Professional Documents
Culture Documents
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, Finding that the signature appearing in the subject
vs. marriage contract was not that of respondent, the court
MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR, Respondent. found basis in granting the latters prayer to straighten her
record and rectify the terrible mistake.10
DECISION
Petitioner, however, moved for the reconsideration of the
PERALTA, J.: assailed Decision on the grounds that: (1) there was no
clerical spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under in the marriage contract for it to fall within the provisions
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the Regional Trial of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court; and (2) granting the
Court1(RTC) Decision2 dated May 5, 2009 and Order3 dated cancellation of all the entries in the wife portion of the
August 25, 2009 in SP. Proc. No. 16519-CEB. The assailed alleged marriage contract is, in effect, declaring the
decision granted respondent Merlinda L. Olaybar's petition marriage void ab initio.11
for cancellation of entries in the latter's marriage contract;
while the assailed order denied the motion for In an Order dated August 25, 2009, the RTC denied
reconsideration filed by petitioner Republic of the petitioners motion for reconsideration couched in this
Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor General wise:
(OSG).
WHEREFORE, the court hereby denies the Motion for
The facts of the case are as follows: Reconsideration filed by the Republic of the Philippines.
Furnish copies of this order to the Office of the Solicitor
Respondent requested from the National Statistics Office General, the petitioners counsel, and all concerned
(NSO) a Certificate of No Marriage (CENOMAR) as one of government agencies.
the requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend of
five years. Upon receipt thereof, she discovered that she SO ORDERED.12
was already married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean
National, on June 24, 2002, at the Office of the Municipal Contrary to petitioners stand, the RTC held that it had
Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Palace of Justice. She denied jurisdiction to take cognizance of cases for correction of
having contracted said marriage and claimed that she did entries even on substantial errors under Rule 108 of the
not know the alleged husband; she did not appear before Rules of Court being the appropriate adversary proceeding
the solemnizing officer; and, that the signature appearing required. Considering that respondents identity was used
in the marriage certificate is not hers.4 She, thus, filed a by an unknown person to contract marriage with a Korean
Petition for Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage national, it would not be feasible for respondent to
Contract, especially the entries in the wife portion institute an action for declaration of nullity of marriage
thereof.5 Respondent impleaded the Local Civil Registrar of since it is not one of the void marriages under Articles 35
Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband, as parties to the and 36 of the Family Code.13
case.
Petitioner now comes before the Court in this Petition for
During trial, respondent testified on her behalf and Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
explained that she could not have appeared before Judge seeking the reversal of the assailed RTC Decision and
Mamerto Califlores, the supposed solemnizing officer, at Order based on the following grounds:
the time the marriage was allegedly celebrated, because
she was then in Makati working as a medical distributor in I.
Hansao Pharma. She completely denied having known the
supposed husband, but she revealed that she recognized RULE 108 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT APPLIES
the named witnesses to the marriage as she had met them ONLY WHEN THERE ARE ERRORS IN THE ENTRIES
while she was working as a receptionist in Tadels Pension SOUGHT TO BE CANCELLED OR CORRECTED.
House. She believed that her name was used by a certain
Johnny Singh, who owned a travel agency, whom she gave
her personal circumstances in order for her to obtain a II.
passport.6 Respondent also presented as witness a certain
Eufrocina Natinga, an employee of MTCC, Branch 1, who GRANTING THE CANCELLATION OF "ALL THE ENTRIES IN
confirmed that the marriage of Ye Son Sune was indeed THE WIFE PORTION OF THE ALLEGED MARRIAGE
celebrated in their office, but claimed that the alleged wife CONTRACT," IS IN EFFECT DECLARING THE MARRIAGE
who appeared was definitely not respondent.7 Lastly, a VOID AB INITIO.14
document examiner testified that the signature appearing
in the marriage contract was forged.8 Petitioner claims that there are no errors in the entries
sought to be cancelled or corrected, because the entries
On May 5, 2009, the RTC rendered the assailed Decision, made in the certificate of marriage are the ones provided
the dispositive portion of which reads: by the person who appeared and represented herself as
Merlinda L. Olaybar and are, in fact, the latters personal
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, the petition is circumstances.15 In directing the cancellation of the entries
granted in favor of the petitioner, Merlinda L. Olaybar. The in the wife portion of the certificate of marriage, the RTC,
Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City is directed to cancel all in effect, declared the marriage null and void ab
the entries in the WIFE portion of the alleged marriage initio.16 Thus, the petition instituted by respondent is
contract of the petitioner and respondent Ye Son Sune. actually a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage in
the guise of a Rule 108 proceeding.17
The Court notes, however, that its description of WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the
Metrobanks fourth-party complaint as a claimclosely petition for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of
analogous to solutio indebiti is only to determine the Appeals dated August 25, 2005, holding that the Regional
validity of the lower courts orders denying it. It is not an Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 80, did not commit
adjudication determining the liability of Chuas estate grave abuse of discretion in denying Metropolitan Bank &
against Metrobank. The appropriate trial court should still Trust Company's motion for leave to admit fourth-party
determine whether Metrobank has a lawful claim against complaint Is
Chuas estate based on quasi-contract.1wphi1
AFFIRMED. Costs against Metropolitan Bank & Trust
Metrobanks fourth-party complaint, Company.
as a contingent claim, falls within the
claims that should be filed under SO ORDERED.
Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of
Court G.R. No. 174975 January 20, 2009
A distinctive character of Metrobanks fourth-party LUISA KHO MONTAER, ALEJANDRO MONTAER, JR.,
complaint is its contingent nature the claim depends on LILLIBETH MONTAER-BARRIOS, AND RHODORA
the possibility that Metrobank would be adjudged liable to ELEANOR MONTAER-DALUPAN, Petitioners,
AMC, a future event that may or may not happen. This vs.
characteristic unmistakably marks the complaint as a SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT, FOURTH SHARI'A JUDICIAL
contingent one that must be included in the claims falling DISTRICT, MARAWI CITY, LILING DISANGCOPAN, AND
under the terms of Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court: ALMAHLEEN LILING S. MONTAER, Respondents.
Sec. 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not DECISION
filed, barred; exceptions. All claims for money against the
PUNO, C.J.:
decedent, arising from contract, express or implied,
whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims This Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeks to set
for funeral expenses and expenses for the last sickness of aside the Orders of the Sharia District Court, Fourth
the decedent, and judgment for money against the Sharia Judicial District, Marawi City, dated August 22,
decedent, must be filed within the time limited in the 20061 and September 21, 2006.2
notice. [italics ours]
On August 17, 1956, petitioner Luisa Kho Montaer, a
Specific provisions of Section 5, Rule Roman Catholic, married Alejandro Montaer, Sr. at the
86 of the Rules of Court prevail over Immaculate Conception Parish in Cubao, Quezon
general provisions of Section 11, Rule City.3 Petitioners Alejandro Montaer, Jr., Lillibeth
6 of the Rules of Court Montaer-Barrios, and Rhodora Eleanor Montaer-
Dalupan are their children.4 On May 26, 1995, Alejandro
Metrobank argues that Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of
Montaer, Sr. died.5
Court should apply because it impleaded Chuas estate for
reimbursement in the same transaction upon which it has On August 19, 2005, private respondents Liling
been sued by AMC. On this point, the Court supports the Disangcopan and her daughter, Almahleen Liling S.
conclusion of the CA, to wit: Montaer, both Muslims, filed a "Complaint" for the
judicial partition of properties before the Sharia District
Notably, a comparison of the respective provisions of
Court.6 The said complaint was entitled "Almahleen Liling
Section 11, Rule 6 and Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of
S. Montaer and Liling M. Disangcopan v. the Estates and
Court readily shows that Section 11, Rule 6 applies to
Properties of Late Alejandro Montaer, Sr., Luisa Kho
ordinary civil actions while Section 5, Rule 86 specifically
Montaer, Lillibeth K. Montaer, Alejandro Kho Montaer,
applies to money claims against the estate. The specific
Jr., and Rhodora Eleanor K. Montaer," and docketed as
provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 x x x must therefore
"Special Civil Action No. 7-05."7 In the said complaint,
prevail over the general provisions of Section 11, Rule 6. 48
private respondents made the following allegations: (1) in
We read with approval the CAs use of the statutory May 1995, Alejandro Montaer, Sr. died; (2) the late
construction principle of lex specialis derogat generali, Alejandro Montaer, Sr. is a Muslim; (3) petitioners are the
leading to the conclusion that the specific provisions of first family of the decedent; (4) Liling Disangcopan is the
Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court should prevail over widow of the decedent; (5) Almahleen Liling S. Montaer is
the general provisions of Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of the daughter of the decedent; and (6) the estimated value
Court; the settlement of the estate of deceased persons of and a list of the properties comprising the estate of the
(where claims against the deceased should be filed) is decedent.8 Private respondents prayed for the Sharia
primarily governed by the rules on special proceedings, District Court to order, among others, the following: (1)
while the rules provided for ordinary claims, including the partition of the estate of the decedent; and (2) the
Section 11, Rule 6 ofthe Rules of Court, merely apply appointment of an administrator for the estate of the
suppletorily.49 decedent.9
RESPONDENT SHARIA DISTRICT COURT DID NOT Although private respondents designated the pleading
ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE COMPLAINT OF filed before the Sharia District Court as a "Complaint" for
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AGAINST PETITIONERS DUE TO judicial partition of properties, it is a petition for the
NON-PAYMENT OF THE FILING AND DOCKETING FEES. issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and
distribution of the estate of the decedent. It contains
IV. sufficient jurisdictional facts required for the settlement of
the estate of a deceased Muslim,23 such as the fact of
RESPONDENT SHARIA DISTRICT COURTMARAWI CITY Alejandro Montaer, Sr.s death as well as the allegation
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING that he is a Muslim. The said petition also contains an
TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DENIED THE enumeration of the names of his legal heirs, so far as
OPPOSITION OF PETITIONERS AND THEN GRANTED THE known to the private respondents, and a probable list of
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF RESPONDENTS the properties left by the decedent, which are the very
LILING DISANGCOPAN, ET AL. WHICH WAS FATALLY properties sought to be settled before a probate court.
DEFECTIVE FOR LACK OF A "NOTICE OF HEARING." Furthermore, the reliefs prayed for reveal that it is the
intention of the private respondents to seek judicial
In addition, the present case calls for a liberal construction "Wherefore in view of the foregoing considerations,
of the rules on notice of hearing, because the rights of the judgment appealed from is reversed and set aside and
petitioners were not affected. This Court has held that an another one entered annulling the Deed of Sale executed
exception to the rules on notice of hearing is where it by Graciano Del Rosario in favor of defendant-appellee
appears that the rights of the adverse party were not Patricia Natcher, and ordering the Register of Deeds to
affected.50 The purpose for the notice of hearing coincides Cancel TCT No. 186059 and reinstate TCT No. 107443
with procedural due process,51 for the court to determine without prejudice to the filing of a special proceeding for
whether the adverse party agrees or objects to the motion, the settlement of the estate of Graciano Del Rosario in a
as the Rules do not fix any period within which to file a proper court. No costs.
reply or opposition.52 In probate proceedings, "what the
"So ordered."
law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice, but the
absolute absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were
heard."53 In the case at bar, as evident from the Sharia registered owners of a parcel of land with an area of 9,322
District Courts order dated January 17, 2006, petitioners square meters located in Manila and covered by Transfer
counsel received a copy of the motion for reconsideration Certificate of Title No. 11889. Upon the death of Graciana
in question. Petitioners were certainly not denied an in 1951, Graciano, together with his six children, namely:
opportunity to study the arguments in the said motion as Bayani, Ricardo, Rafael, Leticia, Emiliana and Nieves,
they filed an opposition to the same. Since the Sharia entered into an extrajudicial settlement of Graciana's
District Court reset the hearing for the motion for estate on 09 February 1954 adjudicating and dividing
reconsideration in the same order, petitioners were not among themselves the real property subject of TCT No.
denied the opportunity to object to the said motion in a 11889. Under the agreement, Graciano received 8/14
hearing. Taken together, these circumstances show that share while each of the six children received 1/14 share of
the purpose for the rules of notice of hearing, procedural the said property. Accordingly, TCT No. 11889 was
process, was duly observed. cancelled, and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 35980 was issued in
the name of Graciano and the Six children.1wphi1.nt
Prescription and Filiation
Further, on 09 February 1954, said heirs executed and
Petitioners fifth argument is premature. Again, the Sharia
forged an "Agreement of Consolidation-Subdivision of Real
District Court has not yet determined whether it has
Property with Waiver of Rights" where they subdivided
jurisdiction to settle the estate of the decedent. In the
among themselves the parcel of land covered by TCT No.
event that a special proceeding for the settlement of the
35980 into several lots. Graciano then donated to his
estate of a decedent is pending, questions regarding
children, share and share alike, a portion of his interest in
heirship, including prescription in relation to recognition
the land amounting to 4,849.38 square meters leaving only
and filiation, should be raised and settled in the said
447.60 square meters registered under Graciano's name,
proceeding.54 The court, in its capacity as a probate court,
as covered by TCT No. 35988. Subsequently, the land
has jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of the
subject of TCT No. 35988 was further subdivided into two
decedent.55 In the case at bar, the determination of the
separate lots where the first lot with a land area of 80.90
heirs of the decedent depends on an affirmative answer to
square meter was registered under TCT No. 107442 and
the question of whether the Sharia District Court has
the second lot with a land area of 396.70 square meters
jurisdiction over the estate of the decedent.
was registered under TCT No. 107443. Eventually,
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The Orders of Graciano sold the first lot2 to a third person but retained
the Sharia District Court, dated August 22, 2006 and ownership over the second lot.3
September 21, 2006 respectively, are AFFIRMED. Cost
On 20 March 1980, Graciano married herein petitioner
against petitioners.
Patricia Natcher. During their marriage, Graciano sold the
SO ORDERED. land covered by TCT No. 107443 to his wife Patricia as a
result of which TCT No. 1860594 was issued in the latter's
G.R. No. 133000 October 2, 2001 name. On 07 October 1985,Graciano died leaving his
second wife Patricia and his six children by his first
PATRICIA NATCHER, petitioner, marriage, as heirs.
vs.
HON. COURT OFAPPEALS AND THE HEIR OF GRACIANO In a complaint5 filed in Civil Case No. 71075 before the
DEL ROSARIO LETICIA DEL ROSARIO, EMILIA DEL Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 55, herein private
RESORIO MANANGAN, ROSALINDA FUENTES LLANA, respondents alleged that upon Graciano's death, petitioner
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the Applying these principles, an action for reconveyance and
lower court's decision ratiocinating, inter alia: annulment of title with damages is a civil action, whereas
matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased
"It is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to person such as advancement of property made by the
make a just and legal distribution of the estate. The court a decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding,
quo, trying an ordinary action for reconveyance / which concomitantly requires the application of specific
annulment of title, went beyond its jurisdiction when it rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.
performed the acts proper only in a special proceeding for
the settlement of estate of a deceased person. XXX Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution
of the estate of the decedent fall within the exclusive
"X X X Thus the court a quo erred in regarding the subject province of the probate court in the exercise of its limited
property as advance inheritance. What the court should jurisdiction.
have done was merely to rule on the validity of (the) sale
and leave the issue on advancement to be resolved in a Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court,
separate proceeding instituted for that purpose. XXX" questions as to advancement made or alleged to have been
made by the deceased to any heir may be heard and
Aggrieved, herein petitioner seeks refuge under our determined by the court having jurisdiction of the
protective mantle through the expediency of Rule 45 of the estate proceedings; and the final order of the court
Rules of Court and assails the appellate court's decision thereon shall be binding on the person raising the
"for being contrary to law and the facts of the case." questions and on the heir.
We concur with the Court of Appeals and find no merit in While it may be true that the Rules used the word "may", it
the instant petition. is nevertheless clear that the same
provision11contemplates a probate court when it speaks of
Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure the "court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings".
defines civil action and special proceedings, in this wise:
Corollarily, the Regional Trial Court in the instant case,
"XXX a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another acting in its general jurisdiction, is devoid of authority to
for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the render an adjudication and resolve the issue of
prevention or redress of a wrong. advancement of the real property in favor of herein
petitioner Natcher, inasmuch as Civil Case No. 471075 for
reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is not,
The petitions in these cases must be dismissed. Thus, under Section 1 Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, an
action is defined as "an ordinary suit in a court of justice by
First. As stated in the beginning, the principal question in which one party prosecutes another for the enforcement
these cases is whether a petition for liquidation under 29 or protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a
of Rep. Act No. 265 is in the nature of a special proceeding. wrong." On the other hand, Section 2 of the same Rule
If it is, then the period of appeal is 30 days and the party states that "every other remedy including one to establish
appealing must, in addition to a notice of appeal, file with the status or right of a party or a particular fact shall be by
the trial court a record on appeal in order to perfect his special proceeding."
appeal. Otherwise, if a liquidation proceeding is an
ordinary action, the period of appeal is 15 days from notice To our mind, from the aforequoted definitions of an action
of the decision or final order appealed from. and a special proceeding, the petition for assistance of the
court in the liquidation of an asset of a bank is not "one to
BP Blg. 129 provides: establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact."
Contrary to the submission of the petitioner, the petition is
39. Appeals. The period for appeal from final orders, not intended to establish the fact of insolvency of the bank.
resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court The insolvency of the bank had already been previously
in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the determined by the Central Bank in accordance with
notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment or Section 9 of the CB Act before the petition was filed. All
decision appealed from: Provided, however, that in habeas that needs to be done is to liquidate the assets of the bank
corpuscases the period for appeal shall be forty-eight (48) and thus the assistance of the respondent court is sought
hours from the notice of the judgment appealed from. for that purpose.
No record on appeal shall be required to take an appeal. In It should be pointed out that this petition filed is not
lieu thereof, the entire record shall be transmitted with all among the cases categorized as a special proceeding under
the pages prominently numbered consecutively, together Section 1, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court, nor among the
with an index of the contents thereof. special proceedings that may be appealed under Section 1,
Rule 109 of the Rules.
This section shall not apply in appeals in special
proceedings and in other cases wherein multiple appeals We disagree with the foregoing view of the Fourteenth
are allowed under applicable provisions of the Rules of Division. Rule 2 of the Rules of Court provide:
Court.
1. Action defined. Action means an ordinary suit in a
The Interim Rules and Guidelines to implement BP Blg. court of justice, by which the party prosecutes another for
129 provides: the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention
or redress of a wrong.
19. Period of Appeals.
2. Special Proceeding Distinguished. Every other
(a) All appeals, except in habeas corpus cases and in the
remedy, including one to establish the status or right of a
cases referred to in paragraph (b) hereof, must be taken
party or a particular fact, shall be by special proceeding.
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment, order,
resolution or award appealed from. Elucidating the crucial distinction between an ordinary
action and a special proceeding, Chief Justice Moran
(b) In appeals in special proceedings in accordance with
states:" 11
Rule 109 of the Rules of Court and other cases wherein
multiple appeals are allowed, the period of appeals shall be Action is the act by which one sues another in a court of
thirty (30) days, a record on appeal being required. justice for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong while special proceeding
The Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals held that
is the act by which one seeks to establish the status or
the proceeding is an ordinary action similar to an action
right of a party, or a particular fact. Hence, action is
for interpleader under Rule 63. 10 The Fourteenth Division
distinguished from special proceeding in that the former is
stated:
a formal demand of a right by one against another, while
The petition filed is akin to an interpleader under Rule 63 the latter is but a petition for a declaration of a status, right
of the Rules of Court where there are conflicting claimants or fact. Where a party litigant seeks to recover property
or several claims upon the same subject matter, a person from another, his remedy is to file an action. Where his
who claims no interest thereon may file an action for purpose is to seek the appointment of a guardian for an
interpleader to compel the claimants to "interplead" and insane, his remedy is a special proceeding to establish the
litigate their several claims among themselves. (Section I fact or status of insanity calling for an appointment of
Rule 63). guardianship.
An interpleader is in the category of a special civil action Considering this distinction, a petition for liquidation of an
under Rule 62 which, like an ordinary action, may be insolvent corporation should be classified a special
appealed only within fifteen (15) days from notice of the proceeding and not an ordinary action. Such petition does
judgment or order appealed from. Under Rule 62, the not seek the enforcement or protection of a right nor the
preceding rules covering ordinary civil actions which are prevention or redress of a wrong against a party. It does
not inconsistent with or may serve to supplement the not pray for affirmative relief for injury arising from a
provisions of the rule relating to such civil actions are
Rule 72: Subject Matter and Applicability of General Rules Page 13
party's wrongful act or omission nor state a cause of action Verily, the import of the final character of an Order of
that can be enforced against any person. allowance or disallowance of a particular claim cannot be
overemphasized. It is the operative fact that constitutes a
What it seeks is merely a declaration by the trial court of liquidation proceeding a "case where multiple appeals are
the corporation's insolvency so that its creditors may be allowed by law." The issuance of an Order which, by its
able to file their claims in the settlement of the nature, affects only the particular claims involved, and
corporation's debts and obligations. Put in another way, which may assume finality if no appeal is made
the petition only seeks a declaration of the corporation's therefrom, ipso facto creates a situation where multiple
debts and obligations. Put in another way, the petition only appeals are allowed.
seeks a declaration of the corporation's state of insolvency
and the concomitant right of creditors and the order of A liquidation proceeding is commenced by the filing of a
payment of their claims in the disposition of the single petition by the Solicitor General with a court of
corporation's assets. competent jurisdiction entitled, "Petition for Assistance in
the Liquidation of e.g., Pacific Banking Corporation. All
Contrary to the rulings of the Fourteenth Division, claims against the insolvent are required to be filed with
liquidation proceedings do not resemble petitions for the liquidation court. Although the claims are litigated in
interpleader. For one, an action for interpleader involves the same proceeding, the treatment is individual. Each
claims on a subject matter against a person who has no claim is heard separately. And the Order issued relative to
interest therein. 12 This is not the case in a liquidation a particular claim applies only to said claim, leaving the
proceeding where the Liquidator, as representative of the other claims unaffected, as each claim is considered
corporation, takes charge of its assets and liabilities for the separate and distinct from the others. Obviously, in the
benefit of the creditors. 13 He is thus charged with insuring event that an appeal from an Order allowing or disallowing
that the assets of the corporation are paid only to rightful a particular claim is made, only said claim is affected,
claimants and in the order of payment provided by law. leaving the others to proceed with their ordinary course.
In such case, the original records of the proceeding are not
Rather, a liquidation proceeding resembles the proceeding elevated to the appellate court. They remain with the
for the settlement of state of deceased persons under Rules liquidation court. In lieu of the original record, a record of
73 to 91 of the Rules of Court. The two have a common appeal is instead required to be prepared and transmitted
purpose: the determination of all the assets and the to the appellate court.
payment of all the debts and liabilities of the insolvent
corporation or the estate. The Liquidator and the Inevitably, multiple appeals are allowed in liquidation
administrator or executor are both charged with the assets proceedings. Consequently, a record on appeal is
for the benefit of the claimants. In both instances, the necessary in each and every appeal made. Hence, the
liability of the corporation and the estate is not disputed. period to appeal therefrom should be thirty (30) days, a
The court's concern is with the declaration of creditors and record on appeal being required. (Record pp. 162-164).
their rights and the determination of their order of
payment. In G.R. No. 112991 (the case of the
Stockholders/Investors), the Liquidator's notice of appeal
Furthermore, as in the settlement of estates, multiple was filed on time, having been filed on the 23rd day of
appeals are allowed in proceedings for liquidation of an receipt of the order granting the claims of the
insolvent corporation. As the Fifth Division of the Court of Stockholders/Investors. However, the Liquidator did not
Appeals, quoting the Liquidator, correctly noted: file a record on appeal with the result that he failed to
perfect his appeal. As already stated a record on appeal is
A liquidation proceeding is a single proceeding which required under the Interim Rules and Guidelines in special
consists of a number of cases properly classified as proceedings and for cases where multiple appeals are
"claims." It is basically a two-phased proceeding. The first allowed. The reason for this is that the several claims are
phase is concerned with the approval and disapproval of actually separate ones and a decision or final order with
claims. Upon the approval of the petition seeking the respect to any claim can be appealed. Necessarily the
assistance of the proper court in the liquidation of a close original record on appeal must remain in the trial court
entity, all money claims against the bank are required to be where other claims may still be pending.
filed with the liquidation court. This phase may end with
the declaration by the liquidation court that the claim is Because of the Liquidator's failure to perfect his appeal,
not proper or without basis. On the other hand, it may also the order granting the claims of the
end with the liquidation court allowing the claim. In the Stockholders/Investors became final. Consequently. the
latter case, the claim shall be classified whether it is Fourteenth Division's decision dismissing the Liquidator's
ordinary or preferred, and thereafter included Liquidator. Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus must be
In either case, the order allowing or disallowing a affirmed albeit for a different reason.
particular claim is final order, and may be appealed by the
party aggrieved thereby. On the other hand, in G.R. No. 109373 (case of the Labor
Union), we find that the Fifth Division correctly granted
The second phase involves the approval by the Court of the the Liquidator's Petition for Certiorari. Prohibition
distribution plan prepared by the duly appointed and Mandamus. As already noted, the Liquidator filed a
liquidator. The distribution plan specifies in detail the total notice of appeal and a motion for extension to file a record
amount available for distribution to creditors whose claim on appeal on December 10, 1991, i.e., within 30 days of his
were earlier allowed. The Order finally disposes of the receipt of the order granting the Union's claim. Without
issue of how much property is available for disposal. waiting for the resolution of his motion for extension, he
Moreover, it ushers in the final phase of the liquidation filed on December 20, 1991 within the extension sought a
proceeding payment of all allowed claims in accordance record on appeal. Respondent judge thus erred in
with the order of legal priority and the approved disallowing the notice on appeal and denying the
distribution plan. Liquidator's motion for extension to file a record on
appeal.
Second. In G.R. No. 109373, The Union claims that under CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
29 of Rep. Act No. 265, the court merely assists in
adjudicating the claims of creditors, preserves the assets of In "In the Matter of Declaration of Presumptive Death of
the institution, and implements the liquidation plan Absentee Spouse Clemente P. Jomoc, Apolinaria Malinao
approved by the Monetary Board and that, therefore, as Jomoc, petitioner," the Ormoc City, Regional Trial Court,
representative of the Monetary Board, the Liquidator Branch 35, by Order of September 29, 1999,1 granted the
cannot question the order of the court or appeal from it. It petition on the basis of the Commissioners Report2 and
contends that since the Monetary Board had previously accordingly declared the absentee spouse, who had left his
admitted PaBC's liability to the laborers by in fact setting petitioner-wife nine years earlier, presumptively dead.
aside the amount of P112,234,292.44 for the payment of
In granting the petition, the trial judge, Judge Fortunito L.
their claims, there was nothing else for the Liquidator to
Madrona, cited Article 41, par. 2 of the Family Code. Said
do except to comply with the order of the court.
article provides that for the purpose of contracting a valid
The Union's contention is untenable. In liquidation subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a previous
proceedings, the function of the trial court is not limited to marriage where the prior spouse had been absent for four
assisting in the implementation of the orders of the consecutive years, the spouse present must
Monetary Board. Under the same section (29) of the law institute summary proceedings for the declaration of
invoked by the Union, the court has authority to set aside presumptive death of the absentee spouse, without
the decision of the Monetary Board "if there is a convincing prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the absent
proof that the action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad spouse.
faith." 14 As this Court held in Rural Bank of Buhi,
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals: 15
sought to appeal the trial courts order by filing a Notice of
There is no question, that the action of the monetary Board Appeal.3
in this regard may be subject to judicial review. Thus, it has
By Order of November 22, 1999s,4 the trial court, noting
been held that the Court's may interfere with the Central
that no record of appeal was filed and served "as required
Bank's exercise of discretion in determining whether or
by and pursuant to Sec. 2(a), Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of
not a distressed bank shall be supported or liquidated.
Civil Procedure, the present case being a special
Discretion has its limits and has never been held to include
proceeding," disapproved the Notice of Appeal.
arbitrariness, discrimination or bad faith (Ramos v. Central
Bank of the Philippines, 41 SCRA 567 [1971]). The Republics Motion for Reconsideration of the trial
courts order of disapproval having been denied by Order
In truth, the Liquidator is the representative not only of
of January 13, 2000,5 it filed a Petition
the Central Bank but also of the insolvent bank. Under
for Certiorari6 before the Court of Appeals, it contending
28A-29 of Rep. Act No. 265 he acts in behalf of the bank
that the declaration of presumptive death of a person
"personally or through counsel as he may retain, in all
under Article 41 of the Family Code is not a special
actions or proceedings or against the corporation" and he
proceeding or a case of multiple or separate appeals
has authority "to do whatever may be necessary for these
requiring a record on appeal.
purposes." This authority includes the power to appeal
from the decisions or final orders of the court which he By Decision of May 5, 2004,7 the Court of Appeals denied
believes to be contrary to the interest of the bank. the Republics petition on procedural and substantive
grounds in this wise:
Finally the Union contends that the notice of appeal and
motion for extension of time to file the record on appeal At the outset, it must be stressed that the petition is not
filed in behalf of the Central Bank was not filed by the sufficient in form. It failed to attach to its petition a
office of the Solicitor General as counsel for the Central certified true copy of the assailed Order dated January 13,
Bank. This contention has no merit. On October 22, 1992, 2000 [denying its Motion for Reconsideration of the
as Assistant Solicitor General Cecilio O. Estoesta informed November 22, 1999 Order disapproving its Notice of
the trial court in March 27, 1992, the OSG had previously Appeal]. Moreover, the petition questioned the [trial
authorized lawyers of the PDIC to prepare and sign courts] Order dated August 15, 1999, which declared
pleadings in the case. 16 Conformably thereto the Notice of Clemente Jomoc presumptively dead, likewise for having
Appeal and the Motion for Additional Time to submit been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
Record on Appeal filed were jointly signed by Solicitor lack of jurisdiction, yet, not even a copy could be found in
Reynaldo I. Saludares in behalf of the OSG and by lawyers the records. On this score alone, the petition should have
of the PDIC. 17 been dismissed outright in accordance with Sec. 3, Rule 46
of the Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 109373 and G.R. No 112991, the
decisions appealed from are AFFIRMED. However, despite the procedural lapses, the Court resolves
to delve deeper into the substantive issue of the
SO ORDERED.
validity/nullity of the assailed order.
G.R. No. 163604 May 6, 2005
The principal issue in this case is whether a petition
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, for declaration of the presumptive death of a person is
vs. in the nature of a special proceeding. If it is, the period
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (Twentieth Division), to appeal is 30 days and the party appealing must, in
HON. PRESIDING JUDGE FORTUNITO L. MADRONA, addition to a notice of appeal, file with the trial court a
As defined in Section 3(a), Rule 1 of the Rules of Court, "a (f) Rescission and revocation of adoption;
civil action is one by which a party sues another for the
(g) Hospitalization of insane persons;
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention of
redress of a wrong" while a special proceeding under (h) Habeas corpus;
Section 3(c) of the same rule is defined as "a remedy by
which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or a (i) Change of name;
particular fact (Heirs of Yaptinchay, et al. v. Del Rosario, et
al., G.R. No. 124320, March 2, 1999). (j) Voluntary dissolution of corporations;
Considering the aforementioned distinction, this Court (k) Judicial approval of voluntary recognition of minor
finds that the instant petition is in the nature of a natural children;
special proceeding and not an ordinary action. The
petition merely seeks for a declaration by the trial court of (l) Constitution of family home;
the presumptive death of absentee spouse Clemente
Jomoc. It does not seek the enforcement or protection of a (m) Declaration of absence and death;
right or the prevention or redress of a wrong. Neither does
it involve a demand of right or a cause of action that can be (n) Cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
enforced against any person. registry.
On the basis of the foregoing discussion, the subject Order Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of civil actions. In the absence
dated January 13, 2000 denying OSGs Motion for of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary
Reconsideration of the Order dated November 22, 1999 actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special
disapproving its Notice of Appeal was correctly proceedings. (Underscoring supplied)
issued. The instant petition, being in the nature of a
The pertinent provision of the Civil Code on presumption
special proceeding, OSG should have filed, in addition
of death provides:
to its Notice of Appeal, a record on appeal in accordance
with Section 19 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines to Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown
Implement BP Blg. 129 and Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the whether or not the absentee still lives, he shall
Rules of Court . . . (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of
succession.
The Republic (petitioner) insists that the declaration of
presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
not a special proceeding involving multiple or separate
appeals where a record on appeal shall be filed and served Upon the other hand, Article 41 of the Family Code, upon
in like manner. which the trial court anchored its grant of the petition for
the declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse,
Petitioner cites Rule 109 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
which enumerates the cases wherein multiple appeals are
allowed and a record on appeal is required for an appeal to Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the
be perfected. The petition for the declaration of subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void,
presumptive death of an absent spouse not being included unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage,
in the enumeration, petitioner contends that a mere notice the prior spouses had been absent for four consecutive
of appeal suffices. years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief
that the absent spouses was already dead. In case of
By Resolution of December 15, 2004,8 this Court, noting disappearance where there is danger of death under the
that copy of the September 27, 2004 Resolution9requiring circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of
respondent to file her comment on the petition was the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be
returned unserved with postmasters notation "Party sufficient.
refused," Resolved to consider that copy deemed served
upon her. For the purpose pf contracting the subsequent marriage
under the preceding paragraph, the spouses present must
The pertinent provisions on the General Provisions on institute a summary proceeding as provided in this
Special Proceedings, Part II of the Revised Rules of Court Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the
entitled SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS, read: absentee, without prejudice to the effect of a reappearance
of the absent spouse. (Emphasis and underscoring
RULE 72
supplied)
SUBJECT MATTER AND APPLICABILITY
OF GENERAL RULES Rule 41, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, on Modes
of Appeal, invoked by the trial court in disapproving
Section 1. Subject matter of special proceedings. Rules of
petitioners Notice of Appeal, provides:
special proceedings are provided for in the following:
Sec. 2. Modes of appeal. -
(a) Settlement of estate of deceased persons;
(a) Ordinary appeal. - The appeal to the Court of Appeals in
(b) Escheat;
cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of
its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of
Rule 72: Subject Matter and Applicability of General Rules Page 16
appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or having assailed the order disapproving the Notice of
final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon Appeal.
the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be required
except in special proceedings and other cases of WHEREFORE, the assailed May 5, 2004 Decision of the
multiple or separate appeals where the law or these Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let
Rules so require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall the case be REMANDED to it for appropriate action in light
be filed and served in like manner. (Emphasis and of the foregoing discussion.
underscoring supplied)
SO ORDERED.
xxx
G.R. No. 141396 April 9, 2002
By the trial courts citation of Article 41 of the Family Code,
it is gathered that the petition of Apolinaria Jomoc to have DEOGRACIAS MUSA, ROMEO and ANDRO MUSA, as
her absent spouse declared presumptively dead had for its represented by their Attorney-in-fact, MARILYN
purpose her desire to contract a valid subsequent MUSA, petitioners,
marriage. Ergo, the petition for that purpose is a vs.
"summary proceeding," following above-quoted Art. 41, SYLVIA AMOR, respondent.
paragraph 2 of the Family Code.
KAPUNAN, J.:
Since Title XI of the Family Code, entitled SUMMARY
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the
JUDICIAL PROCEEDING IN THE FAMILY LAW, contains the
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated September 27, 1999
following provision, inter alia:
in C.A. G.R. S.P. No. 49263 which modified in part the
xxx decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) and ruled that herein
Art. 238. Unless modified by the Supreme Court, the petitioners Deogracias, Romeo and Andro Musa are not
procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all tenants of the subject landholding; as well as the
casesprovided for in this Codes requiring summary court Resolution dated December 29, 1999 denying petitioners
proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an motion for reconsideration.
expeditious manner without regard to technical
rules. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) This case involves an agricultural landholding with a total
area of 9.9611 hectares located at Dancalan, Donsol,
x x x, Sorsogon formerly owned by one Antonio Dasig, two
hectares of which are ricelands and the rest are devoted to
there is no doubt that the petition of Apolinaria Jomoc coconuts. When Antonio Dasig migrated to the United
required, and is, therefore, a summary proceeding under States, his mother, Rosario Dasig, acted as administratrix
the Family Code, not a special proceeding under the of the said property.
Revised Rules of Court appeal for which calls for the filing
of a Record on Appeal. It being a summary ordinary On March 5, 1993, Rosario, representing her son, sold the
proceeding, the filing of a Notice of Appeal from the trial subject property to herein respondent Sylvia Amor for the
courts order sufficed. total amount of P300,000.00. This prompted petitioners,
claiming to be tenants of the landholding, to file a case for
That the Family Code provision on repeal, Art. 254, redemption against respondent and Rosario Dasig with the
provides as follows: Department of Agrarian Reform Regional Adjudicator.
Later on, respondent tried to eject petitioners from the
Art. 254. Titles III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, XI and XV of Book I property so the latter withdrew the case for redemption
of Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the Civil Code and filed against respondent a complaint for annulment of
of the Philippines, as amended, and Articles 17, 18, 19, 27, sale, reinstatement and damages with a prayer for
28, 29, 30, 31, 39, 40, 41 and 42 of Presidential Decree No. preliminary injunction, docketed as DARAB Case No. 05-
603, otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare 154-S.
Code, as amended, and all laws, decrees, executive orders,
proclamations rules and regulations, or parts In their complaint, petitioners averred that in 1979,
thereof, inconsistent therewith are Deogracias Musa entered into a verbal tenurial
hereby repealed, (Emphasis and underscoring supplied), arrangement with Antonio Dasig, through Rosario Dasig.
Deogracias tenancy continued uninterrupted under a 2/3-
seals the case in petitioners favor. 1/3 sharing arrangement per harvest on the riceland
portion and a 60-40 sharing in the produce of the coconut
Finally, on the alleged procedural flaw in petitioners plantation. Deogracias was helped by his two sons, Andro
petition before the appellate court. Petitioners failure to and Romeo Musa. When Deogracias fell ill due to a stroke
attach to his petition before the appellate court a copy of in 1990, his sons took over the cultivation and continued
the trial courts order denying its motion for the previous arrangement with Rosario Dasig who duly
reconsideration of the disapproval of its Notice of Appeal acknowledged the same and received the share pertaining
is not necessarily fatal, for the rules of procedure are not to to her as landowner. Petitioners were thus surprised when
be applied in a technical sense. Given the issue raised the landholding was later on sold by Rosario Dasig to
before it by petitioner, what the appellate court should respondent without their knowledge and consent. They
have done was to direct petitioner to comply with the rule. tried to redeem the property as tenants but during the
pendency of the case, a notice dated September 8, 1993
As for petitioners failure to submit copy of the trial courts
was issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform placing
order granting the petition for declaration of presumptive
the entire property under the Comprehensive Agrarian
death, contrary to the appellate courts observation that
Reform Program (CARP). This prompted petitioners to file
petitioner was also assailing it, petitioners 8-page
a complaint for annulment of the sale. Finally, petitioners
petition10 filed in said court does not so reflect, it merely
asseverated that the sale of the land to private respondent
It should be pointed out that identification of actual and As the above-quoted provision requires, service and filing
potential beneficiaries under CARP is vested in the DAR of pleadings must be done personally whenever
Secretary. Administrative Order No. 10, Series of 1989 practicable. The Court notes that in the present case,
provides: personal service would not be practicable. Considering the
distance between the Court of Appeals and Donsol,
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 10 Sorsogon where the petition was posted, clearly, service by
registered mail would have entailed considerable time,
Series of 1989 effort and expense. A written explanation why service was
not done personally might have been superfluous. In any
SUBJECT: RULES AND PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE case, as the rule is so worded with the use of "may,"
REGISTRATION OF BENEFICIARIES signifying permissiveness, a violation thereof gives the
court discretion whether or not to consider the paper as
I. PREFATORY STATEMENT not filed. While it is true that procedural rules are
necessary to secure an orderly and speedy administration
Pursuant to Section 15, Chapter IV, of the Comprehensive
of justice,14 rigid application of Section 11, Rule 13 may be
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, the DAR, in coordination
relaxed in this case in the interest of substantial
with the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC), as
justice.1wphi1.nt
organized pursuant to RA 6657, shall register all
agricultural lessees, tenants and farmworkers who are WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the
qualified beneficiaries of the CARP. This Administrative decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. S.P. No. 49263
Order provides the Implementing Rules and Procedures dated September 27, 1999 is AFFIRMED.
for the said registration.
SO ORDERED.
II. OBJECTIVES.
G.R. No. L-26306 April 27, 1988
A. General
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE GREGORIO VENTURA
1. Develop a data bank of potential and qualified MARIA VENTURA, executrix- appellant, MIGUEL
beneficiaries of the CARP for the effective implementation VENTURA and JUANA CARDONA, heirs-appellants,
of the program. vs.
GREGORIA VENTURA and HER HUSBAND, EXEQUIEL
B. Specific
VICTORIO, MERCEDES VENTURA and HER HUSBAND,
1. Identify the actual and potential farmer-beneficiaries of PEDRO D. CORPUZ, oppositors-appellees.
the CARP. (Underscoring ours.)
xxx
PARAS, J.:
It is significant to note that on September 3, 1993, the DAR
This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First
Secretary through the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office
Instance of Nueva Ecija, Guimba, Branch V in Special
(MARO) issued a Notice of Coverage placing the entire
Proceedings No. 812, Testate of the late Gregorio Venture,
agricultural landholding, including the subject property,
dated October 5, 1965, removing the appellant Maria
under CARP. Such being the case, the appellate courts
Ventura as executrix and administratrix of the estate of the
pronouncement that petitioners are not qualified
late Gregorio Ventura, and in her place appointing the
beneficiaries under CARP is just an obiter dictum and not
appellees Mercedes Ventura and Gregoria Ventura as joint
necessary in the resolution of the issues.
administratrices of the estate. (Record on Appeal, pp. 120-
Petitioners also allege that the Court of Appeals should not 131.)
have given due course to the petition because the
Appellant Maria Ventura is the illegitimate daughter of the
respondent failed to attach thereto a written explanation
deceased Gregorio Ventura while Miguel Ventura and
why personal service was not done, thereby violating
Juana Cardona are his son and saving spouse who are also
Section 11, Rule 13, of the Rules of Court. The Court of
the brother and mother of Maria Ventura. On the other
Appeals found the service of petition by registered mail
hand, appellees Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura are the
sufficient notwithstanding the absence of an explanation
deceased's legitimate children with his former wife, the
why service by mail was resorted to. Citing the case
late Paulina Simpliciano (Record on Appeal, p. 122) but the
of Reyes vs. Court of Appeals,13 it declared that "the Rules of
The lower court erred in ordering the removal of Maria On July 19,1967, Atty. Arturo Tolentino (representing
Ventura as executrix and administratrix of the will and appellees Mercedes Ventura and Pedro Corpuz) and Atty.
estate of the deceased Gregorio Ventura without giving her Jose J. Francisco (representing Gregoria and Exequiel
full opportunity to be heard and to present all her Victoria), having failed to submit their respective briefs
evidence. within the period for the purpose, which expired on July 2
and May 29,1967, respectively, the Supreme Court
II Resolved to consider this case submitted for decision
WITHOUT SAID APPELLEES' BRIEF (Rollo, p. 152).
The lower court erred in finding that the executrix Maria
Ventura had squandered and dissipated the funds of the The crucial issue in this case is whether or not the removal
estate under her administration. of Maria Ventura as executrix is legally justified. This issue
has, however, become moot and academic in view of the
III
decision of this Court in related cases.
The lower court erred in finding that the executrix Maria
At the outset, it is worthy to note that aside from the
Ventura was inefficient and incompetent.
instant special proceedings, there are two other civil cases
involving the estate of the deceased Gregoria Ventura,
IV
namely, Civil Cases Nos. 1064 and 1476. Civil Case No.
That, considering the circumtances surrounding the case, 1064 was filed on December 2, 1952 by herein appellee
the lower court erred in finding that the failure of Maria Gregoria Ventura in the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ventura to submit her periodical account had justified her Ecija, Branch I, against the other appellees herein
removal as executrix. Mercedes Ventura and their father, Gregorio Ventura.
Later Mercedes Ventura joined cause with Gregoria
V Ventura. (Record on Appeal, p. 95). Gregoria and Mercedes
Ventura claimed that they are the legitimate children of
The lower court erred in considering as an established fact Gregorio Ventura and his wife Paulina Simpliciano, who
that the appellees Mercedes Ventura and Gregoria Ventura died in 1943, and asked that one-half of the properties
are the legitimate daughters of the deceased Gregorio described in the complaint be declared as the share of
Ventura. their mother in the conjugal partnership, with them as the
only forced heirs of their mother Paulina (Joint Brief for
VI the Appellants, pp. 53-68).
The lower court erred in finding that the devises and Subsequently, Civil Case No. 1476 was filed by Alipio,
bequests in favor of Maria Ventura and Miguel Ventura as Eufracia and Juliana, all surnamed Simpliciano, against
specified in paragraph 8 of the last Will and Testament of Gregorio Ventura and the two sisters, Mercedes and
the late Gregorio Ventura have ipso facto been annulled. Gregoria Ventura, before the Court of First Instance of
Nueva Ecija, Branch I. They alleged that as the only
VII children of Modesto Simpliciano, sole brother of Paulina
Simpliciano, they, instead of Mercedes and Gregoria
The lower court erred in allowing the appellees Mercedes
Ventura, whom they claimed are adulterous children of
Ventura and Gregoria Ventura to intervene in the hearing
Paulina with another man, Teodoro Ventura and as such
of the accounts of administration submitted by the
are not entitled to inherit from her, are the ones who
executrix Maria Ventura and/or in not suspending the
should inherit the share of Paulina Simpliciano in the
hearing of the said accounts until the said appellees have
3. Both administrators have deliberately failed to file their Despite repeated urgent motions filed by Jose S. Matute
inventories andstatements of accounts of time, and did so praying that the Courtof Appeals resolve with dispatch the
only when ordered by the probatecourt; issue of jurisdiction, the said appelatetribunal instead
required then respondent Jose S. Matute to answer, which
4. Both administrators have made unauthorized he did.However, on October 27, 1966 herein petitioner
disbursements as shown by theirfinancial statements; and Jose S. Matute interposed theinstant petition
for certiorari with preliminary injunction against the Court
5. The probate court has discretion to remove the of Appeals and Matias Matute, challenging the jurisdiction
administrator. of the respondentCourt of Appeals upon two basic
contentions:
It appears that during the reception of evidence
conducted on December 29, 1965by the probate court The Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction to entertain, give
(Branch IV of the Court of First Instance of Manila due course, andmuch more to issue a writ of preliminary
withHonorable Emigdio Nietes as the then presiding injunction, against the petitioner, Jose S. Matute, and
judge), Carlos S. Matute and theCandelario-Matute heirs respondent Judge Emigdio Nietes in CA-G.R. No. 37039-R ...
submitted respective lists of exhibits in support oftheir because the estate of Amadeo Matute Olave is worth more
motion to oust Matias. On January 8, 1966 Matias filed a than P200,000.00; and
written objectionto the admission of the movants' exhibits
on the ground that the same were hearsay,self-serving, The same Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 35124-R, on
irrelevant and/or mere photostatic copies of supposed January 27, 1965, specialfourth division, has ruled that the
originalswhich were never properly identified nor shown Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction on theestate of
in court. Four days later, or onJanuary 12, 1966, the Amadeo Matute Olave in the matter of the appointment
counsel for Matias filed with leave of court a "Motion and removal ofits administrators.
toDismiss and/or Demurrer to Evidence" which avers that
"there is no sufficientevidence on record to justify and The respondent Matias Matute does not controvert the
support the motions for the removal of theherein co- petitioner's claim that thevalue of the estate of their
administrator Matias S. Matute." In the same motion, said deceased father exceeds P200,000. He maintains,however,
counselreserved the right to introduce evidence in behalf that the respondent Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over
of his client should theforegoing motion be denied. CA-G.R.37039-R "because the subject matter involved is
merely ... the right to collectthe (monthly) rentals due the
On January 31, 1966 the probate court issued an order, Estate in the sum of P5,000.00" pursuant to acontract of
the dispositive portionof which reads: lease which he executed in favor of one Mariano Nasser
coveringfive haciendas of the estate under his separate
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby removes co- administration.
administrator, Matias S.Matute, as such co-administrator
of the estate and orders him to submit a finalaccounting of The foregoing assertion does not merit credence. A
his administration together with his past administration searching review of the record from the initial petition
accountswhich have not been approved, and, in his stead filed by Carlos Matute to oust the respondentas co-
appoints Jose S. Matute, a brother by the same mother of administrator up to the latter's petition for certiorari filed
Matias S. Matute, as co-administrator, who ishereby with theCourt of Appeals impugning the validity of the
required to put up a bond of P15,000.00, and thereafter abovementioned order of January31, 1966 which removed
immediatelyqualify in his commission and assume the him as co-administrator and appointed the petitioner inhis
responsibility of co-administrator.... place reveals no single pleading, statement, contention,
reference or eveninference which would justify the
Forthwith, Matias interposed with the Court of Appeals a respondent's pretension that the instantcontroversy is a
petition for certiorari with preliminary mandatory mere contest over the right to collect a P5,000 rental. In
injunction (CA-G.R. 37039-R) dated February 1, 1966, bold contrast, the record vividly chronicles the
praying that the aforesaid order of January 31, 1966 be set controversy as a bitter fight for co-administration: the
aside as a nullityfor having decreed his removal without removal of the respondent as co-administrator and the
due process and the appointment of JoseS. Matute without appointment of anyone of the movants and the herein
the requisite hearing. petitioner as new co-administrator. Indeed, the principal
conflict gravitates over the right to co-administer the vast
On March 4, 1966 the Court of Appeals gave due course to
Amadeo Matute Olave estate. This is the same issue
the aforesaid petitionand resolved to grant a writ of
underlying the respondent'sabovementioned petition in
preliminary injunction against Jose S. Matuteand the
CA-G.R. 37039-R. The respondent's prayer in said petition
Honorable Judge Emigdio Nietes, respondents in CA-G.R.
unmistakably indicates that the dispute pertains to the
37039-R, conditioned on the filing of a P1,000 bond by the
right to co-administer in general, not the mere authority to
therein petitioner Matias, the respondentherein. On March
collect a P5,000 monthly rental.The said prayer reads:
22, 1966 Jose S. Matute moved for the dismissal of the
abovementionedpetition on the ground that the Court of 1. That an ex parte writ of preliminary mandatory
Appeals does not have jurisdiction totake cognizance of injunction be issued enjoiningand/or prohibiting the
the same since the value of the estate involved is more respondent Judge from approving the administrator's
thanP200,000. He further contended that the value of the bondthat will be filed by respondent Jose S. Matute and in
Amadeo Matute Olave estatefor purposes of jurisdiction issuing the letters ofadministration of the latter, and from
had already been resolved in CA-G.R. 35124-R wherethe issuing Orders incidental and/or connectedwith the
Court of Appeals refused to take jurisdiction over a exercise and performance of acts of administration of said
petition for certiorari contesting the appointment of respondent Jose S. Matute; likewise enjoining and
Matias Matute as co-administrator, on the groundthat the prohibiting respondent Jose S. Matutehimself, and/or
value of the Matute estate was placed at P2,132,282.72 as
Rule 72: Subject Matter and Applicability of General Rules Page 24
through his counsels, agents and representatives from Like in the aforecited Maravilla case, the instant intra-
takingphysical possession of the different haciendas under fraternal controversy involves a contest over
the exclusive administrationand management of herein administration, an incident in the settlement of the vast
petitioner and from performing and exercising acts ofa Matute estate. Considering that the value of the said estate
duly and legally appointed administrator, upon filing a is more thanP200,000, and considering further that as
bond in such amountthat this Honorable Tribunal may fix; enunciated in the Maravilla case thetotal value of the
subject estate determines the jurisdictional amount
2. That the Order of the respondent Judge dated January anentdisputes over administration arising as incidents in a
31, 1966, removing herein petitioner as co-administrator probate or settlementproceeding, like the case at bar, then
of the Estate of Amadeo Matute Olave andappointing it is indubitable that the respondent Court of Appeals does
respondent Jose S. Matute as co-administrator without not have jurisdiction over CA-G.R. 37039-R nor the judicial
presentationof evidence, be declared null and void and of authority to grant the writs of certiorari and prohibition
no force and effect.... prayed fortherein.
In fine, the pith of the controversy is the right to co- Herein respondent insists, however, that even granting
administer the entire estate. In this regard, the ruling that the actual controversy pertains to administration,
in Fernandez, et al. vs. Maravilla 1 is determinative of the such contested administration does not encompassthe
jurisdictional issue posed here. In said case, this whole estate but is limited to the collection of a P5,000
Courtruled that in a contest for the administration of an monthly rental,which sum should be the basis of the
estate, the amount incontroversy is deemed to be the value jurisdictional amount, not the value ofthe whole estate. In
of the whole estate, which total valueshould be the proper support of his thesis, the respondent alleges that duringhis
basis of the jurisdictional amount. Consequently the incumbency as co-administrator, five haciendas in Davao
Courtproceeded to conclude that the Court of Appeals does belonging to theestate of his deceased father were
not have jurisdiction toissue writs of certiorari and consigned to his separate administration; that in his
preliminary injunction prayed for in a petition concerning capacity as co-administrator he leased on February 10,
a conflict over administration arising as an incident in the 1965 said haciendas to one Mariano Nasser for P5,000 a
mainprobate or settlement proceeding if in the first place month; that by virtue of said leasecontract, the possession,
the principal case or proceeding falls outside its appelate management and administration of the said properties
jurisdiction considering the total value of the subject estate. were transferred to the lessee until the expiration of the
This Court in the aforesaid Maravilla case elaborated thus: contract; that consequently, only the collection of the
monthly rental of P5,000 remains asthe subject of the
The Court of Appeals, in the decision appealed from, administration.
assumed jurisdiction overthe present case on the theory
that "the amount in controversy relative to The foregoing contention of the respondent is patently
theappointment of Eliezar Lopez as special co- untenable.
administrator to protect the interestsof the respondents
(herein petitioners) is only P90,000.00 more or less, 1. The averment of the respondent that the controversy
i.e.,one fourth of the conjugal property" (of respondent and centers on the collectionof the alleged P5,000 monthly
the deceased DignaMaravilla) which, as per inventory rental and that the contest over administrationis limited
submitted by the respondent as special administrator, is thereto, does not find any support in the record.
valued at P362,424.90. This theory is untenable. Note that
theproceedings had on the appointment of Eliezar Lopez as 2. The rule remains that the jurisdictional amount is
special co-administrator are merely incidental to the determined by the totalvalue of the estate, not by value of
probate or testate proceedings of the deceased Digna the particular property or portion of the estate subject to
Maravilla. administration, since the question of administration is
merely incidental to the principal proceeding for the
settlement and distribution ofthe whole estate.
That the Court of Appeals have no appelate jurisdiction 3. The respondent's impression that a co-administrator's
over the said testateproceedings cannot be doubted, trust and responsibilityare circumscribed and delimited by
considering the properties therein involved arevalued at the size and value of the particular propertyor portion of
P362,424.00, as per inventory of the special administrator. the estate subject to his separate administration, is
erroneous. Although a co-administrator is designated to
... Not having appelate jurisdiction over the proceedings in admininister a portion of theestate, he is no less an
probate (CA-G.R.No. 27478-R), considering that the amount administrator of the whole because his
involved therein is more than P200,000.00,the Court of judiciousmanagement of a mere parcel enhances the value
Appeals cannot also have original jurisdiction to grant the of the entire estate, while hisinefficient or corrupt
writsof certiorari and prohibition prayed for by respondent administration thereof necessarily diminishes the valueof
in the instant case, whichare merely incidental thereto.... the whole estate. Moreover, when two or more
administrators are appointed toadminister separate parts
Note also that the present proceedings under review were of a large estate they are not to discharge theirfunctions in
for the annulment ofthe appointment of Eliezar Lopez as distant isolation but in close cooperation so as to
special co-administrator and to restrain theprobate court safeguard andpromote the general interests of the entire
from removing respondent as special administrator. It is estate. The teaching in Sison vs.Teodoro 2 is of positive
therefore,a contest for the administration of the estate and, relevance. In the said case, the probate court
consequently, the amount orvalue of the assets of the whole chargedagainst the entire estate the compensation of an
estate is the value in controversy. (4 C.J.S. 204.) It appearing administrator who was assignedas judicial administrator
that the value of the estate in dispute is much more than representing the interests of one of the two heiresses.The
P200,000.00, the Court of Appeals clearly had no original other heiress whose interest was represented by the
jurisdiction to issuethe writs in question. (emphasis executor opposed theaward on the ground that the said
supplied) administrator had not rendered service to theestate but
Upon the foregoing disquisition, we hold that the Failing to receive any notice of a court resolution on his
respondent Court of Appeals was without jurisdiction over client's motion to dismiss during the period of about 1-
CA-G.R. 37039-R, and that the controverted order of months after the filing of the said motion, the defendant-
January 31, 1966 is a nullity and must therefore be set petitioner's counsel on April 11, 1966 wrote the clerk of
aside in its entirety. court of the court a quo, requesting that any resolution or
order of the trial court be mailed to him by airmail at his
L-26085 expense, instead of by surface mail, in order to minimize
postal delay. Sometime between April 11 and 19, 1966, the
L-26085 is a petition for certiorari with preliminary said counsel also dispatched an emissary to Davao to
injunction interposed on May 19, 1966 by the same inquire about the status of civil case 4968. After personal
petitioner Jose S. Matute, praying that the controverted verification of the record, the said emissary reported to the
order of default dated April 16, 1966, judgment by default defendant-petitioner's counsel that the abovementioned
dated April 23, 1966 and order of execution dated May 3, motion to dismiss had been denied by the court a quo in an
1966, all issued by the Court of First Instance of Davao, be order dated March 31, 1966. It was also discovered from
set aside. the record that the plaintiff-respondent's counsel had been
sent a copy of the order of denial on the very day it was
The sequence of events, like in L-26751, commenced with
rendered (March 31, 1966) but the record was silent as to
the issuance by the probate court (Court of First Instance
the mailing of the corresponding copy for the defendant-
of Manila) of the order of January 31, 1966 removing
petitioner's counsel, which copy until then had not been
Matias S. Matute as co-administrator and replacing him
received by the latter. Forthwith, on April 19, 1966,
with Jose S. Matute. Armed with the letters of co-
although he had not yet been furnished his copy of the said
administration awarded to him on February 3, 1966, Jose
order of denial, defendant-petitioner's counsel interposed
attempted to take possession of and exercise
the requisite answer with counterclaim. Then on April 23,
administration over the five haciendas La Union, Sigaboy,
1966 he filed a manifestation calling the attention of the
Monserrat, Colatinan and Pundaguitan, all belonging to the
court a quo that as of the said date he had not received a
Matute estate and situated in Governor Generoso, Davao.
copy of the order denying his client's motion to dismiss. It
Said five haciendas were previously assigned to the
was only two days later, or on April 25, 1966, that the said
separate administration of the deposed co-administrator,
counsel claims, uncontroverted by the respondent Judge
Matias S. Matute.
and the plaintiff-respondent, that he received his copy of
Mariano Nasser, herein plaintiff-respondent, who was in the aforesaid order.
actual possession of the said haciendas, opposed the
In a "Motion to Strike" dated April 26, 1966, the plaintiff-
projected takeover by the defendant-petitioner Jose S.
respondent urged that the aforementioned answer with
Matute in the latter's capacity as co-administrator.
counterclaim be stricken from the record on the grounds
Subsequently, on February 15, 1966, Nasser instituted civil
that on April 16, 1966 the court a quo had declared
case 4968 in the Court of First Instance of Davao, a
defendant-petitioner in default for failure to answer the
complain for injunction, alleging that the defendant-
complaint in civil case 4928 and that subsequently,
petitioner was forcibly wresting possession of the
on April 23, 1966, a judgment by default had been entered
said haciendas with the aid of hired goons, and praying
against the latter.
that the said defendant-petitioner be enjoined from taking
The intervenor-petitioner contends, however, that it was We now come to the challenged order of default and
only on April 25, 1966 that he received notice of the judgment by default, both contained in the
dismissal of civil case 4252 and on the very same day he abovementioned order dated March 29, 1966. Attacking
caused the filing of the necessary notice of appeal and the validity of the said order of default, the intervenor-
appeal bond. Conceding that the foregoing assertion is petitioner claims that the respondent Judge failed to
correct, the intervenor-petitioner's projected appeal was consider that Matias Matute, representing the plaintiff
still out of time since the requisite record on appeal was estate, filed on time an answer dated March 1, 1965
filed only on May 26, 1966, or thirty-one days from April traversing the allegations of Canlas' counterclaim, which
25, 1966. answer inured to the benefit of not only Matias Matute but
also to the intervenors who were jointly impleaded as
In passing, it is pertinent to note that the dismissal of the defendants in the said counterclaim. The defendant-
complaint in civil case 4252m, after the issues were joined respondent Canlas, on the other hand, while not denying
with the filing of the responsive pleadings, upon the receipt of the aforesaid answer to his counterclaim,
defendants' motion to resolve a pending motion to dismiss, contends that the herein intervenor-petitioner's failure to
the resolution of which had been previously deferred until personally answer said counterclaim is fatal and that he
after the trial by virtue of an order of the same court under could not take refuge under the answer interposed by
another judge, is a procedural deviation from the standard Matias Matute.
sequence of trial in accordance with which the court a quo,
after the requisite answers were filed, should have We are of the considered opinion that the herein disputed
proceeded with the trial on the merits, and only thereafter order of default is illegal and void, and, consequently, the
resolved the motion to dismiss as was the import of the controverted judgment by default and order of execution
order of defendant. Nevertheless, it is relevant to were improvidently issued.
emphasize, on the other hand, that an order deferring the
resolution of a motion to dismiss, being an interlocutory 1. The counterclaim interposed by Canlas raised a
order, may be altered or revoked by the trial court during common cause of action for damages against Matias
the pendency of the main action. It is settled that an Matute, as the representative of the plaintiff estate, and
"interlocutory order or decree made in the progress of a Jose and Luis Matute, as intervenors in civil case 4252, all
case is always under the control of the court until the final in their personal capacities. The counterclaim reads:
decision of the suit, and may be modified or rescinded
That for instituting this patently frivolous and unfounded
upon sufficient grounds shown at any time before final
action in bad faith calculated to merely harass answering
judgment...." 16 Of similar import is the ruling of this Court
defendant Paterno R. Canlas in order to satisfy the
declaring that "it is rudimentary that such (interlocutory)
personal revenge, hatred and vindictiveness of the co-
orders are subject to change in the discretion of the
administrator, Matias S. Matute, representing the plaintiff
court. 17 Moreover, one of the inherent powers of the court
Estate, and the intervenors Jose S. Matute and Luis S.
is "To amend and control its process and orders so as to
Matute, defendant Paterno R. Canlas suffered actual, moral
make them conformable to law and justice." 18 In the
and consequential damages in the total amount of
language of Chief Justice Moran, paraphrasing the ruling
P100,000.00, for which plaintiff Matias S. Matute and
in Veluz vs. Justice of the Peace of Sariaya, 19 "since judges
intervenors Jose S. Matute and Luis S. Matute should be held
are human, susceptible to mistakes, and are bound to
personally liable. (emphasis supplied)
administer justice in accordance with law, they are given
the inherent power of amending their orders or judgments Having been this jointly charged to pay the abovestated
so as to make them conformable to law and justice, and damages, the brothers Matias, Jose and Luis Matute could
they can do so before they los their jurisdiction of the case validly file a common responsive pleading, as in effect they
that is before the time to appeal has expired and no appeal did when Matias Matute filed an answer to the aforesaid
has been perfected." 20 And in the abovecited Veluz case, counterclaim, the receipt of which Canlas admits. It is
this Court held that "If the trial court should discover or be significant to note that the said answer does not only deny
convinced that it had committed an error in its judgment, the charge against Matias Matute but as well as negates the
or had done an injustice, before the same has become final,
claim against the intervenors.
it may, upon its own motion or upon a motion of the
On July 13, 2004, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Both parties anchor their right of material possession of
Las Pias City, Branch 79 ruled in favor of Fe S. Factor. The the disputed property on their respective claims of
dispositive portion of the decision reads: ownership. Petitioners insist that petitioner Precy has a
better right of possession over the subject property since
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the she inherited the subject property as the surviving spouse
plaintiff and against the defendants ordering the latter and and sole heir of Ruben Labao, who owned the property
all persons claiming rights under them to: before his death.
1. To immediately vacate the subject premises and Respondent, on the other hand, hinges her claim of
surrender possession thereof to the plaintiff. possession on the fact that her predecessor-in-interest had
prior possession of the property as early as 1975.
2. To pay the monthly rental of P2,000.00 from December
1, 2002 up to the time they finally vacate the premises. After careful consideration, we find in favor of the
respondent.
3. To pay attorneys fee of Php 10,000.00.
In ejectment cases, the only issue for resolution is who is
The counter-claim is dismissed for lack of merit. entitled to the physical or material possession of the
property involved, independent of any claim of ownership
SO ORDERED.10 set forth by any of the party-litigants. The one who can
prove prior possession de facto may recover such
Petitioners appealed the decision to the RTC of Las Pias
possession even from the owner himself.15 Possession de
City, Branch 198, which, however, affirmed in toto the
facto is the physical possession of real property.
decision of the MeTC and later denied their motion for
Possession de facto and not possession de jure is the only
reconsideration.11 Undaunted, petitioners filed a petition
issue in a forcible entry case.16 This rule holds true
for review before the Court of Appeals but it was denied
regardless of the character of a partys possession,
also. Hence, the instant petition before us.
provided, that he has in his favor priority of time which
Petitioners submit the following issues for the Courts entitles him to stay on the property until he is lawfully
consideration: ejected by a person having a better right by either accion
publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.17
I.
Petitioners argue that respondent was never in possession
[WHETHER] THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS of the subject property since the latter never occupied the
SERIOUSLY ERRED IN LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE WHEN same. They claim that they have been in actual possession
IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL of the disputed property from the time petitioner Precy
COURT THAT FORCE, THREAT, INTIMIDATION AND married Ruben Labao in 2002.
STEALTH HAD BEEN COMMITTED BY THE PETITIONERS
IN OCCUPYING THE SUBJECT RESIDENTIAL HOUSE; In this instance, however, petitioners contention is
unconvincing.
II.
For one to be considered in possession, one need not have
[WHETHER] THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS actual or physical occupation of every square inch of the
SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT MISAPPRECIATED THE FACT property at all times.18 Possession can be acquired not only
THAT THE RESPONDENT HAS A BETTER RIGHT OF by material occupation, but also by the fact that a thing is
PHYSICAL AND MATERIAL POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT subject to the action of ones will or by the proper acts and
PROPERTY; legal formalities established for acquiring such
right.19 Possession can be acquired by juridical acts. These
III. are acts to which the law gives the force of acts of
possession. Examples of these are donations, succession,
[WHETHER] THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS execution and registration of public instruments, and the
SERIOUSLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDING OF THE inscription of possessory information titles.20
REGIONAL [TRIAL] COURT HOLDING PETITIONERS
LIABLE TO PAY THE MONTHLY RENTAL OF P2,000.00
Petitioner disputes before us through the instant petition xxx xxx xxx
for review on certiorari, the decision1 of the Court of
Appeals promulgated on 18 April 1996, in CA-GR SP No.
38617, which nullified and set aside the orders dated 04 Auto Truck 2251 Roosevelt Avenue,
July 19952, 12 September 19953 and 15 September TBA Corp. Quezon City.
19954 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
93, sitting as a probate court.
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner Rufina Luy Lim is the surviving spouse of late
Pastor Y. Lim whose estate is the subject of probate Active Block 3, Lot 6, Dacca BF
proceedings in Special Proceedings Q-95-23334, entitled, Distributors, Homes, Paraaque, Metro
"In Re: Intestate Estate of Pastor Y. Lim Rufina Luy Lim, Inc. Manila.
represented by George Luy, Petitioner".1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
Rule 72: Subject Matter and Applicability of General Rules Page 39
xxx xxx xxx lifetime, acquired several properties and put up
corporations as his instrumentalities.
q. Alliance TCT No. Prance, Metro Wherefore, the parties and the following banks concerned
Marketing 27896 Manila herein under enumerated are hereby ordered to comply
strictly with this order and to produce and submit to the
Copies of the above-mentioned Transfer Certificate of Title special administrators, through this Honorable Court
and/or Tax Declarations are hereto attached as Annexes within (5) five days from receipt of this order their
"C" to "W". respective records of the savings/current accounts/time
deposits and other deposits in the names of Pastor Lim
xxx xxx xxx and/or corporations above-mentioned, showing all the
transactions made or done concerning savings/current
7. The aforementioned properties and/or real interests left accounts from January 1994 up to their receipt of this
by the late Pastor Y. Lim, are all conjugal in nature, having court order.
been acquired by him during the existence of his marriage
with petitioner. xxx xxx xxx
SO ORDERED. SO ORDERED.
On 04 September 1995, the probate court appointed Through the expediency of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
Rufina Lim as special administrator11 and Miguel Lim and herein petitioner Rufina Luy Lim now comes before us
Lawyer Donald Lee, as co-special administrators of the with a lone assignment of
estate of Pastor Y. Lim, after which letters of error16:
administration were accordingly issued.
The respondent Court of Appeals erred in reversing the
In an order12 dated 12 September 1995, the probate court orders of the lower court which merely allowed the
denied anew private respondents' motion for exclusion, in preliminary or provisional inclusion of the private
this wise: respondents as part of the estate of the late deceased (sic)
Pastor Y. Lim with the respondent Court of Appeals
The issue precisely raised by the petitioner in her petition arrogating unto itself the power to repeal, to disobey or to
is whether the corporations are the mere alter egos or ignore the clear and explicit provisions of Rules 81,83,84
instrumentalities of Pastor Lim, Otherwise (sic) stated, the and 87 of the Rules of Court and thereby preventing the
issue involves the piercing of the corporate veil, a matter petitioner, from performing her duty as special
that is clearly within the jurisdiction of this Honorable administrator of the estate as expressly provided in the
Court and not the Securities and Exchange Commission. said Rules.
Thus, in the case of Cease vs. Court of Appeals, 93 SCRA 483,
the crucial issue decided by the regular court was whether Petitioner's contentions tread on perilous grounds.
the corporation involved therein was the mere extension
of the decedent. After finding in the affirmative, the Court In the instant petition for review, petitioner prays that we
ruled that the assets of the corporation are also assets of affirm the orders issued by the probate court which were
the estate. subsequently set aside by the Court of Appeals.
A reading of P.D. 902, the law relied upon by oppositors, Yet, before we delve into the merits of the case, a review of
shows that the SEC's exclusive (sic) applies only to intra- the rules on jurisdiction over probate proceedings is
corporate controversy. It is simply a suit to settle the indeed in order.
intestate estate of a deceased person who, during his
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts . . . The function of resolving whether or not a certain
shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction: property should be included in the inventory or list of
properties to be administered by the administrator is one
xxx xxx xxx clearly within the competence of the probate court.
However, the court's determination is only provisional in
(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, character, not conclusive, and is subject to the final
where the gross value of the estate exceeds One Hundred decision in a separate action which may be instituted by
Thousand Pesos (P100,000) or, in probate matters in the parties.
Metro Manila, where such gross value exceeds Two
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000); Further, in MORALES vs. CFI OF CAVITE20 citing CUIZON
vs. RAMOLETE21, We made an exposition on the probate
xxx xxx xxx court's limited jurisdiction:
Sec. 3. Section 33 of the same law is hereby amended to It is a well-settled rule that a probate court or one in
read as follows: charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot
adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
part of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil
to outside parties. All that the said court could do as
Cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts
regards said properties is to determine whether they
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
should or should not be included in the inventory or list of
1. Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and properties to be administered by the administrator. If
probate proceedings, testate and intestate, including the there is no dispute, well and good; but if there is, then the
grant of provisional remedies in proper cases, where the parties, the administrator and the opposing parties have to
value of the personal property, estate or amount of the resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the
demand does not exceed One Hundred Thousand Pesos conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot
(P100,000) or, in Metro Manila where such personal do so.
property, estate or amount of the demand does not exceed
Again, in VALERA vs. INSERTO22, We had occasion to
Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000), exclusive of
elucidate, through Mr. Justice Andres Narvasa23:
interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees,
litigation expenses and costs, the amount of which must be Settled is the rule that a Court of First Instance (now
specifically alleged, Provided, that interest, damages of Regional Trial Court), acting as a probate court, exercises
whatever kind, attorney's, litigation expenses and costs but limited jurisdiction, and thus has no power to take
shall be included in the determination of the filing cognizance of and determine the issue of title to property
fees, Provided further, that where there are several claims claimed by a third person adversely to the decedent,
or causes of actions between the same or different parties, unless the claimant and all other parties having legal
embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the interest in the property consent, expressly or impliedly, to
demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes the submission of the question to the probate court for
of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action adjudgment, or the interests of third persons are not
arose out of the same or different transactions; thereby prejudiced, the reason for the exception being that
the question of whether or not a particular matter should
xxx xxx xxx
be resolved by the court in the exercise of its general
Simply put, the determination of which court exercises jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court
jurisdiction over matters of probate depends upon the (e.g. probate, land registration, etc.), is in reality not a
jurisdictional but in essence of procedural one, involving a
gross value of the estate of the decedent.
mode of practice which may be waived. . . .
As to the power and authority of the probate court,
petitioner relies heavily on the principle that a probate . . . . These considerations assume greater cogency where,
court may pass upon title to certain properties, albeit as here, the Torrens title is not in the decedent's name but
provisionally, for the purpose of determining whether a in others, a situation on which this Court has already had
certain property should or should not be included in the occasion to rule . . . . (emphasis Ours)
inventory.
Petitioner, in the present case, argues that the parcels of
In a litany of cases, We defined the parameters by which land covered under the Torrens system and registered in
the court may extend its probing arms in the the name of private respondent corporations should be
determination of the question of title in probate included in the inventory of the estate of the decedent
proceedings. Pastor Y. Lim, alleging that after all the determination by
the probate court of whether these properties should be
This Court, in PASTOR, JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS,18 held: included or not is merely provisional in nature, thus, not
conclusive and subject to a final determination in a
. . . As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous separate action brought for the purpose of adjudging once
matter which the probate court cannot resolve with and for all the issue of title.
finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a
certain property should or should not be included in the Yet, under the peculiar circumstances, where the parcels of
inventory of estate properties, the Probate Court may pass land are registered in the name of private respondent
It does not matter that respondent-administratrix has Notwithstanding that the real properties were duly
evidence purporting to support her claim of ownership, registered under the Torrens system in the name of
for, on the other hand, petitioners have a Torrens title in private respondents, and as such were to be afforded the
their favor, which under the law is endowed with presumptive conclusiveness of title, the probate court
incontestability until after it has been set aside in the obviously opted to shut its eyes to this gleamy fact and still
manner indicated in the law itself, which of course, does proceeded to issue the impugned orders.
not include, bringing up the matter as a mere incident in
special proceedings for the settlement of the estate of By its denial of the motion for exclusion, the probate court
deceased persons. . . . in effect acted in utter disregard of the presumption of
conclusiveness of title in favor of private respondents.
. . . . In regard to such incident of inclusion or exclusion, We Certainly, the probate court through such brazen act
hold that if a property covered by Torrens title is involved, transgressed the clear provisions of law and infringed
the presumptive conclusiveness of such title should be settled jurisprudence on this matter.
given due weight, and in the absence of strong compelling
evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof should be Moreover, petitioner urges that not only the properties of
considered as the owner of the property in controversy private respondent corporations are properly part of the
until his title is nullified or modified in an appropriate decedent's estate but also the private respondent
ordinary action, particularly, when as in the case at bar, corporations themselves. To rivet such flimsy contention,
possession of the property itself is in the persons named in petitioner cited that the late Pastor Y. Lim during his
the title. . . . lifetime, organized and wholly-owned the five
corporations, which are the private respondents in the
A perusal of the records would reveal that no strong instant case.25 Petitioner thus attached as Annexes
compelling evidence was ever presented by petitioner to "F"26 and "G"27 of the petition for review affidavits
bolster her bare assertions as to the title of the deceased executed by Teresa Lim and Lani Wenceslao which among
Pastor Y. Lim over the properties. Even so, P.D. 1529, others, contained averments that the incorporators of
otherwise known as, "The Property Registration Decree", Uniwide Distributing, Inc. included on the list had no
proscribes collateral attack on Torrens Title, hence: actual and participation in the organization and
incorporation of the said corporation. The affiants added
xxx xxx xxx that the persons whose names appeared on the articles of
incorporation of Uniwide Distributing, Inc., as
Sec. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. A incorporators thereof, are mere dummies since they have
certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It not actually contributed any amount to the capital stock of
cannot be altered, modified or cancelled except in a direct the corporation and have been merely asked by the late
proceeding in accordance with law. Pastor Y. Lim to affix their respective signatures thereon.
In CUIZON vs. RAMOLETE, where similarly as in the case at It is settled that a corporation is clothed with personality
bar, the property subject of the controversy was duly separate and distinct from that of the persons composing
registered under the Torrens system, We categorically it. It may not generally be held liable for that of the persons
stated: composing it. It may not be held liable for the personal
indebtedness of its stockholders or those of the entities
. . . Having been apprised of the fact that the property in
connected with it.28
question was in the possession of third parties and more
important, covered by a transfer certificate of title issued Rudimentary is the rule that a corporation is invested by
in the name of such third parties, the respondent court law with a personality distinct and separate from its
should have denied the motion of the respondent stockholders or members. In the same vein, a corporation
administrator and excluded the property in question from by legal fiction and convenience is an entity shielded by a
the inventory of the property of the estate. It had no protective mantle and imbued by law with a character
authority to deprive such third persons of their possession alien to the persons comprising it.
and ownership of the property. . . .
Nonetheless, the shield is not at all times invincible. Thus,
Inasmuch as the real properties included in the inventory in FIRST PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL BANK vs. COURT OF
of the estate of the Late Pastor Y. Lim are in the possession APPEALS29, We enunciated:
of and are registered in the name of private respondent
corporations, which under the law possess a personality . . . When the fiction is urged as a means of perpetrating a
separate and distinct from their stockholders, and in the fraud or an illegal act or as a vehicle for the evasion of an
absence of any cogency to shred the veil of corporate existing obligation, the circumvention of statutes, the
fiction, the presumption of conclusiveness of said titles in achievement or perfection of a monopoly or generally the
favor of private respondents should stand undisturbed. perpetration of knavery or crime, the veil with which the
law covers and isolates the corporation from the members
Accordingly, the probate court was remiss in denying or stockholders who compose it will be lifted to allow for
private respondents' motion for exclusion. While it may be its consideration merely as an aggregation of individuals. . .
true that the Regional Trial Court, acting in a restricted .
capacity and exercising limited jurisdiction as a probate
court, is competent to issue orders involving inclusion or Piercing the veil of corporate entity requires the court to
exclusion of certain properties in the inventory of the see through the protective shroud which exempts its
estate of the decedent, and to adjudge, albeit, provisionally stockholders from liabilities that ordinarily, they could be
the question of title over properties, it is no less true that subject to, or distinguishes one corporation from a
such authority conferred upon by law and reinforced by
The corporate mask may be lifted and the corporate veil WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, the
may be pierced when a corporation is just but the alter ego instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and
of a person or of another corporation. Where badges of the decision of the Court of Appeals which nullified and set
fraud exist, where public convenience is defeated; where a aside the orders issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch
wrong is sought to be justified thereby, the corporate 93, acting as a probate court, dated 04 July 1995 and 12
fiction or the notion of legal entity should come to September 1995 is AFFIRMED.
naught.31
SO ORDERED.
Further, the test in determining the applicability of the
doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction is as
follows: 1) Control, not mere majority or complete stock
control, but complete domination, not only of finances but
of policy and business practice in respect to the
transaction attacked so that the corporate entity as to this
transaction had at the time no separate mind, will or
existence of its own; (2) Such control must have been used
by the defendant to commit fraud or wrong, to perpetuate
the violation of a statutory or other positive legal duty, or
dishonest and unjust act in contravention of plaintiffs legal
right; and (3) The aforesaid control and breach of duty
must proximately cause the injury or unjust loss
complained of. The absence of any of these elements
prevent "piercing the corporate veil".32