[G.R. No. 160753.

June 28, 2005]

JIMMY L. BARNES, a.k.a. JAMES L. BARNES, petitioner, vs. HON. MA.

LUISA C. QUIJANO PADILLA, Presiding Judge, Br. 215, Regional
Trial Court, Quezon City and TERESITA C. REYES, ELIZABETH
C. PASION, MA. ELSA C. GARCIA, IMELDA C. TRILLO, MA.
ELENA C. DINGLASAN and RICARDO P.
CRISOSTOMO, respondents.

RESOLUTION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before the Court is private respondents motion for

reconsideration[1] seeking a referral to the Court en banc and reversal of the
Decision[2] of the Second Division of this Court, dated September 30, 2004.

For a proper perspective of the issues on hand, it is necessary that the

Court reiterates the factual backdrop of the case.

A complaint for ejectment for non-payment of rentals was filed by private

respondents against petitioner before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC),
Branch 34, Quezon City. After trial, the MeTC rendered judgment, finding that:
petitioner entered into a Contract of Lease with private respondents late
mother, Natividad Crisostomo, whereby the latter leased to the former the
subject property from January 1, 1995 to December 31, 1997 at P60,000.00
per month; in a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) dated December 5, 1995,
petitioner and Natividad extended the term of lease until December 31, 2007,
whereby the petitioner has the obligation to pay lease rentals and at the same
time, he is given the option to purchase a portion of the disputed property;
petitioner has not been paying rentals since September 1996. As a result, the
MeTC ordered petitioner to vacate the disputed premises. Petitioner appealed
to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 227, Quezon City (Branch 227 for brevity).

In the interim, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 215,
Quezon City (Branch 215 for brevity) a complaint for specific performance with
damages. He prayed that judgment be rendered in his favor ordering private
respondents to abide with the MOA executed on December 5, 1995 between
him and the late Natividad with respect to all the terms and conditions of the
contract to sell a 403.41-square meter portion of the subject property, the
payment of P60,000.00 a month as lease and P80,000.00 as amortization
payment for the sale.

Later, Branch 227 set aside the MeTC decision and dismissed the case
without prejudice on the ground that the MeTC had no jurisdiction over the
case since it is not for ejectment but for specific performance of contract,
cognizable by the Regional Trial Court in its original and exclusive jurisdiction.
When their motion for reconsideration was denied, private respondents filed a
petition for review with the Court of Appeals (CA) docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 55949.

Private respondents, in Branch 215, moved for outright dismissal of the

complaint for specific performance on the ground of forum-shopping in view of
the pendency of the appeal on the ejectment case with the CA. Branch 215
dismissed the complaint for specific performance.

When his motion for reconsideration was denied by Branch 215, petitioner
filed a petition for certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 69573 with the CA.
The CA in its Resolution, dated August 18, 2003, dismissed the petition
for certiorari, ruling that petitioner committed forum-shopping in view of the
pendency of the appeal on the ejectment case. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Extension of Time to File Motion for Reconsideration but the CA, in its
Resolution dated September 25, 2003, denied the motion on the ground that
the period for filing a motion for reconsideration is non-extendible. Petitioner
filed a Manifestation and Motion to Admit Petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration with Leave of Court but the CA, in its Resolution dated
November 17, 2003, also denied it on the ground that the motion for
reconsideration was filed beyond the reglementary period.

Thus, petitioner filed the present petition for review on certiorari.

On September 30, 2004, the Court, through the Second Division,

promulgated herein assailed decision setting aside the Resolution, dated
November 17, 2003, of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 69573 which denied
petitioners manifestation and motion to admit his motion for reconsideration;
and reversing and setting aside the Resolution dated August 18, 2003 of the
CA which affirmed the Resolution dated April 20, 2001 of Branch 215,
dismissing the complaint for specific performance on the ground of forum-
shopping. The Court remanded the case to Branch 215 with instructions that
the trial court shall proceed with the case with all deliberate dispatch.

Private respondents assail the decision of the Court arguing that while the
Court had categorically declared that the CAs resolutions had attained finality;
yet, despite their finality, the Court proceeded to set aside the same in
violation of its own rules and the law of the land. They claim that the Court
erroneously decided to relax procedural rules and the relaxation of the rules
run afoul of the doctrine of immutability of judgments. Moreover, they posit
that the Court failed to realize that its power to suspend or even disregard
rules of procedure can only be exercised if it is within its jurisdiction to act.
They submit that the decision in this case modified or reversed doctrines
rendered by this Court, which can only be done by the Court en banc.

On January 24, 2005, the Court required the parties to submit a report on
the present status of CA-G.R. SP No. 55949 (Teresita C. Reyes, Elizabeth C.
Pasion, Ma. Elsa C. Garcia, Imelda C. Trillo, Ricardo P. Crisostomo, and Ma.
Elena C. Dinglasan vs. Jimmy L. Barnes) and to discuss their respective
positions on the significance of said case on the issues raised before the
Court.[3]

In his Compliance, petitioner manifests that he is awaiting the order of the

CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 55949 requiring him to comment on private
respondents petition for review therein after this Court in G.R. No. 144533
(Jimmy L. Barnes a.k.a. James L. Barnes, Petitioner, versus Teresita Reyes,
et al., Respondents) denied petitioners petition for review of the Resolution of
the CA dated May 25, 2000 giving due course to the private respondents
petition for review, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 55949. [4] As to the
significance of the said case on the issue of forum-shopping, petitioner
submits that there is none since said case involves the ejectment case
anchored on non-payment of rentals based on a pure lease agreement only;
that the ejectment suit calls for de facto possession, while the specific
performance case involves issues of ownership and enforcement of a right or
a de jure possession.

In their Compliance Memorandum, private respondents manifest that they

are awaiting the comment of the petitioner in CA-G.R. SP No. 55949. As to the
significance of the said case on the issue of forum-shopping presently before
the Court, private respondents submit that the principal issue before CA-G.R.
SP No. 55949 is whether or not the MOA is valid. They contend that until said
issue is resolved, the action for specific performance on the provisions of the
MOA is premature. They emphasize that the action for specific performance is
a mere off-shoot of the decision rendered by Branch 227.

We are not persuaded by the arguments of private respondents.

Private respondents harp on the fact that the Court applied procedural
rules liberally in favor of the petitioner which they consider an injustice. They,
however, must realize that the Rules of Court itself calls for its liberal
construction, with the view of promoting their objective of securing a just,
speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. [5] The
Court is fully aware that procedural rules are not to be belittled or simply
disregarded for these prescribed procedures insure an orderly and speedy
administration of justice. However, it is equally true that litigation is not merely
a game of technicalities. Law and jurisprudence grant to courts the
prerogative to relax compliance with procedural rules of even the most
mandatory character, mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need to put an
end to litigation speedily and the parties right to an opportunity to be heard.
[6]
In numerous cases, the Court has allowed liberal construction of
the Rules of Court with respect to the rules on the manner and periods for
perfecting appeals, when to do so would serve the demands of substantial
justice and in the exercise of equity jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. [7] As the
Court has expounded in Aguam vs. Court of Appeals:[8]

The court has the discretion to dismiss or not to dismiss an appellant's appeal. It is a
power conferred on the court, not a duty. The "discretion must be a sound one, to be
exercised in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, having in mind the
circumstances obtaining in each case." Technicalities, however, must be avoided. The
law abhors technicalities that impede the cause of justice. The court's primary duty is
to render or dispense justice. "A litigation is not a game of technicalities." "Lawsuits
unlike duels are not to be won by a rapier's thrust. Technicality, when it deserts its
proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy,
deserves scant consideration from courts." Litigations must be decided on their
merits and not on technicality. Every party litigant must be afforded the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the
unacceptable plea of technicalities. Thus, dismissal of appeals purely on technical
grounds is frowned upon where the policy of the court is to encourage hearings of
appeals on their merits and the rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very
rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure, not override
substantial justice. It is a far better and more prudent course of action for the
court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on
appeal to attain the ends of justice rather than dispose of the case on technicality
and cause a grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy
disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of
justice.[9] (Emphasis supplied)

In the assailed decision, indeed, the Court upheld the general rule that the
filing of a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration in the
CA does not toll the fifteen-day period to appeal, citing Habaluyas
Enterprises, Inc. vs. Japson.[10] However, we suspended this rule in order to
serve substantial justice in accordance with Ginete vs. Court of
Appeals[11] and Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals.[12]

In the Ginete case, the Court held:

The Court may suspend its own rules or exempt a particular case from its operation
where the appellate court failed to obtain jurisdiction over the case owing to
appellants failure to perfect an appeal. Hence, with more reason would this Court
suspend its own rules in cases where the appellate court has already obtained
jurisdiction over the appealed case. This prerogative to relax procedural rules of the
most mandatory character in terms of compliance such as the period to appeal has
been invoked and granted in a considerable number of cases.

Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which
would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial
justice, must always be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflect this principle. The
power to suspend or even disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to
alter even that which this Court itself has already declared to be final, as we are now
constrained to do in the instant case.

The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant
the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free
from the constraints of technicalities. Time and again, this Court has consistently
held that rules must not be applied rigidly so as not to override substantial
justice.[13] (Emphasis supplied)

In the Sanchez case, the Court restated the range of reasons which may
provide justification for a court to resist a strict adherence to procedure,
enumerating the elements for an appeal to be given due course by a
suspension of procedural rules, such as: (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or
property; (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (c) the
merits of the case, (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or
negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (e) a lack of
any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (f) the
other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.[14] Elements or
circumstances (a), (d), (e) and (f) exist in the present case.

A suspension of the Rules is warranted in this case since the procedural

infirmity was not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the petitioner.
Petitioners counsel was understandably confused with the absence of an
explicit prohibition in the 2002 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (IRCA)
that the period of filing a motion for reconsideration is non-extendible, which
was expressly stated in the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals
that was in effect prior to the IRCA. The lawyers negligence without any
participatory negligence on the part of the petitioner is a sufficient reason to
set aside the resolution of the CA.[15]

More significantly, a careful study of the merits of the case and the lack of
any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, dictated
the setting aside of the resolutions of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 69573 and
Branch 215 in Civil Case No. Q-99-37219, as both are patently erroneous.
Both dismissed petitioners complaint for specific performance on the ground
of forum-shopping. It is elementary that petitioner is not guilty of forum-
shopping because there is no identity of issues and causes of action between
the ejectment case which was appealed by petitioner from the MeTC to
Branch 227, and the specific performance suit filed by petitioner in Branch
215. Without pre-empting the decision of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 55949, it
cannot be ignored that the primary issue before Branch 227, now pending
review in CA-G.R. SP No. 55949, is not actually the validity of the MOA, as
advanced by private respondents, but whether, based on private
respondents allegations in their complaint, the MeTC has jurisdiction over
the case and whether private respondents have a cause of action for
ejectment. It is well to state, by way of reminder, that while petitioner may
have brought up the MOA in the ejectment suit, by way of defense, any ruling
therein is merely provisional, only for purposes of resolving the issue of
physical possession and is not res judicata or conclusive on the issue of the
enforceability of the MOA, as such determination is not clothed with finality.
[16]
This is so because an ejectment case is simply designed to summarily
restore physical possession of a piece of land or building to one who has been
illegally or forcibly deprived thereof, without prejudice to the settlement of the
parties' opposing claims of juridical possession in appropriate proceedings.
[17]
The Court has long recognized that suits for specific performance
with damages do not affect ejectment actions; an ejectment case for
non-payment of rentals is not prejudicial to an action to enforce the right
of preemption or prior purchase of the leased premises. [18] Moreover, the
consistent case law is that a judgment rendered in an ejectment case shall not
bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the land or building
nor shall it be conclusive as to the facts therein found in a case between the
same parties upon a different cause of action involving possession.[19]

Furthermore, the private respondents will not be unjustly prejudiced by the

suspension of the rules. What is subject of the appeal is only a question of
law, involving the issue of forum-shopping, and not a factual matter involving
the merits of each partys respective claims and defenses relating to the
enforcement of the MOA, wherein petitioner was given an option to purchase
the subject property. Litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on
their merits and not on mere technicalities. [20] Every party-litigant should be
afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his
cause, freed from the constraints of technicalities.[21]

In essence, the Court is convinced that the test for substantial justice and
equity considerations which we have set in Sanchez vs. Court of
Appeals[22] has been adequately met by petitioner to justify a suspension of
procedural rules.

Thus, when the Second Division referred the issue on the suspension of
the rule that the filing of a motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration per the Habaluyas case, the Court en banc in its Resolution
dated June 14, 2005 referred back the case to the Second Division and
allowed it pro hac vice to relax the case law on the matter in view of the merits
of the present case.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration

and referral to the Court en banc is DENIED with finality.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, Callejo, Sr., Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.