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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA


FORT MYERS DIVISION

JENNIFER FRANKLIN PRESCOTT, and DR. JORG BUSSE,

Plaintiffs, pro se

v. CASE NO. 2:09-cv-0041-FtM-UA-TBM

RICHARD A. LAZZARA, MARK ALLAN PIZZO, JOHN EDWIN


STEELE, SHERI POLSTER CHAPPELL, UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA, REAGAN K. RUSSELL, STATE OF FLORIDA,
KENNETH M. WILKINSON, SHERRI L. JOHNSON,
JACK N. PETERSON, DONNA MARIE COLLINS, DAVID M. OWEN,
LEE COUNTY, FLORIDA, TOBY PRINCE BRIGHAM, S. WILLIAM
MOORE, BRIGHAM & MOORE, LLP, MENELAOS PAPALAS, ET AL.,

APPEAL

Defendants.
_______________________________________________________________________/

P. APPELLANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND


INVALIDATION OF CONFISCATORY AND INVALID “O.R. 569/875”

DEFENDANT LAZZARA PRESIDES OVER HIS OWN PROSECUTION

1. Objectively partially, Defendant Judge Richard A. Lazzara presides over his own

prosecution for, e.g., case fixing, bribery, deliberate deprivations, and obstruction

of justice.
CONFISCATORY, UNENFORCEABLE “O.R. 569/875” WAS INVALID

2. Admittedly, Plaintiff Appellants’ actions “center” on the deliberate deprivations

under “official policy” of governmental fraud and corruption and “color” of

confiscatory “O.R. 569/875”, which was null and void ab initio and for vagueness.

CONFISCATORY “O.R. 569/875” WAS UNDULY VAGUE

3. Confiscatory, unduly vague, and invalid “O.R. 569/875” lacks a legal description

and ascertainable boundaries. The fraudulently “claimed” uncertain “lands” and

“accretions” were never subdivided and platted as evidenced by the 1912 Cayo Costa

Subdivision Plat as recorded in Lee County Plat Book 3, p. 25. See also Transcript of

November 2007 Court Hearing.

PUBLIC ACCESS AND PUBLIC USE WERE IMPOSSIBLE

4. The Court knew that no “public lands” ever existed in said Subdivision, because

admittedly public easements were never dedicated and did not exist. Thus the “O.R.

569/875” “claim”/defense was a sham, and the proceedings a farce to cover up the

governmental fraud. See said 1912 Subdivision Plat.

NO EMINENT DOMAIN EXERCISE AND/OR POWER

5. Here, the physical invasion of said private undedicated Subdivision was for private

use, which the Constitution absolutely prohibits. Therefore, no eminent domain

power existed.
“ADVERSE POSSESSION” WAS IMPOSSIBLE

6. “Adverse possession” was factually and legally impossible, because admittedly the

Appellants hold perfect exclusive title to “PID 12-44-20-01-00015.015A”, which was

derived from the 1895 Federal Land Patent recorded in Deed Book C, p. 110.

Indisputably, the Appellants are successors-in-title to Alexander C. Roesch and

have his equal rights.

7. Here, the objectively unfit Judge has been “imagining” a “passed resolution”, which

was factually and legally impossible.

“ACCRETIONS” CAUSED APPELLANTS’ PROTECTED PROPERTY [“015A”]

8. Plaintiff Appellants’ Constitutionally protected property “PID 12-44-20-01-

00015.015A” was the very result of “accretions” as indicated by the “A” for

“Accretions” in “lot 015A” and as indisputably evidenced by the four Subdivision

Plats of Survey in the public records and on file. The Appellants had the equal

riparian and property rights, e.g., of A. C. Roesch and Alice M. S. Robinson [“O.R.

2967/1084-1090”; and corresponding Blue Sheet]. Here, the judicial Defendants

discriminated against the Appellants and deliberately mis-construed the publicly

recorded conveyance of their protected riparian property “PID 12-44-20-01-

00015.015A”.
CONSTRUCTION OF INCOGNIZABLE “O.R. 569/875” WAS IMPOSSIBLE

9. Any reasonable construction of facially confiscatory “O.R. 569/875” was utterly

impossible.

THE APPELLANTS COMPLIED WITH THE COURT’S ORDERS

10. In, e.g., Doc. # 338 (“First Case”), Defendant Judge John E. Steele ordered the

Appellants to pursue further litigation and relief in state court such as, e.g.,

invalidation of confiscatory and unenforceable “O.R. 569/875”.

COMPLIANCE WITH COURT ORDERS WAS NOT ‘VEXATIOUS’

11. When the Appellants followed and complied with the District Court’s said Order to

pursue the ‘available relief in state court’, the Defendant corrupt Judges Pizzo and

Lazzara dismissed Appellants’ cases for bribes calling Appellants’ ‘pursuit of the

Court-ordered relief’ “vexatious”, “litigious”, “frivolous”.

12. In his orders (e.g., Doc. # 8) Defendant corrupt Judge Lazzara called the pro se

Appellants “vexatious” and “litigious” merely because they followed and complied

with Def. Judge Steele’s orders [e.g., Doc. # 338] to “pursue” further state court

litigation [purportedly due to falsely alleged “ripeness requirement”].


APPELLANTS ARE ENTITLED TO THE RELIEF UNDER DOC. # 338

13. The Appellants are entitled to the state court relief ordered by the District Court in

Doc. # 338 such as, e.g., invalidation of confiscatory and unenforceable “O.R.

569/875” under, e.g., Corn, Dade County, and Eide, infra.

DEF. LAZZARA IS OBJECTIVELY PARTIAL AND UNFIT

14. Def. Judge R. A. Lazzara is objectively unfit and partial. Even though the

Appellants were not subject to Rule 11 sanctions for their Court-ordered Complaint

(see Doc. # 338), Def. Judge threatened and intimidated the pro se P. Appellants

with illegal means to fix the case in exchange for Defendants’ bribes and the corrupt

construction of Appellants’ property grant violative of the existing rules of grant

construction.

15. Only an objectively unfit and partial judge could have asserted that confiscatory

and invalid “O.R. 569/875” was a “passed resolution”.

THE COURT KNEW THAT “O.R. 569/875” WAS NOT COGNIZABLE

16. Here, the District Court knew that confiscatory “O.R. 569/875” was not a cognizable

“claim” or defense under any legal theory. And no judge, no matter how corrupt and

unfit, will be able to do so under the existing rules of construction. When perverting

the existing rules failed, Defendant Judge Steele disallowed the Plaintiff Appellants

to “assert otherwise” (see, e.g., Doc. # 338, p. 12). The co-Plaintiff Appellant was a

former Research Associate at the University of Chicago and Rotary Scholar with
outstanding Researcher/Professor status. Given said education, the Appellants reject

the nonsense fabricated by this Court in exchange for Defendants bribes. If “O.R.

569/875” is a “passed resolution” or “legislative act”, the Madoff Ponzi scheme is

legal act. The District Court is a tarnished and corrupt Court in which the judicial

Defendants willingly accepted Defendants’ bribes to send the pro se Plaintiffs to state

court. When they got there, the Defendant Judges themselves removed the case back

to the Federal court [Madoff would approve]. Now the Court calls compliance with

its very own Orders “vexatious”, “litigious”, frivolous”, etc. to fix Appellants’ cases in

exchange for bribes.

SECRET EVIDENCE IS ILLEGAL: NO EVIDENCE OF ANY RESOLUTION

17. The Court never answered who, when, where, why and how purportedly “passed” the

confiscatory and invalid resolution. The fake resolution itself states [ipse dixit] that

it is confiscatory and invalid. Likely, Judges Lazzara and Pizzo never read or looked

at “O.R. 569/875” before they accepted Defendants’ bribes or are disabled, because

the error is so “patently” egregious and abusive.

THE PROCEEDINGS WERE SHAM AND “FIXED”

18. Here, the District Court must try again, because any reasonable juror, or fact finder

can determine that confiscatory “O.R. 569/875” is invalid and unenforceable as a

matter of fact and law. Thus, Defendant Lazzara’s fabrications of “no basis in law
and fact” [see, e.g., Doc. # 8] were for the improper and criminal purpose of fixing

Appellants’ cases in exchange for Defendants’ bribes.

PRECLUSIVE EFFECT OF LAY v. STATE OF FLORIDA

19. The factual findings and legal conclusions by the Lay Court precluded re-litigation of

said sham “claim”. See John Lay and Janet Lay v. [Defendant Appellees] State of

Florida, OGC CASE ## 01-0203, 01-0204, DOAH CASE ## 01-1541, 01-1542,

AND D.E.P. CASE ## 01-0860, 01-0876. In exchange for Defendants’ bribes, the

Defendant Judges did not accept as true the factual findings and legal conclusions of,

e.g., the Lay Court on record.

THE JUDGE AFFIRMED HE DOESN’T GET IT

20. When the Appellants blew the whistle on Def. Lazzara’s case fixing in exchange for

Defendants’ bribes, Def. corrupt Judge Lazzara conveniently fabricated

‘incomprehensibility’ of Appellants’ claims while Judge Steele had “comprehended”

the 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1988 causes of action very well (see, e.g., Doc. # 87,

338).

PLAYING DUMB AT APPELLANTS’ EXPENSE OBSTRUCTED JUSTICE

21. “Playing dumb” in court in exchange for bribes is not a legitimate just, speedy, and

inexpensive way of adjudicating the pro se Appellants’ cases and constructing


Appellants’ clear and indisputable conveyance, surveys, and other indisputable

evidence on record.

22. The judicial Defendants tarnished the reputation of the District Court. Nobody could

reasonably construe unduly vague, and confiscatory “O.R. 569/875”, which was

admittedly never signed and executed.

23. Def. corrupt Judge Steele falsely claimed that the Court had no jurisdiction over

Appellants’ “arbitrary and capricious” type claims [which was controverted by,

e.g., Eide v. Sarasota County, 908 F.2d 716 (11th Cir. 1990)].

MISREPRESENTING THE MERITS WHILE CLAIMING NO JURISDICTION

24. However, said Defendant fabricated a “legislative act” thereby reaching and

deliberately misrepresenting the merits in order to deceive the Appellants, while

simultaneously fabricating purported lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

25. The judicial Defendants knew that the indisputable factual findings and legal

conclusions by, e.g., the Lay Court and Attorneys Stewart & Keyes [see Doc. # 31-4,

“1st Case”] fatally controverted the concoction of a cognizable “claim” or defense by

the Defendant Appellees. Because title to the “accretions” ran with the upland owners

of record, and not Lee County, the District Court knew that it was corrupting the

proceedings and construction of self-authenticating public records on file.


INCOGNIZABLE SHAM CLAIMS OF “LOT 00A0” AND “BLOCK 00001”

26. Defendant Judge Polster Chappell had been affiliated with Defendants State and

County and refused to accept as true the highly meritorious and cognizable claim

that “PID 12-44-20-01-00000.00A0” and “PID 07-44-21-01-00001.0000” were never

platted and had no ascertainable boundaries. Instead of conducting a reasonable

factual inquiry the Court had accepted Defendants’ bribes and manufactured that

confiscatory “O.R. 569/875” was a valid “legislative act” even though it was not an

exercise of the police power or a land use regulation.

27. Defendant Polster Chappell communicated with the Defendant Appellees and

conspired to fix Appellant(s)’ case by minimizing court access and frivolously

sanctioning the Appellants for asserting the governmental fraud scheme. Plaintiff(s)’

review of the evidence of the 1912 Subdivision Plat in Court had indisputably

established the fraud of “lot 00A0” and “block 00001”.

DEF. JUDGE LAZZARA WAS ESTOPPED

28. When Def. Steele removed the state court case to the District Court, Def. Richard A.

Lazzara fixed and dismissed the case in order to deliberately deprive the Appellants

of the ‘state court relief’ ordered by Judge Steele.

APPELLANTS ARE ENTITLED TO COURT ACCESS

29. Here, Defendant Lazzara conspired with, e.g., Defendant Steele to shut the door of

the Federal Court in exchange for Defendants’ bribes and enforce non-ascertainable
boundaries and invalid confiscatory “O.R. 569/875” in exchange for Defendants’

bribes. Here confiscatorily, the Defendant Appellees “claimed” Gulf-front land

worth more than approximately 100 Million Dollars without any instrument, title, or

conveyance. The District Court knew that confiscatory “O.R. 569/875” is an

admittedly unsigned and unexecuted sham claim, which is facially null and void.

No cognizable meritorious claim or defense for the confiscation of the disputed

private Cayo Costa lands is on the record or was ever offered by any Defendant.

APPELLANTS ARE ENTITLED TO BE FREE FROM CASE FIXING

30. Def. corrupt Judge Lazzara obstructs invalidation of confiscatory “O.R. 569/875”

pursuant to, e.g., Corn, infra. Here, Defendant Lazzara was controverted by the

Florida Supreme Court in, e.g., Dade County, infra, and the 11th Circuit precedent

in Corn [see also Lazzara’s biography]. In Corn v. City of Lauderdale Lakes, 816

F.2d 1514 (11th Cir. 1987), the 11th Circuit had already determined:

“In Dade County v. National Bulk Carriers, Inc., 450 So.2d 213 (Fla.1984),

the Florida Supreme Court ruled that where a zoning ordinance is

confiscatory, an action for inverse condemnation is "not necessary," id. at

216, and relief may be obtained by instituting a suit to declare the

ordinance/resolution invalid and to enjoin its enforcement.”

ARBITRARY, CARPICIOUS “O.R. 569/875” AND RULINGS


31. Here, “O.R. 569/875” was admittedly not an exercise of any police or other

legitimate governmental conferred power [see also Lee County Charter]. Pursuant to

Eide, supra, “O.R. 569/875” was “arbitrary and capricious” and “irrational” just

like Defendant corrupt Judge Lazzara’s rulings and orders [e.g., Doc. # 8].

INJUNCTIVE RELIEF FROM OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE

32. The Appellants move for emergency injunctive relief from the deliberate

deprivations of the “relief” ordered by Def. Judge Steele [Doc. # 338] and from case

fixing and bribery in the Middle District.

APPELLANTS ARE ENTITLED TO LAWFUL CONSTRUCTION

33. The Appellants are entitled to proper and lawful construction of their grant of

Constitutionally protected property [Lee County] “PID 12-44-20-01-00015.015A”

under the existing rules and pursuant to, e.g.,

a. West Peninsular Title Co. v. Palm Beach County, 41 F.3d 1490 (11th Cir. 1995);

b. Murrell v. United States, 269 F.2d 458 (5th Cir. 1959);

c. John Lay and Janet Lay v. [Defendant Appellees] State of Florida, OGC CASE

## 01-0203, 01-0204, DOAH CASE ## 01-1541, 01-1542, AND D.E.P. CASE ##

01-0860, 01-0876;
d. United States v. 16.33 Acres of Land in Dade County, Florida, 537 F.2d 182 (5th

Cir. 1976).

34. Defendant Lazzara has no authority to make any substantive orders or rulings,

because Lazzara accepted Defendants’ bribes in exchange for enforcing the fraud

and corruption under “official policy” of invalid and confiscatory “O.R. 569/875”.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully demand judgment granting the following

1. An Order granting Plaintiff Appellants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, because

statedly confiscatory “O.R. 569/875” was invalid and unenforceable and could not

have possibly created any genuine “claim” or issue;

2. An Order declaring confiscatory “O.R. 569/875” a nullity under “color” of which

the Defendant Appellees temporarily confiscated and physically invaded

Appellants’ Constitutionallly protected property PID 12-44-20-01-01-

00015.015A”;

3. An Order granting Appellants’ said Motion in their favor, because invalid and

confiscatory “O.R. 569/875” was a nullity, and here it is as if it had never existed;

4. An Order granting said Motion in Plaintiffs’, because the facial invalidity was

indisputable under, e.g., Lay, supra, and the cited 11th Circuit jurisprudence;

5. An Order removing the Defendant corrupt Judges for accepting Defendants’ bribes

in exchange for fixing Plaintiff Appellants cases and fabricating, e.g., frivolity, no
basis in law and fact, failure to state a cause of action, etc., [which was controverted

by Defendant Judge John Edwin Steele, who had falsely alleged availability of state

remedies even though judicial determination of invalidity was the exclusive remedy

under 11th Circuit jurisprudence (see “First Case”; Doc. # 338];

6. An Order granting the Plaintiff Appellants the “exclusive” relief of invalidation of

unauthorized, confiscatory, forged “O.R. 569/875” as prescribed by 11th Circuit

jurisprudence [see, e.g., Lay v. State of Florida, supra; Corn v. City of Lauderdale

Lakes, 904 F.2d 585 (11th Cir. 1990); Corn v. City of Lauderdale Lakes, 816 F.2d

1514 (11th Cir. 1987); Eide v. Sarasota County, 895 F.2d 1326 (11th Cir. 1990); West

Peninsular Title Co. v. Palm Beach County, 41 F.3d 1490 (11th Cir. 1995);

7. An Order for adjudication on the merits of the facial invalidity of indisputably

unauthorized, confiscatory and invalid “O.R. 569/875” under Federal and Florida

law;

8. An Order striking said Doc. # 8 as unauthorized, non-meritorious and clear

evidence in support of abuse and Defendant Lazzara’s criminal case fixing in

exchange for bribes;

9. An Order for panel review of the case fixing and bribery in the Middle District of

Florida;

10. An Order enjoining Defendant Richard A. Lazzara from misrepresenting and/or

tampering with the public record evidence, because Lazzara knew that the

fraudulently claimed “Lee County record ownership” and/or “adverse possession”

were factually and legally impossible;


11. An Order compelling the panel of Judges to take judicial notice of the binding

precedent and/or preclusive effects of, e.g., Lay v. State of Florida, supra; Corn v.

City of Lauderdale Lakes, 904 F.2d 585 (11th Cir.1990); Corn v. City of Lauderdale

Lakes, 816 F.2d 1514 (11th Cir.1987); Eide v. Sarasota Cty, 895 F.2d 1326 (11th Cir.

1990); West Peninsular Title Co. v. Palm Beach Cty, 41 F.3d 1490 (11th Cir.1995);

12. An Order forwarding the information, which the Plaintiff Appellants have blown

the whistle on, to the United States Supreme Court for review.

/s/Jennifer Franklin Prescott, Plaintiff, pro se


SIGNATURE OF PLAINTIFF
Mailing Address: P.O. Box 845, Palm Beach, FL 33480-0845; T: 561-400-3295
/s/Jorg Busse, M.D., M.B.A., M.M., Plaintiff, pro se
SIGNATURE OF PLAINTIFF
Mailing Address: P.O. Box 7561, Naples, Florida 34101-7561; T: 239-595-7074
EXHIBITS:
Unauthorized, confiscatory, and forged “O.R. 569/875”, which was unduly vague, and
null and void ab initio in the absence of any conferred police, eminent domain, or other
legitimate governmental power, authority, or purpose. See, e.g., Corn, supra, and Dade
County, supra; see www.leeclerk.org [on record]

Doc. # 31-4 (“1st Case”): May 14, 1997 STEWART & KEYES LEGAL OPINION
[on record]; citing Caples v. Taliaferro, 197 So. 861.
The District Court knew that the 11th Circuit affirmed in Murrell v. United States, 269
F.2d 458 (5th Cir. 1959):
“ … in Caples v. Taliaferro, 144 Fla. 1, 197 So. 861, 862, the Supreme Court
of Florida approved the rule that 'when a street or highway is platted on the
margin of the grantor's land, a conveyance of the lands bordering the street
carries the fee to the entire width of the street unless expressly reserved.' This
rule, sound in principle, is controlling here.”
The Appellants were entitled to the application of that rule in the instant case.

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