The Tenerife Airport Disaster - the worst in aviation
history
The Tenerife Airport Disaster occurred at just before
5:07pm on 27 March 1977. Despite the terrible loss of
life as a result of the terrorist attacks on the Twin
Towers in 2001, the tragic accident at Los Rodeos still
retains the dubious title of having the highest number
of fatalities (excluding those on the ground) of any
single incident in aviation history.
The circumstances resulting in the Tenerife Airport disaster came about due to an unfortunate series of unrelated
events.
Both aeroplanes were bound for Las Palmas, on the
island of Gran Canaria. It was only as they were
approaching the Canary Islands that events began that
would ultimately lead to the tragedy.
At 1:15pm on the day of the accident, a small terrorist
bomb exploded in the terminal building of Las Palmas
Airport. There had been a warning, so there were a few
injuries, but no deaths. A phone call claimed
resposibility and told of a second bomb. The airport
authorities had no choice but to temporarily close the
airport.
The Pan Am and the KLM aircraft were both told to
divert to the nearest alternative airport, which was Los
Rodeos. At least three other large, long-haul planes
were directed there too.
Los Rodeos Airport was ill-equipped to deal with so
many large aircraft. As mentioned earlier, it had only
one runway, plus one main taxiway, running parallel to
Next, the Pan Am flight was instructed to backtaxi
along the same runway, then leave it at the third exit,
taking it onto the main taxiway. The captain asked for a
repeat of the exit number and was told "The third one,
sir, one, two, three, third. The third one". The aircraft
began its slow taxi, with the crew using a map of the
airport to find the required exit. Remember, it was
There were two aircraft involved in this Tenerife Airport
disaster, a Pan American World Airways and
a KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, both of them Boeing 747s.
In 1977, Los Rodeos Airport only had one runway and
the two aircraft found themselves taxiing along it in
opposite directions, on a collision course.
it. There were also several smaller taxiways connected
to this main one. With so many large planes to
accommodate, it was necessary to park them on the
main taxiway, resulting in planes about to take off
having to taxi into position using the actual runway.
Whilst on the ground, the captain of the KLM flight
decided to refuel, to save time. This decision meant
that the aircraft was fully fuelled when the Tenerife
Airport disaster occurred - and the resulting
conflagration was that much more terrible.
Eventually, word came through that Las Palmas Airport
had been reopened, so the KLM plane was cleared by
the control tower and told to backtaxi to the end of the
single runway, then make a 180 turn (a difficult
manoeuver in such a narrow space). The aircraft's crew
were asked to acknowledge this clearence, but,
because they were performing their pre-flight check,
this was never made until the plane was in take-off
position. Meanwhile, low clouds had drifted in, resulting
in a fog that limited visibility to just under 1000 feet.
foggy by this time. It appears that the crew never
managed to identify the correct exit 3. This is reflected
in the fact that the imminent collision eventually
happened near the fourth exit.
It was at about this time that there appear to have
been misunderstandings in communication between
 the planes and the control tower. The captain of the
KLM flight instructed his co-pilot to report that they
were ready for take-off and to request clearance. The
control tower then gave a clearance which specified
the aircrafts departure route and gave instructions of
what to do after take-off. It was not a specific clearance
for actual take-off.
The co-pilot's reply was "We're now at take-off", to
which the control tower replied "OK". It appears that
the flight crew meant that they were actually beginning
their take-off, while the controller took it to mean they
were in take-off position, awaiting final clearance. He
added, "Stand by for take-off, I will call you".
At that point in events leading to the Tenerife Airport
disaster, there occurred the most unfortunate
coincidence of all. A simultaneous radio call from the
Pan Am flight, saying that they had not finished taxiing
and were still on the runway, had the effect of causing
radio interference, so the control tower's last few words
were not heard by the KLM captain. The crucial
information of the Pan Am flight's position was also
lost. If both these messages had been heard, the KLM
flight would have been able to abort its take-off.
Because of the fog, the aircraft could not see each
other and neither could be viewed from the control
tower. Also, Los Rodeos Airport wasn't equipped with
ground radar. The tower asked the Pan Am flight to
There followed an extensive investigation into the
cause of the Tenerife Airport Disaster by a team of 70
investigators. Their conclusions were that the main
reasons such a catastrophe was allowed to happen
were:
The KLM flight started its take-off without
proper clearance.
The Pan Am flight missed the third exit it was
told to use, instead carrying on towards exit four.
Changes made to airport procedures as a result of the
Tenerife Airport Disaster echoed around the word.
Aviation authorities now insisted on the use of standard
phrases, as opposed to such colloquilisms as "OK" in
radio responses. The phrase "take-off" was not to be
used until the actual take-off was due to take place.
Instead, control towers and aircrew should refer to
"departure".
report when it was clear of the runway. Its captain
replied, "OK, we'll report when we're clear". On hearing
this, the flight engineer on the KLMflight expressed
concern about the position of the other aircaft. The
KLM captain, however, seemed positive he had been
given clearance for take-off and continued down the
runway.
As the two planes approached one another, their
respective crews eventually saw the other plane's
landing lights through the fog. The Pan Am captain
applied full power and attempted to veer sharply onto
the fourth exit. The KLM captain attempted a steep
climb, scraping the planes's tail along the runway for
some 65 feet. It left the ground, but its underside
struck the Pam Am plane's upper fuselage, ripping it
apart. The KLM plane stalled and came down some 500
feet further on, then slid a further 1000 feet.
The loss of life from the Tenerife Airport disaster was
horrendous. From the KLM flight, all 234 passengers
and 14 crew perished. 326 passengers and 9 crew on
the Pan Am flight died, primarily due to the spilt fuel
igniting and exploding. 56 passengers and 5 crew from
this flight survived. Some people who had survived the
crash and were out on the runway were killed by
shrapnel flying from the 747's engines, which were still
running after the impact. Firefighters initially rushed to
the KLM aircraft, believing, due to the thick fog, that
there was only one plane involved. Ironically, this was
the plane with no survivors.
The loss of two crucial radio messages, due to
their being broadcast as exactly the same time and
causing cross-interference, resulting in meaningless
radio hiss-and-crackle.
Use of non-standard responses, such as "OK".
The airport being forced to accommodate a
number of large aircraft, way beyond its capacity.
The following year (1978), Tenerife's second airport
was inaugurated. Reina Sofia Airport was much bigger
and took over international flights. Los Rodeos was
relegated to servicing only domestic and inter-island
flights, such as its size permitted.
Ground radar was installed at Los Rodeos.
In 2002, a new terminal was opened at Los Rodeos and the airport regained its international status.
A monument dedicated to the memory of all the people
who lost their lives on that fateful day was eventually
erected.

Photo: Tenerife77