[G.R. No. 109373.

March 27, 1998]

PACIFIC BANKING CORPORATION EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION, PAULA S. PAUG, and its officers and members,
petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and VITALIANO N. NAAGAS II, as Liquidator of Pacific Banking
Corporation, respondents.

FACTS:

On March 20, 1995, the Court rendered a decision holding that a petition for liquidation under Sec. 29 of the Central
Bank Act, R.A.No. 265[1] is a special proceeding and , therefore, the rules prescribing a period of 30 days for appealing
and requiring a record on appeal apply. Accordingly, the appeal in G.R. No. 109373 was held to have been duly
perfected but the appeal in G.R. No. 112991 had not been perfected because of petitioner's failure to file a record on
appeal.

On November 6, 1995, petitioner then filed the Omnibus Motion in question seeking to (1) reopen the case and/or
consider the resolution of October 9, 1995 which denied his motion for reconsideration, and (2) reconsider the October
13, 1995 resolution absolving the branch clerk of the trial court from contempt charges.

In his omnibus motion, petitioner insists that he filed a record on appeal. As proof, he presents a photocopy of the
record on appeal allegedly received by the branch clerk of the trial court bearing the handwritten notation "Received,
10-15-92, 3:45 PM" and the alleged initials of the said clerk. Petitioner explains that the record on appeal does not
have the RTC stamp "Received" because the trial court does not use a stamp but receipt of pleadings is acknowledged
simply by nothing this fact by hand.

Issue:

Whether or not RECORD ON APPEAL was actually filed in the court a quo.

Held:

No. It is to be noted that the alleged duplicate original copy of the Notice of Appeal [Record on Appeal] which is
supposed to be with the counsels of PDIC was not presented as evidence. No evidence was likewise presented to prove
the same. No effort was exerted by PDIC to prove the authenticity of the signature of Clerk of Court Valencia appearing
in PDIC's copy of the Record on Appeal.

The private respondent was able to present proof which are affirmative, unequivocal convincing, and consistent. In fact
the testimony alone of Atty. Valencia which was a reiteration of his previous testimonies were very clear, concise, and
moreover consistent.
Even the documentary evidence submitted by petitioner to prove the authenticity of the signature of the branch clerk
on the alleged duplicate original copy of the record on appeal is not convincing. The branch clerk's alleged signature
and notation are markedly different from his signature and handwriting appearing in the submitted documentary
evidence.

As regards petitioner's prayer that the Court reconsider its resolution of October 13, 1995 absolving the branch clerk of
court of charges of wrongdoing, suffice it to state here that no ground exists to impute bad faith on the part of the
branch clerk. Good faith is presumed and the complainant has the burden of proving any wrongdoing.

Manalo vs CA
GR No. 129242, January 16, 2001

FACTS:

Troadic Manalo who died on February 1992, was survived by his Pilar and his 11 children. The deceased left several
real properties in Manila and a business in Tarlac. In November 1992, herein respondents, 8 of the surviving children,
filed a petition with RTC Manila for the judicial settlement of the estate of their late father and for appointment of their
brother Romeo Manalo as administrator thereof. Hearing was set on February 11, 1993 and the herein petitioners were
granted 10 days within which to file their opposition to the petition.
ISSUE: WON the case at bar is covered under Article 151 where earnest efforts toward compromise should first be
made prior the filing of the petition.

HELD:

It is a fundamental rule that in the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the averments and the
character of the relief were sought in the complaint or petition, shall be controlling. The careful scrutiny of the petition
for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement and distribution of the estate belies herein petitioners claim
that the same is in the nature of an ordinary civil action. The provision of Article 151 is applicable only to ordinary civil
actions. It is clear from the term suit that it refers to an action by one person or persons against another or other in
a court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him for the redress of an injury or
enforcement of a right. It is also the intention of the Code Commission as revealed in the Report of the Code
Commission to make the provision be applicable only to civil actions. The petition for issuance of letters of
administration, settlement, and distribution of estate is a special proceeding and as such a remedy whereby the
petitioners therein seek to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. Hence, it must be emphasized that herein
petitioners are not being sued in such case for any cause of action as in fact no defendant was pronounced therein.

Roberts v. Leonidas
129 SCRA 754

FACTS:

Grimm, an American resident of Manila, died in 1977. He was survived by his second wife (Maxine), their two children
(Pete and Linda), and by his two children by a first marriage (Juanita and Ethel) which ended by divorce.

Grimm executed two wills in San Francisco, California on January 23, 1959. One will disposed of his Philippine estate
described as conjugal property of himself and his second wife. The second will disposed of his estate outside the
Philippines. The two wills and a codicil were presented for probate in Utah by Maxine on March 1978. Maxine admitted
that she received notice of the intestate petition filed in Manila by Ethel in January 1978. The Utah Court admitted the
two wills and codicil to probate on April 1978 and was issued upon consideration of the stipulation between the
attorneys for Maxine and Ethel.

Also in April 1978, Maxine and Ethel, with knowledge of the intestate proceeding in Manila, entered into a compromise
agreement in Utah regarding the estate.

As mentioned, in January 1978, an intestate proceeding was instituted by Ethel. On March 1978, Maxine filed an
opposition and motion to dismiss the intestate proceeding on the ground of pendency of the Utah probate
proceedings. She submitted to the court a copy of Grimms will. However, pursuant to the compromise agreement,
Maxine withdrew the opposition and the motion to dismiss. The court ignored the will found in the record.The estate
was partitioned.

In 1980, Maxine filed a petition praying for the probate of the two wills (already probated in Utah), that the partition
approved by the intestate court be set aside and the letters of administration revoked, that Maxine be appointed
executrix and Ethel be ordered to account for the properties received by them and return the same to Maxine. Maxine
alleged that they were defrauded due to the machinations of Ethel, that the compromise agreement was illegal and
the intestate proceeding was void because Grimm died testate so partition was contrary to the decedents wills.

Ethel filed a motion to dismiss the petition which was denied by Judge Leonidas for lack of merit.

ISSUE:

Whether the judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying Ethels motion to
dismiss.

HELD:

We hold that respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in
denying Ethels motion to dismiss.
A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died with two wills and no will shall pass either real or
personal property unless it is proved and allowed (Art. 838, Civil Code; sec. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court).

The probate of the will is mandatory. It is anomalous that the estate of a person who died testate should be settled in
an intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should be consolidated with the testate proceeding and the
judge assigned to the testate proceeding should continue hearing the two cases.

Cuenco vs. CA

G.R. No. L-24742, October 26, 1973

FACTS:

Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died in Manila. He was survived by his widow and two minor sons, residing in Quezon
City, and children of the first marriage, residing in Cebu. Lourdes, one of the children from the first marriage, filed a
Petition for Letters of Administration with the Court of First Instance (CFI) Cebu, alleging that the senator died intestate
in Manila but a resident of Cebu with properties in Cebu and Quezon City.

The petition still pending with CFI Cebu, Rosa Cayetano Cuenco, the second wife, filed a petition with CFI Rizal for the
probate of the last will and testament, where she was named executrix. Rosa also filed an opposition and motion to
dismiss in CFI Cebu but this court held in abeyance resolution over the opposition until CFI Quezon shall have acted on
the probate proceedings.

Lourdes filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Quezon, on ground of lack of jurisdiction and/or improper
venue, considering that CFI Cebu already acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The opposition and motion to
dismiss were denied. Upon appeal CA ruled in favor of Lourdes and issued a writ of prohibition to CFI Quezon.

ISSUEs:

1. Whether or not CA erred in issuing the writ of prohibition

2. Whether or not CFI Quezon acted without jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance and
assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the probate proceedings in pursuance to CFI Cebu's order expressly
consenting in deference to the precedence of probate over intestate proceedings

HELD:

1. The Supreme Court found that CA erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition against the Quezon City court
from proceeding with the testate proceedings and annulling and setting aside all its orders and actions,
particularly its admission to probate of the last will and testament of the deceased and appointing petitioner-
widow as executrix thereof without bond pursuant to the deceased testator's wish.

2. Under Rule 73, the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.

The residence of the decent or the location of his estate is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but
merely of venue. If this were otherwise, it would affect the prompt administration of justice.

The court with whom the petition is first filed must also first take cognizance of the settlement of the estate in order to
exercise jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all other courts.

TIMBOL V. CANO

Facts: Mercedes Cano died leaving her only son Floranto Timbol as sole heir. Her brother, Jose Cano, was appointed
judicial administrator. Jose proposed that the agricultural lands of the estate be leased to him at P4,000 which was
approved by the court. The court later on approved the reduction of rent to P2,400 and the conversion of some of the
agricultural lands to a subdivision. A year later, a project of partition was approved by court designating Florante as
the sole heir and he was appointed judicial administrator. He then proposed moved that the area designated for the
subdivision be increased but was opposed by Jose because the enlargement of the subdivision would reduce the land
leased to him and his tenants will lose their landholdings. Nevertheless, the court approved Florantes petition hence
the case at bar.

Issue: W/N the probate court has jurisdiction to annul rights under the contract of lease though it would prejudice the
lessee

Held: YES
In probate proceedings, the court orders the probate of the will of the decedent, grants letters of administration of the
party best entitled thereto, supervises and controls all acts of administration, hears and approves claims against the
estate of the deceased, orders payment of lawful debts, authorizes sale, mortgage, or any encumbrance or real estate,
directs the delivery of the estate to those entitled. The lease was obtained with the courts approval hence if the
probate court has the right to approve the lease, so may it order its revocation or reduction of the subject of the lease.

And though lessee may be prejudiced by the reduction, reduction alone cannot bar the reduction of the land leased
because such reduction is necessary to raise funds to pay and liquidate the debts of the estate under administration.

Sandejas v Lina

Doctrine: . In settling the estate of the deceased, a probate court has jurisdiction over matters incidental and collateral
to the exercise of its recognized powers. Such matters include selling, mortgaging or otherwise encumbering realty
belonging to the estate.

Facts:

On February 17, 1981, Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. filed a petition in the lower court praying that letters of administration be
issued in his favor for the settlement of the estate of his wife, REMEDIOS R. SANDEJAS. Letters of Administration were
issued by the lower court appointing Eliodoro as administrator.

On November 19, 1981, the 4th floor of Manila City Hall was burned and among the records burned were the records of
the Court where Sandejas filed his petition.

On April 19, 1983, an Omnibus Pleading for motion to intervene and petition-in-intervention was filed by Alex A. Lina
alleging that Sandejas, in his capacity as seller, obligated to sell to Lina 4 parcels of land.

Eliodoro died sometime in November 1984 in Canada His counsel is still waiting for official word on the fact of the
death of the administrator. He also alleged that the matter of the claim of Alex becomes a money claim to be filed in
Eliodoro's estate. the lower court issued an order directing the other heirs of Sandejas to move for the appointment of
a new administrator within 15 days from receipt of the order.

On January 1986, Alex filed a Motion for his appointment as a new administrator of the Intestate Estate of Remedios R.
Sandejas on the following reasons: that Alex has not received any motion for the appointment of an administrator in
place of Eliodoro; that his appointment would be beneficial to the heirs; that he is willing to give away his being an
administrator as long as the heirs has found one. The heirs chose Sixto Sandejas as new administrator. They were
reasoning out that it was only at a later date that Sixto accepted the appointment. The lower court substituted Alex
Lina with Sixto Sandejas as administrator.

On November 1993, Alex filed an Omnibus Motion to approve the deed of conditional sale executed between Alex A.
Lina and Elidioro and to compel the heirs to execute a deed of absolute sale in favor of Alex. The lower court granted
Alex's motion.

Overturning the RTC ruling, the CA held that the contract between Eliodoro Sandejas Sr. and respondent was merely a
contract to sell, not a perfected contract of sale. It ruled that the ownership of the four lots was to remain in the
intestate estate of Remedios until the approval of the sale was obtained from the settlement court.

Issue

What is the settlement court's jurisdiction?

Held:

Court approval is required in any disposition of the decedent's estate per Rule 89 of the Rules of Court. One can sell
their rights, interests or participation in the property under administration. A stipulation requiring court approval does
not affect the validity and the effectivity of the sale as regards the selling heirs. It merely implies that the property
may be taken out of custodia legis, but only with the court's permission.

Section 8 of Rule 89 allows this action to proceed. The factual differences have no bearing on the intestate court's
jurisdiction over the approval of the subject conditional sale. Probate jurisdiction covers all matters relating to the
settlement of estates (Rules 74 & 86-91) and the probate of wills (Rules 75-77) of deceased persons, including the
appointment and the removal of administrators and executors (Rules 78-85). It also extends to matters incidental and
collateral to the exercise of a probate court's recognized powers such as selling, mortgaging or otherwise encumbering
realty belonging to the estate. Indeed, the rules on this point are intended to settle the estate in a speedy manner, so
that the benefits that may flow from such settlement may be immediately enjoyed by the heirs and the beneficiaries.

In the present case, the Motion was meant to settle the decedent's obligation to Alex; hence, that obligation clearly
falls under the jurisdiction of the settlement court. To require respondent to file a separate action -- on whether
petitioners should convey the title to Eliodoro Sr.'s share of the disputed realty -- will unnecessarily prolong the
settlement of the intestate estates of the deceased spouses.

[A.M. No. RTJ-91-766. April 7, 1993.]

JOSE P. UY and RIZALINA C. UY, Complainants, v. HON. JUDGE TERESITA DIZON-CAPULONG, Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 172, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Respondent.

JUDGE TERESITA DIZON-CAPULONG, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Branch 172, Metro
Manila, is charged 1 with gross incompetence, gross ignorance of the law and grave misconduct in a complaint filed on
15 November 1991 with the Office of the Court Administrator by the spouses Jose P. Uy and Rizalina C. Uy, relative to
Special Proceedings No. 335-V-88 for settlement of the estate of the late Ambrocio C. Pingco.

The records show that on 21 November 1988, a certain Herminia R. Alvos, claiming to be a niece of Paz Ramirez,
surviving spouse of the late Ambrocio C. Pingco, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela a petition for
settlement of the estate of Ambrocio C. Pingco. Two (2) days after, or on 23 November 1988, respondent Judge
appointed said Herminia R. Alvos special administratrix under Rule 80 of the Rules of Court.

Spouses Jose P. Uy and Rizalina C. Uy claim that despite the Decision of the Court of Appeals of 28 September 1989
and the pendency of the petition for review by way of certiorari before this Court, respondent Judge continued issuing
various orders resulting in the issuance of new titles to the properties in the name of persons stated in the project of
partition, to the damage and prejudice of complainants.

Issue: WON respondent judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and grave misconduct prejudicial to the interest of
the judicial service

Held:

Yes. The transgressions of respondent Judge are further aggravated by her refusal to abide by the Decision of the Court
of Appeals annulling her Order of 7 June 1989 which directed the cancellation of the titles of complainants.

Moreover, the total disregard by respondent Judge of Our Resolution of 8 March 1991 cannot be condoned. Therein, We
affirmed the Decision of the Court of Appeals declaring her to have exceeded her jurisdiction in cancelling the titles of
complainants. Nonetheless, respondent Judge chose not to heed our pronouncement. She issued two (2) more orders
approving the sale to other persons of the remaining properties which were titled in the name of complainants.

We consider this willful disobedience and continued disregard of Our Resolution as grave and serious misconduct.
Indeed, respondent Judge displayed open defiance to Our authority and utterly failed to show proper respect for, and
due and needed cooperativeness with resolutions of this Court.
By her acts and omissions, respondent Judge has failed to observe in the performance of her duties that prudence and
circumspection which the law requires for public service. She has made a mockery of the judicial system of which she
is a part and which she is sworn to uphold. This Court cannot countenance any act or omission which would diminish
the faith of the people in the administration of justice.

Pio Barretto Realty Development Corporation vs Court of Appeals

Honor Moslares and Pio Barretto Realty Development Corporation are disputing over the estate of Nicolai Drepin,
represented by Atty. Tomas Trinidad. To settle the dispute, and while the case was in court, they entered into a
Compromise Agreement by which they agreed to have the estate in dispute be sold; that in case Moslares was able to
buy the property first, he should pay P3,000,000.00 to Barretto Realty (representing the amount of investments by
Barretto Realty in the estate); that should Barretto Realty buy the property first, it should pay P1,000,000.00 to
Moslares (representing interest). The compromise agreement was approved by the judge (Judge Perfecto Laguio).

Barretto Realty was able to buy the property first hence it delivered a managers check worth P1,000,000.00 to
Moslares but the latter refused to accept the same. Barretto Realty filed a petition before the trial court to direct
Moslares to comply with the Compromise Agreement. Barretto Realty also consigned the check payment with the
court. The judge issued a writ of execution against Moslares and the sheriff also delivered the check to Moslares which
the latter accepted. However, three years later, Moslares filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that the check
payment did not amount to legal tender and that he never even encashed the check. The judge agreed with Moslares.

ISSUE: Whether or not the judge was correct.

HELD: No. There was already a final and executory order issued by the same judge three years prior. The same may no
longer be amended regardless of any claim or error or incorrectness (save for clerical errors only). It is true that a
check is not a legal tender and while delivery of a check produces the effect of payment only when it is encashed, the
rule is otherwise if the debtor (Barretto Realty) was prejudiced by the creditors (Moslares) unreasonable delay in
presentment. Acceptance of a check implies an undertaking of due diligence in presenting it for payment. If no such
presentment was made, the drawer cannot be held liable irrespective of loss or injury sustained by the payee.
Payment will be deemed effected and the obligation for which the check was given as conditional payment will be
discharged.

G.R. No. L-39532 July 20, 1979

VDA. DE RODRIGUEZ vs. COURT OF Appeal

This is supposedly a case about collation. As factual background, it should be stated that the spouses, Beatriz Bautista
and Jose M. Valero, did not beget any child during their marriage In 1951 Beatriz adopted Carmen (Carmencita)
Bautista. Jose wanted also to adopt her but because, by his first marriage, he had two children named Flora Valero
Vda. de Rodriguez and Rosie Valero Gutierrez. he was disqualified to adopt Carmen. Jose manifested in the adoption
proceeding that he consented to the use by Carmen of his surname Valero.

Beatriz B. Valero died intestate on September 12, 1972, survived by her husband and her adopted child. Her estate is
pending settlement in Special Proceeding No. 88896 of the Court of First Instance of Manila. Mrs. Rustia was named
administratrix of her adopted mother's estate.

More than a month later, or on October 18, 1972, Jose M. Valero died testate, survived by his two children, Mrs.
Rodriguez and Mrs. Gutierrez. His will was duly probated in Special Proceeding No. 88677, also of the Court of First
Instance of Manila. Lawyer Celso F. Unson, the executor, submitted an inventory wherein, following the list of conjugal
assets in the testator's will, the two San Lorenzo Village lots were included as part of the testate estate.

That inclusion provoked Mrs. Rustia, the adopted child of Mrs. Valero, and Mrs. Rodriguez and Mrs. Gutierrez, the
legitimate children of the testator, Jose M. Valero, to file (through Mrs. Rustia's lawyer) in the testate proceeding a
motion for the exclusion of the two San Lorenzo Village lots from the testator's inventoried estate.

Issue:
WON issue of collation is necessary to the disposition of the case which merely involved the issue of inclusion in, or
exclusion from, the inventory of the testator's estate.
Held:

No. Whether collation may exist with respect to the two lots and whether Mrs. Rustia's Torrens titles thereto are
indefeasible are matters that may be raised later or may not be raised at all. How those issues should be resolved, if
and when they are raised, need not be touched upon in the adjudication of this appeal.

We have examined the expedientes of the two cases. We found that the proceedings have not yet reached the stage
when the question of collation or advancement to an heir may be raised and decided. The numerous debts of the
decedents are still being paid. The net remainder (remanente liquido) of their conjugal estate has not yet been
determined. On the other hand, up to this time, no separate action has been brought by the appellants to nullify Mrs.
Rustia's Torrens titles to the disputed lots or to show that the sale was in reality a donation. Furthermore, the
proceedings have not reached the stage of partition and distribution when the legitimes of the compulsory heirs have
to be determined.

The Acourt affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals and the orders of the lower court dated August 9 and December
14, 1973, excluding from the inventory of Jose M. Valeros estate the two San Lorenzo Village lots now registered in the
name of Carmen B. Valero-Rustia, but we delete from that decision and the two orders any ruling regarding collation
which is a matter that may be passed upon by the probate court at the time when it is seasonably raised by the
interested parties, if it is ever raised at all.

RAMOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 124354. December 29, 1999.

FACTS:
Erlinda Ramos underwent a surgical procedure to remove stone from her gall bladder (cholecystectomy). They hired
Dr. Hosaka, a surgeon, to conduct the surgery at the De Los Santos Medical Center (DLSMC). Hosaka assured them
that he would find a good anesthesiologist. But the operation did not go as planned, Dr. Hosaka arrived 3 hours late for
the operation, Dra. Gutierrez, the anesthesiologist botched the administration of the anesthesia causing Erlinda to
go into a coma and suffer brain damage. The botched operation was witnessed by Herminda Cruz, sister in law of
Erlinda and Dean of College of Nursing of Capitol Medical Center.

The family of Ramos (petitioners) sued the hospital, the surgeon and the anesthesiologist for damages. The petitioners
showed expert testimony showing that Erlinda's condition was caused by the anesthesiologist in not exercising
reasonable care in intubating Erlinda. Eyewitnesses heard the anesthesiologist saying Ang hirap ma-intubate nito,
mali yata ang pagkakapasok. O lumalaki ang tiyan.

Diagnostic tests prior to surgery showed that Erlinda was robust and fit to undergo surgery.

ISSUES: Whether or not the private respondents were negligent and thereby caused the comatose condition of Ramos.

HELD:
Yes, private respondents were all negligent and are solidarily liable for the damages.

RATIO:

Res ipsa loquitur a procedural or evidentiary rule which means the thing or the transaction speaks for itself. It is a
maxim for the rule that the fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with the surrounding circumstances, may permit
an inference or raise a presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiffs prima facie case, and present a question of
fact for defendant to meet with an explanation, where ordinarily in a medical malpractice case, the complaining party
must present expert testimony to prove that the attending physician was negligent.

This doctrine finds application in this case. On the day of the operation, Erlinda Ramos already surrendered her person
to the private respondents who had complete and exclusive control over her. Apart from the gallstone problem, she
was neurologically sound and fit. Then, after the procedure, she was comatose and brain damagedres ipsa loquitur!
the thing speaks for itself!
Negligence Private respondents were not able to disprove the presumption of negligence on their part in the care of
Erlinda and their negligence was the proximate cause of her condition. One need not be an anesthesiologist in order to
tell whether or not the intubation was a success. [res ipsa loquitur applies here]. The Supreme Court also found that
the anesthesiologist only saw Erlinda for the first time on the day of the operation which indicates unfamiliarity with
the patient and which is an act of negligence and irresponsibility.

REYES V. MOSQUEDA

FACTS:

Dr. Emilio Pascual died intestate and was survived by his sister Ursula Pascual and the children of his late sisters,
herein petitioners Ruperto Reyes et. al. The heirs of Dr. Pascual filed Special Proceedings No. 73-30-M in the CFI for the
administration of Pascuals estate. Ursula then filed a motion to exclude some properties included alleging that these
were donated to her in a donation mortis causa in 1966. This was granted by the CFI without prejudice to its final
determination in a separate action. An appeal was made to the SC. The SC then issued a TRO enjoining the CFI from
enforcing the order.

Among the properties donated to Ursula is lot 24 which was also donated in 1969 in a deed of donation inter vivos in
favor of Ofelia Parungao who was then a minor at the time of the donation. When she reached the age of majority, she
had the donation registered but found out that the certificate of title was missing so she filed a petition for
reconstitution of title which was granted and she registered the donation and was issued a new TCT in her name.

Ursula then sold the lot in favor of the Reyes. Benjamin Reyes filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of Ofelias TCT
which prompted Ofelia to file a petition for recovery of possession against Benjamin Reyes. The CFI issued a joint
decision for the 2 cases ruling that Ofelias TCT was null and void. The IAC affirmed thus an appeal to the SC.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the probate has jurisdiction to exclude properties donated to Ursula
(2) Whether or not the donation executed in favor of Ursula was a donation inter vivos

RULING:

(1) YES

It was stressed in the order of the probate court that it was without prejudice to the final determination in a separate
action. It is well-settled that although a probate court cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties, it can
determine whether or not the properties should be included in the inventory to be administered. Such determination is
not conclusive and is subject to the final decision in a separate action.

(2) YES
Although the donation was entitled donations mortis causa it has been held that dispositions in a deed of donation
do not depend on the title or term used in the deed of donation. It is the body of the document which should be
considered in ascertaining the intention of the donor.

For a donation to be a donation mortis causa, the following characteristics should be present:
1. It conveys no title before the death of the transferor or the transferor retains ownership over the property
2. Before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will
3. The transfer is void should the transferor survive the transferee