Ramirez vs. CA G.R. No.

93833 September 28, 1995

Facts:

Petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez filed a civil case in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the
latter's office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious
mood" and in a manner offensive to his dignity and personality, contrary to morals,
good customs and public policy.

In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and
sought moral damages, attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation in the
amount of P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests and other reliefs awardable at
the trial court's discretion. The transcript on which the civil case was based was
culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner.

As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act of
secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case
before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200,
entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of
private communication, and other purposes.

Issue:

Whether or not the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the
taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation.

Ruling:

No. Section 1 of the Republic Act 4200 states that it shall be unlawful for any
person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or
spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement,
to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or
walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.

The law is clear and unambiguous. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does
not distinguish. The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed decision. The instant
petition is hereby DENIED. Cost against petitioner.
People vs. Jabinal GR No. L-30061 (February 27, 1974)

Facts:

Jabinal was found guilty of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and
Ammunition.

The accused admitted that he was in possession of the revolver and the ammunition
described in the complaint, without the requisite license or permit. He, however,
claimed to be entitled to exoneration because, although he had no license or
permit, he had an appointment as Secret Agent from the Provincial Governor of
Batangas and an appointment as Confidential Agent from the PC Provincial
Commander, and the said appointments expressly carried with them the authority
to possess and carry the firearm in question.

The accused contended before the court that he was entitled to acquittal on the
basis of the Supreme Courts decision in People vs. Macarandang(1959) and People
vs. Lucero(1958) and not on the basis of the latest reversal and abandonment in
People vs. Mapa (1967).

Issue:

Whether or not appellant should be acquitted on the basis of the courts rulings in
Macarandang and Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of the complete
reversal of the MAcarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa.

Ruling:

Decisions of this Court, under Article 8 of the New Civil Code states that Judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of
the legal system . The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a
restatement of legal maxim legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet the
interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of
law.

Appellant was appointed as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent and authorized to
possess a firearm pursuant to the prevailing doctrine enunciated in Macarandang
and Lucero under which no criminal liability would attach to his possession of said
firearm in spite of the absence of a license and permit therefore, appellant must be
absolved. Certainly, appellant may not be punished for an act which at the time it
was done was held not to be punishable.

The appellant was acquitted.

Ruffy vs. Chief of Staff G.R. No. L-53375 Phil 875 August 20, 1956

Facts:

During the Japanese insurrection in the Philippines, military men were assigned at
designated camps or military bases all over the country. Japanese forces went to
Mindoro thus forcing petitioner and his band move up the mountains and organize a
guerilla outfit and call it the "Bolo area". A certain Capt. Beloncio relieved Ruffy and
fellow petitioners of their position and duties in the "Bolo area" by the new authority
vested upon him because of the recent change of command. Capt. Beloncio was
thus allegedly slain by Ruffy and his fellow petitioners.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioners were subject to military law at the time the
offense was committed, which was at the time of war and the Japanese occupancy.

Ruling:

The Court held that the petitioners were still subject to military law since members
of the Armed Forces were still covered by the National Defense Act, Articles of War
and other laws even during an occupation. The act of unbecoming of an officer and
a gentleman is considered as a defiance of 95th Article of War held petitioners liable
to military jurisdiction and trial. Moreover, they were operating officers, which
makes them even more eligible for the military court's jurisdiction.

In consideration of the foregoing, the petition has no merit and should be dismissed.
Thus, the petition is hereby DENIED.
U.S. v. Sweet, 1 Phil. 18 (1901)

Facts:

Sweet was employed by the United States military who committed an offense
against a POW. His case is filed with the CFI, who is given original jurisdiction in all
criminal cases for which a penalty of more than 6 months is imposed. He is now
contending that the courts are without jurisdiction because he was acting in the
line of duty.

Issue:

Whether or not this case is within the jurisdiction of the CFI

Ruling:

Yes. By Act No. 136 of the US-Phil Commission, the CFIs are given original
jurisdiction in all criminal cases in which a penalty more than 6 months
imprisonment or a fine greater than $100 may be imposed. Furthermore, CFIs have
jurisdiction to try offenders charged with violation of the Penal Code within their
territorial limits. The application of the general principle that the jurisdiction of the
civil tribunals is unaffected by the military or other special character brought before
them for trial regardless of the military character of the accused. The defendant and
his acts are within the jurisdiction of the CFI because he failed to prove that he was
indeed acting in the line of duty.
Kuroda v. Jalandoni, G.R. No. L-2662, March 26, 1949

Facts:

Petitioner Shigenori Kuroda, the Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial

Forces in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation, was charged before the
Philippine Military Commission of war crimes. He questioned the constitutionality of
E.O. No. 68 that created the National War Crimes Office and prescribed rules on the
trial of accused war criminals. He contended the Philippines is not a signatory to the
Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare and therefore
he is charged of crimes not based on law, national and international.

Issue:

Whether or not E.O. No. 68 valid and constitutional?

Ruling:

YES, E.O. No. 68 valid and constitutional.

Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its section 3, that

The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation.

It cannot be denied that the rules and regulation of the Hague and Geneva
conventions form, part of and are wholly based on the generally accepted principals
of international law. Such rule and principles therefore form part of the law of our
nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying
them for our Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in its scope
and is not confined to the recognition of rule and principle of international law as
contained in treaties to which our government may have been or shall be a
signatory.

People V. Wong Cheng (1922)

Facts:

Appellant is accused of having illegally smoked opium, aboard the merchant vessel
Changsa of English nationality while said vessel was anchored in Manila Bay two
and a half miles from the shores of the city. The Lower court dismissed the case.

Issue:

Whether or not the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction over crime committed
aboard merchant vessels anchored in our jurisdiction waters

Ruling: The order appealed from is revoked and the cause ordered remanded to the
court of origin for further proceedings in accordance with law, without special
findings as to costs.

French rule-according to which crimes committed aboard a foreign merchant vessel

should not be prosecuted in the courts of the country within whose territorial
jurisdiction they were committed unless their commission affects the peace and
security of the territory.

Mere possession of opium aboard a foreign vessel in transit was held by this court
not triable by or courts, because it being the primary object of our Opium Law to
protect the inhabitants of the Philippines against the disastrous effects entailed by
the use of this drug, its mere possession in such a ship, without being used in our
territory, does not being about in the said territory those effects that our statute
contemplates avoiding. Hence such a mere possession is not considered a
disturbance of the public order.

To smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though aboard a foreign merchant
ship, is certainly a breach of the public order here established, because it causes
such drug to produce its pernicious effects within our territory.
US. V. Ah- Sing, 36 Phil. 987

G.R. No. L-13005. October 10, 1917.

Facts:

Ah Sing is a chinaman at the steamship Shun Chang, a foreign vessel which arrived
in the port of Cebu from Saigon.

He bought 8 cans of opium in Saigon, brought them on board and had them in his
possession during the trip. The 8 cans of opium were found in the ashes below the
boiler of the steamer's engine by authorities who made a search upon anchoring on
the Cebu port.

Ah Sing confessed that it was his and that it was bought in Saigon without stating
his intention.

CFI of Cebu held that Ah Sing is guilty in violation of the Opium Law

Issue: Whether or not the crime of illegal importation of opium into the Philippine
Islands is criminally liable in the Philippines

Ruling:

Yes. Ah Sing having been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt

As applied to the Opium Law, we expressly hold that any person unlawfully imports
or brings any prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands, when the prohibited drug is
found under this person's control on a vessel which has come direct from a foreign
country and is within the jurisdictional limits of the Philippine Islands.

In such case, a person is guilty of illegal importation of the drug unless contrary
circumstances exist or the defense proves otherwise.

Applied to the facts herein, it would be absurd to think that the accused was merely
carrying opium back and forth between Saigon and Cebu for the mere pleasure of
so doing. It would likewise be impossible to conceive that the accused needed so
large an amount of opium for his personal use. No better explanation being
possible, the logical deduction is that the defendant intended this opium to be
brought into the Philippine Islands.

US vs. Look Chaw, December 16, 1911

Facts:

Several persons went aboard the steamship Erroll to inspect and search its cargo.
Note that steamship Erroll is of English nationality and it came from HongKong
bound for Mexico via the call ports of Manila and Cebu. These persons found sacks
of opium.

The complaint filed against defendant stated that defendant carried, kept,
possessed, and had in his possession and control 96 kg of opium and that he he
had been surprised in the act of selling P1,000 worth prepared opium. However,
since there was more than 1 crime charged, the fiscal just filed for unlawful
possession of opium

According to the testimony of the internal-revenue, the opium seized in the vessel
had been bought by the defendant in HongKong, at P3.00 for each round can and
P5.00 for each of the others, for the purpose of selling it, as contraband, in Mexico
and Puerto de Vera Cruz; that the vessel arrived at Cebu and on the same day he
sold opium.

Issue: Whether or not the Philippine courts have jurisdiction

Held: Yes, the Philippine courts have jurisdiction.

Mere possession of a thing of prohibited use in the Philippine Islands, aboard a
foreign vessel in transit, in any of their ports, does not, as a general rule, constitute
a crime triable by the courts of the Philippines. However, in the case at bar, a can of
opium is landed from the vessel upon Philippine soil, thus committing an open
violation of the Philippine laws.

United States vs. Fowler December 31, 1902 (1 Phil 614)

Facts:

August 12, 1901, the defendants were accused of the theft of 16 champagne bottles
worth 20 dollars while on board the vessel Lawton. The counsel for defendants
alleged to the Court of First Instance that they were without jurisdiction over the
crime charged . Since it happened in the high seas and not in the city of Manila or in
the territory in which the jurisdiction of the court extends, they asked that the case
be dismissed.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of First Instance has jurisdiction over crimes committed on
the high seas on board of transport not registered in the Philippines.

Held:

No. The Philippine court has no jurisdiction over the crime of theft committed on
high seas on board a vessel not registered or licensed in the Philippines. The
transport Lawton not being a vessel of this class, our courts are without
jurisdiction to take a cognizance of a crime committed on board the same.

US vs Bull, 15 Phil 7

Facts:

On December 2, 1908, a steamship vessel engaged in the transport of animals

named Stanford commanded by H.N. Bull docked in the port of Manila, Philippines. It
was found that said vessel from Ampieng, Formosa carried 674 heads of cattle
without providing appropriate shelter and proper suitable means for securing the
animals which resulted for most of the animals to get hurt and others to have died
while in transit.

This cruelty to animals is said to be contrary to Acts No. 55 and No. 275 of the
Philippine Constitution. It is however contended that cases cannot be filed because
neither was it said that the court sitting where the animals were disembarked would
take jurisdiction, nor did it say about ships not licensed under Philippine laws, like
the ships involved.

Issue:

Whether or not the court had jurisdiction over an offense committed on board a
foreign ship while inside the territorial waters of the Philippines.
Held:

Yes. When the vessel comes within 3 miles from the headlines which embrace the
entrance of Manila Bay, the vessel is within territorial waters and thus, the laws of
the Philippines shall apply. A crime committed on board a Norwegian merchant
vessel sailing to the Philippines is within the jurisdiction of the courts of the
Philippines if the illegal conditions existed during the time the ship was within the
territorial waters - regardless of the fact that the same conditions existed when the
ship settled from the foreign port and while it was on the high seas.

In light of the above restriction, the defendant was found guilty and sentenced to
pay a fine of two hundred and fifty pesos with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs.

Us vs. Cuna 12 phil rep. 241 Dec. 15, 1908

Facts:

The provincial fiscal of the province of Isabela filed an information charging the
defendant Chinaman Cuna for violation of an opium law for selling a small quantity
of opium to a Filipino woman, who was neither a doctor, pharmacist, or vendor of
opium with license, all contrary to law.

Defendant claims, relying on American and English common law, where the repeal
of a penal statute operates as a remission of penalties for violations of it committed,
and for its release from prosecution. That since the provision of the law that was
violated was repealed and there was no law in force which penalizes the alleged
offense, therefore the court has no jurisdiction over the case.

Issue:

Whether or not the defendant is still criminally liable because of the repeal.

Ruling:

Yes. The Court ruled that the reliance of the defendant of the American and English
common law is not and has not been the accepted doctrine, the courts in the Phil.
Islands are not deprived of jurisdiction to try the accused. That laws shall have no
retroactive effect unless favorable to the offender, is not applicable to acts of the
Phil. Commission or the Phil. Legislature.

US. Vs. Abad Santos 36 Phil. Rep 243 Feb. 10, 1917

Facts:

The appellant is the owner of a printing establishment and was required by law to
keep a book where he make the entries required. Appellant was charged in an
information that he violated the provisions of said regulation, when one day he
failed to make an entry, indicating whether any business was done in that day or
not. Such omission was done by appellants bookkeeper.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused is liable for the acts of another.

Ruling:

No. The court is upon opinion that he must be acquitted.

It was undisputed that he regularly employed a bookkeeper who was in complete

charge of the book where entries should have been made, where the failure to make
an entry was due to the bookkeeper of which appellant knew nothing. A person is
not criminally liable for the acts of another without his knowledge or consent, unless
the law clearly so provides.

People vs. Sara 55 Phil. Rep. 939 Aug. 15 1931

Facts:

Francisco Sara, armed with a shotgun, was out in a barrio with the design of
shooting birds. At the same time a couple was out collecting bananas. A witness
saw the incident where the discharge of a gun was heard, and the saw the wifes
husband stretched on the ground as he was hit in the abdomen. They saw the
accused running away carrying a gun.

Issue:

Whether or not there was deliberate intent to kill by the accused.

Ruling:
No, there was no intent although the accused was responsible for homicide.

Homicide resulted from the discharge of the gun in the hands of the accused but the
relations between them were such as to negate any direct intention on his part to
do bodily harm.

People vs. Silvestre and Atienza 56 Phil Rep. 353 Dec. 14 1931

Facts:

The accused Atienza cohabited with co- accused Silvestre at the home of co-
accuseds son by her former marriage. While they are gathered together after
eating supper, accused Atienza ordered the co-accuseds son and his wife to take
out the furniture because he was going to set fire on it, because he wanted to get
revenged upon the people who instigated the charge of adultery against him and
his co-accused. Accused Silvestre did not raise protest and did not give alarm when
the latter set fire to the house. The lower court found her guilty of arson as an
accomplice.

Issue:
Whether or not Accused Silvestre is guilty as an accomplice for not giving alarm of
the incident.

Ruling:

The Court ruled that mere passive presence at the scene of anothers crime or mere
silence and failure to give the alarm without evidence of agreement or conspiracy
does not constitute cooperation for commission of the crime. Accused Silvestre was
acquitted.

People vs. Gonzales 183 SCRA 309 March 19 1990

Facts:

Spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales surrendered to the authorities when,

Augustos wife killed their landlord. Jose Huntoria a witness claimed to have
witnessed the killing, and mentioned additional accused. When was passing at the
vicinity of the spouses house he heard cries for help. He hid himself behind the
clump of banana trees, and allegedly saw all the accused ganging up on the
deceased, taking turns in stabbing and hacking him.

Issue:
Whether or not all the accused mentioned by the witness had a direct participation
in killing the victim.

Ruling:

No. The court dismissed the witness testimony because the prosecution cannot
prove direct participation on all the accused, when he admitted that he could not
determine who among the six accused did the stabbing or hacking of the victim.
Appellant was acquitted.

US vs. Penalosa 1 Phil Rep. 109 Jan 27 1902

Facts:

Accused was convicted by the lower court for having contracted an illegal marriage
without consent of her parents, as she was not 21 years of age at the time when
she married. She contends that she was of age

Issue:

Whether or not she is liable for illegal marriage

Ruling:

No. The court held that the defendant stated that she believed that she was born in
1879 that her parents had given her to understand since at her childhood. Being
true, they disclose that she acted under a mistake of fact. The court acquitted the
accused.

People vs. Ramirez 48 Phil. Rep 204 Nov .3 ,1925

Facts:

The accused together with his companions and deceased went out to the woods to
hunt. Upon arriving at the place, accused carrying a shotgun while holding a
lantern, happened to spot a deer. He told his companions to stay and watch over
the prey while he entered the forest to get it. While waiting, they suddenly heard
the discharge of the shotgun and hit the deceased in the eye and the right temple.

Issue:
Whether or not the accused is liable for homicide

Ruling:

Yes. Where it appears that the accused killed the deceased while hunting at night
by shooting him in the belief that he was a deer the court held that he is liable of
homicide through reckless imprudence since he has not exercised due diligence to
avoid the accident.

People vs. Bayona 61 Phil 181 Feb. 16 1935

Facts:

The CFI found the defendant guilty of violation of a provision of the Election Law for
carrying a firearm in an election polling place. The defendant contends that he was
not guilty, because he was called by a friend and approached him and that he had
no interest in the election. That because there were so many people, the defendant
could not risk losing his revolver in his automobile, in which he decided to carry it
with him.
Issue:

Whether or not defendant is guilty of violating the said law.

Ruling:

Yes. The court ruled that the law which the defendant violated is a statutory
provision, and the intent with which he violated is immaterial. The court
distinguished acts that are mala in se requires criminal intent, and acts mala
prohibita, it is sufficient that the prohibited act was done. The law in question is
under acts mala prohibita, therefore intent is not required to commit the violation.

US. Vs. Catangay 28 Phil 490 Nov.25, 1914

Facts:

Three men were hunting deer at night. One of them carried a lantern fastened to his
forehead. His other companions followed him. Then they saw a deer. The accused,
whose gun was already cocked aimed at the deer but he stumbled against an
embankment which lay between him and the deceased. His gun was accidentally
discharged, hitting and killing the deceased. The RTC ruled convicting the accused
with homicide through reckless negligence, because he did not take necessary
precaution.

Issue:

Whether or not there was negligence resulting with homicide.

Ruling:

No. The Court held that Catangay was not criminally liable because he had no
criminal intent and was not negligent. He was going for along with his eyes fixed on
the deer, the embankment attributed to what was an unforeseen and unfortunate
accident for which defendant cannot be held liable. Accused was acquitted.

US vs. Siy Cong Bieng 30 Phil 577

Facts:

Co Kong, was in charge of appellants store, acting as his agent and employee, sold
in the ordinary course of business, coffee which had been adulterated by the
admixture of peanuts and other extraneous substances. He was convicted by the
lower court of violation of a provision of the Food and Drugs Act.
Issue:

Whether or not criminal intent or guilty knowledge is required to sustain conviction

of a violation of a statute.

Ruling:

No. The court held in the case at bar that the principal may be held criminally liable
for the act, omission or failure of his employee for the prohibited sale of adulterated
coffee, although it appeared that the principal had no guilty knowledge of the fact
that the coffee is adulterated or that such had been sold by his agent.

US v. Ah Chong GR No. L-5272, March 19, 1910

Facts:

The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook in one of the Officersquarters at

Fort McKinley, Rizal Province. Together living with him in the said quarters was the
deceased, Pascual Gualberto, who was employed as a houseboy. There had been
severalrobberies in Fort McKinley prior to the incident thus prompting the defendant
and his roommateto reinforce the lock of the door of their room by placing a chair
against it. Thedefendant and the deceased had an understanding that when either
returned at night, he shouldknock on the door and say his name. Onenight,Ah
Chong, who was alonein his room, was awakened by someone trying to force open
the door of the room. Thedefendant called out twice, asking the identity of the
person but heard no answer. Fearing thatthe intruder was a robber or a thief, the
defendant called out that he would kill the intruder if hetried to enter. At that
moment, the door was forced open and the defendant was struck firstabove the
knee by the edge of the chair. Because of the darkness of the room, the
defendantthought he was being hit by the intruder and tried to defend himself by
striking wildly at theintruder using a common kitchen knife which he kept under his
pillow. It turned out that the saidintruder was actually the defendants roommate,
PascualGualberto who died from the effects of the wound the following day.

Issue:

WON the defendant was criminally liable for committing a felony.

Held:

Defendant was not criminally liable and exonerated. In order for mistake of fact to
be held as a valid defense, there has to be several requisites.One, that the act done
would have been lawful had the facts been as the accused believedthem to be. Two,
that the intention of the accused in performing the act should be lawful, andlastly,
that the mistake must be without fault or carelessness on the part of the accused.In
the case at bar, had the intruder been a robber as the defendant believed him to
be, then AhChong acted in good faith, without malice or criminal intent, and would
have been whollyexempt from criminal liability and that he cannot be said to have
been guilty of negligence orrecklessness.

People vs. Sia Teb Ban G.R. No. L-31695 November 26, 1929

Facts:
Found guilty of qualified theft and habitual delinquency, the defendant was
sentenced by the municipal court of Manila and on appeal, by the Court of First
Instance of this City, to two years, four months, and one day presidio correccional,
with costs, and to the additional penalty of twenty-one years' imprisonment.

He now contends that he is not guilty of the crime with which he is charged.

Issue: Whether or not the accused is liable for his acts.

Held:

It has been proved that he took the watch described in the information without the
owner's consent, having been overtaken a few moments later by a friend of the
offended party, who found the stolen watch on the appellant. It is alleged that
animus lucrandi has not been proved. We find it sufficiently established, as the acts
of the accused shows his intention.

It is a fundamental doctrine of law that the act penalized by the law is presumed to
be voluntary unless contrary is shown. And from the appellant's felonious acts,
freely and deliberately executed, the moral and legal presumption of a criminal and
injurious intent arises conclusively and indisputably, in the absence of evidence to
the contrary the appealed judgment is modified, the appellant being sentenced to
the accessory penalties provided in article 58 of the Penal Code.

US vs. Catolico GR No 6486 18 Phil 504 02 March 1911

Facts: The justice of peace of Cagayan had before him 16 separate civil cases
initiated by Juan Canillas for damages resulting from breach of contract. All cases
were decided in favor of Canillas and all defendants appealed the decision and
deposited Php 16 and a bond of Php 50 as required by law. It appears that the
sureties of the bond were insolvent and new bonds were not presented on the
extension given. Canillas appealed. The justice of peace dismissed the appeals and
ordered the sm of money attached and delivered to Canillas in satisfaction of the
judgment. The judge was prosecuted for malversation of funds.

Issue: Whether or not the defendant is guilty of felony.

Ruling:

Judgment of conviction is reversed and defendant ordered to be discharged from

custody.The judge decided in good faith under the belief that he was acting
judiciously and correctly. It was a result of erroneous exercise of judicial function and
not an intention to deprive any person of his property feloniously. He acted that
debts might be paid to those who they are legally and justly due and not to enrich
himself or another by criminal misappropriation. It was a mistake not a crime.

People vs. Taneo March 31, 1933 (58 Phil 255)

Facts:
On January 16, 1932, in the house of PotencianoTaneos parents in Dolores, Ormoc,
Leyte, because of severe stomachache, Potenciano slept early. While sleeping, he
suddenly got up, left the room with a bolo in hand and upon meeting his wife who
tried stop him, he wounded her int eh abdomen. Several others were also attacked,
this includes his father, and his guests, Fred Tanner and Luis Malinao. It was claimed
that he was dreaming when the crime happened. The trial court found Potenciano
guilty of parricide and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua.

Issue:

WON the defendant is criminally liable.

Ruling:

No. The defendant acted while in a dream and his acts with which he was charged
were not voluntary in the sense of entailing criminal liability. The expert witness
claimed that the defendant was under the influence of hallucination and not in his
right mind. The defendant is not criminally liable however, he was ordered to be
confined in an insane asylum.

People vs. Beronilla 96 Phil. 566 (1955)

Facts:
Arsenio Borjal was mayor of La Paz Abra at the outbreak of war and continued to
serve as mayor during the Japanese occupation. Dec 19, 1944 accused-appellant
Manuel Beronilla was appointed Military Mayor of La Paz by LT. Col Arnold.
Simultaneously, he received a memorandum issued by Arnold authorizing them to
appoint a jury of 12 bolomen to try persons accused of treason, espionage or aiding
the enemy. Beronilla, pursuant to his instructions placed Borjal under custody and
asked residents of La Paz to file case against him. The jury found Borjal guilty on all
counts and imposed death penalty. Mayor Beronilla forwarded the records of the
case to Headquarters of Infantry for review. Records were returned on April 18,1945
with approval of Arnold. On the same day, Beronilla ordered the execution of Borjal.
Immediately after the execution, Beronilla reported the execution to Arnold, the
latter complementing Beronilla.

Two years later, Mayor Beronillo and others involved in the Borjal case were indicted
by CFI of Abra for murder, for allegedly conspiring and confederating in the
execution of Borjal. Hence they appealed to the court.

Issue:

Whether or not accused appellants are guilty of murder;

Held: The records are ample to show that Beronilla acted pursuant to the orders of
the Infantry Headquarters. Although it was alleged by the state that there was a
radiogram from certain Col. Volkmann to Lt. Col. Arnold, on the illegality of Borjal's
execution, there are no sufficient evidence to show that it was known to Beronilla.
Furthermore, the messages of Col. Arnold approving the decisions of Beronilla prove
otherwise. The court said that the conduct of the appellants does not dispose that
they were impelled by malice. The court held that the accused-appellants just acted
upon the orders of superiors and criminal intent was not established.

People vs. Oanis, 74 Phil. 257

Facts:

Chief of Police Oanis received a telegram of the following tenor: "Information

received escaped convict AnselmoBalagtas with bailarina and Irene in Cabanatuan
get him dead or alive." Defendants Oanis and Galanta were one of the people
tasked to apprehend the convict.

Defendants went to the room of Irene, and upon seeing a man sleeping with his
back towards the door where they were, simultaneously or successively fired at him
with their .32 and .45 caliber revolvers however it turned out later that the person
shot and killed was not the notorious criminal Anselmo Balagtas but a peaceful and
innocent citizen named SerapioTecson, Irene's paramour.

According to Appellant Galanta, when he and chief of police Oanis arrived at the
house, the latter asked Brigida where Irene's room was. Brigida indicated the place,
and upon further inquiry as to the whereabouts of Anselmo Balagtas, she said that
he too was sleeping in the same room.

Issue: Whether or not defendants are responsible for the death thus caused to
Tecson.

Ruling: Yes. Appellants were declared guilty of murder.

Mistake of fact may relieve one from criminal liability, but this applies only when the
mistake is committed without fault or carelessness. Appellants found no
circumstances whatsoever which would press them to immediate action. The person
in the room being then asleep, appellants had ample time and opportunity to
ascertain his identity without hazard to themselves, and could even effect a
bloodless arrest if any reasonable effort to that end had been made, as the victim
was unarmed.

The crime committed by appellants is not merely criminal negligence, the killing
being intentional and not accidental. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to
another should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act
performed without malice.
People vs. De Fernando 49 Phil. 75

Facts:

The accused, a policeman, was informed that three convicts had escaped.In the
dark, he saw a person going up the stairs of a house, carrying a bolo andcalling for
someone inside. The daughter of the owner of the house was at that time with the
accused whofired a shot in the air. As the unknown personcontinued to ascend the
stairs and believing that he was one of the escapedconvicts, the accused fired
directly at the man who turned out to be the nephewof the owner of the house

Issue: Whether or not the appellant is exempt from criminal liability due tomistake
of fact.

Ruling: An agent of the law, to whom notice had been given of the presence of
suspicious looking persons, who might be escaped prisoners prowling around the
vicinity, and who enters a house to keepwatch, and later in the evening sees a
person with a bolo in hand, approachingthe house in the attitude of going up the
stairs, who does not answer thechallenge of the officer of the law, even when the
latter had fired a shot into the air, thinking him to be an evil-doer, shoots and kills
him, is not guiltyof murder or homicide.Taking into consideration the state of the
mind of the accused at the time, in shooting thelatter, he felt that he was
performing his duty by defending the owners of thehouse against an unexpected
attack, and such act cannot constitute the crime of murder, but only that of a
simple homicide.
People v. Guillen GR No. L-1477, January 18, 1950

Facts:

The accused Julio Guillen, was found guilty of thecrime of murder and multiple
frustrated murder after his attempt to assassinate the President of the Philippines,
Manuel Roxas. During the 1946 Presidential Elections, Guillen voted for the opposing
candidate of Manuel Roxas because he was disappointed with him for failing to fulfill
his promises made during the elections. The accused determined to assassinate the
President and found the oppoturnity when the President attended a popular meeting
at Plaza de Miranda, Quiapo, Manila. He thought of using two hand grenades which
were given to him by an American soldier for two bottles of whisky. The accused
stood on a chair and hurled the grenade at the President when he had just closed
his speech. A general who was on the platform saw the smoking grenade and kicked
it away from the platform towards an open space where he thought the grenade
would do the least harm. The grenade exploded in the middle of a group of persons
and killed one person, and injured several other persons. Guillen was arrested and
he readily admitted his responsibility.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused was guilty only of homicide through reckless
imprudence in regard to thedeath of Simeon Varela and of less serious physical
injuries in regard to the other injuredpersons.

Ruling :

The facts do not support the contention of the counsel for the appellant. In throwing
the handgrenade at the President with the intention of killing him, the appellant
acted with malice and is therefore liable for all the consequences of his wrongful
act. Art. 4 of the Revised Penal Code, states that criminal liability is incurred by any
person committing a felony althoughthe wrongful act done be different from that
which he intended. Where such unlawful act is wilfully done, a mistake in the
identity of the intended victim cannot be considered reckless imprudence.
US vs. Go Chico (14 Phil 133)

Facts: appellant Go Chico displayed in one of the windows and one of the show
cases of his store a the flag or banner or device used during the late insurrection in
the Phil. Islands to designate and identify those in armed insurrection against the
United States. He was arranging his stock of goods for the purpose of displaying
them to the public, and in doing so, he placed it in his showcase and on one of the
windows of his store. The appellant was ignorant of a law against the display of such
and had consequently no corrupt intention. The facts stated above are admitted.
The appellant has two propositions for his acquittal: first is that before a conviction
can be had, a criminal intent upon the part of the accused must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt. Second is that the prohibition of law is directed against the use of
identical banners, devices or emblems actually used during the Philippine
insurrection by those in armed rebellion against the United States.

Issue: Whether or not criminal intent is necessary in crimes punishable by special

laws.

Held: The court ruled that the act alone, irrespective of its motive, constitutes the
crime. The words used during the late insurrection in the Philippine Islands to
designate or identify those in armed rebellion against the United States mean not
only the identical flags actually used in the insurrection, but any flag which is of that
type. The description refers not to a particular flag, but to a type of flag. The literal
interpretation of a statute may lead to an absurdity, or evidently fail to give the real
intent of the legislature.
People v. Ural [56 SCRA 138 (1974)]

Facts: Ural, a policeman, boxed the deceased, Felix Napola, a detention prisoner,
inside the jail. As a consequence, the deceased collapsed on the floor and the
accused stepped on the prostate body and left. After a while he returned with a
bottle poured its contents on the recumbent body of the deceased, ignited it with a
match and left the cell again. As a consequence, the victim later on died of the
burns. The crime committed by appellant Ural was murder by means of fire.

Issue: Whether or not the accuseds contention of lack of intention to commit so

grave a wrong is valid.

Held: The trial court correctly held that the accused took advantage of his public
position but it failed to appreciate the mitigating circumstance of no intention to
commit so grave a wrong as that committed. The intention, as an internal act, is
judged not only by the pro-portion of the means employed by him to the evil
produced by his act, but also by the fact that the blow was or was not aimed at a
vital part of the body. Thus, it may be deduced from the proven facts that the
accused had no intent to kill the victim, his design being only to maltreat him, such
that when he realized the fearful consequences of his felonious act, he allowed the
victim to secure medical treatment at the municipal dispensary.

Lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong offsets the generic aggravating,

circumstance of abuse of his official position. The trial court properly imposed the
penalty of reclusion perpetua which is the medium period of the penalty for murder.
US vs. Divino, 12 Phil 175

Facts: A girl named Alfonsa, about 13 years of age when the incident happened, was
a servant for Feliciano Divino and his family. Her feet were the focus in this case
because it is said that Feliciano Divino burned her feet, in a very unorthodox and
harmful way in a sense, by setting her feet on fire after applying petroleum to it and
tying her down to the floor. He argued in the court that when Alfonsa came to their
home, her body was full of scars and ulcers, and that the ulcer in her body was
cured, through his efforts.

Issue: Whether Feliciano Divino can be acquitted because he argued that he acted
in good faith and did not mean any harm to the girl, except to help her get cured.

Held: Medical arguments were brought in the light of the decision and that a doctor
clearly identified that the scars on Alfonsas feet were indeed because of burns and
that the wounds became worse on account of Felicianos efforts to cure them.
Certainly it was found certain that the acts of the guilty person do not seem to have
been intended to cause an evil, but rather as a remedy. However, article 568 or the
Penal Code clearly states that a person that undertakes medical assistance to
another person is liable for any injuries resulting from such treatment, and the fact
that he acted in good faith and according to the best of his ability does not relieve
him from responsibility, although his ignorance may be considered as a mitigating
circumstance.
People vs. Bindoy G.R. NO. L-34665 August 28, 1931

Facts:

In the afternoon of May 6, 1930, a disturbance arose in a tuba wineshop. Donato

Bindoy offered some tuba to Faustino Paca's wife Tibay. She refused because she
already have one, but Bindoy threatened to injure her if she did not accept. Pacas
stepped in to defend his wife, attempting to take away from Bindoy the bolo he
carried. Emigdio Omamdam who came to the wine shop to see whats happening,
instead got stabbed in the chest by Bindoy. This happened when Bindoy succeeded
in disengaging himself from Pacas, wrenching the bolo from the latter's hand
towards the left behind the accused and with such violence that the point of the
bolo reached Omamdam's chest who was then behind Bindoy.

Issue: Whether or not Bindoy is criminally liable?

Ruling: Corroborated by a witness of the testimony of the accused, Pacas and

Bindoy were actually for the possession of the bolo. When Pacas let go of the bolo,
Bindoy had pulled so violently that it flew towards his left side, at the very moment
when Emigdio Omamdam came up and who was therefore hit in the chest without
Bindoy seeing him. Bindoy alleges that it was caused accidentally and without
malicious intent because he was only defending his possession of the bolo which
Pacas was trying to wrench away from him and his conduct was perfectly lawful.
The Court therefore acquitted Bindoy based on the facts stated.
People vs. Cagoco GR No. L-38511October 6, 1933

Facts:

The accused willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, without any just cause therefor and
with intent to kill and treachery, assaulted and attacked Yu Lon by suddenly giving
hima fist blow on the back part of the head, treacherously under conditions which
intended directly and especially to insure, the accomplishment of his purpose
without risk to himself arising from any defense the victim Yu Lon might make, thus
causing him to fall on the ground as aconsequence of which he suffered a lacerated
wound in the scalp and a fissured fracture on the left occipital region, which were
necessarily mortal and which caused the immediate death of the saidYu Lon.
Defendant was found guilty of murder in the CFI, for which the defendant made an
appeal.

Issue: Whether or not a naturally resulting injury from a direct consequence of an

unlawful act would make theaggressor criminally liable.

Ruling:

Regarding the contention of the appellant that striking Yu Lon at the back of the
headwould not possibly cause him to fall forward on his face to the pavement, the
Court declared upon expert testimony that the victim had undergone a natural
phenomenon of falling backwards on the pavement in an attempt to regain balance.
The Court referred to par. 1, Article 4 of the RPC which provides that criminal liability
shall be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful
act done be different from what he intended; but in order that a person be
criminally liable, thefollowing requisites must be present: (1) that a felony was
committed, and (2) that the wrong done tothe aggrieved person be the direct
consequence of the crime committed by the offender. There is no doubt as to the
cause of the death of Yu Lon, which occurred as the direct consequence of the blow
dealt by the appellant.

People vs. Tomotorgo (April 30, 1985)

Facts: Accused was the husband of the deceased. She had been persistently asking
her husband to sell their conjugal home in order for them to transfer to the house of
her husbands in-laws. Plaintiff didnt want to abandon their house because the
improvements that he made to the land.

Upon returning home one day, Accused found his wife and baby already gone. He
went out to look and managed to caught up with them. Plaintiff begged for his wife
to surrender and when she refused, they got into a fight when the plaintiff tried to
take their child from his wife. The wife infuriated the accused when she threw their
child onto the grassy portion of the trail. Plaintiff picked up a wood and began
hitting his wife. She fell and complained of severe chest pains. Realizing what he
had done, he brought her home but she died despite plaintiffs effort to alleviate her
pain.

Plaintiff brought the piece of wood and reported the incident to the baranggay
where he was charged with parricide and pleaded guilty. The court found him guilty
of parricide but with three mitigating circumstances. Appellant claims that the court
handed him the wrong punishment. He avers that the penalty for the felony
committed by him parricide was higher than that which he intended to commit
physical injuries.

Issue: Whether the court imposed the wrong penalty.

Held: The judgment is affirmed but the court would recommend that executive
clemency be extended to the accused Article 4 of the RPC states that criminal
liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the
wrongful act be different from that which he intended and that accused is liable for
all the consequences of his felonious act. His lack of intention to commit a grave
wrong is at best mitigating.

People vs. Monleon December 10, 1946 (74 SCRA 263)

Facts:

On June 1, 1970, Cosme Monleon in his inebriated state asked whether the carabao
was already fed. To check the veracity of the statement, he went to see the
carabao. He discovered that the carabao had not been adequately fed. He was
about to hit Marciano, his 10 year old son, when Concordia, his wife, intervened.
Monleon choked her, bashed her head against the post, and kicked her abdomen.
Concordia died the following day due to trauma or external violence.

Issue:

WON the accused is criminally liable although he had no intention to kill his wife.

Ruling:

Yes. Art 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is incurred by
any person committing a felony although the wrongful act don be different than that
which he intended to do. The maltreatment inflicted by the accused on his wife was
the proximate cause of her death. He could have easily killed his wife had he really
intended to take her life. He did not kill her outright. The accused was found guilty
of parricide sentencing him to reclusion perpetua.

US vs. Brobst 14 Phil 310

Facts:

Accused Brobst was the owner of a mining company. He discharged the deceased,
his employee from working in the mine because he was a thief. The deceased went
back to look for work. Brobst was in the tent ordered him off the place but deceased
merely smiled or grinned at him. Accused approached him and struck him a
powerful blow with closed fist on the left side, just over the lower ribs, at the point
where his bolo's handle lay against his belt. The deceased threw up his hands,
staggered and without saying a word, went away in the direction of his sister's
house where he died as he reached the door. The trial court convicted him guilty of
homicide. His defense contends that evidence fails to prove that the blow was the
cause of death.

Issue:
Whether or not accused is liable for the consequence of the death of his employee

Ruling:

Held: No. Under Art. 4 paragraph 1 of RPC result is different from what is intended
is still punishable. The Court takes note of the inflicted injury before death since
there is no more proof that could lead to the death of a person as there was no
intervening cause.

People vs. Lucero 103 Phil. 500

Facts:

The accused Lucero was found guilty by the lower court of illegal possession of
firearm. Lucero had been appointed confidential agent and was authorized to
possess a revolver to effect capture of one Angel Aviso alias commander Mori.

Issue:

Whether or not accused Lucero is guilty of illegal possession of firearm.

Ruling:

The Court ruled that as the grant for the temporary use of revolver to defendant-
appellant was a necessary means to carry out a lawful purpose and within the limits
of the law, defendant-appellant is exempt from criminal liability for illegal
possession of firearm.

Sulpicio Intod vs. CA G.R. 103119 October 21, 1992

Facts:
Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and Avelino Daligdig went to Salvador Mandaya's
house and asked him to go with them to the house of Bernardina Palangpangan. Thereafter, they
had a meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan who told Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan to be killed
because of a land dispute between them and that Mandaya should accompany them. Otherwise, he
would also be killed.
All of them armed arrived at Palangpangan's house and fired at Palangpangan's bedroom but there
was no one in the room. The Trial Court convicted Intod of attempted murder based on the testimony
of the witness.

Issue: Whether or not Intod is guilty attempted murder since it is an impossible crime under Art. 4
par. 2.
Ruling: Yes. The court held that the accused is guilty of impossible crime.

Art. 4 par. 2 provides that criminal liability is incurred:by any person performing an act which would
be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.

Petitioner contends that, Palangpangan's absence from her room on the night he and his
companions riddled it with bullets made the crime inherently impossible. Legal impossibility occurs
where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime

People vs. Gona 54 Phil. 605 March 15, 1930

Facts:

One evening, there was a reunion celebrated at the house of the Mansacas. Liberal
supply of alcoholic drinks resulted the men present to be intoxicated. A quarrel took
place between one person and defendant. Some of the people left the house,
including the deceased and the defendant followed. But because of the darkness of
the night, the defendant mistook the one he was following for the deceased, as he
inflicted a mortal wound upon him. That he had no intention to kill the deceased
because of mistake, and alleges that he is only guilty of homicide through
negligence.

Issue:

Whether or not mistake of the victim will relieve defendant from liability

Ruling:
The court held that his mistake in killing one man instead of another where it was
proved that he acted maliciously and willfully does not relieve him from criminal
responsibility and could not even be considered a mitigating circumstance.

US vs. Mallari 29 Phil. 14 December 23. 1914

Facts:

Accused Mallari went to the house of a married couple and threatened to kill them,
alleging that they enchanted his wife of an illness. He demanded the spouses to
cure his wife, but rejected him because he was not a wizard. The accused became
enraged and pursued him, armed with a bolo. The deceased fled away to report him
to the authorities but the accused managed to caught up with him. The deceased
had no choice but to defend himself, but he was slashed by the accused in the
abdomen and fled.

The victim developed infections in the wounds and died three days after. The
accused was sentenced by the trial court for homicide.

Issue:
Whether or not the accused is wholly liable for the consequences of his act.

Ruling:

Yes. Under Art. 4 of the RPC. The Court held that the proven perpetrator of a crime
is directly responsible for all the consequences of his criminal act, and therefore for
the death that occurred five days after the victim had received the wound that
caused it.

People vs. Toling 62 SCRA 18 January 17. 1975

Facts:

Antonio Toling and Jose Toling twins, are illiterate farmers tilling their own lands.
Antonio's daughter works in Manila as well as Jose's three children. Antonio decided
to go to Manila after receiving a letter from his daughter telling him she would give
him money. Jose decided to go with Antonio in order to see his children. He was able
to raise eighty-five pesos for his expenses. But when they reached the place all the
children gave him is only enough for their trip. After buying their tickets home, they
boarded the train in the afternoon. The train left in the evening. After a while, the
twins ran amuck and started stabbing the people in the coach. They were finally
stopped when Constabulary soldiers aboard the train heard about the incident.
The dead amounted to twelve. Eight suffered from stab wounds while others died
after they jumped off the train, apparently trying to escape the violence. The lower
court found them guilty of multiple and frustrated murder.

Issue:

Whether or not the two accused is also liable for the other deaths that were not
caused by their stabbing.

Ruling:

Yes. The court held that under criminal statutes, the presumption is that a person
intends all the consequences of his voluntary act. The rule is that if a man creates
in another mans mind an immediate sense of danger which causes such person to
injure himself, the man who creates such state is liable for the injuries which result.

US. Vs. Valdez 41 Phil. 497 March 22. 1921

Facts:

This is a case of homicide. The facts of the case are as follows: While the steamer
Vigan anchored in Pasig River, a small boat was sent to raise the anchor. The crew
of the boat consisted of the accused and among others the deceased. The accused
was in charge of the men. The work of raising the anchor seems to have proceeded
slowly and the accused began to abuse the men with offensive remarks. The
deceased, remonstrated saying that they would work together if he would not insult
them. The accused took this as a display of insubordination and moved towards the
deceased with a big knife. The deceased believing himself in great peril, decided to
jump to the water, but disappeared.
Issue:

Whether or not the victims act of jumping from the boat as a consequence, will
result as a criminal liability for the accused.

Ruling:

Yes. The Court held that If a person against whom a criminal assault is directed
reasonably believes himself to be in danger of death or great bodily harm and in
order to escape jumps into the water, impelled by instinct of self- preservation, the
assailant is responsible for homicide in case death results by drowning.

People vs. Quianson 62 Phil. 162

Facts:

The accused was convicted of homicide. In an occasion, the deceased went to ask
for food where the accused was preparing. The accused took hold of a fireband and
applied it to the neck of the deceased as he was repeatingly pestering him. The
victim also received a wound in the abdomen from the accused. While the deceased
was undergoing medical treatment, the victim took out the drainage from his wound
and as a result, peritonitis developed and he died. The accused claimed that had
not the deceased taken out the drainage, he would not have died.

Issue:
Whether or not the acts of the victim on his wound that caused his death is the
responsibility of the accused.

Ruling:

Yes. The Court ruled that death was the natural consequence of the mortal wound
inflicted. The victim, in removing the drainage, did not do so voluntarily nor did he
have knowledge that it was prejudicial to his recovery. It was due to a pathological
condition and state of nervousness and restlessness by the victim on account of the
physical pain caused by the wound.

People vs. Mabugat 51 Phil. 967

Facts:

The accused and Juana Buralo were sweethearts. One day, the accused invited
Juana to take a walk with him, but the latter refused him on account that the
accused was seeing another woman. Later the accused went to a house where
Juana had gone to take part in some devotion. The accused waited for Juana, with
revolver in hand. Juana came out with her niece and proceeded to their house and
the accused followed them. As they were going upstairs, the accused shot at Juana
but hit her niece instead. She did not die because of proper medical attention.

Issue:
Whether or not the accused is liable for mistake of the person he intended to cause
harm.

Ruling:

Yes. The Court held the accused guilty of frustrated murder, qualified by treachery,
committed on the niece of Juana.

People vs. Illustre 54 Phil. 594 March 14. 1930

Facts:

On St. Johns Day a celebration took place in a barrio, where a feast was held with a
roasted pig. The people considering of the presence of the pig, will try to take a
piece of it. To direct the procession and prevent the people from consuming the
animal before it reached the end, defendant Ilustre was placed in charge.

A young man, suffering from tuberculosis, tried to secure a piece of the pig, even
though it was not permitted. The defendant ran after him and boxed him as
punishment, and the victim was sprawled on the ground. Upon being struck the
victim became very ill and was carried home, and in the afternoon he expired. The
opinion of a physician states that the cause of death was an internal hemorrhage in
the liver and although the victim had tuberculosis, he could not have died from it.
Appellant was charged of homicide.

Issue:

Whether or not Appellants blow on the victim, was the efficient cause of his death.

Ruling:

Yes. The court held that the deceased had a delicate constitution and suffered from
tuberculosis does not affect the criminal liability of the defendant. Even from his
weakened condition rendered the blow more fatal, the efficient cause of the death
remains the same.

US vs. Rodriguez 23 Phil. 22 Aug 17, 1912

Facts:

Rosalino Rodriguez is charged for having dealt blows upon Marciano Magno, one on
the stomach, and one at the back. The witnesses averred that it was she (the
accuseds daughter) that dealt the blows. The physician observed on the autopsy,
that the victim has suffered a weak heart and the wounds developed abdominal
peritonitis, all which hastened the death of the victim. The accused was convicted
for homicide.

Issue:
Whether or not the defendant is liable for the death of the victim.

Ruling:

Yes. The blows dealt by the accused to the victim is rightly classified as homicide if
the victim dies as a result. Even though, a blow of a fist or a kick does not produce
external wound it may produce inflammation of the spleen and peritonitis and cause
death, and even though the victim was suffering from an internal malady, yet a
blow accelerated death, he who caused such is responsible for the death.

People vs. Reyes 61 Phil. 341

Facts:

Appellant was convicted by CFI in Camarines Sur of homicide. Appellant and

deceased were a couple that were scheduled to be married. One evening, on the
occasion of the crime, there had been a barrio procession. The deceased and
appellant were talking outside the event. She informed him that she could not
return to him because of her parents. Appellant then dragged her towards the street
and stabbed her in the chest with a fan knife. The deceased managed to run
towards the house of a barrio lieutenant but fell dead at the foot of the staircase.
Appellant contends that: (1) he was attacked by the relatives of the deceased, and
(2) he cannot be convicted with homicide because the wound inflicted was
superficial.

Issue:

Whether or not the wound inflicted by the accused is the proximate cause of death.

Ruling:

Yes. The Court held that a person is responsible for the consequences of his criminal
act and even if the deceased had been shown to be suffering from a diseased heart
although not shown, appellants assault being the proximate cause of the death, he
would be responsible.

US vs. Marasigan 27 Phil 504

Facts:

Francisco Mendoza while examining his sugar crops was asked by the accused why
the division line between their lands was curved. They had a misunderstanding then
suddenly, accused drew his knife to strike him. A fight ensued and as a result,
Mendoza sustained wounds where the one he got in his left hand was the most
serious. The accused assert he should have a new trial, to be given opportunity to
present evidence by submitting the victim to a surgical operation.
Issue:

Whether or not the victim, Mendoza, is obliged to submit to surgical operation.

Ruling:

No. The Court does not regard the case to warrant a new trial by alleged by the
accused to show the usefulness of the finger which was destroyed. Mendoza is not
obliged to submit to surgical operation to relieve the accused from the natural and
ordinary results of his crime. It was his voluntary act which disabled Mendoza and
he must abide by the consequences resulting therefrom.

Vda. De Bataclan vs. Medina 102 Phil 181

Facts:

The case involves the overturning of a bus. Medina Transportation operated by its
owner, defendant Mariano Medina. The route of the bus on the tragic incident, was
from Cavite to Pasay City. One of the front tires burst and the vehicle began to zig-
zag until it fell into a canal or ditch and turned turtle. Some of the passengers
managed to leave the bus while the others cannot. After a while, some men came
carrying lighted torches with them. But when they approached the bus, a fierce fire
started because of a gas leak that was due to the overturning of the bus, thus
burning the passengers inside.

Issue:

What was the proximate cause of death of the passengers of the bus?

Ruling:

The court held that the overturning of the bus was the proximate cause of death.
That a vehicle turned on its back, the leaking of the gas from the tank was not
unnatural or unexpected. That the coming of the men with the torches was
expected in a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were unavailable. The driver
was accountable to the consequence as a result of his negligence.

People vs. Martin 89 Phil. 18

Facts:

Accused was convicted with the complex crime of parricide with abortion. The
accused was woken up by his wife and told him why he doesnt have interest in her
anymore. He said that he doesnt love her and he consented to marry her only
because of fear of her filing against him. Accused had to answer the call of nature,
but then his wife came after him with a rope placed around his neck. He asked as to
why, and she said because he does not love her. Accused managed to took off the
rope and turned the same to his wife and tightened it, thus killing her, and her
unborn child because she was pregnant.

Issue:

Whether or not accused is proximately liable for the death of his wife

Ruling:

Yes. The Court reiterated their rule in People vs. Reyes: that a person is responsible
for the consequences of his criminal act and even if the deceased had been shown
to be suffering from a diseased heart although not shown, appellants assault being
the proximate cause of the death, he would be responsible.

People vs. Piamonte 94 Phil. 293

Facts:
The accused was charged with robbery with homicide. A robbery took place in the
house of one Magno Israel. In the course of the robbery, he was seriously wounded
and was taken to a hospital for treatment. The operation did him well but not so in
the post-operative period, where he contracted a sickness known as mucuous colitis
which develop due to his weak condition and died afterwards.

Issue:

Whether or not the deceased died as a result of the wounds inflicted upon him by
the accused, that he was able to survive for sometime because of the operation.

Ruling:

Yes. The Court affirm the statements of the doctors who attended the deceased had
agreed that the weakened condition which caused disturbance of the functions of
the intestines made it possible for him to contract mucuous colitis, which shows that
while said wounds were not the immediate cause, they were however the proximate
cause of death.

Gumabon v. Director of Prisons 37 SCRA 420

Facts:
Gumabon, after pleading guilty, was sentenced to reclusion perpetua for the
complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, robbery, arson and kidnapping
(along with Agapito, Palmares and Padua). Each of the petitioners have been
imprisoned for more than 13 years by virtue of their convictions.

They now invoke the doctrine laid down in People v. Hernandez which negated such
complex crime, a ruling which was not handed down until after their convictions
have become final. In People v. Hernandez, the SC ruled that the information
against the accused for rebellion complexed with murder, arson and robbery was
not warranted under Art. 134 of the RPC, there being no such complex offense. This
ruling was not handed down until after their convictions have become final. Since
Hernandez served more than the maximum penalty that could have been served
against him, he is entitled to freedom, and thus, his continued detention is illegal.

Issue:

Whether or not Art. 22 of the RPC which gives a penal judgment a retroactive effect
is applicable in this case, that judicial decisions favourable to the accused/convicted
for the samecrime can be applied retroactively.

Ruling:

Yes. Judicial decisions favourable to the accused must be applied retroactively.

Petitioners relied on Art. 22 of the RPC, which states the penal laws shall have a
retroactive effect insofar as they favour the accused who is not a habitual criminal.
The Civil Code also provides that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the
Constitution forms part of our legal system. Petitioners even raised their
constitutional right to equal protection, given that Hernandez et al., has been
convicted for the same offense as they have, though their sentences were lighter.
Habeas corpus is the only means of benefiting the accused by the retroactive
character of a favorable decision

People vs. Narvaez, 121 SCRA 389 (1983)

Facts:

Mamerto Narvaez has been convicted of murder (qualified by treachery) of David

Fleischer and Flaviano Rubia. Narvaez shot Fleischer and Rubia during the time the
two were constructing a fence that would prevent Narvaez from getting into his
house and rice mill. The defendant was taking a nap when he heard sounds of
construction and found fence being made. He addressed the group and asked them
to stop destroying his house and asking if they could talk things over. Fleischer
responded with "No, gadamit, proceed, go ahead." Defendant lost his "equilibrium,"
and shot Fleisher with his shotgun. He also shot Rubia who was running towards the
jeep where the deceased's gun was placed. Prior to theshooting, Fleischer and Co.
(the company of Fleischer's family) was involved in a legal battle with the defendant
and other land settlers of Cotabato over certain pieces of property. Defendant
claims he killed in defense of his person and property. CFI ruled that Narvaez was
guilty.

Issue:

Whether or not the court erred in convicting defendant-appellant although he acted

in defence of his rights.

Ruling:

Yes. However, the argument of the justifying circumstance of self-defense is

applicable only if the 3 requirements are fulfilled but the indispensable requisite
being Unlawful aggression. In the case at bar, there was unlawful aggression
towards appellant's property rights. In Reasonable necessity of means employed to
prevent or repel attack. In the case, killing was disproportionate to the attack. Lack
of sufficient provocation on part of person defending himself. Here, there was no
provocation at all since he was asleep.

Gutierrez, dissenting. Defense of property can only be invoked when coupled with
form of attack on person defending property. In the case at bar, this was not so.
Appellant should then be sentenced to prision mayor. However, since he has served
more than that, he should be released.
In Re: Kay Villegas Kami, 35 SCRA 429 (1970)

Facts:

Kay Villegas Kami Inc. claiming to be a recognized nonstock, non-profit corporation

contests validity of RA # 6132 Sec. 8 saying it violates due process rights of
association, freedom of expression and is an ex post facto law

Issue:

Whether or not it is an ex post facto law?

Ruling:

No. Ex post facto law defined:

a. makes criminal an act done before law was passed and punishes act innocent
when done.
b. aggravates a crime, makes it greater than it was.
c. inflicts greater punishment than the law prescribed when committed.
d. alters legal rules of evidence and authorizes conviction upon less or different
tests.
e. assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only in effect imposes penalty or
deprivation of right which when done was lawful.

Constitutional inhibition refers only to criminal laws. Penalty in law imposed to acts
committed after approval of law. Petition denied.
People vs. Ringor, 320 SCRA 342 (1999)

Facts:

The accused (Ringor) on the night of June 23, 1994 was seen entering a restaurant.
A witness Fely Batanes saw the accused approach a table where the victim was
sitting, pulled his hair, and poked a knife at the latters throat. After, leaving the
restaurant, the accused returned with a gun, entered the kitchen of the restaurant,
stealthily approached the victim from behind and shot him six times successively.
The defendant was later apprehended and caught in his possession was an
unlicensed weapon. Ringor put up self-defense but he failed to prove Floridas
unlawful aggression. He was found guilty of murder qualified by treachery and was
sentenced to death. He was found guilty of a separate charge of possession of an
unlicensed firearm with a sentence of 17 to 20 years.

Issue:

Whether or not RTC erred in convicting appellant for simple illegal possession of
firearms and sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate sentence of 17 to 20 years.

Ruling:

Yes. In cases where murder or homicide is committed with the use of an unlicensed
firearm, there can be no separate conviction for the crime of illegal possession of
firearms under PD No. 1866. t is simply considered as an aggravating circumstance,
no longer as a separate offence.
According to the article 22 of RPC, retroactivity of the law must be applied if it is
favourable to the accused.
People vs. Pimentel, 288 SCRA 542 (1998)

Facts:

In 1983, Tujan was charged with subversions under RA 1700 with warrant of arrest
issued. On June 5, 1990, Tujan was arrested and caught with .38 caliber revolver. On
June 14, 1990, he was charged with illegal possession of firearms and ammunition in
furtherance of subversion (PD 1866) Tujan filed motion to quash invoking protection
versus double jeopardy (Art. III, Constitution; Misolas v. Panga; and Enrile v. Salazar:
alleged possession absorbed in subversion.) It was granted by the trial court and
the court of appeals.

Issue:

Whether or not charge under PD 1866 be quashed on ground of double jeopardy in

view of the previous charge under RA 1700.

Ruling:

No.
1. Article III of the Constitution and Rule 117 Revised Rules of Court state that for
double jeopardy to occur, acquittal, conviction or dismissal in previous cases must
have occurred. In this case, first case was not even arraigned yet.
2. They are different offenses. R.A. 1700 punishes subversion while PD 1866
punishes illegal possession of firearms.

However, since RA 7636 totally repealed subversion or RA 1700, and since this is
favorable to the accused, we can no longer charge accused with RA 1700 even if
they didnt raise this issue. PD 1866 should be amended to mere illegal possession
of firearms without furtherance of subversion

Ruling: RTC and CA reversed and set aside. RA 1700 charge dismissed. PD 1866
change amended. Release Tujan.