Corpus vs.

CA gr l-40424 #3
Held: While there was no express agreement between petitioner Corpus and respondent David
as regards attorney's fees, the facts of the case support the position of respondent David that
there was at least an implied agreement for the payment of attorney's fees.

Payment of attorney's fees to respondent David may be justified by virtue of the innominate
contract of facio ut des (I do and you give which is based on the principle that "no one shall
unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another." Innominate contracts have been elevated to a
codal provision in the New Civil Code by providing under Article 1307 that such contracts shall
be regulated by the stipulations of the parties, by the general provisions or principles of
obligations and contracts, by the rules governing the most analogous nominate contracts, and by
the customs of the people.
WE reiterated this rule in Pacific Merchandising Corp. vs. Consolacion Insurance & Surety Co.,
Inc. (73 SCRA 564 [1976]) citing the case of Perez v. Pomar, supra thus:
Where one has rendered services to another, and these services are accepted by the latter, in the
absence of proof that the service was rendered gratuitously, it is but just that he should pay a
reasonable remuneration therefor because 'it is a well-known principle of law, that no one
should be permitted to enrich himself to the damage of another.

Facts: David accepted the case of Corpus though there was no express agreement regarding
attorneys fees.
Corpus was administratively charged. He employed the services of David. David won the
administrative case
For Copuz. Corpus gave a check to David, but was returned by David with the intention of
getting paid after
the case is ruled with finality by the SC and Corpus gets his back salaries and wages. (Your
appreciation of the
efforts I have invested in your case is enough compensation therefor, however, when you shall
have obtained a
decision which would have finally resolved the case in your favor, remembering me then will
make me happy.
In the meantime, you will make me happier by just keeping the check) David continued to fight
for Corpus
case and got a favorable judgment. Corpus refused to pay David contending that since David
refused the first
check given by him, he gave his services gratuitously.
Javier Security Agency v. Shell Craft GR L-18639 #4
Facts:
Since 1954, H. L. Swiryn had engaged at P290.00 a month the
services of Federico E. Javier to guard the premises of appellee
Shell-Craft & Button Corporation, of which Swiryn is the vice-
president and manager. Because the services rendered by
Federico E. Javier were efficient, defendant corporation renewed
annually its contract with him. The last renewal, on 4 May 1956
(Exhibit C), would have expired on 1 December 1957, as per
agreement, which stipulated the following:

For and in consideration of the sum of P290.00 per month,

the JAVIER SECURITY SPECIAL WATCHMAN AGENCY with
business address at 3195 Sta. Mesa Blvd., Manila, through its
representative, Federico E. Javier, hereby agrees to guard
the establishment of SHELL-CRAFT & BUTTON CORPORATION,
located at 114 Beata, Pandacan, subject to the following
conditions:

1. That in order to carry out this agreement, the JAVIER

SECURITY SPECIAL WATCHMAN AGENCY will furnish the
SPECIAL guards or watchmen between the hours of 8:00 P.M.
and 8:00 A.M. daily, seven days a week;

2. That the number of said guards or watchmen will not be

less than two (2) ;

3. That JAVIER SECURITY SPECIAL WATCHMAN AGENCY shall

be responsible for the payment of the salaries of said guards
or watchmen and such other benefits to which they may be
entitled under existing labor laws;

4. That the JAVIER SECURITY SPECIAL WATCHMAN AGENCY

shall furnish the SHELL-CRAFT & BUTTON CORPORATION
every 15th and end of the MONTH a copy of the payrolls and
time records duly signed by each and every guard or
 watchman who might be employed by the JAVIER SECURITY
SPECIAL WATCHMAN AGENCY;

5. That this Contract shall expire on December 1, 1957

renewable for another year upon mutual consent.

Issue:
whether or not said Exhibit "C" is personal contract, in the sense
that the lights and obligations thereunder are intransmissible to
the heirs of a party thereto. The trial court held the contract to be
"intuitu personae", and dismissed the action whereupon the
plaintiffs appealed.

Held:
No. Because the widow could not be expected to perform the
contract for custodial services celebrated by her husband, and
because upon the death of Javier no one could take his place (his
widow being at the time in Hongkong and his children minors),
while the premises could not be left unguarded by trusted
persons, the appellee was entitled to regard its contract with
Javier terminated then and there. Hence it was free to engage
other guards.

The decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the

plaintiffs-appellants.

Floirendo v metrobank gr l-148325 #2

Facts:
Petitioner signed a promissory note dated March 14, 1997 fixing
the rate of interest at 15.446% per annum for the first 30 days,
subject to upward/downward adjustment every 30 days
thereafter; and a penalty charge of 18% per annum based on any
unpaid principal to be computed from date of default until
payment of the obligation.
On July 11, 1997, respondent bank started imposing higher
interest rates on petitioners loan which varied through the
months, in fact, as high as 30.244% in October 1997.
August 17, 1998, the auction sale was set.
On August 14, 1998, the RTC issued a TRO and on September 3,
1998, a writ of preliminary injunction.
On February 22, 2001, the RTC rendered a Judgment (1)
dismissing the complaint for reformation of instruments, (2)
dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction and (3) directing the
sale at public auction of petitioners mortgaged properties.

Issue:
whether the mortgage contract and the promissory note express
the true agreement between the parties herein.
Held:
Yes. The provision in the promissory note authorizing respondent
bank to increase, decrease or otherwise change from time to time
the rate of interest and/or bank charges without advance notice
to petitioner, in the event of change in the interest rate
prescribed by law or the Monetary Board of the Central Bank of
the Philippines, does not give respondent bank unrestrained
freedom to charge any rate other than that which was agreed
upon. Here, the monthly upward/downward adjustment of interest
rate is left to the will of respondent bank alone. It violates the
essence of mutuality of the contract.
Hence, the instant petition.

Zepeda vs CA gr l-100486 #5
Facts:
On July 17, 1973, Antonio Santos mortgaged his share in the lot in
question with the Sta. Rosa Rural Bank for the amount of
P3,000.00. The property however was foreclosed due to the non-
payment of the obligation of Antonio Santos and the property was
sold by public auction in favor of the Bank. While the sale was
annotated at the Memorandum of Encumbrance of T.C.T. No. NT-
57013 on October 8, 1974, said property was not consolidated in
the name of the Bank and no writ of possession was issued by the
Court placing the Bank in possession before the property in
question was disposed of by the Bank in favor of petitioner
spouses Felix Zepeda and Virginia Rena Zepeda on March 12,
1981.
on January 13, 1981, Leonila Amansec and the Bank Manager
came into an agreement that the property in question may be
redeemed for the price of Twelve Thousand (P12,000.00) Pesos,
the Six Thousand (P6,000.00) Pesos to be deposited that same
date or within one (1) week and the other Six Thousand
(P6,000.00) Pesos to be paid within one (1) year from January 13,
1981.
on January 13, 1981, Leonila Amansec gave Five Thousand
(P5,000.00) Pesos as deposit to the Bank which amount was
evidenced by Official Receipt No. 36102. (Exhibit "C") This
agreement 2 was confirmed and ratified on January 22, 1981 by
the Board of Directors of the said Bank.
On February 1981 however, the Bank sold the property in
question to herein petitioner for the amount of Fourteen Thousand
(P14,000.00) Pesos. On March 20, 1981, a letter 3 was sent by the
counsel of the Leonila Amansec informing her that she can
withdraw anytime her deposit of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) and
further, that the bank have decided to sell the property to the
Zepedas instead.
Issues:
Held:

Llenado vs llenado gr l-145736 #1

Facts:
On December 2, 1975, Cornelio leased Lot 249-D-1 to his nephew,
Romeo Llenado (Romeo), for a period of five years, renewable for
another five years at the option of Cornelio. On March 31, 1978,
Cornelio, Romeo and the latters cousin Orlando Llenado (Orlando)
executed an Agreement[5] whereby Romeo assigned all his rights
to Orlando over the unexpired portion of the aforesaid lease
contract. The parties further agreed that Orlando shall have the
option to renew the lease contract for another three years
commencing from December 3, 1980, up to December 2, 1983,
renewable for another four years or up to December 2, 1987, and
that during the period that [this agreement] is enforced, the x x x
property cannot be sold, transferred, alienated or conveyed in
whatever manner to any third party.
Upon the death of Orlando on November 7, 1983, his wife, Wenifreda
Llenado (Wenifreda), took over the operation of the gasoline
station. Meanwhile, on January 29, 1987, Cornelio sold Lot 249-D to
his children, namely, Eduardo, Jorge,Virginia and Cornelio, Jr.,
through a deed of sale, denominated as Kasulatan sa Ganap Na
Bilihan,[7] for the sum of P160,000.00. As stated earlier, the
subject lot, which forms part of Lot 249-D, was sold to Eduardo
and Jorge, and titled in their names under TCT No. V-1689. Several
months thereafter or on September 7, 1987, Cornelio passed away.

Issues:
whether the lease agreement was in force at the time of the
subject sale and, if it was in force, whether the violation of the
prohibitory clause invalidated the sale.

Held:
the petition is DENIED. The May 30, 2000 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58911 dismissing the complaint for
annulment of deed of conveyance, title and damages, and the
October 6, 2000 Resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.