability of Petition for
ReliefunderRule38,asaremedyagainstthejudgmentoftheCourt
ofAppealspromulgatedintheexerciseofitsappellatejurisdiction.
Iftheremedyisthusavailable,petitionerspraythatthisCourtrule
whetherornotthegroundsreliedbythemaresufficienttogivedue
16
coursetothepetition.
After careful examination of the case, we resolve to deny the
petition.
Relieffromjudgmentisanequitableremedyandisallowedonly
under exceptional circumstances and only if fraud, accident,
mistake, or excusable negligence is present. Where the defendant
has other available or adequate remedy such as a motion for new
trialorappealfromtheadversedecision,hecannotavailhimselfof
17
thisremedy.
Underthe1997RevisedRulesofCivilProcedure,thepetitionfor
reliefmustbefiledwithinsixty(60)daysafterthepetitionerlearns
ofthejudgment,finalorderorotherproceedingtobesetasideand
must be accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud, accident,
mistake, or excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts
constitutingthepetitionersgoodandsubstantialcauseof

_____________
 15Supranote2.

16Supranote1,pp.1214.

17Palmares,etal.vs.Jimenez,etal.,90Phil.659(1951).

633

VOL.383,JULY2,2002 633
Mesinavs.Meer
18
actionordefense,asthecasemaybe. Mostimportantly,itshould
befiledwiththesamecourtwhichrenderedthedecision,viz.:

Section1.Petitionforrelieffromjudgment,order,orotherproceedings.
When a judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is
thereaftertakenagainstapartyinanycourtthroughfraud,accident,mistake,
orexcusablenegligence,hemayfileapetitioninsuchcourtandinthesame
19
caseprayingthatthejudgment,orderorproceedingbesetaside.

As revised, Rule 38 radically departs from the previous rule as it

now allows the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Court which
decided the case or issued the order to hear the petition for relief.
Under the old rule, petition for relief from the judgment or final
orderofmunicipaltrialcourtsshouldbefiledwiththeregionaltrial
court,viz.:

Section1.Petition to Court of First Instance for Relief from Judgment of

inferiorcourt.Whenajudgmentisrenderedbyaninferiorcourtonacase,
andapartytheretobyfraud,accident,mistake,orexcusablenegligence,has
been unjustly deprived of a hearing therein, or has been prevented from
takinganappeal,hemayfileapetitionintheCourtofFirstInstanceofthe
province in which the original judgment was rendered, praying that such
judgmentbesetasideandthecasetrieduponitsmerits.
Section2.PetitiontoCourtofFirstInstanceforrelieffromthejudgment
or other proceeding thereof.When a judgment order is entered, or any
otherproceedingistakenagainstapartyinaCourtofFirstInstancethrough
fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in
such court and in the same cause praying that the judgment, order or
proceedingbesetaside.

Petitioners argue that apart from this change, the present Rule
extends the remedy of relief to include judgments or orders of
20
the
Court of Appeals since the Rule uses the phrase any court. We
disagree.

_____________

18Rule38,sec.2.

19Id.,sec.1.

20Supranote1,pp.1415.
 634

634 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Mesinavs.Meer

TheproceduralchangeinRule38isinlinewithRule5,prescribing 21
uniform procedure for municipal and regional trial courts and
designation
22
of municipal/metropolitan trial courts as courts of
record. WhileRule38usesthephraseanycourt,itrefersonlyto
23
municipal/metropolitanandregionaltrialcourts.
The procedure in the Court of Appeals and the Supreme
24
Court
aregovernedbyseparateprovisionsoftheRulesofCourt andmay,
fromtimetotime,besupplementedbyadditionalrulespromulgated
bytheSupremeCourtthroughresolutionsorcirculars.Asitstands,
neither the Rules25of Court nor the Revised Internal Rules of the
Court of Appeals allow the remedy of petition for relief in the
CourtofAppeals.
Petitioners beg this Court, on equitable grounds, not to strictly
construetheRules,arguingthattheironlyearthlypossessionisat
26
stake. Indeed,incertainoccasions,thisCourthas,intheinterestof
substantialjusticeandinexerciseofitsequityjurisdiction,construed
theRulesofCourtwithliberality.
Nevertheless,thecircumstancesobtaininginthepresentcasedo
notconvincethisCourttotakeexception.
AscorrectlypointedoutbytheCourtofAppeals,thepetitioners
allegationofextrinsicfraudshouldhavebeenbroughtatissueinthe
MetropolitanTrialCourt.Iftheytrulybelievethatthedefaultofthe
spousesMesinaprejudicedtheirrights,theyshouldhavequestioned
thisfromthebeginning.Yet,theychosetoparticipate

_____________

21 Section 1. Uniform procedure.The procedure in the Municipal Trial Courts

shall be the same as in the Regional Trial Court, except (a) where a particular
provision expressly or impliedly applies only to either of said courts, or (b) in civil
casesgovernedbytheRuleonSummaryProcedure.
22SeeR.A.No.7691(1994).

23See Florenz D. Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium (1999), Vol. 1, pp. 391

392JoseY.Feria,1997RulesofCivilProcedureAnnotated(2000),p.111.
24SeeRules4456.

25AsamendedbySupremeCourtResolutionsdatedOctober20,1988,November3,

1988,February27,1991,April1,1992,November24,1992andJune14,1993.
26Supranote1,p.17.

635

VOL.383,JULY2,2002 635
 Mesinavs.Meer

in the proceedings and actively presented their defense. And their

effortswererewardedastheMetropolitanTrialCourtruledintheir
favor.
When the respondent appealed the case to the Regional Trial
Court, they never raised this issue. Even after the Regional Trial
Court reversed the finding of the MeTC, and the Court of Appeals
sustainedthisreversal,petitionersmadenoefforttobringthisissue
for consideration.This Court will not allow petitioners, in guise of
equity,tobenefitfromtheirownnegligence.
The same is true with regard to the defenses forwarded by the
petitioners in support of their petition. These contentions should
havebeenraisedintheMeTC,astheyhavebeenavailabletothem
sincethebeginning.
Finally,itisasettledrulethatreliefwillnotbegrantedtoaparty
whoseekstoberelievedfromtheeffectsofthejudgmentwhenthe
loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence, or a
mistaken mode of procedure otherwise, the petition for relief will
betantamounttorevivingtherightofappealwhichhasalreadybeen
lost either because of inexcusable27
negligence or due to mistaken
mode of procedure by counsel. Petitioners, however, place the
blame on their counsel and invoke honest mistake of law. They
contendthattheylacklegaleducation,hence,werenotawareofthe
28
requiredperiodforfilinganappeal.
Inexceptionalcases,whenthemistakeofcounselissopalpable
that it amounts to gross negligence, this Court affords a party a
second opportunity to vindicate his right. But this opportunity is
unavailing in the instant case, especially since petitioners have
squandered the various opportunities available to them at the
differentstagesofthiscase.Publicinterestdemandsanendtoevery
litigation and a belated effort to reopen a case that has already
attained finality will serve no purpose other than to delay the
administrationofjustice.
INVIEWWHEREOF,thispetitionisDENIEDforlackofmerit
and the assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals are
AFFIRMED.

_____________

27Espinosavs.Yatco,7SCRA78(1963).

28Rollo,p.30.

636

636 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Re:AdministrativeCaseNo.44oftheRTC,Br.IV,TagbilaranCity,
AgainstAtty.SamuelC.Occea
 SOORDERED.

Panganiban,SandovalGutierrezandCarpio,JJ.,concur.

Petitiondenied,resolutionsaffirmed.

Notes.A few days in excess of the 60day requirement is not

fatalaslongasitisfiledwithinsix(6)monthsfromissuanceofthe
order.(Magovs.CourtofAppeals,303SCRA600[1999])
UnderSection19(d)ofthe1991RuleonSummaryProcedure,a
petitionforrelieffromjudgmentisaprohibitedpleading.(Sta.Lucia
RealtyandDevelopment,Inc.vs.CourtofAppeals,343SCRA214
[2000])

o0o

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