G.R. No.
L-20392, December 18, 1968 The mishap occurred at about 5:30 in the morning of March 24, 1958
MARCIAL T. CAEDO, JUANA SANGALANG CAEDO, AND THE
MINORS, EPHRAIM CAEDO, EILEEN CAEDO, ROSE ELAINE
CAEDO, SUING THROUGH THEIR FATHER, MARCIAL T. CAEDO, AS
GUARDIAN AD LITEM, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, VS. YU KHE
THAI AND RAFAEL BERNARDO, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.
DECISION
MAKALINTAL, J.:
As a result of a vehicular accident in which plaintiff Marcial Caedo and
several members of his family were injured they filed this suit for
recovery of damages from the defendants. The judgment, rendered by
the Court of First Instance of Rizal on February 26, 1960 (Q-2952),
contains the following disposition:
"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the court renders a judgment, one in
favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, Yu Khe Thai and
Rafael Bernardo, jointly and severally, to pay to plaintiffs Marcial Caedo
et al., the sum of P1, 929. 70 for actual damages; P48, 000.00 for
moral damages; P10, 000.00 for exemplary damages; and P5,000.00
for attorney's fees, with costs against the defendants. The
counterclaim of the defendants against the plaintiffs is hereby ordered
dismissed, for lack of merits."
On March 12, 1960 the judgment was amended so as to include an
additional award of P3, 705.11 in favor of the plaintiffs for the damage
sustained by their car in the accident.
Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals, which certified the case
to us in view of the total amount of the plaintiffs claim.
There are two principal questions posed for resolution: (1) who was
responsible for the accident? and (2) if it was defendant Rafael
Bernardo, was his employer, defendant Yu Khe Thai, solidarily liable
with him? On the first question the trial court found Rafael Bernardo
negligent; and on the second, held his employer solidarily liable with
him.
on Highway 54 (now E. de los Santos Avenue) in the vicinity of San
Lorenzo Village. Marcial was driving his Mercury car on his way from
his home in Quezon City to the airport, where his son Ephraim was
scheduled to take a plane for Mindoro. With them in the car were Mrs.
Caedo and three daughters. Coming from the opposite direction was
the Cadillac of Yu Khe Thai, with his driver Rafael Bernardo at the
wheel, taking the owner from his Paraaque home to Wack Wack for
his regular round of golf. The two cars were traveling at fairly
moderate speeds, considering the condition of the road and the
absence of traffic - the Mercury at 40 to 50 kilometers per hour, and
the Cadillac at approximately 30 to 35 miles (48 to 56 kilometers).
Their headlights were mutually noticeable from a distance. Ahead of
the Cadillac, going in the same direction, was a carretela owned by a
certain Pedro Bautista. The carretela was towing another horse by
means of a short rope coiled around the rig's vertical post on the right
side and held at the other end by Pedro's son, Julian Bautista.
Rafael Bernardo testified that he was almost upon the rig when he saw
it in front of him, only eight meters away. This is the first clear
indication of his negligence. The carretela was provided with two
lights, one on each side, and they should have given him sufficient
warning to take the necessary precautions. And even if he did not
notice the lights, as he claimed later on at the trial, the carretela
should anyway have been visible to him from afar if he had been
careful, as it must have been in the beam of his headlights for a
considerable while.
In the meantime the Mercury was coming on its own lane from the
opposite direction. Bernardo, instead of slowing dawn or stopping
altogether behind the carretela until that lane was clear, veered to the
left in order to pass. As he did so the curved end of his cars right rear
bumper caught the forward rim of the rig's left wheel, wrenching it off
and carrying it along as the car skidded obliquely to the other lane,
where it collided with the oncoming vehicle. On his part Caedo had
seen the Cadillac on its own lane; he slackened his speed, judged the
distances in relation to the carretela and concluded that the Cadillac
would wait behind. Bernardo, however, decided to take a gamble -
beat the Mercury to the point where it would be in line with the
carretela, or else squeeze in between them in any case. It was a risky
1
maneuver either way, and the risk should have been quite obvious.
Or, since the car was moving at from 30 to 35 miles per hour (or 25
miles according to Yu Khe Thai) it was already too late to apply the
brakes when Bernardo saw the carretela only eight meters in front of
him, and so he had to swerve to the left in spite of the presence of the
oncoming car on the opposite lane. As it was, the clearance Bernardo
gave for his cars right side was insufficient. Its rear bumper, as
already stated, caught the wheel of the carretela and wrenched it
loose. Caedo, confronted with the unexpected situation, tried to avoid
the collision at the last moment by going farther to the right, but was
unsuccessful. The photographs taken at the scene show that the right
wheels of his car were on the unpaved shoulder of the road at the
moment of impact.
There is no doubt at all that the collision was directly traceable to
Rafael Bernardo's negligence and that he must be held liable for the
damages suffered by the plaintiffs. The next question is whether or not
Yu Khe Thai, as owner of the Cadillac, is solidarily liable with the driver.
The applicable law is Article 2184 of the Civil Code, which reads:
"ART. 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable
with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by
the use of due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably
presumed that a driver was negligent, if he has been found guilty of
reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the
next preceding two months.
Under the foregoing provision, if the causative factor was the driver's
negligence, the owner of the vehicle who was present is likewise held
liable if he could have prevented the mishap by the exercise of due
diligence. The rule is not new, although formulated as law for the first
time in the new Civil Code. It was expressed in Chapman vs.
Underwood (1914) 27 Phil. 374, where this Court held:
x x x The same rule applies where the owner is present, unless the
negligent acts of the driver are continued for such a length of time as
to give the owner a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to
direct his driver to desist therefrom. An owner who sits in his
automobile, or other vehicle, and permits his driver to continue in a
violation of the law by the performance of negligent acts, after he has
had a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct that the
driver cease therefrom, becomes himself responsible for such acts.
The owner of an automobile who permits his chauffeur to drive up the
Escolta, for example, at a speed of 60 miles an hour, without any effort
to stop him, although he has had a reasonable opportunity to do so,
becomes himself responsible, both criminally and civilly, for the results
produced by the acts of the chauffeur. On the other hand, if the driver,
by a sudden act of negligence, and without the owner having a
reasonable opportunity to prevent the act or its continuance, injures a
person or violates the criminal law, the owner of the automobile,
although present therein at the time the act was committed, is not
responsible, either civilly or criminally, therefor. The act complained of
must be continued in the presence of the owner for such a length of
time that the owner, by his acquiescence, makes his driver's act his
own."
The basis of the masters liability in civil law is not respondeat superior
but rather the relationship of pater familias. The theory is that
ultimately the negligence of the servant, if known to the master and
susceptible of timely correction by him, reflects his own negligence if
he fails to correct it in order to prevent injury or damage.
In the present case the defendants' evidence is that Rafael Bernardo
had been Yu Khe Thai's driver since 1937, and before that had been
employed by Yutivo Sons Hardware Co. in the same capacity for over
ten years. During that time he had no record of violation of traffic laws
and regulations. No negligence for having employed him at all may be
imputed to his master. Negligence on the part of the latter, if any,
must be sought in the immediate setting and circumstances of the
accident, that is, in his failure to detain the driver from pursuing a
course which not only gave him clear notice of the danger but also
sufficient time to act upon it. We do not see that such negligence may
be imputed. The car, as has been stated, was not running at an
unreasonable speed. The road was wide and open, and devoid of
traffic that early morning. There was no reason for the car owner to be
in any special state of alert. He had reason to rely on the skill and
experience of his driver. He became aware of the presence of the
carretela when his car was only twelve meters behind it, but then his
failure to see it earlier did not constitute negligence, for he was not
himself at the wheel. And even when he did see it at that distance, he
2
could not have anticipated his driver's sudden decision to pass the 1. Marcial Caedo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . P20,000.00
carretela on its left side in spite of the fact that another car was ......
approaching from the opposite direction. The time element was such 15,000.00
that there was no reasonable opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess the 2. Juana S. Caedo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
...... 3,000.00
risks involved and warn the driver accordingly. The thought that
entered his mind, he said, was that if he sounded a sudden warning it 4,000.00
3. Ephraim Caedo
might only make the other man nervous and make the situation
....................
worse. It was a thought that, wise or not, connotes no absence of that 3,000.00
due diligence required by law to prevent the misfortune. 4. Eileen Caedo . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3,000.00
....
The test of imputed negligence under Article 2184 of the Civil Code is,
to a great degree, necessarily subjective. Car owners are not held to a 5. Rose Elaine
uniform and inflexible standard of diligence as are professional drivers. Caedo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
In many cases they refrain from driving their own cars and instead hire
other persons to drive for them precisely because they are not trained 6. Merilyn
or endowed with sufficient discernment to know the rules of traffic or Caedo . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .
to appreciate the relative dangers posed by the different situations
that are continually encountered on the road. What would be a Plaintiffs appealed from the award, claiming that the Court should have
negligent omission under the aforesaid Article on the part of a car granted them also actual or compensatory damages, aggregating
owner who is in the prime of age and knows how to handle a motor P225,000, for the injuries they sustained. Defendants, on the other
vehicle is not necessarily so on the part, say, of an old and infirm hand, maintain that the amounts awarded as moral damages are
person who is not similarly equipped. excessive and should be reduced. We find no justification for either
side. The amount of actual damages suffered by the individual plain-
The law does not require that a person must possess a certain measure tiffs by reason of their injuries, other than expenses for medical
of skill or proficiency either in the mechanics of driving or in the treatment, has not been shown by the evidence. Actual damages, too
observance of traffic rules before he may own a motor vehicle. The be compensable, must be proven. Pain and suffering are not capable
test of his negligence, within the meaning of Article 2184, is his of pecuniary estimation, and constitute a proper ground for granting
omission to do that which the evidence of his own senses tells him he moral, not actual, damages, as provided in Article 2217 of the Civil
should do in order to avoid the accident. And as far as perception is Code.
concerned, absent a minimum level imposed by law, a maneuver that
appears to be fraught with danger to one passenger may appear to be The injuries sustained by plaintiffs are the following:
entirely safe and commonplace to another. Were the law to require a
"MARCIAL T. CAEDO:
uniform standard of perceptiveness, employment of professional
drivers by car owners who, by their very inadequacies, have real need
A. Contusion, with hematoma, scalp, frontal left; abrasions, chest
of drivers services, would be effectively proscribed.
wall, anterior;
We hold that the imputation of liability to Yu Khe Thai, solidarity with
B. Multiple fractures, ribs, right, 1st to 5th inclusive. Third rib has a
Rafael Bernardo, is an error. The next question refers to the sums
double fracture; Subparieto-pleural hematoma; Basal disc atelectasis,
adjudged by the trial court as damages. The award of P48, 000 by way
lung, right lower lobe, secondary;
of moral damages is itemized as follows:
3
C. Pseudotosis, left, secondary to probable basal fracture, skull. A. Abrasions, multiple:

JUANA SANGALANG CAEDO: (1) shin, lower 1/3 right;

A. Abrasions, multiple: (2) arm, lower third

(1) frontal region, left; (2) apex of nose; (3) upper eyelid, left; (4) B. Contusion with hematoma, shin, lower 1/3, anterior aspect, right.
knees. (See Exhibits D, D-1, D-2, D-3, D-4 and D-5)"

B. Wound, lacerated, irregular, deep, frontal; It is our opinion that, considering the nature and extent of the above-
mentioned injuries, the amounts of moral damages granted by the trial
C. Fracture, simple, 2nd rib posterior, left with displacement. court are not excessive.

D. Fracture, simple, base, proximal phalanx, right big toe. WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is modified in the sense of
declaring defendant-appellant Yu Khe Thai free from liability, and is
E. Fracture, simple, base, metatarsals, III and V right.
otherwise affirmed with respect to defendant Rafael Bernardo, with
F. Concussion, cerebral. costs against the latter.

EPHRAIM CAEDO: Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Dizon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, and
Capistrano, JJ., concur.
A. Abrasions, multiple: Fernando, J., did not take part.

(1) left temporal area; (2) left frontal; (3) left supraorbital

EILEEN CAEDO:

A. Lacerated wound (V-shaped), base, 5th finger, right, lateral

aspect.

B. Abrasions, multiple:

(1) dorsum, proximal phalanx, middle finger; (2) Knee, anterior,

bilateral; (3) shin, lower 1/3.

ROSE ELAINE CAEDO:

A. Abrasions, multiple:

(1) upper and lower lids; (2) left temporal; (3) nasobial region; (4) leg,
lower third, anterior.

MARILYN CAEDO:

4
G.R. No. L-24101, September 30, 1970
MARIA TERESA Y. CUADRA, MINOR REPRESENTED BY HER
FATHER ULISES P. CUADRA, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES, VS.
ALFONSO MONFORT, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
DECISION
MAKALINTAL, J.:
This is an action for damages based on quasi-delict, decided by the
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental favorably to the plaintiffs
and appealed by the defendant to the Court of Appeals, which certified
the same to us since the facts are not in issue.
Maria Teresa Cuadra, 12, and Maria Teresa Monfort, 13, were
classmates in Grade Six at the Mabini Elementary School in Bacolod
City. On July 9, 1962 their teacher assigned them, together with three
other classmates, to weed the grass in the school premises. While thus
engaged Maria Teresa Monfort found a plastic headband, an
ornamental object commonly worn by young girls over their hair.
Jokingly she said aloud that she had found an earthworm and,
evidently to frighten the Cuadra girl, tossed the object at her. At that
precise moment the latter turned around to face her friend, and the
object hit her right eye. Smarting from the pain, she rubbed the injured
part and treated it with some powder. The next day, July 10, the eye
became swollen and it was then that the girl related the incident to her
parents, who thereupon took her to a doctor for treatment. She
underwent surgical operation twice, first on July 20 and again on
August 4,1962, and stayed in the hospital for a total of twenty-three
days, for all of which the parents spent the sum of Pl,703.75. Despite
the medical efforts, however, Maria Teresa Cuadra completely lost the
sight of her right eye.
In the civil suit subsequently instituted by the parents in behalf of their
minor daughter against Alfonso Monfort, Maria Teresa Monfort's father,
the defendant was ordered to pay P1,703.00 as actual damages;
P20,000.00 as moral damages; and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees, plus
the costs of the suit.
The legal issue posed in this appeal is the liability of a parent for an act
of his minor child which causes damage to another under the specific
facts related above and the applicable provisions of the Civil Code,
particularly Articles 2176 and 2180 thereof, which read:
"ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter."
"ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not
only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in
their company.
xxx
The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of
a good father of a family to prevent damage."
The underlying basis of the liability imposed by Article 2176 is the fault
or negligence accompanying the act or the omission, there being no
willfulness or intent to cause damage thereby. When the act or
omission is that of one person for whom another is responsible, the
latter then becomes himself liable under Article 2180, in the different
cases enumerated therein, such as that of the father or the mother
under the circumstances above quoted. The basis of this vicarious,
although primary, liability is, as in Article 2176, fault or negligence,
which is presumed from that which accompanied the causative act or
omission. The presumption is merely prima facie and may therefore be
rebutted. This is the clear and logical inference that may be drawn
from the last paragraph of Article 2180, which states "that the
responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the persons
herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage."
5
Since the fact thus required to be proven is a matter of defense, the Fernando, J., took no part.
burden of proof necessarily rests on the defendant. But what is the
exact degree of diligence contemplated, and how does a parent prove Concepcion, CJ., is on leave.
it in connection with a particular act or omission of a minor child,
especially when it takes place in his absence or outside his immediate
company? Obviously there can be no meticulously calibrated measure
applicable; and when the law simply refers to "all the diligence of a
good father of the family to prevent damage," it implies a
consideration of the attendant circumstances in every individual case,
to determine whether or not by the exercise of such diligence the
damage could have been prevented.

In the present case there is nothing from which it may be inferred that
the defendant could have prevented the damage by the observance of
due care, or that he was in any way remiss in the exercise of his
parental authority in failing to foresee such damage, or the act which
caused it. On the contrary, his child was at school, where it was his
duty to send her and where she was, as he had the right to expect her
to be, under the care and supervision of the teacher. And as far as the
act which caused the injury was concerned, it was an innocent prank
not unusual among children at play and which no parent, however
careful, would have any special reason to anticipate, much less guard
against. Nor did it reveal any mischievous propensity, or indeed any
trait in the child's character which would reflect unfavorably on her
upbringing and for which the blame could be attributed to her parents.

The victim, no doubt, deserves no little commiseration and sympathy

for the tragedy that befell her. But if the defendant is at all obligated to
compensate her suffering, the obligation has no legal sanction
enforceable in court, but only the moral compulsion of good
conscience.

The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint is

dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs.

Reyes, J.B.L., Acting C.J., Dizon, Zaldivar, Ruiz Castro, Teehankee,

Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Barredo, J., dissents in a separate opinion.

6
G.R. No. 85044, June 03, 1992
MACARIO TAMARGO, CELSO TAMARGO AND AURELIA TAMARGO,
PETITIONERS, VS. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS; THE HON.
ARISTON L. RUBIO, RTC JUDGE, BRANCH 20, VIGAN, ILOCOS
SUR; VICTOR BUNDOC; AND CLARA BUNDOC, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
FELICIANO, J.:
On 20 October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of
age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which
resulted in her death. Accordingly, a civil complaint for damages was
filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Vigan, Ilocos Sur,
docketed as Civil Case No. 3457-V, by petitioner Macario Tamargo,
Jennifers adopting parent, and petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia
Tamargo, Jennifer's natural parents, against respondent spouses Victor
and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents with whom he was living
at the time of the tragic incident. In addition to this case for damages,
a criminal information for Homicide through Reckless Imprudence was
filed [Criminal Case No. 1722-V] against Adelberto Bundoc. Adelberto,
however, was acquitted and exempted from criminal liability on the
ground that he had acted without discernment.
Prior to the incident, or on 10 December 1981, the spouses Sabas and
Felisa Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt the minor Adelberto
Bundoc in Special Proceedings No. 0373-T before the then Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Sur. This petition for adoption was granted on 18
November 1982, that is, after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer.
In their Answer, respondent spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's natural
parents, reciting the result of the foregoing petition for adoption,
claimed that not they, but rather the adopting parents, namely the
spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura, were indispensable parties to the
action since parental authority had shifted to the adopting parents
from the moment the successful petition for adoption was filed.
Petitioners in their Reply contended that since Adelberto Bundoc was
then actually living with his natural parents, parental authority had not
ceased nor been relinquished by the mere filing and granting of a
petition for adoption.
The trial court on 3 December 1987 dismissed petitioners' complaint,
ruling that respondent natural parents of Adelberto indeed were not
indispensable parties to the action.
Petitioners received a copy of the trial court's Decision on 7 December
1987. Within the 15-day reglementary period, or on 14 December
1987, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration followed by a
supplemental motion for reconsideration on 15 January 1988. It
appearing, however, that the motions failed to comply with Sections 4
and 5 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court -- that notice of the
motion shall be given to all parties concerned at least three (3) days
before the hearing of said motion; and that said notice shall state the
time and place of hearing -- both motions were denied by the trial
court in an Order dated 18 April 1988. On 28 April 1988, petitioners
filed a notice of appeal. In its Order dated 6 June 1988, the trial court
dismissed the notice of appeal, this time ruling that the notice had
been filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period ending 22
December 1987.
Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for mandamus
and certiorari questioning the trial court's Decision dated 3 December
1987 and the Orders dated 18 April 1988 and 6 June 1988. The Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition, ruling that petitioners had lost their
right to appeal.
In the present Petition for Review, petitioners once again contend that
respondent spouses Bundoc are the indispensable parties to the action
for damages caused by the acts of their minor child, Adelberto Bundoc.
Resolution of this Petition hinges on the following issues: (1) whether or
not petitioners, notwithstanding loss of their right to appeal, may still
file the instant Petition; conversely, whether the Court may still take
cognizance of the case even though petitioners' appeal had been filed
out of time; and (2) whether or not the effects of adoption, insofar as
parental authority is concerned, may be given retroactive effect so as
to make the adopting parents the indispensable parties in a damage
case filed against their adopted child, for acts committed by the latter
when actual custody was yet lodged with the biological parents.
7
1. It will be recalled that petitioners' motion (and supplemental motion)
for reconsideration filed before the trial court, not having complied with
the requirements of Section 13, Rule 41, and Section 4, Rule 15, of the
Revised Rules of Court, were considered pro forma and hence did not
interrupt and suspend the reglementary period to appeal: the trial
court held that the motions, not having contained a notice of time and
place of hearing, had become useless pieces of paper which did not
interrupt the reglementary period.[1] As in fact repeatedly held by this
Court, what is mandatory is the service of the motion on the opposing
counsel indicating the time and place of hearing.[2]
In view, however, of the nature of the issue raised in the instant
Petition, and in order that substantial justice may be served, the Court,
invoking its right to suspend the application of technical rules to
prevent manifest injustice, elects to treat the notice of appeal as
having been seasonably filed before the trial court, and the motion
(and supplemental motion) for reconsideration filed by petitioner in the
trial court as having interrupted the reglementary period for appeal. As
the Court held in Gregorio v. Court of Appeals:[3]
Dismissal of appeal purely on technical grounds is frowned upon
where the policy of the courts is to encourage hearings of appeal on
their merits. The rules of procedure ought not be applied in a very rigid
technical sense, rules of procedure are used only to help secure not
override, substantial justice. If a technical and rigid enforcement of the
rules is made, their aim would be defeated.[4]
2. It is not disputed that Adelberto Bundoc's voluntary act of shooting
Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle gave rise to a cause of action on
quasi-delict against him. As Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault
or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties, is called a quasi-delict x x x.
Upon the other hand, the law imposes civil liability upon the father
and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages
that may be caused by a minor child who lives with them. Article 2180
of the Civil Code reads:
The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for
one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom
one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in
their company.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the person
herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage. (Underscoring supplied)
This principle of parental liability is a species of what is frequently
designated as vicarious liability, or the doctrine of imputed
negligence under Anglo-American tort law, where a person is not only
liable for torts committed by himself, but also for torts committed by
others with whom he has a certain relationship and for whom he is
responsible. Thus, parental liability is made a natural or logical
consequence of the duties and responsibilities of parents - their
parental authority - which includes the instructing, controlling and
disciplining of the child.[5] The basis for the doctrine of vicarious liability
was explained by the Court in Cangco v. Manila Railroad Co.[6] in the
following terms:
With respect to extra-contractual obligation arising from negligence,
whether of act or omission, it is competent for the legislature to elect --
and our Legislature has so elected -- to limit such liability to cases in
which the person upon whom such an obligation is imposed is morally
culpable or, on the contrary, for reasons of public policy, to extend that
liability, without regard to the lack of moral culpability, so as to include
responsibility for the negligence of those persons whose acts or
omissions are imputable, by a legal fiction, to others who are in a
position to exercise an absolute or limited control over them. The
legislature which adopted our Civil Code has elected to limit extra-
contractual liability -- with certain well-defined exceptions -- to cases in
which moral culpability can be directly imputed to the persons to be
charged. This moral responsibility may consist in having failed to
exercise due care in one's own acts, or in having failed to exercise due
8
care in the selection and control of one's agents or servants, or in the
control of persons who, by reasons of their status, occupy a position of
dependency with respect to the person made liable for their
conduct.[7] (Underscoring supplied)
The civil liability imposed upon parents for the torts of their minor
children living with them, may be seen to be based upon the parental
authority vested by the Civil Code upon such parents. The civil law
assumes that when an unemancipated child living with its parents
commits a tortious act, the parents were negligent in the performance
of their legal and natural duty closely to supervise the child who is in
their custody and control. Parental liability is, in other words, anchored
upon parental authority coupled with presumed parental dereliction in
the discharge of the duties accompanying such authority. The parental
dereliction is, of course, only presumed and the presumption can be
overturned under Article 2180 of the Civil Code by proof that the
parents had exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent the damage.
In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with an air
rifle occured when parental authority was still lodged in respondent
Bundoc spouses, the natural parents of the minor Adelberto. It would
thus follow that the natural parents who had then actual custody of the
minor Adelberto, are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages.
The natural parents of Adelberto, however, stoutly maintain that
because a decree of adoption was issued by the adoption court in favor
of the Rapisura spouses, parental authority was vested in the latter as
adopting parents as of the time of the filing of the petition for adoption
that is, before Adelberto had shot Jennifer with ad air rifle. The Bundoc
spouses contend that they were therefore free of any parental
responsibility for Adelberto's allegedly tortious conduct.
Respondent Bundoc spouses rely on Article 36 of the Child and Youth
Welfare Code[8] which reads as follows:
Article 36. Decree of Adoption. -- If, after considering the report of the
Department of Social Welfare or duly licensed child placement agency
and the evidence submitted before it, the court is satisfied that the
petitioner is qualified to maintain, care for, and educate the child, that
the trial custody period has been completed, and that the best
interests of the child will be promoted by the adoption, a decree of
adoption shall be entered, which shall be effective as of the date the
original petition was filed. The decree shall state the name by which
the child is thenceforth to be known. (Underscoring supplied)
The Bundoc spouses further argue that the above Article 36 should be
read in relation to Article 39 of the same Code:
Art. 39. Effect of Adoption. --The adoption shall:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Dissolve the authority vested in the natural parents, except where
the adopter is the spouse of the surviving natural parent;
xxx xxx x x x"
(Underscoring supplied)
and urge that their parental authority must be deemed to have been
dissolved as of the time the petition for adoption was filed.
The Court is not persuaded. As earlier noted, under the Civil Code, the
basis of parental liability for the torts of a minor child is the relationship
existing between the parents and the minor child living with them and
over whom, the law presumes, the parents exercise supervision and
control. Article 58 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, re-enacted this
rule:
Article 58 Torts -- Parents and guardians are responsible for the
damage caused by the child under their parental authority in
accordance with the Civil Code. (Underscoring supplied)
Article 221 of the Family Code of the Philippines [9] has similarly insisted
upon the requisite that the child, doer of the tortious act, shall have
been in the actual custody of the parents sought to be held liable for
the ensuing damage:
Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall
be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or
9
omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company and
under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses
provided by law. (Underscoring supplied)
We do not believe that parental authority is properly regarded as
having been retroactively transferred to and vested in the adopting
parents, the Rapisura spouses, at the time the air rifle shooting
happened. We do not consider that retroactive effect may be given to
the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting
parents accruing at a time when the adopting parents had no actual or
physical custody over the adopted child. Retroactive effect may
perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for adoption where
such is essential to permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in
favor of the adopted child. In the instant case, however, to hold that
parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura
spouses so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act that they
could not have forseen and which they could not have prevented (since
they were at the time in the United States and had no physical custody
over the child Adelberto) would be unfair and unconscionable. Such a
result, moreover, would be inconsistent with the philosophical and
policy basis underlying the doctrine of vicarious liability. Put a little
differently, no presumption of parental dereliction on the part of the
adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, could have arisen since
Adelberto was not in fact subject to their control at the time the tort
was committed.
the instant case, the trial custody period either had not yet begun or
had already been completed at the time of the air rifle shooting; in any
case, actual custody of Adelberto was then with his natural parents,
not the adopting parents.
Accordingly, we conclude that respondent Bundoc spouses, Adelberto's
natural parents, were indispensable parties to the suit for damages
brought by petitioners, and that the dismissal by the trial court of
petitioners' complaint, the indispensable parties being already before
the court, constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is hereby
GRANTED DUE COURSE and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
6 September 1988, in C.A.-G.R. No. SP-15016 is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Petitioners' complaint filed before the trial court is hereby
REINSTATED and this case is REMANDED to that court for further
proceedings consistent with this Decision. Costs against respondent
Bundoc spouses. This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., (Chairman), Bidin, Davide, Jr., and Romero, JJ., concur.

Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code fortifies the conclusion
reached above. Article 35 provides as follows:

Art. 35. Trial Custody. - No petition for adoption shall be finally granted
unless and until the adopting parents are given by the courts a
supervised trial custody period of at least six months to assess their
adjustment and emotional readiness for the legal union. During the
period of trial custody, parental authority shall be vested in the
adopting parents. (Underscoring supplied)

Under the above Article 35, parental authority is provisionally vested in

the adopting parents during the period of trial custody, i.e., before the
issuance of a decree of adoption, precisely because the adopting
parents are given actual custody of the child during such trial period. In
10
G.R. No. 70890, September 18, 1992
CRESENCIO LIBI* AND AMELIA YAP LIBI, PETITIONERS, VS. HON.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, FELIPE GOTIONG AND
SHIRLEY GOTIONG, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
One of the ironic verities of life, it has been said, is that sorrow is
sometimes a touchstone of love. A tragic illustration is provided by the
instant case, wherein two lovers died while still in the prime of their
years, a bitter episode for those whose lives they have touched. While
we cannot expect to award complete assuagement to their families
through seemingly prosaic legal verbiage, this disposition should at
least terminate the acrimony and rancor of an extended judicial
contest resulting from the unfortunate occurrence.
In this final denouement of the judicial recourse the stages whereof
were alternately initiated by the parties, petitioners are now before us
seeking the reversal of the judgment of respondent court promulgated
on January 2, 1985 in AC-G.R. CV No. 69060 with the following decretal
portion:
"WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court dismissing plaintiff's
complaint is hereby reversed; and instead, judgment is hereby
rendered sentencing defendants, jointly and solidarily, to pay to
plaintiffs the following amounts:
1. Moral damages, P30,000.00;
2. Exemplary damages, P10,000.00;
3. Attorney's fees, P20,000.00, and costs.
However, denial of defendants-appellees' counterclaims is affirmed."[1]
[1]
Synthesized from the findings of the lower courts, it appears that
respondent spouses are the legitimate parents of Julie Ann Gotiong
who, at the time of the deplorable incident which took place and from
which she died on January 14, 1979, was an 18-year old first year
commerce student of the University of San Carlos, Cebu City; while
petitioners are the parents of Wendell Libi, then a minor between 18
and 19 years of age living with his aforesaid parents, and who also died
in the same event on the same date.
For more than two (2) years before their deaths, Julie Ann Gotiong and
Wendell Libi were sweethearts until December, 1978 when Julie Ann
broke up her relationship with Wendell after she supposedly found him
to be sadistic and irresponsible. During the first and second weeks of
January, 1979, Wendell kept pestering Julie Ann with demands for
reconciliation but the latter persisted in her refusal, prompting the
former to resort to threats against her. In order to avoid him, Julie Ann
stayed in the house of her best friend, Malou Alfonso, at the corner of
Maria Cristina and Juana Osmea Streets, Cebu City, from January 7 to
13, 1978.
On January 14, 1979, Julie Ann and Wendell died, each from a single
gunshot wound inflicted with the same firearm, a Smith and Wesson
revolver licensed in the name of petitioner Cresencio Libi, which was
recovered from the scene of the crime inside the residence of private
respondents at the corner of General Maxilom and D. Jakosalem streets
of the same city.
Due to the absence of an eyewitness account of the circumstances
surrounding the death of both minors, their parents, who are the
contending parties herein, posited their respective theories drawn from
their interpretation of circumstantial evidence, available reports,
documents and evidence of physical facts.
Private respondents, bereaved over the death of their daughter,
submitted that Wendell caused her death by shooting her with the
aforesaid firearm and, thereafter, turning the gun on himself to commit
suicide. On the other hand, petitioners, puzzled and likewise distressed
over the death of their son, rejected the imputation and contended
that an unknown third party, whom Wendell may have displeased or
antagonized by reason of his work as a narcotics informer of the
11
Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU), must have caused Wendell's
death and then shot Julie Ann to eliminate any witness and thereby
avoid identification.
As a result of the tragedy, the parents of Julie Ann filed Civil Case No.
R-17774 in the then Court of First Instance of Cebu against the parents
of Wendell to recover damages arising from the latter's vicarious
liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. After trial, the court below
rendered judgment on October 20, 1980 as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises duly considered, judgment is hereby rendered
dismissing plaintiffs complaint for insufficiency of the evidence.
Defendants counterclaim is likewise denied for lack of sufficient
merit."[2]
On appeal to respondent court, said judgment of the lower court
dismissing the complaint of therein plaintiffs-appellants was set aside
and another judgment was rendered against defendants-appellees
who, as petitioners in the present appeal by certiorari, now submit for
resolution the following issues in this case:
1.Whether or not respondent court correctly reversed the trial court in
accordance with established decisional laws; and
2. Whether or not Article 2180 of the Civil Code was correctly
interpreted by respondent court to make petitioners liable for vicarious
liability.[3]
In the proceedings before the trial court, Dr. Jesus P. Cerna, Police
Medico-Legal Officer of Cebu, submitted his findings and opinions on
some postulates for determining whether or not the gunshot wound
was inflicted on Wendell Libi by his own suicidal act. However, undue
emphasis was placed by the lower court on the absence of gunpowder
or tattooing around the wound at the point of entry of the bullet. It
should be emphasized, however, that this is not the only circumstance
[2]
[ [6]
to be taken into account in the determination of whether it was suicide
or not.
It is true that said witness declared that he found no evidence of
contact or close-contact of an explosive discharge in the entrance
wound. However, as pointed out by private respondents, the body of
deceased Wendell Libi must have been washed at the funeral parlor,
considering the hasty interment thereof a little after eight (8) hours
from the occurrence wherein he died. Dr. Cerna himself could not
categorically state that the body of Wendell Libi was left untouched at
the funeral parlor before he was able to conduct his autopsy. It will also
be noted that Dr. Cerna was negligent in not conducting a paraffin test
on Wendell Libi, hence possible evidence of gunpowder residue on
Wendell's hands was forever lost when Wendell was hastily buried.
More specifically, Dr. Cerna testified that he conducted an autopsy on
the body of Wendell Libi about eight (8) hours after the incident or, to
be exact, eight (8) hours and twenty (20) minutes based on the record
of death; that when he arrived at the Cosmopolitan Funeral Homes, the
body of the deceased was already on the autopsy table and in the
stage of rigor mortis; and that said body was not washed, but it was
dried.[4] However, on redirect examination, he admitted that during the
8-hour interval, he never saw the body nor did he see whether said
body was wiped or washed in the area of the wound on the head which
he examined because the deceased was inside the morgue. [5] In fact,
on cross-examination, he had earlier admitted that as far as the
entrance of the wound, the trajectory of the bullet and the exit of the
wound are concerned, it is possible that Wendell Libi shot himself.[6]
He further testified that the muzzle of the gun was not pressed on the
head of the victim and that he found no burning or singeing of the hair
or extensive laceration on the gunshot wound of entrance which are
[4]
[5]
12
general characteristics of contact or near-contact fire. On direct
examination, Dr. Cerna nonetheless made these clarification:
"QIs it not a fact that there are certain guns which are so made that
there would be no black residue or tattooing that could result from
these guns because they are what we call clean?
A Yes, sir. I know that there are what we call smokeless powder.
ATTY. ORTIZ:
Q Yes. So, in cases, therefore, of guns where the powder is
smokeless, those indications that you said may not rule out the
possibility that the gun was closer than 24 inches, is that correct?
A If the assuming that the gun used was ... the bullet used was
a smokeless powder.
Q At any rate, doctor, from . . . disregarding those other matters
that you have noticed, the singeing, etc., from the trajectory, based on
the trajectory of the bullets as shown in your own sketch, is it not a
fact that the gun could have been fired by the person himself, the
victim himself, Wendell Libi, because it shows a point of entry a little
above the right ear and point of exit a little above that, to be very fair
and on your oath?
A As far as the point of entrance is concerned and as far as the
trajectory of the bullet is concerned and as far as the angle or the
manner of fire is concerned, it could have been fired by the victim."[7]
As shown by the evidence, there were only two used bullets [8] found at
the scene of the crime, each of which were the bullets that hit Julie Ann
Gotiong and Wendell Libi, respectively. Also, the sketch prepared by the
Medico-Legal Division of the National Bureau of Investigation,[9] shows
that there is only one gunshot wound of entrance located at the right
[7]
[ [10]
temple of Wendell Libi. The necropsy report prepared by Dr. Cerna
states:
xxx
"Gunshot wound, ENTRANCE, ovaloid, 0.5 x 0.4 cm., with contusion
collar widest inferiorly by 0.2 cm., edges inverted, oriented upward,
located at the head, temporal region, right, 2.8 cms. Behind and 5.5
cms. above right external auditory meatus, directed slightly forward,
upward and to the left, involving skin and soft tissues, making a punch-
in fracture on the temporal bone, right, penetrating cranial cavity,
lacerating extensively along its course the brain tissues, fracturing
parietal bone, left, and finally making an EXIT wound, irregular, 2.0 x
1.8 cms., edges (e)verted, parietal region, left, 2.0 cms. behind and
12.9 cms. above left external auditory meatus.
xxx
"Evidence of contact or close-contact fire, such as burning around the
gunshot wound of entrance, gunpowder tattooing (sic), smudging,
singeing of hair, extensive laceration or bursting of the gunshot wound
of entrance, or separation of the skin from the underlying tissue are
absent."[10]
On cross-examination, Dr. Cerna demonstrated his theory which was
made of record, thus:
"QNow, will you please use yourself as Wendell Libi, and following the
entrance of the wound, the trajectory of the bullet and the exit of the
wound, and measuring yourself 24 inches, will you please indicate to
the Honorable Court how would it have been possible for Wendell Libi
to kill himself? Will you please indicate the 24 inches?
WITNESS:
[9]
13
A Actually, sir, the 24 inches is approximately one arm's length . .
. house?
ATTY. SENINING:
I would like to make of record that the witness has demonstrated by
extending his right arm almost straight towards his head."[11]
Private respondents assail the fact that the trial court gave credence to
the testimonies of defendants' witnesses Lydia Ang and James Enrique
Tan, the first being a resident of an apartment across the street from
the Gotiongs and the second, a resident of the house adjacent to the
Gotiong residence, who declared having seen a "shadow" of a person
at the gate of the Gotiong house after hearing shots therefrom.
On cross-examination, Lydia Ang testified that the apartment where
she was staying faces the gas station; that it is the second apartment;
that from her window she can see directly the gate of the Gotiongs;
and, that there is a firewall between her apartment and the gas
station.[12] After seeing a man jump from the gate of the Gotiongs to
the rooftop of the Tans, she called the police station but the telephone
lines were busy. Later on, she talked with James Enrique Tan and told
him that she saw a man leap from the gate towards his rooftop.[13]
However, James Enrique Tan testified that he saw a "shadow" on top of
the gate of the Gotiongs, but denied having talked with anyone
regarding what he saw. He explained that he lives in a duplex house
with a garden in front of it; that his house is next to Felipe Gotiong's
house; and he further gave the following answers to these questions:
"ATTY. ORTIZ: (TO WITNESS).
[11]
[ [14]
[ [15]
QWhat is the height of the wall of the Gotiong's in relation to your
WITNESS:
A It is about 8 feet.
ATTY. ORTIZ: (TO WITNESS)
Q And where were you looking from?
WITNESS:
A From upstairs in my living room.
ATTY. ORTIZ (TO WITNESS)
Q From your living room window, is that correct?
WITNESS:
A Yes, but not very clear because the wall is high."[14]
Analyzing the foregoing testimonies, we agree with respondent court
that the same do not inspire credence as to the reliability and accuracy
of the witnesses' observations, since the visual perceptions of both
were obstructed by high walls in their respective houses in relation to
the house of herein private respondents. On the other hand, witness
Manolo Alfonso, testifying on rebuttal, attested without contradiction
that he and his sister, Malou Alfonso, were waiting for Julie Ann Gotiong
when they heard her scream; that when Manolo climbed the fence to
see what was going on inside the Gotiong house, he heard the first
shot; and, not more than five (5) seconds later, he heard another shot.
Consequently, he went down from the fence and drove to the police
station to report the incident.[15] Manolo's direct and candid testimony
establishes and explains the fact that it was he whom Lydia Ang and
14
James Enrique Tan saw as the "shadow" of a man at the gate of the
Gotiong house.
We have perforce to reject petitioners' effete and unsubstantiated
pretension that it was another man who shot Wendell and Julie Ann. It
is significant that the Libi family did not even point to or present any
suspect in the crime nor did they file any case against any alleged
"John Doe." Nor can we sustain the trial court's dubious theory that
Wendell Libi did not die by his own hand because of the overwhelming
evidence -- testimonial, documentary and pictorial -- the confluence of
which point to Wendell as the assailant of Julie Ann, his motive being
revenge for her rejection of his persistent pleas for a reconciliation.
Petitioners' defense that they had exercised the due diligence of a
good father of a family, hence they should not be civilly liable for the
crime committed by their minor son, is not borne out by the evidence
on record either.
Petitioner Amelita Yap Libi, mother of Wendell, testified that her
husband, Cresencio Libi, owns a gun which he kept in a safety deposit
box inside a drawer in their bedroom. Each of these petitioners holds a
key to the safety deposit box and Amelita's key is always in her bag, all
of which facts were known to Wendell. They have never been their son
Wendell taking or using the gun. She admitted, however, that on that
fateful night the gun was no longer in the safety deposit box.[16] We,
accordingly, cannot but entertain serious doubts that petitioner
spouses had really been exercising the diligence of a good father of a
family by safely locking the fatal gun away. Wendell could not have
gotten hold thereof unless one of the keys to the safety deposit box
was negligently left lying around or he had free access to the bag of his
mother where the other key was.
The diligence of a good father of a family required by law in a parent
and child relationship consists, to a large extent, of the instruction and
supervision of the child. Petitioners were gravely remiss in their duties
as parents in not diligently supervising the activities of their son,
despite his minority and immaturity, so much so that it was only at the
time of Wendell's death that they allegedly discovered that he was a
[16]
CANU agent and that Cresencio's gun was missing from the safety
deposit box. Both parents were sadly wanting in their duty and
responsibility in monitoring and knowing the activities of their children
who, for all they know, may be engaged in dangerous work such as
being drug informers,[17] or even drug users. Neither was a plausible
explanation given for the photograph of Wendell, with a handwritten
dedication to Julie Ann at the back thereof,[18] holding uptight what
clearly appears as a revolver and on how or why he was in possession
of that firearm.
In setting aside the judgment of the court a quo and holding petitioners
civilly liable, as explained at the start of this opinion, respondent court
waved aside the protestations of diligence on the part of petitioners
and had this to say:
"x x x It is still the duty of parents to know the activity of their children
who may be engaged in this dangerous activity involving the menace
of drugs. Had the defendants-appellees been diligent in supervising the
activities of their son, Wendell, and in keeping said gun from his reach,
they could have prevented Wendell from killing, Julie Ann Gotiong.
Therefore, appellants are liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code
which provides:
The father, and in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by their minor children who live in
their company.'
"Having been grossly negligent in preventing Wendell Libi from having
access to said gun which was allegedly kept in a safety deposit box,
defendants-appellees are subsidiarily liable for the natural
consequence of the criminal act of said minor who was living in their
company. This various liability herein defendants-appellees has been
reiterated by the Supreme Court in many cases, prominent of which is
the case of Fuellas vs. Cadano, et. al. (L-14409, Oct. 31, 1961, 3 SCRA
361-367), which held that:
[
[
15
'The subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor
children imposed by Article 2180 of the New Civil Code covers
obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses.'
'The subsidiary liability of parent's arising from the criminal acts of
their minor children who acted with discernment is determined under
the provisions of Article 2180, N.C.C. and under Article 101 of the
Revised Penal Code, because to hold that the former only covers
obligations which arise from quasi-delicts and not obligations which
arise from criminal offenses, would result in the absurdity that while for
an act where mere negligence intervenes the father or mother may
stand subsidiarily liable for the damages caused by his or her son, no
liability would attach if the damage is caused with criminal intent.' (3
SCRA 361-362).
"x x x In the instant case, minor son of herein defendants-appellees,
Wendell Libi somehow got hold of the key to the drawer where said gun
was kept under lock without defendant-spouses ever knowing that said
gun had been missing from that safety box since 1978 when Wendell
Libi ha(d) a picture taken wherein he proudly displayed said gun and
dedicated this picture to his sweetheart, Julie Ann Gotiong; also since
then, Wendell Libi was said to have kept said gun in his car, in keeping
up with his supposed role of a CANU agent. x x x."
xxx
"Based on the foregoing discussions of the assigned errors, this Court
holds that the lower court was not correct in dismissing herein
plaintiffs-appellants' complaint because as preponderantly shown by
evidence, defendants-appellees utterly failed to exercise all the
diligence of a good father of the family in preventing their minor son
from committing this crime by means of the gun of defendants-
appellees which was freely accessible to Wendell Libi for they have not
regularly checked whether said gun was still under lock, but learned
that it was missing from the safety deposit box only after the crime
had been committed." (Emphases ours.)[19]
[19]
We agree with the conclusion of respondent court that petitioners
should be held liable for the civil liability based on what appears from
all indications was a crime committed by their minor son. We take this
opportunity, however, to digress and discuss its ratiocination therefor
on jurisprudential dicta which we feel require clarification.
In imposing sanctions for the so-called, vicarious liability of petitioners,
respondent court cites Fuellas vs. Cadano, et al.[20] which supposedly
holds that "(t)he subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by
their minor children imposed by Article 2180 of the New Civil Code
covers obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal
offenses," followed by an extended quotation ostensibly from the same
case explaining why under Article 2180 of the Civil Code and Article
101 of the Revised Penal Code parents should assume subsidiary
liability for damages caused by their minor children. The quoted
passages are set out two paragraphs back, with pertinent underscoring
for purposes of the discussion hereunder.
Now, we do not have any objection to the doctrinal rule holding the
parents liable, but the categorization of their liability as being
subsidiary, and not primary, in nature requires a hard second look
considering previous decisions of this court on the matter which
warrant comparative analyses. Our concern stems from our readings
that if the liability of the parents for crimes or quasi-delicts of their
minor children is subsidiary, then the parents can neither invoke nor be
absolved of civil liability on the defense that they acted with the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damages. On the other
hand, if such liability imputed to the parents is considered direct and
primary, that diligence would constitute a valid and substantial
defense.
We believe that the civil liability of parents for quasi-delicts of their
minor children, as contemplated in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, is
primary and not subsidiary. In fact, if we apply Article 2194 of said
code which provides for solidary liability of joint tortfeasors, the
persons responsible for the act or omission, in this case the minor and
the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
[20]
16
solidarily liable. Accordingly, such parental liability is primary and not
subsidiary, hence the last paragraph of Article 2180 provides that
"(t)he responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of
a good father of a family to prevent damage."
We are also persuaded that the liability of the parents for felonies
committed by their minor children is likewise primary, not subsidiary.
Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
"Art. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. -
xxx
First. In cases of subdivisions x x x 2, and 3 of Article 12, the civil
liability for acts committed by x x x a person under nine years of age,
or by one over nine but under fifteen years of age, who has acted
without discernment, shall devolve upon those having such person
under their legal authority or control, unless it appears that there was
no fault or negligence on their part." (Emphases supplied.)[21]
Accordingly, just like the rule in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, under
the foregoing provision the civil liability of the parents for crimes
committed by their minor children is likewise direct and primary, and
also subject to the defense of lack of fault or negligence on their part,
that is, the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family.
That in both quasi-delicts and crimes the parents primarily respond for
such damages is buttressed by the corresponding provisions in both
codes that the minor transgressor shall be answerable or shall respond
with his own property only in the absence or in case of insolvency of
the former. Thus, for civil liability ex quasi delicto of minors, Article
2182 of the Civil Code states that "(i)f the minor causing damage has
no parents or guardian, the minor x x x shall be answerable with his
own property in an action against him where a guardian ad litem shall
be appointed." For civil liability ex delicto of minors, an equivalent
provision is found in the third paragraph of Article 101 of the Revised
Penal Code, to wit:
[21]
"Should there be no person having such x x x minor under his
authority, legal guardianship or control, or if such person be insolvent,
said x x x minor shall respond with (his) own property, excepting
property exempt from execution, in accordance with civil law."
The civil liability of parents for felonies committed by their minor
children contemplated in the aforesaid rule in Article 101 of the
Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code has,
aside from the aforecited case of FueIlas, been the subject of a number
of cases adjudicated by this Court, viz.: Exconde vs. Capuno, et al.,[22]
Araneta vs. Arreglado,[23] Salen, et al. vs. Balce,[24] Paleyan, etc., et al.
vs. Bangkili, et al.,[25] and Elcano, et al. vs. Hill, et al.[26] Parenthetically,
the aforesaid cases were basically on the issue of the civil liability of
parents for crimes committed by their minor children over 9 but under
15 years of age, who acted with discernment, and also of minors 15
years of age or over, since these situations are not covered by Article
101, Revised Penal Code. In both instances, this Court held that the
issue of parental civil liability should be resolved in accordance with
the provisions of Article 2180 of the Civil Code for the reasons well
expressed in Salen and adopted in the cases hereinbefore enumerated
that to hold that the civil liability under Article 2180 would apply only
to quasi-delicts and not to criminal offenses would result in the
absurdity that in an act involving mere negligence the parents would
be liable but not where the damage is caused with criminal intent. In
said cases, however, there are unfortunate variances resulting in a
regrettable inconsistency in the Court's determination of whether the
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
17
liability of the parents, in cases involving either crimes or quasi-delicts
of their minor children, is primary or subsidiary.
In Exconde, where the 15-year old minor was convicted of double
homicide through reckless imprudence, in a separate civil action
arising from the crime the minor and his father were held jointly and
severally liable for failure of the latter to prove the diligence Of a good
father of a family. The same liability in solidum and, therefore, primary
liability was imposed in a separate civil action in Araneta on the
parents and their 14-year old son who was found guilty of frustrated
homicide, but on the authority of Article 2194 of the Civil Code
providing for solidary responsibility of two or more persons who are
liable for a quasi-delict.
However, in Salen, the father was declared subsidiarily liable for
damages arising from the conviction of his son, who was over 15 but
less than 18 years of age, by applying Article 2180 but, this time,
disregarding Article 2194 of the Civil Code. In the present case, as
already explained, the petitioners herein were also held liable but
supposedly in line with Fuellas which purportedly declared the parents
subsidiarily liable for the civil liability for serious physical injuries
committed by their 13-year old son. On the other hand, in Paleyan, the
mother and her 19-year old son were adjudged solidarity liable for
damages arising from his conviction for homicide by the application of
Article 2180 of the Civil Code since this is likewise not covered by
Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code. Finally, in Elcano, although the
son was acquitted in a homicide charge due to "lack of intent, coupled
with mistake," it was ruled that while under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code there should be solidary liability for damages, since the son,
"although married, was living with his father and getting subsistence
from him at the time of the occurrence," but "is now of age, as a
matter of equity" the father was only held subsidiarily liable.
It bears stressing, however, that the Revised Penal Code provides for
subsidiary liability only for persons causing damages under the
compulsion of irresistible force or under the impulse of an
uncontrollable fear;[27] innkeepers, tavernkeepers and proprietors of
[ [30]
establishments;[28] employers, teachers, persons and corporations
engaged in industry;[29] and principals, accomplices and accessories for
the unpaid civil liability of their co-accused in the other classes.[30]
Also, coming back to respondent court's reliance on Fuellas in its
decision in the present case, it is not exactly accurate to say that
Fuellas provided for subsidiary liability of the parents therein. A careful
scrutiny shows that what respondent court quoted verbatim in its
decision now on appeal in the present case, and which it attributed to
Fuellas, was the syllabus on the law report of said case which spoke of
"subsidiary" liability. However, such categorization does not specifically
appear in the text of the decision in Fuellas. In fact, after reviewing
therein the cases of Exconde, Araneta and Salen and the discussions in
said cases of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article
2180 of the Civil Code, this Court concluded its decision in this wise.
"Moreover, the case at bar was decided by the Court of Appeals on the
basis of evidence submitted therein by both parties, independent of
the criminal case. And responsibility for fault or negligence under
Article 2176 upon which the present action was instituted, is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from fault or
negligence under the Penal Code (Art. 2177), and having in mind the
reasons behind the law as heretofore stated, any discussion as to the
minor's criminal responsibility is of no moment."
Under the foregoing considerations, therefore, we hereby rule that the
parents are and should be held primarily liable for the civil liability
arising from criminal offenses committed by their minor children under
their legal authority or control, or who live in their company, unless it is
proven that the former acted with the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent such damages. That primary liability is premised on
the provisions of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code with respect to
[28]
[29]
18
damages ex delicto caused by their children 9 years of age or under, or ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed
over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted without discernment; and, judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED, with
with regard to their children over 9 but under 15 years of age who costs against petitioners.
acted with discernment, or 15 years or over but under 21 years of age,
such primary liability shall be imposed pursuant to Article 2180 of the SO ORDERED.
Civil Code.[31]
Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino,
Under said Article 2180, the enforcement of such liability shall be Medialdea, Romero, Nocon, and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.
effected against the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the Feliciano, J., on leave.
mother. This was amplified by the Child and Youth Welfare Code which Davide, Jr., and Campos, Jr., JJ., no part.
provides that the same shall devolve upon the father and, in case of Melo, J., no part, on leave.
his death or incapacity, upon the mother or, in case of her death or
incapacity, upon the guardian, but the liability may also be voluntarily
assumed by a relative or family friend of the youthful offender. [32]
However, under the Family Code, this civil liability is now, without such
alternative qualification, the responsibility of the parents and those
who exercise parental authority over the minor offender.[33] For civil
liability arising from quasi-delicts committed by minors, the same rules
shall apply in accordance with Articles 2180 and 2182 of the Civil Code,
as so modified.

In the case at bar, whether the death of the hapless Julie Ann Gotiong
was caused by a felony or a quasi-delict committed by Wendell Libi,
respondent court did not err in holding petitioners liable for damages
arising therefrom. Subject to the preceding modifications of the
premises relied upon by it therefor and on the bases of the legal
imperatives herein explained, we conjoin in its findings that said
petitioners failed to duly exercise the requisite diligentissimi patris
familias to prevent such damages.

[32]

[33]

19
G.R. No. L-47745, April 15, 1988
JOSE S. AMADORA, LORETA A. AMADORA, JOSE A. AMADORA
JR., NORMA A. YLAYA, PANTALEON A. AMADORA, JOSE A.
AMADORA III, LUCY A. AMADORA, ROSALINDA A. AMADORA,
PERFECTO A. AMADORA SERREC A. AMADORA, VICENTE A.
AMADORA AND MARIA TISCALINA A. AMADORA, PETITIONERS,
VS. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE-
RECOLETOS, VICTOR LLUCH, SERGIO P. DAMASO, JR.,
CELESTINO DICON, ANIANO ABELLANA, PABLITO DAFFON, THRU
HIS PARENTS AND NATURAL GUARDIANS, MR. AND MRS.
NICANOR GUMBAN, AND ROLANDO VALENCIA, THRU HIS
GUARDIAN, ATTY. FRANCISCO ALONSO, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CRUZ, J.:
Like any prospective graduate, Alfredo Amadora was looking forward to
the commencement exercises where he would ascend the stage and in
the presence of his relatives and friends receive his high school
diploma. These ceremonies were scheduled on April 16, 1972. As it
turned out, though, fate would intervene and deny him that awaited
experience. On April 13, 1972, while they were in the auditorium of
their school, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletes, a classmate, Pablito
Daffon, fired a gun that mortally hit Alfredo, ending all his expectations
and his life as well. The victim was only seventeen years old. [1]
Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence. [2]
Additionally, the herein petitioners, as the victim's parents, filed a civil
action for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code against the
Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector, the high school principal, the
dean of boys, and the physics teacher, together with Daffon and two
other students, through their respective parents. The complaint against
the students was later dropped. After trial, the Court of First Instance of
Cebu held the remaining defendants liable to the plaintiffs in the sum
of P294,984.00, representing death compensation, loss of earning
capacity, costs of litigation, funeral expenses, moral damages,
exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.[3] On appeal to the
respondent court, however, the decision was reversed and all the
defendants were completely absolved.[4]
In its decision, which is now the subject of this petition for certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the respondent court found that
Article 2180 was not applicable as the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos
was not a school of arts and trades but an academic institution of
learning. It also held that the students were not in the custody of the
school at the time of the incident as the semester had already ended,
that there was no clear identification of the fatal gun, and that in any
event the defendants had exercised the necessary diligence in
preventing the injury.[5]
The basic undisputed facts are that Alfredo Amadora went to the San
Jose-Recoletos on April 13, 1972, and while in its auditorium was shot
to death by Pablito Daffon, a classmate. On the implications and
consequences of these facts, the parties sharply disagree.
The petitioners contend that their son was in the school to finish his
physics experiment as a prerequisite to his graduation; hence, he was
then under the custody of the private respondents. The private
respondents submit that Alfredo Amadora had gone to the school only
for the purpose of submitting his physics report and that he was no
longer in their custody because the semester had already ended.
There is also the question of the identity of the gun used which the
petitioners consider important because of an earlier incident which
they claim underscores the negligence of the school and at least one of
the private respondents. It is not denied by the respondents that on
April 7, 1972, Sergio Damaso, Jr., the dean of boys, confiscated from
Jose Gumban an unlicensed pistol but later returned it to him without
making a report to the principal or taking any further action. [6] As
Gumban was one of the companions of Daffon when the latter fired the
gun that killed Alfredo, the petitioners contend that this was the same
pistol that had been confiscated from Gumban and that their son would
not have been killed if it had not been returned by Damaso. The
respondents say, however, that there is no proof that the gun was the
same firearm that killed Alfredo.
Resolution of all these disagreements will depend on the interpretation
20
of Article 2180 which, as it happens, is invoked by both parties in
support of their conflicting positions. The pertinent part of this article
reads as follows:
"Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be
liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices
so long as they remain in their custody."
Three cases have so far been decided by the Court in connection with
the above-quoted provision, to wit: Exconde v. Capuno,[7] Mercado v.
Court of Appeals,[8] and Palisoc v. Brillantes.[9] These will be briefly
reviewed in this opinion for a better resolution of the case at bar.
In the Exconde Case, Dante Capuno, a student of the Balintawak
Elementary School and a Boy Scout, attended a Rizal Day parade on
instructions of the city school supervisor. After the parade, the boy
boarded a jeep, took over its wheel and drove it so recklessly that it
turned turtle, resulting in the death of two of its passengers. Dante was
found guilty of double homicide with reckless imprudence. In the
separate civil action filed against them, his father was held solidarily
liable with him in damages under Article 1903 (now Article 2180) of the
Civil Code for the tort committed by the 15-year old boy.
This decision, which was penned by Justice Bautista Angelo on June 29,
1957, exculpated the school in an obiter dictum (as it was not a party
to the case) on the ground that it was not a school of arts and trades.
Justice J.B.L. Reyes, with whom Justices Sabino Padilla and Alex Reyes
concurred, dissented, arguing that it was the school authorities who
should be held liable. Liability under this rule, he said, was imposed on
(1) teachers in general; and (2) heads of schools of arts and trades in
particular. The modifying clause "of establishments of arts and trades"
should apply only to "heads" and not "teachers."
Exconde was reiterated in the Mercado Case, and with an elaboration.
A student cut a classmate with a razor blade during recess time at the
Lourdes Catholic School in Quezon City, and the parents of the victim
sued the culprit's parents for damages. Through Justice Labrador, the
Court declared in another obiter (as the school itself had also not been
sued) that the school was not liable because it was not ar
establishment of arts and trades. Moreover, the custody requirement
had not been proved as this "contemplates a situation where the
student lives and boards with the teacher, such that the control,
direction and influences on the pupil supersede those of the parents."
Justice J.B.L. Reyes did not take part but the other members of the
Court concurred in this decision promulgated on May 30, 1960.
In Palisoc v. Brillantes, decided on October 4, 1971, a 16-year old
student was killed by a classmate with fist blows in the laboratory of
the Manila Technical Institute. Although the wrongdoer - who was
already of age - was not boarding in the school, the head thereof and
the teacher in charge were held solidarily liable with him. The Court
declared through Justice Teehankee:
"The phrase used in the cited article -'so long as (the students) remain
in their custody' - means the protective and supervisory custody that
the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and
students for as long as they are at attendance in the school, including
recess time. There is nothing in the law that requires that for such
liability to attach, the pupil or student who commits the tortious act
must live and board in the school, as erroneously held by the lower
court, and the dicta in Mercado (as well as in Exconde) on which it
relied, must now be deemed to have been set aside by the present
decision."
This decision was concurred in by five other members,[10] including
Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who stressed, in answer to the dissenting opinion,
that even students already of age were covered by the provision since
they were equally in the custody of the school and subject to its
discipline. Dissenting with three others,[11] Justice Makalintal was for
retaining the custody interpretation in Mercado and submitted that the
rule should apply only to torts committed by students not yet of age as
the school would be acting only in loco parentis.
In a footnote, Justice Teehankee said he agreed with Justice Reyes's
dissent in the Exconde Case but added that "since the school involved
at bar is a non-academic school, the question as to the applicability of
the cited codal provision to academic institutions will have to await
another case wherein it may properly be raised."
This is the case.
21

Unlike in Exconde and Mercado, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos has
been directly impleaded and is sought to be held liable under Article
2180; and unlike in Palisoc, it is not a school of arts and trades but an
academic institution of learning. The parties herein have also directly
raised the question of whether or not Article 2180 covers even
establishments which are technically not schools of arts and trades,
and, if so, when the offending student is supposed to be "in its
custody."
After an exhaustive examination of the problem, the Court has come to
the conclusion that the provision in question should apply to all
schools, academic as well as non-academic. Where the school is
academic rather than technical or vocational in nature, responsibility
for the tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher in
charge of such student, following the first part of the provision. This is
the general rule. In the case of establishments of arts and trades, it is
the head thereof, and only he, who shall be held liable as an exception
to the general rule. In other words, teachers in general shall be liable
for the acts of their students except where the school is technical in
nature, in which case it is the head thereof who shall be answerable.
Following the canon of reddendo singula singulis, "teachers" should
apply to the words "pupils and students" and "heads of establishments
of arts and trades" to the word "apprentices."
The Court thus conforms to the dissenting opinion expressed by Justice
J.B.L Reyes in Exconde where he said in part:
"I can see no sound reason for limiting Art. 1903 of the old Civil Code
to teachers of arts and trades and not to academic ones. What
substantial difference is there between them insofar as concerns the
proper supervision and vigilance over their pupils? It cannot be
seriously contended that an academic teacher is exempt from the duty
of watching that his pupils do not commit a tort to the detriment of
third persons, so long as they are in a position to exercise authority
and supervision over the pupil. In my opinion, in the phrase 'teachers
or heads of establishments of arts and trades' used in Art. 1903 of the
old Civil Code, the words 'arts and trades' does not qualify 'teachers'
but only 'heads of establishments.' The phrase is only an updated
version of the equivalent terms 'preceptores y artesanos' used in the
Italian and French Civil Codes.
"If, as conceded by all commentators, the basis of the presumption of
negligence of Art. 1903 in some culpa in vigilando that the parents,
teachers, etc. are supposed to have incurred in the exercise of their
authority, it would seem clear that where the parent places the child
under the effective authority of the teacher, the latter, and not the
parent, should be the one answerable for the torts committed while
under his custody, for the very reason that the parent is not supposed
to interfere with the discipline of the school nor with the authority and
supervision of the teacher while the child is under instruction. And if
there is no authority, there can be no responsibility."
There is really no substantial distinction between the academic and the
non-academic schools insofar as torts committed by their, students are
concerned. The same vigilance is expected from the teacher over the
students under his control and supervision, whatever the nature of the
school where he is teaching. The suggestion in the Exconde and
Mercado Cases is that the provision would make the teacher or even
the head of the school of arts and trades liable for an injury caused by
any student in its custody but if that same tort were committed in an
academic school, no liability would attach to the teacher or the school
head. All other circumstances being the same, the teacher or the head
of the academic school would be absolved whereas the teacher and
the head of the non-academic school would be held liable, and simply
because the latter is a school of arts and trades.
The Court cannot see why different degrees of vigilance should be
exercised by the school authorities on the basis only of the nature of
their respective schools. There does not seem to be any plausible
reason for relaxing that vigilance simply because the school is
academic in nature and for increasing such vigilance where the school
is non-academic. Notably, the injury subject of liability is caused by the
student and not by the school itself nor is it a result of the operations
of the school or its equipment. The injury contemplated may be caused
by any student regardless of the school where he is registered. The
teacher certainly should not be able to excuse himself by simply
showing that he is teaching in an academic school where, on the other
22
hand, the head would be held liable if the school were non-academic.
These questions, though, may be asked: If the teacher of the academic
school is to be held answerable for the torts committed by his
students, why is it only the head of the school only who is held liable
where the injury is caused in a school of arts and trades? And in the
case of the academic or non-technical school, why not apply the rule
also to the head thereof instead of imposing the liability only on the
teacher?
The reason for the disparity can be traced to the fact that historically
the head of the school of arts and trades exercised a closer tutelage
over his pupils than the head of the academic school. The old schools
of arts and trades were engaged in the training of artisans apprenticed
to their master who personally and directly instructed them on the
technique and secrets of their craft. The head of the school of arts and
trades was such a master and so was personally involved in the task of
teaching his students, who usually even boarded with him and so came
under his constant control, supervision and influence. By contrast, the
head of the academic school was not as involved with his students and
exercised only administrative duties over the teachers who were the
persons directly dealing with the students. The head of the academic
school had then (as now) only a vicarious relationship with the
students. Consequently, while he could not be directly faulted for the
acts of the students, the head of the school of arts and trades, because
of his closer ties with them, could be so blamed.
It is conceded that the distinction no longer obtains at present in view
of the expansion of the schools of arts and trades, the consequent
increase in their enrollment, and the corresponding diminution of the
direct and personal contact of their heads with the students. Article
2180, however, remains unchanged. In its present state, the provision
must be interpreted by the Court according to its clear and original
mandate until the legislature, taking into account the changes in the
situation subject to be regulated, sees fit to enact the necessary
amendment.
The other matter to be resolved is the duration of the responsibility of
the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades over the
students. Is such responsibility co-extensive with the period when the
student is actually undergoing studies during the school term, as
contended by the respondents and impliedly admitted by the
petitioners themselves?
From a reading of the provision under examination, it is clear that while
the custody requirement, to repeat Palisoc v. Brillantes, does not mean
that the student must be boarding with the school authorities, it does
signify that the student should be within the control and under the
influence of the school authorities at the time of the occurrence of the
injury. This does not necessarily mean that such custody be co-
terminous with the semester, beginning with the start of classes and
ending upon the close thereof, and excluding the time before or after
such period, such as the period of registration, and in the case of
graduating students, the period before the commencement exercises.
In the view of the Court, the student is in the custody of the school
authorities as long as he is under the control and influence of the
school and within its premises, whether the semester has not yet
begun or has already ended.
It is too tenuous to argue that the student comes under the discipline
of the school only upon the start of classes notwithstanding that before
that day he has already registered and thus placed himself under its
rules. Neither should such discipline be deemed ended upon the last
day of classes notwithstanding that there may still be certain requisites
to be satisfied for completion of the course, such as submission of
reports, term papers, clearances and the like. During such periods, the
student is still subject to the disciplinary authority of the school and
cannot consider himself released altogether from observance of its
rules.
As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school premises in
pursuance of a legitimate student objective, in the exercise of a
legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate
student privilege, the responsibility of the school authorities over the
student continues. Indeed, even if the student should be doing nothing
more than relaxing in the campus in the company of his classmates
and friends and enjoying the ambience and atmosphere of the school,
he is still within the custody and subject to the discipline of the school
23
authorities under the provisions of Article 2180.
During all these occasions, it is obviously the teacher-in-charge who
must answer for his students' torts, in practically the same way that
the parents are responsible for the child when he is in their custody.
The teacher-in-charge is the one designated by the dean, principal, or
other administrative superior to exercise supervision over the pupils in
the specific classes or sections to which they are assigned. It is not
necessary that at the time of the injury, the teacher be physically
present and in a position to prevent it. Custody does not connote
immediate and actual physical control but refers more to the influence
exerted on the child and the discipline instilled in him as a result of
such influence. Thus, for the injuries caused by the student, the
teacher and not the parent shall be held responsible if the tort was
committed within the premises of the school at any time when its
authority could be validly exercised over him.
In any event, it should be noted that the liability imposed by this article
is supposed to fall directly on the teacher or the head of the school of
arts and trades and not on the school itself. If at all, the school,
whatever its nature, may be held to answer for the acts of its teachers
or even of the head thereof under the general principle of respondeat
superior, but then it may exculpate itself from liability by proof that it
had exercised the diligence of a bonus paterfamilias.
Such defense is, of course, also available to the teacher or the head of
the school of arts and trades directly held to answer for the tort
committed by the student. As long as the defendant can show that he
had taken the necessary precautions to prevent the injury complained
of, he can exonerate himself from the liability imposed by Article 2180,
which also states that:
"The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of
a good father of a family to prevent damages."
In this connection, it should be observed that the teacher will be held
liable not only when he is acting in loco parentis for the law does not
require that the offending student be of minority age. Unlike the
parent, who will be liable only if his child is still a minor, the teacher is
held answerable by the law for the act of the student under him
regardless of the student's age. Thus, in the Palisoc Case, liability
attached to the teacher and the head of the technical school although
the wrongdoer was already of age. In this sense, Article 2180 treats the
parent more favorably than the teacher.
The Court is not unmindful of the apprehensions expressed by Justice
Makalintal in his dissenting opinion in Palisoc that the school may be
unduly exposed to liability under this article in view of the increasing
activism among the students that is likely to cause violence and
resulting injuries in the school premises. That is a valid fear, to be sure.
Nevertheless, it should be repeated that, under the present ruling, it is
not the school that will be held directly liable. Moreover, the defense of
due diligence is available to it in case it is sought to be held
answerable as principal for the acts or omission of its head or the
teacher in its employ.
The school can show that it exercised proper measures in selecting the
head or its teachers and the appropriate supervision over them in the
custody and instruction of the pupils pursuant to its rules and
regulations for the maintenance of discipline among them. In almost all
cases now, in fact, these measures are effected through the assistance
of an adequate security force to help the teacher physically enforce
those rules upon the students. This should bolster the claim of the
school that it has taken adequate steps to prevent any injury that may
be committed by its students.
A fortiori, the teacher himself may invoke this defense as it would
otherwise be unfair to hold him directly answerable for the damage
caused by his students as long as they are in the school premises and
presumably under his influence. In this respect, the Court is disposed
not to expect from the teacher the same measure of responsibility
imposed on the parent for their influence over the child is not equal in
degree. Obviously, the parent can expect more obedience from the
child because the latter's dependence on him is greater than on the
teacher. It need not be stressed that such dependence includes the
child's support and sustenance whereas submission to the teacher's
influence, besides being co-terminous with the period of custody, is
usually enforced only because of the students' desire to pass the
24
course. The parent can instill more lasting discipline on the child than
the teacher and so should be held to a greater accountability than the
teacher for the tort committed by the child.
3. At any rate, assuming that he was the teacher-in-charge, there
And if it is also considered that under the article in question, the
teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades is responsible for
the damage caused by the student or apprentice even if he is already
of age - and therefore less tractable than the minor - then there should
all the more be justification to require from the school authorities less
accountability as long as they can prove reasonable diligence in
preventing the injury. After all, if the parent himself is no longer liable
for the student's acts because he has reached majority age and so is
no longer under the former's control, there is then all the more reason
for leniency in assessing the teacher's responsibility for the acts of the
student.
Applying the foregoing considerations, the Court has arrived at the
following conclusions:
4. In the absence of a teacher-in-charge, it is probably the dean of
1. At the time Alfredo Amadora was fatally shot, he was still in the
custody of the authorities of Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos
notwithstanding that the fourth year classes had formally
ended. It was immaterial if he was in the school auditorium to
finish his physics experiment or merely to submit his physics
report for what is important is that he was there for a legitimate
purpose. As previously observed, even the mere savoring of the
company of his friends in the premises of the school is a
legitimate purpose that would have also brought him in the
custody of the school authorities.
5. Finally, as previously observed, the Colegio de San Jose-
2. The rector, the high school principal and the dean of boys
cannot be held liable because none of them was the teacher-in-
charge as previously defined. Each of them was exercising only
a general authority over the student body and not the direct
control and influence exerted by the teacher placed in charge
of particular classes or sections and thus immediately involved
in its discipline. The evidence of the parties does not disclose
who the teacher-in-charge of the offending student was. The
mere fact that Alfredo Amadora had gone to school that day in
connection with his physics report did not necessarily make the
physics teacher, respondent Celestino Dicon, the teacher-in-
charge of Alfredo's killer.
is no showing that Dicon was negligent in enforcing discipline
upon Daffon or that he had waived observance of the rules and
regulations of the school or condoned their non-observance. His
absence when the tragedy happened cannot be considered
against him because he was not supposed or required to report
to school on that day. And while it is true that the offending
student was still in the custody of the teacher-in-charge even if
the latter was physically absent when the tort was committed,
it has not been established that it was caused by his laxness in
enforcing discipline upon the student. On the contrary, the
private respondents have proved that they had exercised due
diligence, through the enforcement of the school regulations, in
maintaining that discipline.
boys who should be held liable, especially in view of the
unrefuted evidence that he had earlier confiscated an
unlicensed gun from one of the students and returned the same
later to him without taking disciplinary action or reporting the
matter to higher authorities. While this was clearly negligence
on his part, for which he deserves sanctions from the school, it
does not necessarily link him to the shooting of Amador as it
has not been shown that the confiscated and returned pistol
was the gun that killed the petitioners' son.
Recoletos cannot be held directly liable under the article
because only the teacher or the head of the school of arts and
trades is made responsible for the damage caused by the
student or apprentice. Neither can it be held to answer for the
tort committed by any of the other private respondents for
none of them has been found to have been charged with the
custody of the offending student or has been remiss in the
discharge of his duties in connection with such custody.
25
In sum, the Court finds under the facts as disclosed by the record and
in the light of the principles herein announced that none of the
respondents is liable for the injury inflicted by Pablito Daffon on Alfredo
Amadora that resulted in the latter's death at the auditorium of the
Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos on April 13, 1972. While we deeply
sympathize with the petitioners over the loss of their son under the
tragic circumstances here related, we nevertheless are unable to
extend them the material relief they seek, as a balm to their grief,
under the law they have invoked.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, without any pronouncement as

to costs. It is so ordered.

Yap, Narvasa, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, and

Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., concur but please see additional statement.
Melencio-Herrera, J., with separate concurring and dissenting opinion.
Teehankee, C.J., did not participate in deliberations.
Fernan, and Padilla, JJ., no part, formerly counsel for Colegio de San
Jose-Recoletos.

26
G.R. No. 84698, February 04, 1992
PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, JUAN D.
LIM, BENJAMIN P. PAULINO, ANTONIO M. MAGTALAS, COL.
PEDRO SACRO, AND LT. M. SORIANO, PETITIONERS, VS. COURT
OF APPEALS, HON. REGINA ORDOEZ-BENITEZ, IN HER
CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 47, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, MANILA, SEGUNDA R. BAUTISTA, AND ARSENIA D.
BAUTISTA, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
PADILLA, J.:
A stabbing incident on 30 August 1985 which caused the death of
Carlitos Bautista while on the second-floor premises of the Philippine
School of Business Administration (PSBA) prompted the parents of the
deceased to file suit in the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 47)
presided over by Judge (now Court of Appeals justice) Regina Ordoez-
Benitez, for damages against the said PSBA and its corporate officers.
At the time of his death, Carlitos was enrolled in the third year
commerce course at the PSBA. It was established that his assailants
were not members of the school's academic community but were
elements from outside the school.
Specifically, the suit impleaded the PSBA and the following school
authorities: Juan D. Lim (President), Benjamin P. Paulino (Vice-
President), Antonio M. Magtalas (Treasurer/Cashier), Col. Pedro Sacro
(Chief of Security) and a Lt. M. Soriano (Assistant Chief of Security).
Substantially, the plaintiffs (now private respondents) sought to
adjudge them liable for the victim's untimely demise due to their
alleged negligence, recklessness and lack of security precautions,
means and methods before, during and after the attack on the victim.
During the proceedings a quo, Lt. M. Soriano terminated his
relationship with the other petitioners by resigning from his position in
the school.
Defendants a quo (now petitioners) sought to have the suit dismissed,
alleging that since they are presumably sued under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code, the complaint states no cause of action against them, as
jurisprudence on the subject is to the effect that academic institutions,
such as the PSBA, are beyond the ambit of the rule in the afore-stated
article.
The respondent trial court, however, overruled petitioners' contention
and thru an order dated 8 December 1987, denied their motion to
dismiss. A subsequent motion for reconsideration was similarly dealt
with by an order dated 25 January 1988. Petitioners then assailed the
trial court's dispositions before the respondent appellate court which,
in a decision* promulgated on 10 June 1988, affirmed the trial court's
orders. On 22 August 1988, the respondent appellate court resolved to
deny the petitioners' motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
At the outset, it is to be observed that the respondent appellate court
primarily anchored its decision on the law of quasi-delicts, as
enunciated in Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. [1] Pertinent
portions of the appellate court's now assailed ruling state:
Article 2180 (formerly Article 1903) of the Civil Code is an adoptation
from the old Spanish Civil Code. The comments of Manresa and learned
authorities on its meaning should give way to present day changes.
The law is not fixed and flexible (sic); it must be dynamic. In fact, the
greatest value and significance of law as a rule of conduct in (sic) its
flexibility to adopt to changing social conditions and its capacity to
meet the new challenges of progress.
Construed in the light of modern day educational systems, Article 2180
cannot be construed in its narrow concept as held in the old case of
Exconde vs. Capuno[2] and Mercado vs. Court of Appeals [3] ; hence, the
ruling in the Palisoc[4] case that it should apply to all kinds of
educational institutions, academic or vocational.
At any rate, the law holds the teachers and heads of the school staff
liable unless they relieve themselves of such liability pursuant to the
last paragraph of Article 2180 by proving that they observed all the
diligence to prevent damage. This can only be done at a trial on the
merits of the case.[5]
While we agree with the respondent appellate court that the motion to
dismiss the complaint was correctly denied and the complaint should
27
be tried on the merits, we do not however agree with the premises of
the appellate courts ruling.
Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code,
establishes the rule of in loco parentis. This Court discussed this
doctrine in the afore-cited cases of Exconde, Mendoza, Palisoc and,
more recently, in Amadora vs. Court of Appeals.[6] In all such cases, it
had been stressed that the law (Article 2180) plainly provides that the
damage should have been caused or inflicted by pupils or students of
the educational institution sought to be held liable for the acts of its
pupils or students while in its custody. However, this material situation
does not exist in the present case for, as earlier indicated, the
assailants of Carlitos were not students of the PSBA, for whose acts the
school could be made liable.
However, does the appellate courts failure to consider such material
facts mean the exculpation of the petitioners from liability? It does not
necessarily follow.
When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is
established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations
which both parties are bound to comply with.[7] For its part, the school
undertakes to provide the student with an education that would
presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to
pursue higher education or a profession. On the other hand, the
student covenants to abide by the schools academic requirements and
observe its rules and regulations.
Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or built-in
obligation of providing their students with an atmosphere that
promotes or assists in attaining its primary undertaking of imparting
knowledge. Certainly, no student can absorb the intricacies of physics
or higher mathematics or explore the realm of the arts and other
sciences when bullets are flying or grenades exploding in the air or
where there looms around the school premises a constant threat to life
and limb. Necessarily, the school must ensure that adequate steps are
taken to maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to
prevent the breakdown thereof.
Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual
relation between the PSBA and Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-
delict do not really govern.[8] A perusal of Article 2176 shows that
obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-
contractual obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise
bound by contract, whether express or implied. However, this
impression has not prevented this Court from determining the
existence of a tort even when there obtains a contract. In Air France vs.
Carrascoso (124 Phil. 722), the private respondent was awarded
damages for his unwarranted expulsion from a first-class seat aboard
the petitioner airline. It is noted, however, that the Court referred to
the petitioner-airlines liability as one arising from tort, not one arising
from a contract of carriage. In effect, Air France is authority for the
view that liability from tort may exist even if there is a contract, for the
act that breaks the contract may be also a tort. (Austro-America S.S.
Co. vs. Thomas, 248 Fed 231).
This view was not all that revolutionary, for even as early as 1918, this
Court was already of a similar mind. In Cangco vs. Manila Railroad (38
Phil. 780), Mr. Justice Fisher elucidated thus:
The field of non-contractual obligation is much more broader than that
of contractual obligation, comprising, as it does, the whole extent of
juridical human relations. These two fields, figuratively speaking,
concentric; that is to say, the mere fact that a person is bound to
another by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual
liability to such person. When such a contractual relation exists the
obligor may break the contract under such conditions that the same
act which constitutes a breach of the contract would have constituted
the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed
between the parties.
Immediately what comes to mind is the chapter of the Civil Code on
Human Relations, particularly Article 21, which provides:
Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage. (emphasis supplied).
28
Air France penalized the racist policy of the airline which emboldened
the petitioners employee to forcibly oust the private respondent to
cater to the comfort of a white man who allegedly had a better right
to the seat. In Austro-American, supra, the public embarrassment
caused to the passenger was the justification for the Circuit Court of
Appeals, (Second Circuit), to award damages to the latter. From the
foregoing, it can be concluded that should the act which breaches a
contract be done in bad faith and be violative of Article 21, then there
is a cause to view the act as constituting a quasi-delict.
As the proceedings a quo have yet to commence on the substance of
the private respondents complaint, the record is bereft of all the
material facts. Obviously, at this stage, only the trial court can make
such a determination from the evidence still to unfold.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is
DENIED. The court of origin (RTC, Manila, Br. 47) is hereby ordered to
continue proceedings consistent with this ruling of the Court. Costs
against the petitioners.

In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however, there is, as SO ORDERED.
yet, no finding that the contract between the school and Bautista had
Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Paras, and Regalado, JJ., concur.
been breached thru the formers negligence in providing proper
security measures. This would be for the trial court to determine. And,
even if there be a finding of negligence, the same could give rise
generally to a breach of contractual obligation only. Using the test of
Cangco, supra, the negligence of the school would not be relevant
absent a contract. In fact, that negligence becomes material only
because of the contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista. In
other words, a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to the
schools liability. The negligence of the school cannot exist
independently on the contract, unless the negligence occurs under the
circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code.

This Court is not unmindful of the attendant difficulties posed by the

obligation of schools, above-mentioned, for conceptually a school, like
a common carrier, cannot be an insurer of its students against all risks.
This is specially true in the populous student communities of the so-
called university belt in Manila where there have been reported
several incidents ranging from gang wars to other forms of
hooliganism. It would not be equitable to expect of schools to
anticipate all types of violent trespass upon their premises, for
notwithstanding the security measures installed, the same may still fail
against an individual or group determined to carry out a nefarious deed
inside school premises and environs. Should this be the case, the
school may still avoid liability by proving that the breach of its
contractual obligation to the students was not due to its negligence,
here statutorily defined to be the omission of that degree of diligence
which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponding to
the circumstances of persons, time and place.[9]
29
G.R. No. 179337, April 30, 2008
JOSEPH SALUDAGA, Petitioner, vs. FAR EASTERN UNIVERSITY
and EDILBERTO C. DE JESUS in his capacity as President of FEU,
Respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SATIAGO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assails the June 29, 2007 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 87050, nullifying and setting aside the November 10,
2004 Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 2, in Civil
Case No. 98-89483 and dismissing the complaint filed by petitioner; as
well as its August 23, 2007 Resolution [4] denying the Motion for
Reconsideration.[5]
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner Joseph Saludaga was a sophomore law student of respondent
Far Eastern University (FEU) when he was shot by Alejandro Rosete
(Rosete), one of the security guards on duty at the school premises on
August 18, 1996. Petitioner was rushed to FEU-Dr. Nicanor Reyes
Medical Foundation (FEU-NRMF) due to the wound he sustained.[6]
Meanwhile, Rosete was brought to the police station where he
explained that the shooting was accidental. He was eventually released
considering that no formal complaint was filed against him.
Petitioner thereafter filed a complaint for damages against respondents
on the ground that they breached their obligation to provide students
with a safe and secure environment and an atmosphere conducive to
learning. Respondents, in turn, filed a Third-Party Complaint [7] against
Galaxy Development and Management Corporation (Galaxy), the
agency contracted by respondent FEU to provide security services
within its premises and Mariano D. Imperial (Imperial), Galaxy's
President, to indemnify them for whatever would be adjudged in favor
of petitioner, if any; and to pay attorney's fees and cost of the suit. On
the other hand, Galaxy and Imperial filed a Fourth-Party Complaint
against AFP General Insurance.[8]
On November 10, 2004, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of
petitioner, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, from the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered
ordering:
1. FEU and Edilberto de Jesus, in his capacity as president of FEU
to pay jointly and severally Joseph Saludaga the amount of
P35,298.25 for actual damages with 12% interest per annum
from the filing of the complaint until fully paid; moral damages
of P300,000.00, exemplary damages of P500,000.00, attorney's
fees of P100,000.00 and cost of the suit;
2. Galaxy Management and Development Corp. and its president,
Col. Mariano Imperial to indemnify jointly and severally 3rd
party plaintiffs (FEU and Edilberto de Jesus in his capacity as
President of FEU) for the above-mentioned amounts;
3. And the 4th party complaint is dismissed for lack of cause of
action. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[9]
Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered the
assailed Decision, the decretal portion of which provides, viz:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated
November 10, 2004 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
complaint filed by Joseph Saludaga against appellant Far Eastern
University and its President in Civil Case No. 98-89483 is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[10]
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied; hence,
the instant petition based on the following grounds:
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN MANNER CONTRARY TO
LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN RULING THAT:
5.1. THE SHOOTING INCIDENT IS A FORTUITOUS EVENT;
30

5.2. RESPONDENTS ARE NOT LIABLE FOR DAMAGES FOR THE INJURY
RESULTING FROM A GUNSHOT WOUND SUFFERED BY THE PETITIONER
FROM THE HANDS OF NO LESS THAN THEIR OWN SECURITY GUARD IN
VIOLATION OF THEIR BUILT-IN CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION TO
PETITIONER, BEING THEIR LAW STUDENT AT THAT TIME, TO PROVIDE
HIM WITH A SAFE AND SECURE EDUCATIONAL ENVIRONMENT;
5.3. SECURITY GAURD, ALEJANDRO ROSETE, WHO SHOT PETITIONER
WHILE HE WAS WALKING ON HIS WAY TO THE LAW LIBRARY OF
RESPONDENT FEU IS NOT THEIR EMPLOYEE BY VIRTUE OF THE
CONTRACT FOR SECURITY SERVICES BETWEEN GALAXY AND FEU
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT PETITIONER, NOT BEING A PARTY
TO IT, IS NOT BOUND BY THE SAME UNDER THE PRINCIPLE OF
RELATIVITY OF CONTRACTS; and
5.4. RESPONDENT EXERCISED DUE DILIGENCE IN SELECTING GALAXY
AS THE AGENCY WHICH WOULD PROVIDE SECURITY SERVICES WITHIN
THE PREMISES OF RESPONDENT FEU.[11]
Petitioner is suing respondents for damages based on the alleged
breach of student-school contract for a safe learning environment. The
pertinent portions of petitioner's Complaint read:
6.0. At the time of plaintiff's confinement, the defendants or any of
their representative did not bother to visit and inquire about his
condition. This abject indifference on the part of the defendants
continued even after plaintiff was discharged from the hospital when
not even a word of consolation was heard from them. Plaintiff waited
for more than one (1) year for the defendants to perform their moral
obligation but the wait was fruitless. This indifference and total lack of
concern of defendants served to exacerbate plaintiff's miserable
condition.
xxxx
11.0. Defendants are responsible for ensuring the safety of its students
while the latter are within the University premises. And that should
anything untoward happens to any of its students while they are within
the University's premises shall be the responsibility of the defendants.
In this case, defendants, despite being legally and morally bound,
miserably failed to protect plaintiff from injury and thereafter, to
mitigate and compensate plaintiff for said injury;
12.0. When plaintiff enrolled with defendant FEU, a contract was
entered into between them. Under this contract, defendants are
supposed to ensure that adequate steps are taken to provide an
atmosphere conducive to study and ensure the safety of the plaintiff
while inside defendant FEU's premises. In the instant case, the latter
breached this contract when defendant allowed harm to befall upon
the plaintiff when he was shot at by, of all people, their security guard
who was tasked to maintain peace inside the campus.[12]
In Philippine School of Business Administration v. Court of Appeals,[13]
we held that:
When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is
established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations
which both parties are bound to comply with. For its part, the school
undertakes to provide the student with an education that would
presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to
pursue higher education or a profession. On the other hand, the
student covenants to abide by the school's academic requirements and
observe its rules and regulations.
Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or "built-in"
obligation of providing their students with an atmosphere that
promotes or assists in attaining its primary undertaking of imparting
knowledge. Certainly, no student can absorb the intricacies of physics
or higher mathematics or explore the realm of the arts and other
sciences when bullets are flying or grenades exploding in the air or
where there looms around the school premises a constant threat to life
and limb. Necessarily, the school must ensure that adequate steps are
taken to maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to
prevent the breakdown thereof.[14]
It is undisputed that petitioner was enrolled as a sophomore law
student in respondent FEU. As such, there was created a contractual
obligation between the two parties. On petitioner's part, he was
31
obliged to comply with the rules and regulations of the school. On the
other hand, respondent FEU, as a learning institution is mandated to
impart knowledge and equip its students with the necessary skills to
pursue higher education or a profession. At the same time, it is obliged
to ensure and take adequate steps to maintain peace and order within
the campus.
It is settled that in culpa contractual, the mere proof of the existence of
the contract and the failure of its compliance justify, prima facie, a
corresponding right of relief.[15] In the instant case, we find that, when
petitioner was shot inside the campus by no less the security guard
who was hired to maintain peace and secure the premises, there is a
prima facie showing that respondents failed to comply with its
obligation to provide a safe and secure environment to its students.
In order to avoid liability, however, respondents aver that the shooting
incident was a fortuitous event because they could not have
reasonably foreseen nor avoided the accident caused by Rosete as he
was not their employee;[16] and that they complied with their obligation
to ensure a safe learning environment for their students by having
exercised due diligence in selecting the security services of Galaxy.
After a thorough review of the records, we find that respondents failed
to discharge the burden of proving that they exercised due diligence in
providing a safe learning environment for their students. They failed to
prove that they ensured that the guards assigned in the campus met
the requirements stipulated in the Security Service Agreement. Indeed,
certain documents about Galaxy were presented during trial; however,
no evidence as to the qualifications of Rosete as a security guard for
the university was offered.
Respondents also failed to show that they undertook steps to ascertain
and confirm that the security guards assigned to them actually possess
the qualifications required in the Security Service Agreement. It was
not proven that they examined the clearances, psychiatric test results,
201 files, and other vital documents enumerated in its contract with
Galaxy. Total reliance on the security agency about these matters or
failure to check the papers stating the qualifications of the guards is
negligence on the part of respondents. A learning institution should not
be allowed to completely relinquish or abdicate security matters in its
premises to the security agency it hired. To do so would result to
contracting away its inherent obligation to ensure a safe learning
environment for its students.
Consequently, respondents' defense of force majeure must fail. In
order for force majeure to be considered, respondents must show that
no negligence or misconduct was committed that may have
occasioned the loss. An act of God cannot be invoked to protect a
person who has failed to take steps to forestall the possible adverse
consequences of such a loss. One's negligence may have concurred
with an act of God in producing damage and injury to another;
nonetheless, showing that the immediate or proximate cause of the
damage or injury was a fortuitous event would not exempt one from
liability. When the effect is found to be partly the result of a person's
participation - whether by active intervention, neglect or failure to act -
the whole occurrence is humanized and removed from the rules
applicable to acts of God. [17]
Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides that those who are negligent in
the performance of their obligations are liable for damages.
Accordingly, for breach of contract due to negligence in providing a
safe learning environment, respondent FEU is liable to petitioner for
damages. It is essential in the award of damages that the claimant
must have satisfactorily proven during the trial the existence of the
factual basis of the damages and its causal connection to defendant's
acts.[18]
In the instant case, it was established that petitioner spent P35,298.25
for his hospitalization and other medical expenses.[19] While the trial
court correctly imposed interest on said amount, however, the case at
bar involves an obligation arising from a contract and not a loan or
forbearance of money. As such, the proper rate of legal interest is six
percent (6%) per annum of the amount demanded. Such interest shall
continue to run from the filing of the complaint until the finality of this
Decision.[20] After this Decision becomes final and executory, the
applicable rate shall be twelve percent (12%) per annum until its
satisfaction.
32
The other expenses being claimed by petitioner, such as transportation
expenses and those incurred in hiring a personal assistant while
recuperating were however not duly supported by receipts.[21] In the
absence thereof, no actual damages may be awarded. Nonetheless,
temperate damages under Art. 2224 of the Civil Code may be
recovered where it has been shown that the claimant suffered some
pecuniary loss but the amount thereof cannot be proved with certainty.
Hence, the amount of P20,000.00 as temperate damages is awarded to
petitioner.
As regards the award of moral damages, there is no hard and fast rule
in the determination of what would be a fair amount of moral damages
since each case must be governed by its own peculiar circumstances.
[22]
The testimony of petitioner about his physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, and moral shock resulting from the
shooting incident[23] justify the award of moral damages. However,
moral damages are in the category of an award designed to
compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a
penalty on the wrongdoer. The award is not meant to enrich the
complainant at the expense of the defendant, but to enable the injured
party to obtain means, diversion, or amusements that will serve to
obviate the moral suffering he has undergone. It is aimed at the
restoration, within the limits of the possible, of the spiritual status quo
ante, and should be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. Trial courts
must then guard against the award of exorbitant damages; they should
exercise balanced restrained and measured objectivity to avoid
suspicion that it was due to passion, prejudice, or corruption on the
part of the trial court.[24] We deem it just and reasonable under the
circumstances to award petitioner moral damages in the amount of
P100,000.00.
Likewise, attorney's fees and litigation expenses in the amount of
P50,000.00 as part of damages is reasonable in view of Article 2208 of
the Civil Code.[25] However, the award of exemplary damages is deleted
considering the absence of proof that respondents acted in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner.
We note that the trial court held respondent De Jesus solidarily liable
with respondent FEU. In Powton Conglomerate, Inc. v. Agcolicol,[26] we
held that:
[A] corporation is invested by law with a personality separate and
distinct from those of the persons composing it, such that, save for
certain exceptions, corporate officers who entered into contracts in
behalf of the corporation cannot be held personally liable for the
liabilities of the latter. Personal liability of a corporate director, trustee
or officer along (although not necessarily) with the corporation may so
validly attach, as a rule, only when - (1) he assents to a patently
unlawful act of the corporation, or when he is guilty of bad faith or
gross negligence in directing its affairs, or when there is a conflict of
interest resulting in damages to the corporation, its stockholders or
other persons; (2) he consents to the issuance of watered down stocks
or who, having knowledge thereof, does not forthwith file with the
corporate secretary his written objection thereto; (3) he agrees to hold
himself personally and solidarily liable with the corporation; or (4) he is
made by a specific provision of law personally answerable for his
corporate action.[27]
None of the foregoing exceptions was established in the instant case;
hence, respondent De Jesus should not be held solidarily liable with
respondent FEU.
Incidentally, although the main cause of action in the instant case is
the breach of the school-student contract, petitioner, in the alternative,
also holds respondents vicariously liable under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code, which provides:
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not
only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible.
xxxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees
and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks,
even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
xxxx
33

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of
a good father of a family to prevent damage.
We agree with the findings of the Court of Appeals that respondents
cannot be held liable for damages under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code
because respondents are not the employers of Rosete. The latter was
employed by Galaxy. The instructions issued by respondents' Security
Consultant to Galaxy and its security guards are ordinarily no more
than requests commonly envisaged in the contract for services entered
into by a principal and a security agency. They cannot be construed as
the element of control as to treat respondents as the employers of
Rosete.[28]
As held in Mercury Drug Corporation v. Libunao:[29]
In Soliman, Jr. v. Tuazon,[30] we held that where the security agency
recruits, hires and assigns the works of its watchmen or security
guards to a client, the employer of such guards or watchmen is such
agency, and not the client, since the latter has no hand in selecting the
security guards. Thus, the duty to observe the diligence of a good
father of a family cannot be demanded from the said client:
... [I]t is settled in our jurisdiction that where the security agency, as
here, recruits, hires and assigns the work of its watchmen or security
guards, the agency is the employer of such guards or watchmen.
Liability for illegal or harmful acts committed by the security guards
attaches to the employer agency, and not to the clients or customers
of such agency. As a general rule, a client or customer of a security
agency has no hand in selecting who among the pool of security
guards or watchmen employed by the agency shall be assigned to it;
the duty to observe the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection of the guards cannot, in the ordinary course of events, be
demanded from the client whose premises or property are protected by
the security guards.
xxxx
The fact that a client company may give instructions or directions to
the security guards assigned to it, does not, by itself, render the client
responsible as an employer of the security guards concerned and liable
for their wrongful acts or omissions.[31]
We now come to respondents' Third Party Claim against Galaxy. In
Firestone Tire and Rubber Company of the Philippines v. Tempengko,[32]
we held that:
The third-party complaint is, therefore, a procedural device whereby a
`third party' who is neither a party nor privy to the act or deed
complained of by the plaintiff, may be brought into the case with leave
of court, by the defendant, who acts as third-party plaintiff to enforce
against such third-party defendant a right for contribution, indemnity,
subrogation or any other relief, in respect of the plaintiff's claim. The
third-party complaint is actually independent of and separate and
distinct from the plaintiff's complaint. Were it not for this provision of
the Rules of Court, it would have to be filed independently and
separately from the original complaint by the defendant against the
third-party. But the Rules permit defendant to bring in a third-party
defendant or so to speak, to litigate his separate cause of action in
respect of plaintiff's claim against a third-party in the original and
principal case with the object of avoiding circuitry of action and
unnecessary proliferation of law suits and of disposing expeditiously in
one litigation the entire subject matter arising from one particular set
of facts.[33]
Respondents and Galaxy were able to litigate their respective claims
and defenses in the course of the trial of petitioner's complaint.
Evidence duly supports the findings of the trial court that Galaxy is
negligent not only in the selection of its employees but also in their
supervision. Indeed, no administrative sanction was imposed against
Rosete despite the shooting incident; moreover, he was even allowed
to go on leave of absence which led eventually to his disappearance. [34]
Galaxy also failed to monitor petitioner's condition or extend the
necessary assistance, other than the P5,000.00 initially given to
petitioner. Galaxy and Imperial failed to make good their pledge to
reimburse petitioner's medical expenses.
For these acts of negligence and for having supplied respondent FEU
34
with an unqualified security guard, which resulted to the latter's breach president, Mariano D. Imperial are ORDERED to jointly and severally
of obligation to petitioner, it is proper to hold Galaxy liable to pay respondent FEU damages equivalent to the above-mentioned
respondent FEU for such damages equivalent to the above-mentioned amounts awarded to petitioner.
amounts awarded to petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Unlike respondent De Jesus, we deem Imperial to be solidarily liable
with Galaxy for being grossly negligent in directing the affairs of the Austria-Martinez, Chico-Nazario, Nachura, and Reyes, JJ., concur.
security agency. It was Imperial who assured petitioner that his medical
expenses will be shouldered by Galaxy but said representations were
not fulfilled because they presumed that petitioner and his family were
no longer interested in filing a formal complaint against them.[35]

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The June 29, 2007 Decision of

the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 87050 nullifying the Decision of
the trial court and dismissing the complaint as well as the August 23,
2007 Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch 2, in Civil Case No. 98-89483 finding respondent FEU
liable for damages for breach of its obligation to provide students with
a safe and secure learning atmosphere, is AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS:

a. respondent Far Eastern University (FEU) is ORDERED to pay

petitioner actual damages in the amount of P35,298.25, plus
6% interest per annum from the filing of the complaint until the
finality of this Decision. After this decision becomes final and
executory, the applicable rate shall be twelve percent (12%)
per annum until its satisfaction;

b. respondent FEU is also ORDERED to pay petitioner temperate

damages in the amount of P20,000.00; moral damages in the
amount of P100,000.00; and attorney's fees and litigation
expenses in the amount of P50,000.00;

c. the award of exemplary damages is DELETED.

The Complaint against respondent Edilberto C. De Jesus is DISMISSED.

The counterclaims of respondents are likewise DISMISSED.

Galaxy Development and Management Corporation (Galaxy) and its

35
G.R. No. 182353, June 29, 2010
ST. JOSEPH'S COLLEGE, SR. JOSEPHINI AMBATALI, SFIC, AND
ROSALINDA TABUGO, PETITIONERS, VS. JAYSON MIRANDA,
REPRESENTED BY HIS FATHER, RODOLFO S. MIRANDA,
RESPONDENT.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 68367, which affirmed in
toto the decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 221,
Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-95-22889.
The facts, as found by the CA, follow:
On November 17, 1994, at around 1:30 in the afternoon inside St.
Joseph College's [SJC's] premises, the class to which [respondent
Jayson Val Miranda] belonged was conducting a science experiment
about fusion of sulphur powder and iron fillings under the tutelage of
[petitioner] Rosalinda Tabugo, she being the subject teacher and
employee of [petitioner] SJC. The adviser of [Jayson's] class is x x x
Estefania Abdan.
Tabugo left her class while it was doing the experiment without having
adequately secured it from any untoward incident or occurrence. In the
middle of the experiment, [Jayson], who was the assistant leader of
one of the class groups, checked the result of the experiment by
looking into the test tube with magnifying glass. The test tube was
being held by one of his group mates who moved it close and towards
the eye of [Jayson]. At that instance, the compound in the test tube
spurted out and several particles of which hit [Jayson's] eye and the
different parts of the bodies of some of his group mates. As a result
thereof, [Jayson's] eyes were chemically burned, particularly his left
eye, for which he had to undergo surgery and had to spend for his
medication. Upon filing of this case [in] the lower court, [Jayson's]
wound had not completely healed and still had to undergo another
surgery.
Upon learning of the incident and because of the need for finances,
[Jayson's] mother, who was working abroad, had to rush back home for
which she spent P36,070.00 for her fares and had to forego her salary
from November 23, 1994 to December 26, 1994, in the amount of at
least P40,000.00.
Then, too, [Jayson] and his parents suffered sleepless nights, mental
anguish and wounded feelings as a result of his injury due to
[petitioners'] fault and failure to exercise the degree of care and
diligence incumbent upon each one of them. Thus, they should be held
liable for moral damages. Also, [Jayson] sent a demand letter to
[petitioners] for the payment of his medical expenses as well as other
expenses incidental thereto, which the latter failed to heed. Hence,
[Jayson] was constrained to file the complaint for damages.
[Petitioners], therefore, should likewise compensate [Jayson] for
litigation expenses, including attorney's fees.
On the other hand, [petitioners SJC, Sr. Josephini Ambatali, SFIC, and
Tabugo] alleged that [Jayson] was a grade six pupil of SJC in the school
year 1994-1995. On November 17, 1994, at about 1:30 in the
afternoon, the class to which [Jayson] belong[s] was conducting a
science experiment under the guidance and supervision of Tabugo, the
class science teacher, about fusion of sulphur powder and iron fillings
by combining these elements in a test tube and heating the same.
Before the science experiment was conducted, [Jayson] and his
classmates were given strict instructions to follow the written
procedure for the experiment and not to look into the test tube until
the heated compound had cooled off. [Jayson], however, a person of
sufficient age and discretion and completely capable of understanding
the English language and the instructions of his teacher, without
waiting for the heated compound to cool off, as required in the written
procedure for the experiment and as repeatedly explained by the
teacher, violated such instructions and took a magnifying glass and
looked at the compound, which at that moment spurted out of the test
tube, a small particle hitting one of [Jayson's] eyes.
Jayson was rushed by the school employees to the school clinic and
thereafter transferred to St. Luke's Medical Center for treatment. At the
36
hospital, when Tabago visited [Jayson], the latter cried and apologized
to his teacher for violating her instructions not to look into the test
tube until the compound had cooled off.
After the treatment, [Jayson] was pronounced ready for discharge and
an eye test showed that his vision had not been impaired or affected.
In order to avoid additional hospital charges due to the delay in
[Jayson's] discharge, Rodolfo S. Miranda, [Jayson's] father, requested
SJC to advance the amount of P26,176.35 representing [Jayson's]
hospital bill until his wife could arrive from abroad and pay back the
money. SJC acceded to the request.
On December 6, 1994, however, the parents of [Jayson], through
counsel, wrote SJC a letter demanding that it should shoulder all the
medical expenses of [Jayson] that had been incurred and will be
incurred further arising from the accident caused by the science
experiment. In a letter dated December 14, 1994, the counsel for SJC,
represented by Sr. Josephini Ambatali, SFIC, explained that the school
cannot accede to the demand because "the accident occurred by
reason of [Jayson's] failure to comply with the written procedure for the
experiment and his teacher's repeated warnings and instruction that
no student must face, much less look into, the opening of the test tube
until the heated compound has cooled.[3]
Since SJC did not accede to the demand, Rodolfo, Jayson's father, on
Jayson's behalf, sued petitioners for damages.
After trial, the RTC rendered judgment, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of [Jayson] and against [petitioners]. This Court orders and holds
the [petitioners] joint[ly] and solidarily liable to pay [Jayson] the
following amount:
1. To pay [Jayson] the amount of P77,338.25 as actual damages;
However, [Jayson] is ordered to reimburse [petitioner] St. Joseph
College the amount of P26,176.36 representing the advances given to
pay [Jayson's] initial hospital expenses or in the alternative to deduct
said amount of P26,176.36 from the P77,338.25 actual damages herein
awarded by way of legal compensation;
2. To pay [Jayson] the sum of P50,000.00 as mitigated moral
damages;
3. To pay [Jayson] the sum of P30,000.00 as reasonable attorney's
fees;
4. To pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.[4]
Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to the CA. However, as previously
adverted to, the CA affirmed in toto the ruling of the RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed decision of the
RTC of Quezon City, Branch 221 dated September 6, 2000 is hereby
AFFIRMED IN TOTO. Costs against [petitioners].[5]
Undaunted, petitioners appealed` by certiorari to this Court, adamant
that the CA grievously erred, thus:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT
THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF JAYSON'S INJURY WAS HIS OWN ACT OF
LOOKING AT THE HEATED TEST TUBE BEFORE THE COMPOUND HAD
COOLED IN COMPLETE DISREGARD OF INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN PRIOR TO
THE EXPERIMENT.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO APPRECIATE THAT, IN LIGHT OF
THE RULING IN THE CASE OF ST. MARY'S COLLEGE V. WILLIAM
CARPITANOS, x x x JAYSON'S CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF PEEKING
INTO THE TEST TUBE WAS IN FACT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF HIS
INJURY FOR WHICH THE PETITIONERS SHOULD NOT BE HELD LIABLE.
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
AWARD OF ACTUAL DAMAGES DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF PROOF TO
SUPPORT THE SAME.
37

IV. THE LOWER COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN AWARDING MORAL
DAMAGES TO [JAYSON].
V. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO [JAYSON].
VI. THE LOWER COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN DENYING THE
PETITIONERS' COUNTERCLAIM.[6]
We find no reason to depart from the uniform rulings of the lower
courts that petitioners were "negligent since they all failed to exercise
the required reasonable care, prudence, caution and foresight to
prevent or avoid injuries to the students."
Jurisprudence dictates that factual findings of the trial court, especially
when affirmed by the appellate court, are accorded the highest degree
of respect and are considered conclusive between the parties. [7] A
review of such findings by this Court is not warranted except for highly
meritorious circumstances when: (1) the findings of a trial court are
grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) a lower
court's inference from its factual findings is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion in the
appreciation of facts; (4) the findings of the appellate court go beyond
the issues of the case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if
properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; (5) there is a
misappreciation of facts; (6) the findings of fact are conclusions
without mention of the specific evidence on which they are based, are
premised on the absence of evidence, or are contradicted by evidence
on record.[8] None of the foregoing exceptions which would warrant a
reversal of the assailed decision obtains in this instance.
Yet, petitioners maintain that the proximate cause of Jayson's injury
was his own negligence in disregarding the instructions given by
Tabugo prior to the experiment and peeking into the test tube.
Petitioners invoke our ruling in St. Mary's Academy v. Carpitanos[9]
which absolved St. Mary's Academy from liability for the untimely
death of its student during a school sanctioned activity, declaring that
"the negligence of petitioner St. Mary's Academy was only a remote
cause of the accident."
We are not convinced.
Contrary to petitioners' assertions, the lower courts' conclusions are
borne out by the records of this case. Both courts correctly concluded
that the immediate and proximate cause of the accident which caused
injury to Jayson was the sudden and unexpected explosion of the
chemicals, independent of any intervening cause. The assailed
Decision of the CA quotes with favor the RTC decision, thus:
In this case, [petitioners] failed to show that the negligence of [Jayson]
was the proximate cause of the latter's injury. We find that the
immediate cause of the accident was not the negligence of [Jayson]
when he curiously looked into the test tube when the chemicals
suddenly exploded which caused his injury, but the sudden and
unexpected explosion of the chemicals independent of any intervening
cause. [Petitioners] could have prevented the mishap if they exercised
a higher degree of care, caution and foresight. The court a quo
correctly ruled that:
"All of the [petitioners] are equally at fault and are liable for negligence
because all of them are responsible for exercising the required
reasonable care, prudence, caution and foresight to prevent or avoid
injuries to the students. The individual [petitioners] are persons
charged with the teaching and vigilance over their students as well as
the supervision and ensuring of their well-being. Based on the facts
presented before this Court, these [petitioners] were remiss in their
responsibilities and lacking in the degree of vigilance expected of
them. [Petitioner] subject teacher Rosalinda Tabugo was inside the
classroom when the class undertook the science experiment although
[Jayson] insisted that said [petitioner] left the classroom. No evidence,
however, was presented to establish that [petitioner] Tabugo was
inside the classroom for the whole duration of the experiment. It was
unnatural in the ordinary course of events that [Jayson] was brought to
the school clinic for immediate treatment not by [petitioner] subject
teacher Rosalinda Tabugo but by somebody else. The Court is inclined
to believe that [petitioner] subject teacher Tabugo was not inside the
classroom at the time the accident happened. The Court is also
38
perplexed why none of the other students (who were eyewitnesses to
the incident) testified in Court to corroborate the story of the
[petitioners]. The Court, however, understands that these other
students cannot testify for [Jayson] because [Jayson] is no longer
enrolled in said school and testifying for [Jayson] would incur the ire of
school authorities. Estefania Abdan is equally at fault as the subject
adviser or teacher in charge because she exercised control and
supervision over [petitioner] Tabugo and the students themselves. It
was her obligation to insure that nothing would go wrong and that the
science experiment would be conducted safely and without any harm
or injury to the students. [Petitioner] Sr. Josephini Ambatali is likewise
culpable under the doctrine of command responsibility because the
other individual [petitioners] were under her direct control and
supervision. The negligent acts of the other individual [petitioners]
were done within the scope of their assigned tasks.
x x x x
"The defense of due diligence of a good father of a family raised by
[petitioner] St. Joseph College will not exculpate it from liability
because it has been shown that it was guilty of inexcusable laxity in
the supervision of its teachers (despite an apparent rigid screening
process for hiring) and in the maintenance of what should have been a
safe and secured environment for conducting dangerous experiments.
[Petitioner] school is still liable for the wrongful acts of the teachers
and employees because it had full information on the nature of
dangerous science experiments but did not take affirmative steps to
avert damage and injury to students. The fact that there has never
been any accident in the past during the conduct of science
experiments is not a justification to be complacent in just preserving
the status quo and do away with creative foresight to install safety
measures to protect the students. Schools should not simply install
safety reminders and distribute safety instructional manuals. More
importantly, schools should provide protective gears and devices to
shield students from expected risks and anticipated dangers.
"Ordinarily, the liability of teachers does not extend to the school or
university itself, although an educational institution may be held liable
under the principle of RESPONDENT SUPERIOR. It has also been held
that the liability of the employer for the [tortuous] acts or negligence of
its employees is primary and solidary, direct and immediate and not
conditioned upon the insolvency of or prior recourse against the
negligent employee."[10]
Under the foregoing circumstances, we are hard pressed to disturb the
findings of the RTC, which the CA affirmed.
Nonetheless, petitioners make much of the fact that Tabugo specifically
instructed her students, including Jayson, at the start of the
experiment, not to look into the heated test tube before the compound
had cooled off. Petitioners would allocate all liability and place all
blame for the accident on a twelve (12)-year-old student, herein
respondent Jayson.
We disagree.
As found by both lower courts, the proximate cause of Jayson's injury
was the concurrent failure of petitioners to prevent the foreseeable
mishap that occurred during the conduct of the science experiment.
Petitioners were negligent by failing to exercise the higher degree of
care, caution and foresight incumbent upon the school, its
administrators and teachers.
Article 218 of the Family Code, in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil
Code, bestows special parental authority on the following persons with
the corresponding obligation, thus:
Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual,
entity or institution engaged in child care shall have special parental
authority and responsibility over the minor child while under their
supervision, instruction or custody.
Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities
whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or
institution.
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not
only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for
39
whom one is responsible. Significantly, respondents did not present any evidence to show that
the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the school
x x x x authorities, or the reckless driving of James Daniel II. x x x.

Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be Further, there was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor
liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, James Daniel II to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva. It
so long as they remain in their custody. was Ched Villanueva, grandson of respondent Vivencio Villanueva, who
had possession and control of the jeep. He was driving the vehicle and
he allowed James Daniel II, a minor, to drive the jeep at the time of the
Petitioners' negligence and failure to exercise the requisite degree of accident.
care and caution is demonstrated by the following:
Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of
1. Petitioner school did not take affirmative steps to avert damage and the minor driver or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide
injury to its students although it had full information on the nature of of the jeep, must be pinned on the minor's parents primarily. The
dangerous science experiments conducted by the students during negligence of petitioner St. Mary's Academy was only a remote cause
class; of the accident. Between the remote cause and the injury, there
intervened the negligence of the minor's parents or the detachment of
2. Petitioner school did not install safety measures to protect the the steering wheel guide of the jeep.[11]
students who conduct experiments in class;

3. Petitioner school did not provide protective gears and devices,
specifically goggles, to shield students from expected risks and
dangers; and
4. Petitioner Tabugo was not inside the classroom the whole time her
class conducted the experiment, specifically, when the accident
involving Jayson occurred. In any event, the size of the class--fifty (50)
students-- conducting the experiment is difficult to monitor.
Moreover, petitioners cannot simply deflect their negligence and
liability by insisting that petitioner Tabugo gave specific instructions to
her science class not to look directly into the heated compound.
Neither does our ruling in St. Mary's preclude their liability in this case.
Unfortunately for petitioners, St. Mary's is not in point. In that case,
respondents thereat admitted the documentary exhibits establishing
that the cause of the accident was a mechanical defect and not the
recklessness of the minor, James Daniel II, in driving the jeep. We held,
thus:
In marked contrast, both the lower courts similarly concluded that the
mishap which happened during the science experiment was
foreseeable by the school, its officials and teachers. This neglect in
preventing a foreseeable injury and damage equates to neglect in
exercising the utmost degree of diligence required of schools, its
administrators and teachers, and, ultimately, was the proximate cause
of the damage and injury to Jayson. As we have held in St. Mary's, "for
petitioner [St. Mary's Academy] to be liable, there must be a finding
that the act or omission considered as negligent was the proximate
cause of the injury caused because the negligence must have a causal
connection to the accident."[12]
As regards the contributory negligence of Jayson, we see no need to
disturb the lower courts' identical rulings thereon:
As earlier discussed, the proximate cause of [Jayson's] injury was the
explosion of the heated compound independent of any efficient
intervening cause. The negligence on the part of [petitioner] Tabugo in
not making sure that the science experiment was correctly conducted
was the proximate cause or reason why the heated compound
40
exploded and injured not only [Jayson] but his classmates as well.
However, [Jayson] is partly responsible for his own injury, hence, he WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
should not be entitled to recover damages in full but must likewise Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68367 is AFFIRMED. Costs against
bear the consequences of his own negligence. [Petitioners], therefore, petitioners.
should be held liable only for the damages actually caused by their
negligence.[13] SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Peralta, Abad, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Lastly, given our foregoing ruling, we likewise affirm the lower courts'
award of actual and moral damages, and grant of attorney's fees. The
denial of petitioners' counterclaim is also in order.

41