Barredo v Garcia (Torts)

BARREDO V GARCIA G.R. No. L-48006 July 8, 1942 FAUSTO BARREDO, petitioner, vs. SEVERINO GARCIA
and TIMOTEA ALMARIO, respondents.

FACTS:
At about half past one in the morning of May 3, 1936, on the road between Malabon and Navotas,
Province of Rizal, there was a head- on collision between a taxi of the Malate Taxicab driven by Pedro
Fontanilla and a carretela guided by Pedro Dimapalis. The carretela was overturned, and one of its
passengers, 16-year-old boy Faustino Garcia, suffered injuries from which he died two days later. A
criminal action was filed against Fontanilla in the Court of First Instance of Rizal.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS (CRIMINAL CASE):

1. CFI- Rizal Fontanilla was convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one year and
one day to two years ofprision correccional. The court in the criminal case granted the petition that the
right to bring a separate civil action be reserved.
2. CA: affirmed the sentence of the lower court in the criminal case.
Severino Garcia and Timotea Almario, parents of the deceased on March 7, 1939, brought an action in
the Court of First Instance of Manila against Fausto Barredo as the sole proprietor of the Malate Taxicab
and employer of Pedro Fontanilla.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS (CIVIL CASE):

1. CFI Manila: Fausto Barredo is liable in damages for the death of Faustino Garcia caused by
negligence of Pedro Fontanilla, a taxi driver employed by Barredo in the amount of 2,000.
2. CA: reduced the damages to 1,000.

ISSUE:
Whether the plaintiffs may bring this separate civil action against Fausto Barredo, thus making him
primarily and directly, responsible under article 1903 of the Civil Code as an employer of Pedro thus
making him primarily and directly, responsible under article 1903 of the Civil Code as an employer of
Pedro Fontanilla

RULING:
Yes.
The responsibility in question is imposed on the occasion of a crime or fault, but not because of the
same, but because of thecuasi- delito, that is to say, the imprudence or negligence of the father,
guardian, proprietor or manager of the establishment, of the teacher, etc. Whenever anyone of the
persons enumerated in the article referred to (minors, incapacitated persons, employees, apprentices)
causes any damage, the law presumes that the father, guardian, teacher, etc. have committed an act
of negligence in not preventing or avoiding the damage. It is this fault that is condemned by the law.
One is not responsible for the acts of others, because one is liable only for his own faults, this being
the doctrine of article 1902; but, by exception, one is liable for the acts of those persons with whom
there is a bond or tie which gives rise to the responsibility.

Crimes under penal code

1. affect public interest
2. Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act
3. not as broad as quasi-delicts because crimes are punished only if there is a penal law clearly
covering them
4. proof beyond reasonable doubt is required

Culpa aquiliana / Cuasi-delito

1. Only of private concern
2. Civil Code, by means of indemnification, merely repairs the damage (includes both reckless and
simple negligence)
3. include all acts in which any kind of fault or negligence intervenes
when there is exercise of the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the presumption is
overcome and he is relieved from liability.

4. only preponderance of evidence is required

Note: not all violations of the penal law produce civil responsibility.

The action against the principal is accessory in the sense that it implies the existence of a prejudicial
act committed by the employee, but it is not subsidiary in the sense that it can not be instituted till
after the judgment against the author of the act or at least, that it is subsidiary to the principal action;
the action for responsibility (of the employer) is in itself a principal action. (Laurent, Principles of
French Civil Law) The basis of civil law liability is not respondent superior but the relationship ofpater
familias. This theory bases the liability of the master ultimately on his own negligence and not on that
of his servant.A quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual is a separate and distinct legal institution,
independent from the civil responsibility arising from criminal liability, and that an employer is, under article
1903 of the Civil Code, primarily and directly responsible for the negligent acts of his employee.

Thus, there were two liabilities of Barredo: first, the subsidiary one because of the civil liability of the
taxi driver arising from the latter's criminal negligence; and, second, Barredo's primary liability as an
employer under article 1903. The plaintiffs were free to choose which course to take, and they
preferred the second remedy. In so doing, they were acting within their rights. It might be observed in
passing, that the plaintiff choose the more expeditious and effective method of relief, because
Fontanilla was either in prison, or had just been released, and besides, he was probably without
property which might be seized in enforcing any judgment against him for damages.
Section 1902 of that chapter reads: "A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another
when there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done.
"SEC. 1903. The obligation imposed by the preceeding article is demandable, not only for personal acts
and omissions, but also for those of the persons for whom they should be responsible.
"The father, and on his death or incapacity, the mother, is liable for the damages caused by the minors
who live with them.
xxx xxx xxx "Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for the damages
caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter may be employed or in
the performance of their duties. xxx xxx xxx
"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove that they
employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage."

the same act of negligence being a proper subject-matter either of a criminal action with its consequent civil
liability arising from a crime or of an entirely separate and independent civil action for fault or negligence
under article 1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate individually of acuasi-
delito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a
negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for
which, after such a conviction, he could have been sued for this civil liability arising from his crime.
Porfirio P. Cinco V. Hon. Mateo Canonoy Et Al.
(1979)
G.R. No. L-33171 May 31, 1979
Laws Applicable: Rule 111, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, Art. 31 and Article 2176 of
the Civil Code

Lessons Applicable: Quasi-delict (Torts and Damages)

FACTS:

Porfirio P. Cinco filed a complaint against jeepney driven by Romeo Hilot and
operated by Valeriana Pepito and Carlos Pepito for a vehicular accident
At the pre-trial in the civil case, counsel for private respondents moved to
suspend the civil action pending the final determination of the criminal suit, invoking
Rule 111, Section 3 (b) of the Rules of Court, which provides:
(b) After a criminal action has been commenced. no civil action arising from the
same offense can be prosecuted, and the same shall be suspended, in whatever
stage it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been
rendered

City Court: ordered the suspension of the civil case

CFI by certiorari: dismissed
ISSUE: W/N there can be an independent civil action for damage to property during the
pendency of the criminal action

HELD: YES. granting the Writ of certiorari prayed for

nature and character of his action was quasi-delictual predicated principally on

Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under
the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant
 primary and direct responsibility of employers and their presumed negligence are
principles calculated to protect society
The separate and independent civil action for a quasi-delict is also clearly
recognized in section 3, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 3. When civil action may proceed independently.In the cases provided in Articles
32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action
may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal
action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may
the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the
criminal action.

Secs. 3(a) and 3(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, which should be suspended
after the criminal action has been instituted is that arising from the criminal offense
not the civil action based on quasi-delict
Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act
or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently
of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code (supra), is so broad that it includes not only
injuries to persons but also damage to property
word "damage" is used in two concepts: the "harm" done and "reparation" for
the harm done

gacia v. florido

Lessons Applicable: Elements of Quasi-Delict (Torts and Damages)

FACTS:

August 4, 1971: German C. Garcia, Chief of the Misamis Occidental Hospital, his
wife, Luminosa L. Garcia, and Ester Francisco, bookkeeper of the hospital, hired and
boarded a PU car owned and operated by Marcelino Inesin, and driven by
respondent, Ricardo Vayson, for a round-trip from Oroquieta City to Zamboanga
City for the purpose of attending a conference
August 4, 1971 9:30 a.m.: While the PU car was negotiating a slight curve on
the national highway at 21 km, it collided with an oncoming passenger bus owned
and operated by the Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and driven by Pedro Tumala
 Garcia et al. sustained various physical injuries which necessitated their medical
treatment and hospitalization
Garcia et al. filed an action for damages against both drivers and their owners
for driving in a reckless, grossly negligent and imprudent manner in gross violation
of traffic rules and without due regard to the safety of the passengers aboard the PU
car
RTC: Dismissed the case because it is not quasi-delict because there is
a violation of law or traffic rules or regulations for excessive speeding
ISSUE: W/N Garcia et al. can still file a civil action for quasi-delict despite having a
criminal action.

HELD: YES. decision appealed reversed and set aside, and the court a quo is directed to
proceed with the trial of the case
essential averments for a quasi-delictual action under Articles 2176-2194 of the
New Civil Code are present, namely:
a) act or omission of the private respondents
b) presence of fault or negligence or the lack of due care in the operation
of the passenger bus No. 25 by Pedro Tumala resulting in the collision of the bus
with the passenger car
c) physical injuries and other damages sustained by as a result of the
collision
d) existence of direct causal connection between the damage or prejudice
and the fault or negligence of private respondents
e) the absence of pre-existing contractual relations between the parties
violation of traffic rules is merely descriptive of the failure of said driver to
observe for the protection of the interests of others, that degree of care, precaution
and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, which failure resulted in the
injury on petitioners
petitioners never intervened in the criminal action instituted by the Chief of
Police against respondent Pedro Tumala, much less has the said criminal action been
terminated either by conviction or acquittal of said accused
It is, therefore, evident that by the institution of the present civil action for
damages, petitioners have in effect abandoned their right to press recovery for
damages in the criminal case, and have opted instead to recover them in the
present civil case
petitioners have thereby foreclosed their right to intervene therein, or one where
reservation to file the civil action need not be made, for the reason that the law
itself (Article 33 of the Civil Code) already makes the reservation and the failure of
the offended party to do so does not bar him from bringing the action, under the
peculiar circumstances of the case, We find no legal justification for respondent
court's order of dismissal

taylor v. Manila
Elements of quasi-delict (Torts and Damages)
Good Father of a Family (Torts and Damages)

FACTS:
September 30, 1905 Sunday afternoon: David Taylor, 15 years of age,
the son of a mechanical engineer, more mature than the average boy of
his age, and having considerable aptitude and training in mechanics with
a boy named Manuel Claparols, about 12 years of age, crossed the
footbridge to the Isla del Provisor, for the purpose of visiting Murphy, an
employee of the defendant, who and promised to make them a cylinder
for a miniature engine
After leaving the power house where they had asked for Mr.
Murphy, they walked across the open space in the neighborhood of the
place where the company dumped in the cinders and ashes from its
furnaces
they found some twenty or thirty brass fulminating caps
scattered on the ground
These caps are approximately of the size and appearance
of small pistol cartridges and each has attached to it 2 long thin wires by
means of which it may be discharged by the use of electricity
They are intended for use in the explosion of blasting
charges of dynamite, and have in themselves a considerable explosive
power
the boys picked up all they could find, hung them on stick, of which
each took end, and carried them home
After crossing the footbridge, they met Jessie Adrian, less than 9
years old, and they went to Manuel's home
The boys then made a series of experiments with the caps
trust the ends of the wires into an electric light socket - no
result
break the cap with a stone - failed
opened one of the caps with a knife, and finding that it was filled
with a yellowish substance they got matches
David held the cap while Manuel applied a lighted match to
the contents
An explosion followed, causing more or less serious
injuries to all three
Jessie, who when the boys proposed putting a
match to the contents of the cap, became frightened and started to run
away, received a slight cut in the neck
Manuel had his hand burned and wounded
 David was struck in the face by several
particles of the metal capsule, one of which injured his right eye to such
an extent as to the necessitate its removal by the surgeons
Trial Court: held Manila Electric Railroad And Light Company liable
ISSUE:

1. W/N the elemnents of quasi-delict to make Manila Electric Railroad And

Light Company liable - NO
2. W/N Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co. sufficiently proved that they
employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage -
NO

HELD: reversing the judgment of the court below

ART. 1089 Obligations are created by law, by contracts, by quasi-contracts,

and illicit acts and omissions or by those in which any kind of fault or
negligence occurs.

ART. 1902 A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another

when there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so
done.

ART. 1903 The obligation imposed by the preceding article is demandable,

not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of the persons
for whom they should be responsible.

The father, and on his death or incapacity the mother, is liable for the
damages caused by the minors who live with them.
xxx xxx xxx
Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for
damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which
the latter may be employed or on account of their duties.
xxx xxx xxx
The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons
mentioned therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to avoid the damage.

ART. 1908 The owners shall also be liable for the damage caused
1 By the explosion of machines which may not have been cared for with due
diligence, and for kindling of explosive substances which may not have been
placed in a safe and proper place.
 in order to establish his right to a recovery, must establish by
competent evidence:
1. Damages to the plaintiff
2. Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or some person for
whose acts it must respond, was guilty.
3. The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damage.
while we hold that the entry upon the property without express
invitation or permission would not have relieved Manila Electric from
responsibility for injuries incurred, without other fault on his part, if such
injury were attributable to his negligence, the negligence in leaving the
caps exposed on its premises was not the proximate cause of the injury
received
cutting open the detonating cap and putting match to its
contents was the proximate cause of the explosion and of the resultant
injuries inflicted
Manila Electric is not civilly responsible for the injuries thus
incurred
2 years before the accident, David spent 4 months at sea, as a cabin
boy on one of the interisland transports. Later he took up work in his
father's office, learning mechanical drawing and mechanical engineering.
About a month after his accident he obtained employment as a
mechanical draftsman and continued in that employment for 6 months at
a salary of P2.50 a day; and it appears that he was a boy of more than
average intelligence, taller and more mature both mentally and physically
than most boys of 15
The series of experiments made by him in his attempt to
produce an explosion, as described by Jessie who even ran away
True, he may not have known and probably did not know the precise nature of
the explosion which might be expected from the ignition of the contents of the cap,
and of course he did not anticipate the resultant injuries which he incurred; but he
well knew that a more or less dangerous explosion might be expected from his act,
and yet he willfully, recklessly, and knowingly produced the explosion. It would be
going far to say that "according to his maturity and capacity" he exercised such and
"care and caution" as might reasonably be required of him, or that defendant or
anyone else should be held civilly responsible for injuries incurred by him under
such circumstances.
The law fixes no arbitrary age at which a minor can be said to have the
necessary capacity to understand and appreciate the nature and
consequences of his own acts, so as to make it negligence on his part to
fail to exercise due care and precaution in the commission of such acts;
and indeed it would be impracticable and perhaps impossible so to do, for
in the very nature of things the question of negligence necessarily
depends on the ability of the minor to understand the character of his
own acts and their consequences
 he was sui juris in the sense that his age and his experience qualified
him to understand and appreciate the necessity for the exercise of that
degree of caution which would have avoided the injury which resulted
from his own deliberate act; and that the injury incurred by him must be
held to have been the direct and immediate result of his own willful and
reckless act, so that while it may be true that these injuries would not
have been incurred but for the negligence act of the defendant in leaving
the caps exposed on its premises, nevertheless plaintiff's own act was the
proximate and principal cause of the accident which inflicted the injury
rule of the Roman law was: Quod quis ex culpa sua damnum sentit,
non intelligitur sentire
just thing is that a man should suffer the damage which comes
to him through his own fault, and that he can not demand reparation
therefor from another
Negligence is not presumed, but must be proven by him who alleges
it.

Heirs Of Pedro Tayag V. Hon. Fernando S.

Alcantara, Et Al.

Lessons Applicable: Elements of quasi-delict (Torts and Damages)

FACTS:
September 2, 1974 a.m.: Philippine Rabbit Bus bump Pedro Tayag Sr. was riding
on a bicycle along MacArthur Highway at Bo. San Rafael, Tarlac driven by Romeo
Villa, as a result of which he sustained injuries which caused his instantaneous
death
Judge granted the motion, and consequently, suspended the hearing of Civil
Case while criminal case is pending judgment
RTC: acquitting the Romeo Villa of the crime of homicide on the ground of
reasonable doubt
subsequently, the civil case was dismissed
ISSUE: W/N the civil case based on quasi-delict should be barred by the acquittal in a
criminal case
HELD: NO. order of dismissal should be, as it is hereby set aside
Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act
or commission complained of as a felony. such civil action may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
All the essential averments for a quasi delictual action are present, namely: (1)
an act or omission constituting fault or negligence on the part of private respondent;
(2) damage caused by the said act or commission; (3) direct causal relation
between the damage and the act or commission; and (4) no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties

PADILLA, et al. v COURT OF APPEALS (Edz)

129 SCRA 558

Acquittal

Facts:

Padilla (P), et al. were found guilty of grave coercion for unlawfully preventing, by
means of threat, force and violence, Vergara (V) and his family from closing their
stall at a public market and for forcibly opening the door of the stall, demolishing
and destroying it and the furnitures therein by axes and other massive instruments,
and carrying away the goods, wares and merchandise.

Accused allegedly took advantage of their positions: P was the incumbent

municipal mayor, while the rest were policemen except for one civilian.

P, et al. appealed to the CA, claiming that P had the power to order removal of
the stall, which was deemed a nuisance per se under a municipal ordinance. The CA
acquitted the accused on ground of reasonable doubt, but still held them liable for
actual damages (P9,600).

Issue: Did the acquittal based on reasonable doubt as to the criminal liability result
in the extinction of the civil liability?

Held: NO.
 P, et al. were acquitted not because they did not commit the acts stated in the
charge against them. They were acquitted because their acts were denominated
coercion when they properly constituted some other offense such as threat or
malicious mischief. (Crime of coercion requires that the violence be employed
against the person, not against property)

The extinction of the civil action by reason of acquittal in the criminal case refers
exclusively to civil liability ex delicto under Art. 100, RPC. The civil liability must
have arisen from the act as a crime.

The same punishable act or omission can create 2 kinds of civil liabilities against
the accused: that arising from the act as a crime and that arising from the same act
as a quasi-delict. Either of these 2 may be enforced against the accused. However,
the offended party cannot recover under both types of liability.

Civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based on

reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases;
where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal
but only civil in nature; and where the civil liability does not arise from or is not
based upon the criminal act of which the accused was acquitted.

There are no sound reasons to require a separate civil action to still be filed
sincce the facts to be proved in the civil case have already been established in the
criminal proceedings where the accused was acquitted. Due process has been
accorded the accused. The accused themselves do not deny that they caused the
destruction of Vs market stall and had its contents carted away.

CRUZ VS CA (GR NO. 122445 NOVEMBER 18, 1997)

Cruz vs Court of Appeals

GR No. 122445 November 18, 1997

Facts: On March 22, 1991, prosecution witness, Rowena Umali de

Ocampo, accompanied her mother to the Perpetual Help Clinic and
General Hospital situated in Balagtas Street, San Pablo City, Laguna.
They arrived at the said hospital at around 4:30 in the afternoon of
the same day. Prior to March 22, 1991, Lydia was examined by the
petitioner who found a Myoma in her uterus, and scheduled her
for a hysterectomy operation on March 23, 1991. Rowena and her
mother slept in the clinic on the evening of March 22, 1991 as the
latter was to be operated on the next day at 1pm. According to
Rowena, she noticed that the clinic was untidy and the windows and
the floor were very dusty prompting her to ask the attendant fora
rag to wipe the window and floor with. Prior to the operation,
Rowena tried to convince her mother to not proceed with the
operation and even asked petitioner for it to be postponed, however
it still pushed through after the petitioner told Lydia that operation
must be done as scheduled. During the operation, the assisting
doctor of the petitioner, Dr. Ercillo went out of the operating room
and asked that tagmet ampules be bought which was followed by
another instruction to buy a bag of blood. After the operation, when
Lydia came out of the OR, another bag of blood was requested to be
bought, however, the same was not bought due to unavailability of
type A from the blood bank. Thereafter a person arrived to donate
blood which was later transferred to Lydia. Rowena then noticed her
mother, who was attached to an oxygen tank, gasping for breathe
apparently, the oxygen tank is empty, so her husband and
petitioners driver bought an oxygen. Later, without the knowledge
of Lydias relatives,she was decided by the doctors to be transferred
to San Pablo District Hospital were she was supposed to be re-
operated. After Lydia experienced shocks, she died.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner has been negligent which caused

the death of Lydia Umali.

Held: Yes. Whether or not a physician has committed an

inexcusable lack of precaution in the treatment of his patient to be
determined according to the standard of care observed by other
members of the profession in good standing under similar
circumstances bearing in mind the advanced state of the profession
at the time of treatment or the present state of medical science. A
doctor in effect represents that, having the needed training and skill
possessed by physicians and surgeons practicing in the same field,
he will employ such training, care and skill in the treatment of his
patients. He therefore has a duty to use at least the same level of
care that any other reasonably competent doctor would use to treat
a condition under the same circumstances. It is in this aspect of
medical malpractice that expert testimony is essential to establish
not only the standard of care of the profession but also that the
physicians conduct in the treatment and care falls below such
standard. Further, in as much as the causes of the injuries involved
in malpractice actions are determinable only in the light of scientific
knowledge, it has been recognized that expert testimony is usually
necessary to the conclusion as to causation.

In litigations involving medical negligence, the plaintiff has the

burden of establishing appellants negligence and for a reasonable
conclusion of negligence, there must be proof of breach of duty on
the part of the surgeon as well as causal connection of such breach
and the resulting death of his patient.

In order that there may be recovery for an injury, however, it must

be shown that the injury for which recovery is sought must be
legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the connection between
the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural reference
of events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes. In other words,
the negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury. For
negligence, no matter what it consists, cannot create a right of
action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury complained of
and the proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which in natural
and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury and without which the result would have
occurred.

The elements of reckless imprudence are:

1. That the offender does or fails to do an act;

2. That the doing or the failure to do that act is voluntary;
3. That it be without malice;
4. That material damage results from the reckless imprudence;
and
 5. That there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of
the offender, taking into consideration his employment or
occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition, and
other circumstances regarding persons, time, and place.

The possible causes of hemorrhage during an operation are: 1.) the

failure of the surgeon to tie or suture a cut blood vessel; 2.) allowing
a cut blood vessel to get out of control; 3.) the subsequent loosening
of the tie or suture applied to a cut blood vessel; and 4.)and a
clotting defect known as DIC.

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Philippine Rabbit vs. People

G.R. No. 147703 April 14, 2004
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Facts: Napoleon Roman was found guilty and convicted of the
crime of reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide,
multiple physical injuries and damage to property and was
sentenced to suffer imprisonment and to pay damages. The court
further ruled that in the event of the insolvency of accused,
petitioner shall be liable for the civil liabilities of the accused.
Evidently, the judgment against accused had become final and
executory.
Admittedly, accused had jumped bail and remained at-large. The
CA ruled that the institution of a criminal case implied the
institution also of the civil action arising from the offense. Thus,
once determined in the criminal case against the accused-
employee, the employers subsidiary civil liability as set forth in
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code becomes conclusive and
enforceable.
Issue: Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in
the defense of its accused-employee, may appeal the judgment
of conviction independently of the accused.
Held: No. It is well-established in our jurisdiction that the
appellate court may, upon motion or motu proprio, dismiss an
appeal during its pendency if the accused jumps bail. This rule is
based on the rationale that appellants lose their standing in court
when they abscond.
2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure has clarified what civil
actions are deemed instituted in a criminal prosecution. When a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of
civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed
instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately
or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime
charged is deemed impliedly instituted in a criminal action; that
is, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the
right to institute it separately, or institutes it prior to the criminal
action. Hence, the subsidiary civil liability of the employer
under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code may be enforced
by execution on the basis of the judgment of conviction meted
out to the employee.
What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the
civil liability arising from the crime or delict per se, but not
those liabilities arising from quasi-delicts, contracts or quasi-
contracts. In fact, even if a civil action is filed separately, the ex
delicto civil liability in the criminal prosecution remains, and the
offended party may -- subject to the control of the prosecutor --
still intervene in the criminal action, in order to protect the
remaining civil interest therein.
The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers
uniformly declare that, strictly speaking, they are not parties to
the criminal cases instituted against their employees. Although
in substance and in effect, they have an interest therein, this fact
should be viewed in the light of their subsidiary liability. While
they may assist their employees to the extent of supplying the
latters lawyers, as in the present case, the former cannot act
independently on their own behalf, but can only defend the
accused.
As a matter of law, the subsidiary liability of petitioner now
accrues. Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code,
employers are subsidiarily liable for the adjudicated civil
liabilities of their employees in the event of the latters
insolvency. Thus, in the dispositive portion of its decision, the
trial court need not expressly pronounce the subsidiary liability
of the employer. In the absence of any collusion between the
accused-employee and the offended party, the judgment of
conviction should bind the person who is subsidiarily liable. In
effect and implication, the stigma of a criminal conviction
surpasses mere civil liability.
To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a
criminal case would enable them to amend, nullify or defeat a
final judgment rendered by a competent court. By the same
token, to allow them to appeal the final criminal conviction of
their employees without the latters consent would also result in
improperly amending, nullifying or defeating the judgment. The
decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding
and conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to the
formers civil liability, but also with regard to its amount. The
liability of an employer cannot be separated from that of the
employee.
The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to and
dependent on the pecuniary civil liability of the accused-
employee. Since the civil liability of the latter has become final
and enforceable by reason of his flight, then the formers
subsidiary civil liability has also become immediately
enforceable. Respondent is correct in arguing that the concept of
subsidiary liability is highly contingent on the imposition of the
primary civil liability.

Quasi-delict vs. Breach of Contract

Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co. 38 Phil 768 (October 14, 1918)

Facts: Jose Cangco, was in the employment of Manila Railroad Company in the
capacity of clerk. He lived in the pueblo of San Mateo, Rizal, which is located upon the
line of the defendant railroad company. Everyday, he comes by train to the company's
office in the city of Manila where he works and he uses a pass, supplied by the
company, which entitles him to ride the trains free of charge. One day, Jose Cangco
stepped off the train, but one or both of his feet came in contact with a sack of
watermelons causing his feet to slip making him fell violently on the platform. His body
rolled from the platform and was drawn under the moving car, where his right arm was
badly crushed and lacerated. It appears that after the plaintiff alighted from the train the
car moved forward possibly six meters before it came to a full stop. Cangco was drawn
from under the car in an unconscious condition, and it appeared that the injuries he had
received were very serious. He was brought at once to hospital in the city of Manila
where an examination was made and his arm was amputated. He instituted this
proceeding in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila to recover damages from
the defendant company. His action is founded upon the negligence of the servants and
employees of the defendant in placing the sacks of melons upon the platform and
leaving them so placed as to be a menace to the security of passenger alighting from
the trains. The trial judge concluded that, although negligence was attributable to the
defendant by reason of the fact that the sacks of melons were so placed as to obstruct
passengers passing to and from the cars, nevertheless, the plaintiff himself had failed to
use due caution in alighting from the coach and was therefore precluded from
recovering. Judgment was accordingly entered in favor of the defendant company, and
the plaintiff appealed.

Issues: 1. Whether or not Manila Railroad can excuse its liability upon the ground that
the breach was due to the negligence of their servant.

2. Whether Cango is negligent when he alight from the moving train.

Held:

(1) No. Failure to perform a contract cannot be excused upon the ground that the
breach was due to the negligence of a servant of the obligor, and that the latter
exercised due diligence in the selection and control of the servant. It cannot be doubted
that the employees of the railroad company were guilty of negligence in piling these
sacks on the platform in the manner above stated; that their presence caused the
plaintiff to fall as he alighted from the train; and that they therefore constituted an
effective legal cause of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff. It necessarily follows that
the defendant company is liable for the damage thereby occasioned unless recovery is
barred by the plaintiff's own contributory negligence. In resolving this problem it is
necessary that each of these conceptions of liability, to-wit, the primary responsibility of
the defendant company and the contributory negligence of the plaintiff should be
separately examined. It is important to note that the foundation of the legal liability of the
defendant is the contract of carriage, and that the obligation to respond for the damage
which plaintiff has suffered arises, if at all, from the breach of that contract by reason of
the failure of defendant to exercise due care in its performance. That is to say, its liability
is direct and immediate, differing essentially, in legal viewpoint from that presumptive
responsibility for the negligence of its servants, imposed by article 1903 of the Civil
Code, which can be rebutted by proof of the exercise of due care in their selection and
supervision. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to obligations arising ex
contractu, but only to extra-contractual obligations or to use the technical form of
expression, that article relates only to culpa aquiliana and not to culpa contractual. (2)
No. it is not negligence per se for a traveler to alight from a slowly moving train. As
pertinent to the question of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff in this
case the following circumstances are to be noted: The company's platform was
constructed upon a level higher than that of the roadbed and the surrounding ground.
The distance from the steps of the car to the spot where the alighting passenger would
place his feet on the platform was thus reduced, thereby decreasing the risk incident to
stepping off. The nature of the platform, constructed as it was of cement material, also
assured to the passenger a stable and even surface on which to alight. Furthermore,
the plaintiff was possessed of the vigor and agility of young manhood, and it was by no
means so risky for him to get off while the train was yet moving as the same act would
have been in an aged or feeble person. In determining the question of contributory
negligence in performing such act that is to say, whether the passenger acted prudently
or recklessly the age, sex, and physical condition of the passenger are circumstances
necessarily affecting the safety of the passenger, and should be considered. Again, it
may be noted that the place was perfectly familiar to the plaintiff as it was his daily
custom to get on and of the train at this station. There could, therefore, be no
uncertainty in his mind with regard either to the length of the step, which he was
required to take, or the character of the platform where he was alighting. Our conclusion
is that the conduct of the plaintiff in undertaking to alight while the train was yet slightly
under way was not characterized by imprudence and that therefore he was not guilty of
contributory negligence.

Fores vs. Miranda 105 Phil 266 (March 4, 1959)

Facts:

Miranda was riding a jeepney driven by Luga. While the vehicle was descending
Sta. Mesa bridge at high speed, the driver lost control. It swerved and hit the bridge
wall, resulting to injuries to the passengers and Miranda. Miranda broke some bones in
his right arm. The driver was charged with serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, pleaded guilty, and was sentenced accordingly. Fores, owner of the
jeepney, claimed that one day before the accident, she sold the vehicle to a certain
Sackerman. In the meantime, Miranda prays for moral damages.

Issues: Whether or not approval of the Public Service Commission is necessary for the
sale of a public service vehicle even without conveying therewith the authority to
operate the same. Whether or not an award for damages is proper.

Held: While the sale, without the required approval, is still valid and binding between
the parties, approval of the Public Service Commission is necessary for such sale, as
provided for 1.

2. Held: While the sale, without the required approval, is still valid and binding
between the parties, approval of the Public Service Commission is necessary for such
sale, as provided for by Sec. 20 of the Public Service Act (Commonwealth Act 146). As
to the second issue, the award of moral damages is not proper. It has been held that
moral damages are not recoverable in damage actions predicated on a breach of
contract of transportation, in view of Art. 2219 and 2220 of the new Civil Code: ART
2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following analogous cases: a criminal
offense resulting in physical injuries quasi delicts causing physical injuries ART. 2220.
Willfull injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court
should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule
applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
The exceptional rule in Article 1764 provides that where the injured passenger does not
die, moral damages are not recoverable unless it is proved that the carrier was guilty of
malice or bad faith. The mere carelessness of the carriers driver does not per se
constitute or justify an inference of malice or bad faith on the part of the carrier, as in the
case at bar. In the absence of statutory provision, it is presumed that the lawmakers
intended in article 2220 to limit recovery of moral damages to breaches of contract in
bad faith. The fact that negligence may be so gross as to amount to malice, must be
shown in evidence, and a carriers bad faith is not to be lightly inferred from a mere
finding that the contract was breached though negligence of the carriers employees.
The award for moral damages is eliminated